

Appendix: Democracy in America? Partisanship, Polarization, and the Robustness of Support for Democracy in the United States

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A The Model

Here we give formal statements, proofs, and illustrations of the theoretical results presented in the section “A Model of the Public as a Democratic Check.” We first consider predictions 1-4 about $\Delta \downarrow$, then build on those results to support prediction 5.

The following proposition summarizes our analysis in the paper of the deterministic case with a single policy position k :

Proposition 1. *Let candidate 1’s platform be to the right of candidate 2’s platform, $x_{1k} > x_{2k}$. Then the fraction of voters who always vote for the more democratic of the two candidates is*

$$\Delta = F(x_s^1) - F(x_s^2),$$

where $F(x_{ik})$ is the distribution of voters’ ideal points and x_s^1, x_s^2 are the swing voters

$$\begin{aligned} x_s^1 &= \frac{x_{1k} + x_{2k}}{2} + \frac{\delta}{2\alpha_k(x_{1k} - x_{2k})}, \\ x_s^2 &= \frac{x_{1k} + x_{2k}}{2} - \frac{\delta}{2\alpha_k(x_{1k} - x_{2k})}. \end{aligned}$$

- (i) Δ is increasing in support for democracy δ ;
- (ii) Δ is decreasing in the intensity of voters’ policy preferences α_k ;
- (iii) Δ is decreasing in the distance between candidate platforms $x_{1k} - x_{2k}$;
- (iv) Δ is decreasing in the degree to which the distribution of voters’ ideal points is U-shaped, defined here the fraction of ideal points located below and above two values symmetric around the median m of F , i.e. the sum $F(m-a) + [1 - F(m+a)]$, where $0 < a < |m|$.

Proof. Parts (i)-(iii) are straightforward comparative statics on expressions for the swing voters x_s^1 and x_s^2 with respect to δ , α , and $x_{1k} - x_{2k}$.

To see part (iv), observe that, by our definition, the distribution $F(x_{ik})$ is more U-shaped than the distribution $G(x_{ik})$ if

$$F(m-a) + [1 - F(m+a)] > G(m-a) + [1 - G(m+a)] \quad \text{for any } 0 < a < |m|.$$

In turn, a more U-shaped distribution will have a smaller fraction of voters located on the interval (x_s^2, x_s^1) , resulting in a smaller fraction Δ of voters who always vote for the more democratic of the two candidates. $\square$

The following proposition summarizes our analysis in the paper of the stochastic case with a single policy position k :

Proposition 2. *Let candidate 1's platform be to the right of candidate 2's platform, $x_{1k} > x_{2k}$. Then the fraction of voters who defect from the candidate 1 when he adopts undemocratic position M_1 is*

$$\Delta = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1}{1 + e^{-\alpha_k D}} - \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(\alpha_k D - \delta M_1)}} \right) dF(x_i),$$

where $F(x_i)$ is the distribution of voters' ideal points, $\frac{1}{1+e^{-x}}$ is the logistic function in X , and $D = (x_{ik} - x_{2k})^2 - (x_{ik} - x_{1k})^2$ is the difference in voter's policy payoff between the two candidate's platforms (in favor of candidate 1.)

- (i) Δ is increasing in support for democracy δ ,
- (ii) Δ is decreasing in the intensity of voters' policy preferences α_k ,
- (iii) Δ is decreasing in the distance between candidate platforms $x_{1k} - x_{2k}$,
- (iv) Δ is decreasing in the degree to which the distribution of voters' ideal points is U-shaped, defined here by the sum $F(m - a) + [1 - F(m + a)]$, where $0 < a < |m|$ (the fraction of ideal points located below and above two values symmetric around the median m of F .)

Proof. Assuming that the error terms ϵ_{ij} are (independently) drawn from type I extreme value distribution (also known as the standard Gumbel distribution) implies that voter i 's probability of voting for candidate 1 is shaped by the difference in voter i 's payoff from the two candidates according to the logistic function,¹

$$\Pr(i \text{ votes for candidate 1}) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-[u_i(X_1, M_1) - u_i(X_2, M_2)]}}.$$

The difference in voter i 's payoff from the two candidates $u_i(X_1, M_1) - u_i(X_2, M_2)$ then becomes $\alpha_k D$ when $M_1 = M_2 = 0$ and $\alpha_k D - \delta M_1$ when $M_1 = 1$ and $M_2 = 0$.

Parts (i)-(iii) are straightforward comparative statics on the $\frac{1}{1+e^{-\alpha_k D}} - \frac{1}{1+e^{-(\alpha_k D - \delta M_1)}}$ part of Δ with respect to δ , α , and $x_{1k} - x_{2k}$.

To see part (iv), observe that the difference $\frac{1}{1+e^{-\alpha_k D}} - \frac{1}{1+e^{-(\alpha_k D - \delta M_1)}}$ has a unique global maximum at the ideal point

$$x_{\Delta}^1 = \frac{x_{1k} + x_{2k}}{2} + \frac{\delta}{4\alpha_k(x_{1k} - x_{2k})},$$

¹For an explicit derivation of how type I extreme value distributed error terms imply the logistic model, see e.g. [Cameron and Trivedi \(2005, 476-478, 486-487\)](#).

and is strictly increasing for any $x_{ik} < x_{\Delta}^1$ and strictly decreasing for any $x_{ik} > x_{\Delta}^1$. Furthermore,

$$\frac{x_{1k} + x_{2k}}{2} < x_{\Delta}^1 < x_s^1,$$

that is, voter x_{Δ}^1 is to the right of the median but to the left of the swing voter x_s^1 . By the same argument, when $M_1 = 0$ and $M_2 = 1$, the difference $-(\frac{1}{1+e^{-\alpha_k D}} - \frac{1}{1+e^{-(\alpha_k D + \delta M_2)}})$ has the unique global maximum

$$x_{\Delta}^2 = \frac{x_{1k} + x_{2k}}{2} - \frac{\delta}{4\alpha_k(x_{1k} - x_{2k})},$$

and is strictly increasing for any $x_{ik} < x_{\Delta}^2$ and strictly decreasing for any $x_{ik} > x_{\Delta}^2$. Furthermore,

$$x_s^2 < x_{\Delta}^2 < \frac{x_{1k} + x_{2k}}{2}.$$

This implies that voters with ideal points on the interval (x_s^2, x_s^1) vote for the more democratic of the two candidates with a probability greater than one-half, regardless of which of the two candidates adopts an undemocratic platform. (By our definition of a swing voter, swing voter x_s^1 votes for candidate 1 with the probability one-half when $M_1 = 1$ and $M_2 = 0$; swing voter x_s^2 votes for candidate 2 with the probability one-half when $M_1 = 0$ and $M_2 = 1$.) Voters outside the interval (x_s^2, x_s^1) vote for the *less* democratic candidate when that candidate is closer to them policy-wise with a probability greater than one-half. By our definition, the distribution $F(x_{ik})$ is more U-shaped than the distribution $G(x_{ik})$ if

$$F(m - a) + [1 - F(m + a)] > G(m - a) + [1 - G(m + a)] \quad \text{for any } 0 < a < |m|.$$

In turn, a more U-shaped distribution will have a smaller fraction of voters located on the interval (x_s^2, x_s^1) , resulting in a smaller fraction voters who always vote for the more democratic of the two candidates with a probability greater than one-half and a greater fraction voters who for the less democratic candidate when that candidate is closer to them policy-wise. $\square$

Figure A.1 illustrates part (iv) of Proposition 2 by plotting the fraction of voters who defect from an undemocratic candidate as the distribution of voters becomes more U-shaped. We do this by drawing voters' ideal policies from the symmetrical $Beta(\gamma, \gamma)$ density. The left panel shows that a decrease in the parameter γ from 5 to $\frac{1}{5}$ corresponds to the shift from a centrist distribution of voter ideal points to one that is U-shaped.² The right panel plots

²The remaining parameter values are $\alpha_k = 8$, $\delta = 2$, $x_{1k} = 1/5$, $x_{2k} = -1/5$, $M_1 = 1$, which implies $x_s^1 = -x_s^2 = 5/16$.




Figure A.1: $Beta(\gamma, \gamma)$ distribution of voters' ideal points (left) and the decline in the less democratic candidate's vote share (right) associated with the shift from a centrist distribution of voter ideal points ($\gamma = 5$) to a U-shaped one ($\gamma = 1/5$)

the resulting decrease in the fraction of voters who defect from candidate 1 when he adopts undemocratic position M_1 .

The proof of part (iv) of Proposition 2 contains two corollaries that we evaluate using data from our candidate-choice experiment. We therefore state them explicitly below:

Corollary 1. *The segment between the two swing voters, (x_s^2, x_s^1) , delineates voters who in the treatment condition D^- vs. D^+ vote for the D^+ candidate with a probability greater than one-half, regardless of which of the two candidates is closer to them policy-wise,*

$$Pr(i \text{ votes for the } D^+ \text{ candidate} | D^- \text{ vs. } D^+) > \frac{1}{2} \quad \text{for all } x_{ik} \in (x_s^2, x_s^1).$$

This segment of voters is shown in the left panel of Figure 1 in the main text.

Corollary 2. *Denote the ideal point of voters who in the treatment condition D^- vs. D^+ defect from the D^- candidate at the highest rate by x_Δ^1 ,*

$$x_\Delta^1 = \frac{x_{1k} + x_{2k}}{2} + \frac{\delta}{4\alpha_k(x_{1k} - x_{2k})}.$$

Voters with the ideal point x_Δ^1 are located to the right of the median $\frac{x_{1k} + x_{2k}}{2}$ but to the left of the swing voter x_s^1 ,

$$\frac{x_{1k} + x_{2k}}{2} < x_\Delta^1 < x_s^1.$$

The right panel in Figure 1 in the main text illustrates Corollary 2.

Both propositions generalize to the case with K policy positions after accounting for the fact that voter ideal points are now distributed according to a multivariate joint distribution $F(x_{i1}, \dots, x_{iK})$, which implies that we need to extend our definition of the degree to which




Figure A.2: An illustration of the two-issue case, $K = 2$

a distribution is U-shaped to the multivariate context. We will say that the distribution $F(x_{i1}, \dots, x_{iK})$ is more U-shaped than the distribution $G(x_{i1}, \dots, x_{iK})$ if

$$F(\dots, m - a, \dots) + [1 - F(\dots, m + a, \dots)] > G(\dots, m - a, \dots) + [1 - G(\dots, m + a, \dots)]$$

for all $k \in K$ and for any $0 < a < |m|$.

When $K \geq 2$, swing voters x_s^1 and x_s^2 are no longer characterized by unique ideal policy points but by hyperplanes satisfying the indifference conditions

$$u_i(X_1, M_1 = 1) = u_i(X_2, M_2 = 0) \quad \text{and} \quad u_i(X_1, M_1 = 0) = u_i(X_2, M_2 = 1).$$

Figure A.2 illustrates swing voters x_s^1 and x_s^2 for the two-issue case, $K = 2$, and parameter values $\alpha_1 = 8$, $\alpha_2 = 4$, $\delta = 2$, $x_{11} = x_{12} = 1/5$, $x_{21} = x_{22} = -1/5$, $M_1 = M_2 = 1$. This results in swing voters x_s^1 and x_s^2 that are characterized by the equations

$$x_{i2} = \frac{5}{8} - 2x_{i1} \quad \text{and} \quad x_{i2} = -\frac{5}{8} - 2x_{i1}.$$

The solid black line in Figure A.2 plots voters who are indifferent between the two candidates when both adopt democratic positions, $M_1 = M_2 = 0$ (i.e. the equivalent of the median voter in the single-issue case.) The red and blue dashed lines plot swing voters x_s^1 and x_s^2 . Note that the slopes of these lines are steeper than -1 , which is due to our assumption in

this illustration that voters care twice as much about issue 1 as they care about issue 2.

A distinct prediction that arises only in the case of more than one issue concerns cross-cutting cleavages. Specifically, in the paper we anticipate that the fraction of voters who defect from a candidate that adopts an undemocratic position is smaller when voters' preferences over the K distinct issues are aligned as opposed to cross-cutting with respect to candidates platforms. To see this, fix candidates' platforms and define a voter's policy preferences as *aligned* if her ideal point x_{ik} is closer to one candidate on all K issues; otherwise, we say that the voter's policy preferences are *cross-cutting*. This implies that the difference in a voter's overall policy distance from the two candidates, $\sum_K \alpha_k [(x_{ik} - x_{2k})^2 - (x_{1k} - x_{2k})^2]$, will be larger for voters whose policy preferences are aligned than for voters whose policy preferences are cross-cutting. This follows from our assumption that voters' policy preference over the K issues are additive: for voters with cross-cutting preferences, a voter's greater distance from a candidate on one issue is at least partially cancelled out by her greater proximity to that candidate on another issue. In effect, voters with aligned policy preferences see an overall greater policy difference between candidates than do voters whose preferences are cross-cutting, parallelling part (iii) in Propositions 1 and 2.

B Real-World Examples of Undemocratic Practices

An important criterion in the design of our treatments is that they be realistic and can be plausibly adopted by both major parties. Accordingly, the undemocratic positions our candidates take are situated at the state level, where most attempts to subvert the democratic process for partisan gain in the United States occur and have historically been attempted by both major parties.

In this section, we explain the design of each treatment in more detail and provide recent real-world examples of each treatment. We will see that treatments concerning both electoral manipulation and checks and balances reflect practices that are frequently threatened and often carried out (gerrymandering, voter suppression, executive orders, and threats to judicial independence.) Real-world violations of civil liberties rarely manifest as explicitly as they do in our treatments, but they do reflect positions that politicians openly express and occasionally act upon (banning protests, prosecuting journalists.)

B.1 Electoral fairness

Treatments capturing positions that aim to undermine the fairness of elections focused on two issues: i) gerrymandering, and ii) voter suppression.

i) Gerrymandering

Gerrymandering – the manipulation of electoral district boundaries for partisan gain – is one of the oldest and best-known forms of electoral manipulation practiced in the United States (McGann et al. 2016; Seabrook 2017).³ Because state legislatures are in charge of drawing electoral districts in most states, parties that control the process often draw the boundaries to give their own party a disproportionate number of seats in the state legislature and the U.S. House of Representatives.⁴

We designed our treatment to unambiguously communicate this type of manipulation without using a loaded term like gerrymandering. Accordingly, our candidates have

Supported a redistricting plan that gives [own party]s
[2 or 10] extra seats despite a decline in the polls.

³The term “gerrymander” was coined in 1812 after Massachusetts Democratic-Republicans redrew district boundaries to disadvantage the rival Federalists. One particularly egregious district was shaped like a salamander. Though governor Elbridge Gerry is said to have been minimally involved in the process, the term “gerrymander” stuck.

⁴See Magleby et al. (2018) for a review.

While the identification of a workable standard for judging when a partisan bias in redistricting is extreme enough to be “unfair” is the subject of active research ([Chen and Rodden 2013](#); [Cho and Liu 2016](#)), compelling evidence of recent partisan gerrymandering exists for a number of states, including Maryland, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin.⁵

One example that captures our treatment’s realism especially well occurred in 2011 in Maryland, where former Governor Martin O’Malley (D-MD) admitted to using his influence over the redistricting process to produce a map that favored Democrats. O’Malley said shifting a seat from a Republican to Democrat was “certainly my hope, and it was part of my intent.”⁶ Democrats undertook this effort in 2011 despite a decline in the House vote share from 67 percent to 60 percent between 2008 and 2010.⁷

ii) Voter suppression

Electoral manipulation and voter suppression have a long history in the United States ([Campbell 2005](#); [Bateman 2018](#); [Keyssar 2000](#)). The Supreme Court’s 2013 *Shelby v. Holder* decision to overturn the Voting Rights Act’s requirement that states with a history of disenfranchisement pre-clear any changes to election procedures has coincided with a resurgence of voting restrictions at the state level (especially restrictions on early voting, same-day registration, and stricter voter ID requirements).⁸ Before turning to our treatment, we present exemplars of some of the tactics currently in use.

- **Voter identification laws:** Between 2004 and 2016, the number of states with voter ID laws classified as “strict” by the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) increased from zero to 11.⁹ The majorities enacting these laws tend to favor forms of identity documents that their supporters disproportionately possess and disallow forms of ID that their opponents tend to use. In Pennsylvania, state House Republican leader Mike Turazí predicted that the state’s voter ID law “is gonna allow Governor Romney to win the state of Pennsylvania, done.”¹⁰ In Texas, Ansolabehere and Hersh (2017) found that S.B. 14, the voter ID law passed by Texas Republicans, disproportionately affected black and Hispanic voters; the law also disallowed the use of student IDs. The

⁵See e.g. Laura Royden, Michael Li, and Yuriy Rudensky, “Extreme Gerrymandering & the 2018 Midterm,” *Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law*.

⁶Brian Witte, “O’Malley intended redistricting to favor Md. Democrats,” *Herald-Mail*, June 1, 2017.

⁷Dave Leip, “[Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections](#),” accessed via Yale University Libraries.

⁸See [Bergman et al. \(2018\)](#) and “Election 2016: Restrictive Voting Laws by the Numbers,” *Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law*, September 28, 2016.

⁹NCSL, “[History of Voter ID](#),” May 31, 2017.

¹⁰MacKenzie Weigner, “[Pa. pol: Voter ID helps GOP win state](#),” *Politico*, June 25, 2012.

law was struck down in court due to its discriminatory intent.¹¹

- **Restrictions on the time and location of voting:** State legislatures frequently attempt to change the available times and locations of voting to their political opponents' disadvantage. In particular, some Republican legislatures have restricted early and weekend voting options favored by low-income and black voters.¹² In Wisconsin, the Republican legislature passed a law, later struck down, that limited all cities to one early voting location.¹³ Almost immediately after the Supreme Court ruling in *Shelby v. Holder*, the North Carolina legislature used data on demographic voting patterns to devise a package of voting changes that the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals later ruled had been designed to target black voters "with almost surgical precision."¹⁴ The changes included shortening the early voting period, eliminating same-day registration, eliminating preregistration for young people, eliminating provisional ballots for people who went to the wrong precinct in the correct county, and changing registration requirements to eliminate forms of identification disproportionately used by black voters.
- **Impeding voter registration:** The practice of "voter caging," or sending a non-forwardable letter to geographic areas that tend to support opponents and challenging the registration of voters whose letter is returned to sender, has been a common practice in the United States since the 1950s.¹⁵ The purpose of this tactic is to prevent or overturn the registration of voters who support the opposing party. Organized groups recruit volunteers to use century-old voter challenge laws to dispute the registration of eligible voters at the polls. These challenges are almost never upheld by courts, but they do appear to successfully intimidate voters.¹⁶
- **Misinformation about procedures:** Robocalls, fliers, and billboards with false information about voting locations, times, and identity requirements are a common feature of American elections.¹⁷ For example, although the Pennsylvania and Texas voter ID laws described above were each struck down in court, signage indicating that

¹¹Ariane de Vogue and Steve Almasy, "[New Texas voter ID law discriminates, federal judge rules](#)," *CNN*, August 23, 2017.

¹²Steven Yaccino and Lizette Alvarez, "[New G.O.P. Bid to Limit Voting in Swing States](#)," *The New York Times*, March 29, 2014."

¹³Patrick Marley and Jason Stein, "[Judge strikes down Wisconsin voter ID, early voting laws](#)," *The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel*, July 30, 2016.

¹⁴[North Carolina NAACP v. McCrory](#), U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, July 29, 2016.

¹⁵Project Vote, "[Voter Intimidation and Caging](#)," February 2010.

¹⁶Nicholas Riley, "[Voter Challengers](#)," *The Brennan Center*, August 30, 2012.

¹⁷Common Cause, "[Deceptive Practices 2.0: Legal and Policy Responses](#)," October 2008.

photo ID was required remained in place at some polling places.¹⁸

- **Ballot fraud:** In 2018, the Republican Candidate in North Carolina’s ninth U.S. House district, Mark Harris, hired a political consultant, Leslie McCrae Dowless, who along with several accomplices collected and filled in absentee ballots for the purpose of manipulating the outcome of the election. After months of resistance, Harris called for a new election following the presentation of overwhelming evidence that fraud occurred¹⁹—including testimony by Harris’s son, John Harris, that he had warned his father about Dowless’ illegal practices.²⁰ Dowless is under investigation for similar practices in the 2016 election.²¹ The publicity associated with these incidents is drawing attention to what may be a more longstanding pattern of manipulation in Bladen and Robeson counties.²² Though we are not aware of similar recent events in other states, North Carolina’s unusually transparent electoral data makes suspicious patterns easier to spot.²³

For incumbent parties seeking to tilt the playing field in their favor, these types of changes are convenient because they can also occur for legitimate reasons. The voter identification requirements described above are often justified in terms of preventing voter fraud. Changing the location of polling places can be justified by shifts in population patterns, as was the case when 170 Democratic-leaning precincts were eliminated in Lake County, Indiana.²⁴ Cuts to the number of polling places can be necessitated by budget crisis²⁵ or to a shift toward absentee voting.

For our candidate-choice experiment, we chose a treatment from the “restrictions on the time and location of voting” category. A candidate

Supported a proposal to reduce the number of polling stations
in areas that support [opposite party]s.

¹⁸Michaela Winberg, “[Do you need photo ID to vote in PA? No, but there’s good reason for confusion,](#)” *Billy Penn*, May 7, 2018. Alex Samuels, “[Texas civil rights advocates air concerns about voter ID issues,](#)” October 28, 2016.

¹⁹Ely Portillo and Jim Morrill, “[Mark Harris calls for new election in 9th district,](#)” *Charlotte Observer*, February 21, 2019.

²⁰Laura Barron-Lopez, “[Mark Harris’ son warned him about operative in North Carolina scandal,](#)” *Politico*, February 20, 2019.

²¹Dan Kane and Ely Portillo, “[The ‘guru of Bladen County’ is at the center of NC’s election troubles,](#)” *News and Observer*, December 9, 2018.

²²Bruce Henderson and Will Doran, “[In 2 NC counties with ‘rough politics,’ election fraud claims are nothing new,](#)” *News and Observer*, January 26, 2019

²³Nate Cohn, “[Why Voting Anomalies Are Impossible to Ignore in North Carolina,](#)” *The New York Times*, December 7, 2018.

²⁴“[Secretary of state trims Lake County’s precinct map by a third. Democrats cry foul.](#)” *Northwest Indiana Times*, August 1, 2018.

²⁵Matt Vasilogambros, “[Polling Places Remain a Target Ahead of November Elections,](#)” *Pew Stateline*, September 4, 2018.

The closure of polling places has been an increasing national trend since the *Shelby v. Holder* decision: nationwide, the total number of polling stations dropped from 119,968 to 116,990 between 2012 and 2016.²⁶ Civil Rights organizations have cited a larger number of closures.²⁷ We highlight two cases that illustrate our treatment’s realism:

- In North Carolina, the governor’s party uses its control of the state board of elections to secure two of the three seats on each county’s board of elections.²⁸ After Republican Pat McCrory was elected governor in 2012 these boards eliminated early voting sites at many of the state’s largest colleges and universities ahead of the 2014 election.²⁹ After the Fourth Circuit struck down the state’s voter ID law in summer 2016, the executive director of North Carolina’s Republican party contacted Republican appointees to encourage them to “make party line changes to early voting.”³⁰ Subsequently, Randolph County backed off plans to open a Sunday voting site because Republican elections board chairman Bill McAnulty, in his own words, “got accused of being a traitor and everything else by the Republican Party.”³¹

Further partisan efforts to close polling places in a partisan manner occurred in 2018, when the state passed a law that forced the closure of early voting sites by raising operating costs. The requirement that all early voting sites to be open from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. was credited with a 17 percent decline in the total number of early voting sites statewide, with a disproportionate share of closures occurring in poor, rural counties.³²

- In 2018, a public controversy surfaced around the role that then Secretary of State of Georgia, now Governor, Brian Kemp played in administering his own election. Between

²⁶Election Assistance Commission, “[EAVS Deep Dive](#),” November 15, 2017.

²⁷For more comprehensive lists of closures, see: Leadership Conference Fund, “[The Great Poll Closure](#),” November 2016. NAACP, “[Democracy Diminished](#).”

²⁸Following the events that we describe, the status of this procedure went into flux. When Democrat Roy Cooper won the governor’s race in 2016, Republicans in the state legislature passed a law, later ruled unconstitutional, that stripped the governor’s power over county boards. Current law appears to preserve the governor’s party’s control over the state elections board, which is the traditional mechanism through which the governor’s party controlled county boards, but we are not absolutely certain that past practice will continue in the future. See Max Greenwood, “[NC governor says he won’t appoint interim elections board](#),” *The Hill*, January 2, 2019. N&O Editorial Board, “[The election board amendment isn’t ‘bipartisan.’ It’s a partisan power grab](#),” *News and Observer*, October 25, 2018. Chatham County, “[Board of Elections](#),” Accessed January 29, 2019.

²⁹Evan Walker-Wells, “[Blocking the youth vote in the south](#),” *Institute for Southern Studies*, October 29, 2014.

³⁰News and Observer, “[NC Republican Party seeks ‘party line changes’ to limit early voting hours](#),” August 17, 2016.

³¹Julia Harte, “[Insight: Emails show how Republicans lobbied to limit voting hours in North Carolina](#),” *Reuters*, November 3, 2016.

³²Blake Paterson, “[Bipartisan Furor as North Carolina Election Law Shrinks Early Voting Locations by Almost 20 Percent](#),” *ProPublica*, September 24, 2018.

2012 and 2018, eight percent of precincts in Georgia were closed, with a disproportionate share of these in poor and minority counties.³³ Kemp’s office hired Mike Malone to go county-by-county recommending the closures.³⁴ Public pressure prevented additional closures: after a national controversy erupted over Malone’s recommendation that the predominantly black Randolph County close seven of its nine precincts, Kemp came out against the plan and denied having supported it.³⁵ Though an apparent “smoking gun” comment appears to have been taken out of context,³⁶ Kemp’s repeated use of his office to pursue measures that coincided with his electoral self-interest—including aggressive efforts to remove voters from the rolls and investigate minority-focused voter registration programs—aroused considerable suspicion.

B.2 Checks and balances

Treatments reflecting candidate positions that aim to undermine checks and balances focused on the expansion of executive power at the expense of i) legislative power, and ii) the independence of courts. Both forms of this treatment are motivated by the prominent role that “executive aggrandizement” has historically played in democratic backsliding ([Bermeo 2016](#)).

i) Circumventing the legislature

The expansion of executive power has been a long-running trend in American politics. By a combination of congressional acquiescence and express grants, the executive branch has expanded its powers, especially in the areas of trade, immigration, national defense, and budgeting ([Howell 2003](#); [Posner and Vermeule 2010](#)). Our treatment is designed to capture a practice that has become increasingly prominent in recent years: express invocation of legislative deadlock as a justification for unilateral executive action, with the explicit encouragement of co-partisan legislators. Governors across U.S. states exceedingly rely on executive orders to govern in the face of hostile or deadlocked legislatures ([Barber et al. Forthcoming](#); [Cockerham and Jr. 2017](#)), sometimes exceeding their constitutionally granted powers. Accordingly, in this treatment a candidate

³³Mark Niese, Maya T. Prabhu, and Jacquelyn Elias, “[Voting precincts closed across Georgia since election oversight lifted](#),” *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, August 31, 2018.

³⁴Prior to the controversy, Malone stated publicly that Kemp directed him to undertake the effort. Mark Joseph Stern, “[Brian Kemp’s Bid for Governor Depends on Erasing the Black Vote in Georgia](#),” *Slate*, August 17, 2018.

³⁵Richard Faussett, “[Georgia County Rejects Plan to Close 7 Polling Places in Majority-Black Area](#),” *The New York Times*, August 23, 2018.

³⁶Jim Galloway, “[What Brian Kemp really said about Democratic voter registration efforts](#),” *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, September 11, 2014.

Said the [own party] governor should rule by executive order
if [opposite party] legislators don't cooperate.

The following examples from the state and federal levels substantiate this treatment:

- In 2016, Governor Terry McAuliffe (D-VA) issued a series of executive orders restoring voting rights to more than 200,000 felons who had completed their sentences, circumventing a Republican-controlled legislature.³⁷ McAuliffe justified his order using an expansive legal interpretation of his clemency authority and was accused by his critics of abusing his position to strengthen his party's position in the upcoming 2016 general election. A petition to cancel the order was filed by, among others, the Republican speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates and the Republican majority leader of the State Senate. McAuliffe's executive orders were ruled unconstitutional by the Virginia Supreme Court.³⁸ McAuliffe would later restore voting rights to almost 13,000 felons on a case-by-case basis.³⁹
- After Congress decided not to pass a bailout of the automotive industry in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the George W. Bush administration unilaterally reallocated \$14 billion from the Troubled Asset Relief Program. White House spokesman Tony Fratto justified the move with reference to congressional inaction: "Congress lost its opportunity to be a partner because they couldn't get their job done."⁴⁰
- Faced with congressional inaction on its plan for reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA)—which had been rebranded No Child Left Behind (NCLB) for its 2001 reauthorization—the Obama Administration implemented a sweeping plan to release states from NCLB requirements in exchange for their commitment to meet a new set of curricular, teacher evaluation, and professional development standards. Announcing the ESEA Flexibility Waivers, President Obama said, "Given that Congress can't act, I am acting."⁴¹ To satisfy Principle 1, "College- and Career-Ready Expectations for All Students," most states adopted the Common Core State Standards.

³⁷Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Erik Eckholm, "[Virginia Governor Restores Voting Rights to Felons](#)," *The New York Times*, April 22, 2016.

³⁸"Howell v. McAuliffe: Supreme Court of Virginia Holds that Executive Order Restoring Voting Rights En Masse Is Unconstitutional," *Harvard Law Review*, May 10, 2017.

³⁹Laura Vozzella, "[McAuliffe restores voting rights to 13,000 felons](#)," *The Washington Post*, August 22, 2016.

⁴⁰David Cho and Zachary A. Goldfarb, "[UAW Vows to Fight Wage Concessions](#)," *The Washington Post*, December 24, 2008.

⁴¹Michelle McNeil and Alyson Klein, "[Obama Offers Waivers From Key Provisions of NCLB](#)," *Education Week*, September 27, 2011.

- After compromise legislation on immigration reform floundered in Congress, President Obama twice acted to grant work authorization and immunity from deportation to unauthorized immigrants, stretching prosecutorial discretion authority⁴² that can only be used on a case-by-case basis.⁴³ Obama invoked Congress’s failure to pass similar legislation in his announcement of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program in 2012⁴⁴ and the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (DAPA) program in 2014.⁴⁵ The executive order establishing the DAPA program was ruled unconstitutional after an equally divided Supreme Court affirmed a lower court ruling.⁴⁶
- After congressional resistance to his administration’s proposal to build a wall along the U.S.-Mexico border, President Trump invoked a national emergency to sidestep Congress. Before declaring the emergency, Trump explicitly invoked the lack of congressional action on his priorities as a justification.⁴⁷ In declaring the emergency, the president remarked, “I went through Congress. I made a deal. I got almost 1.4 billion dollars ... but I’m not happy with it. I also got billions and billions of dollars for other things. ... but on the wall they skimped. So I was successful in that sense, but I want to do it faster. I could do the wall over a long period of time. I didn’t need to do this but I’d rather do it much faster.”⁴⁸

⁴²Michael A. Olivas, “[Dreams Deferred: Deferred Action, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Vexing Case\(s\) of DREAM Act Students](#),” *William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal*, 21.2, 2012.

⁴³Secretary Janet Napolitano, “[Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children](#),” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, June 15, 2012.

⁴⁴Obama said: “I have said time and time and time again to Congress that, send me the DREAM Act, put it on my desk, and I will sign it right away. Now, both parties wrote this legislation. And a year and a half ago, Democrats passed the DREAM Act in the House, but Republicans walked away from it. It got 55 votes in the Senate, but Republicans blocked it. The bill hasn’t really changed. The need hasn’t changed. It’s still the right thing to do. The only thing that has changed, apparently, was the politics.” White House Office of the Press Secretary, “[Remarks by the President on Immigration](#),” June 15, 2012.

⁴⁵Obama said: “And a year and a half ago, a big majority of Democrats, Republicans, and independents in the Senate – including both of your senators – passed a bipartisan bill to fix our broken immigration system. ... And if the House of Representatives had simply called for an up-or-down vote, it would have passed. It would be the law. We would be on the way to solve – solving this problem in a sensible way. But for a year and a half now, Republican leaders in the House blocked this simple up-or-down vote.” C-SPAN, “[President Obama Remarks on Immigration](#),” December 9, 2014.

⁴⁶Adam Liptak and Michael D. Shear, “[Supreme Court Tie Blocks Obama Immigration Plan](#),” *The New York Times*, June 23, 2016.

⁴⁷For example, Trump said of negotiations in Congress: “We will be looking at a national emergency because I don’t think anything’s going to happen. I don’t think Democrats want border security.” Katie Pavlich, “[Trump: They Should Be Chanting ‘Finish the Wall’](#),” *Townhall*, February 1, 2019.

⁴⁸Associated Press, “[Trump on emergency: ‘I didn’t need to do this’](#),” February 15, 2019.

ii) Circumventing the courts

Refusals to comply with court rulings have been at the center of many notable moments in American history, including the forced removal of Cherokee from Georgia in the 1830s, Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus in 1861, and southern foot-dragging in the wake of the *Brown v. Board of Education* ruling in 1954. While respect for judicial rulings is robust today, politicians sometimes do voice politically motivated support for the curbing of judicial authority or even outright ignoring of court rulings. At the state level, this often happens when a governor uses legal maneuvers to delay the implementation of a politically inconvenient ruling. In our candidate choice experiment, a candidate

Said the [own party] governor should ignore unfavorable
court rulings by [opposite party]-appointed judges.

The following recent examples document the realism of this treatment:

- In 2017, Governor Paul LePage (R-ME) refused to implement an expansion of Medicaid approved in a referendum that year.⁴⁹ In the years before the referendum, LePage vetoed five bills passed by the legislature to expand the program; after the referendum, LePage again vetoed a bill to fund the program. After LePage refused to implement the expansion, his administration was sued by supporters of the expansion. On a radio program, LePage boasted that he would “go to jail before [he] put the state in red ink.”⁵⁰ The administration was ordered to implement the plan by a court, a decision LePage appealed to the state’s highest court where it lost. The expansion was eventually ordered by LePage’s successor, Democrat Janet Mills.⁵¹
- In December 2018, Governor Charlie Baker (R-MA) and his administration refused to comply with a series of state district court orders to reinstate gun licenses.⁵²
- In March 2018, Governor John Carney (D-DE) declared his intent to continue considering partisanship in the selection of state judges despite a federal court ruling that

⁴⁹Abby Goodnough, “A Vote Expanded Medicaid in Maine. The Governor Is Ignoring It.” *The New York Times*, July 24, 2018. In a politically related stance, a number of Republican governors have threatened to refuse or delay the implementation of the Affordable Care Act, even after it affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court. See Amanda Terkel, “[GOP Governors Resist Implementing Obama’s Health Care Law Despite Supreme Court Ruling](#),” *HuffPost*, June 29, 2012.

⁵⁰Ed Morin, “[LePage Says He’d Rather Go To Jail Than Expand Medicaid And Put Maine In ‘Red Ink’](#),” *Maine Public Radio*, July 12, 2018.

⁵¹Alex Acquisto and Michael Shepherd, “[Mills signs order to expand Medicaid in Maine](#),” *Bangor Daily News*, January 2, 2019.

⁵²Matt Stout, “[Baker defends stance on gun permits, but judges disagree](#),” *The Boston Globe*, December 4, 2018.

the practice is unconstitutional.⁵³

- In February 2018 Joseph Scarnati, president pro tempore of the Pennsylvania Senate, ignored a court order to turn over electoral data related to the state’s redistricting plan, which the state supreme court had just ruled unconstitutional.⁵⁴ Later that month, Republican gubernatorial candidate Scott Wagner released a statement that began with, “If I were governor, I would refuse to implement the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s remedial map and I would instruct the Secretary of the Commonwealth to oversee the 2018 elections under our old map,” and went on to declare that “[i]f a governor can’t stand up to an order he deems unconstitutional, then he is a mere subordinate of the Court.”⁵⁵
- After the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in *Obergefell v. Hodges* legalized same-sex marriage, Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) encouraged states to ignore the Supreme Court’s decision.⁵⁶ In Tennessee, state Rep. Rick Womack (R-TN) sent a letter to all 95 county clerks urging them to “ignore the recent SCOTUS opinion.”⁵⁷
- As a presidential candidate, Newt Gingrich promised to ignore Supreme Court decisions on matters of national security: “I would instruct the national security officials in a Gingrich administration to ignore the recent decisions of the Supreme Court on national security matters.”⁵⁸
- An abortion ban proposed in 2018 by state Senator Joseph Silk (R-OK) would have directed the state’s attorney general to “direct state agencies to enforce those laws regardless of any contrary or conflicting federal statutes, regulations, executive orders, or court decisions.”⁵⁹
- After a federal court ordered a hold on President Trump’s second travel ban in March 2017, former Arkansas Gov. Mike Huckabee encouraged Trump to ignore the decision,

⁵³Sarah Mueller, “[Gov. Carney says he’s not defying court decision on judicial nominations](#),” *Delaware Public Media*, March 8, 2018.

⁵⁴Elissa Nunez, “[Pennsylvania GOP leader defies court on gerrymandering](#),” *CNN*, February 1, 2018.

⁵⁵Press Release, “[Wagner Urges Governor Wolf To Ignore Court Order On Redistricting](#),” *Scott Wagner for Governor*, February 21, 2018.

⁵⁶Jason Molinet, “[Ted Cruz tells states to ignore Supreme Court ruling allowing gay marriage](#),” *New York Daily News*, June 30, 2015.

⁵⁷Taylor Shaw, “[State Rep. Womick prompts county clerks to ignore Supreme Court’s ruling on gay marriage](#),” *WATE ABC 6*, July 28, 2015.

⁵⁸Lyle Denniston, “[Can the President Ignore Supreme Court Rulings?](#),” *Huffington Post*, December 18, 2011.

⁵⁹Ian Smith, “[Oklahoma senator proposing to abolish abortion in Oklahoma calls on state to ignore federal rulings](#),” *Oklahoma’s News 4*, November 30, 2018.

explicitly invoking former President Andrew Jackson’s rejection of the Supreme Court’s 1832 *Worcester v. Georgia* decision.⁶⁰

- In a 2015 Rasmussen poll, 26 percent of likely voters said the president should have the right to ignore court rulings if they are standing in the way of actions he feels are important for the country. 60 percent disagreed and 15 percent were undecided.⁶¹

Three additional contemporary practices that threaten judicial independence speak to the realism of our treatment: the use of explicitly political litmus tests in the selection of judges, efforts to impeach justices who issue unfavorable rulings, and court curbing.

- **Politicizing nominations and appointments:** A recent report by the Brennan Center for Justice that examined 2018 state legislative proposals catalogues 27 attempts in eight states that would inject partisan politics into the processes by which judges are selected for and retain their seats. These include efforts to strip power from non-partisan nominating commissions in Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Oklahoma, Missouri, North Carolina, and South Carolina, as well as proposals to make judicial elections and retention elections more partisan in North Carolina and Pennsylvania.⁶²
- **Judicial impeachments:** State legislators commonly threaten to impeach judges in response to or in anticipation of rulings they find unfavorable. In 2011, seven state legislatures introduced a total of 12 such bills.⁶³ A collection of such cases from 2004 to 2010 by the National Center for State Courts includes examples from Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, New Jersey, Tennessee, Vermont, and Virginia.⁶⁴ More recent instances include Pennsylvania’s attempt to impeach justices who overruled a heavily-gerrymandered electoral map⁶⁵ and the threat by Dallas Woodhouse, the executive director of North Carolina’s Republican Party, to remove judges if they ruled against the legislature in a dispute over proposed constitutional amendments.⁶⁶

⁶⁰On March 15, 2017 Huckabee [Tweeted](#), “Hoping @POTUS tells Hawaii judge what Andrew Jackson told overreaching court-‘I’ll ignore it and let the court enforce their order.’”

⁶¹Rasmussen, “[Should Obama Ignore the Federal Courts?](#),” February 20, 2015.

⁶²Brennan Center, “[Legislative Assaults on State Courts - 2018](#),” December 27, 2018.

⁶³Bill Raftery, “[2011 Year in Review: Record number of impeachment attempts against judges for their decisions](#),” *Gavel to Gavel*, December 27, 2011.

⁶⁴National Center for State Courts, “[Removal of Office for Specific Decisions](#),” December 2010.

⁶⁵Liz Navratil, “[Pa. Supreme Court chief justice to legislature: Don’t impeach my colleagues](#),” *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, March 22, 2018.

⁶⁶Lynn Bonner, “[NC GOP leader raises possibility of impeaching justices over amendment ruling](#),” *News and Observer*, August 17, 2018.

- **Court curbing:** As a result of their involvement in politically sensitive cases, courts are often criticized for overreach at both the federal and state level. Throughout U.S. history, this has resulted in numerous instances of politically-motivated legislative attempts to limit judicial power or overturn specific court rulings ([Clark 2010](#); [Kramer 2004](#)).

B.3 Civil liberties

Civil liberties are central to a number of conceptions of democracy. Our treatments for candidate positions that aim to undermine civil liberties focused on two fundamental freedoms: i) the freedom of assembly, and ii) the freedom of the press.

i) Restrictions on the freedom of assembly

While the right of free assembly is widely respected in the United States, politically motivated attempts to limit its exercise do occasionally occur. The most frequent method is to impose restrictions on the location and other logistical aspects of protest organization (permit fees, waiting periods for permits), arbitrary arrests of protestors for minor infractions, and the use of excessive force against protestors.⁶⁷ In a number of instances, the intent behind such restrictions is to limit political expression by extremist groups.⁶⁸

To test the public’s commitment to the freedom of assembly, we designed a treatment that builds on such practices. In our candidate choice experiment, a candidate

Said the [own party] governor should ban
far-[left or right] group rallies in the state capital.

The following recent examples document the realism of this treatment:

- The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law maintains a database of state-level laws and proposals that limit free assembly.⁶⁹ Closest to our treatment are two proposals taking aim at protest activity at the state capitol building: an Oklahoma proposal requiring groups of 100 or more to post a \$50,000 bond before protesting at the capitol building⁷⁰ and a West Virginia law that eliminates Capitol Police liability for harming

⁶⁷In an official report to the United Nations, for instance, Special Rapporteur on the rights of freedom of assembly Maina Kiai noted that though free assembly is “relatively healthy” in the United States, the pervasiveness of permitting systems and their “potential for abuse and arbitrary enforcement” is a concern. Maina Kiai, “[Country Visit: United States Of America](#),” *Report to the UN Human Rights Council*, June 2017.

⁶⁸A classic instance of this is the 1977 Supreme Court case *National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie* (432 U.S. 43).

⁶⁹“[US Protest Law Tracker](#),” The International Center for Nor-for-Profit Law, accessed February 1, 2019.

⁷⁰Oklahoma State Legislature, “[S.B. 592](#),” Introduced January 18, 2019.

protestors and allows Capitol Police to deputize bystanders to assist in breaking up protests.⁷¹

- After a series of violent street demonstrations⁷² and a hate crime that left two Muslim women dead, Portland, OR, mayor Ted Wheeler called for the cancellation of rallies by two alt-right groups on a federally-owned plaza next to City Hall.⁷³ Wheeler remarked that, “My main concern is that they are coming to peddle a message of hatred and of bigotry, and I am reminded constantly that they have a first amendment right to speak, but my pushback on that is that hate speech is not protected by the first amendment to the United States Constitution.”⁷⁴ In 2018, Wheeler’s proposal to give himself expansive powers to regulate the time, location, and size of protests was defeated 3-2 by the city council.⁷⁵
- In the 115th Congress, Rep. Daniel Donovan (R-NY) and three cosponsors proposed the Unmasking Antifa Act, which proposed prison sentences of up to 15 years for anyone who, “while in disguise, including while wearing a mask, injures, oppresses, threatens, or intimidates any person ... in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same.”⁷⁶ Arizona’s Senate approved a similar bill following protests outside a rally for President Trump, but its harshest provisions were curtailed before it became law. Similar laws have also been proposed in Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, North Dakota, Ohio, and Washington. Laws aimed at curtailing student protestors have recently been, or currently are, under consideration in Arkansas (proposed), Georgia (enacted), Illinois (proposed), Louisiana (vetoed), Michigan (proposed), Missouri (proposed), South Carolina (proposed), Wisconsin (proposed), and Wyoming (proposed).

ii) Restrictions on the freedom of the press

To test the public’s commitment to the freedom of the press, a treatment in our candidate choice experiment featured candidates who

⁷¹West Virginia Legislature, “[House Bill 4618](#),” Passed June 7, 2018.

⁷²Valerie Richardson, “[Portland Mayor condemns May Day rioting: ‘That’s not political speech. That’s a crime.’](#)” The Washington Times, May 2, 2017.

⁷³Kristine Phillips, “[‘Hate speech is not protected by the First Amendment,’ Portland mayor says. He’s wrong.](#)” Washington Post, May 30, 2017.

⁷⁴KGW News, “[Mayor Wheeler Press Conference](#),” May 29, 2017.

⁷⁵Katie Shepherd and Rachel Monahan, “[Portland City Council Rejects Mayor’s Plan to Restrict Violent Protests](#),” Willamette Week, November 14, 2018.

⁷⁶[H.R. 6054](#), 115th Congress.

Said the [own party] governor should prosecute journalists
who accuse him of misconduct without revealing sources.

This treatment constitutes a brazen infringement on the freedom of the press and we are not aware of any contemporary instances that would be as flagrant. Nonetheless, the following recent developments illustrate the relevance of this treatment:

- Compared with their predecessors, post-9/11 Justice Departments have shown an increased willingness to subpoena journalist records and in some cases, jail or otherwise threaten to prosecute journalists for refusing to reveal their sources regarding matters of national security. In 2005, New York Times reporter Judith Miller was jailed in contempt of court for 85 days after refusing to name a confidential source.⁷⁷ In 2010, a federal search warrant application called Fox News reporter James Rosen an “aider and abettor and/or co-conspirator” to State Department employee Stephen Jin-Woo Kim’s leaks and proposed criminal penalties of up to ten years in prison.⁷⁸ From 2008 to 2015, New York Times journalist James Risen was subpoenaed and threatened with jail time for his refusal to testify against the suspected source of his information about a botched operation to sabotage Iran’s nuclear program.⁷⁹ Risen was compelled to take the stand in a preliminary hearing but following his refusal to reveal any information, the government dropped his subpoena just before the trial.⁸⁰
- President Trump has repeatedly labelled critical news reporting as “fake news” and called several news outlets the “enemy of the people.”⁸¹ He has repeatedly called for changing libel laws so that “when somebody says something that is false and defamatory about someone, that person will have meaningful recourse in our courts.”⁸² In memos about his conversations with the president, former FBI director James Comey notes that Trump approvingly invoked the Judith Miller case while repeatedly encouraging him to imprison journalists for publishing leaked information.⁸³ In retaliation

⁷⁷Adam Liptak, “[Reporter Jailed After Refusing to Name Source](#),” *The New York Times*, July 7, 2005.

⁷⁸Reginald B. Reyes, “[Application for a Search Warrant](#),” US District Court for the District of Columbia, May 28, 2010.

⁷⁹Adam Liptak, “[Supreme Court Rejects Appeal From Times Reporter Over Refusal to Identify Source](#),” *The New York Times*, June 2, 2014.

⁸⁰Matt Apuzzo, “[Times Reporter Will Not Be Called to Testify in Leak Case](#),” *The New York Times*, January 12, 2015.

⁸¹Trump insists that his “enemy of the people” [tweet](#) has been taken out of context because he only applied this label to The New York Times, NBC, ABC, CBS, CNN, and “fake news.” For example, in a November 18, 2018 [interview](#), he told Fox News’s Chris Wallace that “I’m glad you’re finally quoting it correctly because they like to leave the fake news out.”

⁸²Michael M. Grynbaum, “[Trump Renews Pledge to ‘Take a Strong Look’ at Libel Laws](#),” *The New York Times*, January 10, 2018.

⁸³On February 14, 2017, Comey [wrote](#): “I said I was eager to find leakers... I said something about it

for negative coverage, Trump has advocated more substantial steps than his Justice Department has been willing to take: in October 2017, he floated revoking the license of “NBC and the Networks”⁸⁴; he has urged the USPS to increase shipping rates for Amazon.com, allegedly in retaliation for critical reporting by the Washington Post;⁸⁵ and he pressured the Justice Department to stop the merger between AT&T and Time Warner, allegedly in retaliation for critical reporting by CNN.⁸⁶ In October 2018, the Trump White House suspended the press credentials of Jim Acosta of CNN after the reporter’s critical questioning of the president at a news conference.⁸⁷ Acosta’s credentials were reinstated after CNN challenged the suspension in court.

being difficult and he replied that we need to go after the reporters, and referred to the fact that 10 or 15 years ago we put them in jail to find out what they know, and it worked. He mentioned Judy Miller by name. I explained that I was a fan of pursuing leaks aggressively but that going after reporters was tricky, for legal reasons and because DOJ tends to approach it conservatively. He replied by telling me to talk to ‘Sessions’ and see what we can do about being more aggressive. I told him I would speak to the Attorney General... The President then wrapped up our conversation by returning to the issue of finding leakers. I said something about the value of putting a head on a pike as a message. He replied by saying it may involve putting reporters in jail. ‘They spend a couple days in jail, make a new friend, and they are ready to talk.’ I laughed as I walked to the door Reince Priebus had opened.”

⁸⁴On October 11, 2017, Trump [tweeted](#): “With all of the Fake News coming out of NBC and the Networks, at what point is it appropriate to challenge their License? Bad for country!”

⁸⁵Damian Paletta and Josh Dawsey, [“Trump personally pushed postmaster general to double rates on Amazon, other firms,”](#) *The Washington Post*, May 18, 2018.

⁸⁶Jane Mayer, [“The making of the Fox News White House,”](#) *The New Yorker*, March 11, 2019.

⁸⁷Peter Baker, [“Trump Bars CNN’s Jim Acosta From the White House,”](#) *The New York Times*, November 7, 2018.

C Survey Design

We fielded a two-wave survey on Lucid, a survey respondent aggregator that recruits respondents from a wide range of web sites and quota samples according to census demographics. Compared with other commonly-used samples, respondents on Lucid have been found to have similar experimental treatment effects, demographic characteristics, and patterns of political knowledge. Below, we compare our sample’s demographics to the 2017 American Community Survey.

We split our survey into two waves in order to measure theoretically-relevant covariates while minimizing the risk that the act of answering questions about policy and democracy would affect respondent decisions in the candidate choice task. Wave 1 was fielded to 3,038 respondents on Tuesday August 28 and Wednesday August 29, 2018. Of these, 68 spent less than three minutes on the survey or were unable to complete part of the survey due to browser incompatibility. The remaining 2,970 were invited to complete Wave 2 on Tuesday September 4. Of these, 1,692 completed Wave 2 survey before it closed on Tuesday September 25.

This section outlines the survey and describes the randomization procedure for the candidate choice experiment. Full text of both surveys appears at the end of this appendix.

C.1 Survey outline

Because Wave 1’s purpose was to measure theoretically-relevant variables related to our treatments, it focused on partisanship, policy positions, and views about democracy. In sequence, respondents saw the following groups of questions. The group of questions with numbers and letters (4a, 4b, 4c) appeared in random order.

0. **Demographics:** Lucid supplied age, education level, gender, Hispanic ethnicity, household income, and race.
1. **State of residence:** to make candidate policies consistent with current law in each state.
2. **Policy ratings:** 0-100 ratings of the exact policy positions used later in the candidate choice experiment. Figure C.1 presents a screen shot, Figure C.5 lists the full text of the positions, and Section C.4 substantively justifies the choice of policies and policy areas.
3. **Policy area importance:** 0-100 ratings of the importance of each of the four policy areas used in the candidate choice experiment.

- 4a. **Democracy** : a series of questions about democracy asked of all respondents, followed by randomization into one of two batteries from the World Values Survey (simple random assignment, $p = 0.5$). Section E.2 presents the response distribution for each question.
- 4b. **Knowledge of state party control** of the legislature and governor’s office. For Nebraska residents, the questions referred to a unicameral legislature.
- 4c. **Partisanship**: the ANES 7-point party ID branching question, 7-point liberal/conservative ideology, and 4-point agreement with a set of statements designed to measure partisans’ commitment to voting for their party.
5. **Bundle ratings**: for each respondents, the two policy platforms and partisan affiliation (i.e. a party-policy bundle) of 24 of the 32 candidates they would later see in the candidate choice experiment were chosen by blocked complete random assignment (exactly 12 of 16 scenarios). On a 0 to 100 scale, respondents answered the question, “How close is this candidate to your ideal set of policies?” Figures C.2 and C.3 presents a screen shot.
6. **Vote choice and Trump approval**: 2012 and 2016 vote choice, approval of President Trump’s job performance.


Because Wave 2 contained the candidate choices, we only asked questions without a clear connection to views about policy, partisanship, or democracy. In sequence, respondents saw the following groups of questions.

1. **Political knowledge**: Eight questions from the ANES. Four exactly matched the ANES wording and response options. The four “knowledge of officeholders” questions are open-ended on the ANES. We approximated this format with seven-item multiple choice questions that included a “don’t know” option.
2. **Voting is a “duty/choice”**: Exactly matched the ANES branching format.
3. **Authoritarian personality**: Exactly matched the four binary child-rearing questions from the ANES.
4. **Candidate choices**: Sixteen choice scenarios, described in more detail below. Figure C.4 presents a screen shot.
5. **Final choice debrief**: Two questions about the last of the candidate choices: an open-ended question about how the respondent chose, and a question about which candidate “is more likely to respect norms of democratic political competition.”

C.2 Selected screen shots

Figure C.1: Policy rating example: immigration

How strongly would you support or oppose each policy?



Local police should not help federal authorities to enforce immigration laws.

Local police should turn over to federal authorities only illegal immigrants accused of violent crimes.

Local police should turn over to federal authorities every illegal immigrant they encounter.

Local police should aggressively search for illegal immigrants and turn them over to federal authorities.



Figure C.2: Bundle rating instructions

We would like to learn about your views on a series of candidates for a state legislature. Each candidate will have a few policy positions and most will have a political party.

As you rate these candidates, please think about how close each one is to the combination of party and policy positions that you would most like to see in a real candidate.



Figure C.3: Bundle rating example

A Republican with the platform:

- ▶ Cut state aid across all local school districts.
- ▶ Marijuana should be legal for recreational use and only sold in state-licensed dispensaries.

How similar is this candidate to your ideal set of policy views?

Exact opposite of me		Different than me			Similar to me			Exactly my views		
0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100



Figure C.4: Candidate choice example

	Candidate 1	Candidate 2
Age	50 years old	40 years old
Gender	Male	Female
Race	White	White
Background	Business executive for 21 years	Lawyer for 8 years
Party	Republican	Democrat
Positions	Marijuana should be legal for recreational use and only sold in state-licensed dispensaries.	Marijuana should be illegal for everyone. No exceptions.
	Served on a subcommittee that reviews the structure of state legislative staff offices.	Supported a proposal to reduce the number of polling stations in areas that support Republicans.
	Increase state aid across all local school districts.	Increase state aid to local school districts and prioritize poor school districts.

Which candidate do you prefer?

Candidate 1	Candidate 2
-------------	-------------

Would you vote in this election?

Yes	No
-----	----

The next button will appear after 20 seconds.



C.3 Candidate choices and the randomization procedure

Each respondent made 16 candidate choices. All candidate characteristics were assigned by a combination of block random and simple random assignment. Figure C.4 presents an example of a candidate-choice scenario.

For all respondents, each candidate-choice scenario was assigned an ID number between 1 and 16. All attributes in scenarios 1 to 13 were assigned independently of the other. All candidates in scenarios 1 to 13 were either a Democrats or a Republican. In nine of these 13, one candidate endorsed one of seven undemocratic positions or committed one of two “negative valence” behaviors; each of the nine negative attributes appeared once per respondent.

Candidate-choice scenarios 14 and 15 featured candidates without a political party, and scenario 16 was either a Democrat vs. Republican or Republican vs. Democrat choice in which both candidates were undemocratic. Because scenarios 14-16 did not use the same random assignment procedure as scenarios 1-13, our analysis excludes them unless explicitly noted.

Figure C.5 lists the values of each attribute and the random assignment procedure. We selected the distribution of non-policy, non-democracy attributes using data from the National Council of State Legislatures, with an oversample of women and racial minorities. Note that although age and years of experience are not independent of one another, the possible combinations of age and years are independent of all other candidate characteristics.

Figure C.5: Randomization of candidate attributes

Attribute	Randomization	Values
Party	Each respondent saw the same sixteen combinations.	Scenarios 1-13, 16 (randomized): • Democrat vs. Republican (4) • Republican vs. Democrat (4) • Democrat vs. Democrat (3) • Republican vs. Republican (3) Scenarios 14, 15: no party listed.
Policy	Each candidate took one social position and one economic position. Both candidates took positions in the same policy area. Each respondent saw the same sixteen combinations: each possible combination of the economic and social issues (2 x 2) listed in both possible orders (x 2) twice (x 2 = 16) Within each issue area, the issue position (the number 1-4) was assigned by simple random assignment ($p = 0.25$). *Respondents from states without an income and/or corporate tax saw wording that aligned with state policy---see full text below.	<i>Education finance (economic)</i> • Increase state aid to local school districts and prioritize poor school districts. • Increase state aid across all local school districts. • Cut state aid across all local school districts. • Eliminate state aid to local school districts. <i>Tax rates (economic)*</i> • Increase the state income tax on households earning over \$250,000 and increase the state corporate tax. • Increase the state income tax on households earning over \$250,000. • Cut the state income tax for all households. • Eliminate the state income tax. <i>Immigration (social)</i> • Local police should not help federal authorities to enforce immigration laws. • Local police should turn over to federal authorities only illegal immigrants accused of violent crimes. • Local police should turn over to federal authorities every illegal immigrant they encounter. • Local police should aggressively search for illegal immigrants and turn them over to federal authorities. <i>Marijuana (social)</i> • Marijuana should be legal for recreational use and sold freely. • Marijuana should be legal for recreational use and only sold in state-licensed dispensaries. • Marijuana should only be legal for medical use. • Marijuana should be illegal for everyone. No exceptions.
Democracy	Scenarios 1-13: • Four scenarios were randomly assigned to feature only “generic” candidates. Generic candidates took each generic attribute with equal probability. • Nine scenarios were randomly assigned to feature one generic and one undemocratic candidate. Each respondent saw each undemocratic attribute (i.e., all values not labelled “generic”) one time.	<i>Civil liberties</i> • Said the [own party] governor should prosecute journalists who accuse him of misconduct without revealing sources. • Said the [own party] governor should ban far-[opposite side of political spectrum] group rallies in the state capital. <i>Checks and balances</i> • Said the [own party] governor should rule by executive order if [opposite party] legislators don't cooperate. • Said the [own party] governor should ignore unfavorable court rulings by [opposite party]-appointed judges.

Scenario 14 - Always one generic and one undemocratic candidate. Values chosen with equal probability. Scenario 15 - Always two generic candidates. Two values chosen with equal probability but without replacement. Scenario 16 - Always two undemocratic candidates. Two values chosen with equal probability but without replacement. All scenarios - A coin flip determined which candidate appeared on the left and which appeared on the right.		
<i>Electoral fairness</i> - Supported a proposal to reduce the number of polling stations in areas that support [opposite party]s. - Supported a redistricting plan that gives [own party]s 2 extra seats despite a decline in the polls. - Supported a redistricting plan that gives [own party]s 10 extra seats despite a decline in the polls. <i>Negative valence</i> - Was convicted of underpaying federal income taxes. - Was reported to have had multiple extramarital affairs. <i>Generic</i> - Served on a committee that establishes the state legislature's schedule for each session. - Worked on a plan to change the state legislature's committee structure. - Served on the state's Board of Elections, which handles local, state, and federal elections. - Submitted a proposal that would change the state's record-keeping laws and practices. - Served on a subcommittee that reviews the structure of state legislative staff offices. - Served on a committee that approves proposed changes to legislative procedure. - Participated in a working group on using program evaluation to inform policymaking.		
Age	Draw a random integer	{35, 36, ..., 65}
Race	Draw from a distribution	White (p = 0.65), Black (p = 0.15), Hispanic (p = 0.15), Asian (p = 0.05)
Gender	Same distribution for each respondent	Each respondent saw 20 men and 12 women
Profession	Draw from a distribution	Business executive (p = .15), Small business owner (p = .15), Lawyer (p = 0.2), Farmer (p = 0.1), Legislative staffer (p=.1), Teacher (p=.1), Served in the army (p=.05), Served in the navy (p=.05)
Years of experience	Subtract a random integer from candidate age.	Age minus a random integer between 20 and 30.

C.4 Justification of policy treatments

We selected four policy areas—education, tax rates, immigration, marijuana—to be representative of the key economic and social policy issues in U.S. state politics. Both the *Congressional Quarterly* (CQ) and the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) included these four areas among their top policy areas for 2018.⁸⁸ In a 2016 survey of political reporters, CQ found that budget/taxes and education were the top two state public policy issues.⁸⁹ This section describes the substantive rationale for our choices in each area.

Education is the largest budget item in U.S. states.⁹⁰ According to the latest data from the National Center for Education Statistics, 45.1 percent of public school districts’ 2013-14 revenue came from state aid, 46.5 percent from local sources, and 8.4 percent from the federal government.⁹¹ As local revenue sources (chiefly property taxes) tend to be strongly tied to wealth and income, state aid to local districts is the key redistributive lever in state education finance: poorer districts count on it for a larger share of their budgets.⁹² We chose four policies that alter the level and distributive consequences of state aid. From most liberal to most conservative, the policies were:

- Increase state aid to local school districts and prioritize poor school districts.
- Increase state aid across all local school districts.
- Cut state aid across all local school districts.
- Eliminate state aid to local school districts.

Tax policy. Sales, income, and corporate taxes are the largest revenue sources in U.S. state budgets.⁹³ We designed four policies that would alter this revenue mix and its distributive consequences. Respondents in 41 states and the District of Columbia saw the following tax policies. Respondents in states lacking an income or sales tax saw slight modifications that

⁸⁸CQ: Whit Robinson, “[11 Issues to Watch in 2018](#),” CQ State, January 2018. NCSL: Julia Lays, “[Top 10 in 2018](#),” State Legislatures Magazine, January 2018.

⁸⁹Ann Dermody, “[52 Statehouse Reporters Review the Top 5 Public Policy Issues in Each State in 2016](#),” CQ, May 3, 2016.

⁹⁰“[State and Local Expenditures](#),” Urban Institute backgrounder, accessed October 25, 2018.

⁹¹Calculated using data from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) [Public School District Finance Peer Search](#) on October 25, 2018.

⁹²We confirmed this well-known relationship in the NCES data using the OLS regression

$$\text{StateRevenuePercent}_i = s_i + \beta \text{PercentPoverty}_i + \epsilon_i$$

where i indexes school districts, $\text{StateRevenuePercent}_i$ is the percentage of the districts revenue that comes from the state, s_i is a state fixed effect, and PercentPoverty_i is the poverty rate among students. $\beta = 0.56$ (robust SE = 0.02), indicating that controlling for state-to-state average differences, each percentage point increase in the poverty rate among students predicts 0.56 percent greater budget share for state aid. These variable names match the source data from NCES.

⁹³“[State and Local Revenues](#),” Urban Institute backgrounder, accessed October 25, 2018.

fit the policies to the status quo in the state while preserving the left-right ordering of the policies; see the full survey text below.

- Increase the state income tax on households earning over \$250,000 and increase the state corporate tax.
- Increase the state income tax on households earning over \$250,000.
- Cut the state income tax for all households.
- Eliminate the state income tax.

Immigration. Many state policies affect unauthorized immigrants. One issue that is both salient and fundamental is the extent to which state and local law enforcement assist with enforcement of federal immigration laws. Because state and local police often come into contact with unauthorized immigrants but cannot themselves enforce immigration law, the federal government requests that local agencies hold them for pickup by federal authorities. Cities and states that do not fully cooperate are known as “sanctuaries.” We constructed a four-point scale of willingness to assist with federal immigration enforcement. We follow the ANES and CCES by referring to “illegal” immigrants.

- Local police should not help federal authorities to enforce immigration laws.
- Local police should turn over to federal authorities only illegal immigrants accused of violent crimes.
- Local police should turn over to federal authorities every illegal immigrant they encounter.
- Local police should aggressively search for illegal immigrants and turn them over to federal authorities.

Marijuana has become an increasingly prominent state policy area since California became the first state to legalize medical marijuana 1996.⁹⁴ Today, marijuana is legal for recreational use in 10 states, for medical use in an additional 21, and in low-THC forms in another 15.⁹⁵ As the trend in reform proposals and public opinion has been toward greater liberalization, our four-item set of marijuana policies is slightly to the left of status quo policy in the states: two recreational proposals (lax and stringent), a medical proposal, and an outright ban.

- Marijuana should be legal for recreational use and sold freely.
- Marijuana should be legal for recreational use and only sold in state-licensed dispensaries.
- Marijuana should only be legal for medical use.
- Marijuana should be illegal for everyone. No exceptions.

⁹⁴Sarah Trumble, “[Timeline of State Marijuana Legalization Laws](#),” *Third Way*, April 19, 2017.

⁹⁵National Council of State Legislatures, “[State Medical Marijuana Laws](#),” October 17, 2018.

C.5 Measures of candidate-respondent policy distance

All results in the paper compute the distance between candidates and respondents using the respondent’s average rating of the candidate’s two policies. In this section we present results equivalent to those presented in the paper using alternative measures. We computed four measures of distance between candidates and respondents.

- **Policy rating:** The average of 0-100 rating of the candidate’s two policies, based on the policy ratings described above.
- **Policy rank:** Each respondent’s policy ratings were transformed to the scale $\{1, 2/3, 1/3, 0\}$, ranging from favorite to least favorite.
- **Party-policy bundle:** The 0-100 rating of the candidate’s party and both policies, as described above.
- **Ideological distance:** This measure is computed using the candidates’ policies, the respondent’s ideal policy, and a liberal-conservative ordering of the policies in each area.
 - In each of the four policy areas, the four policies in each area were scored 1-4, from most liberal to most conservative.
 - The respondent’s ideal policy in each policy area was identified based on their highest-rated policy. If two or more policies tied, the average was used as the ideal policy.
 - In each policy area, the difference between the candidate and the respondent was computed according to the formula $X_{\text{respondent}} - X_{\text{candidate}}$. This quantity was then averaged for the candidate’s two policies.

For each of these four measures we applied two transformations common in formal theoretic analysis of electoral competition:

- **Absolute:** The untransformed rating, or negative absolute distance for the ideological measure.
- **Squared:** The squared rating, or negative squared distance for the ideological measure.

For most of our results, we take the difference between Candidate 1 and Candidate 2’s ratings on these measures. Table C.1 gives the formula for each measure and transformation: R_{je} is the respondent’s rating of the candidate j ’s economic policy; R_{js} is the social policy; B_j is the party-policy bundle rating; $\text{rk}()$ is the rank function; x_{is} and x_{ie} are respondent i ’s ideal points on economic and social policy; and x_{js} and x_{je} are the ideological positions of candidate j ’s policies.

In the paper, we always use the formula in the top right cell of Table C.1. The robustness checks below use the measures in the other seven cells. Figure C.5 plots the distribution of each measure (columns) and transformation (rows), with each colored line representing a different category of partisan strength (0 = independent, 1 = lean toward a party, 2 =

Table C.1: Formulas used to calculate candidate 1's policy proximity advantage

		Transformation	
		Absolute	Squared
Measure	Policy proximity	$\frac{R_{1e}+R_{1s}}{2} - \frac{R_{2e}+R_{2s}}{2}$	$\left(\frac{R_{1e}^2+R_{1s}^2}{2}\right) - \left(\frac{R_{2e}^2+R_{2s}^2}{2}\right)$
	Policy rank	$\frac{\text{rk}(R_{1e})+\text{rk}(R_{1s})}{2} - \frac{\text{rk}(R_{2e})+\text{rk}(R_{2s})}{2}$	$\frac{\text{rk}(R_{1e})^2+\text{rk}(R_{1s})^2}{2} - \frac{\text{rk}(R_{2e})^2+\text{rk}(R_{2s})^2}{2}$
	Party-policy bundle	$B_1 - B_2$	$(B_1)^2 - (B_2)^2$
	Ideological distance	$\left \frac{(x_{ie}-x_{2e})+(x_{is}-x_{2s})}{2} \right - \left \frac{(x_{ie}-x_{1e})+(x_{is}-x_{1s})}{2} \right $	$\frac{(x_{ie}-x_{2e})^2+(x_{is}-x_{2s})^2}{2} - \frac{(x_{ie}-x_{1e})^2+(x_{is}-x_{1s})^2}{2}$

partisan but not strong, 3 = strong partisan). Figure C.5 is identical except that the Y-axis is cut off so as to make differences in the distributions more evident.

Note that while all distributions are similar, the rank-based distributions are almost identical. This is because by construction, the rank-based measure is distributed identically for every respondent. On this measure, differences between partisan groups can only emerge as a consequence of chance variation in the candidate choices.

Table C.2 tests the difference in the plotted distributions using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, a non-parametric test based on the largest difference between two empirical cumulative distribution functions. Note that the policy rank measure always passes the test, with the smallest $p = 0.695$.

Figure C.6: Density of policy distance measures by partisan strength




Figure C.7: Density of policy distance measures by partisan strength, zoomed in on bottom




Table C.2: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test between party strength groups, by policy distance measure

Measure	Transformation	Group 1	Group 2	Statistic	p
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	0	1	0.07	0.000
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	0	2	0.04	0.001
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	0	3	0.03	0.001
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	1	2	0.04	0.000
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	1	3	0.03	0.000
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	2	3	0.02	0.006
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	0	1	0.06	0.000
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	0	2	0.04	0.000
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	0	3	0.04	0.000
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	1	2	0.03	0.018
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	1	3	0.02	0.354
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	2	3	0.02	0.019
Policy Rank	Absolute	0	1	0.01	0.977
Policy Rank	Absolute	0	2	0.00	1.000
Policy Rank	Absolute	0	3	0.00	1.000
Policy Rank	Absolute	1	2	0.01	0.758
Policy Rank	Absolute	1	3	0.01	0.726
Policy Rank	Absolute	2	3	0.00	1.000
Policy Rank	Squared	0	1	0.01	0.800
Policy Rank	Squared	0	2	0.01	0.902
Policy Rank	Squared	0	3	0.00	1.000
Policy Rank	Squared	1	2	0.01	0.844
Policy Rank	Squared	1	3	0.01	0.869
Policy Rank	Squared	2	3	0.01	0.954
Policy Rating	Absolute	0	1	0.04	0.000
Policy Rating	Absolute	0	2	0.02	0.046
Policy Rating	Absolute	0	3	0.02	0.058
Policy Rating	Absolute	1	2	0.03	0.000
Policy Rating	Absolute	1	3	0.02	0.006
Policy Rating	Absolute	2	3	0.02	0.000
Policy Rating	Squared	0	1	0.03	0.003
Policy Rating	Squared	0	2	0.02	0.084
Policy Rating	Squared	0	3	0.02	0.038
Policy Rating	Squared	1	2	0.03	0.001
Policy Rating	Squared	1	3	0.02	0.023
Policy Rating	Squared	2	3	0.02	0.001
Spatial Distance	Absolute	0	1	0.01	0.955
Spatial Distance	Absolute	0	2	0.01	0.592
Spatial Distance	Absolute	0	3	0.01	0.938
Spatial Distance	Absolute	1	2	0.01	0.607
Spatial Distance	Absolute	1	3	0.01	0.994
Spatial Distance	Absolute	2	3	0.01	0.410
Spatial Distance	Squared	0	1	0.01	0.836
Spatial Distance	Squared	0	2	0.01	0.797
Spatial Distance	Squared	0	3	0.01	1.000
Spatial Distance	Squared	1	2	0.01	0.655
Spatial Distance	Squared	1	3	0.01	0.872
Spatial Distance	Squared	2	3	0.01	0.584

C.6 Comparison to Census and ANES

The following tables compare respondents from our Lucid sample to the 2016 American National Election Study (ANES) web sample and the 2017 American Community Survey (ACS)⁹⁶ one-year estimates for adult U.S. citizens. The first table displays partisanship and demographic characteristics from the Lucid sample, ANES, and ACS. The second displays a series of attitudinal and political knowledge variables that appear only in the Lucid and ANES surveys.

With one exception, the ACS data are individual-level estimates computed using the Public Use Microdata File. The ACS household income estimates are from the American FactFinder table S1901.⁹⁷ Because the Lucid data are at the individual level, these estimates are not strictly comparable.

To make the sample more nationally representative, we computed raked weights using the ACS crosstabs below and the `survey` package in R. We trimmed the weights to fall between 1/2 and 2, then scaled them up so that they sum to the sample size. All results presented in the paper and this appendix use these weights.

All ANES variables in the table below are computed using the weights that correspond to the survey wave in which the question was fielded. No ANES variables were used to construct the weights.

⁹⁶In 2010, the ACS replaced the long-form Census for all but a few population characteristics. As of this writing, the 2017 ACS one-year summary file is the most recent edition of the ACS.

⁹⁷Shortly before publication, the Census Bureau announced the retirement of the American FactFinder. We regret any difficulty verifying the contents of this table.

Variable	Value	ACS	ANES	Weighted	Unweighted
Age	18 to 34	29.6	28.3	25.7	20.2
	35 to 49	23.6	23.4	22.7	21.3
	50 to 64	25.7	28.4	28.5	33.8
	65 to 96	21.2	17.4	23.1	24.7
	Refused or missing		2.5	0.0	0.0
Education	Associate's degree	8.5	11.5	9.2	9.6
	Bachelor's degree	19.0	17.4	22.9	26.3
	Did not complete high school	10.1	9.1	5.8	2.8
	Graduate or professional degree	10.9	12.7	11.9	12.6
	High school graduate	27.9	28.6	25.1	23.1
	Some college, no degree	23.7	19.7	24.6	25.2
	Refused or missing		1.0	0.4	0.4
Gender	Female	51.5	52.3	52.7	51.1
	Male	48.5	47.7	47.3	48.9
Hispanic	Yes	12.5	11.8	10.2	7.9
	No	87.5	88.2	88.2	90.5
	Refused or missing		0.0	1.6	1.6
Race	American Indian or Alaska Native	0.8	0.9	1.5	1.5
	Asian or Pacific Islander	4.5	3.3	5.3	5.8
	Black	12.8	11.0	11.5	10.5
	Other	5.6	9.0	4.8	4.5
	White	76.4	74.2	75.6	76.4
	Refused or missing		1.6	1.2	1.2
Party ID (7 point)	-3		22.2	24.3	24.2
	-2		14.1	14.1	14.0
	-1		9.4	7.3	7.8
	0		16.3	14.0	13.5
	1		9.4	8.2	7.7
	2		11.6	13.4	13.7
	3		16.7	18.6	19.1
	Refused or missing		0.3	0.0	0.0
Household income	[0,25)	20.3		21.9	25.0
	[100,200)	20.9		16.7	9.6
	[200,201)	6.9		0.9	0.4
	[25,50)	21.8		25.3	31.7
	[50,75)	17.6		18.6	19.6
	[75,100)	12.5		11.9	9.1
	Refused or missing			4.7	4.7

Variable	Value	ANES	Weighted	Unweighted
Satisfied with U.S. democracy	Fairly satisfied	46.3	54.4	55.1
	Not at all satisfied	5.7	5.8	6.2
	Not very satisfied	24.1	23.8	23.2
	Very satisfied	6.6	16.0	15.5
	Refused or missing	17.4	0.0	0.0
Authoritarian trait 1	Independence	22.0	26.8	26.0
	Respect for elders	61.0	73.1	73.9
	Refused or missing	17.0	0.1	0.2
Authoritarian trait 2	Curiosity	29.0	32.9	31.4
	Good manners	54.1	67.0	68.4
	Refused or missing	16.9	0.1	0.2
Authoritarian trait 3	Obedience	40.6	48.9	48.8
	Self-reliance	42.2	50.9	50.9
	Refused or missing	17.1	0.2	0.2
Authoritarian trait 4	Considerate	55.2	56.6	56.0
	Well-behaved	27.8	43.3	43.8
	Refused or missing	17.0	0.1	0.2
Voting a duty/choice	-3	19.4	21.8	23.3
	-2	15.4	17.1	16.6
	-1	5.2	2.5	2.9
	0	11.1	13.7	13.4
	1	3.6	0.9	0.7
	2	13.8	12.0	10.7
	3	31.2	32.0	32.5
	Refused or missing	0.4	0.0	0.0
Foreign aid budget share	Correct	25.7	29.1	29.7
	Incorrect	70.8	70.9	70.3
	Refused or missing	3.5	0.0	0.0
House party control	Correct	69.1	83.3	84.2
	Incorrect	27.1	16.6	15.7
	Refused or missing	3.8	0.1	0.1
Senate term length	Correct	44.5	39.8	40.2
	Incorrect	51.4	60.1	59.7
	Refused or missing	4.1	0.1	0.1
Senate party control	Correct	64.9	81.2	81.4
	Incorrect	35.1	18.5	18.4
	Refused or missing	0.0	0.2	0.2
Angela Merkel's job	Correct	57.0	54.2	55.4
	Incorrect	43.0	45.8	44.6
Paul Ryan's job	Correct	64.9	65.1	66.6
	Incorrect	35.1	34.9	33.4
John Roberts' job	Correct	39.9	41.2	42.6
	Incorrect	43.5	58.8	57.4
	Refused or missing	16.6	0.0	0.0
Vladimir Putin's job	Correct	87.4	88.9	89.7
	Incorrect	12.6	11.1	10.3

D Supporting Survey Results by Section


D.1 Democratic Principles versus Policy Preferences

For the “Democratic Principles versus Policy Preferences” section, we present three main sets of supplemental results:


- we reproduce the left and right panels of Figure 2 using several alternative measures of distance between the candidates’ policies and our respondents’ preferences;
- we present numerical results that correspond to each point plotted in both panels, for both the policy distance measure used in the paper and each of the alternative measures of distance;
- we reproduce the left panel separately for each democracy treatment.

D.1.1 Figure 2, left panel with alternative measures

This figure displays the analogue of Figure 2 in the paper. The first facet is identical to Figure 1 and the remaining facets use the alternative measures of candidate 1's proximity advantage described in Section C.5.



D.1.2 Figure 2, right panel with alternative measures



D.1.3 Numerical results for Figure 2

The tables below present numerical results for the two preceding figures. Table D.1 list candidate 1's mean vote share (the left panel of Figure 2) and Table D.2 presents the differences in means (the right panel of Figure 2).

Table D.1: Mean Vote Share by Distance Measure

Measure	Transformation	Type	Value	Estimate	Bootstrap		Clustered	
					SE	CI	SE	CI
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	D+ vs. D+	-0.9	0.127	0.025	(0.082, 0.174)	0.025	(0.077, 0.177)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	D- vs. D+	-0.9	0.107	0.024	(0.061, 0.156)	0.024	(0.058, 0.155)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	V- vs. D+	-0.9	0.065	0.034	(0.013, 0.142)	0.034	(-0.005, 0.136)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	D+ vs. D+	-0.7	0.172	0.024	(0.126, 0.222)	0.024	(0.124, 0.219)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	D- vs. D+	-0.7	0.157	0.026	(0.112, 0.212)	0.026	(0.105, 0.209)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	V- vs. D+	-0.7	0.135	0.045	(0.048, 0.229)	0.046	(0.04, 0.229)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	D+ vs. D+	-0.5	0.201	0.018	(0.169, 0.239)	0.018	(0.166, 0.236)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	D- vs. D+	-0.5	0.149	0.017	(0.118, 0.18)	0.016	(0.116, 0.181)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	V- vs. D+	-0.5	0.132	0.032	(0.073, 0.198)	0.033	(0.067, 0.197)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	D+ vs. D+	-0.3	0.306	0.017	(0.275, 0.34)	0.017	(0.272, 0.34)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	D- vs. D+	-0.3	0.233	0.018	(0.199, 0.269)	0.017	(0.2, 0.266)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	V- vs. D+	-0.3	0.197	0.030	(0.142, 0.259)	0.030	(0.137, 0.257)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	D+ vs. D+	-0.1	0.466	0.010	(0.447, 0.487)	0.010	(0.446, 0.487)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	D- vs. D+	-0.1	0.339	0.010	(0.316, 0.358)	0.010	(0.318, 0.359)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	V- vs. D+	-0.1	0.299	0.020	(0.263, 0.34)	0.019	(0.262, 0.337)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	D+ vs. D+	0.1	0.534	0.010	(0.513, 0.553)	0.010	(0.513, 0.554)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	D- vs. D+	0.1	0.389	0.011	(0.368, 0.411)	0.011	(0.367, 0.41)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	V- vs. D+	0.1	0.295	0.018	(0.26, 0.331)	0.019	(0.258, 0.332)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	D+ vs. D+	0.3	0.694	0.017	(0.66, 0.725)	0.017	(0.66, 0.728)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	D- vs. D+	0.3	0.534	0.022	(0.491, 0.577)	0.021	(0.492, 0.575)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	V- vs. D+	0.3	0.425	0.038	(0.351, 0.498)	0.036	(0.353, 0.497)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	D+ vs. D+	0.5	0.799	0.018	(0.761, 0.831)	0.018	(0.764, 0.834)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	D- vs. D+	0.5	0.631	0.024	(0.584, 0.678)	0.025	(0.583, 0.68)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	V- vs. D+	0.5	0.476	0.047	(0.386, 0.577)	0.047	(0.381, 0.57)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	D+ vs. D+	0.7	0.828	0.024	(0.778, 0.874)	0.024	(0.781, 0.876)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	D- vs. D+	0.7	0.732	0.029	(0.675, 0.786)	0.029	(0.676, 0.789)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	V- vs. D+	0.7	0.584	0.063	(0.456, 0.705)	0.061	(0.46, 0.708)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	D+ vs. D+	0.9	0.873	0.025	(0.826, 0.918)	0.025	(0.823, 0.923)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	D- vs. D+	0.9	0.814	0.029	(0.752, 0.869)	0.029	(0.756, 0.872)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	V- vs. D+	0.9	0.751	0.074	(0.603, 0.887)	0.075	(0.595, 0.906)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	D+ vs. D+	-0.9	0.124	0.021	(0.083, 0.165)	0.021	(0.082, 0.167)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	D- vs. D+	-0.9	0.123	0.022	(0.082, 0.169)	0.022	(0.079, 0.168)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	V- vs. D+	-0.9	0.059	0.026	(0.019, 0.119)	0.025	(0.007, 0.111)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	D+ vs. D+	-0.7	0.190	0.022	(0.148, 0.234)	0.022	(0.145, 0.234)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	D- vs. D+	-0.7	0.167	0.024	(0.121, 0.216)	0.025	(0.118, 0.216)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	V- vs. D+	-0.7	0.124	0.043	(0.049, 0.216)	0.044	(0.034, 0.215)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	D+ vs. D+	-0.5	0.248	0.023	(0.207, 0.295)	0.023	(0.202, 0.294)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	D- vs. D+	-0.5	0.180	0.020	(0.143, 0.221)	0.021	(0.139, 0.221)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	V- vs. D+	-0.5	0.237	0.045	(0.152, 0.318)	0.045	(0.146, 0.328)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	D+ vs. D+	-0.3	0.311	0.018	(0.276, 0.346)	0.019	(0.274, 0.348)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	D- vs. D+	-0.3	0.232	0.018	(0.197, 0.269)	0.018	(0.198, 0.267)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	V- vs. D+	-0.3	0.176	0.028	(0.123, 0.235)	0.029	(0.118, 0.234)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	D+ vs. D+	-0.1	0.451	0.010	(0.432, 0.471)	0.010	(0.432, 0.471)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	D- vs. D+	-0.1	0.329	0.010	(0.307, 0.349)	0.010	(0.309, 0.349)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	V- vs. D+	-0.1	0.289	0.019	(0.254, 0.329)	0.019	(0.252, 0.325)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	D+ vs. D+	0.1	0.549	0.010	(0.529, 0.568)	0.010	(0.529, 0.568)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	D- vs. D+	0.1	0.404	0.011	(0.383, 0.426)	0.011	(0.383, 0.426)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	V- vs. D+	0.1	0.320	0.018	(0.283, 0.354)	0.019	(0.283, 0.356)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	D+ vs. D+	0.3	0.689	0.018	(0.654, 0.724)	0.019	(0.652, 0.726)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	D- vs. D+	0.3	0.542	0.021	(0.502, 0.581)	0.021	(0.5, 0.584)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	V- vs. D+	0.3	0.331	0.037	(0.26, 0.403)	0.037	(0.258, 0.405)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	D+ vs. D+	0.5	0.752	0.023	(0.705, 0.793)	0.023	(0.706, 0.798)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	D- vs. D+	0.5	0.567	0.028	(0.511, 0.62)	0.028	(0.512, 0.622)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	V- vs. D+	0.5	0.477	0.054	(0.372, 0.579)	0.053	(0.37, 0.583)

Table D.1: Mean Vote Share by Distance Measure (continued)

Measure	Transformation	Type	Value	Estimate	— Bootstrap —		— Clustered —	
					SE	CI	SE	CI
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	D+ vs. D+	0.7	0.810	0.022	(0.766, 0.852)	0.022	(0.766, 0.855)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	D- vs. D+	0.7	0.687	0.028	(0.631, 0.742)	0.029	(0.631, 0.744)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	V- vs. D+	0.7	0.607	0.060	(0.487, 0.72)	0.059	(0.487, 0.726)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	D+ vs. D+	0.9	0.876	0.021	(0.835, 0.917)	0.021	(0.833, 0.918)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	D- vs. D+	0.9	0.804	0.027	(0.747, 0.855)	0.027	(0.75, 0.858)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	V- vs. D+	0.9	0.691	0.064	(0.557, 0.813)	0.063	(0.562, 0.82)
Policy Rank	Absolute	D+ vs. D+	-0.9	0.240	0.028	(0.185, 0.3)	0.029	(0.183, 0.297)
Policy Rank	Absolute	D- vs. D+	-0.9	0.206	0.028	(0.15, 0.262)	0.029	(0.147, 0.264)
Policy Rank	Absolute	V- vs. D+	-0.9	0.120	0.058	(0.017, 0.246)	0.058	(0, 0.24)
Policy Rank	Absolute	D+ vs. D+	-0.7	0.287	0.022	(0.246, 0.331)	0.022	(0.243, 0.33)
Policy Rank	Absolute	D- vs. D+	-0.7	0.226	0.024	(0.179, 0.274)	0.023	(0.181, 0.271)
Policy Rank	Absolute	V- vs. D+	-0.7	0.133	0.032	(0.076, 0.201)	0.031	(0.071, 0.195)
Policy Rank	Absolute	D+ vs. D+	-0.5	0.289	0.016	(0.259, 0.32)	0.016	(0.258, 0.321)
Policy Rank	Absolute	D- vs. D+	-0.5	0.245	0.017	(0.212, 0.28)	0.017	(0.212, 0.277)
Policy Rank	Absolute	V- vs. D+	-0.5	0.194	0.027	(0.148, 0.251)	0.027	(0.141, 0.247)
Policy Rank	Absolute	D+ vs. D+	-0.3	0.350	0.013	(0.327, 0.375)	0.013	(0.325, 0.376)
Policy Rank	Absolute	D- vs. D+	-0.3	0.258	0.012	(0.234, 0.282)	0.013	(0.233, 0.283)
Policy Rank	Absolute	V- vs. D+	-0.3	0.225	0.024	(0.18, 0.272)	0.023	(0.179, 0.271)
Policy Rank	Absolute	D+ vs. D+	-0.1	0.431	0.010	(0.412, 0.452)	0.010	(0.412, 0.451)
Policy Rank	Absolute	D- vs. D+	-0.1	0.324	0.010	(0.305, 0.343)	0.010	(0.304, 0.344)
Policy Rank	Absolute	V- vs. D+	-0.1	0.280	0.018	(0.246, 0.317)	0.018	(0.245, 0.315)
Policy Rank	Absolute	D+ vs. D+	0.1	0.569	0.010	(0.548, 0.588)	0.010	(0.549, 0.588)
Policy Rank	Absolute	D- vs. D+	0.1	0.390	0.010	(0.37, 0.411)	0.010	(0.37, 0.41)
Policy Rank	Absolute	V- vs. D+	0.1	0.305	0.018	(0.27, 0.34)	0.018	(0.269, 0.34)
Policy Rank	Absolute	D+ vs. D+	0.3	0.650	0.013	(0.625, 0.673)	0.013	(0.624, 0.675)
Policy Rank	Absolute	D- vs. D+	0.3	0.504	0.016	(0.472, 0.536)	0.016	(0.473, 0.535)
Policy Rank	Absolute	V- vs. D+	0.3	0.416	0.027	(0.358, 0.47)	0.027	(0.363, 0.468)
Policy Rank	Absolute	D+ vs. D+	0.5	0.711	0.016	(0.68, 0.741)	0.016	(0.679, 0.742)
Policy Rank	Absolute	D- vs. D+	0.5	0.566	0.018	(0.529, 0.601)	0.019	(0.53, 0.603)
Policy Rank	Absolute	V- vs. D+	0.5	0.491	0.033	(0.427, 0.557)	0.034	(0.423, 0.559)
Policy Rank	Absolute	D+ vs. D+	0.7	0.713	0.022	(0.669, 0.754)	0.022	(0.67, 0.757)
Policy Rank	Absolute	D- vs. D+	0.7	0.645	0.024	(0.596, 0.691)	0.024	(0.598, 0.691)
Policy Rank	Absolute	V- vs. D+	0.7	0.520	0.049	(0.418, 0.613)	0.049	(0.422, 0.618)
Policy Rank	Absolute	D+ vs. D+	0.9	0.760	0.028	(0.7, 0.815)	0.029	(0.703, 0.817)
Policy Rank	Absolute	D- vs. D+	0.9	0.691	0.034	(0.624, 0.756)	0.034	(0.624, 0.757)
Policy Rank	Absolute	V- vs. D+	0.9	0.547	0.071	(0.406, 0.677)	0.073	(0.397, 0.696)
Policy Rank	Squared	D+ vs. D+	-0.9	0.228	0.031	(0.167, 0.289)	0.032	(0.165, 0.291)
Policy Rank	Squared	D- vs. D+	-0.9	0.237	0.035	(0.171, 0.306)	0.035	(0.167, 0.307)
Policy Rank	Squared	V- vs. D+	-0.9	0.116	0.060	(0.018, 0.252)	0.060	(-0.009, 0.241)
Policy Rank	Squared	D+ vs. D+	-0.7	0.269	0.020	(0.23, 0.31)	0.020	(0.228, 0.309)
Policy Rank	Squared	D- vs. D+	-0.7	0.226	0.022	(0.183, 0.271)	0.022	(0.182, 0.269)
Policy Rank	Squared	V- vs. D+	-0.7	0.180	0.034	(0.117, 0.25)	0.033	(0.113, 0.246)
Policy Rank	Squared	D+ vs. D+	-0.5	0.322	0.013	(0.297, 0.35)	0.014	(0.295, 0.349)
Policy Rank	Squared	D- vs. D+	-0.5	0.251	0.014	(0.225, 0.279)	0.014	(0.225, 0.278)
Policy Rank	Squared	V- vs. D+	-0.5	0.195	0.024	(0.153, 0.243)	0.024	(0.148, 0.242)
Policy Rank	Squared	D+ vs. D+	-0.3	0.382	0.012	(0.359, 0.406)	0.012	(0.359, 0.405)
Policy Rank	Squared	D- vs. D+	-0.3	0.293	0.012	(0.269, 0.316)	0.013	(0.268, 0.317)
Policy Rank	Squared	V- vs. D+	-0.3	0.257	0.021	(0.215, 0.299)	0.021	(0.215, 0.298)
Policy Rank	Squared	D+ vs. D+	-0.1	0.427	0.011	(0.406, 0.449)	0.011	(0.405, 0.448)
Policy Rank	Squared	D- vs. D+	-0.1	0.330	0.012	(0.309, 0.352)	0.012	(0.307, 0.353)
Policy Rank	Squared	V- vs. D+	-0.1	0.276	0.021	(0.237, 0.319)	0.021	(0.235, 0.317)
Policy Rank	Squared	D+ vs. D+	0.1	0.573	0.011	(0.551, 0.594)	0.011	(0.552, 0.595)
Policy Rank	Squared	D- vs. D+	0.1	0.386	0.012	(0.362, 0.409)	0.012	(0.363, 0.41)
Policy Rank	Squared	V- vs. D+	0.1	0.287	0.020	(0.248, 0.326)	0.021	(0.246, 0.327)
Policy Rank	Squared	D+ vs. D+	0.3	0.618	0.012	(0.594, 0.641)	0.012	(0.595, 0.641)
Policy Rank	Squared	D- vs. D+	0.3	0.454	0.013	(0.427, 0.479)	0.013	(0.427, 0.48)
Policy Rank	Squared	V- vs. D+	0.3	0.371	0.024	(0.323, 0.418)	0.024	(0.324, 0.418)
Policy Rank	Squared	D+ vs. D+	0.5	0.678	0.013	(0.65, 0.703)	0.014	(0.651, 0.705)
Policy Rank	Squared	D- vs. D+	0.5	0.544	0.016	(0.512, 0.575)	0.016	(0.514, 0.575)
Policy Rank	Squared	V- vs. D+	0.5	0.479	0.030	(0.422, 0.54)	0.030	(0.421, 0.538)
Policy Rank	Squared	D+ vs. D+	0.7	0.731	0.020	(0.69, 0.77)	0.020	(0.691, 0.772)
Policy Rank	Squared	D- vs. D+	0.7	0.607	0.024	(0.562, 0.654)	0.024	(0.559, 0.655)
Policy Rank	Squared	V- vs. D+	0.7	0.494	0.044	(0.407, 0.579)	0.044	(0.406, 0.581)

Table D.1: Mean Vote Share by Distance Measure (continued)

Measure	Transformation	Type	Value	Estimate	—— Bootstrap ——		—— Clustered ——	
					SE	CI	SE	CI
Policy Rank	Squared	D+ vs. D+	0.9	0.772	0.031	(0.711, 0.833)	0.032	(0.709, 0.835)
Policy Rank	Squared	D- vs. D+	0.9	0.701	0.038	(0.623, 0.773)	0.036	(0.628, 0.774)
Policy Rank	Squared	V- vs. D+	0.9	0.634	0.082	(0.473, 0.786)	0.084	(0.46, 0.807)
Policy Rating	Absolute	D+ vs. D+	-0.9	0.113	0.029	(0.06, 0.172)	0.030	(0.053, 0.172)
Policy Rating	Absolute	D- vs. D+	-0.9	0.132	0.040	(0.064, 0.216)	0.041	(0.049, 0.214)
Policy Rating	Absolute	V- vs. D+	-0.9	0.046	0.036	(0, 0.131)	0.034	(-0.03, 0.122)
Policy Rating	Absolute	D+ vs. D+	-0.7	0.144	0.028	(0.094, 0.203)	0.028	(0.089, 0.199)
Policy Rating	Absolute	D- vs. D+	-0.7	0.089	0.021	(0.05, 0.133)	0.021	(0.046, 0.132)
Policy Rating	Absolute	V- vs. D+	-0.7	0.083	0.044	(0.011, 0.181)	0.045	(-0.01, 0.175)
Policy Rating	Absolute	D+ vs. D+	-0.5	0.234	0.015	(0.207, 0.265)	0.014	(0.206, 0.262)
Policy Rating	Absolute	D- vs. D+	-0.5	0.160	0.013	(0.133, 0.186)	0.013	(0.134, 0.187)
Policy Rating	Absolute	V- vs. D+	-0.5	0.139	0.023	(0.096, 0.185)	0.023	(0.094, 0.185)
Policy Rating	Absolute	D+ vs. D+	-0.3	0.289	0.013	(0.263, 0.313)	0.013	(0.262, 0.315)
Policy Rating	Absolute	D- vs. D+	-0.3	0.224	0.013	(0.197, 0.249)	0.013	(0.198, 0.251)
Policy Rating	Absolute	V- vs. D+	-0.3	0.158	0.020	(0.119, 0.199)	0.020	(0.119, 0.197)
Policy Rating	Absolute	D+ vs. D+	-0.1	0.447	0.009	(0.429, 0.466)	0.009	(0.429, 0.466)
Policy Rating	Absolute	D- vs. D+	-0.1	0.341	0.010	(0.324, 0.36)	0.010	(0.323, 0.36)
Policy Rating	Absolute	V- vs. D+	-0.1	0.295	0.017	(0.261, 0.33)	0.017	(0.261, 0.328)
Policy Rating	Absolute	D+ vs. D+	0.1	0.553	0.009	(0.534, 0.571)	0.009	(0.534, 0.571)
Policy Rating	Absolute	D- vs. D+	0.1	0.400	0.010	(0.381, 0.42)	0.010	(0.381, 0.419)
Policy Rating	Absolute	V- vs. D+	0.1	0.311	0.016	(0.28, 0.343)	0.017	(0.277, 0.345)
Policy Rating	Absolute	D+ vs. D+	0.3	0.711	0.013	(0.687, 0.737)	0.013	(0.685, 0.738)
Policy Rating	Absolute	D- vs. D+	0.3	0.521	0.015	(0.49, 0.551)	0.015	(0.491, 0.551)
Policy Rating	Absolute	V- vs. D+	0.3	0.444	0.027	(0.387, 0.496)	0.028	(0.39, 0.498)
Policy Rating	Absolute	D+ vs. D+	0.5	0.766	0.015	(0.735, 0.793)	0.014	(0.738, 0.794)
Policy Rating	Absolute	D- vs. D+	0.5	0.647	0.019	(0.608, 0.683)	0.019	(0.611, 0.684)
Policy Rating	Absolute	V- vs. D+	0.5	0.547	0.035	(0.48, 0.617)	0.035	(0.477, 0.617)
Policy Rating	Absolute	D+ vs. D+	0.7	0.856	0.028	(0.797, 0.906)	0.028	(0.801, 0.911)
Policy Rating	Absolute	D- vs. D+	0.7	0.749	0.033	(0.685, 0.811)	0.034	(0.682, 0.816)
Policy Rating	Absolute	V- vs. D+	0.7	0.628	0.078	(0.475, 0.77)	0.081	(0.458, 0.797)
Policy Rating	Absolute	D+ vs. D+	0.9	0.887	0.029	(0.828, 0.94)	0.030	(0.828, 0.947)
Policy Rating	Absolute	D- vs. D+	0.9	0.799	0.039	(0.721, 0.871)	0.038	(0.722, 0.876)
Policy Rating	Absolute	V- vs. D+	0.9	0.775	0.079	(0.615, 0.923)	0.079	(0.608, 0.942)
Policy Rating	Squared	D+ vs. D+	-0.9	0.130	0.033	(0.071, 0.197)	0.032	(0.065, 0.195)
Policy Rating	Squared	D- vs. D+	-0.9	0.126	0.038	(0.059, 0.204)	0.037	(0.051, 0.201)
Policy Rating	Squared	V- vs. D+	-0.9	0.056	0.042	(0, 0.152)	0.040	(-0.032, 0.145)
Policy Rating	Squared	D+ vs. D+	-0.7	0.139	0.028	(0.089, 0.2)	0.028	(0.084, 0.195)
Policy Rating	Squared	D- vs. D+	-0.7	0.120	0.028	(0.07, 0.177)	0.028	(0.064, 0.177)
Policy Rating	Squared	V- vs. D+	-0.7	0.084	0.048	(0.01, 0.197)	0.048	(-0.016, 0.185)
Policy Rating	Squared	D+ vs. D+	-0.5	0.237	0.015	(0.21, 0.265)	0.014	(0.209, 0.265)
Policy Rating	Squared	D- vs. D+	-0.5	0.170	0.014	(0.144, 0.197)	0.013	(0.144, 0.197)
Policy Rating	Squared	V- vs. D+	-0.5	0.135	0.022	(0.094, 0.18)	0.022	(0.092, 0.178)
Policy Rating	Squared	D+ vs. D+	-0.3	0.298	0.014	(0.27, 0.327)	0.015	(0.27, 0.327)
Policy Rating	Squared	D- vs. D+	-0.3	0.246	0.014	(0.218, 0.276)	0.014	(0.218, 0.274)
Policy Rating	Squared	V- vs. D+	-0.3	0.178	0.023	(0.135, 0.223)	0.023	(0.133, 0.223)
Policy Rating	Squared	D+ vs. D+	-0.1	0.441	0.009	(0.423, 0.459)	0.009	(0.423, 0.459)
Policy Rating	Squared	D- vs. D+	-0.1	0.328	0.009	(0.31, 0.346)	0.009	(0.309, 0.347)
Policy Rating	Squared	V- vs. D+	-0.1	0.292	0.017	(0.257, 0.326)	0.017	(0.259, 0.324)
Policy Rating	Squared	D+ vs. D+	0.1	0.559	0.009	(0.541, 0.577)	0.009	(0.541, 0.577)
Policy Rating	Squared	D- vs. D+	0.1	0.415	0.010	(0.395, 0.435)	0.010	(0.395, 0.434)
Policy Rating	Squared	V- vs. D+	0.1	0.314	0.016	(0.284, 0.345)	0.017	(0.281, 0.347)
Policy Rating	Squared	D+ vs. D+	0.3	0.702	0.014	(0.673, 0.73)	0.015	(0.673, 0.73)
Policy Rating	Squared	D- vs. D+	0.3	0.496	0.017	(0.464, 0.528)	0.017	(0.464, 0.529)
Policy Rating	Squared	V- vs. D+	0.3	0.420	0.030	(0.362, 0.476)	0.030	(0.361, 0.479)
Policy Rating	Squared	D+ vs. D+	0.5	0.763	0.015	(0.735, 0.79)	0.014	(0.735, 0.791)
Policy Rating	Squared	D- vs. D+	0.5	0.636	0.019	(0.598, 0.671)	0.019	(0.599, 0.672)
Policy Rating	Squared	V- vs. D+	0.5	0.531	0.034	(0.463, 0.598)	0.033	(0.465, 0.597)
Policy Rating	Squared	D+ vs. D+	0.7	0.861	0.028	(0.8, 0.911)	0.028	(0.805, 0.916)
Policy Rating	Squared	D- vs. D+	0.7	0.727	0.038	(0.644, 0.8)	0.038	(0.652, 0.802)
Policy Rating	Squared	V- vs. D+	0.7	0.716	0.079	(0.557, 0.863)	0.081	(0.547, 0.885)
Policy Rating	Squared	D+ vs. D+	0.9	0.870	0.033	(0.803, 0.929)	0.032	(0.805, 0.935)
Policy Rating	Squared	D- vs. D+	0.9	0.814	0.033	(0.746, 0.876)	0.034	(0.745, 0.882)
Policy Rating	Squared	V- vs. D+	0.9	0.792	0.074	(0.647, 0.922)	0.074	(0.637, 0.948)

Table D.1: Mean Vote Share by Distance Measure (continued)

Measure	Transformation	Type	Value	Estimate	—— Bootstrap ——		—— Clustered ——	
					SE	CI	SE	CI
Spatial Distance	Absolute	D+ vs. D+	-0.9	0.199	0.071	(0.071, 0.342)	0.071	(0.053, 0.345)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	D- vs. D+	-0.9	0.176	0.069	(0.053, 0.313)	0.071	(0.027, 0.325)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	V- vs. D+	-0.9	0.096	0.106	(0, 0.362)	0.098	(-0.195, 0.388)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	D+ vs. D+	-0.7	0.236	0.031	(0.181, 0.303)	0.032	(0.172, 0.3)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	D- vs. D+	-0.7	0.206	0.033	(0.149, 0.271)	0.033	(0.14, 0.272)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	V- vs. D+	-0.7	0.178	0.049	(0.091, 0.277)	0.051	(0.074, 0.281)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	D+ vs. D+	-0.5	0.296	0.020	(0.259, 0.336)	0.020	(0.257, 0.336)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	D- vs. D+	-0.5	0.253	0.020	(0.214, 0.292)	0.020	(0.214, 0.292)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	V- vs. D+	-0.5	0.248	0.039	(0.177, 0.334)	0.040	(0.169, 0.328)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	D+ vs. D+	-0.3	0.350	0.014	(0.324, 0.378)	0.014	(0.323, 0.377)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	D- vs. D+	-0.3	0.280	0.015	(0.252, 0.31)	0.014	(0.252, 0.308)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	V- vs. D+	-0.3	0.219	0.025	(0.175, 0.268)	0.025	(0.169, 0.269)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	D+ vs. D+	-0.1	0.467	0.009	(0.45, 0.483)	0.009	(0.45, 0.485)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	D- vs. D+	-0.1	0.335	0.009	(0.318, 0.354)	0.009	(0.317, 0.353)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	V- vs. D+	-0.1	0.287	0.016	(0.254, 0.319)	0.016	(0.256, 0.318)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	D+ vs. D+	0.1	0.533	0.009	(0.517, 0.55)	0.009	(0.515, 0.55)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	D- vs. D+	0.1	0.403	0.009	(0.384, 0.42)	0.009	(0.385, 0.421)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	V- vs. D+	0.1	0.338	0.016	(0.305, 0.368)	0.016	(0.306, 0.369)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	D+ vs. D+	0.3	0.650	0.014	(0.622, 0.676)	0.014	(0.623, 0.677)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	D- vs. D+	0.3	0.495	0.016	(0.464, 0.526)	0.016	(0.464, 0.526)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	V- vs. D+	0.3	0.367	0.028	(0.31, 0.42)	0.029	(0.31, 0.423)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	D+ vs. D+	0.5	0.704	0.020	(0.664, 0.741)	0.020	(0.664, 0.743)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	D- vs. D+	0.5	0.577	0.023	(0.531, 0.623)	0.023	(0.532, 0.623)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	V- vs. D+	0.5	0.421	0.042	(0.341, 0.501)	0.042	(0.337, 0.504)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	D+ vs. D+	0.7	0.764	0.031	(0.697, 0.819)	0.032	(0.7, 0.828)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	D- vs. D+	0.7	0.680	0.034	(0.612, 0.749)	0.033	(0.615, 0.745)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	V- vs. D+	0.7	0.618	0.077	(0.466, 0.755)	0.075	(0.463, 0.774)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	D+ vs. D+	0.9	0.801	0.071	(0.658, 0.929)	0.071	(0.655, 0.947)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	D- vs. D+	0.9	0.749	0.068	(0.607, 0.873)	0.070	(0.603, 0.896)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	V- vs. D+	0.9	0.416	0.167	(0.149, 0.802)	0.176	(-0.088, 0.919)
Spatial Distance	Squared	D+ vs. D+	-0.9	0.068	0.051	(0, 0.174)	0.051	(-0.041, 0.177)
Spatial Distance	Squared	D- vs. D+	-0.9	0.181	0.076	(0.042, 0.343)	0.077	(0.013, 0.35)
Spatial Distance	Squared	V- vs. D+	-0.9	0.193	0.135	(0, 0.493)	0.136	(-0.152, 0.539)
Spatial Distance	Squared	D+ vs. D+	-0.7	0.254	0.034	(0.188, 0.322)	0.034	(0.186, 0.321)
Spatial Distance	Squared	D- vs. D+	-0.7	0.243	0.033	(0.181, 0.311)	0.035	(0.173, 0.313)
Spatial Distance	Squared	V- vs. D+	-0.7	0.114	0.053	(0.027, 0.228)	0.055	(0, 0.228)
Spatial Distance	Squared	D+ vs. D+	-0.5	0.282	0.019	(0.243, 0.322)	0.020	(0.244, 0.321)
Spatial Distance	Squared	D- vs. D+	-0.5	0.215	0.018	(0.181, 0.251)	0.018	(0.18, 0.25)
Spatial Distance	Squared	V- vs. D+	-0.5	0.205	0.032	(0.146, 0.271)	0.033	(0.14, 0.271)
Spatial Distance	Squared	D+ vs. D+	-0.3	0.313	0.012	(0.289, 0.338)	0.012	(0.289, 0.336)
Spatial Distance	Squared	D- vs. D+	-0.3	0.258	0.013	(0.233, 0.285)	0.013	(0.234, 0.283)
Spatial Distance	Squared	V- vs. D+	-0.3	0.225	0.021	(0.187, 0.269)	0.020	(0.185, 0.266)
Spatial Distance	Squared	D+ vs. D+	-0.1	0.426	0.009	(0.407, 0.444)	0.009	(0.407, 0.444)
Spatial Distance	Squared	D- vs. D+	-0.1	0.298	0.009	(0.279, 0.316)	0.009	(0.279, 0.316)
Spatial Distance	Squared	V- vs. D+	-0.1	0.238	0.016	(0.209, 0.268)	0.016	(0.207, 0.268)
Spatial Distance	Squared	D+ vs. D+	0.1	0.574	0.009	(0.556, 0.593)	0.009	(0.556, 0.593)
Spatial Distance	Squared	D- vs. D+	0.1	0.425	0.010	(0.403, 0.444)	0.010	(0.405, 0.445)
Spatial Distance	Squared	V- vs. D+	0.1	0.352	0.018	(0.316, 0.388)	0.018	(0.317, 0.388)
Spatial Distance	Squared	D+ vs. D+	0.3	0.687	0.012	(0.662, 0.711)	0.012	(0.664, 0.711)
Spatial Distance	Squared	D- vs. D+	0.3	0.543	0.014	(0.516, 0.569)	0.014	(0.516, 0.57)
Spatial Distance	Squared	V- vs. D+	0.3	0.441	0.025	(0.392, 0.489)	0.025	(0.391, 0.491)
Spatial Distance	Squared	D+ vs. D+	0.5	0.718	0.019	(0.678, 0.757)	0.020	(0.679, 0.756)
Spatial Distance	Squared	D- vs. D+	0.5	0.587	0.021	(0.545, 0.628)	0.021	(0.545, 0.628)
Spatial Distance	Squared	V- vs. D+	0.5	0.508	0.041	(0.43, 0.585)	0.040	(0.429, 0.588)
Spatial Distance	Squared	D+ vs. D+	0.7	0.746	0.034	(0.678, 0.812)	0.034	(0.679, 0.814)
Spatial Distance	Squared	D- vs. D+	0.7	0.667	0.039	(0.593, 0.742)	0.037	(0.592, 0.741)
Spatial Distance	Squared	V- vs. D+	0.7	0.433	0.088	(0.266, 0.617)	0.086	(0.251, 0.615)
Spatial Distance	Squared	D+ vs. D+	0.9	0.932	0.051	(0.826, 1)	0.051	(0.823, 1.041)
Spatial Distance	Squared	D- vs. D+	0.9	0.769	0.083	(0.585, 0.903)	0.081	(0.59, 0.948)
Spatial Distance	Squared	V- vs. D+	0.9	0.571	0.284	(0.157, 1)	0.407	(-1.758, 2.9)

Table D.2: Average Treatment Effect by Distance Measure

Measure	Transformation	Type	Value	Estimate	Bootstrap		Clustered	
					SE	CI	SE	CI
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	D- vs. D+	-0.9	-0.021	0.035	(-0.089, 0.051)	0.034	(-0.089, 0.047)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	V- vs. D+	-0.9	-0.062	0.042	(-0.135, 0.031)	0.042	(-0.149, 0.025)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	D- vs. D+	-0.7	-0.014	0.035	(-0.079, 0.055)	0.035	(-0.084, 0.055)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	V- vs. D+	-0.7	-0.037	0.050	(-0.138, 0.06)	0.049	(-0.136, 0.062)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	D- vs. D+	-0.5	-0.052	0.025	(-0.1, -0.004)	0.024	(-0.099, -0.005)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	V- vs. D+	-0.5	-0.069	0.037	(-0.144, 0.002)	0.037	(-0.143, 0.005)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	D- vs. D+	-0.3	-0.073	0.023	(-0.122, -0.027)	0.023	(-0.118, -0.028)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	V- vs. D+	-0.3	-0.109	0.035	(-0.172, -0.04)	0.035	(-0.177, -0.04)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	D- vs. D+	-0.1	-0.127	0.015	(-0.158, -0.099)	0.015	(-0.156, -0.099)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	V- vs. D+	-0.1	-0.167	0.022	(-0.211, -0.125)	0.022	(-0.21, -0.124)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	D- vs. D+	0.1	-0.145	0.015	(-0.172, -0.116)	0.015	(-0.175, -0.115)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	V- vs. D+	0.1	-0.239	0.021	(-0.281, -0.198)	0.022	(-0.282, -0.195)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	D- vs. D+	0.3	-0.160	0.027	(-0.214, -0.109)	0.027	(-0.214, -0.107)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	V- vs. D+	0.3	-0.269	0.041	(-0.354, -0.185)	0.040	(-0.347, -0.191)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	D- vs. D+	0.5	-0.168	0.030	(-0.223, -0.108)	0.030	(-0.226, -0.109)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	V- vs. D+	0.5	-0.323	0.049	(-0.416, -0.216)	0.050	(-0.422, -0.225)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	D- vs. D+	0.7	-0.096	0.037	(-0.165, -0.023)	0.036	(-0.167, -0.024)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	V- vs. D+	0.7	-0.244	0.068	(-0.383, -0.11)	0.067	(-0.377, -0.111)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	D- vs. D+	0.9	-0.058	0.037	(-0.129, 0.01)	0.037	(-0.131, 0.015)
Party/Policy Bundle	Absolute	V- vs. D+	0.9	-0.122	0.078	(-0.284, 0.025)	0.079	(-0.283, 0.039)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	D- vs. D+	-0.9	-0.001	0.031	(-0.06, 0.056)	0.030	(-0.061, 0.059)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	V- vs. D+	-0.9	-0.065	0.034	(-0.122, 0.006)	0.033	(-0.132, 0.002)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	D- vs. D+	-0.7	-0.023	0.033	(-0.087, 0.039)	0.033	(-0.088, 0.043)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	V- vs. D+	-0.7	-0.065	0.048	(-0.156, 0.03)	0.049	(-0.165, 0.034)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	D- vs. D+	-0.5	-0.068	0.030	(-0.124, -0.008)	0.030	(-0.127, -0.009)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	V- vs. D+	-0.5	-0.011	0.050	(-0.109, 0.08)	0.050	(-0.111, 0.088)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	D- vs. D+	-0.3	-0.079	0.025	(-0.129, -0.033)	0.024	(-0.126, -0.031)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	V- vs. D+	-0.3	-0.135	0.033	(-0.198, -0.068)	0.034	(-0.203, -0.068)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	D- vs. D+	-0.1	-0.122	0.014	(-0.151, -0.093)	0.014	(-0.15, -0.095)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	V- vs. D+	-0.1	-0.163	0.021	(-0.203, -0.12)	0.021	(-0.205, -0.121)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	D- vs. D+	0.1	-0.144	0.014	(-0.171, -0.115)	0.015	(-0.173, -0.115)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	V- vs. D+	0.1	-0.229	0.021	(-0.269, -0.187)	0.022	(-0.271, -0.186)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	D- vs. D+	0.3	-0.147	0.026	(-0.196, -0.095)	0.027	(-0.201, -0.093)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	V- vs. D+	0.3	-0.357	0.040	(-0.437, -0.276)	0.040	(-0.437, -0.278)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	D- vs. D+	0.5	-0.184	0.038	(-0.261, -0.111)	0.038	(-0.259, -0.11)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	V- vs. D+	0.5	-0.275	0.057	(-0.384, -0.159)	0.058	(-0.39, -0.16)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	D- vs. D+	0.7	-0.123	0.035	(-0.187, -0.053)	0.036	(-0.193, -0.053)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	V- vs. D+	0.7	-0.204	0.061	(-0.319, -0.077)	0.061	(-0.325, -0.082)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	D- vs. D+	0.9	-0.072	0.033	(-0.136, -0.006)	0.034	(-0.139, -0.005)
Party/Policy Bundle	Squared	V- vs. D+	0.9	-0.185	0.066	(-0.323, -0.058)	0.065	(-0.316, -0.054)
Policy Rank	Absolute	D- vs. D+	-0.9	-0.034	0.039	(-0.109, 0.042)	0.040	(-0.113, 0.044)
Policy Rank	Absolute	V- vs. D+	-0.9	-0.120	0.066	(-0.239, 0.022)	0.065	(-0.252, 0.012)
Policy Rank	Absolute	D- vs. D+	-0.7	-0.061	0.029	(-0.115, -0.001)	0.030	(-0.119, -0.002)
Policy Rank	Absolute	V- vs. D+	-0.7	-0.154	0.038	(-0.225, -0.075)	0.038	(-0.23, -0.078)
Policy Rank	Absolute	D- vs. D+	-0.5	-0.045	0.022	(-0.088, -0.001)	0.022	(-0.088, -0.001)
Policy Rank	Absolute	V- vs. D+	-0.5	-0.095	0.030	(-0.151, -0.03)	0.031	(-0.156, -0.034)
Policy Rank	Absolute	D- vs. D+	-0.3	-0.092	0.017	(-0.125, -0.06)	0.018	(-0.127, -0.057)
Policy Rank	Absolute	V- vs. D+	-0.3	-0.125	0.027	(-0.178, -0.07)	0.027	(-0.179, -0.072)
Policy Rank	Absolute	D- vs. D+	-0.1	-0.108	0.014	(-0.137, -0.081)	0.014	(-0.135, -0.08)
Policy Rank	Absolute	V- vs. D+	-0.1	-0.152	0.020	(-0.19, -0.11)	0.020	(-0.191, -0.112)
Policy Rank	Absolute	D- vs. D+	0.1	-0.178	0.015	(-0.206, -0.149)	0.014	(-0.206, -0.151)
Policy Rank	Absolute	V- vs. D+	0.1	-0.264	0.021	(-0.304, -0.223)	0.021	(-0.305, -0.223)
Policy Rank	Absolute	D- vs. D+	0.3	-0.146	0.020	(-0.183, -0.105)	0.020	(-0.186, -0.106)
Policy Rank	Absolute	V- vs. D+	0.3	-0.234	0.031	(-0.297, -0.173)	0.030	(-0.293, -0.175)
Policy Rank	Absolute	D- vs. D+	0.5	-0.144	0.024	(-0.191, -0.097)	0.024	(-0.192, -0.097)
Policy Rank	Absolute	V- vs. D+	0.5	-0.220	0.037	(-0.289, -0.151)	0.037	(-0.294, -0.146)
Policy Rank	Absolute	D- vs. D+	0.7	-0.069	0.033	(-0.131, -0.002)	0.032	(-0.132, -0.005)
Policy Rank	Absolute	V- vs. D+	0.7	-0.193	0.053	(-0.296, -0.087)	0.053	(-0.298, -0.089)
Policy Rank	Absolute	D- vs. D+	0.9	-0.069	0.045	(-0.156, 0.018)	0.044	(-0.157, 0.018)
Policy Rank	Absolute	V- vs. D+	0.9	-0.213	0.077	(-0.378, -0.066)	0.079	(-0.373, -0.054)
Policy Rank	Squared	D- vs. D+	-0.9	0.009	0.045	(-0.078, 0.098)	0.046	(-0.082, 0.1)
Policy Rank	Squared	V- vs. D+	-0.9	-0.112	0.069	(-0.23, 0.036)	0.068	(-0.251, 0.027)
Policy Rank	Squared	D- vs. D+	-0.7	-0.043	0.027	(-0.096, 0.01)	0.028	(-0.097, 0.011)

Table D.2: Average Treatment Effect by Distance Measure (continued)

Measure	Transformation	Type	Value	Estimate	— Bootstrap —		— Clustered —	
					SE	CI	SE	CI
Policy Rank	Squared	V- vs. D+	-0.7	-0.089	0.039	(-0.161, -0.014)	0.038	(-0.165, -0.013)
Policy Rank	Squared	D- vs. D+	-0.5	-0.071	0.019	(-0.108, -0.036)	0.019	(-0.107, -0.034)
Policy Rank	Squared	V- vs. D+	-0.5	-0.127	0.026	(-0.177, -0.073)	0.027	(-0.179, -0.074)
Policy Rank	Squared	D- vs. D+	-0.3	-0.089	0.017	(-0.121, -0.057)	0.017	(-0.123, -0.056)
Policy Rank	Squared	V- vs. D+	-0.3	-0.126	0.025	(-0.174, -0.076)	0.024	(-0.173, -0.078)
Policy Rank	Squared	D- vs. D+	-0.1	-0.097	0.015	(-0.128, -0.066)	0.016	(-0.128, -0.065)
Policy Rank	Squared	V- vs. D+	-0.1	-0.151	0.023	(-0.194, -0.106)	0.023	(-0.196, -0.105)
Policy Rank	Squared	D- vs. D+	0.1	-0.187	0.016	(-0.219, -0.155)	0.016	(-0.219, -0.155)
Policy Rank	Squared	V- vs. D+	0.1	-0.287	0.023	(-0.331, -0.241)	0.023	(-0.333, -0.241)
Policy Rank	Squared	D- vs. D+	0.3	-0.164	0.018	(-0.2, -0.128)	0.018	(-0.199, -0.129)
Policy Rank	Squared	V- vs. D+	0.3	-0.247	0.028	(-0.301, -0.194)	0.027	(-0.3, -0.194)
Policy Rank	Squared	D- vs. D+	0.5	-0.134	0.020	(-0.173, -0.093)	0.020	(-0.174, -0.094)
Policy Rank	Squared	V- vs. D+	0.5	-0.199	0.033	(-0.263, -0.131)	0.032	(-0.263, -0.135)
Policy Rank	Squared	D- vs. D+	0.7	-0.124	0.032	(-0.185, -0.059)	0.031	(-0.186, -0.062)
Policy Rank	Squared	V- vs. D+	0.7	-0.238	0.048	(-0.333, -0.144)	0.048	(-0.332, -0.143)
Policy Rank	Squared	D- vs. D+	0.9	-0.071	0.050	(-0.17, 0.025)	0.048	(-0.166, 0.024)
Policy Rank	Squared	V- vs. D+	0.9	-0.138	0.087	(-0.312, 0.02)	0.090	(-0.321, 0.044)
Policy Rating	Absolute	D- vs. D+	-0.9	0.019	0.045	(-0.061, 0.11)	0.047	(-0.075, 0.113)
Policy Rating	Absolute	V- vs. D+	-0.9	-0.067	0.047	(-0.147, 0.03)	0.044	(-0.162, 0.028)
Policy Rating	Absolute	D- vs. D+	-0.7	-0.055	0.034	(-0.129, 0.007)	0.034	(-0.123, 0.013)
Policy Rating	Absolute	V- vs. D+	-0.7	-0.061	0.051	(-0.156, 0.046)	0.052	(-0.167, 0.044)
Policy Rating	Absolute	D- vs. D+	-0.5	-0.074	0.018	(-0.11, -0.039)	0.018	(-0.11, -0.038)
Policy Rating	Absolute	V- vs. D+	-0.5	-0.095	0.027	(-0.147, -0.04)	0.027	(-0.148, -0.042)
Policy Rating	Absolute	D- vs. D+	-0.3	-0.064	0.018	(-0.099, -0.032)	0.018	(-0.1, -0.029)
Policy Rating	Absolute	V- vs. D+	-0.3	-0.131	0.024	(-0.175, -0.085)	0.024	(-0.178, -0.084)
Policy Rating	Absolute	D- vs. D+	-0.1	-0.106	0.012	(-0.13, -0.08)	0.013	(-0.132, -0.08)
Policy Rating	Absolute	V- vs. D+	-0.1	-0.153	0.019	(-0.189, -0.116)	0.019	(-0.191, -0.115)
Policy Rating	Absolute	D- vs. D+	0.1	-0.153	0.014	(-0.178, -0.123)	0.014	(-0.18, -0.126)
Policy Rating	Absolute	V- vs. D+	0.1	-0.242	0.020	(-0.28, -0.203)	0.020	(-0.281, -0.203)
Policy Rating	Absolute	D- vs. D+	0.3	-0.190	0.019	(-0.229, -0.151)	0.020	(-0.229, -0.151)
Policy Rating	Absolute	V- vs. D+	0.3	-0.267	0.029	(-0.326, -0.209)	0.031	(-0.327, -0.207)
Policy Rating	Absolute	D- vs. D+	0.5	-0.119	0.025	(-0.166, -0.07)	0.024	(-0.167, -0.071)
Policy Rating	Absolute	V- vs. D+	0.5	-0.219	0.038	(-0.291, -0.145)	0.037	(-0.292, -0.145)
Policy Rating	Absolute	D- vs. D+	0.7	-0.107	0.041	(-0.19, -0.022)	0.043	(-0.191, -0.023)
Policy Rating	Absolute	V- vs. D+	0.7	-0.228	0.083	(-0.392, -0.076)	0.085	(-0.403, -0.054)
Policy Rating	Absolute	D- vs. D+	0.9	-0.088	0.050	(-0.193, 0.008)	0.049	(-0.187, 0.01)
Policy Rating	Absolute	V- vs. D+	0.9	-0.112	0.086	(-0.283, 0.049)	0.085	(-0.286, 0.062)
Policy Rating	Squared	D- vs. D+	-0.9	-0.004	0.045	(-0.088, 0.085)	0.046	(-0.096, 0.087)
Policy Rating	Squared	V- vs. D+	-0.9	-0.074	0.053	(-0.165, 0.036)	0.051	(-0.182, 0.034)
Policy Rating	Squared	D- vs. D+	-0.7	-0.019	0.039	(-0.097, 0.058)	0.040	(-0.097, 0.06)
Policy Rating	Squared	V- vs. D+	-0.7	-0.055	0.056	(-0.155, 0.062)	0.056	(-0.168, 0.058)
Policy Rating	Squared	D- vs. D+	-0.5	-0.066	0.018	(-0.103, -0.031)	0.018	(-0.102, -0.031)
Policy Rating	Squared	V- vs. D+	-0.5	-0.101	0.027	(-0.153, -0.048)	0.026	(-0.152, -0.051)
Policy Rating	Squared	D- vs. D+	-0.3	-0.052	0.019	(-0.089, -0.012)	0.020	(-0.091, -0.014)
Policy Rating	Squared	V- vs. D+	-0.3	-0.120	0.026	(-0.173, -0.067)	0.027	(-0.173, -0.067)
Policy Rating	Squared	D- vs. D+	-0.1	-0.113	0.012	(-0.137, -0.089)	0.013	(-0.138, -0.088)
Policy Rating	Squared	V- vs. D+	-0.1	-0.150	0.019	(-0.188, -0.113)	0.019	(-0.187, -0.113)
Policy Rating	Squared	D- vs. D+	0.1	-0.144	0.014	(-0.17, -0.116)	0.014	(-0.171, -0.117)
Policy Rating	Squared	V- vs. D+	0.1	-0.245	0.019	(-0.279, -0.208)	0.019	(-0.283, -0.207)
Policy Rating	Squared	D- vs. D+	0.3	-0.205	0.021	(-0.247, -0.164)	0.022	(-0.248, -0.162)
Policy Rating	Squared	V- vs. D+	0.3	-0.282	0.033	(-0.344, -0.219)	0.033	(-0.347, -0.217)
Policy Rating	Squared	D- vs. D+	0.5	-0.128	0.024	(-0.176, -0.079)	0.024	(-0.175, -0.081)
Policy Rating	Squared	V- vs. D+	0.5	-0.232	0.036	(-0.302, -0.158)	0.035	(-0.302, -0.162)
Policy Rating	Squared	D- vs. D+	0.7	-0.134	0.047	(-0.229, -0.04)	0.047	(-0.227, -0.041)
Policy Rating	Squared	V- vs. D+	0.7	-0.145	0.083	(-0.309, 0.017)	0.085	(-0.319, 0.029)
Policy Rating	Squared	D- vs. D+	0.9	-0.056	0.049	(-0.152, 0.041)	0.049	(-0.153, 0.04)
Policy Rating	Squared	V- vs. D+	0.9	-0.078	0.082	(-0.249, 0.074)	0.081	(-0.244, 0.088)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	D- vs. D+	-0.9	-0.023	0.101	(-0.228, 0.173)	0.100	(-0.225, 0.179)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	V- vs. D+	-0.9	-0.103	0.129	(-0.313, 0.189)	0.121	(-0.415, 0.209)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	D- vs. D+	-0.7	-0.030	0.045	(-0.117, 0.054)	0.046	(-0.122, 0.061)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	V- vs. D+	-0.7	-0.058	0.056	(-0.168, 0.054)	0.060	(-0.178, 0.062)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	D- vs. D+	-0.5	-0.043	0.027	(-0.095, 0.009)	0.026	(-0.095, 0.009)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	V- vs. D+	-0.5	-0.048	0.044	(-0.132, 0.043)	0.043	(-0.134, 0.038)

Table D.2: Average Treatment Effect by Distance Measure (continued)

Measure	Transformation	Type	Value	Estimate	—— Bootstrap ——		—— Clustered ——	
					SE	CI	SE	CI
Spatial Distance	Absolute	D- vs. D+	-0.3	-0.070	0.019	(-0.105, -0.033)	0.019	(-0.107, -0.033)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	V- vs. D+	-0.3	-0.131	0.028	(-0.184, -0.074)	0.028	(-0.186, -0.076)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	D- vs. D+	-0.1	-0.132	0.013	(-0.156, -0.107)	0.012	(-0.156, -0.108)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	V- vs. D+	-0.1	-0.180	0.018	(-0.213, -0.144)	0.018	(-0.216, -0.144)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	D- vs. D+	0.1	-0.129	0.012	(-0.156, -0.107)	0.013	(-0.155, -0.104)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	V- vs. D+	0.1	-0.195	0.019	(-0.233, -0.16)	0.019	(-0.232, -0.158)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	D- vs. D+	0.3	-0.155	0.021	(-0.193, -0.113)	0.021	(-0.195, -0.114)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	V- vs. D+	0.3	-0.283	0.032	(-0.346, -0.223)	0.032	(-0.347, -0.22)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	D- vs. D+	0.5	-0.126	0.031	(-0.185, -0.063)	0.031	(-0.186, -0.066)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	V- vs. D+	0.5	-0.283	0.048	(-0.37, -0.19)	0.047	(-0.376, -0.19)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	D- vs. D+	0.7	-0.083	0.046	(-0.175, 0.011)	0.045	(-0.173, 0.006)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	V- vs. D+	0.7	-0.145	0.078	(-0.307, 0.001)	0.077	(-0.302, 0.012)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	D- vs. D+	0.9	-0.051	0.098	(-0.244, 0.147)	0.100	(-0.252, 0.15)
Spatial Distance	Absolute	V- vs. D+	0.9	-0.385	0.181	(-0.684, 0.022)	0.190	(-0.854, 0.084)
Spatial Distance	Squared	D- vs. D+	-0.9	0.114	0.093	(-0.055, 0.305)	0.092	(-0.075, 0.302)
Spatial Distance	Squared	V- vs. D+	-0.9	0.126	0.144	(-0.122, 0.432)	0.145	(-0.202, 0.453)
Spatial Distance	Squared	D- vs. D+	-0.7	-0.011	0.045	(-0.1, 0.079)	0.046	(-0.101, 0.079)
Spatial Distance	Squared	V- vs. D+	-0.7	-0.139	0.062	(-0.245, -0.007)	0.064	(-0.27, -0.009)
Spatial Distance	Squared	D- vs. D+	-0.5	-0.068	0.025	(-0.116, -0.018)	0.025	(-0.118, -0.018)
Spatial Distance	Squared	V- vs. D+	-0.5	-0.077	0.036	(-0.146, -0.003)	0.037	(-0.15, -0.004)
Spatial Distance	Squared	D- vs. D+	-0.3	-0.054	0.016	(-0.086, -0.023)	0.016	(-0.086, -0.023)
Spatial Distance	Squared	V- vs. D+	-0.3	-0.087	0.024	(-0.131, -0.037)	0.023	(-0.133, -0.041)
Spatial Distance	Squared	D- vs. D+	-0.1	-0.128	0.013	(-0.154, -0.102)	0.013	(-0.153, -0.103)
Spatial Distance	Squared	V- vs. D+	-0.1	-0.188	0.018	(-0.222, -0.152)	0.018	(-0.224, -0.152)
Spatial Distance	Squared	D- vs. D+	0.1	-0.150	0.014	(-0.178, -0.124)	0.014	(-0.177, -0.122)
Spatial Distance	Squared	V- vs. D+	0.1	-0.222	0.022	(-0.264, -0.18)	0.021	(-0.264, -0.18)
Spatial Distance	Squared	D- vs. D+	0.3	-0.144	0.018	(-0.179, -0.109)	0.018	(-0.178, -0.11)
Spatial Distance	Squared	V- vs. D+	0.3	-0.246	0.028	(-0.301, -0.194)	0.028	(-0.302, -0.19)
Spatial Distance	Squared	D- vs. D+	0.5	-0.131	0.028	(-0.186, -0.075)	0.028	(-0.186, -0.076)
Spatial Distance	Squared	V- vs. D+	0.5	-0.209	0.044	(-0.292, -0.125)	0.043	(-0.295, -0.123)
Spatial Distance	Squared	D- vs. D+	0.7	-0.079	0.053	(-0.181, 0.02)	0.051	(-0.181, 0.022)
Spatial Distance	Squared	V- vs. D+	0.7	-0.313	0.092	(-0.48, -0.119)	0.088	(-0.495, -0.131)
Spatial Distance	Squared	D- vs. D+	0.9	-0.163	0.097	(-0.356, 0.019)	0.096	(-0.36, 0.034)
Spatial Distance	Squared	V- vs. D+	0.9	-0.361	0.287	(-0.777, 0.142)	0.410	(-2.044, 1.321)

D.1.4 Figure 2, left panel separated by D^- treatment

The following figures present the analogue of Figure 2 in the paper separately for each democracy treatment. Each figure corresponds to one of the alternative measures of candidate-responder distance described in Section C.5. In each figure, each panel corresponds to a different D^- treatment.

The red text in each panel displays the overall average treatment effect. Note that from measure to measure, the estimates change slightly due to missing data for some measures. In particular, because we only elicited a party-policy bundle measure for three-fourths of the candidate choices, the ATE estimates in the party-policy bundle plots reflect only three-fourths of the data. The policy rank estimates depart slightly from the policy rating estimates because creating the policy rank variable requires respondents to rate all four policies in each area.

Figure D.1: Candidate 1's vote share by treatment, policy rating, absolute




Figure D.2: Candidate 1's vote share by treatment, policy rating, squared




Figure D.3: Candidate 1's vote share by treatment, policy rank, absolute




Figure D.4: Candidate 1's vote share by treatment, policy rank, squared




Figure D.5: Candidate 1's vote share by treatment, party-policy bundle, absolute




Figure D.6: Candidate 1's vote share by treatment, party-policy bundle, squared




Figure D.7: Candidate 1's vote share by treatment, ideological distance, absolute





Figure D.8: Candidate 1's vote share by treatment, ideological distance, squared



D.2 Does Partisanship Trump Civic Virtue?

D.2.1 Numerical results for Figures 3

The following table corresponds to Figures 3 in the main text.

Table D.3: Numerical results for Figure 3

Respondent	Candidates	R vote share	Bootstrap SE	Bootstrap CI
Strong Dem	Rep D+ vs. Dem D+	0.335	0.020	(0.298, 0.374)
Strong Dem	Rep D+ vs. Dem D-	0.404	0.023	(0.358, 0.451)
Strong Dem	Rep D- vs. Dem D+	0.232	0.020	(0.195, 0.272)
Dem	Rep D+ vs. Dem D+	0.445	0.027	(0.390, 0.497)
Dem	Rep D+ vs. Dem D-	0.487	0.031	(0.427, 0.544)
Dem	Rep D- vs. Dem D+	0.311	0.028	(0.256, 0.364)
Lean Dem	Rep D+ vs. Dem D+	0.429	0.028	(0.375, 0.485)
Lean Dem	Rep D+ vs. Dem D-	0.556	0.031	(0.497, 0.621)
Lean Dem	Rep D- vs. Dem D+	0.239	0.039	(0.167, 0.319)
Indep	Rep D+ vs. Dem D+	0.474	0.024	(0.426, 0.518)
Indep	Rep D+ vs. Dem D-	0.597	0.028	(0.540, 0.651)
Indep	Rep D- vs. Dem D+	0.388	0.026	(0.340, 0.441)
Lean Rep	Rep D+ vs. Dem D+	0.577	0.036	(0.509, 0.648)
Lean Rep	Rep D+ vs. Dem D-	0.700	0.040	(0.619, 0.779)
Lean Rep	Rep D- vs. Dem D+	0.474	0.035	(0.407, 0.542)
Rep	Rep D+ vs. Dem D+	0.599	0.028	(0.543, 0.653)
Rep	Rep D+ vs. Dem D-	0.706	0.028	(0.654, 0.760)
Rep	Rep D- vs. Dem D+	0.465	0.028	(0.413, 0.521)
Strong Rep	Rep D+ vs. Dem D+	0.712	0.022	(0.666, 0.753)
Strong Rep	Rep D+ vs. Dem D-	0.842	0.019	(0.806, 0.877)
Strong Rep	Rep D- vs. Dem D+	0.651	0.022	(0.611, 0.695)

D.2.2 Numerical results and regression test for Figure 4

The following table corresponds to Figures 4 in the main text.

Table D.4: Numerical results for Figure 4

Party	Estimate	Bootstrap SE	Bootstrap CI
Strong opposite	-0.115	0.023	(-0.160, -0.074)
Weak opposite	-0.121	0.031	(-0.181, -0.057)
Lean opposite	-0.157	0.041	(-0.241, -0.080)
Independent	-0.105	0.032	(-0.169, -0.041)
Lean same	-0.115	0.039	(-0.195, -0.038)
Weak same	-0.088	0.032	(-0.149, -0.026)
Strong same	-0.066	0.023	(-0.112, -0.020)

For a formal test of whether stronger partisans are less likely to punish D^- candidates, we used OLS to estimate

$$\mathbb{1}(\text{Vote for Candidate 1})_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1(M_1 - M_2)_{ij} + \beta_2 S_i + \beta_3(M_1 - M_2)_{ij} S_i + \epsilon_{ij}$$

where i indexes respondents, j indexes candidate choices, M_1 and M_2 are candidate 1 and 2's democracy positions, and S measures partisan strength. We coded partisan strength $\{0, 1, 2\}$ where 0 indicates leaners, 1 indicates weak partisans, and 2 indicates strong partisans. We excluded independents.

To increase the precision with which we can estimate the relationship between strength of partisanship and willingness to punish for undemocratic candidates, we add controls for conduct the same test with controls for our respondents' preferences for same-party candidates, as well as the policy rank measure described in section C.5 (below, P_1 - P_2). As explained there, the policy rank measure is orthogonal to all respondent characteristics by construction: within each policy area, each respondent's policy ratings were ranked so that every respondent's policy ratings take on the same uniform distribution (ties were broken randomly). Because the policy rank measure is correlated with the dependent variable, but uncorrelated by construction with any of the independent variables, including it leads to more precise estimates without introducing any confounding.

Table D.5 displays the results, with robust standard errors clustered at the respondent level. The estimates of β_3 suggest that stronger partisans are less likely to punish a D^- candidate.

Table D.5: Regression test to accompany Figure 4

Model	Term	Estimate	SE	CI
No controls	(Intercept)	0.500	0.014	(0.472, 0.529)
	(M1-M2)	-0.134	0.019	(-0.169, -0.097)
	Party strength	-0.000	0.019	(-0.039, 0.036)
	(M1-M2) x Party strength	0.028	0.025	(-0.022, 0.076)
Same party control	(Intercept)	0.422	0.015	(0.378, 0.440)
	(M1-M2)	-0.137	0.019	(-0.172, -0.098)
	Party strength	-0.000	0.019	(-0.037, 0.038)
	(M1-M2) x Party strength	0.031	0.024	(-0.018, 0.078)
	Same-party candidate 1	0.155	0.010	(0.163, 0.202)
Party and policy controls	(Intercept)	0.422	0.014	(0.379, 0.436)
	(M1-M2)	-0.140	0.018	(-0.173, -0.104)
	Party strength	-0.000	0.018	(-0.037, 0.036)
	(M1-M2) x Party strength	0.033	0.023	(-0.013, 0.078)
	Same-party candidate 1	0.156	0.010	(0.164, 0.203)
	(P1-P2)	0.344	0.013	(0.319, 0.369)

D.2.3 Numerical results for Figure 5

The following table corresponds to Figures 5 in the main text.

Table D.6: Numerical results for Figure 5

Respondent	Candidates	D- vote share	Bootstrap SE	Bootstrap CI
Strong Dem	Dem D- vs. Dem D+	0.438	0.022	(0.394, 0.479)
Strong Dem	Rep D- vs. Rep D+	0.345	0.023	(0.302, 0.388)
Dem	Dem D- vs. Dem D+	0.407	0.028	(0.351, 0.461)
Dem	Rep D- vs. Rep D+	0.323	0.026	(0.276, 0.378)
Lean Dem	Dem D- vs. Dem D+	0.425	0.041	(0.343, 0.502)
Lean Dem	Rep D- vs. Rep D+	0.298	0.033	(0.234, 0.366)
Indep	Dem D- vs. Dem D+	0.363	0.029	(0.305, 0.416)
Indep	Rep D- vs. Rep D+	0.331	0.029	(0.277, 0.392)
Lean Rep	Dem D- vs. Dem D+	0.325	0.038	(0.253, 0.407)
Lean Rep	Rep D- vs. Rep D+	0.398	0.038	(0.325, 0.477)
Rep	Dem D- vs. Dem D+	0.322	0.025	(0.274, 0.373)
Rep	Rep D- vs. Rep D+	0.392	0.028	(0.336, 0.446)
Strong Rep	Dem D- vs. Dem D+	0.315	0.025	(0.268, 0.366)
Strong Rep	Rep D- vs. Rep D+	0.411	0.024	(0.365, 0.458)

D.3 The Consequences of Candidate Polarization

D.3.1 Numerical results for Figure 6


Table D.7: Numerical results for Figure 6

Platform Distance	Estimate	SE	CI
0.0	-0.159	0.021	(-0.201, -0.119)
0.5	-0.124	0.015	(-0.152, -0.093)
1.0	-0.124	0.017	(-0.158, -0.091)
1.5	-0.113	0.022	(-0.157, -0.069)
2.0	-0.035	0.031	(-0.095, 0.023)
2.5	-0.026	0.049	(-0.114, 0.070)
3.0	-0.002	0.095	(-0.187, 0.177)

D.3.2 Figure 6 robustness check

The figure below displays two robustness checks for Figure 6 in the paper. Figure D.9 presents the estimates from the paper (left panel) along with results that exclude scenarios in which the two candidates took the exact same position on either policy (right panel).

Figure D.9: Defection rate by candidate platform distance.



D.3.3 Regression test for heterogeneity

For a formal test of whether defection is decreasing in platform distance, we used OLS to fit the linear model

$$\mathbb{1}(\text{Vote for Candidate 1})_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1(M_1 - M_2)_{ij} + \beta_2 P_{ij} + \beta_3(M_1 - M_2) \times P_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}$$

where i indexes respondents, j indexes candidate choices, M_1 and M_2 are candidate 1 and 2's democracy positions, and $P \equiv |\frac{P_{1E}-P_{2E}+P_{1S}-P_{2S}}{2}|$ is the mean absolute distance between candidate 1 and 2's policy positions on a left-right scale. As in the figure, this measure can take the values $\{0, 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3\}$. See section C.5 for details as to how we mapped the candidates' positions onto a left-right scale.

The positive coefficient on β_3 constitutes evidence that when policy differences between candidates are larger, our respondents were less likely to punish a D^- candidate.

Table D.8: Regression test to accompany Figure 6

Subset	Term	Estimate	SE	CI
All	(Intercept)	0.5000	0.0093	(0.482, 0.518)
	(M1-M2)	-0.1584	0.0128	(-0.183, -0.133)
	Platform polarization	-0.0000	0.0075	(-0.014, 0.014)
	(M1-M2) x Platform polarization	0.0462	0.0106	(0.025, 0.067)
Distinct platforms	(Intercept)	0.5000	0.0108	(0.479, 0.522)
	(M1-M2)	-0.1182	0.0159	(-0.149, -0.086)
	Platform polarization	-0.0000	0.0081	(-0.015, 0.015)
	(M1-M2) x Platform polarization	0.0311	0.0120	(0.007, 0.055)

D.4 Resisting the Menu of Manipulation

D.4.1 Numerical results for Figures 7 and 8

The following tables provide numerical results that correspond to Figures 7 and 8 in the paper.

To test whether there are statistically significant differences in how severely respondents punish the distinct D[−] positions, we conducted an F-test for the equality of all of the D[−] coefficients in Table D.9. We find that $F = 3.8232$ (df = 6 and 18102, $p = 0.0008212$).

To demonstrate that the choice between cluster-robust and block bootstrapped standard errors makes little difference, Table D.9 includes standard errors computed by both methods. The correlation between the two sets of standard errors is 0.9988 and the average block bootstrapped standard error is 1.5 percent larger than the average clustered standard error.

Table D.9: Average marginal effect, numerical results

Term	Estimate	Bootstrap SE	Clustered SE
Male (baseline)			
Female	0.0120	0.0049	0.0051
White (baseline)			
Asian	-0.0153	0.0115	0.0114
Black	-0.0033	0.0071	0.0073
Hispanic	-0.0132	0.0071	0.0072
Business Executive (baseline)			
Farmer	0.0111	0.0105	0.0104
Lawyer	0.0105	0.0081	0.0082
Legislative Staffer	0.0142	0.0100	0.0099
Police Officer	0.0123	0.0099	0.0104
Served in the Army	0.0304	0.0120	0.0123
Served in the Navy	0.0149	0.0134	0.0133
Small Business Owner	0.0120	0.0089	0.0088
Teacher	0.0254	0.0106	0.0104
Same Party (baseline)			
Different Party	-0.1377	0.0066	0.0066
Economic Policy	-0.2335	0.0086	0.0089
Social Policy	-0.2664	0.0085	0.0086
D+ Board of Elections (baseline)			
D+ Committee Structure	0.0042	0.0106	0.0108
D+ Legislative Staff	-0.0013	0.0112	0.0113
D+ Legislative Procedure	0.0022	0.0104	0.0105
D+ Program Evaluation	-0.0019	0.0108	0.0110
D+ Record-keeping Practices	-0.0200	0.0114	0.0114
D+ Legislative Schedule	-0.0106	0.0109	0.0110
D- Gerrymander by 2	-0.1057	0.0158	0.0139
D- Gerrymander by 10	-0.1248	0.0163	0.0148
D- Close Polling Stations	-0.1283	0.0160	0.0145
D- Executive Order	-0.1045	0.0154	0.0145
D- Ignore Courts	-0.1407	0.0153	0.0144
D- Prosecute Journalists	-0.1607	0.0159	0.0140
D- Ban Protests	-0.1022	0.0154	0.0142
V- Extramarital Affairs	-0.1705	0.0153	0.0141
V- Underpaid Taxes	-0.2113	0.0152	0.0138

Table D.10: Marginal means by party

Category	Position	Party	Estimate	Bootstrap SE	CI
Undemocratic	D- Gerrymander by 2	Overall	0.407	0.014	(0.381, 0.433)
Undemocratic	D- Gerrymander by 2	Democrat	0.411	0.020	(0.373, 0.451)
Undemocratic	D- Gerrymander by 2	Republican	0.393	0.021	(0.355, 0.433)
Undemocratic	D- Gerrymander by 10	Overall	0.382	0.013	(0.357, 0.408)
Undemocratic	D- Gerrymander by 10	Democrat	0.408	0.020	(0.366, 0.445)
Undemocratic	D- Gerrymander by 10	Republican	0.358	0.021	(0.318, 0.400)
Undemocratic	D- Close Polling Stations	Overall	0.379	0.014	(0.351, 0.407)
Undemocratic	D- Close Polling Stations	Democrat	0.379	0.020	(0.338, 0.418)
Undemocratic	D- Close Polling Stations	Republican	0.378	0.021	(0.337, 0.419)
Undemocratic	D- Executive Order	Overall	0.403	0.013	(0.377, 0.428)
Undemocratic	D- Executive Order	Democrat	0.429	0.020	(0.389, 0.466)
Undemocratic	D- Executive Order	Republican	0.398	0.021	(0.356, 0.434)
Undemocratic	D- Ignore Courts	Overall	0.365	0.013	(0.339, 0.389)
Undemocratic	D- Ignore Courts	Democrat	0.351	0.020	(0.310, 0.390)
Undemocratic	D- Ignore Courts	Republican	0.381	0.020	(0.343, 0.421)
Undemocratic	D- Prosecute Journalists	Overall	0.346	0.014	(0.319, 0.373)
Undemocratic	D- Prosecute Journalists	Democrat	0.333	0.020	(0.290, 0.372)
Undemocratic	D- Prosecute Journalists	Republican	0.359	0.021	(0.320, 0.402)
Undemocratic	D- Ban Protests	Overall	0.397	0.013	(0.370, 0.424)
Undemocratic	D- Ban Protests	Democrat	0.435	0.019	(0.397, 0.472)
Undemocratic	D- Ban Protests	Republican	0.358	0.021	(0.317, 0.399)
Negative Valence	V- Extramarital Affairs	Overall	0.336	0.013	(0.312, 0.363)
Negative Valence	V- Extramarital Affairs	Democrat	0.332	0.020	(0.294, 0.373)
Negative Valence	V- Extramarital Affairs	Republican	0.336	0.020	(0.299, 0.374)
Negative Valence	V- Underpaid Taxes	Overall	0.288	0.013	(0.263, 0.314)
Negative Valence	V- Underpaid Taxes	Democrat	0.282	0.019	(0.247, 0.320)
Negative Valence	V- Underpaid Taxes	Republican	0.280	0.019	(0.243, 0.315)

D.4.2 Estimation method

Here we clarify how we adapt the Average Marginal Component Effect (AMCE) framework (Hainmuller et al. 2015) to our experimental design. A key difference between the typical conjoint design and our candidate-choice experiment is that the former is most often based on the uniform randomization of all attributes at the candidate level. By contrast, (1) most of our candidate attributes were randomized to mirror the real-world distribution of those attribute among state legislators (i.e. not uniform), and (2) we intentionally constrained our randomization of democracy positions in the 13 (out of 16) candidate-choice scenarios that we focus on in the main text to feature either the D^+ vs. D^+ , D^- vs. D^+ , or D^+ vs. D^- conditions but not the D^- vs. D^- condition. The purpose of this constraint was to focus in the majority of our scenarios on the process of democratic backsliding and the public’s willingness to check it.⁹⁸ That is, we treat the D^+ vs. D^+ condition as a control reflecting the status quo and the D^- vs. D^+ and D^+ vs. D^- conditions as treatments.

To adapt the AMCE framework to our experimental design, we begin with a regression equation that gives separate estimates of the effects of candidate 1 and candidate 2’s attributes:

$$\mathbb{1}(\text{choose candidate 1}) = \alpha + \sum_j \beta_j X_{1ij} + \sum_j \gamma_j X_{2ij} + \epsilon_{ij} \quad (\text{A.1})$$

where X_{1ij} and X_{2ij} are indicator variables for all possible values of attribute j in choice i between candidates 1 and 2. Because all attributes are balanced across the two candidates by randomization, the effect of X_{1ij} and X_{2ij} is the same for candidates 1 and 2. This implies that we can simplify the above formulation by $\beta_j = -\gamma_j$, giving

$$\mathbb{1}(\text{choose candidate 1}) = \alpha + \sum_j \beta_j (X_{1ij} - X_{2ij}) + \epsilon_{ij} \quad (\text{A.2})$$

Reporting estimates for (A.2) allows us to present our results in the familiar AMCE style of one coefficient per attribute while staying true to our randomization procedure. In the paper, we presented these results using only the candidates’ democracy positions.

In the main text, Figure 7 uses (A.2) to compute results for the full range of candidate attributes, with the exception of candidate age and years of job experience. As described above, age and job experience are jointly randomized in our design, with $31 \times 11 = 341$ total possible values. Rather than display estimates for each possible age/experience combination, we treat these as background noise that is (by design) independent of all other candidate

⁹⁸One of the remaining three scenarios did include the D^- vs. D^- condition; see Figure C.5.


characteristics.

Table D.9 presents numerical results that correspond to Figure 7, with both bootstrapped and cluster-robust standard errors. The two methods of estimating standard errors yield very similar results.

To validate the claim that $\beta_j = -\gamma_j$, Figure D.10 displays results based on (A.1). To facilitate the comparison of the coefficients, we multiply γ_j by -1 .⁹⁹

⁹⁹Note that differences between coefficient estimates for the two candidates may be a consequence of how our data is organized. Above and in the paper, we note that although candidates 1 and 2 were equally likely to appear as D^- to the respondent, we reshaped our data so that candidate 1 varies between D^- and D^+ (depending on the experimental condition), while candidate 2 serves as a reference candidate, always holding a neutral position (D^+). The smaller (negative) coefficient estimate for “different party” for candidate 1 is most likely the consequence of the partisan double standard that we examine in section 3 of the paper: partisans punish D^- candidates from “different party” more severely than candidates from “same party”, and this only affects candidate 1 in our data. Such differences between coefficient estimates for the two candidates can be eliminated by including interaction terms capturing such partisan double standard (as we do in section 4 of the paper).

Figure D.10: Average marginal effect for candidate characteristics: separate estimates for both candidates



D.5 Structural Estimates of Support for Democracy

This subsection supplements our structural analysis with

- a graphical summary of the relationship among key structural parameters;
- an assessment of the goodness of fit for the logit model;
- full regression tables for the logit models that we used to compute the structural parameters.

D.5.1 A summary of the relationship among key structural parameters

The relationship between the structural parameters estimated in this section of the paper is graphically summarized by Figure D.11. It plots the combinations of economic and social policies that result in an equal probability of victory for both candidates, assuming candidate 1 is the respondent's co-partisan but candidate 2 is not. We refer to these lines as *isoelects*. The solid black isoelect plots combinations of economic and social policies that result in an equal probability of victory for either candidate when both adopt a neutral democracy position (D^+ vs. D^+); the dashed blue and dotted red isoelects correspond to the D^- vs. D^+ and D^+ vs. D^- conditions, respectively. Combinations of economic and social policies to the right and above the isoelects correspond to scenarios when candidate 1 is more likely to win; policy combinations to the left and below the isoelects correspond to scenarios when candidate 2 is more likely to win.

The slope of all isoelects is negative ($-\frac{\alpha_1}{\alpha_2}$) with an absolute value smaller than one ($|\frac{\alpha_1}{\alpha_2}| < 1$). This implies that voters value a candidate's greater proximity on both economic and social policies but place more weight on the latter.¹⁰⁰ Meanwhile, voters' value for democracy in terms of economic and social policies corresponds the distance between the D^+ vs. D^+ and the D^+ vs. D^- isoelect along the horizontal and vertical axis, respectively ($\frac{\delta}{\alpha_1}$ and $\frac{\delta}{\alpha_2}$).

The isoelects in Figure D.11 summarize the impact of partisanship in two ways. First, note that the D^+ vs. D^+ isoelect is below the point (0,0), reflecting the advantage ($\frac{\alpha_3}{\alpha_2}$) conferred on candidate 1 by his co-partisanship with the respondent. Second, the 50% bias in the punishment of undemocratic positions that co-partisans benefit from is mirrored in the smaller distance between the D^+ vs. D^+ and the D^- vs. D^+ isoelects (compared to the distance between the D^+ vs. D^+ and the D^+ vs. D^- isoelects.)¹⁰¹

¹⁰⁰A value of 0 on the horizontal and vertical axes refers to scenarios when the respondent rates the two candidates' economic or social platforms equally; positive values correspond to a higher rating of candidate 1's platform.

¹⁰¹This distance is $\frac{\delta}{\alpha_1}(1 - \pi)$ and $\frac{\delta}{\alpha_2}(1 - \pi)$ along the horizontal and vertical axis, respectively.





Figure D.11: Isoelects depicting the combinations of economic and social policies that result in an equal probability of victory for both candidates. Candidate 1 is the respondent's co-partisan, candidate 2 is not; gray bands reflect statistical uncertainty

D.5.2 Goodness of fit for the logit model

In the paper, we justify our use of the logit model by showing that the logit specification is directly implied by our theoretical framework. The figures below provides evidence of goodness of fit by overlaying predictions from logistic regression models onto our non-parametric estimates of candidate support. The figure below presents the same estimates as Section D.1.1 (solid lines) along with predicted values from logit models fit using the same data (dashed lines). The proximity between the solid and dashed lines of the same color indicates the logit model’s good fit.



D.5.3 Logistic regression results

In the main text, Table 2 presents structural estimates of our model's parameters, which were calculated based on logistic regressions. The following tables present results for the underlying logistic regressions.

Table D.11: Logistic regression results, standardized

Term	Core model (column 1)			Full model (column 2)		
	Estimate	SE	CI	Estimate	SE	CI
(Intercept)	-0.000	0.029	(-0.057, 0.056)	-0.000	0.029	(-0.058, 0.057)
diff_M	-0.580	0.040	(-0.656, -0.504)	-0.579	0.040	(-0.655, -0.504)
diff_econ_rateN	-0.871	0.038	(-0.946, -0.801)	-0.870	0.038	(-0.945, -0.802)
diff_social_rateN	-1.048	0.040	(-1.122, -0.968)	-1.048	0.040	(-1.126, -0.970)
diff_sameParty	0.704	0.037	(0.635, 0.782)	0.707	0.037	(0.639, 0.785)
diff_sex_Female				0.053	0.026	(0.007, 0.109)
diff_race_Asian				-0.069	0.058	(-0.193, 0.037)
diff_race_Black				-0.016	0.038	(-0.087, 0.059)
diff_race_Hispanic				-0.066	0.039	(-0.137, 0.011)
diff_pro_Farmer				0.059	0.056	(-0.048, 0.172)
diff_pro_Lawyer				0.054	0.043	(-0.030, 0.137)
diff_pro_Legislative_staffer				0.092	0.051	(-0.012, 0.188)
diff_pro_Police_officer				0.041	0.054	(-0.075, 0.149)
diff_pro_Served_in_the_army				0.144	0.066	(0.009, 0.273)
diff_pro_Served_in_the_navy				0.061	0.072	(-0.081, 0.206)
diff_pro_Small_business_owner				0.026	0.047	(-0.069, 0.114)
diff_pro_Teacher				0.113	0.056	(0.001, 0.218)
diff_experN				-0.006	0.026	(-0.057, 0.044)
diff_ageN				-0.017	0.026	(-0.065, 0.034)

Table D.12: Logistic regression results, natural units

Term	Core model (column 3)			Full model (column 4)		
	Estimate	SE	CI	Estimate	SE	CI
(Intercept)	-0.000	0.029	(-0.059, 0.054)	0.000	0.029	(-0.059, 0.055)
diff_M	-0.566	0.040	(-0.640, -0.491)	-0.566	0.040	(-0.640, -0.492)
diff_econ_rate	1.142	0.051	(1.044, 1.244)	1.142	0.052	(1.045, 1.244)
diff_social_rate	1.246	0.052	(1.145, 1.355)	1.247	0.052	(1.152, 1.359)
diff_sameParty	0.691	0.036	(0.624, 0.766)	0.694	0.037	(0.628, 0.770)
diff_sex_Female				0.056	0.025	(0.009, 0.112)
diff_race_Asian				-0.079	0.058	(-0.199, 0.025)
diff_race_Black				-0.022	0.038	(-0.093, 0.055)
diff_race_Hispanic				-0.063	0.038	(-0.136, 0.014)
diff_pro_Farmer				0.057	0.056	(-0.049, 0.173)
diff_pro_Lawyer				0.054	0.043	(-0.028, 0.139)
diff_pro_Legislative_staffer				0.103	0.050	(0.000, 0.202)
diff_pro_Police_officer				0.044	0.054	(-0.069, 0.154)
diff_pro_Served_in_the_army				0.136	0.065	(0.007, 0.262)
diff_pro_Served_in_the_navy				0.040	0.071	(-0.097, 0.184)
diff_pro_Small_business_owner				0.032	0.046	(-0.062, 0.116)
diff_pro_Teacher				0.125	0.056	(0.018, 0.232)
diff_experN				-0.002	0.025	(-0.053, 0.046)
diff_ageN				-0.019	0.026	(-0.068, 0.032)

Table D.13: Logistic regression results with democracy ratings

Term	Core model (column 5)			Full model (column 6)		
	Estimate	SE	CI	Estimate	SE	CI
(Intercept)	0.000	0.026	(-0.052, 0.047)	-0.000	0.026	(-0.051, 0.047)
diff_M_rate	0.836	0.047	(0.740, 0.927)	0.837	0.047	(0.743, 0.928)
diff_econ_rate	1.161	0.054	(1.054, 1.263)	1.161	0.054	(1.055, 1.264)
diff_social_rate	1.262	0.054	(1.160, 1.372)	1.264	0.054	(1.165, 1.376)
diff_sameParty	0.698	0.037	(0.628, 0.776)	0.701	0.037	(0.631, 0.781)
diff_sex_Female				0.056	0.026	(0.006, 0.112)
diff_race_Asian				-0.082	0.060	(-0.205, 0.031)
diff_race_Black				-0.016	0.039	(-0.090, 0.063)
diff_race_Hispanic				-0.069	0.038	(-0.140, 0.004)
diff_pro_Farmer				0.068	0.058	(-0.044, 0.181)
diff_pro_Lawyer				0.084	0.045	(-0.002, 0.173)
diff_pro_Legislative_staffer				0.125	0.051	(0.023, 0.226)
diff_pro_Police_officer				0.057	0.056	(-0.059, 0.168)
diff_pro_Served_in_the_army				0.143	0.067	(0.007, 0.277)
diff_pro_Served_in_the_navy				0.063	0.072	(-0.075, 0.206)
diff_pro_Small_business_owner				0.038	0.048	(-0.056, 0.123)
diff_pro_Teacher				0.150	0.057	(0.043, 0.264)
diff_experN				-0.001	0.025	(-0.051, 0.050)
diff_ageN				-0.022	0.027	(-0.073, 0.031)

E Additional Survey Results

E.1 Abstention

After seeing a profile of two candidates, each respondent was first asked which candidate they preferred and then whether they would vote in an election that pitted the two candidates against each other. The paper focused on the first of these outcomes, the respondents’ vote choices. Our analysis therefore uses the outcome variable

$$Y_i = \mathbb{1}(\text{prefers candidate 1})$$

where $\mathbb{1}()$, the indicator function, returns 1 if the respondent prefers candidate 1 and zero otherwise. We refer to this, for simplicity, as “voting” for candidate 1.

To understand how abstention affects undemocratic candidates’ fortunes, we defined a new outcome variable

$$Y_i = \mathbb{1}(\text{prefers candidate 1 and voted})$$

which is the outcome variable that is observed in real-world elections. This variable allows us to examine the possibility that undemocratic candidates also suffer due to abstention. When we only count the choices of respondents who also voted—the joint outcome variable that is observed in real elections—the average treatment effect of undemocratic positions rises from 11.7 percentage points to 13.1 percentage points (difference = 1.4 percent, 95% CI = (0.4, 2.4)). The table below presents the average treatment effect computed using both outcome variables as well as the difference between them. Standard errors and confidence intervals were computed via the block bootstrap. For a detailed examination of the potential for abstention/turnout to serve as a democratic check, see [Graham and Svolik \(2019\)](#).

Table E.1: Treatment Effect by Outcome Variable

	Estimate	SE	CI
Overall	-0.117	0.009	(-0.135, -0.099)
Voters only	-0.132	0.010	(-0.150, -0.112)
Difference	0.014	0.005	(0.004, 0.024)

E.2 Do Americans Know What Democracy Is (And Is Not)?

One potential explanation for our findings – especially those about the limited punishment for candidates who undermine democratic principles – is that Americans may simply have a poor understanding of what democracy is and what it is not.¹⁰² In order to evaluate this hypothesis, we included in a survey that preceded the candidate choice experiment by about a week a battery of democratic and undemocratic practices and asked each respondent to evaluate them. Crucially, the undemocratic practices also included items that would later appear as our treatments. To avoid priming our respondents, we intentionally avoided a direct reference to the US context and introduced the battery by the statement: “Countries around the world differ in how democratic they are. We sampled the following practices from around the world. How democratic do you think each one is?” This allows us to check whether our respondents understood that the specific practices that would later appear in our treatments were undemocratic, and it does so without alerting respondents to our interest in those specific practices.

In order to verify that respondents also understand what democracy *is*, we also included some perfectly democratic practices, as well as a number of items from the “essential for democracy” battery from the World Values Survey. A randomly selected half of our respondents were asked, “Many things are desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. On a scale from 1 to 10, how essential for democracy is each of the following things?” Respondents rated each statement on a 1-10 scale, where 1 means “not at all democratic” and 10 means “completely democratic.” Before computing the mean ratings, we rescaled the items to range from 0 to 1.

Below, Figures E.1 and E.2, show that most Americans subscribe to the same conception of democracy that political scientists do. The average rating is below .5 for each of the treatment check items, as well as the “essential to democracy” items that describe undemocratic practices (all labelled D^-).

For further verification that our respondents are similarly capable of distinguishing democratic, undemocratic, and democratically-neutral practices, we included two batteries of standard questions from the *World Values Survey*. Figure E.3 plots the World Values Survey’s “essential to democracy” battery and Figure E.4 plots the World Values Survey’s “political systems” battery. In both cases, majorities of respondents correctly identified the democratic and undemocratic practices and were about evenly divided over the democratically-neutral practices.

¹⁰²For recent perspectives on how to conceptualize and measure democracy, see Boix et al. (2013), Cheibub et al. (2010), and Coppedge et al. (2011).

Figure E.1: Ratings of “around the world” treatment check statements




Figure E.2: Ratings of “around the world” statements not related to treatment




Figure E.3: Ratings of World Values Survey “essential to democracy” battery




Figure E.4: Ratings of World Values Survey “political systems” battery






Figure E.5: Ratings of other questions asked of all respondents



E.3 Treatment effect heterogeneity by respondent characteristic

This figure plots treatment effect heterogeneity according to a set of pre-treatment covariates not considered in the body of the paper.



F The Montana Natural Experiment

In the paper, we showed that more-Republican precincts were less-punishing of Rep. Greg Gianforte (R-MT)’s assault on a journalist. This section checks the parallel trends assumption, shows that changes in the composition of absentee/polls voters were not associated with the dependent variable, and presents two robustness tests.

Parallel trends. Figure F.1 examines the parallel trends assumption (see e.g. Angrist and Pischke 2009). Each square plots the percentage Republican for absentee and election day (“polls”) voters, with text indicating the number of voters using each method. Though we only observe one period prior to our diff-in-diff, we observe the behavior of voters in each precinct without error, allowing a precise test of whether each precinct’s absentee and polls voters responded similarly to the differences between the candidates in 2014 and 2016. This gives us a precinct-by-precinct proxy for whether absentee and polls voters respond similarly to common shocks.

The shaded squares in Figure F.1 flag observations in which the parallel trends assumption appears to be violated. These correspond to the observations we dropped in columns (3) and (4) in the regression table in the paper. Bright pink squares indicate precincts in which the 2014-16 diff-in-diff has an absolute value of more than 10 percentage points. Maroon squares indicate 2014-16 diff-in-diffs with an absolute value of between 5 and 10 percentage points. Grey squares indicate Lake County, for which we do not observe 2014. White squares indicate a 2014-16 diff-in-diff of 5 percentage points or less.

Balance on observables. Another threat to inference in our Montana study is that the composition of absentee and election-day voters in 2016 may have been different than the same composition in 2017. Using the voter file we can create three variables describing the background characteristics of voters in each precinct: age (operationalized by mean birth year), residence within city limits, and percentage of voters voting absentee versus at the polls. Comparing these characteristics with the 2016-17 diff-in-diff provides a check as to whether places with different levels of support for Republicans experienced systematically different changes in the composition of absentee/election-day voters from 2016 to 2017.

To check for an association between observable characteristics and support for Republicans, we plot two versions of each covariate. “Mean” is simply the mean value of the covariate for all voters in the precinct, pooling across 2016 and 2017. “D-in-D” transforms the covariate according to the diff-in-diff formula $(X_{\text{polls},2017} - X_{\text{absent},2017}) - (X_{\text{polls},2016} - X_{\text{absent},2016})$. Figure F.3 plots these measures against the percentage of voters in the precinct supporting Republicans in 2016 (i.e., the interaction term in the interacted diff-in-diff). Figure F.2 plots


the same measures against the 2016-17 percent Republican diff-in-diff (i.e., the dependent variable). The plots suggest that there is no major systematic relationship between baseline voter characteristics and the key variables.

Dropping controls. Table F.2 verifies that our main result is robust to the exclusion of control variables. Although we can no longer detect the overall average effect of the attack, we still detect a large, statistically significant difference between more- and less-Republican precincts.

Placebo test. As a check that our results are not spurious, Tables F.3 and F.4 present regression results from placebo tests using the difference between 2014 and 2016 instead of 2016 and 2017. We never detect a negative main effect ($2016 \times \text{electDay}$) or a positive interaction effect ($2016 \times \text{Elect Day} \times \% \text{ R } 2014$), suggesting that the key results in the paper were not spurious. We do detect some placebo effects with the wrong sign in the full sample, but not for the restricted sample of counties that met our parallel trends criteria.

F.1 Parallel trends

Figure F.1: Montana parallel trends by precinct



F.2 Balance on observable characteristics

Figure F.2: Montana covariate balance vs. dependent variable





Figure F.3: Montana covariate balance vs. percent Republican support



F.3 Full regression table

Table F.1: Montana diff-in-diff

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Republican two-party vote share			
	D-in-D (1)	Interacted (2)	D-in-D (3)	Interacted (4)
2017	−0.048*** (0.008)	−0.024 (0.022)	−0.063*** (0.012)	−0.111*** (0.027)
Election Day	0.087*** (0.023)	0.171*** (0.038)	0.128*** (0.032)	0.301*** (0.061)
2017 x Elect Day	−0.036* (0.014)	−0.237*** (0.041)	−0.042* (0.021)	−0.174** (0.055)
% R 2016		1.047*** (0.027)		1.133*** (0.044)
2017 x % R 2016		−0.033 (0.031)		0.084* (0.042)
Elect Day x % R 2016		−0.137* (0.058)		−0.304*** (0.090)
2017 x Elect Day x % R 2016		0.313*** (0.066)		0.220** (0.085)
Mean birth year	−0.003 (0.004)	−0.002* (0.001)	−0.008 (0.005)	−0.002 (0.001)
% voting absentee	−0.130** (0.044)	−0.135** (0.044)	−0.137* (0.068)	−0.114 (0.064)
% in city limits	−0.150*** (0.034)	−0.0005 (0.007)	−0.122** (0.040)	0.007 (0.010)
Constant	6.723 (7.273)	4.106* (1.622)	15.890 (10.386)	3.077 (1.926)
Observations	348	348	164	164
Adjusted R ²	0.315	0.904	0.432	0.923

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by precinct.

F.4 No-controls regression

Table F.2: Montana diff-in-diff, no controls

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Republican two-party vote share			
	D-in-D	Interacted	D-in-D	Interacted
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
2017	−0.053*** (0.005)	−0.033 (0.021)	−0.060*** (0.005)	−0.118*** (0.027)
Election Day	0.073*** (0.008)	0.153*** (0.045)	0.092*** (0.010)	0.312*** (0.060)
2017 x Elect Day	−0.010 (0.009)	−0.216*** (0.039)	−0.003 (0.009)	−0.160** (0.055)
% R 2016		1.054*** (0.031)		1.143*** (0.041)
2017 x % R 2016		−0.030 (0.031)		0.086* (0.041)
Elect Day x % R 2016		−0.124 (0.069)		−0.326*** (0.093)
2017 x Elect Day x % R 2016		0.318*** (0.063)		0.232** (0.086)
Constant	0.616*** (0.014)	−0.067*** (0.020)	0.635*** (0.017)	−0.136*** (0.026)
Observations	348	348	164	164
Adjusted R ²	0.096	0.896	0.199	0.919

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by precinct.

F.5 Placebo tests

Table F.3: Montana placebo diff-in-diff

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Republican two-party vote share			
	D-in-D	Interacted	D-in-D	Interacted
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
2016	−0.016 (0.016)	−0.074 (0.040)	0.030 (0.022)	−0.042 (0.041)
Election Day	0.049 (0.025)	−0.105 (0.116)	0.101*** (0.028)	0.251** (0.079)
2016 x Elect Day	0.018 (0.012)	0.301** (0.095)	0.010 (0.007)	0.038 (0.042)
% R 2014		0.892*** (0.081)		1.101*** (0.068)
2016 x % R 2014		0.113 (0.058)		0.069 (0.060)
Elect Day x % R 2014		0.233 (0.165)		−0.256* (0.115)
2016 x Elect Day x % R 2014		−0.417** (0.136)		−0.049 (0.062)
Mean birth year	0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.001)	−0.005 (0.005)	0.001 (0.001)
% voting absentee	−0.177*** (0.052)	−0.208** (0.068)	−0.183 (0.095)	−0.120 (0.092)
% in city limits	−0.161*** (0.034)	−0.005 (0.008)	−0.110** (0.037)	−0.007 (0.008)
Constant	−0.416 (7.172)	−1.049 (2.357)	10.264 (9.646)	−1.440 (2.168)
Observations	308	268	164	164
Adjusted R ²	0.307	0.862	0.395	0.877

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by precinct.

Table F.4: Montana placebo diff-in-diff, no controls

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Republican two-party vote share			
	D-in-D	Interacted	D-in-D	Interacted
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
2016	−0.003 (0.007)	−0.066 (0.037)	0.010* (0.004)	−0.031 (0.042)
Election Day	0.063*** (0.012)	−0.058 (0.122)	0.092*** (0.010)	0.298*** (0.071)
2016 x Elect Day	0.009 (0.011)	0.292** (0.096)	−0.0002 (0.005)	0.026 (0.042)
% R 2014		0.922*** (0.081)		1.136*** (0.056)
2016 x % R 2014		0.110 (0.056)		0.062 (0.061)
Elect Day x % R 2014		0.187 (0.178)		−0.307** (0.109)
2016 x Elect Day x % R 2014		−0.414** (0.139)		−0.040 (0.062)
Constant	0.619*** (0.015)	0.019 (0.055)	0.625*** (0.016)	−0.137*** (0.036)
Observations	308	268	164	164
Adjusted R ²	0.061	0.851	0.188	0.871

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by precinct.

F.6 Relationship between geographic and individual characteristics

Our Montana study uses the percentage of Republicans in a precinct as an indicator of precinct extremism. To examine the relationship between Republican vote share and individual-level indicators of partisanship and ideology, Figure F.4 merges data from the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES) and county-level returns from the 2016 presidential election. In each panel, the X-axis is the county-level presidential Republican vote share and the Y-axis is one measure of CCES respondents' partisan and ideological leanings. All measures were standardized to have a mean of zero and the standard deviation of one.


Each panel shows that respondents in counties that vote more Republican tend to be more conservative, even within political party. The solid line is a loess line and the dotted line is an OLS regression. The table below displays the slope coefficient for each OLS line with each measure rescaled to $[0, 1]$ for comparability.

Both the figure and the table show that even within party, more Republican counties have more conservative and Republican voters. The first panel shows that Democrats, independents, and Republicans place themselves as more conservative on a five-point liberal-conservative scale. The second panel shows that Democrats are weaker partisans and Republicans are stronger partisans in areas that vote more Republican. Pure (non-leaning) independents are excluded because they only take one value on the seven-point party identification scale. The third panel shows that in more Republican counties, each partisan group is more disapproving of President Obama. The fourth panel uses item response theory (IRT)-based ideal points computed for [Graham and Orr \(Forthcoming\)](#). Each partisan group is more conservative in counties that vote more Republican. The fifth panel shows the same pattern using the additive score ideal points from the appendix to [Graham and Orr \(Forthcoming\)](#).

Table F.5: Bivariate regression coefficients for individual-level characteristics on county vote share

Party	Measure	Coefficient	SE	t	p	2.5%	97.5%
Democrat	Liberal/conservative scale	0.045	0.008	5.636	0.000	0.029	0.060
	7-point party scale	0.052	0.004	11.693	0.000	0.043	0.060
	Obama approval rating	-0.172	0.009	-18.160	0.000	-0.190	-0.153
	IRT ideal point from issue Qs	0.053	0.004	12.853	0.000	0.045	0.061
	Additive ideal point from issue Qs	0.061	0.004	14.507	0.000	0.053	0.069
Independent	Liberal/conservative scale	0.108	0.010	10.729	0.000	0.088	0.127
	Obama approval rating	-0.370	0.019	-19.693	0.000	-0.407	-0.334
	IRT ideal point from issue Qs	0.120	0.006	18.496	0.000	0.107	0.133
	Additive ideal point from issue Qs	0.141	0.008	17.301	0.000	0.125	0.157
Republican	Liberal/conservative scale	0.102	0.009	11.845	0.000	0.085	0.118
	7-point party scale	0.029	0.006	5.002	0.000	0.017	0.040
	Obama approval rating	-0.251	0.012	-20.859	0.000	-0.275	-0.228
	IRT ideal point from issue Qs	0.073	0.005	15.292	0.000	0.064	0.082
	Additive ideal point from issue Qs	0.101	0.006	15.804	0.000	0.088	0.113

Figure F.4: Relationship between presidential vote share and within-party conservatism



G Full Survey Text

The following pages contain screenshots for each page of the questionnaire, in the order they appeared in one run through the survey. For branching questions (e.g., the ANES 7-point party identification questions), only one possible branch appears.

You are invited to participate in a survey about politics and public affairs that will take approximately 10 to 15 minutes to complete. You will be asked to answer some questions about yourself and your views on politics.

Your participation in this survey is completely voluntary, and you may skip any question or choose to end your participation at any time without penalty. There are no known or anticipated risks to you for participating. Although this study will not benefit you personally, we hope that our results will add to our knowledge about political attitudes in the United States.

The survey is anonymous. The researcher will not know your name, and no identifying information will be connected to your survey answers in any way.

- ☐ I agree to participate
- ☐ I do not agree to participate



In which state do you live?




On the next four screens, we will ask you about some of your public policy preferences.

Please state how strongly you would support or oppose each policy in your state.



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How strongly would you support or oppose each policy?



Increase the state income tax on households earning over \$250,000 and increase the state corporate tax.

Increase the state income tax on households earning over \$250,000.

Cut the state income tax for all households.

Eliminate the state income tax.



How strongly would you support or oppose each policy?

Strongly oppose	Oppose		Neutral		Support		Strongly support			
0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100

Local police should not help federal authorities to enforce immigration laws.


Local police should turn over to federal authorities only illegal immigrants accused of violent crimes.

Local police should turn over to federal authorities every illegal immigrant they encounter.

Local police should aggressively search for illegal immigrants and turn them over to federal authorities.



How strongly would you support or oppose each policy?



Increase state aid to local school districts and prioritize poor school districts.

Increase state aid across all local school districts.

Cut state aid across all local school districts.

Eliminate state aid to local school districts.



How strongly would you support or oppose each policy?

Strongly oppose	Oppose		Neutral		Support		Strongly support			
0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100

Marijuana should be legal for recreational use and sold freely.

Marijuana should be legal for recreational use and only sold in state-licensed dispensaries.

Marijuana should only be legal for medical use.

Marijuana should be illegal for everyone. No exceptions.



Thinking about the policy issues you just rated, how important do you consider each one?

Not at all important		Not too important			Fairly important			Extremely important		
0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100

Education spending

Immigration

Marijuana

Taxes



How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically?

Please choose on a scale where 1 means “not at all democratic” and 10 means “completely democratic.”

Not at all democratic										Completely democratic
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	



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"Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government."

To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

- ☐ Strongly agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Strongly disagree



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On the whole, are you satisfied with the way democracy works in the United States?

- ☐ Very satisfied
- ☐ Fairly satisfied
- ☐ Not very satisfied
- ☐ Not at all satisfied



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Countries around the world differ in how democratic they are. We sampled the following practices from around the world. How democratic do you think each one is?

Use a scale where 1 means “not at all democratic” and 10 means “completely democratic.”

[illegible]



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Here are some more practices from around the world. How democratic do you think each one is?

Use a scale where 1 means “not at all democratic” and 10 means “completely democratic.”

[illegible]



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As you may know, state legislatures redraw election maps every ten years. This is called *redistricting*. Redistricting ensures that each state legislator and member of Congress represents the same number of people.

Politicians sometimes draw district boundaries to help their party do better. This is called *gerrymandering*. For example, if you draw the map just right, one party might win 70 or 80 percent of the available seats with just 51 percent of the total votes.

How strongly do you support or oppose gerrymandering?

Strongly oppose										Strongly support
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐



Many things are desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. On a scale from 1 to 10, how essential for democracy is each of the following things?

	Not at all essential 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Essential to democracy 10
Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Religious authorities ultimately interpret the laws	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
People choose their leaders in free elections	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
People receive state aid for unemployment	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
The army takes over when government is incompetent	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Civil rights protect people from state oppression	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
The state makes people's incomes equal	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
People obey their rulers	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Women have the same rights as men	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐



Next you will answer some questions about politically-relevant facts.

We want to measure what you **already know** about these questions. Please do not cheat by looking up the answers, asking someone, or getting help in any other way.

Do you promise not to cheat?

- ☐ Yes, I promise not to cheat.
- ☐ No.



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In New York, which party currently controls a majority of the seats in the state legislature?

- ☐ Democrats control both houses
- ☐ Republicans control both houses
- ☐ Split (each party controls one house)
- ☐ Don't know



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In New York, to which party does the governor belong?

- ☐ Democrat
- ☐ Republican
- ☐ Independent
- ☐ Don't know



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Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?

- ☐ Democrat
- ☐ Republican
- ☐ Independent
- ☐ Other



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Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic party or the Republican party?

- ☐ Republican
- ☐ Neither
- ☐ Democrat



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How would you describe your political ideology?

- ☐ Extremely liberal
- ☐ Liberal
- ☐ Slightly liberal
- ☐ Moderate
- ☐ Slightly conservative
- ☐ Conservative
- ☐ Extremely conservative



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How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
A candidate's policies matter more than their political party.	☐	☐	☐	☐
I always vote for Democrats.	☐	☐	☐	☐
Knowing the candidates' parties helps me choose.	☐	☐	☐	☐
I would never vote for a Republican.	☐	☐	☐	☐
I always trust Democrats to do the right thing.	☐	☐	☐	☐



We would like to learn about your views on a series of candidates for a state legislature. Each candidate will have a few policy positions and most will have a political party.

As you rate these candidates, please think about how close each one is to the combination of party and policy positions that you would most like to see in a real candidate.




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[Respondents answered 24 questions in this format]

A Republican with the platform:

- ▶ Cut state aid across all local school districts.
- ▶ Marijuana should be legal for recreational use and only sold in state-licensed dispensaries.

How similar is this candidate to your ideal set of policy views?



Finally, we need a little more background information.



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Are you registered to vote?

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No
- ☐ No, I just moved and haven't had a chance
- ☐ Not sure
- ☐ Other



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Do you approve or disapprove of the way Donald Trump is handling his job as President?

- ☐ Strongly approve
- ☐ Somewhat approve
- ☐ Somewhat disapprove
- ☐ Strongly disapprove



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For whom did you vote in the 2016 presidential election?

☐ Hillary Clinton

☐ Donald Trump

☐ Another candidate

☐ Did not vote



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For whom did you vote in the 2012 presidential election?

☐ Barack Obama

☐ Mitt Romney

☐ Another candidate

☐ Did not vote



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If the 2016 presidential election were held again tomorrow, which major party candidate would you prefer?

- ☐ Hillary Clinton
- ☐ Donald Trump
- ☐ Would not vote



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Thank you for completing the survey.

If you have any questions about this research, you may contact Milan Svolik at milan.svolik@yale.edu or (217) 419-6685.

If you would like to talk with someone other than the researchers to discuss problems or concerns, to discuss situations in the event that a member of the research team is not available, or to discuss your rights as a research participant, you may contact the Yale University Human Subjects Committee, (203)785-4688, human.subjects@yale.edu. Additional information is available at <https://your.yale.edu/research-support/human-research/research-participants/rights-research-participant>.



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Your participation in this survey is completely voluntary, and you may skip any question or choose to end your participation at any time without penalty. There are no known or anticipated risks to you for participating. Although this study will not benefit you personally, we hope that our results will add to our knowledge about political attitudes in the United States.

The survey is anonymous. The researcher will not know your name, and no identifying information will be connected to your survey answers in any way.

I agree to participate

I do not agree to participate



In which state do you live?

Connecticut ▼



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Next you will answer some questions about politically-relevant facts.

We want to measure what you **already know** about these questions. Please do not cheat by looking up the answers, asking someone, or getting help in any other way.

Do you promise not to cheat?

Yes, I promise not to cheat.



No.



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What job or political office does Vladimir Putin hold?

☐ Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

☐ Secretary-General of the United Nations

☐ Prime Minister of Hungary

☐ Don't know

☐ President of Turkey

☐ Chancellor of Germany

☐ President of Russia



What job or political office does Angela Merkel hold?

☐ President of Turkey	☐ Secretary-General of the United Nations
☐ Chancellor of Germany	☐ President of Russia
☐ Prime Minister of the United Kingdom	☐ Prime Minister of Hungary
☐ Don't know	



What job or political office does John Roberts hold?

☐ Chief Justice of the Supreme Court

☐ Secretary of Defense

☐ Attorney General

☐ Don't know

☐ Senate Majority Leader

☐ Vice President

☐ Speaker of the House



What job or political office does Paul Ryan hold?

☐ Secretary of Defense

☐ Vice President

☐ Attorney General

☐ Don't know

☐ Chief Justice of the Supreme Court

☐ Speaker of the House

☐ Senate Majority Leader



For how many years is a United States Senator elected – that is, how many years are there in one full term of office for a U.S. Senator?

Please type a number:



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On which of the following does the U.S. federal government currently spend the least?

Social Security	Medicare	Foreign aid	National defense
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☐☐☐☐

Do you happen to know which party currently has the most members in the U.S. House of Representatives in Washington?

Democrats	Republicans
-----------	-------------



Do you happen to know which party currently has the most members in the U.S. Senate?

Democrats	Republicans
-----------	-------------



Different people feel differently about voting. For some, voting is a duty: they feel they should vote in every election no matter how they feel about the candidates and parties. For others voting is a choice: they feel free to vote or not to vote, depending on how they feel about the candidates and parties.

For you personally, is voting mainly a duty, mainly a choice, or neither a duty nor a choice?

Mainly a duty	Mainly a choice	Neither a duty nor a choice
☐	☐	☐



How strongly do you feel that voting is a duty?

Very strongly	Moderately strongly	Not too strongly
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Next, we would like to know about which traits you consider most important for children.

On the next screen, you will see four pairs of traits. Choose the one that is most important for a child to have.



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Which is more important for a child to have:

Independence



Respect for elders



Which is more important for a child to have:

Good manners



Curiosity



Which is more important for a child to have:

Obedience



Self-reliance



Which is more important for a child to be:

Considerate



Well-behaved



Your final task is to choose between sets of candidates for a state legislature. There will be sixteen total choices. On each page, the "next" button will appear after 20 seconds.

Please choose the candidate you would most likely vote for if a legislative election were held today.



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	Candidate 1	Candidate 2
Age	38 years old	40 years old
Gender	Male	Female
Race	White	White
Background	Served in the army for 13 years	Business executive for 15 years
Party	Democrat	Democrat
Positions	Cut state aid across all local school districts.	Cut state aid across all local school districts.
	Local police should turn over to federal authorities only illegal immigrants accused of violent crimes.	Local police should not help federal authorities to enforce immigration laws.
	Supported a redistricting plan that gives Democrats 10 extra seats despite a decline in the polls.	Participated in a working group on using program evaluation to inform policymaking.

Which candidate do you prefer?

Candidate 1

Candidate 2

Would you vote in this election?

Yes

No

The next button will appear after 20 seconds.

[The next two slides only appeared after the final choice.]

Finally, we have two more questions **about the same choice you just made**. We want to learn about how people make these choices.

For reference, here is the information again:

	Candidate 1	Candidate 2
Age	38 years old	40 years old
Gender	Male	Female
Race	White	White
Background	Served in the army for 13 years	Business executive for 15 years
Party	Democrat	Democrat
Platform	Cut state aid across all local school districts.	Cut state aid across all local school districts.
	Local police should turn over to federal authorities only illegal immigrants accused of violent crimes.	Local police should not help federal authorities to enforce immigration laws.
	Supported a redistricting plan that gives Democrats 10 extra seats despite a decline in the polls.	Participated in a working group on using program evaluation to inform policymaking.

In your own words, **how did you choose between these candidates?**

Please be as specific as you can. Your response will help us understand how people make these choices.

The "next" button will appear after 20 seconds.

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Below is the second question about the choice you just made.

	Candidate 1	Candidate 2
Age	38 years old	40 years old
Gender	Male	Female
Race	White	White
Background	Served in the army for 13 years	Business executive for 15 years
Party	Democrat	Democrat
Platform	Cut state aid across all local school districts.	Cut state aid across all local school districts.
	Local police should turn over to federal authorities only illegal immigrants accused of violent crimes.	Local police should not help federal authorities to enforce immigration laws.
	Supported a redistricting plan that gives Democrats 10 extra seats despite a decline in the polls.	Participated in a working group on using program evaluation to inform policymaking.

Which of these two candidates is **more likely to respect norms of democratic political competition**?

Candidate 1	No difference	Candidate 2
☐	☐	☐



Thank you for completing the survey.

If you have any questions about this research, you may contact Milan Svolik at milan.svolik@yale.edu or (217) 419-6685.

If you would like to talk with someone other than the researchers to discuss problems or concerns, to discuss situations in the event that a member of the research team is not available, or to discuss your rights as a research participant, you may contact the Yale University Human Subjects Committee, (203)785-4688, human.subjects@yale.edu. Additional information is available at <https://your.yale.edu/research-support/human-research/research-participants/rights-research-participant>.



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