



# Meta Problems: Government Access to Data in the Metaverse

Simon Sun (sunchi@iu.edu)

S.J.D. Candidate, Indiana University Maurer School of Law

Atta Tantratian (attantra@iu.edu)

S.J.D. Candidate, Indiana University Maurer School of Law

Mar Diez Henao (mardiezhena097@gmail.com)

RegTech Analyst, ECIX Tech


## 1 Research Question

The Metaverse offers boundless possibilities for users, ... **yet concurrently presents new avenues for... CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES.**

Given the following activities happened in the Metaverse:

- Abuse and harassment
- Drugs dealing
- Child pornography screening
- Money laundering using digital currencies


**Metaverse** is commonly understood as an interconnected realm of virtual landscapes and augmented reality domains, facilitating user interactions of diverse forms.



**A research question arises: Which search standard should apply when the government accesses your data in the Metaverse?**

## However!

**3** Due to prevailing scalability concerns, a complete DAO is an ideal, where achieving a fully decentralized DAO is an ongoing journey. Today's norm remains the utilization of centralized, private storages from **THIRD PARTIES.**



## 2 Ideally!

**The governance of Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) would avoid the 4th Amendment privacy concerns.**

- In a DAO, personal information or transaction details are typically stored on a blockchain. Blockchains are **decentralized, pseudonymized, and transparent** by design, so the data isn't "given" to a singular third party and identities are secured.

From: 0xb26370...4fd55407 *Who?*

Interact With (To): 0x70916c...93A0a87D

Tokens Transferred: **From** 0xb26370...4fd55407 **To** 0x70916c...93A0a87D

For 879.999 (\$333)

Value: 0 ETH (\$0.00)

Transaction Fee: 0.00161699... ETH (\$2.99)

Gas Price: 29.80694... Gwei (0.000000029806 ETH)

- **The notion of control is instrumental here.** This creates the user's ability to control its data, assets, and identity.

### Case Review:


- In *U.S. v. Gratkowski* (2020), law enforcement subpoenaed Coinbase, a crypto exchange platform, and obtained access to Gratkowski's identity without a warrant.
  - The court held that the defendant lacked a privacy interest in his personal data (1) located on Coinbase and (2) located directly on the blockchain. **We disagree** as it disregards the critical distinction between Blockchain and third party crypto exchange, lowering the standard of a search.

## 4 The 4th Amendment & The 3rd-Party Doctrine

For criminal prosecutions, law enforcement may need to obtain data about you from these third parties, giving rise to concerns regarding your expectation of privacy!

The **4th Amendment** requires that law enforcement obtains a warrant upon probable cause from court before conducting search. However, there exists **3rd-Party Doctrine** exempting search warrant for information held by 3rd parties.

**The doctrine assumes that you have no expectation of privacy over information you already disclosed to someone else.**



### Property

Historically, the Supreme Court's analysis of the Fourth Amendment relied on doctrines of "common-law trespass" in property law, such as in *Olmstead v. U.S.* (1928).

### Expectation of Privacy

Later recognizing that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," the Supreme Court in *Katz v. U.S.* (1967). The Fourth Amendment protects the "expectations of privacy consisting of the actual expectation (subjective) and one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable' (objective)."

### Property-based privacy

In response, textualist justices insisted that property is a basis for Fourth Amendment consideration, clarifying that the *Katz's* privacy test is merely an addition, not a substitution.

## 5 Current Regulations

To extend the 4th Amendment protection to include electronic communications, Congress passed the **Stored Communications Act (SCA)** in 1986. **(Too old!)**

**Search rules** under the SCA

- To access your **communications data** (180 days old or less), the police need a **warrant upon probable cause** from court!
- **However, for other data**, the police merely need a **subpoena** (easier to obtain). The following become less protected data:

**Older or opened communications data** "read" "seen" 180+ d/o

**Personal info.** of you and your friends

- Name
- Date of birth
- Bank account
- etc.

Your data captured by XR devices

- Room environment
- Biometrics and possible inferences

Note that while the SCA protects data at rest, the **Wiretap Act** protects data in transit.

- To **intercept** your communications, the police need a **warrant upon probable cause!**
- **But will this rule apply to police patrolling in the Metaverse?**

**Gap: As the SCA generally applies to phone/internet service providers--your data held by third parties like crypto exchanges and device manufacturers are less likely protected by the SCA.**

## Our Proposal: THE THEORY OF CONTROL

We believe the search standard under the 4th Amendment consideration in the Metaverse should focus on **the notion of control.**



The reasons are that:


- 1) "Control" is an underlying component discussed in court decisions.
- 2) "Control" is instrumental to those who envision the Metaverse being a DAO.

We propose that "Control" in the Metaverse (C) directly correlates with the Government's search standard (S):


- When C increases, S proportionally rises.  $C \uparrow = S \uparrow$
- Users maintain different levels of control, depending on the space they choose.

1) The degree of decentralization

The higher degree of decentralization = the higher control



2) The nature of spaces and activities



### HYPOTHETICAL CASE

A user built a **personal space** for their **self-explorations**. Although the platform is run by a third party, the user **implemented most controls** available (such as creating a world that can only be accessed through an NFT-key and trusting a platform that is fully administratively decentralized).

- As such, regardless of what activities the user did or items the user had in that space, **the government cannot ask the third party to disclose such information without a warrant upon probable cause.**