

## Supplemental Information for Chong et al. 2015. “Does Corruption Information Inspire the Fight or Quash the Hope? A Field Experiment in Mexico on Voter Turnout, Choice, and Party Identification”. *Journal of Politics*.

This file contains the following:

- Map of experimental sites
- Graph with information about audit reports
- Robustness tests of the precinct-level estimates:
  - Estimates without the inverse probability weights
  - Estimates with baseline controls
  - Estimates excluding the three state capitals where spillovers are expected to be the greatest
  - Estimates without the three municipalities where failure to treat was larger than 30 percent
- Survey baseline summary statistics and orthogonality tests
- Robustness tests of the survey-based estimates with data aggregated at the precinct level:
  - Estimates of beliefs and opinions aggregated at the precinct level
  - Estimates of party identification aggregated at the precinct level
  - Estimates of party identification aggregated at the precinct level with baseline controls
  - Estimates of party identification aggregated at the precinct level excluding the three state capitals where spillovers are expected to be the greatest
  - Estimates of party identification aggregated at the precinct level without the three municipalities where failure to treat was larger than 30 percent
- Robustness tests of the individual-level estimates:
  - Estimates of beliefs and opinions with probit models
  - Estimates of party identification with probit models
- Estimates of the effect of information about corruption on self-reported electoral behavior
- Comparison of the election results in the publicly-available precinct-level data and the followup survey




Figure A1. Sites included in the experiment

Notes: The upper image is a map of Mexico, which indicates the three states in our experiment. The lower image gives a closer look to the states and highlights the experimental voting precincts.




Figure A2. Information from audit reports

Notes: This figure shows the information collected from the audit reports. The first box shows the distribution of the share of the transfer scheme that was spent. In average, mayors spent 56 percent of the resources available to them (with a standard deviation of 23, and a median of 52). The second box show the distribution of the share of the transfer scheme spent on poor areas. In average, 83 percent of the transfer was allocated to poor areas (with a standard deviation of 15, and a median of 76). Finally, the third box shows the distribution of the share of the transfer scheme spent with corruption. In average, 35 percent of resources were spent with some form of irregularity (with a standard deviation of 25, and a median of 54).

Table A1. Robustness of the precinct-level estimates to the exclusion of weights  
 Data Source: Publicly available election returns at the electoral precinct level

	Turnout			Incumbent party votes/reg. voters			Challenger parties votes/reg. voters		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Corruption Information	-1.43* (0.64)	-2.13** (0.57)		-0.48 (0.37)	-0.78 (0.60)		-0.96* (0.42)	-1.35* (0.52)	
No Information	-0.33 (0.46)	-0.34 (0.46)	-0.32 (0.46)	-0.00 (0.28)	0.00 (0.28)	0.01 (0.28)	-0.33 (0.27)	-0.34 (0.27)	-0.33 (0.27)
Placebos (omitted category)									
Corruption Info. X linear		9.81* (4.26)			2.49 (2.94)			7.32 (3.73)	
Corruption Info. X quad.		-14.37* (6.45)			-2.57 (3.15)			-11.80* (5.27)	
Corruption Information X $C_{0-33}$			-1.61* (0.63)			-0.63 (0.45)			-0.98 (0.46)
Corruption Information X $C_{33-66}$			-0.61 (0.40)			-0.08 (0.23)			-0.54 (0.28)
Corruption Information X $C_{66-100}$			-5.25* (2.27)			-0.96* (0.37)			-4.29 (1.98)
Constant	52.12** (0.41)	52.12** (0.41)	52.11** (0.40)	17.83** (0.24)	17.83** (0.24)	17.82** (0.24)	34.29** (0.24)	34.29** (0.25)	34.29** (0.24)
Observations	2,340	2,340	2,340	2,340	2,340	2,340	2,340	2,340	2,340
R-squared	0.44	0.44	0.44	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.44	0.44	0.44
<i>P-values:</i>									
Corr X $C_{0-33}$ = Corr X $C_{33-66}$			0.0310			0.2594			0.2142
Corr X $C_{0-33}$ = Corr X $C_{66-100}$			0.1347			0.5440			0.1284
Corr X $C_{33-66}$ = Corr X $C_{66-100}$			0.0619			0.0035			0.0872
Joint Hypotheses test = 0			0.0468			0.0206			0.0673
Mean dep. variable in placebos	52	52	52	17.15	17.15	17.15	34.75	34.75	34.75

Notes: See notes in Table 4. \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05 on two sided test.

Table A2. Robustness of the precinct-level estimates to the inclusion of baseline controls  
 Data Source: Publicly available election returns from Mexican Election Commission

	Turnout			Incumbent party votes/reg. voters			Challenger parties votes/reg. voters		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Corruption Information	-1.10** (0.25)	-2.00** (0.48)		-0.50** (0.15)	-0.69* (0.28)		-0.60** (0.22)	-1.31** (0.41)	
No Information	-0.69** (0.26)	-0.69** (0.25)	-0.68** (0.25)	-0.36* (0.15)	-0.36* (0.15)	-0.36* (0.15)	-0.33 (0.22)	-0.33 (0.22)	-0.33 (0.22)
Placebos (omitted category)									
Corruption Info. X linear		8.26* (3.27)			1.70 (1.93)			6.55* (2.84)	
Corruption Info. X quad		-10.59* (4.57)			-2.18 (2.70)			-8.40* (3.97)	
Corruption Information X $C_{0-33}$			-1.71** (0.37)			-0.69** (0.22)			-1.02** (0.32)
Corruption Information X $C_{33-66}$			-0.25 (0.35)			-0.31 (0.21)			0.07 (0.30)
Corruption Information X $C_{66-100}$			-4.27** (1.08)			-0.65 (0.64)			-3.62** (0.94)
Constant	22.62** (0.83)	22.73** (0.84)	22.74** (0.83)	6.80** (0.49)	6.82** (0.49)	6.80** (0.49)	15.83** (0.72)	15.91** (0.73)	15.95** (0.72)
Observations	2,338	2,338	2,338	2,338	2,338	2,338	2,338	2,338	2,338
R-squared	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.59	0.59	0.59

Notes: See notes in Table 4. \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05 on two sided test.

Table A3. Robustness of the precinct-level estimates to the exclusion of the three state capitals (where spillovers are expected to be the greatest)  
 Data Source: Publicly available election returns from Mexican Election Commission

	Turnout			Incumbent party votes/reg. voters			Challenger parties votes/reg. voters		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Corruption Information	-2.70** (0.59)	-2.92** (0.98)	-0.86* (0.39)	-0.29 (0.64)	-1.84** (0.48)	-2.63** (0.79)			
No information	-1.65** (0.59)	-1.65** (0.59)	-1.64** (0.59)	-0.99* (0.39)	-0.99* (0.39)	-0.99* (0.39)	-0.66 (0.48)	-0.65 (0.48)	
Placebos (omitted category)									
Corruption Info. X linear		12.14 (6.67)		1.03 (4.37)				11.11* (5.43)	
Corruption Info. X quad		-19.61* (8.00)		-4.99 (5.25)				-14.62* (6.52)	
Corruption Information X $C_{0-33}$			-2.52** (0.72)			-0.44 (0.47)			-2.08** (0.59)
Corruption Information X $C_{33-66}$			-0.40 (1.18)			-0.82 (0.77)			0.42 (0.96)
Corruption Information X $C_{66-100}$			-7.56** (1.54)			-2.97** (1.01)			-4.59** (1.25)
Constant	55.97** (0.34)	55.97** (0.34)	55.96** (0.34)	19.41** (0.22)	19.41** (0.22)	19.41** (0.22)	36.56** (0.28)	36.56** (0.28)	36.55** (0.28)
Observations	873	873	873	873	873	873	873	873	873
R-squared	0.59	0.60	0.60	0.63	0.64	0.64	0.32	0.33	0.33

Notes: See notes in Table 4. \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05 on two sided test.

Table A4. Robustness of the precinct-level estimates to the exclusion of the three municipalities where failure to treat was > 30%  
 Data Source: Publicly available election returns from Mexican Election Commission

	Turnout			Incumbent party votes/reg. voters			Challenger parties votes/reg. voters		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Corruption Information	-1.20** (0.33)	-2.61** (0.67)		-0.43* (0.20)	-1.30** (0.42)		-0.76** (0.27)	-1.32* (0.55)	
No information	-0.23 (0.33)	-0.23 (0.33)	-0.23 (0.33)	0.02 (0.20)	0.02 (0.20)	0.02 (0.20)	-0.25 (0.27)	-0.25 (0.27)	-0.24 (0.27)
Placebos (omitted category)									
Corruption Info. X linear		18.59** (4.10)			9.28** (2.54)			9.31** (3.34)	
Corruption Info. X quad		-27.21** (5.60)			-12.86** (3.48)			-14.35** (4.57)	
Corruption Information X $C_{0-33}$			-1.75** (0.52)			-0.81* (0.33)			-0.95* (0.43)
Corruption Information X $C_{33-66}$			-0.27 (0.42)			0.02 (0.26)			-0.28 (0.34)
Corruption Information X $C_{66-100}$			-7.09** (1.30)			-2.63** (0.81)			-4.46** (1.06)
Constant	51.53** (0.19)	51.53** (0.19)	51.53** (0.19)	17.75** (0.12)	17.75** (0.12)	17.75** (0.12)	33.78** (0.16)	33.78** (0.15)	33.78** (0.15)
Observations	2,032	2,032	2,032	2,032	2,032	2,032	2,032	2,032	2,032
R-squared	0.44	0.45	0.45	0.56	0.57	0.57	0.46	0.47	0.47

Notes: See notes in Table 4. \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05 on two sided test.

Table A5. Survey Baseline Summary Statistics and Orthogonality tests

	Means and Standard Deviations			P-value from orthogonality test
	Treatment: Corruption information	Placebos: Budget and Poverty expenditure information	Control: No information	
Women	0.56 (0.49)	0.55 (0.49)	0.50 (0.50)	0.0722
Age	41.01 (16.62)	40 (16.73)	38.13 (14.93)	0.1494
Income	2.70 (0.75)	2.76 (1.02)	2.8 (.83)	0.3018
Phone	0.44 (0.49)	0.49 (0.50)	0.53 (0.49)	0.4566
<i>Education:</i>				
No education	0.06 (0.25)	0.08 (0.27)	0.03 (0.16)	0.0350
Primary	0.34 (0.47)	0.21 (0.41)	.22 (0.41)	0.0272
High school	0.54 (0.49)	0.62 (0.48)	0.66 (0.47)	0.1438
College or more	0.03 (0.18)	0.08 (0.27)	0.07 (0.26)	0.1850
<i>Occupation:</i>				
Bureaucrat	0.02 (0.14)	0.01 (0.11)	0.04 (0.21)	0.1401
Self-employed	0.20 (0.40)	0.15 (0.35)	0.16 (0.37)	0.8116
Employed in private sector	0.03 (0.16)	0.12 (0.33)	0.07 (0.26)	0.0010
Employed in agriculture	0.04 (0.19)	0.07 (0.25)	0.04 (0.19)	0.3303
Worker	0.16 (0.36)	0.12 (0.32)	0.13 (0.33)	0.1424
Housewife	0.41 (0.49)	0.32 (0.46)	0.30 (0.46)	0.1910
Student	0.03 (0.18)	0.05 (0.22)	0.07 (0.26)	0.1479
Teacher	0 (0)	0.01 (0.11)	0.01 (0.12)	0.0394
Unemployed	0.07 (0.26)	0.05 (0.23)	0.08 (0.27)	0.1658
Retired	.03 (0.16)	0.05 (0.22)	0.02 (0.15)	0.1499

Notes: This table reports means and standard deviations in parentheses for baseline summary statistics from the survey. See table 2 for more details.



Table A6. Robustness of estimates of beliefs and opinions with aggregated data at the precinct level

Data source: Follow-up Survey (completed two weeks after 2009 elections)												
	Municipal government is dishonest			Municipal government is honest			Approval mayor			Unsatisfied with public services		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Corruption Information	0.02 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.08)		0.01 (0.04)	0.05 (0.07)		-0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.07)		0.05 (0.13)	-0.01 (0.12)	
No Information	0.05 (0.06)	0.07 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.08 (0.08)	0.08 (0.08)	0.07 (0.08)
Placebos (omitted category)												
Corruption Info. X linear		-0.65 (0.75)			0.09 (0.55)			-0.35 (0.41)			0.07 (1.56)	
Corruption Info. X quad		1.48 (1.13)			-0.40 (0.72)			0.36 (0.48)			0.18 (1.89)	
Corruption Information X $C_{0-33}$			-0.07 (0.06)			0.09 (0.05)			0.01 (0.04)			0.03 (0.07)
Corruption Information X $C_{33-66}$			0.01 (0.08)			0.01 (0.08)			-0.05 (0.05)			-0.08 (0.34)
Corruption Information X $C_{66-100}$			0.36** (0.11)			-0.11** (0.04)			-0.04 (0.03)			0.36* (0.16)
Constant	0.42** (0.04)	0.40** (0.04)	0.41** (0.04)	0.25** (0.03)	0.26** (0.03)	0.18** (0.02)	0.07** (0.02)	0.07** (0.02)	0.07** (0.02)	0.52** (0.06)	0.51** (0.06)	0.51** (0.06)
Observations	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75
R-squared	0.55	0.59	0.61	0.50	0.52	0.61	0.66	0.67	0.66	0.25	0.25	0.29

Notes: See table 6 for more details. \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05 on two sided test.

Table A7. Robustness of party id estimates with aggregated data at the precinct level

Data source: Followup Survey (completed two weeks after 2009 elections)

	party id incumbent			party id challengers		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Corruption Information	-0.07*	-0.05		0.03	-0.04	
	(0.03)	(0.05)		(0.06)	(0.06)	
No Information	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	0.09	0.08	0.09
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Placebos (omitted category)						
Corruption Info. X linear		0.09			0.92	
		(0.41)			(0.68)	
Corruption Info. X quad		-0.32			-1.33	
		(0.52)			(1.05)	
Corruption Information X $C_{0-33}$			-0.02			0.01
			(0.04)			(0.04)
Corruption Information X $C_{33-66}$			-0.15*			0.18*
			(0.06)			(0.08)
Corruption Information X $C_{66-100}$			-0.08*			-0.19
			(0.03)			(0.20)
Constant	0.18**	0.18**	0.18**	0.53**	0.54**	0.53**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Observations	75	75	75	75	75	75
R-squared	0.47	0.48	0.50	0.39	0.40	0.45

Notes: See table 6 for more details. \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$  on two sided test.

Table A8. Robustness of party id estimates with aggregated data at the precinct level including baseline controls

Data source: Followup Survey (completed two weeks after 2009 elections)						
	party id incumbent			party id challengers		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Corruption Information	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.05)		0.01 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.06)	
No Information	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.07 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)
Placebos (omitted category)						
Corruption Info. X linear		0.13 (0.42)			1.05 (0.76)	
Corruption Info. X quad		-0.38 (0.52)			-1.56 (1.14)	
Corruption Information X $C_{0-33}$			-0.02 (0.04)			-0.01 (0.03)
Corruption Information X $C_{33-66}$			-0.15* (0.06)			0.16 (0.10)
Corruption Information X $C_{66-100}$			-0.07 (0.05)			-0.27 (0.19)
Constant	-0.00 (0.81)	0.16 (0.81)	0.09 (0.85)	-0.19 (0.83)	-0.13 (0.74)	0.21 (0.68)
Observations	75	75	75	75	75	75
R-squared	0.47	0.49	0.50	0.43	0.46	0.52

Notes: See table 6 for more details. \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05 on two sided test.

Table A9. Robustness of party id estimates with aggregated data at the precinct level without the three state capitals

Data source: Followup Survey (completed two weeks after 2009 elections)

	party id incumbent			party id challengers		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Corruption Information	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.11 (0.06)		-0.05 (0.08)	0.08 (0.05)	
No Information	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.06)	0.06 (0.09)	0.04 (0.09)	0.01 (0.08)
Placebos (omitted category)						
Corruption Info. X linear		0.92 (0.48)			-0.70 (0.61)	
Corruption Info. X quad		-1.20 (0.60)			0.41 (0.67)	
Corruption Information X $C_{0-33}$			-0.03 (0.05)			0.02 (0.04)
Corruption Information X $C_{33-66}$			0.17 (0.09)			-0.49** (0.10)
Corruption Information X $C_{66-100}$			-0.08* (0.03)			-0.20 (0.22)
Constant	0.17** (0.03)	0.19** (0.02)	0.16** (0.03)	0.53** (0.07)	0.54** (0.09)	0.56** (0.08)
Observations	41	41	41	41	41	41
R-squared	0.63	0.66	0.64	0.45	0.49	0.50

Notes: See table 6 for more details. \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05 on two sided test.

Table A10. Robustness of party id estimates with aggregated data at the precinct level without the municipalities where failure to treat was  $> 30\%$

Data source: Followup Survey (completed two weeks after 2009 elections)

	party id incumbent			party id challengers		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Corruption Information	-0.10*	-0.08		0.05	-0.04	
	(0.04)	(0.06)		(0.08)	(0.08)	
No Information	-0.06	-0.06	-0.05	0.12*	0.10	0.12*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Placebos (omitted category)						
Corruption Info. X linear		0.10			1.11	
		(0.43)			(0.80)	
Corruption Info. X quad		-0.25			-1.62	
		(0.54)			(1.23)	
Corruption Information X $C_{0-33}$			-0.05			0.02
			(0.05)			(0.05)
Corruption Information X $C_{33-66}$			-0.15*			0.19*
			(0.06)			(0.08)
Corruption Information X $C_{66-100}$			-0.08*			-0.19
			(0.03)			(0.20)
Constant	0.18**	0.18**	0.18**	0.54**	0.56**	0.54**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Observations	57	57	57	57	57	57
R-squared	0.50	0.50	0.51	0.35	0.38	0.42

Notes: See table 6 for more details. \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$  on two sided test.

Table A11. Robustness of estimates of beliefs and opinions to the use of probit models

		Data source: Follow-up Survey (completed two weeks after 2009 elections)													
		Municipal government is dishonest				Municipal government is honest				Approval mayor				Unsatisfied with public services	
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)		
Corruption Information		0.06 (0.16)	-0.05 (0.20)		0.03 (0.14)	0.21 (0.29)	-0.34 (0.34)	0.21 (0.48)	0.15 (0.26)	0.15 (0.26)	0.15 (0.26)	-0.07 (0.26)			
No information		0.18 (0.16)	0.21 (0.17)	0.15 (0.16)	-0.09 (0.14)	-0.09 (0.14)	-0.06 (0.14)	-0.46 (0.39)	-0.56 (0.46)	v5 (0.20)	0.26 (0.20)	0.25 (0.20)	0.25 (0.20)		
Corruption Info. X linear			-1.99 (1.63)			0.20 (1.80)		-3.88 (4.33)				1.19 (3.41)			
Corruption Info. X quad			4.33 (2.40)			-1.24 (2.28)		3.55 (6.31)				-0.90 (4.06)			
Corruption Information X $C_{0-33}$				-0.20 (0.14)			0.23 (0.20)			v5 (0.05)			0.09 (0.16)		
Corruption Information X $C_{33-66}$				0.01 (0.22)			0.01 (0.19)			(0.42)			-0.11 (0.79)		
Corruption Information X $C_{66-100}$				0.97** (0.30)			-0.38** (0.08)			(0.43)			0.86 (0.44)		
Constant		0.58* (0.29)	0.64* (0.31)	0.66* (0.32)	-1.75** (0.32)	-1.81** (0.35)	-1.81** (0.35)	-1.77** (0.35)	-1.85** (0.40)	-1.86** (0.40)	0.19 (0.34)	0.24 (0.33)	0.21 (0.34)		
Observations		749	749	749	709	709	709	569	569	549	719	719	719		

Notes: See table 3 for more details. \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05 on two sided test.

Table A12. Robustness of party id estimates: probit models  
 Data source: Followup Survey (completed two weeks after 2009 elections)

	party id incumbent			party id challengers		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Corruption Information	-0.38*	-0.38*		0.10	-0.12	
	(0.17)	(0.18)		(0.14)	(0.15)	
No information	-0.21	-0.31	-0.28	0.26*	0.23	0.25*
	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Placebos (omitted category)						
Corruption Info. X linear		4.66			2.69	
		(2.67)			(1.89)	
Corruption Info. X quad		-10.94*			-3.84	
		(4.87)			(2.97)	
Corruption Information X $C_{0-33}$			-0.10			0.02
			(0.14)			(0.08)
Corruption Information X $C_{33-66}$			-1.28**			0.50**
			(0.36)			(0.19)
Corruption Information X $C_{66-100}$			†			-0.42
						(0.44)
Constant	-0.98**	-1.03**	-1.05**	0.29**	0.32**	0.31**
	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Observations	720	720	701	720	720	720

Notes: See table 6 for more details. \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$  on two sided test.

Table A13. The effect of information about corruption on electoral behavior  
 Data source: Follow-up Survey (completed two weeks after 2009 elections)

	Turnout (0,1)	Vote incumbent party (0,1)	Vote challenger party (0,1)	Turn in Spoiled Ballot (0,1)
Corruption Information	-0.11* (0.06)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.07)	0.00 (0.01)
No Information	0.04 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.05)	0.04 (0.06)	0.01 (0.01)
Placebos (omitted category)				
Corruption Information X $C_{0-33}$	-0.14** (0.06)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.01)
Corruption Information X $C_{33-66}$	0.22** (0.09)	-0.03 (0.12)	0.26 (0.19)	0.05 (0.03)
Corruption Information X $C_{66-100}$	-0.29*** (0.09)	-0.02 (0.11)	-0.27 (0.16)	-0.02 (0.04)
Constant	1.94* (1.17)	1.27 (0.93)	0.67 (1.13)	-0.47** (0.21)
Observations	594	594	594	594
R-squared	0.17	0.13	0.10	0.09

Notes: The dependent variables are: in columns (1)-(3), a dummy variable that takes the value of one if respondent turned out to vote; in columns (4) and (6), a dummy variable that takes the value of one if respondent voted for the incumbent party; in columns (7) and (9), a dummy variable that equals one when respondent voted for a challenger party; in columns (10) and (12), a dummy variable that equals one if respondent turned in a spoiled ballot. All specifications include: municipality fixed effects; baseline precinct-level turnout, incumbent and challenger parties votes (as a share of registered voters); education, income, occupation, gender, age, and religion. Corruption is measured at the municipality level, hence the municipality fixed effects capture any underlying effect of corruption on the outcome variable. Robust standard errors clustered by polling precinct in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 on two sided test.



Table A14. Comparison of the election results in the publicly available precinct-level data and the followup survey

Municipality	Turnout			PAN			PRI			PRD		
	Aggregate	Survey	p-value	Aggregate	Survey	p-value	Aggregate	Survey	p-value	Aggregate	Survey	p-value
Centro	0.45	0.71	0.000	0.02	0.10	0.004	0.48	0.45	0.775	0.43	0.40	0.687
Comalcalco	0.71	0.85	0.106	0.01	0.08	0.016	0.51	0.52	0.829	0.44	0.32	0.219
Cuahtla	0.43	0.60	0.047	0.22	0.27	0.469	0.28	0.42	0.063	0.22	0.16	0.418
Cuernavaca	0.50	0.78	0.000	0.23	0.26	0.513	0.39	0.58	0.001	0.13	0.06	0.126
Cardenas	0.54	0.78	0.007	0.02	0.07	0.129	0.49	0.60	0.225	0.36	0.27	0.327
Guadalajara	0.51	0.70	0.000	0.33	0.27	0.207	0.48	0.46	0.786	0.02	0.05	0.102
Huimanguillo	0.65	0.92	0.001	0.09	0.08	0.844	0.42	0.48	0.482	0.38	0.43	0.576
Jiutepec	0.47	0.72	0.012	0.23	0.18	0.580	0.24	0.34	0.268	0.28	0.26	0.874
Macuspana	0.57	0.77	0.048	0.02	0.12	0.024	0.45	0.48	0.781	0.28	0.38	0.290
Tlajomulco	0.50	0.90	0.003	0.27	0.21	0.646	0.26	0.26	0.990	0.36	0.26	0.451
Tlaquepaque	0.46	0.56	0.414	0.37	0.50	0.294	0.44	0.44	0.942	0.04	0.00	0.417
Tonala	0.47	0.78	0.001	0.29	0.25	0.634	0.51	0.55	0.695	0.03	0.10	0.098

Notes: This table reports turnout and party vote shares in the precinct-level data and our post-intervention survey data. It also reports the p-value of a test where the null hypothesis is that electoral outcomes in the precinct-level data are equal to the electoral outcomes in the survey data.