5. Entrepreneurial alertness and opportunity discovery: origins, attributes, critique

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INTRODUCTION

Israel Kirzner’s concept of entrepreneurial alertness to profit opportunities is one of the most influential modern interpretations of the entrepreneurial function. Shane andVenkataraman (2000, p. 218) importantly assesses entrepreneurship research as “the scholarly examination of how, by whom, and with what effects opportunities to create future goods and services are discovered, evaluated, and exploited.” As such, “the field involves the study of sources of opportunities; the processes of discovery, evaluation, and exploitation of opportunities; and the set of individuals who discover, evaluate, and exploit them.” Shane’s A General Theory of Entrepreneurship (2003) cites Kirzner more than any writer except Joseph Schumpeter. More generally, the entrepreneurial opportunity, rather than the individual entrepreneur, the startup company, or the new product, has become the centerpiece of the academic study of entrepreneurship (Gagliano and Katz, 2001; Shane, 2003; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000).

Kirzner’s framework builds on the market-process approach associated with the Austrian school of economics and can trace its roots further back to Richard Cassirier, J.H. Clark, Frank A. Fetter, and other writers. Kirzner himself sees his contribution as primarily an extension of the work of Mises and F.A. Hayek, in effect bridging Mises’s (1949) emphasis on the entrepreneur with Hayek’s (1946, 1948) concept of market competition as an unfolding process of discovery and learning. Among mainstream economists, Kirzner has been cited in the literature on occupational choice, and there have been a few attempts to formalize his model of the market process (Lightleid, 1979, Litmanowid and Owen, 1990; Yates, 2000). In the context of a more general interest in equilibrium processes (Fisher, 1983), Kirzner has explained the Austrian model of the entrepreneurial market process to readers of the prestigious Journal of Economic Literature (Kirzner, 1979a). Still, his work has been more influential among management scholars than among economists. Those who tend to view equilibrium as a second-order phenomenon, the main focus of theoretical work in economics today (both macroeconomic and microeconomic) remains identifying and characterizing market equilibrium in terms of existence, uniqueness, and stability. In this sense, the opportunity-discovery branch of the entrepreneurship literature provides an example of management scholarship that builds upon a simple, yet fundamental insight from economics, and yields that insight in directions that economists are reluctant to go.

This chapter traces the origin and development of the concept of entrepreneurial alertness and its place as the centerpiece of the opportunity-discovery approach to entre-
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preneurship. In particular, we place Kirzner's contribution within the broader context of the Austrian school of economics, comparing and contrasting it with other Austrian conceptions of entrepreneurship. We argue that even though Kirzner's contribution is often thought of as the Austrian conception of the entrepreneur, an alternative Austrian tradition, in fact, exists that emphasizes the entrepreneur as an uncertainty-bearing, asset-owning individual and that this tradition offers some advantages over the discovery approach (whether in the Kirznerian or modern-management incarnations). We also critically discuss the way Kirzner's work has been interpreted and used in the theoretical, empirical, and experimental literatures looking into the antecedents and consequences of such opportunity discovery. As we argue, this literature goes much beyond Kirzner's work, making opportunity discovery and its determinants the key feature of the theory, whereas Kirzner's real interest lies in explaining market equilibration, a higher-level phenomenon.

THE AUSTRIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS

The Austrian school of economics (Böhm-Bawerk, 1889; Hayek, 1948; 1968; Kirzner, 1973; Lachmann, 1956; Menger, 1871; Rothbard, 1962; Mises, 1948) is increasingly well known in management studies for its contributions to the theory of entrepreneurship and the complementary "market process" account of economic activity (Chiles, 2003; Chiles and Choi, 2006; Hill and Deeds, 1996; Jacobson 1992; Langlois, 2001; Roberts and Eisenhardt, 2003). Other characteristically Austrian ideas such as the time structure of capital (Hayek, 1941) and the heterogeneity of capital goods (Lachmann, 1956) have received less attention (but see Foss et al., 2007; Chiles et al., 2007). Like all "heterodox" approaches, the Austrian school occupies a marginal position among contemporary, mainstream economists, though Hayek's theory of the business cycle has attracted renewed interest in the last few years (e.g. Oppers, 2002).

Here we offer a brief sketch of the history and development of the Austrian school, with particular reference to its approach to the entrepreneur. As we discuss in more detail below, the Austrian tradition is more diverse than is conventionally recognized. For example, we offer important differences between Kirzner's approach to entrepreneur- ship and that of Menger, the early twentieth-century American representatives of the Austrian school, and Mises, Kirzner's teacher and the most important and influential of the modern Austrian economists.

Menger and the Early Austrian School

The Austrian tradition begins with Carl Menger (1871), who sought to develop a causal, realistic account of price formation (and other economic phenomena) in contrast to the inductive, historicist approach that dominated late nineteenth-century German economics. Menger's approach emphasized the subjectivity of economic value, marginal analysis, resource heterogeneity, distributed knowledge and the time-structure of production. The entrepreneur figures prominently in Menger's account of production, though not in the sense emphasized by Kirzner. The entrepreneur is described by Menger (1871, p. 68) as a coordinating agent who is both capitalist and manager.
Entrepreneurial activity includes: (a) obtaining information about the economic situation; (b) economic calculation— all the various computations that must be made if a production process is to be efficient (provided that it is economic in other respects); (c) the act of will by which goods of higher order (or goods in general—under conditions of developed commerce, where any economic good can be exchanged for any other) are assigned to a particular production process; and finally (d) supervision of the execution of the production plan so that it may be carried through as economically as possible. This formulation emphasizes the importance of uncertainty and knowledge, and the deliberative, decisive action of the entrepreneur in arranging the productive resources at his or her disposal. Menger also makes the entrepreneur a resource owner, as do Knight (1921) and Fish et al. (2007b).

In his emphasis on uncertainty-bearing Menger picks up a theme introduced by Richard Cantillon, often considered a forerunner of the Austrian tradition ( Rothbard, 1995; Thornton, 1999). Cantillon was the first economist to analyze the entrepreneur systematically. In the Essai sur la nature du commerce en general (1755), he described three classes of economic agents, landowners, wage workers, and entrepreneurs whose main purpose is to engage in arbitrage, motivated by the profit that may stem from buying at a certain price and selling at an uncertain price (Cantillon, 1755/1931, p. 54):

Entrepreneurs work for uncertain wages, so to speak, and all others for certain wages until they have them, although their functions and their risk are very disproportionate. The General who has a salary, the Courtier who has a pension, and the Donnante who has wages, are in the latter class. All the others are Entrepreneurs, whether they establish themselves with a capital to carry on their enterprise or are Entrepreneurs of their own work without any capital, and they may be considered as being subject to uncertainty; even Beggars and Rubbers are Entrepreneurs of this class.

Thus, Cantillon saw uncertainty as an integral part of understanding profits and emphasized that entrepreneurs, rather than being a distinct group of individuals, are all those who bear commercial risk. He also emphasized the importance of foresight and argued that entrepreneurs do not need to own capital, a characteristic of Kirzner’s approach that we discuss in more detail below.

In the 1880s and 1890s, an Austrian school led by around Menger and his disciples, most notably Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk and Friedrich Wieser. Important British and American economists such as Philip Wicksteed, John Bates Clark, Herbert I. Davenport, and Frank A. Fetter also adopted and developed Menger’s principles of pricing and his causal-realistic approach to economic theorizing. Clark, for example, developed a theory of the entrepreneur based on the distinction between the ‘static state’ and ‘dynamic societies’ (Salerno, 2008, p. 18). Under static conditions, the entrepreneur’s function is ‘purely passive . . . the entrepreneur in his capacity of buyer and seller does not even do this work which purchases and sales involve . . . Sales and purchases are made in his name, but he does none of the work that leads up to them’ (Clark, 1918, p 12) There is essentially nothing for the entrepreneur to do under static conditions because under such conditions all factors of production are already allocated to their optimal uses, so that profits and losses will be zero. However, in the ‘dynamic society’ profits and losses are unavoidably present, because under such conditions and the uncertainty that accompanies them, the entrepreneur ‘makes the supreme decisions which now and again lead to changes in the
business' (Clark, 1918, p. 124). The entrepreneur, in Clark's view, is the ultimate decision-maker, and that 'part of the management of a business which consists in making the most far-reaching decisions cannot safely be entrusted to a salaried superintendent or other paid official, and must get its returns, if at all, in the form of profits' (Clark, 1918, p. 157). This meant that the entrepreneur must also be the owner of the business.

Clark's contemporary, Frank A. Fetter, known primarily for his contributions to the theory of capital and interest, also gave the entrepreneur a central role in the process of resource allocation (Fetter, 1905; 1915; 1977). Fetter's explanation of the differences between short-run and long-run production anticipates both Knight's (1921) distinction between 'risk' and 'uncertainty' and Kirzner's concept of market equilibrium. In the long run, Fetter argued, the net returns to production are determined by interest rates, themselves determined by the market's rate of 'time preference', or the relative valuation of present and future consumption. In the short run, business incomes fluctuate around these 'normal' returns because some entrepreneurs are better able than others to anticipate future prices and can thus acquire resources at prices below the present discounted values of their eventual contributions to output, leaving profit in addition to interest. In doing so, these entrepreneurs bid up the price of the 'underpriced' factors and help bring about the long-run equilibrium in which such profits are eliminated.1

Fetter's (1905, pp. 286-7) description of the entrepreneur (he uses the term 'entrepreneur') identifies uncertainty-bearing as the key entrepreneurial function. The entrepreneur (a) 'guarantees to the capitalist-lender a fixed return', (b) 'gives up the certain income to be got by lending his own capital, and, becoming a borrower, offers his capital as insurmountable to the lender', (c) 'gives to other workers a definite amount for services applied to distant ends', and (d) 'risks his own services and accepts an indefinite chance instead of a definite amount for them'. He also serves as an 'organizer' and 'director', possessing 'unusual foresight' and the 'ability to judge men and tact in relations with them' (Fetter, 1905, p. 268). In short, the entrepreneur 'is the economic buffer; economic forces are transmitted through him'.

As the specialized risk-taker, he is the spring or buffer, which takes up and distributes the strain of industry. He feels first the influence of changing conditions. If the prices of his products fall, the first loss comes upon him, and he avoids further loss as best he can by paying less for materials and labor. At such times the wage-earners look upon him as their evil genius, and usually blame him for lowering their wages, not the public for refusing to buy the product at the former high prices. Again, if price rise, he gains from the increased value of the stock in his hand that has been produced at low cost. If the employer often appears to be a harshness, his disposition is the result of 'natural election'. He is placed between the powerful, selfish forces of competition, and his economic survival is conditioned on vigilance, strength, and astuteness. Weak generosity cannot endure. (Fetter, 1905: 287-88)

As in Knight and Kirzner, the entrepreneurial role is not limited to new-venture creation or the introduction of new products, services, production methods, and the like, but lies at the heart of the everyday affairs of production and exchange. Moses, a student of Böhm-Bawerk, and Moses's younger colleague Hayek, more a student of Wieser than of Böhm-Bawerk, would develop and extend the Austrian tradition in the early twentieth century, with Kirzner, Murray Rethbard, both Moses students, and Ludwig Lachmann, a Hayek student, making critical contributions in the 1920s, 1960s, and 1970s. Recent scholars have noted considerable variety within the Austrian
school, particularly in its modern interpretations. Salerno (1993), in particular, argues that there are two distinct strands of Austrian economics, both tracing their origins to Menger. One strand, manifest in the works of Wisser, Hayek, and Kirzner, emphasizes disequilibrium, the informational role of prices, discovery of already existing opportunities, and profit-seeking behavior as an equilibrating force. Another strand, developed by Böhm-Bawerk, Sisines, and Rothbard, focuses on monetary calculation and forward-looking, uncertainty-bearing, entrepreneurial appraisal and investment, rather than discovery. The concept of entrepreneurship as alertness to profit opportunities created by disequilibrium comes out of the Wiefer-Hayek-Kirzner strand. There are, however, important precursors to both strands.

Wieser and Hayek: The Beginnings of the ‘Discovery View’

In his treatise Social Economics (1914) Wieser presented an eclectic definition of the entrepreneur as owner, manager, leader, innovator, organizer, and speculator. He noted that the entrepreneur ‘must possess the quick perception that seizes new terms in current transactions as his affairs develop’ (Wieser, 1914, p.324), the first hint of alertness as an entrepreneurial attribute.

Wieser’s student, Hayek, did not contribute to the theory of entrepreneurship per se, but his discovery view of competition, developed in a series of essays from the mid-1940s (notably Hayek, 1945; 1946) as a critical reaction to the perfect-competition model, is a crucial input into the opportunity discovery approach. Competition, Hayek argued, should be understood not as a static state of affairs, but as a rivalrous process that is essentially a procedure for discovering who will serve us well which grocer or travel agency, which department store or hotel, which doctor or solicitor, we can expect to provide the most satisfactory solution for whatever personal problem we may have to face’ (Hayek, 1946, p.97). The basis for this conceptualization is the characteristically Austrian emphasis on dispersed knowledge, present already in Menger, but fully articulated by Hayek. Competition, Hayek maintains, is the mechanism that makes best use of dispersed knowledge - it is an effective way to discover knowledge we do not yet know is available or indeed needed at all (Hayek, 1968/2002).

However, Hayek is not entirely forthright on how exactly the market performs this discovery function. Entrepreneurs are mentioned only in passing. Indeed, different mechanisms underlying the market’s discovery process can be imagined, depending on how much intention, rationality, and learning ability are ascribed to market participants. At one extreme lies a selection mechanism that selects effectively among various entrepreneurial ventures formed essentially in ignorance of consumer preferences (Austrian, 1950; Becker, 1962). Such a process is heavily error-prone, and, more importantly, no one learns from past errors. Although Hayek’s writings may sometimes describe such processes in which the system, and not individual agents, are ‘rational’ (Langlois, 1985), most other Austrians have strongly emphasized the intentions of entrepreneurs in coping with uncertainty and ignorance, allowing for various degrees of error. Indeed, Kirzner has often conceptualized the market process as one of a ‘systematic’ elimination of errors. Fast-forwarding, one of Kirzner’s earliest papers is a strong critique of Becker’s (1962) evolutionary argument that one can dispense entirely with the rationality of market participants in doing basic price theory (Kirzner, 1962). Kirzner’s entrepreneur is highly
rational, or perhaps more precisely, extra-rational, in going beyond the given means-ends frameworks and noticing previously undiscovered opportunities for pure profit. Körner, then, supplies a crucial mechanism (or micro-foundation) for the Wiser-Hayek discovery view: a competitive market is a superior setting because it generates entrepreneurial discoveries through the exercise of alertness. As Körner (1973, p.14) argues, 'our confidence in the market's ability to learn and to harness the continuous flow of information to generate the market process depends crucially on our belief in the benign presence of the entrepreneurial element.' Although the entrepreneur may not search for any profit opportunity in particular, the lure of pure profit may nevertheless lead him or her to randomly scan the horizon, as it were (Körner, 1967a, p.72).

Böhm-Bawerk, Mises, and Rothbard

Böhm-Bawerk was one of Austria's most prominent economists, not only as a theorist but also as a three-time Austrian minister of finance (whose picture still graces Austria's 100 Schilling note). His work was mainly on the theory of capital and interest (Böhm-Bawerk, 1889), and his approach has largely been abandoned within mainstream macroeconomic theory. (He also authored a penetrating and original critique of Marx (Böhm-Bawerk, 1898). Perhaps for this reason, his work is little known to contemporary management scholars.

Böhm-Bawerk's two most important students were Joseph Schumpeter and Ludwig von Mises. Mises is generally considered the most important twentieth-century representative of the Austrian school, and his work provided a main impetus to the 'Austrian revival' of the 1970s (Vaughn, 1994; Salerno, 1999). Mises became an internationally known monetary theorist with the publication of his Theory of Money and Credit in 1912, followed by an important 1920 article and 1922 book on the economic theory of socialism (Mises, 1920, 1922). Mises's best-known book is his 1949 treatise Human Action, which continues to be a foundational text for Austrians.

Körner has always described his work as an extension of Mises's theory of the market process. Mises, Körner's mentor and teacher at New York University, and Körner are usually lumped together as offering a unified Austrian account of the entrepreneur. However, as we clarify later, we see Mises as closer to the Cantillon-Knight position that entrepreneurs' judgment over the deployment of resources, not alertness per se, Körner (1973, pp.36-40) argues that in a world of uncertainty, resource owners exercise entrepreneurial judgment in allocating their resources to particular uses. But he goes on (1973, pp. 40-43) to introduce the analytical device of the pure entrepreneur, the agent who discovers profit opportunities without putting any resources at stake, and claims that this function, rather than investment under uncertainty, is the 'driving force' of the market economy. This view, we maintain, and the Wiser-Hayek-Körner account in general, is very different from the view found in Cantillon, Knights, and Mises.

Mises's own position is somewhat ambiguous (Salerno, 2008). The entrepreneur, Mises writes, 'shows how the activities of enterprising men, the promoters and speculators, eager to profit from discrepancies in the price structure, tend toward eradicating such discrepancies and thereby also toward blotting out the sources of entrepreneurial profit and loss.' Describing this equilibrating process is 'the task of economic theory' (Mises, 1949, pp. 352-3). Elsewhere, however, Mises describes the entrepreneur as an investor, an
economic actor who bears uncertainty, rather than discovering (certain) opportunities for gain. [The outcome of action is always uncertain. Action is always speculation] (Mises, 1949, p. 253). Consequently, the real entrepreneur is a speculator, a man eager to utilize his opinion about the future structure of the market for business operations promising profits. This specific anticipative understanding of the conditions of the uncertain future defines any rules and systematization (Mises, 1949, p. 582).

This emphasis on action under conditions of uncertainty calls to mind Cantillon's (1755) brief account of the entrepreneurial function and Knight's (1921) concept of entrepreneurial judgment. Judgment is business decision-making when the range of possible future outcomes, let alone the likelihood of individual outcomes, is generally unknown (what Knight terms uncertainty, rather than mere probabilistic risk). Exercising judgment thus requires the investment of resources (primarily, the purchase of factors of production in the present, in anticipation of future receipts from the sale of finished goods). Alertness, or awareness of particular conditions, does not itself involve judgment, and does not, in this understanding, have a direct effect on the allocation of resources.

Kirzner's contemporary Murray Rothbard, another influential contemporary Austrian economist, was among the first to question Kirzner's strict separation between the 'discovery' and 'ownership' functions of the entrepreneur (Rothbard, 1995). Rothbard argued that unless buying and selling are instantaneous, even arbitrageurs bear uncertainty, in that selling prices may change after goods and services are acquired for arbitrage. More generally, the driving force of the market economy is not Kirzner's 'pure entrepreneur', but the capitalist-entrepreneurs who invest resources in anticipation of uncertain rewards:

Kirzner's entrepreneur is a curious formulation. He need not, apparently, risk anything. He is a free-floating whirl, disembodied from real objects. He does not, and need not, possess any assets. All he need have to earn profits is a faculty of alertness to profit opportunities. Since he need not risk any capital assets to meet the chance fate of uncertainty, he cannot suffer any losses. But if the Kirznerian entrepreneur owns no assets, then how in the world does he earn profits? Profits, after all, are simply the other side of the coin of an increase in the value of one's capital; losses are the reflection of a loss in capital assets. The speculator who expects a stock to rise uses money to purchase that stock; a rise or fall in the price of stock will raise or lower the value of the stock assets. If the price rises, the profits are one and the same thing as the increase in capital assets. The process is more complex but similar in the purchase or hiring of factors of production, the creating of a product and then its sale on the market. In what sense can an entrepreneur ever make profits if he owns no capital to make profits on? (Rothbard, 1985, pp. 282–3)

Summary

In short, the Austrian tradition comprises a variety of diverse elements, some complementary but others distinct. Methodological individualism, subjectivism, realism, human purpose, resource heterogeneity, the division of labor and division of knowledge, dynamic processes of adjustment, and decentralized organizational structures are key elements in all strands of Austrian economics. However, there are important differences among scholars working in this tradition. In particular, we distinguish a Wieser–Hayek–Kirzner strand, emphasizing knowledge, discovery, and process, and a Böhm–Bawerk–
Mises-Rothbard strand, emphasizing monetary calculation and decision-making under uncertainty.

Entrepreneurial scholars, particularly those working on entrepreneurial discovery and opportunity identification, may wish to study this strand more carefully, and to consider Austrian insights that have not made appearances in contemporary management theory. For example, the Hayekian emphasis on tacit knowledge and spontaneous processes of discovery has influenced the knowledge-based view of the firm and, to a lesser degree, Williamson's transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1991). But Austrian capital theory is largely unknown among management scholars, despite its close connection to concepts of resource heterogeneity (firm-specific resources and capabilities, asset specificity, etc.) that are central to strategic management (Foss et al., 2007b). The Austrians also made important early contributions in the areas of property rights, knowledge, incentives, and institutions (Foss and Klein, 2010). We hope that interest in Austrian ideas within the opportunity-discovery tradition will lead to greater attention to Austrian contributions in these other areas as well.

**KIRZNER AND ENTREPRENEURIAL ALERTNESS**

We turn next to Israel Kirzner's important and influential interpretation of entrepreneurship as alertness, or discovery, of opportunities for gain. Kirzner, Mises's student and colleague at New York University and director of its graduate program in Austrian economics until his retirement in 2001, is one of the best-known and most cited Austrian economists. Here we briefly summarize Kirzner's approach to entrepreneurship and its place within the broader Austrian and mainstream entrepreneurial literatures. We then summarize some controversies surrounding Kirzner's views, both within and outside the Austrian tradition. These include disagreements about the equilibrating nature of entrepreneurial action (and the market process more generally), the relationship between entrepreneurial discovery and innovation, Kirzner's approach to entrepreneurial creativity, and the role of resource ownership in the Kirznerian system.

**Kirzner's Contribution**

Kirzner's *Competition and Entrepreneurship* (1973) is conventionally seen as the seminal modern Austrian statement on entrepreneurship. Kirzner's later work on entrepreneurship has mainly consisted in clarifying the positions in that book (Kirzner, 1979a; 1992; 1979b; 2009), as well as relating them to other theories of entrepreneurship, and applying them to, for example, regulation (e.g. Kirzner, 1984; 1985) and ethics (Kirzner, 1989).

In Kirzner's framework, profit opportunities result from prices, quantities, and qualities that diverge from their equilibrium values. Some individuals tend to notice, or be alert to, these opportunities, and their actions bring about changes in prices, quantities, and qualities. The simplest case of alertness is that of the arbitrageur, who discovers a discrepancy in present prices that can be exploited for financial gain. In a more typical case, the entrepreneur is alert to a new product or a superior production process and steps in to fill this market gap before others. Success, in this view, comes not from following a well-specified maximization problem, such as a search algorithm (High, 1980), but from
having some insight that no one else has, a process that cannot be modeled as an optimization problem. Entrepreneurship, in other words, is the act of grasping and responding to profit opportunities that emerge in an imperfect world. Unlike other approaches in modern economics, the imperfections in question are not seen as temporary "frictions" resulting from ill-defined property rights, transaction costs, or asymmetric information. Although those imperfections can be cast in an equilibrium mold—as in the modern economics of information—Kirzner has in mind a market in permanent and ineradicable disequilibrium.8

Kirzner's approach, like that of Knight, Schumpeter, and other key contributors to the economic theory of entrepreneurship, sees entrepreneurship as an economic function, not an employment category (i.e. self-employment) or type of firm (i.e. a startup company).9 The main effect of the entrepreneurial function is market equilibration: by closing pockets of ignorance in the market, entrepreneurship always stimulates a tendency towards equilibrium (Selgin, 1987). While Kirzner's "pure entrepreneur", an ideal type, performs only this function, and does not supply labor or own capital, real-world business people may be partly entrepreneurs in this sense, partly laborers, partly capitalists, and so on. As we suggested in the previous section, the relationship between entrepreneurial discovery and capital investment distinguishes Kirzner's approach sharply from Knight's (and, arguably, from that of Kirzner's mentor, Ludwig von Mises). Because Kirzner's (pure) entrepreneurs perform only a discovery function, rather than an investment function, they do not own capital; they need only be alert to profit opportunities. Kirznerian entrepreneurs need not be charismatic leaders, do not innovate, and are not necessarily creative or in possession of sound business judgment. They do not necessarily start firms, raise capital, or manage an enterprise. They perform the discovery function, and nothing else.

Key in Kirzner's work is his distinction between "Robbinsian maximizing" and "entrepreneurial alertness". The first conforms to the standard picture of economic man as applying given means to best satisfy given but conflicting ends in a fundamentally mechanical way (Robbins, 1932). Because everything is given, action becomes purely a matter of calculation. Kirzner argues that this conceptualization of behavior cannot accommodate the discovery of new means, new ends, and the setting up of new means-ends structures. As a result, the dynamic market process cannot be captured by the model of Robbinsian maximizing; another behavioral quality is needed, namely the quality of entrepreneurial alertness to previously unexploited profit opportunities. Alertness ranges from the discovery of a ten dollar bill on the street to the discovery of a new, highly profitable drug. Thus, entrepreneurs are discoverers; they discover new resource uses, new products, new markets, new possibilities for arbitrage—in short, new possibilities for profitable trade. Alertness is not the same as search (Stigler, 1961), the deliberate search for new information. Rather, entrepreneurship is the act of discovering, or being alert to, information and opportunities that others fail to perceive. It is not only that entrepreneurial activity reduces our lack of knowledge about which products, processes, new organizational forms, etc. are needed; it is more fundamentally that entrepreneurial activity alleviates our ignorance about what we don't know. What Kirzner calls "sheer ignorance" is "necessarily accompanied by the element of surprise—one had not hitherto realized one's ignorance" (Kirzner, 1997, p. xii).

Combining his notion of entrepreneurial behavior with Hayek's notion of the market as a dynamic process, Kirzner develops a view of the market process as a continual
process of entrepreneurial discovery of previously unnoticed opportunities for profit. The profits earned in this process reflect the discovery and exploitation of profit opportunities that would not have been grasped in the absence of entrepreneurial activity. Thus, the entrepreneurial function is beneficial because it alleviates the problems of coordination introduced by the division of knowledge (Hayek, 1945). Here Kirzner invokes the welfare concept, borrowed from Hayek, of ‘plan coordination’, a concept that has generated considerable controversy within the Austrian school.8

Kirzner’s fiction of the pure entrepreneur is introduced to elucidate the coordinating function of entrepreneurship. Although Clark and Mises introduced similar devices to emphasize selected aspects of entrepreneurship, Kirzner sees his construct as capturing its very essence. Kirzner has been consistent that the pure entrepreneur is a non-owner (Kirzner, 1975). ‘An important point,’ Kirzner argues (1973, p. 47), ‘is that ownership and entrepreneurship are to be viewed as completely separate functions. Once we have adopted the convention of concentrating all elements of entrepreneurship into the hands of pure entrepreneurs, we have automatically excluded the asset owner from an entrepreneurial role. Purely entrepreneurial decisions are by definition reserved to decision-makers who own nothing at all.’ Thus, the entrepreneur is a pure decision-maker, and nothing else. As such, anyone can be a pure entrepreneur.

The notions of decision-making in the context of entrepreneurship raise several pertinent questions. For example, the notions of ‘alertness’ and ‘discovery’ suggest that there are separate phases in the act of entrepreneurship. Similarly, Kirzner often talks about the exploitation of opportunities, which adds another possible phase (following discovery). These phases could conceivably be separated by long stretches of time. Relatedly, they could have widely different antecedents or determinants. However, Kirzner seems to treat alertness, discovery, and exploitation as parts of one Gestalt – inseparable parts of a whole, and does not seem interested in exploring their relationship. As we argue below, this is presumably because his explanatory concern is equilibration, not the entrepreneur as such.

However, even if entrepreneurship is ultimately a means to understanding a higher-level phenomenon, equilibration, the antecedents of entrepreneurship can still be important and worthy of academic study. The modern entrepreneurship literature in economics and management research has suggested several possible antecedents such as the personal skills (Lazear, 2004), cognitive biases (Buizer and Barney, 1997), and prior experience (Shane, 2000), as well the characteristics of the parent company (Gompers et al., 2001), the institutional environment (Bjarraskov and Foss, 2008), and other background characteristics (Xue and Klein, 2010). However, like other contributors to the economic theory of entrepreneurship (notably Schumpeter and Knight), Kirzner is not interested in such antecedents, presumably because his aim is to construct a general theory of the equilibrating function of entrepreneurship. He does, however, argue that government interference with the price mechanism inhibits the entrepreneurial discovery process (e.g. Kirzner, 1978b).

[Direct controls by government on prices, quantities, or qualities of output production or input employment may unintentionally block activities which have, as yet, not been specifically envisaged by anyone. Where these blocked activities turn out to be entrepreneurially profitable activities (perhaps as a result of unforeseen changes in data), the likelihood of their being discovered]
Debates on the Kirnerian Discovery Approach

Kirner's approach has stimulated considerable controversy, both within and outside the Austrian school of economics. Among Austrians, debate has focused on the inherently equilibrating aspect of entrepreneurial discovery. Kirner was to maintain equilibrium (as understood by mainstream economists) as a meaningful and useful analytical category. The Austrian school equates equilibrium with equilibrium states that are 'entitled to demand' a theoretical basis for the claim that equilibrating processes systematically mold market variables in a direction consistent with the conditions postulated in the equilibrium models (Kirner, 1997a, p.65). However, this 'theoretical basis' has not been offered by mainstream economists. This criticism of equilibrium economics echoes Hayek (1957), who argued that economists should devote analytical attention to understanding those learning processes that establish congruence between 'subjective data' (i.e., agents' perceptions) and 'objective data' (i.e., real scarcities and preferences). However, unlike Hayek, who argued that the 'pure logic of choice' was not helpful in this regard, Kirner claims that entrepreneurship is a logical category that supplies the '4th' which might account for 'the economicist' confidence in the special relevance of the intersection point in [the demand and supply diagram] (Kirner, 1997a, p.66). This may be interpreted as implying that entrepreneurship is always and inherently equilibrating (Selgin, 1987).

However, by explicitly raising the need to theorize equilibrating processes, Kirner may also be seen as linking up with work in mainstream economics that has dealt with the issue of how markets can converge to equilibrium (cf. Selgin, 1987, p.44), notably so-called 'stability theory' (Scarff, 1968). Also, some mainstream economists have argued that it is only meaningful to make use of the equilibrium construct if it can be theoretically demonstrated that there may exist a tendency to equilibrium (Fischer, 1983). Thus, Kirner may be seen as forging linkages to important contributions from mainstream economics. However, overall this work demonstrates that strong assumptions must be made for convergence to take place—and so such assumptions are explicitly made in Kirner's work.

There are several ways in which entrepreneurship may fail to equilibrating markets within Kirner's own analytical system. First, if opportunities can be posited as existing objectively, then if entrepreneurs fail to discover all opportunities, equilibration does not take place (a possibility allowed for by Kirner himself). Second, if by equilibrium Kirner has in mind Hayek's sense of multi-period plan coordination, then Kirner has introduced an inter-temporal dimension that may weaken the whole notion of entrepreneurship as equilibrating. In parts of Kirner's early work (e.g. Kirner, 1973), the exercise of entrepreneurship does not seem to presuppose uncertainty. If entrepreneurship means overcoming sheer ignorance by the exercise of alertness, this is a logically correct inference. However, uncertainty is clearly a fundamental aspect of action (Mises, 1949), and it is difficult to see the usefulness of a theory of entrepreneurship that abstracts from it. However, introducing uncertainty may destroy the basis for the claim that entrepreneurship is equilibrating.

In particular, Ludwig Lachmann, drawing on English economist Ge/rge Shackle's work on the radically uncertain, 'kaleidic' economy, raised strong doubts in the 1970s.
Concerning equilibrium. If the future is unknowable and emerges from creative acts in a kaleidoscope of current, future, current profits and losses—which are based on past actions—do not provide reliable guides to future-oriented current actions (Lachmann, 1976). Only a small subset (e.g. future markets) of the full set of intertemporal prices exists. In other words, there is very little rational basis for entrepreneurs to form expectations of future consumer demands and resource scarcitys, and such expectations are, therefore, more likely to be divergent than convergent.

Selgin (1987) argues that these debates misunderstand the nature of the equilibrium process. Correctly understood, 'equilibrium' does not refer to coordination of plans as in Hayek (1937), mainstream stability theory, convergence to rational expectations, equilibrium, and the like; it refers to entrepreneurial profits and losses. These are strictly subjective categories and have no objective basis outside the minus of entrepreneurs:

It is necessary . . . to treat entrepreneurial profit opportunities as the unique products of the valuations and understanding (Vorhersagen) of actors who will seek their exploitation. Upon the fact of action, these 'imagined' or 'understood' (rather than 'perceived') profits are, logically and temporally, destroyed. Thus, action leads to the systematic elimination of entrepreneurial profit and loss, it is eliminating. (Selgin, 1987, p. 39)

Thus, equilibrium in this (Misesian) sense makes no reference to the state of knowledge of market participants and whether their plans are consistent or not. In fact, Selgin (1987) dismisses the very notion of coordination in a world in which profit opportunities cannot be thought of as 'objectively existing', in which preferences have no existence apart from actions, etc. Klein (2002, p. 182) argues, following Salerno (1991), that Mises has in mind a concept of coordination that refers only to real-world exchanges, not the movements of prices and quantities toward some hypothetical long-run equilibrium values. In this sense, the existence or nonexistence of equilibrating tendencies in the unhampered market—the issue that divided 'Kriznerian' and 'Lachmannians' and dominated much of the Austrian discussion in the 1980s—is relatively unimportant. For Mises, the critical 'market process' is not the convergence to equilibrium, but the selection mechanism in which unsuccessful entrepreneurs—those who systematically overbid for factors, relative to eventual consumer demands—are eliminated from the market (Mises, 1951).

Other economists have emphasized the contrast between the Kirznerian and Schumpeterian entrepreneurs, asking if Kirzner's entrepreneur can also innovate, be creative, take risks, and so on. Kirzner emphasizes that his 'pure entrepreneur' performs only a discovery function and need not be an innovator in the Schumpeterian sense of disrupting an existing equilibrium allocation of resources by introducing new products, services, resources, production methods, etc. Kirzner does not deny that businesses people, resource owners, financiers, traders, and the like exercise boldness, creativity, and imagination, only that an entrepreneur need not exercise these functions to perform the role of alertness to previously unknown profit opportunities. 'My entrepreneurs were engaged in arbitrage, acting entrepreneurially even when they might not be seen as Schumpeterian "creators" . . . in so emphasizing the difference between Schumpeter's theory of entrepreneurship and my own, I was motivated by my primary scientific objective. This was to understand the nature of the market process—even in its simplest conceivable contexts' (Kirzner, 2009, p. 147).

A recent stream of management literature, discussed in more detail below, conceives
the distinction between Kirznerian discovery and Schumpeterian innovation in terms of different kinds of profit opportunities. Under particular circumstances — for instance, mature industries with well-functioning product and factor markets, little technological change, a stable customer base, and so on — gains from trade may be regarded as 'discovery opportunities'. Under different circumstances, such opportunities do not exist, and entrepreneurs must 'create' their own products, mark ups, production methods, and so on, and these may be regarded as 'creation opportunities' (Alvarez and Barney, 2007).

This perspective, we believe, takes the discovery metaphor too literally. Kirzner does not mean that opportunities literally are given, objectively, in the environment, independent of human creativity. 'Discovery' is an analytical construct, an instrumental device, not a description of behavior. As Kirzner explains in a 1997 interview:

I do not mean to convey the idea that the future is a rolled-up tapestry, and we need only to be patient as the picture progressively unravels itself before our eyes. In fact, the future may be a void. There may be nothing around the corner or in the tapestry. The future has to be created. Philosophically, all this may be so. But it doesn't matter for the sake of the metaphor I have chosen. Ex post we have to recognize that when an innovator has discovered something new, that something was metaphorically waiting to be discovered. But from an everyday point-of-view, when a new gadget is invented, we all say, gee, I can see we needed that. It was just waiting to be discovered. (Kirzner, 1997b)

Notice that Kirzner describes opportunities as 'metaphorically waiting to be discovered', not literally waiting to be discovered. He is not offering a particular ontology or epistemology, just proposing an analytical device, designed for a specific purpose (to understand equilibration).

We have discussed elsewhere the relationship between entrepreneurship and resource ownership (Foss and Klein, 2005: Foss et al., 2007a; Foss et al., 2007b; Klein, 2008a). Kirzner's entrepreneurs do not own capital; they need only be alert to profit opportunities. Because they own no assets, they bear no uncertainty. Critics have seized on this point as a defect in Kirzner's conception. According to this criticism, mere alertness to a profit opportunity is not sufficient for earning profits. To reap financial gain, the entrepreneur must invest resources to realize the discovered profit opportunity. 'Entrepreneurial ideas without money are mere parlor games until the money is obtained and committed to the projects' (Rothbard, 1985, p. 283). Moreover, excluding the few cases where buying low and selling high are nearly instantaneous (say, electronic trading of currencies or commodity futures), even arbitrage transactions require some time to complete. The selling price may fall before the arbitrageur has made his sale, and thus even the sure arbitrageur faces some probability of loss. In Kirzner's formulation, the worst that can happen to an entrepreneur is the failure to discover an existing profit opportunity. Entrepreneurs either earn profits or break even, but it is unclear how they suffer losses.15

ENTREPRENEURSHIP AS OPPORTUNITY DISCOVERY

The contemporary opportunity identification literature seeks to build a positive research program by operationalizing the concept of alertness (Busenitz, 1996; Cooperet al., 1995; Demtert and Klein, 2003; Gaglio and Katz, 2001; Kaish and Gilad, 1991; Kitzmann
and Schiereck, 2005). How’s alertness manifested in action? How do we recognize it, empirically? Can we distinguish ‘discovery’ from systematic search? What are the psy-chological characteristics of particularly ‘alert’ individuals? However, as discussed by Klein (2008a), this positive research program may miss the point of Kirzner’s metaphor of entrepreneurial alertness: namely, that it is only a metaphor. Kirzner’s aim is not to characterize entrepreneurship per se, but to explain the tendency for markets to clear. In the Kirznerian system opportunities are (exogenous) arbitrage opportunities and nothing more. Entrepreneurship itself serves a purely instrumental function; it is the means by which Kirzner explains market clearing. As Kirzner (2009, pp. 145-6) explains, reviewing his main contributions and critiquing his own critics:

[My own work has nothing to say about the secrets of successful entrepreneurship. My work has explored, not the nature of the talents needed for entrepreneurial success, not any qualities to be followed by would-be successful entrepreneurs, but, instead, the nature of the market process as set in motion by the entrepreneurial decisions (both successful and unsuccessful ones). … This paper seeks (a) to identify more carefully the sense in which my work on entrepreneurial theory does not throw light on the substantive sources of successful entrepreneurship, (b) to argue that a number of (symptomatic) reviewers of my work have somehow failed to recognize this limitation in the scope of my work (and that these scholars have therefore misunderstood certain aspects of my theoretical system), (c) to show that, despite all of the above, my understanding of the market process (as set in motion by entrepreneurial decisions) can, in a significant sense, provide a theoretical underpinning for public policy in regard to entrepreneurship.

Of course, arbitrage opportunities cannot exist in a perfectly competitive general-equilibrium model, so Kirzner’s framework assumes the presence of competitive imperfections, in the language of strategic factor markets (Alvarez and Barney, 2004; Barney, 1986). Beyond specifying general disequilibrium conditions, however, Kirzner offers no theory of how opportunities come to be identified, who identifies them, and so on; identification itself is a black box. The claim is simply that outside the Arrow-Debreu world in which all knowledge is effectively parameterized, opportunities for disequilibrium profit exist and tend to be discovered and exploited. In short, what Kirzner calls ‘entrepreneurial discovery’ is simply that which causes markets to equilibrate. Contemporary entrepreneurship scholars, considering whether opportunities are objective or subjective (Companies and McMullen, 2007; McMullen and Shephard, 2006), note that Kirzner tends to treat them as objective. Again, this is true, but misses the point. Kirzner is not making an ontological claim about the nature of profit opportunities per se – not claiming, in other words, that opportunities are, in some fundamental sense, objective – but merely using the concept of objective, exogenously given, but not-yet-discovered opportunities as a device for explaining the tendency of markets to clear. To a certain extent this confusion is caused by the different levels of analysis. Kirzner moving on the level of markets, modern entrepreneurship scholars being concerned with entrepreneurs per se. However, this is a case of a fruitful misunderstanding, for the basic notion that opportunity discovery may be taken as the aim of analysis, and that analytical and empirical attention may center on the antecedents to such discovery, has led to a positive research program. This program emphasizes the means by which individuals identify and react to opportunities, relying largely on survey data (Busenitz, 1996; Cooper et al., 1995; Kaish and Gilad, 1991). These studies suggest that founders of new ventures (the operational definition of entrepreneurs) spend more time gathering
information, and rely more heavily on unconventional sources of information, than managers of existing enterprises.

CRITIQUES OF THE DISCOVERY APPROACH

The alertness or discovery perspective faces several challenges, however. First, a precise definition of opportunities has remained elusive. Typically, opportunities are defined very broadly. Shane and Venkataraman's (2000, p. 226) influential paper defines entrepreneurial opportunities as "those situations in which new goods, services, raw materials, and organizing methods can be introduced and sold at greater than their cost of production." This involves not only technical skills like financial analysis and market research, but also other tangible forms of creativity, team building, problem solving, and leadership (Bills et al., 1997; Hisrich, 2004; Long and McMillan, 1984). It can involve both the recognition of already existing opportunities and the creation, ex nihilo, of new opportunities (Alvarez and Barney, 2007). Although value can, of course, be created not only by starting new activities, but also by improving the operation of existing activities, research in opportunity identification tends to emphasize the launching of new ventures (firms, products, or services). As summarized by Shane (2003, pp. 4-5).

the academic field of entrepreneurship incorporates, in its domain, explanations for why, when, and how entrepreneurial opportunities exist, the sources of those opportunities and the forms that they take, the processes of opportunity discovery and evaluation, the acquisition of resources for the exploitation of these opportunities, the act of opportunity exploitation, why, when, and how some individuals and not others discover, evaluate, gather resources for, and exploit opportunities, the strategies used to pursue opportunities, and the organizing efforts to exploit them.

A second debate asks whether opportunities are 'discovered' or 'created'. Alvarez and Barney (2007) distinguish, within the applied entrepreneurship literature, a 'discovery approach', in which entrepreneurial actions are seen as responses to exogenous shocks, and a 'creation approach', in which such actions are taken as endogenous. 'Discovery entrepreneurs' focus on predicting systematic risks, formulating complete and stable strategies, and procuring capital from external sources. 'Creation entrepreneurs', by contrast, appreciate iterative, inductive, incremental decision making, are comfortable with emergent and flexible strategies, and tend to rely on internal finance. More generally, as noted by McMullen et al. (2007, p. 279), some researchers argue that the subjective or socially constructed nature of opportunity makes it impossible to separate opportunity from the individual. While others contend that opportunity is as an objective construct visible to or created by the knowledgeable or astute entrepreneur.

Klein (2008a) argues that the discovery-creation distinction places too much emphasis on the ontology of the opportunity, and that opportunities should be treated instead as institutional constructs, as metaphors useful for the economist or management theorist, rather than frameworks for entrepreneurial decision-making itself. In the Knightian approach (as developed in Foss et al., 2007b, and Foss et al., 2007a) opportunities are best characterized as neither discovered nor created, but imagined. The creation metaphor implies that profit opportunities, once the entrepreneur has conceived of or established
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them, come into being, objectively, like a work of art. Creation implies that something is created. There is no uncertainty about its existence or characteristics (though, of course, its market value may not be known until later). By contrast, the concept of opportunity imagination emphasizes that gains (and losses) do not come into being, objectively, until entrepreneurial action is complete (i.e. until final goods and services have been produced and sold).

Another issue relates to entrepreneurial opportunities and profit opportunities more generally. Shane and Venkataraman (2000) define profit opportunities as opportunities to create value by enhancing the efficiency of producing existing goods, services, and processes, reserving the term entrepreneurial opportunities for value creation through the discovery of new means-ends frameworks, appealing to the Kirznerian distinction between Robinsonian maximizing and entrepreneurial alertness described above. They may misunderstand Kirzner (and the Austrians more generally) on this point, however. In a world of Knightian uncertainty, all profit opportunities involve decisions for which no well-specified maximization problem is available. Kirzner does not mean that some economic decisions really are the result of Robinsonian maximizing while others reflect discovery. Instead, Kirzner is simply contrasting two methodological constructions for the analysis of human action.

An alternative approach is to focus not on what opportunities ‘are’, but what opportu-nities ‘do’. Opportunities, in this sense, are treated as a latent construct that is manifested in entrepreneurial action – investment, creating new organizations, bringing products to market, and so on. Empirically, this approach can be operationalized by treating entre-preneurship as a latent variable in a structural-equations framework (Xue and Klein, 2010). Moreover, by treating opportunities as a latent construct, this approach sidesteps the problem of defining opportunities as objective or subjective, real or imagined, and so on. The formation of entrepreneurial beliefs is treated as a potentially interesting psychological problem, but not part of the economic analysis of entrepreneurship. It also avoids thorny questions about whether alertness or judgment is simply luck (Demsetz, 1983), a kind of intuition (Dane and Pratt, 2007), or something else entirely.

If opportunities are inherently subjective, and we treat them as a black box, then the unit of analysis should not be opportunities, but rather some action – in Knightian terms, the assembly of resources in the present in anticipation of (uncertain) receipts in the future. One way to capture the Knightian concept of entrepreneurial action is Casson and Wadeson’s notion of ‘projects’ (Casson and Wadeson, 2007). A project is a stock of resources committed to particular activities for a specified period of time. Opportunities are defined as potential, but currently inactive, projects. Focusing on projects, rather than opportunities, implies an emphasis not on opportunity identification, but on opportu-nity ‘exploitation’. More generally, this perspective suggests that entrepreneurship research should focus on the execution of business plans.

Foss et al. (2007b) offer an account of opportunity exploitation that combines the Knightian concept of judgment and the Austrian approach to capital heterogeneity. In Knight’s formulation, entrepreneurship represents judgment that cannot be assessed in terms of its marginal product and which cannot, accordingly, be paid a wage (Knight, 1921, p. 311). In other words, there is no market for the judgment that entrepreneurs rely on, and therefore exercising judgment requires the person with judgment to start a firm. Of course, judgmental decision-makers can hire consultants, forecasters, technical
CONCLUSIONS

The concept of entrepreneurial alertness continues to be one of the most heavily used, and potentially valuable, constructs in entrepreneurship research. It dovetails nicely with ideas from microeconomic theory about equilibration and arbitrage, and it appears to have recognizable empirical analogs in processes of decision-making, evaluation, assessment, environmental recognition, and the like. It is easy to see why the concept of alertness has become foundational in applied entrepreneurship studies.

However, as Kirzner’s recent essay (2009) makes clear, the relationship between the theoretical construct of alertness and the applied study of opportunity recognition is subtle and complex. Kirzner (2009) sees his concept of the entrepreneurial market process as relevant to applied work not primarily to management research, but in public policy. After arguing that Schumpeterian creativity can, in an important sense, be subsumed as a category of alertness—even Schumpeter’s innovations can, ex post, be seen as improvements that were waiting to be discovered—Kirzner (2009, p. 151) notes that ‘the way in which policymakers understand the market economy is likely to carry enormously significant implications for encouragement or discouragement of entrepreneurial creativity.’ Specifically, although ‘we know very little that is systematic about what “switches on” alertness . . . it does seem intuitively obvious that alertness can be “switched off” by the conviction that external intervention will confiscate (wholly or in part) whatever one might notice.’

More generally, it suggests that we can analyze specifically the effects of the competitive, regulatory, and technological environment on entrepreneurial behavior, an approach that is not easily squared with the pure concept of alertness, as Kirzner conceives it. In essence, Kirzner wants to treat alertness as an analytical primitive, and there is indeed very little mention of antecedents to alertness in his work. However, as indicated by the above quotation Kirzner—like contemporary management scholars studying entrepreneurship—does allow antecedents to slip into the analysis. Kirzner has in mind regulation, anititrust, and other government policies that affect business decision-making. However, similar arguments could possibly also be applied to alertness within organizations: the belief that senior managers will appropriate the rent streams created by discovery or creation of new activities or uses of assets by lower-level employees will likely stifle ‘entrepreneurial’ activity within the firm.

Our own work on entrepreneurship and the firm (Foss and Klein, 2005; Foss et al., 2007a; Foss et al., 2007b; Klein, 2008a) suggests a different way of incorporating Austrian insights in management research, combining the Knight-Nays concept of entrepreneurial alertness as judgment and the Austrian approach to capital heterogeneity. Austrian
capital theory, we argue, provides a unique foundation for an entrepreneurial theory of economic organization. Nonclassical production theory, with its notion of capital as a permanent, homogeneous fund of value rather than a discrete stock of heterogeneous capital goods, is little help here. Transaction cost, resource-based, and property-rights approaches to the firm do incorporate notions of heterogeneous assets, but they tend to invoke the needed specificities in an ad hoc fashion to rationalize particular trading problems—problems for transaction cost economics, asset specificity: for capabilities theories, tacit knowledge; and so on. The Austrian approach, as described above, offers more rigorous and systematic treatment of heterogeneity.

Entrepreneurs, who seek to create or discover new attributes of capital assets (in the sense of Barzel, 1997), will want ownership titles to the relevant assets, both for speculative reasons and for reasons of economizing on transaction costs. These arguments provide room for entrepreneurship that goes beyond deploying a superior combination of capital assets with 'given' attributes, acquiring the relevant assets, and deploying these for producing a market: entrepreneurship may also be a matter of experimenting with capital assets in an attempt to discover new valued attributes. Such experimental activity may take place in the context of trying out new combinations through the acquisition of or merger with other firms, or in the form of trying out new combinations of assets already under the control of the entrepreneur. Hence we see many fruitful complementarities between the theory of economic organization and Austrian theories of capital heterogeneity and entrepreneurship.

NOTES

1. More specifically: 'The key to understanding the market process is to understand the dynamic character of market competition. But the nonclassical focus on perfect competition as an equilibrium way of affairs precluded appreciation of this insight. It was not until Hayek's pioneering, but insufficiently-appreciated work on the dynamically competitive market as a process of mutual discovery, that Austrian economics was able to grasp the process by which emerging prices were basically the work of Ludwig von Mises. This writer discovered, in the Minimum entrepreneur and in the Minimum dynamically competitive process, what he believed (and believes) to be the true mechanism. His 1973 work was written in order to spell out this insight (Krämer, 2009, p.147).

2. As Rothbard (1977, p.16) says: why does an entrepreneur browse at all in so as to see if he will bid up the loan rate of interest to the rate of time preference as reflected in the long-run normal rate of profit (or the 'natural rate of interest', as use Austrian terminology)? The answer is that superior forecasters envision asking short-run profits whereas the actual loan rate is lower than the returns they expect to obtain. This is precisely the competitive process, which tends, in theory, to equalize all natural and lease rates in the time market. Those entrepreneurs 'with superior knowledge and superior foresight', assist further, 'are merchants, buying in a cheaper and selling in a dearer capitalization market, acting as the equalizers of rates and prices'.

3. Schumpeter is often classified with the Austrian economists but, despite being trained by Böhm-Bawerk, was most heavily influenced by Walras and is better classified as a neoclassical equilibrium theorist. See also Klein (2008b) on these two streams within the Austrian tradition.

4. Hayek (1968,2002) mentions that competition is important primarily as a design feature whereby entrepreneurs constantly search for unexploited opportunities that can also be taken advantage of by others. [This ability to detect certain conditions . . . can be used effectively only if the market tells them what kinds of good and bad services are demanded, and how strongly (Hayek, 1968,2002), that is, how effectively the price system works. Hayek also notes the term 'entrepreneur' in his earlier writings on social-ist information and capital theory, but he seems to mean simply 'businessman', and does not distinguish sharply among entrepreneurs, managers, capitalists, and other business professionals.

5. I have always emphasized that my own contribution is simply an expansion and deepening of insights
articulated by my teacher, Ludwig von Mises' (Krizner, 2009; p.146). See also Krizner (1982b) for Krizner's most extensive reflections on the relations between his and Mises' work.

6. Knight (1921) introduces the concept of judgment to decompose business income into two elements, interest and profit. Interest is a reward for forgoing present consumption, is determined by the relative time preferences of borrowers and lenders, and would exist even in a world of certainty. Profit, by contrast, is a reward for anticipating the uncertain future more accurately than others and exists only in a world of 'truly' uncertainty. In such a world, given that production takes time, entrepreneurs will earn either profits or losses based on the differences between factor prices paid and product prices received. This understanding of entrepreneurship is central to Mises' argument that rational economic planning is 'impossible' under socialism (Mises, 1920). Entrepreneurs make production plans based on the current prices of factors of production and the anticipated future prices of consumer goods. What Mises calls 'economic calculation' is the comparison of these anticipated future receipts with present outlays, all expressed in common monetary units. Under socialism, the absence of factor markets, and the consequent lack of factor prices, renders economic calculation—and hence rational economic planning—impossible. Mises' point is that a socialist economy may assign individuals to be workers, managers, technicians, inventors, and the like, but it cannot, by definition, have entrepreneurs, because there are no money profits and losses.

7. Krizner is careful to distinguish akrasia from systematic search, as in Stigler's (1961; 1962) analysis of searching for bargains or for jobs. A nice example is provided by Bickets (1987; p.58): Stigler's search decides how much time it is worth spending rummaging through dusty attics and used book dealers looking for a sketch which (the family recalls) Aunt Edna thought might be by Lautrec. Krizner's entrepreneur enters a house and gazes lazily at the pictures which have been hanging in the same place for years: "Is this a Lautrec on the wall?' See also Krizner (1979a) for his most extensive discussion of the distinction between 'sheer ignorance' and asymmetric information, and the role of akrasia in overcoming the former.

8. For details on Krizner's treatment of equilibrium see Klein (2008b).

9. See Klein (2008a) for more on the distinction between occupational, structural, and functional approaches to entrepreneurship.


11. Lachmann's perspective has generated relatively little attention among management scholars. An exception is Chiles et al. (2007).

12. Note that Lachmann (1966) does allow for temporary market clearing, that is, Marshallian short run equilibrium.

13. This has been a critique of Krizner's work from the beginning (i.e. the publication of Krizner, 1973). See Salterio (2008) for a stocktaking and assessment of Austrian views of the entrepreneurs, and a summary of some of the early (Austrian) critiques of Krizner's work.

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