

### (In)direct evidential futures in Colloquial Jakartan Indonesian

Overview: We claim that evidentiality and future tense cross, arguing that Colloquial Jakartan Indonesian fills a typological gap, having a future which is *simultaneously* an evidential marker. The verb ‘want’ *mau* in Indonesian has a life as a future modal that is also a direct evidential. Unlike other evidential futures, we argue that *mau* is at the same time an evidential and a future marker. Like other evidential futures, we propose that the future marker *pasti* (Copley, 2010) behaves as an indirect evidential in its non-predictive usages. Thus, it is possible that a future is simultaneously an evidential; but how can we possibly have direct evidence of the future? We argue that language has precisely a way to encode this.

**Mau as a Direct Evidential Future** Indonesian has no tense morphology on the verb stem; the context disambiguates between a present and a past tense interpretation. However, a bare stem cannot receive a future interpretation unless accompanied by an adverb or a future marker (usually *bakal* ‘will’ colloquially). *Mau* ‘want’ can also function as a future marker, having a purely temporal meaning, and being compatible with the negation of desire *mau* meaning ‘want’, as in (1). Let’s call this use of *mau* the *future mau*.

(1) *We are at a party, but it’s getting late. I need to leave.*

Sebenarnya aku nggak mau, tapi aku mau pulang sekarang ya.  
actually I NEG WANT but I FUT go-home now yes  
‘I don’t actually want to but I will go home now.’

*Mau* cannot be directly negated; it can only receive a ‘not want’ interpretation, not a ‘will not’ one:

(2) *Will you be at the concert tomorrow?*

#Aku nggak mau ke konser=nya.  
I NEG WANT to concert-DEF  
‘I ✓don’t want to/ ✗will not go to the concert.’

Like a weak PPI, it is incompatible with clausemate negation, negative quantifiers, and ‘only’, but compatible with a negation in a higher clause, acceptable under ellipsis and with metalinguistic negation. It can also be rescued like a PPI since it can be negated in the antecedent of an *if*-clause.

Future *mau* is compatible with inanimates as seen in (3). However, for future *mau* to be licensed we need to have direct (perceptual) evidence that the event will occur. More concretely, we need to perceive an event directly correlated with the future proposition.

(3) a. *Mau jatuh buku=nya.*

FUT fall book.DEF  
‘The book will fall.’

b. ✓Context: The book is at the edge of the bookshelf, I am afraid it will fall.

c. ✗Context: The book is well secured in the middle of the bookshelf. However, a magician in the room who wants to show off his skills says the book will fall.

Weather reports, elections polls, guesses do not count as evidence for future *mau* licensing. But it’s not enough that there is evidence for something for future *mau* to be licensed. The future also has to be proximate, and what counts as a ‘proximate’ future is context dependent.

(4) *A boy is shooting an arrow. The arrow just left the bow.*

Panah=nya bakal/#mau kena target=nya.  
arrow-DEF FUT hit target-DEF  
‘The arrow will hit the target.’

We propose that *mau* is ambiguous between a verb ‘want’ *mau*<sub>1</sub> and a future *mau mau*<sub>2</sub>, which is a modal (Copley, 2002, 2010; Jeoung, 2020; Sneddon, 2010). We argue that *mau*<sub>2</sub> is a specification of modal *will*, carrying an additional evidentiality presupposition.

- (5) a. ... [mau [ASP[VP]]]  
 b.  $\llbracket \text{mau}_2 \rrbracket^c = \lambda P_{i,st} . \lambda t . \lambda w . \forall w' \in \text{ACC}(w, t) : \text{author}(c) \text{ has enough direct evidence for } P . P(t)(w')$

Unlike other evidential futures described so far, future *mau* is an evidential that is simultaneously a future. What counts as direct evidence for the future proposition is perceiving a state which directly correlates with the future proposition. We get a proximate future by requiring that there be “enough” direct evidence. The PPI-hood is accounted for, since negating the future proposition contradicts its presupposition, which states that there is evidence, and thus a possibility of the event occurring in some accessible world. **Pasti as an Indirect Evidential Future** Indonesian also has an Italian-style evidential future. *Pasti* is a future marker (Copley, 2010), but we argue that it patterns with other evidential futures, since it can be used non-predictively as an indirect evidential marker. Future interpretations do not *have* to arise:

- (6) *I'm in the room next to the kitchen, and all of a sudden I hear something shuttering.*  
 Pasti adanya pecah.  
 PASTI something broken.  
 ‘Something must have broken.’

*Pasti* seems to indicate indirectness in reasoning, in a way that *mau* precisely does not.

- (7) *I am in my office with a student, and we have a meeting with Ali, so we are expecting him any moment now. Suddenly, the door knocks, and I say:*  
 Itu pasti/\*bakal/\*mau Ali.  
 It PASTI Ali  
 ‘This must be Ali.’

Interestingly, *pasti* can be combined with future *mau*, namely when we have direct evidence for the future event, but there is still a reasoning step involved in interpreting that evidence as such.

- (8) *I am new to work. My colleagues said that when the boss is frowning he is about to say something important. I am having my first meeting with him, and I see him frowning. I think:*  
 Dia pasti lagi mau ngomong serius.  
 3SG PASTI PROGR FUT talk serious  
 ‘He must be about to say something important.’

We argue that *pasti* is an evidential future, such as the Italian one (Frana & Menéndez-Benito, 2019, 2023; Giannakidou & Mari, 2018; Mari, 2010). We follow Frana and Menéndez-Benito (2023), arguing that *pasti* has an expressive presupposition (Schlenker, 2007):

- (9)  $\llbracket \text{pasti } p \rrbracket$  is only defined if the agent of *c* believes in  $c_w$  that the origo of *c* has neither direct evidence for *p* nor for  $\neg p$ .

The at-issue contribution of *pasti* is its prejacent *p*, while the quality threshold required for successful assertions get lowered (Davis et al., 2007).

**Conclusion** Indonesian shows that a future can simultaneously be an evidential. It has an Italian-style future, *pasti*, but also a future that is predictive *and* a direct evidential, future *mau*. This shows that language has a way of expressing what counts as direct evidence of the future.

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