Representation

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND PROTEST: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

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This study examines the relationship between protest activity and political institutions. The fragmentation of the party system and whether parties operate in parliamentary or presidential systems are important in shaping the political opportunity structure for civil protests. An OLS regression analysis across 90 countries and a total of 402 electoral periods indicates that a larger number of political parties in the legislature tend to curtail civil protests in parliamentary systems. In contrast, in presidential systems with fragmented legislatures there is a higher tendency for protest.

Introduction

Political opportunity theory seeks to explain social movement activity based on factors external to the movement (Eisinger 1973; Tilly 1978). According to political opportunity theorists, the institutional structure of the state plays a very important role in shaping incentives for social movement organisations (Della Porta 2002; Della Porta and Rucht 1995; Kitschelt 1986; McAdam 1982, 1997; McAdam et al. 2001; Tarrow 1989) and vice versa (Dalton 1993; Gamson and Meyer 1996). Within democratic polities certain institutional forms can have a stabilising effect by channelling the expression of political interests into non-disruptive action. Yet, if the democratic institutions fail to provide sufficient channels of representation, citizens who feel that their concerns are neglected demand change outside of the established institutional structures through protest. 'The role of institutions in democracy thus explains a mechanism by which social movements come about. Institutions may be necessary to overcome democratic instability, yet at the same time they constrain democratic principles' (Kitschelt 1993: 17).

This study seeks to address the question of what types of political institutions best incorporate citizen interests, yielding less contention within a society. In order to address this question, the study focuses on the interaction of different institutional variables in relation to citizen mobilisation: the fragmentation of political party institutions and whether the system is characterised by a separation of powers as represented by presidential, semi-presidential or parliamentary systems.

Political parties are important representative groups that aggregate citizen interests and translate these interests into policy outcomes. The political institutional system in which political parties exist is central to the political opportunity structure as it can lead to the incorporation or exclusion of citizen demands. Ideally, all citizens would feel that their interests are adequately represented within the established political institutions. Yet, when a group of citizens feel that political institutions fail to fully represent their interests, social movements develop as an alternative means of voicing demands. While social movements can be

considered a healthy part of a functioning democracy and a means by which to advance reforms that can improve on citizen representation, movements do indicate some inadequacies in the social and political order at least at the level of citizen satisfaction. While movement activity can take many forms, civil protest is a common tactic, thus protest can be seen as one indicator of how well established institutions are addressing citizen concerns.

The level of protest in a society is influenced by many factors. Economic factors and social developments can serve as the proximate source of protest activity. Yet, across time and countries we also expect to see patterns in the level of protest based upon the organisation of the political institutional system. The political institutional setting affects the ability of the political parties to respond to citizen demands even in the face of social disruption. Here it is hypothesised that those party systems that incorporate citizen interests more effectively should yield less protest activity while those that fail to provide a medium through which all groups can feel represented should generate more protest. In this study the fragmentation of the party system as measured by the effective number of political parties is the key variable indicating the effectiveness and breadth of citizen representation. This is based on the idea that having more parties means that a wider spectrum of interests and values are represented through these organisations, thus more citizens will feel that their voice is being represented within government. This should diminish the need to express interests via other means such as social protest. Prior research has indicated that high levels of fragmentation within the party system has an influence on social conflict and protest activity within a state (Kitschelt 1986; Lijphart 1999; Wilkinson 2004). Where there is a great deal of fragmentation of parties, a large number of parties compete with reasonable chances of making a contribution to representing the interests of their constituents. In these systems citizens are expected to work within the normal political institutional structure rather than voice opposition through protest from outside.

The fragmentation of the party system, which is an indicator of party system performance, is expected to influence the level of protest activity, but party representation is mediated by other aspects of the institutional structure, such as whether it is a parliamentary or a presidential system (Carey 2007; Mainwaring 1993; Perez-Liñan 2006; Stepan and Skach 1993). Whether the parties in government respond to the executive, as in parliamentary systems, or have separate legislative powers, as in presidential systems, have an influence over the way in which the parties respond to constituents while in government. A multiparty coalition in a parliamentary system faces different representational pressures than the parties in the legislature of a presidential system. With this in mind, I examine the intensity of contentious activity in the form of protests in relation to the fragmentation of the party system as this interacts with the type of executive selection, be it presidential, semi-presidential or parliamentary.

Few studies have examined the relationship between political institutions and protest using a large cross-country comparative approach. Here, I explore the question through an analysis of 402 electoral periods in 90 democratic countries. I present an argument that is built on a combination of the political opportunity structure and political institutions literatures. In the next section, I discuss the political opportunity literature in relation to how institutions affect contentious activity. This is followed by a discussion of the political institutions literature focusing on how party systems and executive selection should impact protest activity. I then introduce the hypotheses, the methods and the variables used in this study.

In the final discussion of the findings, I conclude that the interaction of the fragmentation of the political party systems and executive selection matter in relation to protest activity. Fragmentation of political parties in the legislature tends to curtail civil protests in

parliamentary systems. In contrast, fragmented party systems in presidential systems do not have as much of an effect. The final analysis is on the representational implications of the interaction between the executive selection and party systems.

Political Opportunity Structure and Protest Movements

There is an unresolved debate in the political opportunity literature about the impact of open democratic systems on social movements. While some argue that a more democratic system increases the likelihood of movement activity due to the absence of repression (Dalton 1988: 71; Meyer and Tarrow 1998; Tarrow 1994), others argue that social movement mobilisation declines with democratisation (Gamson 1975; Katzenstein 1998; Koopmans 1995; Tilly 1984). The logic here is that as groups gain access to political representation through conventional channels, the need to act outside of that process through social protest or other unconventional means diminishes.

A similar debate has been carried out regarding the impact of economic policies and protest activity. While Kurtz (2004) argues that market reforms had a demobilising affect in Latin American democracies, others challenge this argument and instead contend that 'economic liberalization in the context of open and democratic politics has led to a significant increase in the level of political protest' (Arce and Bellinger 2007: 100). It is the goal of this study to contribute to this debate by looking more closely at how particular political institutional forms facilitate or deter protest activity.

Those studying political opportunity have identified the role of elites and their ties with others, be they within movement organisations themselves or with other elites, as important variables in shaping the political opportunity structure (Della Porta and Rucht 1995; McAdam 1996; Tarrow 1996). In electoral democracies most political elites are organised through parties, making the political parties important actors in the political opportunity structure.

Parties, in turn, exist and are shaped by party systems and the electoral rules in a country. Party systems have an effect on how citizens organise into political parties, make demands, and ask for representation and changes in government policy. Garner and Zald (1987) introduce this idea when they proposed that:

> [p]arty structure is probably the single most important variable for understanding the pattern of social movements. Movements can only be understood as one part of a range of options that also includes political parties . . . Both are organisational forms for pursuing political ends, so it is not surprising they are so closely intertwined. (p. 312)

Social protest activity and parties are related to one another in complex ways. One issue to consider is the way in which we should seek to understand the direction of that relationship. Given that parties operate within a legally defined and established institutional structure, their behaviour should be viewed as more immutable than that of their more fluid movement counterparts. Therefore, except in those relatively rare instances where movements overthrow or fundamentally alter a social order, movement activity should be understood as *responding to* these representational constraints shaped by the political parties.

Sartori (1976) defines parties as political groups 'identified by an official label that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections . . . candidates for public office' (p. 63). They are organisations that channel expression in liberal democracies where all groups need some form of representation. Parties integrate citizens into national political processes (Gunther and Diamond 2001: 7–8). Citizens identify with a political party if they

believe that the party will serve their interests (Downs 1957). In the representational realm, political parties and social movement organisations have overlapping roles in representing group interests within a society (Schimitter 2001). Nevertheless, different cleavages in society shape representation by civil society, including social movements (Hochstetler and Friedman 2008) as well as the political party system (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Lipson 1959).

Many have argued that there has been a decline in the political representation role of parties, weakening the ties between parties and society (Bartolini and Mair 2001: 338; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000; Lawson and Poguntke 2004; Roberts 2002; Taylor-Robinson 2001) which may lead to more citizen frustration with governments. Yet, despite this decline, political parties are still the most important organisations representing different social groups through aggregating citizen interests into electoral and governing coalitions. In the next sections the political institutional variables that shape party representation are discussed in more detail.

Fragmentation of the Party System

The structure of the party system shapes the strategies that political party organisations must adopt, which in turn affects the way in which organised constituents behave, including the adoption of contentious politics. Sartori (1976) emphasises the number of political parties and the level of polarisation as important characteristics of the party system. The number of political parties is strongly related to the salient cleavages in society (Lijphart 1999: 88). This is relevant because without adequate party representation, different societal groups may opt to form social movement organisations to express their grievances and make demands. Consistent with this argument, Lijphart (1999: 266–7) finds that in consensus based democracies,[1] characterised by multiple parties, there is less contention in the form of strikes, riots or political deaths. Voters have closer links to parties in proportional electoral systems with high party system fragmentation; in these systems, there are stronger ties between the parties and citizens resulting in higher citizen satisfaction with democratic performance (Anderson 1998: 587). Kitschelt (1993) also argues that social movements prefer decision making in consensus democracies where multiple parties have to negotiate policy outcomes—representing multiple cleavages—and the decisions made are more enduring. This is in comparison to decision making in the majoritarian systems where candidate based decisions are short term and opportunistic (Kitschelt 1993: 25–6).

Studies that examine fragmentation of the party system in relation to contentious activity consistently demonstrate that as the fragmentation of parties increases, the contentious activity decreases. Wilkinson (2004) finds that in India the states with a higher degree of party fractionalisation experience less ethnic violence. Using the effective number of political parties to measure fragmentation, he demonstrates that parties are willing to make more compromises under competitive pressure which in turn prevents ethnic violence (Wilkinson 2004: 137). Similarly, Kitschelt (1986), studying new social movements in Europe, argues that as the effective number of parties in a country goes up, there is less entrenchment and broader interest representation. This leads groups to act within normal channels of the political system rather than challenge the system through protest from outside (Kitschelt 1986).

Political parties claim narrower issue agendas in fragmented party systems with a higher number of parties. Party fragmentation leads to 'higher levels of class voting and party membership' and lower electoral volatility. In these systems, there is a higher level of satisfaction with the democratic process among citizens (Anderson and Guillory 1997: 587). Given the

different ways in which social groups are represented within fragmented party systems, organised constituents should adjust their tactics accordingly. The need for boisterous action is lower if groups are well represented by a smaller party that concentrates on their particular issue. Under these circumstances, activity is more likely to be channelled into securing representation for their party through conventional electoral processes, rather than protesting against existing power holders.

In contrast to fragmented party systems, in majoritarian systems, which tend to be dominated by two broad catch-all parties, social movement groups have more incentive to engage in contentious activity in order to get the attention of the parties that encompass so many constituencies. Catch-all parties have 'shallow organization, superficial and vague ideology, and overwhelming electoral orientation' (Gunther and Diamond 2001: 26) and they represent multiple cleavages in society within a single organisation. Representation by the catch-all parties is not going to be as intensely focused on smaller constituency groups as in fragmented systems where parties represent smaller constituencies. The catch-all parties tend to have 'low levels of citizen involvement and identification' which 'limits their potential for social integration' (Gunther and Diamond 2001: 27). As Huntington (1968) points out, catch-all parties are also more adaptable to different issues. But the adoption of positions on particular issues, by necessity, diminishes the attention given to some constituencies over others within the party, potentially fostering discontent among groups that are marginalised, leading to more contentious activity on their part. The adaptability of these catch-all parties itself also makes them more likely targets of organised sub-groups who want to see their issue prioritised. In general, therefore, we should expect more in the way of contentious activity in systems characterised by a small number of broad-based parties.

While fragmentation of the party system shapes how the parties represent groups in society, parties also face different institutional constraints based on the separation of powers. Depending on whether parties have to operate in presidential and parliamentary systems, parties face different pressures when forming governing coalitions. The representation of groups in society by parties is also shaped by the *interaction* of the fragmentation of the party system and whether they operate in a parliamentary or presidential system. Different incentives for social movement protest activity based on these institutional variables are discussed in more detail in the next sections.

Executives, Parties and Protest

In addition to the party fragmentation issues discussed above, the representation of citizens by political party organisations is also shaped by the separation of powers between the executive and the legislature. There has been a lot of debate over the virtues and problems associated with presidentialism, where the executive is elected by the public and the government is formed separate from the legislature (Cheibub 2007; Linz 1990; Linz and Valenzuela 1994; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Morgenstern and Nacif 2002; Shugart and Carey 1992). Linz has argued that presidential systems produce greater potential for conflict between the executive and legislature when the legislature is fragmented and the president's party lacks control of the legislature. This type of conflict tends to be prolonged due to the fixed terms of presidents in office (Linz 1990). Linz's argument that presidential systems are institutionally flawed and set for failure has been disputed by other scholars (Cheibub 2007; Shugart and Carey 1992). They suggest that there are mechanisms through which presidential systems can avoid the breakdowns that Linz sees as detrimental. Perez-Liñan (2006) argues that the

greater use of impeachment has allowed Latin American countries to avoid the past experiences of a total collapse of the democratic system. These impeachments came in response to deadlocks in governance, and, in most cases, after crises expressed through protests by outraged citizens. Thus, there is a connection between the higher levels of protest in fragmented party systems in presidential regimes; this is the predominant system in Latin America.

The low party discipline that tends to characterise presidential systems also contributes to lower legislative success (Carey 2007; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997: 419), thus presidential systems function better with moderate levels of multipartyism (Jones 1995: 7; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997: 399). While presidentialism with multiple parties does not necessarily lead to total democratic breakdown and failure (Cheibub 2002, 2007; Pzeworski et al. 2000), *on average*, parliamentary systems are more successful than presidential systems in party discipline and legislative success (Carey 2007; Cheibub 2007). Overall, parliamentary systems have better performance under higher fragmentation of parties (Stepan and Skach 1993). Thus, whether the government has to respond to the legislature or the government is elected with a separation of powers, has consequences for the representation of groups by parties in the legislature.

Based on this evidence, the representation by political party organisations in a legislature should be considered in the context of the larger political institutional system,[2] in particular whether a system is parliamentary or presidential. When considering the influence of fragmentation of the party system on contentious activity, a higher number of political parties can give hope to different groups for finding some form of representation in the legislature through party politics rather than having to resort to protest. This can be the case even in presidential systems with fragmented legislatures where small parties may bring important issues into the legislature that would otherwise be ignored. Yet, compared with parliamentary systems, in presidential systems with fragmented legislatures, there tends to be less party discipline; stable inter-party coalitions are less likely to be formed and maintained, even though they are not entirely uncommon (see Cheibub 2007). In order to advance policy goals, presidents tend to enter into patronage relations with individual legislators (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997). In this kind of system, forging long-term dependable representative relationships between citizen groups and political parties is difficult, and organised constituents may seek other means of advancing their goals, such as protest activity.

Consistent with this argument, in a study of Latin American countries, Arce (2010) finds that 'the level of party fragmentation is known to imperil the ability of executives to pass their agenda, thus hampering the capacity of states to respond effectively to popular sector demands' (Arce 2010: 4). He demonstrates that in Latin America, where all countries studied are presidential systems, the level of protest increases with increased legislative fragmentation. Fragmented legislatures have a tendency to become 'reactive legislatures' in which individual legislators bargain with presidents to secure particularistic gains (Cox and Morgenstern 2002; Morgenstern 2002) rather than proactive legislatures that systematically carry out party policy. In these fragmented systems, the bargaining mostly takes place through patronage politics between the president and the legislature (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997) and does not address systematic party policy. Individual legislators in parties become reactive to the policies initiated by the president rather than following a programme initiated by their party with their own constituents in mind. Thus, in cases where there are a high number of parties in presidential systems, it is expected that citizens will engage in more protest activity as a means to get the attention from their representatives. Instead of depending on long-term relationships established with stable parties capable of systematically carrying out their agendas, the

movement organisations have to exert short-term pressure on legislators to get their demands met.

In contrast, in systems where there is stronger party discipline, heads of governments can depend on their negotiations with the party leaders to develop cohesive policies, as opposed to the challenge of having to find groups of disparate legislators willing to go along with their proposals. Party discipline leads to more sustainable relationships between groups and parties and a lesser amount of contentious movement activity. Yet, in parliamentary systems, if there is only one catch-all party in charge of the government and legislature, the party representation may be limited to a few important groups that carry this party's base, leaving a large contingency of people without representation in the legislature.

There are also semi-presidential systems where a popularly elected president and a prime minister both carry strong executive powers. When there are mixed executive powers, the system is expected to shift between presidential and parliamentary depending on who controls the majority in the legislature. When the president's party has control over the legislature and the prime minister is also from the president's party, the system acts like a parliamentary system. When the president and prime minister are from different political parties, the system functions more like a presidential system. Thus, in these types of systems, the expectations of representation changes based on dynamics between the president and prime minister (Duverger 1980; Lijphart 1999: 121–2). The issue gets even further complicated with the types of executive powers the president has (Roper 2002; Shugart and Carey 1992), making the effects of semi-presidentialism on the question of representation unclear from election to election.

Several studies have suggested that there is a relationship between the structure of the political system, political party organisations and social movements (Goldstone 2003; Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi and Wisler 1996). This is a fundamental question for our understanding of both parties operating in different political systems and contentious activity. Yet there is little quantitative study of this issue (exception, Arce 2010). Through this study I seek to supplement the existing literature on this dimension of political opportunity theory. In the following section, the hypothesis, variables and methodology are presented, followed by a discussion of findings.

Hypotheses

Based on the discussion above about political party systems and the relationship of party system fragmentation in presidential versus parliamentary systems, as well as the executive control the following hypotheses are tested:

Hypothesis 1: In parliamentary systems, as the effective number of political parties in the legislature increases, protests are expected to decline.

Hypothesis 2: In presidential systems, as the number of political parties in the legislature increases, protests are expected to increase.

Hypothesis 3: In semi-presidential systems, the amount of protest is expected to remain neutral as the system acts like a parliamentary system when the president's party is in control of the parliament as well and acts like a presidential system when the president's party has an opposing party or a coalition government in the parliament.

Variables

Dependent Variables
Contentious social movement activity

The dependent variable is defined as the level and intensity of contentious social movement activity in a country. Tarrow (1996: 874) defines 'contentious politics' as 'collective activity on the part of claimants – or those who claim to represent them – relying at least in part on the noninstitutional forms of interaction with elites, opponents, or the state'. And, he defines social movements 'more narrowly as sustained challenges to power holders in the name of a disadvantaged population' (Tarrow 1996: 874). A broader definition of social movements is proposed by Della Porta and Diani (1999: chap. 1) who define social movements as 'actors formed by networks of informal relationships, based on shared beliefs and solidarity, which are mobilised around conflictual issues through the frequent use of various forms of protest'.

Movement organisations have a wide range of tactics they can use to express their grievances and to attempt to influence state representatives. These range from behind-the-scenes quiet lobbying of officials, to petition drives, boycotts, protest, or even violence. Focusing on legal activity and leaving aside violent tactics, mass protest is among the most common of the unconventional means of political expression and influence. The strength of a movement can often be gauged by the size and frequency of its street protest. Here the intensity and mobilisation power of movements is measured by their ability to get members to the street.

Using these definitions the intensity of protest activity is measured with a variable reported in the *Banks' Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive*. This archive is the most widely used comparative protest measure that is available (see Arce and Bellinger 2007; Kurtz 2004). The anti-government demonstrations measure looks at peaceful protest activity on the streets in large numbers. The *Banks' Archive* defines anti-government demonstrations (AGD) as the yearly average of 'any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature'. Thus the dependent variable, anti-government demonstrations (AGD), is the average yearly demonstrations between two electoral periods in a country.

The *Banks' Archive* uses *New York Times* reporting as a basis to count anti-government demonstrations. It is the only cross-country comparative archive that dates back to the 1970s. Yet, given the debate on the reliability of media-based data (Nam 2006; Ortiz et al. 2005), a second dependent variable is also included to test the validity of the results. The World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators IV (Jenkins and Peterson 2010) uses integrated data for event analysis (see Bond et al. 2003 for a full discussion on methodology). The dataset counts civil protest (CIVDEM) in a country including all demonstrations, obstructions, processions, defacements, altruisms, strikes and boycotts. The data is available from 1991 through 2004, which means the dataset includes only a subset of the years available in the *Banks' Data Archive*. In the first dataset (using AGD as the dependent variable) there are 402 observations across 90 countries. The second dataset (using CIVDEM as the dependent variable) contains 249 observation periods across 90 countries. Like the AGD, the CIVDEM is a calculation of the average yearly civil demonstrations in a country between two electoral observation periods.

Independent Variables
Effective number of political parties

The *average* number of political parties in the legislature (ENPP) between the two electoral periods is the key indicator of the fragmentation of political party system. The ENPP in a country is calculated by using the measure developed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979), which takes into consideration not only the number of political parties in the legislature, but weighs the size of the party's control over seats as well. The measure is

ENPP $= 1/\Sigma S_i^2$,

where ENPP $=$ effective number of political parties in the legislature,

$S =$ the proportion of seats a political party controls.

The values have been calculated using the Herfindahl Index for the entire legislature as reported in the World Bank Database on Political Institutions (DPI) (Beck et al. 2004).

Presidentialism, semi-presidentialism or parliamentary democracies

Variables that classify the overall democratic political system were taken from Cheibub (2007: see chap. 2). The categorisation of the variable starts out with whether the 'government is responsible to the elected assembly' (p. 35). A presidentialism dummy was created if the legislature does not have the authority to remove the government. In systems where there is an independently elected president, if the government can be removed by the legislature, then the system is a semi-presidential democracy. A semi-presidential system dummy was created for these systems.

Control Variables[3]

In the sample, there is a diverse group of liberal democracies ranging from advanced industrialised countries to less developed countries. The level of economic and social development in these countries is highly varied, which may be a factor in the level of organisation and protest in different countries. Economic deprivation combined with social underdevelopment may lead to more protest. With low social and economic development, street level protests may be the most commonly available avenue for some groups to express their interests. 'Normal' political activity, such as legislative lobbying, letter writing campaigns, and petitions, require more social capital than protest activity. Therefore it is important to control for the level of economic and social development in a country. The average *GDP per capita PPP* between two electoral periods is the value used for the economic development figure. Another important variable to consider has to do with the size of the *population* in the country, as a larger population should lead, on average, to a higher number of protests and more conflict.

A third control variable has to do with how much experience a country has with democracy. The longer a country experiences democracy, the more likely that different groups have a chance to obtain representation through conventional channels. In addition, Anderson and Mendes (2006) find that when considering the protest potential differences between winners and losers, being in a political minority status 'matters more in newer democracies' (p. 108). *Age of democracy* is the number of years that the country has been continuously democratic since the last transition to democratic elections. The expectation is that the longer a country has been continuously democratic, the less likely groups will protest.

Data and Methods

The study includes all countries and time periods that were ranked as free and partly free regime categories by the Freedom House Index of Political Rights (Freedom House 2007). The Freedom House Index of Political Rights considers electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of government as democratic political rights measures.[4] In order to conduct a multivariate OLS regression analysis, I created a dataset including 90 countries and a total of 402 observation periods (see Appendix for the list of countries and periods included). Each unit of analysis is constructed based on the time period that starts the year following an election and includes all yearly observations until the next election. The cases were constructed based on the averages of each year during the time period between elections. For example, the two time periods for Armenia were calculated as follows: Armenia had elections in 1995, thus the case listed as Armenia 1995 includes average yearly observations between the years 1996 and 1999; the following election was in 1999, the case listed as Armenia 1999 includes observations between the years 2000 and 2003. The beginning of the third wave of democratisation (Huntington 1993) was chosen as the launching point to construct the dataset.

As the dataset is uneven in time periods and observations of countries, OLS is the most appropriate technique to use. The cross-sectional observations are larger than the time period observations for each country, thus it would be inappropriate to use country dummies and take up the explanatory power of independent variables. As for controlling for time, the data indicates no observed correlation between the dependent variable at t and t-1, thus OLS would provide unbiased and robust results for the observations. As linearity is assumed with OLS analysis, the variables that indicated skewed distribution were corrected using log transformation. The corrections are reported in Tables 1 and 2. The dependent variables, the independent variable (ENPP) and control variable (population) were all logged in order to correct for skewness.

The models that are reported have been tested for collinearity. The variance inflation figure indicated high collinearity between age of democracy and GDP per capita. The GDP per capita values were residualised and included in the study. The Breusch-Pagan test indicated heteroskedasticity in the models due to the population and age of democracy control variables. The weighted models for the control variables did not produce results that were substantively different, therefore OLS results are reported. Outlier effects were checked using the

TABLE 1
Descriptive statistics

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	Skewness	Kurtosis
Civil Protest	0	44	3.69	6.72	3.69	15.48
AGD	0	7.50	0.68	1.07	2.55	8.51
ENPP	1.03	13.18	3.43	1.68	1.74	4.64
GDP per capita PPP	124	43,267	9649	9643	0.97	-0.04
Age of democracy	0	133	36	37.8	1.10	0.03
Population	89,749	999,016,010	42,711,651	1.122E8	5.99	41.28
ENPP (log)	0.01	1.12	0.49	0.19	0.32	-0.02
AGD (log)	-2.00	0.88	-0.92	0.99	-0.002	-1.68
Civil Protest (log)	0	1.65	0.45	0.40	0.81	0.07
Population (log)	4.95	9.00	6.98	0.80	-0.24	-0.002

TABLE 2

Frequencies: presidential, parliamentary and semi-presidential systems

	Frequency	**Percent**
Parliamentary	193	47
Semi-presidential	72	18
Presidential	143	35
Total	408	100.0

measures of Cook's D, hat diagonals and studentised residuals. The case of Israel was an extreme outlier that affected the results based on these figures and that case was therefore left out of the analysis.

Results and Discussion

I tested the three hypotheses regarding the level of anti-government demonstrations and civil demonstrations. The findings reported in Table 3 indicate that the ENPP has a significant effect on AGD and CIVPROTEST when the interactive effect of type of democracy (parliamentary, semi-presidential and presidential systems) is taken into consideration, controlling for population, age of democracy and GDP per capita. The three control variables, population, GDP per capita (PPP) and age of democracy, were included in all models and they yielded results in the expected directions.

In Model 1 Table 3, the ENPP captures the effects of the parliamentary system only as the presidential and semi-presidential systems are introduced separately. The findings show in parliamentary systems, as the ENPP increases by 1%, the level of AGD is expected to decrease by 0.84%.[5] When presented in terms of a change in the number of political parties, in a parliamentary system when a change occurs from a one-party regime to a two-party system, the level of anti-government demonstrations are expected to decrease by 84% (see Table 4). If a hypothetical country were experiencing the highest number of AGD we observe in the sample, an average of 7.5 demonstrations per year, a move from a one-party dominant system to a

TABLE 3

Results of OLS regression

Variable	Model 1 AGD(log)	Model 2 CIVPROTEST(log)
(Constant)	-4.21*** (0.38)	-2.13*** (0.15)
ENPP (log)	-0.84** (0.32)	-0.42*** (0.12)
ENPP*Presidentialism	0.82^ (0.52)	0.43** (0.18)
ENPP*Semi-presidential	1.21* (0.60)	0.34^ (0.20)
Presidentialism	-0.02 (0.27)	-0.26** (0.10)
Semi-presidential System	-0.76* (0.34)	-0.21^ (0.12)
Population (log)	0.53*** (0.06)	0.39*** (0.02)
Age of democracy	0.004** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.00)
GDP per Capita (Residualised)	-9.971E-6 (0.00)	1.071-5*** (0.00)
N	402	249
Adjusted R^2	.27	.65

Note: Entries are unstandardised regression coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis and ^P $\leq$ 0.1, *P $\leq$ 0.05, **p $\leq$ 0.01, *** $\leq$ 0.001.

TABLE 4

Expected percentage change in demonstrations*

Change in number of parties	Percent change in AGD			Percent change in CIVDEM		
	Parliamentary	Presidential	Semi-presidential	Parliamentary	Presidential	Semi-presidential
1 to 2	-84	-2.02	36.24	-42	0.74	-8.21
2 to 3	-55.44	-1.34	23	-27.72	0.4	-5.49
3 to 4	-63	-1.52	26.99	-31.5	0.49	-6.21

Note: *The values were calculated using the coefficients for each variable and holding all control variables constant.

two-party system would lead the number of protests to decline to 1.2 AGD on average per year holding all else constant. As the sample is made up of democratic countries, observing a move from a one to two parties is rare in the sample. In most cases, countries with effective number of parties that are under two parties are British colonies of parliamentary systems with a dominant party. Yet, most observations in our sample have two parties or more; in those case, a change from a two-party system to a three-party system would yield an expected 55% decrease in protest. In the hypothetical high protest case, this would mean a decline from a high of 7.5 protests to an expected 3.4 protests per year. These findings are consistent in the CIVDEM reported in Model 2 Table 3. A 1% increase in ENPP in a parliamentary system is associated with a 0.42% decrease in protests. Thus a move from one to two parties is expected to generate a 42% decline in CIVDEM and a move from two to three parties is expected to generate a 27.72% decline in civil demonstrations.

Different than a parliamentary regime, in presidential systems, as the ENPP increases by 1%, the AGD is expected to decrease by 0.04%. Thus, while we do not observe an increase in protests, the decrease in protests as the number of political parties increases in presidential systems is negligible. In presidential systems a move from a one-party regime to a two-party system is expected to yield a decline of 2.02% in AGD and a move from two to three parties yield a decrease of 1.34% in AGD. In terms of AGD numbers, this would mean that holding all else equal, a hypothetical country with the highest observed level of protests of 7.5 would decline to 7.1 protests per year, a very small change. The CIVDEM variable yielded slightly different results in the expected direction. In presidential systems, a move from a one-party to two-party regime is expected to yield a 0.74% increase in protests and a move from a two- to three-party system is expected to yield a 0.4% increase in protest. These findings for CIVDEM are also very small. In both AGD and CIVDEM measures, the effect of a change in the number of political parties in presidential systems is negligible in comparison to parliamentary systems. This finding is consistent with the expectations about how parties function in parliamentary and presidential systems as will be discussed in the next section.

The findings were more inconclusive for the semi-presidential systems as the two samples yielded different results. For Model 1, as the number of political parties in a semi-presidential system increases by 1%, anti-government demonstrations are expected to decrease by 0.39%. This translates into a large increase in anti-government protests in the AGD sample where a move from one-party to a two-party system would yield a 36% increase in AGD, and a move from a two-party to three-party system would yield a 23% increase. In contrast, in Model 2, a move from a one- to two-party system is expected to yield a decrease of 8.21% and a move

from a two- to a three-party system yield a 5.49% decrease. Semi-presidential systems present a complicated problem which should be explored further separately. When the system acts more like a presidency and when like a parliamentary system needs to be accounted for. This can be done based on different powers of the president and control of the parliament in any given election in order to produce more conclusive results in semi-presidential systems in a separate study.

The overall findings from the model have yielded results in the expected direction with the exception of semi-presidential systems where the results are inconclusive and warrant further study. We find that a larger number of political parties are more important in curtailing anti-government demonstrations in parliamentary systems, but not in presidential systems. The fragmentation of the party system (ENPP), in conjunction with the political system (whether presidential or parliamentary), is a relevant part of the political opportunity structure that shapes protest activity among movement groups. The consistency found regarding the direction of the relationship between the dependent and explanatory variables using different measures of protest (AGD and CIVPROTEST) provides confirmation of these findings.

Conclusion

This study explains how the incentives for protest activity are shaped by the variation between different types of democratic systems. In particular, there are important differences in the way in which political party organisations represent the interests of groups within society under different political institutional settings. Social movements organise mainly to advocate for underrepresented constituents in a society. Groups whose issues are excluded from government policies due to the way in which parties are integrated into governance and who are marginalised in the discussions within the legislature are those that have an incentive to protest. When groups have longer term bonds with parties, and these parties have a real chance to get in government, then citizens are more likely to seek to influence political elites through 'normal' politics instead of protest.

The findings in this study demonstrate that social movements and political party organisations are closely intertwined. The political party system has a role in shaping party behaviour and, as a result, the incentive structure for social movements. In terms of protest activity, fragmentation of the party system becomes salient when considered in conjunction with whether the system has a separation of powers between the president and the legislature, in other words, whether it is a presidential or a parliamentary system. The findings here suggest that organised constituents have less incentive to protest in parliamentary systems where there are multiple parties to represent each distinct interest. But in parliamentary systems with fewer parties, protest is more likely. Broad catch-all parties are less responsive to the needs of each individual group given that the party's survival in the legislature does not depend on any single constituency. Organised groups seeking to advance their interests in parliamentary systems with fewer parties will have to do more to gain the attention of their elected officials relative to groups operating in a system where they represent a more significant element of their party's base. This is when they turn to protest.

In contrast, a fragmented legislature within a presidential system does not provide constituents with consistent effective representation as it does in a parliamentary system; instead it results in instability where contentious politics becomes more necessary. The conflicting relationship between the divided legislature with multiple parties and the president leads to inconsistent policy outcomes where organised constituents cannot depend on parties to

represent them through a coherent party platform. These groups are therefore somewhat more likely to protest in order to get the attention of governments and legislators. Thus, the effect of political parties in presidential systems is negligible in comparison to parliamentary systems. This is not surprising given the low level of discipline in parties in the presidential systems.

While this study is the first broad-based examination of the interaction of party systems, political systems, electoral rules and social movement protest activity, there are several questions that remain. The institutional variables can be refined to look at party discipline and powers of the executive across different presidential systems. While, on average, the presidential systems tend to suffer from these problems, there is variation between the different presidencies. Comparing the parliamentary and presidential systems amongst themselves may enhance our understanding of how parties function in relation to social movements.

NOTES

1. Lijphart (1999) defines consensus-based political systems as having checks and balances, proportionality in elections, and corporatism as well as having multiple parties.

2. The issue of party system institutionalisation is not addressed in the analysis conducted here. Some scholars argue that the effective number of political parties should be considered in the context of party system institutionalisation. Arce (2010) demonstrates that the less volatile political party systems generate lower protest activity. Party system institutionalisation is commonly measured by four factors: stability in the patterns of party competition; parties' stable roots in society; the legitimacy of the political parties; and the strength of party organisation (Mainwaring 1999; Mainwaring and Scully 1995). Yet, institutionalisation does not measure the ability of parties to respond to changing social demands and cleavages. While in some institutionalised systems, this may mean better representation and responsive politics, in other systems the same measure may reflect party entrenchment and an inability to change in response to changes in society. The legitimacy of parties would be a relevant measure to consider in relation to social movement activity, but adequate data for this variable is not available for all of the states and electoral periods included in this study.

3. The population and GDP per capita variables were obtained from the World Bank Development Indicators and the age of democracy variable was obtained from Cheibub and Gandhi (2004).

4. In order to ensure that there is no selection bias associated to the measurement of FHI, the same tests were conducted with a set of countries that are considered to be democratic under POLITY IV. Polity measure defines a democracy based on unrestricted political participation that is fully competitive, an executive selection system that is open, and where there are limits on the executive power. The cases that were included in the study were those countries that score between a 6 and a 10, which Polity IV defines as fully democratic. These cases represented a subset of FHI free and partly free countries. While the results

reported here are based on the FHI case selection, the Polity IV cases were consistent with the findings of the FHI.

5.   When both independent and dependent variables are log transformed, the beta coefficients are interpreted in terms of percentages.

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APPENDIX
Cases included in the study*

Albania	1992 1997
Argentina	1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1997 1999 2001
Armenia	1995 1999
Australia	1980 1983 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1998
Austria	1979 1983 1986 1990 1994 1995 1999
Bahamas	1982 1987 1992 1997
Bangladesh	1991 1996
Belgium	1978 1981 1985 1987 1991 1995 1999
Belize	1984 1989 1993 1998
Bolivia	1985 1989 1993 1997
Brazil	1982 1986 1990 1994 1998
Bulgaria	1990 1991 1994 1997
C. Verde Is.	1991 1995
Canada	1979 1980 1984 1988 1993 1997 2000
Chile	1989 1993 1997
Colombia	1978 1982 1986 1990 1991 1994 1998
Costa Rica	1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998
Croatia	1992 1995 2000
Cyprus	1981 1985 1991 1996
Czech Rep.	1990 1992 1996 1998
Denmark	1979 1981 1984 1987 1988 1990 1994 1998
Dom. Rep.	1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998
Ecuador	1979 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
El Salvador	1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000
Estonia	1992 1995 1999
Finland	1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999
France	1978 1981 1986 1988 1993 1997
FRG/Germany 1980	1983 1987 1990 1994 1998
Ghana	1992 1996 2000
Greece	1981 1985 1989 1990 1993 1996 2000
Grenada	1984 1990 1995 1999
Guatemala	1985 1990 1994 1995 1999
Guyana	1992 1997
Honduras	1981 1985 1989 1993 1997
Hungary	1990 1994 1998
Iceland	1978 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999
India	1980 1984 1989 1991 1996 1999
Indonesia	1999
Ireland	1981 1982 1987 1989 1992 1997
Israel	1981 1984 1988 1992 1996 1999
Italy	1979 1983 1987 1992 1994 1996
Jamaica	1980 1983 1989 1993 1997
Japan	1979 1980 1983 1986 1990 1993 1996 2000
Latvia	1993 1995 1998
Lithuania	1992 1996
Luxembourg	1979 1984 1989 1994 1999
Madagascar	1993 1998
Malawi	1994
Mali	1992 1997
Malta	1981 1987 1992 1996 1998
Mauritius	1987 1991 1995
Mexico	1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000
Moldova	1994 1998
Mongolia	1992 1996 2000
Namibia	1994 1999

Appendix (Continued)

Nepal	1991 1994
Netherlands	1981 1982 1986 1989 1994 1998 2002
New Zealand	1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999
Nicaragua	1996
Niger	1993
Nigeria	1979 1999
Norway	1981 1985 1989 1993 1997
P. N. Guinea	1982 1987 1992 1997
Panama	1989 1994 1999
Peru	1980 1985 1990 1992 1995 2000
Philippines	1987 1992 1995 1998
Poland	1991 1993 1997
Portugal	1979 1980 1983 1985 1987 1991 1995 1999
South Korea	1992 1996 2000
1988	
Romania	1990 1992 1996 2000
Russia	1993 1995 1999
S. Africa	1994 1999
Senegal	1983 1988 1993 1998
Slovakia	1994 1998
Slovenia	1992 1996 2000
Solomon Is.	1984 1989 1993 1997
Spain	1979 1982 1986 1989 1993 1996 2000
Sri Lanka	1989 1994 2000 2001
Suriname	1987 1991
Sweden	1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1998
Switzerland	1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999
Thailand	1983 1986 1992 1995
Trinidad-Tobago	1981 1986 1991 1995 2000
Turkey	1983 1987 1991 1995 1999
UK	1979 1983 1987 1992 1997
Ukraine	1994 1998
Uruguay	1984 1989 1994
USA	1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Vanuatu	1983 1987 1991 1998
Venezuela	1978 1983 1988 1993 1998
Zambia	1991 1996

Note: *Each case is the average of the variables observed for each year between two electoral periods.