

- Q6 - He says the FBB part independence is good, for it "permits it to act as a buffer (or inertial force) against the democratic political process, which appears to have a substantial inflationary bias in the United States today."
- Q8 - on raising the debt ceiling in Congress - a practice that should be abandoned.  
"The annual 'loophole' exemptions to the 'permanent' debt ceiling made by Congress involve mainly political record-making." - (but also harmful to policy in some ways)
- Q27 - Buzg presents a fiscal overview: "But the broad view tends to be lost in the complex appropriations process. Even presidential tax proposals generally move slowly; months + even years elapse before a divided, bickering Congress finally acts on complex major tax bills, while economists + administrators spend writing their hands in frustration."

## G. F. Bach #2

- Q118 - Became in mind that this 1963-64 tax cut was controversial as a policy matter - a real innovation.
- "After the Kennedy tax message of January 1963, it had taken a full year to convince doubters within the administration, among the public, and most important, in Congress, before the tax cut did become a reality."
- Q46ff: "The Need for Coordination" (ch 3)  
Q47 4 goals are widely accepted: high output, rapid or gradual, a reasonably stable price level, rough equality in BGP  
- and it's hard to balance all of these at once.
- (He says almost nothing about taxes in 1966-68.)
- Q155 - "The Johnson budget of 1968 was passed by Congress only after a year of uncertainty on the part of the President followed by almost a year + a half of bitter controversy between the administration."
- Q156 - "As late as 1969, Representative Wilbur Mills .... still spoke of a balanced budget as a desirable norm in its own right."

## G. F. Bach #3

- Q156 - a problem (conclusion generally on fiscal policymaking since 1930s).  
"The inside lag for fiscal policy (the delay between actual events in the economy and policy action) is long + uncertain."
- And he goes in to talk of tax + approps processes.
- "Though there have been some successes in achieving timely fiscal action, political delay + organizational reality offer little hope for flexible statutory fiscal action under present policymaking arrangements. Indeed, the White House, the Treasury, and the Bureau of the Budget on the one hand + Congress on the other have frequently become involved in bitter controversy; the 1967-68 conflict over the need for a tax increase and/or expenditure control is a classic example."
- Q158 (He does blame admin footdragging as well as Congressional)
- Q194-201 - He has a part of marginal recommendations here (of the expected sort)



Edward C. Banfield, "Revenue Sharing in Theory + Practice"  
The Public Interest, No. 23, Spring 1971, pp 33-45

Q 41 - The most recent estimate is that categorical grant programs = 550 in number.

P 41 - Interest groups will defend the present system (over giving discretion to SAC officials).  
(It's easier to deal with a few Congress DC line items)

Q 41-42 "Congressmen--especially those on important committees--are fond of categorical programs for at least two reasons. One is that they constitute answers to the perennial question: What have you done for me lately? ~~XX~~ A narrowly defined category is ideal from this standpoint. It is custom-made to suit the requirements of some key group of constituents and the Congressman can plainly label it "from me to you." Revenue sharing, whether 'general' or 'special,' altogether lacks this advantage. It gives benefits not to constituents directly but in wholesale lots to state and local politicians who will package them for retail distribution under their own labels, taking all of the credit."

p. 42 "Congressmen also like categorical programs because of the opportunities they afford to interfere in administration and thus to secure special treatment, or at least the appearance of it, for constituents among whom...state and local as well as federal agencies sometimes figure prominently. These opportunities  
(contd)

Banfield PI #2

are plentiful because the Congressmen see to it that 'ifs,' 'ands,' and 'buts,' are written into the legislation in the right places, and because administrators are well aware that every year they must respond in public to whatever questions may be asked in appropriations and other hearings. Wanting to stay on the right side of those members of Congress with whom they must deal, administrators frequently ask them for 'advice.' Perhaps it is not too much to say that the categorical grant system constitutes a last line of defense against what many Congressmen regard as the usurpation of their function by the executive branch.

"As this implies, the present coldness of Congress to President Nixon's revenue-sharing proposals is not to be explained solely or perhaps even mainly on the ground that he is Republican and Congress is Democratic. The crucial fact is that his proposals would involve a large-scale shift of power from Congress to the White House. No Congress would like that, although sooner or later one may feel compelled to accept it."

Edward C Bayfield + James P. Wilson, City Politics

p. 95 "To a large extent, the choice between an at-large and a district system turns on the conception that one has of the nature of the public interest. Those who think (as middle-class and upper-class people usually do) that the "city as a whole" has an interest which should be paramount will tend to favor the at-large system. On the other hand, those who think (as the lower class people generally do) that politics is a struggle for personal, neighborhood, or other special advantages will favor the district system."

p. 95-96. Boston city council "has no real function in city government."

I can't find any good material about the decline of city councils generally.

James D. Barber, "Leadership Strategies for Legislative Party Cohesion,"  
28 JOP 347-67, May 1966

Just cite this, nonspecifically, as a picture of a legislature with strong parties.



Anthony Barker + Michael Rush, The President of Parliament and His Reformation  
(London, George Allen + Unwin Ltd., 1970) - OMF 15 970 B

- based on 111 <sup>single</sup> MP interviews (& some select other MP interviews) - H/C membership as of 1/1/67.

Q175. Most mail from constituencies is one personal case or problems rather than opinions on local or national issues.  
175-76. "The most common personal cases were about soc sec & housing esp. in mainly working class constituencies."  
176 - urban MPs offer surgery services with greater frequency than rurals.

Q177: Do MPs try to dog themselves in? (Some apparently do) (eg the 1964 & 1966 frobs?)  
"One 1964 Labour entrant was willing to describe his careful plans for relating his Westminster activity to his constituency's newspaper's headline (sic)...."  
"At least two of our interviewed Members are convinced that they held onto their seats in the election of 1959 & 1964 when their respective parties did badly, because of the personal reputation for 'welfare' they had built up in their constituencies."

Barker + Rush #2

Footnote of 173-204 for a general reference on constituency survey  
(incl letters and surgery) } Caution  
Generally

Q181: "We defined the surgery as a regular, open session at which the Member makes himself available to anyone without a prior arrangement being necessary...."  
182 - all but a tiny handful of MPs were holding these in 1967.

Q264-278 - a gd section on union-sponsored MPs (can cite this)  
265: "...the Unions and the Co-operative Century actually seek selection by Constituency Labour Parties (CLP) of candidates they have already themselves chosen + whom they are willing to sponsor financially."

Michael Barone, Grant Ujifusa & Douglas Matthews, The Almanac of American Politics  
p. 53, Cal 6, William S. Mailliard:

"Since 1952 the district's congressman has been Republican William S. Mailliard, a wealthy member of an old Calif family. For many years Mailliard had a generally liberal voting record. He had no trouble at the polls, winning elections by large majorities in what it, by a small margin at least, a Democratic district. More recently, Mailliard seems caught between the increasing conservatism of the state's Republican party and the increasing liberalism of his constituency.

"After Reagan's victory, M's voting record became noticeably more conservative. Because of this, he has been spared the tough conservative primary opposition that Paul McCloskey has confronted in the 11th. But Mailliard's move to the right has not gone unnoticed in the 6th district. In 1968 he received 73% of the vote, but in 1970 he won only 53%—a highly unusual drop for an incumbent of such long standing. Much of the difference must be attributed to the war issue. San Francisco and Marin are both antiwar strongholds; but M., who is the ranking R on the House Foreign Affairs Com, has supported the Nixon Admin's war policy. In the 6th district, at least, that position is a sure vote-loser."

Barone et al #2

Page 479-480. Frank Thompson Jr. NJ 4

"In 1966, the 4th was altered drastically by redistricting; it lost Burlington County and gained Hunterdon, Warren, and Sussex. Thompson's performance at the polls since 1966 is a case study of how an incumbent congressman, out of line with his district's ideological persuasions, can become unbeatable. In 1966, Thompson carried Mercer by 23,000 votes and lost the three new counties by 4,600, winning reelection with 56% of the votes. He then survived a district-wide drop in his vote two years later. In 1970, the Congressman carried Mercer County by 20,000 votes and the rest of the district by 6,000, finishing with 58%. The drop in Mercer resulted from the attempt of his hard-line conservative opponent to exploit the racial unrest which had developed in Trenton. But for four years T. had been making friends in Hunterdon, Warren, and Sussex, busy doing the kind of chores that congressmen do. In this case, T. concerned himself with the interests of dairy farmers at the Department of Agriculture. The results of his efforts were clear when the results came in from the 4th's ~~northern~~ northern counties."



Brian Barry, Political Argument

p. 239. He quotes Humes's Political Essays, p. 68: "It is, therefore, a just political maxim that every man must be supposed a knave....."

pp. 237-243. He makes the general contrast between "power-concentration" and "power-diffusion" views of politics. By the latter, (p. 241) "nobody is fit to be trusted with absolute power (whether a single individual or a number large enough to form a majority within a state)." By the former (pp. 241-242), "the risks inherent in concentrating power in a certain man or group of men are worth taking because of the advantages this has." planning vs. pricing, etc. There are long intellectual traditions connected with both.

237-243

Barry PA #2

p. 250ff Here he refutes the B-T view on logrolling, but he has a more detailed treatment in a later footnote. Here: He puts the question as "Does Majority Voting Over-Provide Public Goods?".....And he shoots down the B-T view of logrolling (leading to overspending).... This is quite complicated, and I think I can ignore it.

p. 265. Assume that votes for reps. can be bought and sold but all bribery of reps once ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ elected is prohibited. "If office-seekers are motivated by self-interest..then they will promise anything and offer bribes to the electors up to the maximum they can lay their hands on. When elected they will ignore their promises, fill their pockets from the public treasury and emigrate. ."

pp. 268 ff. Here Barry goes into information costs, arguing that B-T have ignored this whole question. "Given the level of info achieved by most voters it ~~may~~ may turn out that a very simple constitution visibly putting the power to do things and the responsibility for not doing them into one set of hands is the best solution available." .....

p. 272.

Barry PA #3

p. 272 "...let me now definitely argue that bargaining costs and info costs, reinforcing one another's influence, may be expected to make for greater irrationality in a power-diffusing system than in a power-concentrating one in spite of the greater total amount of information likely to be generated by it. The crux is that the greater total of info will not be evenly distributed among those affected by decisions." protects the status quo.....

p. 273. "If a group has a permanent org in being to advance its interests (e.g. a trade association or a local residents' association) the marginal cost of fighting an extra campaign is quite low. If these groups are the gainers, groups with the opposite characteristics are the losers: large, amorphous, inarticulate groups, especially when they have no permanent organization or promote common interests, have less influence in a power-diffusing system. In other words, public interests lose out to private or special interests!"

p. 275. "A power-concentrating system makes up for the shortage of info and effort among citizens by economizing on these scarce commodities: a smaller total amount of info and effort goes further. There are two aspects to this, which I shall call visibility and accountability." visibility: people watch the mayor or party. accountability: people can judge "states of affairs" and not policies. This is the ins-outs argument (Key, Kramer, Downs).

pp. 268-279 on info costs is generally useful.



Barry PA #4

Footnote T, pp. 317-318: "The Explanation of the 'Pork Barrel'"

He denies the B-T claim that logrolling (Producing over-spending) results from majority rule itself. Barry says rather that the phenon is connected not with majority voting but with a requirement of unanimity; he says the latter is more a unanimity system than UK.....

He says there are 2 ways, supplementing each other, that ov r-spending logrolling comes about in systems that ~~XXXX~~ approach unanimity.

p. 318: 1) Take Congress (like a unanimity system": "Suppose that a bill will, if passed, benefit the bulk of each Congressman's constituents; why should not a Congressman who is (by himself or with a group of others) able to hold up the bill by his strategic position along the legislative pipeline, threaten to do just that unless he gets another base in his constituency? On this theory the most 'pork' will go to the constituents of those Congressmen who are in the best position to hold the Adm and the rest of Congress to ransom by threatening to block legislation and appropriations of national importance. That this seems to fit the facts well may be verified by anyone who cares to count the number of bases in Georgia."

Barry PA#5

p. 318 2) "The second explanation of the 'pork barrel', which as I said supplements the first, introduces imperfect info...~~XXXXXXXXXX~~...it is perhaps easy to guess that log-rolling under conditions of imperfect info will tend to produce over-investment in projects which yield specific benefits to determinate groups, because such benefits are highly visible to the beneficiaries whereas costs are not so visible to the general taxpayer. The Veterans' Bonus, which was vetoed by every President between the wars, and passed over his veto, is an excellent example of this process though it is strictly a transfer of income rather than a public good.....It clearly cannot be explained as a case of a majority of constituencies filling their pockets at the expense of the rest; on the contrary the strength of the Veterans was (and is) precisely that they are present in about equal proportions in every constituency. Tariffs are another example where the cost to the rest of the community was ignored and only the benefit to the protected producer noticed." And he quotes Schattschneider....

OK. This is good.



# Brian Barry, PA - again on BOT

outcome - a pointer  
from game for every one

Q250 the logically BOT.

251 Barry says the over-generous idea is correct only if

- a) the original 51 don't sign a contract to stick together
- b) if when defection does take place, the new maj always leaves intact existing agreements

253 Barry says that their assumption will lead to a)  $\infty$  of (1 + anarchy),

- b) different & unpredictable equilibria (anarchy), c) no result at all, just an endless series of equilibria under the work of the last (anarchy)

So the Hobbesian solution is rational.

"If we require trust, but hardly altruism, for all concerned to settle on some scheme for which all will benefit compared with the alternatives of deadlock or anarchy."

"Trust" has a cash value in terms of future games.

255 "... without some common standards... rational agents will be unable to negotiate with one another because there will be no stability in their expectations." ✓

## Barry PA #2 (reprise)

Q255-56 - how about an obvious solution  
(Hume + Schelling)  
(status quo, equality etc.)

Q260: He points out that they ~~refuse~~ don't take info costs into account.

(Wherever possible in a  
you leg assembly  
to be unity)

Q272-3 There is general anti-Bainfield point. (what info needs  
multiplying faster than info supplies are power diffusing system)

Q275 credibility & accountability points.



Raymond ~~Baner~~ <sup>Baner</sup> et al., American Bankers' & Cotton Co. (1964 - Thornton, NY)

The old tariff: maybe parties were a way of overcoming this politics (DL = non-partisan interest) <sup>also policy.</sup>

But parties (IKE, JFK) still have to use a lot of energy in tariff matters

Q12) The old tariff: a pressure toward upward revision (correction thru compensation) since the rates tended to rise (a long-term trend) from 1789-1930.

Q17) Rayburn Trade Act of 1934: gives exec the power to raise & lower the old tariff rates by negotiating reciprocal concessions in trade treaties.

Q17-12: "By this act, on the surface a purely administrative modification, Congress passed on to the president much of the tariff-making power. In so doing, it not only changed the entire politics of the tariff but also reversed a 150-year trend toward protection."

Q25 1028 economists petitioned the Pres to veto Smoot Hootley; and the American Bankers' Association denounced it!

## BP+D #2

Q37 Why have Congress given up the tariff-making power? (Why do the aggressors now in the 1980s?) — a dilemma for the Congress. "The complexity in which he deals is far too, neither personal or ideological." But on the tariff issue the danger came to outweigh the benefits.

by 1930 "the demands became such that even ordinary honesty + a workman of a legislature became hard to maintain."

"To protect their freedom, congressmen needed to reduce their power to be immediately helpful to their constituents."

— "The Congressional work load which the tariff generated also had become onerous."

Q38 "And so it came about that tariff-making became a scandal and a farce."

PT There came about "a consensus in Congress... that Congress should fight the battle of the tariff at one step removed from the final decision. A Congressman, no matter how keen his desire to help the big market-makers, does not want to be given the right of voting them an increase in tariff rates. He prefers to be in the position of being allowed merely to place a speech in their favor in The CR as an expression of his remarks & to appear as a witness before the Tariff Commission, free to indulge the irresponsibility afforded those who do not participate in the final decision."

## BD+P #3

Q63-65 gives the account

Q64 - Rayburn's personal appeal on the floor (1953) against voting for an open rule Amendment on tariff bill. — Rayburn won — closed rule won 193-192! (It almost got away!)

Q201 - on the tendency to write letters:

They quote a paper full showing that only about 20% of the public claim ever to have written to a legislator or any issue.

✓ { But here, in BDP sample, 3/4 of these businessmen said they had communicated with Congress on some issue other than foreign trade policy. BDP sample = heads of business orgs. (This skews it)



BD+P #4

P 247: Today: "The individual representative can placate a local industry by writing to the Tariff Commission about an escape-clause proceeding or to the Committee on Reciprocity Information when a trade agreement is about to be negotiated. But letters are cheap. He can also make a speech on the floor of Congress or before a trade association. When done his bit for local industry in this way, he is not necessarily called upon to try to translate local interests into the law of the land."

P 248 - Big industries have only one local region.

So: if Congressmen don't get "pressured," they still have to worry about the effects of their votes!

But BDP point is good: it's devilishly hard to know what P.O. is.

BD+P #5

On P 6's:

P 724: "It then came as a surprise to discover that the lobbies were on the whole poorly financed, ill-managed, out of contact with Congress, and at best only marginally effective in supporting tendencies and measures which already had behind them considerable Congressional support from other sources."

What I have to say is quite compatible with this.

BD+P #6 - Inter section

CHOICES ✓

P 405: "A congressman must decide what to make of his job."

P 406-07: "It is a cliché that the main job of a congressman is to be re-elected. There is much truth to it, but there are various ways of getting re-elected. Somehow, the congressman must do things which will secure for him the esteem and/or support of significant elements of his constituency. This he can achieve in many ways. He can seek for himself a reputation as a national leader, which may sometimes impress his constituents. He can work at press relations, creating + stimulating news stories + an image of activity. He can be a local civic leader, attending + speaking at community functions. He can make a reputation for himself in the field of legislation. In some states, he can be a party wheel horse and rely on the organization to back him. He can get people jobs + do social work + favors. He can become a promoter of <sup>certain</sup> local industries. He can conduct investigations + set himself up as a defender of public morals. He can take well-publicized trips to international hot spots. He can befriend moneyed interests to assume himself a well-financed campaign. He can befriend labor unions, veterans' orgs, or other groups with a numerous clientele + many votes. The one thing he cannot do is much of all these things. He must choose among them; he has to be a certain kind of congressman."



BP+D #7

Dexter section

they feel as if Congressmen making choices  
not being pressured.

Q414: "Congressmen feel much freer than most outsiders think. They need not be unduly constrained by demands from constituents, interest groups, or party."

Q418-19: One point that a Congressman must relate himself to interests in his constituency. What interests do they represent? "They cannot give attention & energy equally to all. They must find groups which have money, votes, media of communication, influence, and political business which a congressman can further. A congressman must seek to make himself an important figure to some such groups within his constituency. These may change over time. A congressman elected by labor votes may throw off his harness by turning to business support. But, at any one moment, a congressman must relate to some key groups within his constituency, for a constituency is a social structure, not an amorphous mass."

The congressman creates his own pressures, by giving interest in particular areas.

Q421: "The job is largely what the congressman makes it."

Scott.

BP+D #8

Dexter

Q426: "A legislative enactment is seldom a clean decision of important issues. It is usually a verbal formula which the majority of congressmen find adequate as a basis for their continuing & plying struggle."

Q430: "Congressmen ... will often propose and/or vote for some measure with the intent of demonstrating that they are alert to their constituents' needs, tacitly understanding that it will be amended in conference."

Q431 Confirmation: On Congress: "Its published procedures are sufficiently complicated to make it often hard to tell exactly what stand a congressman had taken on a particular issue."

Q432 Some put themselves on the record on both sides of an issue.



- p 446 Ray vs Adam a clash of personality types: "one oriented to particular relations with persons and another which abstracts from persons to principles." ✓
- p 447 "The impression we got from our talk with congressmen and their assistants was that the direct interest of their constituents in potential losses in jobs and in business motivated them more strongly than did protectionist considerations of national interest." y
- p 449 imparty now: "...no one expressed a feeling that the criterion for a right tariff stand for himself as a congressman was party interest." ✓

## Conclusions

They talk about how their findings are felt to be Conservative, + that they're knocking down the old PG model.

- p 484 "Our presentation of the congressman as one who is part of a transactional process, who can himself signal what communications he wants, and who has a good deal of latitude in those which he leads is not precisely in accord with the stereotyped picture?" ✓

Samuel H. Beer, "The British Legislature & The Problem of Responsible Government,"  
in Elie Haack (ed.)

It makes 2 relevant points:

p. 34: "The increasing specificity of the essential governmental decision" helps to account for growth of exec power. I.e. in socio ec affairs as well as in military, parl. general rules won't do.

Q 46-48 - Here he's giving a different ex - making the fit that rel-constituent relations (of a U.S. sort) can help to whittle consent by explaining complex programs to constituents, giving feedback & criticism, etc.  
— He'd like a fixed parliament system, somewhat like the US, with more stuff etc.



Murray L. Benedict, Farm Policies of the United States, 1790-1950  
(NY, 20<sup>th</sup> Century Fund, 1953) Nde 83 953 B

tariffs - ag & textiles.

— Cleveland's 1894 bill was ruined by Senate logrolling in which Keas participated  
(eg, the Ca. sugar senators)

(181) - farm bloc organized in Congress in 1921.  
— declined after Cyus (1923)!

— hasn't got what I need.

In fact, none of the farm books goes very spiritually into  
present relations between aggs & Congress.

John F. Bibby and Roger H. Davidson, On Capitaol Hill: Studies in the Leg Process 92d

ch. 2 "Campaigns and Elections: Two Cases"

no 1: "I guess I was Just Too Liberal" (Senator Joseph Tydings of Md)

p. 25 ..on election nite: Tydings mused to report ers: "I guess I was just too liberal...or at least they thought I was."

p. 50 the search for explanations...

"Tydings himself tended to blame the gun lobby, which in turn was quite willing to take the credit. 'Nobody in his right mind is going to take on that issue again,' one Tydings strategist admitted." (and indeed no one has) But there were lots of other things too.



J. Blondel, Comparative Legislatures. Joe LaP ms, intended as PH. 5b in 1972.

p. 16. "When theorists began thinking about legislatures, they faced a situation which was wholly ~~60680166266C~~ different from that which confronts most modern governments. Locke and Montesquieu looked at societies in which the involvement of the State in social and economic matters was minimal if not non-existent. For them, statutes were not education or housing acts; they covered problems of private property, individual rights, family law, in short the regulation of private relationships between individuals. Slowly, the balance tilted increasingly, in the 19th and 20th centuries, towards public legislation establishing new agencies and regulating social and economic matters. But ~~XXXX~~ conclusion was not drawn that this entailed a different type of involvement of legislatures."

This is important. Maybe I shd look at the 2d treatise, to get a sense of what Locke had in mind as "rule-making."

On studying legislatures, in general:

p. 34: "The study of legislatures is not, by itself, interesting; it is interesting only if we can throw some light on the question of the influence of legislatures on the political process and on the ways in which this influence is exercised."

*p141-42 - He says that UK MP's get about as much mail per citizen as US Congress do (6)*

Blondel #2

p. 213 "The US Congress appears much 'stronger' than many legislatures, but its influence is mostly negative and part of its strength stems from the fact that open disagreements with the executive are well-documented, that most of the analysis is conducted on a yearly basis, and that the executive tries out ideas on Congress at a much earlier stage than European and Commonwealth executives do on their legislatures."

Jean Blondel et al., "Legislative Behaviour: Some Steps towards a Cross-National Measurement," 5 Government and Opposition 67-85,  
Winter 1969-1970

OK, but not for my purposes

(5 countries examined, not incl US;  
= UK, Ireland, Sweden, France, India)



John M<sup>o</sup>rton Blum, The Republican Roosevelt.... E757 B58 CCL

ch. 6 "President, Congress, and Control"

75-24] His most valued leg. enterprise: RR regulation (though also he went after, and got, meat-packing reg, pure food and drug standards, navy expansion).....

p 75. On RR legislation: "Roosevelt's first negotiation necessitated the sacrifice of his announced intention to direct a revision of the tariff. It depended, however, on the continuing threat of tariff revision."

75ff. So he played games with the tariff....

He used tariff vs Congress (Cool) although he wasn't really  
burning to do much with tariff reform anyway

Richard Bolling, House Out of Order (NY: Dutton, 1965)

A thing of the usual reform suggestions, but  
perhaps most of all he wants an internal power shakeup

P 238 → use of caucuses, + increase powers of House party leader

P 238 ff / (This is a recipe for stronger parties)

his plan:

P 241 "The party leader will become the true leader of a legislative team that will produce a coherent + co-ordinated legislative program."

(sustained by majority rule of caucuses)



James T. Bonnen, "The Distribution of Benefits from Cotton Price  
Supports," in Samuel B. Chase (ed.), Brotherhood in  
Rural Expenditure Analysis (Brookings, DC, 1968)

This is a gl important study; and apparently the studies of the  
distribution (as opposed to efficiency) important of ag programs are  
very rare. This looks at the 1964 cotton <sup>study</sup> program

Average benefit per farm is much higher in West than in SE  
(West = where it's very efficient)

And, overall, benefit accruing to farmers varies with allotment size,  
cropping & high Gini inequality index

Bernard E. Brown, "Pressure Politics in France," 18 JLP 702-719, 1956

There is an interest group generally.

Dr. Assembly p. 715: ~~The committee system is a device of the Assembly.~~  
"The special committee of each chamber invariably attract deputies particularly interested in their subject matter. The Labor Committee is almost wholly staffed by pro-labor deputies of the Communist, Socialist, and Populist parties. anti-clericals + pro-clericals alike are drawn to the Education Committee; peasant deputies gravitate towards the Agricultural Committee. The fact that committees are unrepresentative of the Assembly as a whole invites attention from the pressure groups concerned with the work of each committee and accounts for the frequent lack of accord between the committees and the govt of the day. For example, in May, 1950, the Education Committee supported the claims of teachers in opposing economy cuts by the Government. Similarly, in January, 1953, the Pensions Committee, always sensitive to pleas from veterans' groups, unanimously recommended that the Assembly reject the Govt's program for veterans! In effect, the committee system enables pressure groups to building a parliamentary base of operations."

Bernard Brown #2

P 717: He comments on elections.

→ a form of vote in 1951 election

CGA = ag group, which supported a lot of cand.

(This sounds like Italy)

P 718: He says that pg's ~~are~~ had more clout in the 3rd Republic.  
— where it was local interest groups.

P 718 in the 3rd: "Most deputies ardently championed the cause of interest groups in their district without waiting to be asked." \*

4th: The big parties stronger 1945-47.

Backsliding after 1947, but pg's still weaker (and kicked system to dept with them districts)  
than in 3rd (though now stronger than in US or UK).



E. Cary Brown, "Fiscal Policy in the Thirties: A Reappraisal," 46 AER 857-879, 1956

Q 483 (in the reprint version, where counts unknown)

"The direct effects on aggregate full-employment demand of the fiscal policy undertaken by all three levels of govt was clearly relatively stronger in the Thirties than in 1929 in only two years — 1931 and 1936 — with 1931 markedly higher than 1936 . . . . There were years in which large payments were made under the veterans' adjusted compensation programs — programs passed by Congress over the vigorous opposition of both the Hoover + Roosevelt administrations."

a little but in some other years, i.e.

England, a poor record

James Bryce, The American Commonwealth, Vol I (Putnam's, NY, 1959)

p 40 - House seats are highly prized, and there's an ethos that they ought to be voted.  
40-41 { "An ambitious congressman is therefore forced to think day + night of his re-nomination, and to secure it not only by procuring, if he can, grants from the Federal Treasury for local purposes, and places for the relatives + friends of the local wire-pullers who control the nominating conventions, but also by sedulously 'nursing' the constituency during the vacations. No habit could more effectively discourage noble ambition or check the growth of a class of accomplished statesmen."

— Rotation exp. prominent in the West.

p 41 - he doesn't like the idea that a member should be "absolutely dependent on his constituents".

p 42 "There is no country whose representatives are more dependent on popular opinion, more ready to trim their sails to the last breath of it."



James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent

ch. 10 "Simple Majority Voting" is the section on logrolling.. Ok

But I can't really use this book. It's way off the charts, with its assumptions about voter preferences, voter information, etc.

Example: They seem to be saying that pork barrel logrolling will occur when :  
p. 143-44: "It would ~~XXXX~~ appear that any governmental activity which benefits specific individuals or groups in a discriminatory fashion and which is financed from general taxation would fit our model well. It is not, of course, necessary that the revenues employed in paying for the projects be collected equally from all voters, either in terms of tax rates or tax collections. The minimum necessity is that the benefits from public activity be significantly more concentrated or localized than the costs. This is a very weak condition, and many budgetary patterns seem to meet it....." And the whole thing gets accentuated if the taxes are indirect, etc.

I think the best thing to do here is to ignore this rather than try to rebut it. I'm dealing with credit considerations, which have overwhelmingly to do with information flow (which is pretty much ignored here.)

Burman + Tullock #1 But more of the interesting Qs in photos admit of a (photo) graphical solution.

Q24 - How they turn the political process into a positional sum game

Q92 - single issue

Q1223 - Intro to vote trading ( $y > \text{vote held in time}$ )  
(this is really important, they say)

Q125 ✓ "If all intensities of preference are identical over all individuals + over all issues, no trading of votes is possible." (If not, then trade)

Q132: Major rule sans logrolling: gd ex. = referendum on a single issue (of the Calif. housing ex. ex.)  
(this ignores intensity of preferences)

Q135ff their road bldg model: ("equilibrium" = some overinvestment of resources)  
136 - a "Kantian" solution is one where everyone has a general preference, + you take the median of these ✓  
(Kantian rule = to civility vs. black power or white supremacy) → the argument is complex  
(Paul Douglas was a Kantian)

Q142 | Some alternatives are 1) a specific goal formula 2) delegation to a group

Burman + Tullock #2 Ch 10 is the key ch here ("Single Majority Voting") pp. 131 - 145

Q143. If more than majority is required, then fewer resources will go into road bldg.

Q144. They also predict a tax loophole system.

Q155. "In game-theory terms, logrolling is simply an indirect means of making side payments."  
Q157. How they say that an unanimous bill (single shot) is just like having no side payments.  
(i.e., a different outcome)

Q169 Conclusion: all this will lead to overinvestment in the public sector.

(but does it, really? US Congress?)

Q201 Again — single maj. rule → overinvestment in the public sector (by Pareto standards)  
"this is because the majority voting rule allows the individual in the decisive coalition to secure benefits from collective action without bearing the full marginal costs properly attributable to him."

Tullock + Burman - Comments

— assumes an agency relation (M.C. + voters) that's quite simplified — no info costs, apparently.  
— hence no focus on what's valuable to M.C.

PT doesn't come in.



James M. Buchanan, Public Finance in Democratic Process  
(UNC, 1967 - ~~42~~ Nja 42 967 B)

p 173 - Who Chooses for the Collectivity?

"Influently analysts have often assumed that political decisions are taken by some central decision-making entity that is effectively divorced from individual citizens ....  
... Despite the warnings of Knut Wicksell + a few others, economists + political scientists alike have carried on their work as if the despot still reigns supreme, as if a single decision-making entity makes political choices for the whole collectivity, as if these choices are not really influenced by citizens."

his Ch 13 is good : "Some Preliminary Research Results" - on ex. & pbs.

Charles S. Bullock III, "House Careerists: Changing Patterns of Longevity and Attrition," 66 APSR 1295-1300, Dec. 1962,

p. 1296. Gives % of House members, 1911-1971, in each Congress, who have served ten or more terms.....

gradually rises, from 2.8% in 1911 to 20.0%(all time high) in 1971....

p. 1297ff. He finds that the proportion of old-timers leaving the House because of GE and PE defeats (both) has been higher in the 1960's than before.....



Charles S. Bullock III, "Freshman Committee Assignments and Re-election in the United States House of Representatives," 66 APSR 996-1007, Sept. 1972

1947-67 ~~XXXXX~~ freshmen members.

Good analysis. This takes frosh, marginal and nonmarginal, and also looks at committee assignments of presumed electoral benefit (by various reasonable defs.) (though I'd do it differently). He concluded that there's no tendency to throw good assignments to marginal frosh (over nonmarginals). This analysis can be challenged; 55% = marginal? Also, how about Bella, Scheuer, etc.? Doesn't everyone need a nesting place at the start? (protection from primary as well as G<sup>W</sup> trouble?)

p. 1004. How about re-election? (treated dichotomously) Take it by committee, looking at the favored vs. unfavored "interested" frosh: the data "fails to produce a single statistically significant difference in the re-election rates of marginal freshmen depending upon their committee assignments, although there is an indication that in the House as a whole, as well as for Democrats, there is some relationship between assignment of interested to Interior and their likelihood of re-election." "Rarely do committee assignments seem to help the narrowly elected win second terms. This conclusion draws additional support from the finding that marginal novices initially assigned to Duty Committees were about as likely to be re-elected as were freshmen assigned elsewhere."

Bullock 1972 #2

1005-06. He goes on to look at vote %, to see if the favored run better second time around. Answer: generally no.

1005. "Thus committee assignments do not appear to figure prominently on the bids of narrowly elected freshmen for sophomore terms."

1006. "The fate of the narrowly elected seems rarely to be linked with committee assignments. ~~XXXXXX~~ Defeat most frequently occurs as a repercussion of events at the national rather than the district level. Good works on committee and constituency service seem insecure moorings amidst the ebb and flow of national electoral trends."

1006. He suggest that they have great role freedom. "Congressmen may be able to pay proper homage to the Madisonian ideal of constituency interest representation by processing casework, visiting the disttit, expressing concern for district problems, and making a display of their attempts to resolve such problems. These actions are less demanding (now p. 1007) than what some--and perhaps most--marginal congressmen believe to be necessary in order to win re-election. Moreover these tasks can be handled by staff members, thus allowing congressmen more time for other matters."

*This ignores the variance problem. Is there much in the way they act? You can get QC out of lot of committees, and your state delegation will also help.*

Ronald Butt, The Power of Parliament (London, Constable, 1967) Omf17 1967 967B

He makes a general (and long) case that UK backbenchers are not powerless ciphers, that they have a good deal of influence (in different ways) on governmental doings. One is thru anticipated reactions.

Can be generally cited.