Mexico's Evolving Democracy

A Comparative Study of the 2012 Elections

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8

How Governmental Corruption Breeds Clientelism

ANA DE LA O

It has long been recognized that clientelism and the misuse of public office for private gain feed upon each other.[1] When politicians design and implement policies with the aim of generating income and political support for themselves, a vicious circle consolidates in which public services become an instrument "to generate revenue which can then be appropriated by politicians through various means such as bribes and kickbacks, or left to clients as remuneration for political support" (Kurer 1993, 262). The assumption that clientelism is strongly associated with governmental corruption is so widespread that in some studies the two phenomena are used interchangeably.[2]

A few recent studies have begun to explore the relationship between corruption and clientelism (Kawata 2006). Szeftel (2000), for example, argues that patron–client relations in Africa are for the most part responsible for the corruption that affects the region. Singer (2009) further argues that because clientelism undermines the ability of citizens to hold public officials accountable, it fosters corruption. In these accounts, corruption is an outcome of clientelism. Yet this direction of causation is unlikely to tell the complete story. Despite the centrality of corruption and clientelism to the governance deficit afflicting many countries in the developing world, how public corruption affects citizens' willingness to engage in patron–client relations remains largely unexplored.

In this chapter, I show that citizens' perceptions of corruption among public officials make them more likely to believe that their communities are rife with vote selling and more willing to sell their own votes. The misconduct of public officials is thus pernicious to democracy not only because corrupt politicians can use misappropriated resources to strengthen their clientelist networks (Della Porta and Vannucci 1997), but also because corruption can lead to citizens'

dissatisfaction with the political system (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Mishler and Rose 2001; Morris and Klesner 2010; Pharr 2000), as well as make citizens skeptical of their political institutions (Clausen, Kraay, and Nyiri 2011), driving them to find clientelism more appealing (Cleary and Stokes 2006).

It is perhaps no surprise that the relationship between corruption—understood as the misuse of public office for private benefit—and clientelism—"the direct exchange of a citizen's vote in return for direct payment or continuing access to employment, goods, and services" (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007)—is a social trap. To date, scholars have suggested that when public officials perceive that others in the public sector are engaged in corrupt behavior, they find fewer reasons not to engage in corruption themselves (Rothstein 2005). Similarly, however, if citizens perceive that politicians are corrupt, they may find less reason to value programmatic politics over clientelist appeals. Therefore understanding how corruption leads to clientelism is particularly relevant to getting a fix on the governance problem posed by machine politics.

The context of this chapter is Mexico's 2012 presidential election, which marked the return of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) to the presidency after twelve years of National Action Party (PAN) administrations. President Enrique Peña Nieto garnered 38% of the vote. The runner up, leftist politician Andrés Manuel López Obrador, garnered 31% of the vote. Despite a margin of victory of seven percentage points, allegations that the PRI bought five million votes tainted the election. To date, the extent to which clientelism influenced election results remains a controversial issue (see the introduction to this volume for more details on the election).

This chapter contributes to two strands of literature that have developed separately. One is the literature that shows that the misconduct of public officials has a negative effect on democracy. Scholarship over the last decade provides ample evidence that corruption leads citizens to question the legitimacy of their political system (Seligson 2002), erodes citizens' confidence in government and trust in political institutions (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Mishler and Rose 2001; Morris and Klesner 2010; Pharr 2000), and casts doubts about the effective enjoyment of legally sanctioned rights (Della Porta and Vannucci 1997). Maladministration also has behavioral consequences. Corruption drives voters away from the voting booth (Chong, De La O, Karlan, and Wantchekon 2011; McCann and Domínguez 1998) but induces a greater inclination to participate in antigovernment protests (Gingerich 2009). The other strand of literature is the vast scholarship on clientelism, where various determinants of vote buying have been studied, including poverty, partisanship (Díaz-Cayeros,

Estévez, and Magaloni 2007, 2009; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Magaloni, Díaz-Cayeros, and Estévez 2007; Nazareno, Stokes, and Brusco 2006; Nichter 2008; Stokes 2005; Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno, and Brusco 2013), institutions like the secret ballot (Balan and Robinson 2012), the size of the electorate (Seymour 1915), and voter's perceptions about the role of partisan networks in access to publicly funded goods (Calvo and Murillo 2013), among others. The findings in this chapter connect these two strands of literature and suggest that, under circumstances similar to those in Mexico in 2012, high levels of corruption breed forms of political behavior that are detrimental to a well-functioning democracy, such as the persistence of patron–client relations.

Clientelism and Corruption in Mexico

Latin America is widely seen as fertile ground for corruption (Morris 2006) and clientelism (Mainwaring 1995). Despite democratization, the spread and tenacity of the misconduct of public officials have not subsided (Robinson 1998, 2). On the contrary, it seems that the level of corruption increased as democracy made its way through the region (Geddes and Ribeiro Neto 1992; Weyland 2008). Clientelism seems to be subsiding in some countries; however, machine politics continues to exist throughout the region (Stokes et al. 2013. Mexico is no exception to this trend. Mexico's one-party dominant political system slowly eroded throughout the 1980s and 90s, with isolated opposition party victories at the local level coming first, and national-level victories second. Heightened electoral competition culminated in the defeat of the PRI in the 2000 presidential elections. By then, a large share of the population lived in a competitive electoral system.[3] Throughout the democratization process, Mexicans became increasingly committed to democratic values (Domínguez and McCann 1996), and the government began to undertake administrative reforms to curb corruption (Morris 2008). Notwithstanding these trends, generalized corruption in the Mexican government, both local and national, remains an obstacle to good governance.

The Mexican Chapter of Transparency International reports 200 million incidences of corruption, specifically of bribery, in 2011. The average price of a bribe, or mordida, as it is commonly referred to in Mexico, was 165 pesos. Bribes to access public services amounted to approximately 32 million pesos. On average, Mexican households spend 14% of their income in bribes. Furthermore, corruption is regressive because low-income households spend 33% of their income in bribes (Transparencia Mexicana 2011).

Democracy did not eradicate clientelism, either. Throughout its long run, the PRI created an efficient and highly adaptable political machine for distributing selective benefits in exchange for political support (Bruhn 1996; Cam... 2003; Cornelius and Craig 1991; Díaz-Cayeros et al. 2007, 2009; Eckstein 198...; Magaloni 2006). There are signs that electoral competition has eroded machin... politics in Mexico (De La O 2013; Dion 2010). Also, the country has developed autonomous institutions to administer elections, and a series of electoral reform... have curbed electoral fraud. Although clientelism appears to be diminishing... (Cornelius 2004; Domínguez, Lawson, and Moreno 2009; Moreno 2003), it has not disappeared from politics. Clientelist practices have spread to parties other than the PRI (Greene 2012), and in the 2012 presidential election, the leftwing candidate accused the PRI of buying five million votes. The extent to which machine politics still influence electoral results remains an open question, however. Perhaps surprisingly, corruption and clientelism survived the transition to multiparty democracy in Mexico.

Examining the Relationship between Corruption and Clientelism

Citizens in Mexico vary considerably in terms of whether they are willing to sell their votes to a political party's broker in exchange for money, a gift, a favor, or access to a public service. Whereas most people would not consider selling their vote, some do so routinely. Still others opt to accept gifts and money from multiple parties. What motivates people to engage in patron–client relations?

Scholars have postulated two factors as critical to explain these divergent positions. First, poverty is associated with clientelism (Bruhn and Greene 2007; Díaz-Cayeros et al. 2007, 2009; Domínguez et al. 2009; Greene 2011; Klesner 2009; McCann and Lawson 2003). Political brokers buy the votes of poor voters because for them the value of the gift, favor, or access to a public service is greater than the value of casting a ballot for a political party ideologically close to them (Stokes 2005). Second, the strength of partisanship determines whether people engage in clientelism. Stokes (2005) argues that if a clientelist machine has the option of targeting loyal, weakly opposed, or opposition voters, it targets the weakly opposed. A vast research program has developed to explore this issue, with some evidence pointing in the direction of Stokes's seminal article, and some evidence suggesting that a clientelist machine would first and foremost

...get its loyal supporters, especially when it is in need of mobilizing them ...ichter 2008). But poverty and the strength of partisanship do not exhaust the ...iation in people's willingness to sell their votes (see, e.g., Simeon Nichter ...nd Brian Palmer-Rubin, chap. 9, this volume).

A third factor that explains why some but not other people are willing to sell ...eir vote relates to citizen's perceptions of—and experiences with—corruption ...mong public officials. When politicians are exposed as corrupt, citizens' trust ...n the political class and their perceptions of the legitimacy of the system erode ...Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Mishler and Rose 2001; Morris and Klesner 2010; Pharr 2000; Seligson 2002).[4] Distrust may lead citizens to be skeptical of campaign promises and to find clientelism more appealing (Cleary and Stokes 2006). A citizen in a context of high levels of public corruption has good reasons to believe that the spoils from public office are large. As a consequence, she may prefer to receive a share from such spoils over being excluded from them. Sell-ing her vote may be one way to participate in the spoils.

Next, I discusses how clientelism, corruption, poverty, and the strength of partisanship can be operationalized using the Mexico 2012 Panel Study, and I use these concepts in a statistical analysis of clientelism. The empirical strategy in this chapter proceeds as follows. First, I examine how perceptions of corruption correlate with clientelism (measured in various ways). Then I examine the same correlation in a multivariate regression that controls for observable personal characteristics like age, gender, religion, education, poverty, and partisanship, as well as locality-fixed effects to take into account factors that are unobserved and time invariant in respondents' localities. From this analysis, a question that remains is whether corruption perceptions lead people to think that their communities are rife with clientelism and therefore are more willing to sell their vote, or the other way around. To get a better sense of the direction of causation, I combine the Mexico 2012 Panel Study with data from Transparencia Mexicana, which contain information on the extent of bribery in a respondent's state the year before the data collection of the Mexico 2012 Panel Study. Because the extent of bribery is measured before (and independently of) the Mexico 2012 Panel Study, this analysis captures the effect of the extent of bribery on clientelism, and not the other way around.

The empirical strategy therefore allows us to see whether corruption perceptions relate to clientelism, whether this correlation persists even after taking into account individual-level observed characteristics as well as locality-level

unobserved and constant characteristics, and, finally, whether corruption leads to clientelism.

If corruption perceptions make people more likely to think that their communities are rife with vote selling, respondents who report that corruption is widespread should also report that clientelism abounds in their neighborhoods. Two survey items in the Mexico 2012 Panel Study ask respondents whether they agree with statements about the engagement of others in their community in clientelism. The first statement refers to the behavior of politicians in the respondent's community, and the second statement refers to the behavior of people in the respondent's community.

Respondents were asked whether they totally agreed, somewhat agreed, somewhat disagreed, or totally disagreed with the following statements:

1. In my community, politicians frequently try to buy votes with gifts, favors, or access to public services.
2. In my community, many sell their votes in exchange of gifts, favors, or access to public services.

Perceptions about politicians making clientelist offers and people accepting them abound in Mexico. Of all respondents, 22% report totally agreeing that politicians frequently try to buy votes in their community, and 21% agree that many in their community sell their votes in exchange for gifts, favors, or access to a service. I create two binary variables; each takes the value of one if the respondent says he totally agrees with each statement and takes the value of zero otherwise.

Like perceptions about clientelism, perceptions about corruption are overwhelming. To measure them, the panel includes a widely used question that asks respondents whether they totally agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or totally disagree with the following statement: "Public employees can take advantage of their jobs for personal benefit without any legal consequence." In the first wave of the panel, 46% of respondents report totally agreeing with this statement, 30% said they somewhat agree, 12% said they somewhat disagree, and 11% said they totally disagree. I create binary variables for each of the possible responses to the corruption survey question.

Perceptions about corruption and clientelism go hand in hand. People who totally agree that governmental corruption is widespread are thirty-five percentage points more likely to say that parties frequently try to buy votes in their community, compared to respondents who totally disagree that corruption is

widespread; see column (1) in table 8.1.[5] This result is statistically significant at the 1% level. People who agree or somewhat disagree that governmental corruption is widespread are indistinguishable from people who disagree with the statement in terms of the probability of seeing parties trying to buy votes in their communities. Only people who strongly perceive corruption as widespread report more attempts of vote buying by parties.

Similarly, people who totally agree that corruption is widespread are thirty percentage points more likely to report that other people in their community sell their votes in exchange for favors, gifts, or access to public services. This result is statistically significant at the 1% level; see column (3) in table 8.1. People who agree and somewhat agree with the statement about corruption are not statistically different from people who disagree with the statement. Corruption, then, makes people more likely to think that their communities are rife with clientelism.

The advantage of measuring clientelism with indirect survey items, like asking about politicians' or other people's participation in clientelism, is that their answers may be more truthful than their answers to a direct question because respondents do not need to reveal their personal involvement in a patron–client relation. The disadvantage, however, is that answers to indirect items measure respondents' perceptions about the behavior of others. Presumably, people are likely to report that their community acts in a similar fashion as them. Yet it is also possible that those people behave differently from others in their community. Indirect survey items thus capture perceptions about the extent of vote buying and vote selling in communities, but to measure personal involvement in clientelist exchanges, we need a different survey item.[6]

The Mexico 2012 Panel Study directly asks respondents whether a political party offered a favor, gift, or access to public services in exchange for their vote. The direct question of vote buying is widely used in the literature. The extent of clientelism measured this way can be compared to the extent of clientelism in other elections in Mexico and in other countries. The exact wording of the question is: "In the last weeks, has anyone made you a favor, offered you a gift or access to a public service in exchange for your vote?" Out of all respondents, 27% admit that they received a gift, favor, or access to a service in exchange for their vote. Of those who report receiving a gift or favor in exchange for their vote, 31% report that it came from the PRI, 18% from the PRD, and 9% from the PAN.

While corruption perceptions make people believe that their communities are rife with vote buying and vote selling, it does not lead people to sell their

Table 8.1. Effects of perceptions of corruption, poverty, and the strength of partisanship on clientelism: Evidence from the Mexico 2012 Panel Study

	Linear probability models						Ordinary least squares regressions	
	Parties always buy votes		Neighbors always sell votes		Received gift or favor		List experiment	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Corruption								
Totally agree	0.347***	0.357***	0.305***	0.319***	−0.005	−0.004	0.413***	0.394***
	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.147)	(0.150)
Agree	0.023	0.034	−0.028	−0.019	−0.009	−0.011	0.129	0.127
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.155)	(0.155)
Somewhat disagree	−0.001	0.008	−0.043	−0.029	−0.026	−0.026	0.302*	0.296
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.175)	(0.183)
Poverty index		−0.005		0.013		−0.006		−0.086**
		(0.014)		(0.013)		(0.006)		(0.042)
Party identification								
Weak		0.039		0.078**		0.003		0.299**
		(0.031)		(0.030)		(0.012)		(0.123)
Strong		0.025		0.055*		0.024*		0.125
		(0.030)		(0.029)		(0.014)		(0.118)
Constant	0.116***	−0.091	0.135***	0.052	0.038**	0.017	1.526***	1.105***
	(0.032)	(0.079)	(0.034)	(0.086)	(0.017)	(0.036)	(0.100)	(0.206)
Observations	1,224	1,224	1,224	1,224	1,224	1,224	1,196	1,196
R^2	0.249	0.278	0.255	0.278	0.044	0.090	0.171	0.212
Controls	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models include locality fixed effects.
***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$.

own votes. As indicated in column (5) of table 8.1, perceptions of corruption have no statistically nor substantive effect on the direct question of vote buying. Before concluding that corruption perceptions do not matter in the personal decision to sell one's vote, however, we need to consider that, because clientelism is an illicit activity, people may be unwilling to report to surveyors that they participated in such an exchange. This measurement problem could explain why perceptions of corruption are not associated with decisions to sell votes. The Mexico 2012 Panel Study included a nonintrusive survey item to measure vote buying that helps circumvent this problem.

List experiments are a useful tool to study social phenomena where people are reluctant to offer truthful answers to surveyors. In political science, this measurement technique has been used to study racial prejudice, corruption, and religious attendance, and more recently Gonzalez-Ocantos, de Jonge, Meléndez, Osorio, and Nickerson (2012) conducted a list experiment to study vote buying. The attractiveness of list experiments is that they grant respondents a certain degree of anonymity when answering sensitive questions. The list experiment in the Mexico 2012 Panel Study poses the following question: "I will read a list of activities, and I would like you to tell me how many of these activities you have done during the last weeks. Please, do not tell me which activities you have done, just tell me how many." The sample of respondents is split in halves. Half of the respondents, the control group, are given the following list of activities.

1. Watch news mentioning a political candidate on television.
2. Attend a campaign event.
3. Talk to other people about politics.

The other half of respondents receives the same list of activities, but vote buying is added in the middle.

1. Watch news mentioning a political candidate on television.
2. Attend a campaign event.
3. Receive a gift, favor, or access to a public service in exchange for your vote.
4. Talk to other people about politics.

The difference between the average number of activities reported in the treatment and control groups is a measure of the extent of clientelism. Compared to Gonzalez-Ocantos et al.'s (2012) experiment, the list experiment in

the Mexico 2012 Panel Study includes activities that respondents could have done, instead of activities that parties could have done. Thus the focus is on respondents' behavior, not parties. Respondents in the treatment group are similar to respondents in the control group in terms of baseline covariates (please see the online appendix, www.press.jhu.edu). We can therefore be sure that the difference in average number of activities between the treatment and control groups is due to the list experiment, and not to any other differences between the experimental groups.

The list experiment detects almost three times more clientelism than the direct survey question. In the first wave of the panel, respondents in the control group report an average of 1.3 activities, and respondents in the treatment group report in average 1.37 activities; in wave 1, the extent of vote buying was 7% ($[1.37 - 1.3] \times 100 = 7$). As a reminder, the direct question detected almost 3% of vote buying.

When using the list experiment, the relationship between corruption and clientelism reappears. In this analysis, the outcome of interest is a count variable that captures the number of items from the list that respondents reported. The independent variables are a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent was part of the treatment or control group; dummy variables for totally agree, agree, and somewhat disagree with the statement about corruption; and interaction terms between treatment and each of the dummies for perceptions about corruption. I report the coefficients corresponding to the interaction terms.[7] Table 8.1, column (7), shows that people who strongly agree that corruption is widespread are forty-one percentage points more likely to sell their vote compared to respondents who totally disagree with the statement that corruption is widespread. This result is also statistically significant at the 1% level.

Corruption perceptions and clientelism are related in the Mexico 2012 data. Yet a comparison between people who have perceptions of high levels of corruption and people with perceptions of low levels of corruption may conflate the effect corruption with that of preexisting differences, if they exist. Thus it is useful to determine whether the correlation between the two phenomena is robust by controlling for various factors such as gender, age, religion, poverty, and education. The even-numbered columns in table 8.1 show that corruption perceptions are still related to clientelism outcomes even after sociodemographic controls are included in the multivariate regression, in addition to the locality fixed effects. Corruption perceptions are therefore an important correlate of clientelism.

To get a sense of how important corruption perceptions are, it is useful to

compare the magnitude of the effect of corruption perceptions to the magnitude of other factors, such as poverty and the partisanship strength. In the statistical models, I include a poverty index that summarizes household characteristics such as not having access to tubed water, electricity, and a gas stove, among others.[8] Partisanship strength is measured as two dummy variables. One takes the value of 1 for respondents who are weakly identified with a party, and otherwise. The other takes the value of 1 for respondents who are strongly identified with a party. The reference group is respondents without partisan identification.[9]

Comparing the magnitude of the effects of corruption perceptions and poverty, the former has a more systematic and substantive effect than the latter. Table 8.1 shows that the poverty index has a statistically significant effect only when measuring vote buying with the list experiment. A standard deviation of 1 in the poverty index leads to nine-percentage-point decrease in vote buying. This result is significant at the 5% level. Considering the estimates in column (8) with the list experiment, strong perceptions that governmental corruption is widespread have a 4.8 times larger effect on vote buying compared to poverty.

To compare the effects of perceptions of corruption and the effects of the strength of partisanship, consider again the estimates when using the list experiment reported in column (8). Strong perceptions that corruption is widespread have an effect similar in magnitude to weak partisan identification (39% vs. 30%, respectively). A strong party identification, however, has a three times smaller effect compared to strong perceptions of corruption and it is not statistically significant. Compared to alternative explanations of clientelism, the magnitude of the effect of corruption is as important as the strength of partisanship and is substantively more important than poverty.

The analysis so far has shown that corruption and clientelism are strongly associated. Yet the question remaining is whether corruption makes people more likely to think their communities are rife with vote selling and more willing to sell their own votes, or the other way around. To get a better sense of whether it is corruption that makes people more likely to engage in vote selling, I merged with the Mexico 2012 Panel Study an aggregate measure of bribery in respondents' states on the basis citizen surveys from Transparencia Mexicana. Because this measure was taken before the Mexico 2012 Panel Study and is an average of bribery in respondents' states—not of respondents' own experience with bribery—we can be confident that the analysis is capturing how bribery makes respondents more likely to sell their votes and not the other way around.

Transparencia Mexicana has collected, every two years since 2001, the National Survey on Corruption and Good Governance (NSCG). The NSCG records the frequency with which households face governmental corruption in the provision of thirty-five public services over the course of a year.[10] Specifically, the surveys record the payment of a bribe in order to speed up, modify the result of, or hinder the provision of a public service of the three levels of government: federal, state, and municipal. The NSCG samples are representative at the national and state level. Each survey has a sample size of approximately 15,000 observations and has the same urban-rural structure as the most updated census.[11]

On the basis of the NSCG surveys, Transparencia Mexicana produces an index of corruption by federal entity called the National Index of Corruption and Good Governance (INCBG). The formula to calculate the index is as follows.

$$INCBG = (\text{number of times a bribe was paid in the thirty-five services } / \text{ total number of times that the thirty-five services were used}) \times 100$$

The index takes values between 0 and 100, with higher numbers indicating higher corruption. At the national level the frequency of corruption was 10.6 in 2001, 8.5 in 2003, 10.1 in 2005, 10.0 in 2007, and 10.3 in 2007.[12]

To estimate the effects of exposure to corruption, I include the change in the corruption index from 2001 to 2010, and I control for the initial value of the index in 2001. This combination of aggregate corruption measures captures that the level and the trend in corruption matter to explain clientelism. A respondent living in a state where corruption is initially high and continues to increase (e.g., Guerrero) may have a different disposition toward clientelism compared with a respondent living in a state where corruption was initially high but over time has decreased (e.g., Durango). Because aggregate measures of exposure to corruption in the past (2001, and the change between 2001 and 2010) are not determined by respondents' answers to the clientelism survey items in 2012, estimates from these regressions surmount, at least partially, the challenge of simultaneity.

Table 8.2 presents results of the analysis combining the Mexico 2012 Panel Study with Transparencia Mexicana data. Odd-numbered columns present the results without control variables, and even-numbered columns with control variables. Columns (1)–(6) present the estimates on the basis of linear probability models, and the last two columns present ordinary least squares regressions. All models include robust standard errors. Because the independent

Table 8.2. Effects of state-level corruption on individual reports of clientelism: Evidence from the Mexico 2012 Panel Study and Transparency International data

	Linear probability models						Ordinary least squares regressions	
	Parties always buy votes		Neighbors always sell votes		Received gift or favor		List experiment	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
INCBG change	0.065***	0.057***	0.059***	0.044***	−0.005**	0.003	0.138***	0.125***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.022)	(0.023)
INCBG 2001	0.003***	0.002***	0.001**	0.001***	−0.000***	−0.000	0.016***	0.012***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	0.233***	0.123***	0.234***	0.244***	0.037***	0.052***	1.097***	0.616***
	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.020)
Observations	1,328	1,328	1,328	1,328	1,328	1,328	1,299	1,299
R^2	0.001	0.045	0.001	0.045	0.000	0.055	0.010	0.074
Controls	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Observations are weighted by frequencies per state.
***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0$.

variables of interest in these specifications are aggregated at the state level, and some states have more observations than others in the Mexico 2012 Panel Study, I weighted the data by the number of observations by state.[13]

Column (1) in table 8.2 shows that a standard deviation increase of one in the change of INCBG from 2001 to 2010 leads to a six-percentage-point increase in the probability that respondents totally agree that parties frequently try to buy votes in their communities. This result is statistically significant at the 1% level, and it is robust to the inclusion of control variables; see columns (1) and (2). Similarly, a standard deviation increase of one in the change of INCBG increases the probability that respondents totally agree that others in their communities sell their votes in exchange for a gift, favor, or access to a public service by six percentage points. This result is also significant at the 1% level, and robust to including controls in the specification.

When measuring vote buying with the direct question, the magnitude of the effect of changes in the corruption index is substantively smaller than when measuring clientelism with indirect questions. Compare, for example, the estimates in column (6) to the estimates in column (1): the effect of changes in INCBG is six times higher when using the indirect question compared to the direct question. As mentioned above, however, the difference in magnitudes could be attributable in part to social desirability bias when using the direct survey item. With the list experiment, the effect of changes in INCBG is again substantively important. A standard deviation increase of one in changes in the corruption index leads to a thirteen-percentage-point increase in vote buying. This result is statistically significant at the 1% level. Once controls are included, the effect of changes in corruption lead still to a substantively important effect of a twelve-percentage-point increase in vote buying, significant at the 1% level.

Compared to the effect of changes in corruption, the effect of baseline corruption as measured by INCBG in 2001 has a substantively small effect (close to zero in most models). Although the magnitude of the effect is small, it is positive and statistically different from zero in most models. Overall, table 8.2 shows that aggregate changes in corruption are important determinants of vote buying. Moreover, these results lend more suggestive evidence that corruption is indeed a determinant of clientelism.

Conclusion

Corruption and clientelism are widely perceived as interrelated phenomena. Yet the ways in which corruption shape clientelist exchanges have been elusive

to scholars. This chapter provides evidence of a strong relationship between public corruption and clientelism in the context of presidential elections in Mexico. The findings in this chapter speak to the empirical regularity that "on average citizens in low- [and middle-] income countries are relatively more willing to condone corruption and less likely to want to use their electoral power to vote out the corrupt" (Pande 2008, 3157). Such empirical regularity is puzzling from the perspective of democratic accountability. This study suggests that, to fully understand why citizens tolerate corruption, we need to further explore how governmental corruption breeds forms of political behavior that are detrimental to a well-functioning democracy.

NOTES

1. See, for example, Scott (1969). Also, see more recent studies: Della Porta (2000), Heywood (1997), Hutchcroft (1997) Keefer (2007), and Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007).

2. Hicken (2011), for example, notes that Persson, Tabellini, and Trebbi (2003) and Keefer (2007) use corruption as a proxy for the level of clientelism.

3. The emergence of competitive elections at the subnational level was highly uneven, however, with the acceptance of multiparty electoral competition in some areas by the mid-1990s and the continued electoral dominance of the PRI into the twenty-first century in other parts of the country (Fox 1994; Hiskey and Bowler 2005; Lawson 2000).

4. Public corruption can also cast doubts about the effective enjoyment of legally sanctioned rights (Della Porta and Vannucci 1997).

5. Nonlinear models, such as probit or logit, are widely used to model dichotomous outcome variables, such as the outcomes in columns (1)–(6) in table 8.1. Yet nonlinear models are cumbersome when specifications include fixed effects or when using panel data. As an alternative, linear probability models (LPMs) work well with fixed effects and panel data. LPMs present some challenges, too: their estimates are not constrained to the unit interval, and their standard errors may be heteroskedastic. However, both concerns can be easily addressed. First, given that the main purpose of the analysis is to estimate marginal effects—and not to make predictions—then the possibility that some predicted values are outside the unit interval is not relevant (Wooldridge 2002). Second, it is straightforward to estimate heteroskedasticity-consistent robust standard errors (Angrist and Pischke 2008).

6. It could also be that respondents interpret the indirect questions as a measure of trust in politicians or their neighbors, in which case the survey items are not capturing clientelism in a meaningful way.

7. The full set of coefficients is available upon request.

8. The index is the standardized sum of eight survey questions that relate to households traits. Compared to separately including household traits as independent variables, the index has the advantage of reducing measurement error. Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder (2008) show that averaging survey items on the same broadly defined issue area eliminates a large amount of measurement error.

9. The exact question in the panel study is: "Generally, do you consider yourself *panista, priísta, or perredista?*"

10. The services include, from the least frequent to the most frequent: pay property taxes (*predial*); request a scholarship; receive mail; receive military service certificate (or exemption); enroll in social programs; install a telephone line; enroll in a public school; install or regularize services (water, sewage, public electricity, roads, parks); obtain or expedite a passport; obtain a credit from a public institution; connect or reconnect water or sewage; connect or reconnect household electricity; obtain an academic degree or access to exams; obtain or expedite birth, marriage, divorce, or death certificates; visit a patient in a hospital out of visiting hours; get a governmental job; access a public hospital or expedite medical attention; obtain a driver's license; request a permit for a commerce; regularize vehicle papers; request a certificate from Registro Público de la Propiedad; obtain a license or permit of *uso de suelo*; approve vehicle pollution verification; obtain a license to build or demolish; present a case to a jury; obtain water from the municipality reserve; collect trash; permit to work or sell in the street; prevent an arrest; denounce a crime; follow up on a case; recover a stolen car; perform border-related transactions; park on the street; and prevent an infraction.

11. The interviews were based on a strictly random national sample. Each Mexican household had exactly the same chance of being selected for the study (Transparencia Mexicana 2011).

12. Among the least corrupt states are Aguascalientes, Baja California Sur, Durango, Nayarit, and Yucatán. Among the most corrupt states, as indicated by the 2010 NSCG, are Distrito Federal, Estado de Mexico, Guerrero, Hidalgo, and Oaxaca. States where corruption has decreased are Baja California Sur, Durango, Morelos, and Yucatán. States where corruption has increased are Colima, Guerrero, Hidalgo, and Oaxaca.

13. A regression gives equal weight to each observation. In this case, some states have more observations than others; therefore for some states there is more information to estimate the effects than for others. To take this into account, I weighted the data by the frequency by state.

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