

Phil. 270, 1/21: Epistemology, Knowledge, Analysis, Intuitions, and Gettier 2

5+. The analysis of knowledge: JTB, philosophical analysis, individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the exemplification of philosophically important concepts

-Issues of conceptual priority: one notion being more fundamental or basic than another. Perhaps knowledge is more basic than some of the concepts being used in attempt to analyze it? Perhaps we knowledge should be used to analyze some of *them*? (Williamson) Perhaps justification can be understood along the lines of “what knowledge looks like from the inside”? (Steven Reynolds) Perhaps belief can be understood as “the attitude of knowledge”? (see C)

- The counter-example game, Gettier cases, intuitions, experimental philosophy, plus: clear “predictions” and squishy terms; particularism, methodism, and reflective equilibrium

8. “Swaying Together”: see passage (D), below. Possible applications of different types:

-belief condition, justification condition, KAA (point 4)

-S’s assertion “It is possible that P_{ind} ” is true iff (1) no member of the relevant community knows that P is false, and (2) there is no relevant way by which members of the relevant community can come to know that P is false

--see KDR, “Epistemic Possibilities,” *Philosophical Review* 100 (1991): 581-605, pp. 593-4

-consider, for another kind of possible case, “know” vs. “know for certain”

(D) I am not one of those philosophers who seek to rest fixed distinctions upon a foundation quite incapable of supporting them. I rather seek to rest an unfixed distinction upon a swaying foundation, claiming that the two sway together rather than independently.

--David Lewis, *Counterfactuals* (Harvard UP), p. 92