

Europe's geographic divide on immigration:
Adaptation or selection?

Rahsaan Maxwell

Department of Political Science

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

rahsaan@email.unc.edu

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Abstract

Europe is geographically divided its attitudes about immigration. Large cities are the home of Cosmopolitan Europe, where immigration is viewed as a positive contribution to society. Outside the large cities - and especially in the countryside - is Nationalist Europe, where immigration is a threat to the social order. This divide is well documented and much discussed, but (to my knowledge) there has been no research on *why* people in large cities are more likely to have favorable opinions about immigrants and immigration. Debates about geographic differences generally highlight two possible explanations: adaptation or selection. Distinguishing between the two is important because they have very different implications for the future of European society. To do so, I analyze data from the European Social Survey (ESS) and the Swiss Household Panel (SHP). The results provide stronger support for selection than adaptation because there is more variation in immigration attitudes across demographic characteristics than across geographic contexts. This has numerous implications for our understanding of immigration attitudes and societal divisions in Europe.

1 Introduction

Europe is divided. The political, economic and cultural fault-lines between urban and rural residents reflect fundamentally different visions for the future of Europe (Brownstein 2016; Guilluy 2014). Large cities are the home of Cosmopolitan Europe: where globalization is embraced, a knowledge-based service sector economy is thriving, the European Union is viewed as a source of prosperity and stability, and diverse immigrants are welcome (Beck and Grande 2007). Outside the large cities - and especially in the countryside - is Nationalist Europe: where globalization is a threat, the agricultural and industrial economies are disintegrating with no replacement in sight, the European Union is viewed as the destructor of national identity, sovereignty and culture, and immigrants are unwelcome (Ford and Goodwin 2014; Gest 2016). Many fear that these two visions of society are increasingly distinct and could become impossible to reconcile (Jennings and Stoker 2016).

The urban-rural divide is not new for Europe. During the economic and political transformations of the 19th century, Europe was deeply divided between the interests of urban residents (who were at the center of the industrial revolution) and rural and small-town residents (who relied on traditional agriculture). However, the geographic divide waned in importance during the 20th century, with the rise of nationalized popular culture that unified urban and rural communities under common nation-state identities (Anderson 1983). In addition, 20th century political contestation was organized around broad socio-economic issues (the distinction between workers and capitalists and the extent to which government should intervene to counteract economic inequality), which cut across geographic differences (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Things changed again toward the end of the 20th century, with the rise of new non-economic issues (e.g. gay rights, sexual rights, or environmental concerns) that began to fracture the mainstream national culture (Hooghe and Marks 2017; Inglehart 1977). Furthermore, the economic transformations of de-industrialization and globalization had very different effects on urban and rural Europe, creating the conditions for geography to re-emerge as a salient societal divide.

In this paper I examine the geographic divide in immigration attitudes in contemporary Europe. Immigration is only one way in which Europeans are divided across geography, but it has been one of the most salient issues for decades because of concerns about how to economically, socially, and politically integrate large numbers of foreign people from around the world (Maxwell 2012). This debate has gotten especially intense in recent years due to the (Syrian) refugee crisis and fears of terrorism from the ISIS and other Islamic extremists. Immigration may have been the pivotal issue in the dramatic June 2016 Brexit vote (Clarke, Goodwin and Whiteley 2017), and has continued to play a central role in election campaigns across Europe during 2017. The geographic divide in immigration attitudes is well documented and much discussed, but (to my knowledge) there has been no research on *why* people in large cities are more likely to have favorable opinions about immigrants and immigration.

Debates about geographic differences generally highlight two possible explanations. One is *adaptation*, as people in different urban/rural environments may be influenced by certain features of their environments that promote common attitudes. Another possibility is *selection*. People may self-select into different geographic locations based on things like demographics or cultural preferences that may be real the drivers of geographic variation in immigration attitudes.

Adjudicating between these two explanations is important because they have very different implications for the future of European society. To the extent that adaptation is the driver of geographic variation, we should expect geographic divides to widen as urban and rural areas develop cultural norms and ideological preferences that are distinct and incompatible. Moreover, if norms and preferences are stratified by geography, Europeans may have increasingly segregated lives with little hope of finding common ground. Selection also implies ongoing societal divides, but on the basis of demographic factors or cultural norms and not geography. Selection therefore suggests that attitudinal differences should exist within geographic regions, which may be a less severe form of division.

I analyze data from the European Social Survey (ESS) and the Swiss Household Panel (SHP). The results provide stronger support for selection than adaptation. Data from 15 West European countries in the ESS indicate more variation in immigration attitudes across demographic characteristics (even within the same type of geographic area) than across geographic areas. Longitudinal data from the SHP indicate that prior to moving to urban areas, people who will move to urban areas are already more positive about immigrants than the people who will never leave the non-urban areas. In addition, prior to moving to urban areas, people who will move to urban areas already share the positive immigration attitudes of permanent urban residents. Moreover, there is no change in attitudes as people spend more time in urban areas. This suggests that while there may be ongoing geographic variation in immigration attitudes, it is primarily the result of demographic differences that also exist within each type of geographic area.

2 Hypotheses

There are two main explanations for why immigration attitudes are more positive in large European cities. The first is *adaptation*, which is based on the assumption that living in geographic proximity is associated with sharing experiences that promote the development of similar political attitudes (Ethington and McDaniel 2007; Johnston and Pattie 2006). In particular, large, diverse and dense urban areas may promote interactions with and awareness of different cultures that cause people to become more comfortable with cultural diversity and more positive about immigration (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006; Stolle et al. 2013).¹ In addition,

¹Research has found a similar link between large cities, exposure to women in different types of social and cultural roles, and more positive gender attitudes (Evans 2017). That said, the relationship between exposure to diversity and attitudes is the subject of vigorous debate as there is also plenty of evidence for the opposite claim: that exposure to diversity may lead to more negative intergroup attitudes (Portes and Vickstrom 2011).

some argue that the mainstream culture in large European cities is now cosmopolitanism (Beck and Grande 2007; Sennett 2002). Cosmopolitanism is the ideology that humans are all one global community, and as a result cultural diversity should be celebrated as part of the richness of human civilization (Appiah 2006). Living in an large city where cosmopolitan values are the norm may also cause residents to become increasingly open to cultural diversity and immigration over time.²

H₁: Geographic variation in immigration attitudes is the result of adapting to the common cultural experience of living in the same location.

The second explanation is *selection*, which is based on the premise that people do not randomly sort themselves geographically. Instead, there is a selection process that determines which types of people go to which types of geographic locations (Florida 2005; Gallego et al. 2016; McAllister and Studlar 1992). In particular, residents of large European cities are more likely to be young, have post-secondary degrees, work in professional occupations, and have foreign origins (Favell 2008). These differences reflect the fact that in recent decades large European cities have become increasingly connected to the global economy through growing financial services and information technology industries. These new industries recruit highly-educated workers from around the world and are especially reliant on continued access to new and young talent. At the same time, rural areas and small towns have suffered from declining agricultural and manufacturing sectors in recent years, which means the more mobile people

²The connection between cosmopolitanism and large urban cities advanced during the late 20th and early 21st centuries, due to the increasingly transnational interconnectedness of the globalized society that has become headquartered in these cities. In the middle of the 20th century, scholars were just as likely to examine how ‘cosmopolitans’ and ‘locals’ were two different worldviews that could be found in every small town (Merton 1949).

from those areas (e.g. the young and the well-educated) have incentives to move to large urban cities in search of opportunities (Castells 1989; Sassen 2001). Another factor boosting the foreign-origin population of large European cities is that they have long been gateway locations for newly-arrived immigrants of all ages, education levels and occupations (Jennings and Stoker 2016; Vertovec 2007).

These demographic differences may account for the geographic variation in immigration attitudes because a wide range of research suggests that being younger, better educated, having a professional occupational status, or having foreign origins are all associated with more favorable attitudes towards immigrants (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014).³ This leads to the following hypothesis.

H₂: Geographic variation in immigration attitudes is the result of self-selection into different geographic areas based on factors (education, occupation, age, and foreign origins) that are associated with immigration attitudes.

3 Data

I use two sources of data in this paper. One is the European Social Survey (ESS), a cross-sectional biennial survey that began in 2002 and is conducted across a wide range of

³The purported mechanisms vary and include economic competition and cultural threat. For example, some scholars emphasize how being well-educated and professional might make one less likely to fear labor market competition from immigrants (Mayda 2006; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Other scholars emphasize that having limited educational qualifications, a low status occupation, being older and not having any foreign origins might make one more likely to embrace a narrow and exclusive version of nationalism that is hostile to immigrants (Ford and Goodwin 2014; Pecoraro and Ruedin 2015).

European countries. The surveys are administered via face-to-face interviews using random probability sampling to generate samples that are nationally representative of all persons aged 15 or older residing in private households.⁴ Most of the ESS questions are consistent across countries and across survey rounds, which makes it an excellent source of data to analyze broad attitudinal patterns in Europe. I use data from ESS rounds one (2002) through seven (2014), which was the most recent data available at the time of analysis.

I limit my analysis of the ESS to West European countries, where there have been roughly similar experiences surrounding the politics and contestation of global migration in recent decades. The dynamics of immigration in Central and Eastern Europe are radically different, and largely involve population movements between neighboring countries due to wars and changing political boundaries. Therefore, it is not clear that survey questions about immigration are capturing similar dynamics across these regions. Appendix Table 1 lists the fifteen countries included in my sample, as well as the ESS waves for which there was available data. Not all ESS countries are included in each wave, so to maximize cross-national comparability I limited the analysis to countries with data for at least four of the seven waves.⁵

⁴Different sampling practices are allowed across the respective countries as long as the end result conforms to the above criteria (no quota sampling is allowed). This necessitates the use of design weights to account for different sampling procedures across countries. In addition, all analyses use post-stratification weights (using information about age, gender, education, and region) to adjust for slight sampling errors and non-response errors.

⁵Italy is a West European country in the ESS but is excluded from my analysis because it was only included in three of the seven ESS waves. Similarly, Luxembourg is excluded from my analysis because it was only included in two of the seven ESS waves. I also exclude Cyprus because of the unique factor of being a divided Greek and Turkish island, a dynamic which includes the capital (and only large urban city) Nicosia. This division makes it unclear who would be referenced by the term ‘immigrant’, how the term ‘immigrant’ is understood

The second source of data is the Swiss Household Panel (SHP). Switzerland has a long history of immigration, starting with its industrial development in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In that respect, Switzerland is similar to Western European countries like Britain, France, Germany, and the Netherlands (Ireland 1994). Overall, Swiss respondents in the ESS have some of the most positive immigration attitudes compared to the other countries in my sample.⁶ However, Switzerland is very much like the rest of the countries in my ESS sample in that immigration attitudes are more positive in large cities and more negative in the countryside.

Panel data are essential to fully test the competing hypotheses about adaptation and selection, both of which involve assumptions about how attitudes change (or do not change) over time as individuals change their geographic region of residence. The SHP is a longitudinal study of Swiss residents with a random sample of households, stratified at the regional level.⁷ All individuals in the household are subject to be surveyed, although in some cases certain individuals will not fill out their own survey (if they suffer from health issues, or have language-comprehension problems, or if they are under the age of 15 years old). Interviews are conducted face-to-face (or by mail if the respondent cannot be contacted in person). The SHP began in 1999 with the intention of surveying each household annually. To address the inevitable attrition, new respondents were added in 2004 and 2013. There are currently 17 waves of SHP data available (1999-2015), but I use 13 waves (1999-2009, 2011 and 2013) because these are the waves in which the question about attitudes towards immigrants was present in the survey.

more generally, and limits comparability with other West European countries in the sample.

⁶Switzerland is the third most positive country for both immigration attitude indexes. Sweden is the most positive country on each index.

⁷I weight all analyses to account for the fact that my unit of analysis is individuals but the sampling strategy that uses household as the primary sampling unit.

4 Measures

My dependent variable is attitudes towards immigrants. In the ESS, I measure this with two additive indexes, each based on three questions. *Immigration policy* is comprised of questions about whether respondents are in favor of allowing people of the same race/ethnicity as [country], allowing people of a different race/ethnicity as [country], and allowing people from poorer countries outside of Europe. *Immigration effects* is comprised of questions about whether immigration bad or good for economy, whether the country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigration, and whether [country] is a better or worse place because of immigrants.⁸ In the SHP, I use a question about opinions on chances for foreigners. There are three response options: 'In favor of equal opportunities', 'In favor of better opportunities for Swiss citizens', or 'Neither'. I recode these answers into two measures. *Equal opportunities*: 1 - Yes, 0 - Other and *Pro Swiss*: 1 - Yes, 0 - Other. This is a somewhat unconventional question that does not appear in many other studies, but it is consistent with the spirit of measuring attitudes towards immigrants.

I have two ways of measuring place of residence with the ESS. The main measure is a self-reported distinction between five categories: Big city, Suburb, Town/small city, Village, and Countryside. In addition, there is administrative data on the sub-national region of residence, which correspond to either Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) level 2 or 3 categories. These categories often include the capital (or the largest) city in the country as a sub-national region, allowing me to identify residents of those specific cities. The SHP provides a government typology of 22 types of communes, which I re-code into Big City,

⁸Note that I have conducted preliminary analysis that suggests results are consistent across each individual item. At some point I will do this comprehensively and put the results in the appendix. Factor analysis suggests that these six items load onto the two separate dimensions.

Rural and Other.⁹

The key demographic independent variables are education, occupation, age and foreign origins. In both surveys I use a standard educational measure of the highest degree obtained: Less than lower secondary, Lower secondary, Upper secondary, Post-Secondary, Tertiary. For occupation, in both surveys I use International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) categories: Professional, Military, Manager, Associate professional, Clerical, Services and Sales, Agricultural, Trades, Machine, and Elementary.¹⁰ Age is measured in years and recoded into quartiles for the statistical analysis. In the ESS I measure foreign origins by distinguishing first-generation immigrants (individuals born abroad) and second-generation immigrants (individuals born in the country of residence with at least one parent born abroad). In the SHP I can only identify first-generation immigrants.

5 Results: An overview of attitudes in Western Europe


I start by analyzing data from the ESS to provide an overview of the relationship between immigration attitudes and geography in Western Europe. Figure 1 plots the mean scores on the two dependent variables across each of the geographic categories. As expected, residents of big cities are the most positive about immigrants. For both immigration policy and immigration effects, residents of big cities are roughly 0.03 points more positive than residents of the suburbs, 0.05 points more positive than residents of towns, and 0.06 points

⁹Many of the categories for smaller communes - e.g. wealthy communes or tourist communes - do not allow me to distinguish among the categories from the ESS and therefore it is simpler to code them all as ‘Other’.

¹⁰In the ESS, respondents are assigned an occupational code for their last employment, even if currently unemployed or out of the labor force due to retirement, illness or being a homemaker. In the SHP, occupational codes only apply to current employment.

more positive than residents of villages or the countryside. These gaps are not enormous, but they do indicate a real geographic difference. Residents of villages and the countryside are close to the midpoint of the scale, which means that on average they are indifferent or slightly negative towards immigration, while residents of big cities are resolutely positive. Moreover, results in figure 1 are also pooled across a wide range of countries that vary in levels of immigration attitudes, but nonetheless indicate significant geographic variation.

Figure 1: Immigration attitudes across geography



Pooled and weighted ESS sample. X-axis coded 0 (negative) to 1 (positive)

One of the main assumptions of H_2 is that big cities are demographically different from the countryside. To confirm that this pattern exists among ESS respondents, appendix figures 1 and 2 present data on demographic characteristics for residents of each geographic category. The data are consistent with expectations as residents of big cities are younger, more likely to have been born abroad, more likely to be second-generation immigrants, more likely to have post-secondary education, less likely to have no secondary education, more

likely to be professionals and less likely to be in manual occupations than residents of all other geographic categories. In addition, the relationships are mostly linear progressions across the categories from big city - suburb - town - village - countryside.¹¹

To explore whether these demographic differences can account for the geographic differences in immigration attitudes (H_2), I turn to regression analysis. I estimate linear regression models with country-level fixed effects (to account for unobserved country-level variation, such as different histories with immigration or different public debates about immigration) and standard errors clustered at the country level (to account for within-country variation - heteroskedasticity - on the dependent variable, as some countries are more polarized or unified on immigration attitudes).¹²

Table 1 presents results from the regression models, with two specifications for each dependent variable. Models 1 and 3 include a factor variable for geography as a predictor, with ‘big city’ as the omitted category. The results indicate that respondents in each of the other four geographic categories are more negative about immigrants than respondents in big cities, and that the relationships are statistically significant at the 95 percent level (or greater). Models 2 and 4 add demographic controls for age, education, occupation, born abroad and second generation.¹³ Results for demographic control variables are not

¹¹In some cases (percent second generation, percent no secondary education and percent manual occupations) the mean scores are similar for big cities and suburbs. In other cases (percent post-secondary education, percent no secondary education, and percent professional) the results are similar for villages and the countryside.

¹²Note that there are other modeling options I will pursue as alternate specifications for future drafts. In particular, multilevel models with random slopes for countries and/or geographic categories.

¹³These models also include controls for sex (women are more negative about immigrants than men) and citizenship. Citizenship is coded ‘1’ if a citizen of the country of residents,

Table 1: Predicting immigration attitudes across geography

	Immigration policy		Immigration effects	
	1	2	3	4
Suburb	-0.031* (0.014)	-0.017 (0.010)	-0.032* (0.012)	-0.018 (0.009)
Town	-0.053*** (0.010)	-0.028*** (0.006)	-0.053*** (0.010)	-0.028*** (0.005)
Village	-0.071*** (0.009)	-0.033*** (0.005)	-0.072*** (0.008)	-0.035*** (0.004)
Countryside	-0.084*** (0.012)	-0.034** (0.009)	-0.078*** (0.008)	-0.034*** (0.004)
Demographic controls		✓		✓
ESS round controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	190,985	171,661	186,500	168,223
Adjusted R^2	0.066	0.155	0.062	0.179

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Pooled and weighted ESS sample. Results from linear regression models with country-level fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the country level. ‘Big city’ is the baseline geographic category. ‘Demographic controls’ are: age, education, occupation, born abroad, second generation, sex and citizenship. ‘ESS round controls’ are a series of dummy variables for each ESS round (round 1 is the omitted category).


presented but are all in the expected direction. Older respondents are more negative, more highly-educated respondents are more positive, professionals are more positive than all other occupations, respondents born abroad are more positive and respondents who are second-generation immigrants are more positive.

The crucial question for my analysis is whether the inclusion of these controls will ac-

‘0’ if not. Including citizenship allows me to estimate the (demographic) importance of born abroad and second generation above and beyond the importance of citizenship, which is negatively related to immigration attitudes. Results are similar with and without controls for sex and citizenship.

count for all of the geographic variation in immigration attitudes. Models 2 and 4 in table 1 indicate that each of the geographic coefficients is reduced (roughly in half) when compared to models 1 and 3 without the demographic controls. This suggests that some of the geographic variation in immigration attitudes can be accounted for by different demographic profiles across geographic categories, which supports H_2 . Yet (with the exception of big city vs. suburb) the geographic categories remain statistically significant (at the 91 percent level) predictors of immigration attitudes even with demographic controls. This suggests that demography alone cannot account for geographic differences in immigration attitudes. Instead, there may be differences in the cultural experience of living in different geographic areas, which would be consistent with H_1 .

Figure 2: Predicated immigration attitude scores across geography



Black: Nationalist (Age>63, no secondary education, manual occupation, native)
 Blue: Cosmopolitan (Age<34, post-secondary education, professional, foreign)
 Red: Cosmopolitan native (Age<34, post-secondary education, professional, native)
 Calculated from models 2 and 4 in table 1

For a more precise estimate of the relative variation in immigration attitudes across demographic characteristics and geographic regions, figure 2 presents a series of predicted scores calculated from models 2 and 4 in table 1.¹⁴ Figure 2 plots the predicted scores for Nationalist and Cosmopolitan demographics.¹⁵ To the extent that H_1 has support and geographic regions exert contextual influences, we would expect predicted scores for Nationalists in large cities to be fairly positive and predicted scores for Cosmopolitans in the countryside to be fairly negative. However, that is not the case. Nationalists are always very negative (with predicted scores around 0.4 on a scale from 0 to 1) regardless of where they live. Similarly, Cosmopolitans are always very positive (with predicted scores from 0.7 to 0.75) regardless of where they live. Cosmopolitan natives are slightly less positive than Cosmopolitans with foreign-origins, but there is a similar consistency across geographic categories for both groups.¹⁶ These results are consistent with H_2 because they suggest there is more variation in immigration attitudes across demographic characteristics than across geographic contexts.

¹⁴Note that another option for future drafts is the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, applied to differences between big cities and non-big cities.

¹⁵Cosmopolitan demographics are presented for foreign-origin and native-origin respondents to determine the extent to which the bundle of cosmopolitan demographics is relevant beyond the dynamic of immigrants being positive about fellow immigrants.

¹⁶I also calculated predicted scores for ‘intermediate’ demographics (older than 33 years old but less than 64 years old, secondary but not post-secondary education and neither professional nor manual occupation) among immigrant and native-origin respondents. These results were also consistent across geographic categories for each demographic, with scores that were less positive than Cosmopolitans but more positive than Nationalists.

6 Is the demographic divide only about immigration?


As mentioned earlier, debates about geographic variation in attitudes in Europe go well beyond the issue of immigration. The geographic split between urban and rural society may reflect a general chasm in how people in the different environments view the world (Jennings and Stoker 2016). Therefore, to understand whether the demographic basis for the geographic divide is just a quirk of the immigration issue, I explore a series of other related measures. The ESS has data on attitudes towards homosexuals, attitudes towards the European Union (EU), and vote choice in the most recent national election. Appendix Figure 3 presents scores for each item across geographic contexts. As one would expect given the literature on cosmopolitanism in Europe (Beck and Grande 2007; Favell 2008), residents of big cities are more positive about homosexuals, the EU, and more likely to vote for left-wing parties. In addition - as for immigration attitudes - the relationships are mostly linear progressions across the categories from big city - suburb - town - village - countryside.

To explore variation in gay attitudes, EU attitudes, and vote choice across demographic characteristics and geographic regions, figure 3 presents a series of predicted scores and predicted probabilities. The Pro Gay and Pro EU plots are from linear regressions with country-level fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the country level.¹⁷ The left-wing vote plots are from a logistic regression with country-level fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the country level.¹⁸ Results in figure 3 for Pro Gay and Pro EU are similar to those from figure 2: Nationalists are always very negative and Cosmopolitans are always

¹⁷The Pro Gay model includes controls for geographic category, age, education, occupation, born abroad, second generation, sex and ESS round. The Pro EU model includes the same controls plus citizenship.

¹⁸The left-wing vote model includes controls for geographic category, age, education, occupation, born abroad, second generation, sex, citizenship, union membership, and ESS round, among registered voters who voted in the last national election.

Figure 3: Pro Gay, Pro EU and left-wing vote across geography



Black: Nationalist (Age>63, no secondary education, manual occupation, native)

Blue: Cosmopolitan (Age<34, post-secondary education, professional, foreign)

Red: Cosmopolitan native (Age<34, post-secondary education, professional, native)

‘Pro Gay’ and ‘Pro EU’ are coded from 0 (negative) to 1 (positive). ‘Voted left wing’ is the vote share for Ecological, Socialist or Social Democratic parties (according to Comparative Manifestos Project coding) among registered voters who voted in the last national election.

very positive, regardless of where they live.

The results for vote choice are different. The Nationalist demographic in the countryside has low levels of support for left-wing parties, but Nationalists who live in big cities, suburbs and towns have high levels of left-wing support (and at the same level as Cosmopolitan natives). In addition, the Cosmopolitan demographic has high levels of left-wing support in the big cities, but becomes progressively less likely to support the left-wing in suburbs, towns, villages and the countryside. This suggests that vote choice has a more significant

geographic divide than the other attitudes.¹⁹ Nonetheless, results for attitudes about gay people and the EU are consistent with the findings about immigration attitudes, which may be part of a broader dynamic in which demographic divides are the key to understanding geographic differences.

7 Alternate specifications

7.1 Country-specific dynamics

The analysis thus far has used data pooled across 15 West European countries but it is possible that urban-rural divides are more important in some countries as opposed to others. Yet, in 13 of the 15 countries there are similar divides between more positive immigration attitudes in big cities and more negative attitudes in the countryside. In addition, in the 13 of the 15 countries, there is more variation in immigration attitudes across demographic characteristics than across geographic contexts. As in the pooled data, for 13 of the 15 countries, Nationalists are always very negative and Cosmopolitans are always very positive, regardless of where they live.

The two exceptions are Greece and Portugal where immigration attitudes are consistent across geographic contexts. This reflects the fact that Greece and Portugal have smaller cosmopolitan demographics (and therefore more negative immigration attitudes) than the other 13 countries. Without the boost of a larger cosmopolitan demographic in the big cities, Greece and Portugal are consistently negative across geographic contexts.²⁰ However, this

¹⁹This is consistent with recent analysis of the challenges facing left-wing parties as their constituents are a) concentrated in large cities and b) split between urban cosmopolitans and urban nationalists who do not share preferences on a wide range of other issues (e.g. immigration, gay rights, or the EU) (Berman 2016).

²⁰In Greece, the mean score is 0.35-0.36 for immigration policy and 0.33-0.35 for immigra-

inconsistency across countries reinforces the importance of demographic characteristics for understanding immigration attitudes and is therefore consistent with H_2 .

7.2 Capitals versus non-capitals?

The analysis thus far has compared big cities to suburbs, towns, villages and the countryside. However, not all big cities are the same. In fact, most of the literature on cosmopolitanism in Europe focuses on large capitals like London, Paris and Amsterdam and not mere ‘big cities’ like Leeds, Lille or Utrecht (Beck and Grande 2007; Favell 2008). Therefore, it is possible that the real geographic divide is between the large capitals and the countryside (with the non-capital big cities and everything else in-between). ESS administrative data on region of residence allows me to identify respondents who live in the largest cities (which form a NUTS 2 or NUTS 3 region) in each country: Vienna, Brussels, Zurich,²¹ Berlin, Copenhagen, Madrid, Paris, London, Athens, Dublin, Amsterdam, Oslo, Lisbon, and Stockholm. Technically, there are residents of the capital regions that live in each of the geographic categories.²² Consistent with literature on capitals as the height of European cosmopolitanism, residents in each geographic category are more positive about immigrants when they live in capital regions as opposed to non-capital regions.


The key comparison for my analysis is residents of capitals in big cities as opposed to residents of non-capitals in suburbs, towns, villages and the countryside. I estimate linear regressions similar to models 2 and 4 from table 1, but with the addition of control variables

tion effects. In Portugal, the mean score is 0.42-0.44 for immigration policy and 0.47-0.48 for immigration effects.

²¹Zurich is the one city in this list that is not a capital. But it is the largest city in Switzerland and the ESS does not identify residents of Bern.

²²Capital residents are heavily concentrated in big cities (42%) and suburbs (35%), with fewer in towns (13%), villages (8%) and the countryside (2%).

Figure 4: Predicted immigration attitude scores in capitals vs. non-capitals



Black: Nationalist (Age>63, no secondary education, manual occupation, native)
 Blue: Cosmopolitan (Age<34, post-secondary education, professional, foreign)
 Red: Cosmopolitan native (Age<34, post-secondary education, professional, native)
 Calculated from regressions similar to models 2 and 4 from table 1, with addition of capital/non-capital variable.

for capital/non-capital. I then calculate predicted scores across geographic and demographic categories, with the results in figure 4. When big city residents are limited to capitals, there is a slightly bigger gap versus the other geographic categories as opposed to for big city residents in general (as depicted in figure 2). Nonetheless, the main takeaway from figure 4 is that cosmopolitan demographics are always very positive regardless of where they live while nationalist demographics are always very negative, regardless of where they live. Therefore, limiting the analysis to big city capital residents is still consistent with H_2 , because there appears to be more variation across demographic characteristics than across geographic contexts.

7.3 Change over time

Rounds 1 through 7 of the ESS cover 13 years (2002-14). During this time, there was an economic crisis in Europe and a rise in terrorist attacks from Islamic extremists. Both of these trends contributed to increased support for anti-immigrant political parties, because immigrants were seen as increasing economic, cultural and security threats for some Europeans. It is possible that these dynamics (economic crisis, terrorism, anti-immigrant politics) operate differently across geographic contexts and therefore that there has been a change over time within the pooled data in the salience of geographic contexts. However, my preliminary analysis show no major differences in immigration attitudes across the seven ESS rounds either in the pooled sample, for individual countries, or across geographic categories. Nonetheless, I can investigate this in more detail for future drafts.


8 A more rigorous test with panel data

ESS data suggest more support for H_2 than H_1 because there is no evidence that people of the same demographic profile have different immigration attitudes across geographic contexts. Yet, because the ESS data are cross-sectional, they cannot directly address the question of how attitudes might change with more exposure to certain geographic contexts (H_1). For this, I turn to panel data from the SHP.

Figure 5 plots mean scores on the two dependent variables across the geographic categories. As expected, residents of Swiss big cities are the most and rural residents are the least in favor of equal opportunities for foreigners. Conversely, residents of big cities are the least and rural residents are the most in favor of better opportunities for Swiss citizens. In addition, residents of big cities are more likely to fit the Cosmopolitan demographic while rural residents are more likely to fit the Nationalist demographic.²³ However, the question for H_1 is whether attitudes change over time as residents spend more time in big cities or

²³Big city residents are more likely than rural residents to be born abroad (27% vs. 9%),

Figure 5: Immigration attitudes across geography, SHP



Pooled and weighted SHP sample. X-axis coded 0 (no), 1 (yes)


rural areas.

The top two panels in figure 6 present mean scores on the two dependent variables for four types of people: people who always live in big cities and never move, people who live in big cities but moved there, people who will move to big cities in the future, and people who never live in big cities.²⁴ The results are more supportive of H_2 (selection) than H_1 (adaptation) because people who will move to the cities have the same immigration attitudes

have a professional occupation (26% vs. 14%), and have post-secondary educational qualifications (33% vs. 24%). Rural residents are more likely to work in manual occupations (31% vs. 16%). One interesting difference from the ESS data is that SHP respondents have similar age profiles in big cities (average 50.4 years) and rural areas (47.9 years).

²⁴I can move to a regression framework for future drafts, this is an initial overview.

Figure 6: Adaptation or Selection?



Pooled and weighted SHP sample. X-axis coded 0 (no), 1 (yes)

as people who always live in the cities, and these attitudes do not change much once the movers get to the cities. In addition, even prior to moving people who will move to the cities are already more positive about immigrants than people who never live in big cities.

The bottom two panels in figure 6 present similar data for rural areas. The results are harder to interpret because there are fewer people who move to rural areas and the confidence intervals are larger. It is not clear to what extent people who move to rural areas already have the same immigration attitudes as those who always live in rural areas. Instead, people who move to rural areas appear to be in-between those who always live in rural areas and those who never live in rural areas. Nonetheless, there is not much evidence that attitudes change once people move to rural, so there is no support for H_1 .

Results in figure 6 support H_2 because they suggest that movers to the big cities were always different from the people who never live in big cities. However, there are demographic

differences between these two groups. SHP respondents who will move to big cities are younger, more likely to be professional, and more likely to have post-secondary education than the people who never live in big cities. It is possible that there is no overall change as people move to big cities but instead that adaptation is concentrated among specific demographics. Perhaps cosmopolitans are the most likely to show pro-immigrant attitudinal adaptation after living in big cities, because they are the most predisposed to be open and embrace cultural diversity. Conversely, nationalists could be the most likely to show pro-immigrant adaptation after living in big cities, because they started out the most negative and had the most room to become positive. Or, the ‘intermediate’ demographic could be the most likely to show pro-immigrant adaptation after living in big cities, because they do not have strongly-held negative views and may be more open to change than nationalists, but they also have more room to develop in a positive direction than cosmopolitans. My initial results do not support any of these possibilities. Each of these demographics (cosmopolitan, nationalist and intermediate) has similar immigration attitudes regardless of where they live and how long they have spent in big cities.²⁵

The similarity of immigration attitudes among the same demographic but across geography (and moving status) adds further nuance to how the self-selection process may operate. I focused on the socio-economic aspects of selection and why large cities offer more career opportunities for the young, the educated, professionals and people with foreign origins. Another way in which selection could operate is through cultural preferences. Some young, educated professionals may prefer the nationalist culture of the countryside while others may prefer the cosmopolitan culture of big cities. If this were the case, we would see self-selection into geographic areas based on cultural preferences, which would suggest that geographic cultural differences are fundamentally important in shaping attitudinal divides, even if not

²⁵I am working on how to present these results. The nationalist demographic is particularly challenging because so few of them move to cities and the sample sizes are very small.

through the adaptation mechanism. However, results from the SHP do not support this interpretation because they indicate that immigration attitudes are similar for people with the same demographic, regardless of where they live or when they moved.²⁶

9 Discussion

Results from the SHP and the ESS suggest that geographic variation in immigration attitudes is mainly the result of selection: people who are young, well-educated, professionals and who have foreign origins are more likely to live in big cities and are also the type of people who have positive immigration attitudes wherever they live. Therefore, geographic variation in immigration attitudes is likely to continue and there is indeed evidence of a real cultural divide in Europe. However, my results suggest that those divides are not fundamentally about geographically-divided cultures. Instead, they primarily reflect demographic differences that also exist within each geographic area.

Despite their reputation as the home of cosmopolitan values, the wide range of cultural and demographic diversity within large European cities should not surprise anyone who has visited such places. However, this raises the question of whether city-level analysis is sufficiently fine-grained to find evidence of geographic contextual effect. Perhaps the effects of cultural adaptation are more likely to occur at the neighborhood level. Big city residents who live in conservative and nationalist enclaves may have very different experiences from those who live in cosmopolitan and international neighborhoods. Therefore, to further test H_1 , I can use the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), with data on neighborhoods. Whether that goes in this paper or a broader related project remains to be seen.

Finally, another question raised by these results is whether Cosmopolitan and Nationalist

²⁶This is consistent with recent research on the socio-economic - as opposed to cultural or political - determinants of geographic sorting in the UK (Gallego et al. 2016; Kaufmann and Harris 2015).

demographics are really the same regardless of where they live. They may give similar answers to blunt survey questions, but there may be other more subtle differences in how they relate to immigrants (or other social and political issues) across geographic contexts. To explore this, I am considering other sources of data that would allow me to compare Cosmopolitans and Nationalists across different types of geographic contexts.

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
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10 Appendix Tables and Figures

Appendix Table 1: European Social Survey (ESS) sample


Country	Rounds
Austria	1-3, 7
Belgium	1-7
Switzerland	1-7
Germany	1-7
Denmark	1-7
Spain	1-7
Finland	1-7
France	1-7
Great Britain	1-7
Greece	1-2, 4-5
Ireland	1-7
Netherlands	1-7
Norway	1-7
Portugal	1-7
Sweden	1-7

Appendix Figure 1: Demography across geography (ESS), Part 1




Weighted data. Foreign origins is the percent born abroad plus the percent second generation.

Appendix Figure 2: Demography across geography (ESS), Part 2



Weighted data. Manual occupations are Agricultural, Trades, Machine, and Elementary occupations.

Appendix Figure 3: Other cosmopolitan attitudes across geography



Weighted data. 'Pro Gay' and 'Pro EU' are coded from 0 (negative) to 1 (positive). 'Voted left wing' is the vote share for Ecological, Socialist or Social Democratic parties (according to Comparative Manifestos Project coding) among registered voters who voted in the last national election.