Articles

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DIACHRONY AND LINGUISTIC COMPETENCE
THE EVIDENCE FROM MORPHOLOGICAL CHANGE*

1. Introduction

The relationship between diachrony and the study of linguistic competence has been a precarious one in the linguistic literature over the past several decades. Kiparsky (1968: 174), for example, revolutionized the situation with his now-famous pronouncement that diachronic evidence could offer a "window on the form of linguistic competence". With that statement, Kiparsky not only articulated a connection between the study of language change and the investigation of linguistic theory, but can be said as well to have popularized it, as subsequent studies drawing on that basic notion demonstrated.[1] Even after that resultant flurry of activity in this domain, though, Kiparsky himself expressed some doubts as to the utility of the overall enterprise, writing in 1982 that "language change is not as direct a 'window' on linguistic structure as one might have hoped" (VIII).

As is well-known, Kiparsky illustrated this idea in his 1968 study with phonological changes that bore on the particular form of rule notation, abbreviatory devices, etc. needed in phonological theory. Admittedly, one can take issue with some of his examples, but the basic idea of a connection between diachronic evidence and the "reality" of constructs posited in linguistic theory would seem to be important still. Thus, despite Kiparsky's own later doubts, other linguists after him have rearticulated some version of

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[1]   Relevant (relatively) early examples include Lightfoot 1979 and Piggott 1980.

his original claim. Hooper (1980: 24), for example, while objecting to a particular example (Piggott 1980) of the application of evidence from language change to linguistic theory, nonetheless reaffirms in general terms the relation between the two:

> What relevance, then, does diachronic evidence have to synchronic theory? The soundest sort of diachronic evidence that can be applied to linguistic theory is evidence from changes that have been observed and described while the change was *in progress* ... Changes observed at close range and in progress can be of unparalleled importance in determining how real speaker-hearers internalize their grammars.

Moreover, on theoretical grounds, there is much to recommend the view that an examination of diachronic evidence can reveal something about the form of synchronic grammars. In particular, if linguistic theory provides the constraints and limits on the form of synchronic grammars—an assumption most every linguist would accept in some form, it would seem—and if diachrony is actually the passage through successive synchronic states, as schematized in (1):

1. D L_1 Synchronic Stage 1
    I L_2 Synchronic Stage 2
    A L_3 Synchronic Stage 3
    C L_4 Synchronic Stage 4
    H   .
    R   .
    O   .
    N L_n Synchronic Stage n
    Y L_{n+1} Synchronic Stage n + 1

then it follows that it must be possible to gain insights into linguistic theory and thus linguistic competence from the study of language change. Diachrony, on this view, is the passage through possible synchronic states as defined and delimited by linguistic theory, so that evidence from language change necessarily becomes relevant for understanding the limits of the notion "possible human language".

Admittedly, it is difficult to say in the abstract just what such insights into linguistic competence might be, and in any case, the particular theory one adopts or is inclined towards in general may seriously affect the extent of such insights. However, there seem to be two main types of benefits that one may gain from such an enterprise.

First, it may emerge from a consideration of data from language change that there is a need for a particular theoretical construct, whether a constraint on grammars or an abbreviatory device or a hierarchical ranking of some sort. Insights of this type would reveal aspects of the form of linguistic competence — grammar in its broadest sense — in general, thereby bringing to light elements that presumably would be applicable in the description and explanation of any relevant natural language phenomena. This type of insight is what Kiparsky seems originally to have had in mind when he proposed his

"window" metaphor. Second, a consideration of diachronic data may reveal information about the form of particular grammars, i.e. which analysis for a given phenomenon in a particular language is the one closest to what speakers have internalized. This sort of insight seems to be what Hooper has in mind in the passage quoted above.

As noted above, Kiparsky himself was not completely convinced by his own early results, and by 1982 had some reservations about the extent to which one might actually be able to learn about linguistic theory from diachronic data. Also, it is true that the results obtained by researchers taking the earlier strong claim seriously did not turn out to be as revealing as had been expected. Two factors may have led to this failure to obtain solid results and its consequence of Kiparsky's weakening his 1968 claim: an insistence on looking for the first type of insight outlined above rather than the second, and the fact that most of the work in this area focused on phonological change.

A reason for thinking that phonological change may not provide the best domain in which to have investigated Kiparsky's claim comes from a consideration of the nature of the most basic aspect of change in phonological systems, namely changes in the phonetic realizations of morphemes, i.e. changes which in traditional terms would be labeled "sound change" but in generative terms "rule addition". Phonological change certainly does present instances in which apparent generalizations were made over what linguists would characterize as "natural classes", and such cases might be taken as support for certain distinctive feature constructs. For example, all the Proto-Indo-European voiceless stops behaved alike — as did the voiced plain and voiced aspirated stops—in the first Germanic Sound Shift ("Grimm's Law"), the Ancient Greek voiced stops all spirantized (except after nasals) on the way to Modern Greek, Proto-Indo-Iranian voiceless unaspirated stops on their way to Avestan all spirantized before other consonants, etc. However, phonological change does not always lend itself well to description via generalizations that could indicate a need for a theoretical construct of some sort. Counter to the above-mentioned examples, there are numerous instances in which obvious generalizations over what may reasonably be supposed to be a "natural class" fail to occur. For instance, in the second Germanic (Old High German) Sound Shift, Proto-West-Germanic (PWGmc) *d became [t] everywhere (i.e., all over the High German area) but *b became [p] and *g became [k] only sporadically (on both the lexical and geographic dimensions), and PWGmc *θ became [d], but no such change occurred with the other voiceless fricatives of the language (*f, *s, *x). Moreover, even the cases that do seem to show generalizations across a natural class may do so only retrospectively, not in "real time" as the change was taking place; Bubenik (1989: 190), for instance, notes, regarding the Greek spirantization of Ancient Greek [b d g], that "in the system of voiced stops in the Egyptian variant of the Hellenistic Koine, /g/ was fricativized in the later Ptolemaic Koine (2nd–1st[a] c.), followed by /b/ in the Greco-Roman Koine (1st[p]–3rd[p] c.), and finally /d/ was fricativized in the Byzantine Koine (4th–7th[p] c.)". If sound change does not provide conclusive evidence for natural classes — and, as noted by Pagliucca and Mowrey 1987, lexical diffusion, if taken seriously, means that speakers do not necessarily generalize even over all the tokens of a sin-

gle phoneme[2] — it seems unlikely that it could offer much in the way of evidence for higher level constructs, such as abbreviatory devices and the like.

Thus, in order to utilize Kiparsky's original insight regarding a connection between diachronic evidence and the understanding of linguistic competence, one might be better served either by turning to other types of linguistic change or by looking for language-particular insights, or by doing both. In fact, it turns out that when one examines change in domains of language other than phonology, examples that are compatible with both types of insights — into the general form of linguistic theory and into the specific form of particular grammars — can readily be found, and especially those of the latter type. More particularly, morphological change offers numerous examples through which one can get a glimpse "behind the scenes" at the organization of linguistic data in speakers' grammars, as well as some in which higher-level insights can emerge. In what follows, several examples are presented, mostly — in keeping with the areal focus of this journal — from languages classifiable by the standards and traditions of Western linguistic scholarship as "Oriental".[3]

2. A Higher-Level Insight from Morphologization

An example of a higher-level insight into the form of linguistic theory available from a consideration of morphological change has been reported on in Joseph and Janda 1988. In that work, examples are considered of two types of morphologization, the process by which a linguistic phenomenon which is not morphological in nature at one stage of a language comes to be morphologically determined at a later stage, and a general point is made about the value of such instances of morphologization for understanding the nature of language and of language change.

Under the view enunciated in that work, morphologization as a historical development may take place in one of two ways. One involves a change of a once-phonologically conditioned rule or set of rules into one having morphological conditioning. This happened, for instance, in the case of Brugmann's Law in Sanskrit. This "Law" refers to the change by which a Proto-Indo-European (PIE) *o, when it occurred in open syllables before a resonant (*r l m n y v*), became *ā* in Sanskrit instead of the expected short *a*, as in *dāru* 'wood' from *doru (compare Greek *doru*). In the perfect tense forms, the *o*-vocalism of the root (compare Greek *de-dork-e* 'he has seen' with Sanskrit *da-darś-a*, from *de-dork-e) led to a long vowel occurring in Sanskrit with roots that ended in a resonant when followed by a vowel-initial ending, as in the third person singular. For instance, the root *tan-* 'stretch' had a third singular form *ta-tān-a*, from *te-ton-e, with Brugmann's Law lengthening of the

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root vowel. Two factors led to the phonological context for the Brugmann's lengthening becoming opaque and not longer obviously linked to a particular root vowel in a particular context: the neutralization in quality between PIE *e and *o (and *a, for that matter) in Sanskrit, and the loss of PIE laryngeal consonants that had once closed syllables and blocked Brugmann's Law (as with the first person singular ending, originally *-H_2a (compare Luvian -*ḫa*) but simply -*a* in Sanskrit). At that point, the context for lengthening in the perfect became a purely morphological one, i.e. lengthen the root vowel in [+ perfect.tense] forms, as shown by the fact that the lengthening spread to roots with non-resonants (e.g. *ta-tāp-a* 'he has heated' from the root *tap-*, and to first person singular forms (e.g. *ta-tān-a* 'I have stretched', originally from *te-ton-H_2a). The once-phonological process has thus been morphologized.

A second way in which morphologization can occur is via the change of a once-syntactically determined phenomenon into a morphologically determined one. An example of this type can be seen in the evolution of an alternative future tense, again in Sanskrit, the so-called periphrastic future. This future is formed by the combining of a deverbal agent noun, e.g. *kartar-* from the root *kar-* 'make, do', with present tense forms of the verb *as-* 'be', e.g. *kartāsmi* 'I will do' (from nominative singular *kartā* + first person singular *asmi*). While this was originally a syntactic combination of two words, the formation moved in the direction of being a single morphological entity, a single word that is, since it came to show obligatory fusion and inseparability of the two pieces, and moreover had a non-compositional meaning (future, not "I-am a-doer"). These characteristics would not be expected if it were simply a phrase formed by the regular syntactic rules of word combination. Thus, one can say that the syntactic combination has been morphologized.

The reason that morphologization as a historical phenomenon offers a higher-level insight into the nature of language and of language change, according to Joseph and Janda (1988), is that it raises an important question: Why should the morphological component of the grammar be the endpoint of so many diverse linguistic changes, and why should morphologization be so seemingly prevalent, especially when changes in the opposite direction — the phonologization or syntacticization of once-morphological phenomena — are possible, though admittedly relatively rare?[4]

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[4] There is controversy on this point, to be sure, in that many linguists working within the rubric of "grammaticalization studies" have adopted the position that any change involving movement between syntax and morphology or between phonology and morphology is always unidirectional, always moving towards greater "grammatical" (i.e., morphological, in this characterization) status. They thus rule out movement from morphology into either of the other components of grammar. Such "unidirectionality" is generally viewed as a bedrock principle in grammaticalization (see Hopper, Traugott 1993/2003 (Chp. 5), Haspelmath 1999, 2004, Traugott 2001, 2002, and Ziegeler 2003, 2004, among others). I have long taken the position, however, that there are real cases of "counter-directional" movement that go against this widely-held tenet of grammaticalization, with some of the cases discussed in Joseph and Janda (1988) being among the early literature in this vein. Note further that even Haspelmath (2004: 22), while generally quite sympathetic to most aspects of grammaticalization theory, nonetheless says that "grammaticalization is overwhelmingly irreversible"; by qualifying his statement with "overwhelmingly", he is thus implying that it is indeed reversible and that movement out of morphology is possible.

Under the view of the relation between synchrony and diachrony espoused earlier, the matter of pervasive diachronic morphologization becomes one of deciding what sort of construct or condition might induce speakers at some synchronic point to place a higher value on a morphological solution to a given set of data than on a phonological or syntactic solution, even if that data in prior stages of the language could be accounted for phonologically or syntactically. Since, in the cases examined, morphological solutions win out and nonmorphological ones only rarely arise, clearly the speakers in these situations must have been guided by some principle that would lead them to opt for the morphological solution, and such a principle can only be a principle of synchronic grammar construction, i.e. of linguistic theory. In this way, then, the facts of diachronic morphologization, by showing morphology to be a preferred "resting place" for certain types of linguistic phenomena, provide the basis for understanding an aspect of the design of grammars in general; in particular, Joseph and Janda (1988) propose that the architecture of grammars should be such that they are more "morphocentric" in nature, with morphology at the center of grammar.

3. Well-Known Examples of Insights into Particular Grammars from Morphological Change

Examples of the second type of insight, into the form of particular grammars, are also readily forthcoming from a consideration of morphological changes of many different types. Morphological change usually involves, in one way or another, the influence of one form or class of forms over another; most typically, one existing form or form-class serves as a model for the reformation or reanalysis of the other. This situation can be seen, for instance, in folk-etymology, in paradigm levelling, in paradigm-external analogies, in back-formations, in reanalyses, and so on. In the typical case, then, a connection is established between the model form(-class) and the remodeled form. The positing of such connections is one "window" that enables the analyst to see how linguistic data might be organized in speakers' grammars. Moreover, as Anttila (1972/1989: passim) has stressed, many morphological changes are motivated by a one-form-to-one-meaning principle, whereby speakers try to associate differences in form with differences in meaning, and/or work to eliminate formal differences that are not so motivated. Thus, there is a psychological and cognitive dimension to analogies and most morphological changes which affords an opportunity for getting at the "psychological reality" of how a speaker analyzes particular words. A few well-known examples of such changes of these types are discussed here in order to establish the validity of this mode of interpretation of the data.

One very obvious starting-point for such a discussion is folk-etymology, a morphological change in which speakers actively alter an existing word or morpheme based on an analysis of the form in such a way as to (try to) make some sense out of an otherwise opaque sequence. There are numerous well-known examples that can be

cited here,[5] such as *sparrow grass* and *cow cumber* in dialectal English for *asparagus* and *cucumber*, respectively, *woodchuck* in English based on Ojibwa *otchek*, *bridegroom* for expected *bridegum- from Old English *bryd-guma* (literally "man of the bride"), and other perhaps less well-known but equally revealing ones such as *spinal moanin' Jesus* for *spinal meningitis*, and *old-timers' disease* for *Alzheimer's Disease*,[6] as well as child-language formations[7] such as [tofud] (i.e. *to(e)-food*) for *tofu*, and [æplkat] (i.e. *apple-cot*) for *apricot*. Folk-etymological reformations are motivated by an apparent need on a speaker's part to search for meaning and for transparency of derivation in an encounter with particular linguistic forms that have no obvious synchronic "etymology" (i.e. analysis); thus, such changes present a clear psychological and cognitive side which the linguist can exploit in trying to understand how speakers parse and presumably store a given lexeme. In that way, the creation of such forms makes clear just what the representations of these words are in an individual speaker's internal grammar.

Similarly, several examples of analogical change in paradigms lend themselves well to the "window-on-competence" interpretation being developed here. For instance, a few *i*-stem nouns in Sanskrit, most notably *pati-* 'lord, master; husband' but also *sakhi-* 'friend' and to a more limited extent *jani-* 'wife' as well, at some point changed their declension from the forms expected on historical grounds (and actually attested in some cases), given in (2) for *pati-*:

2.   NOM.SG   patis
     GEN.SG   pates
     DAT.SG   pataye
     INST.SG   patinā

to those appropriate for the class of irregular kinship nouns such as *pitar-* 'father' and *bhrātar-* 'brother', as in (3):

3.   NOM.SG   pitā 'father'   bhrātā 'brother'
     GEN.SG   pitur   bhrātur
     DAT.SG   pitre   bhrātre
     INST.SG   pitrā   bhrātrā

The attested innovative forms are given in (4):[8]

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[5]   Standard textbooks on historical linguistics, such as Arlotto 1972, Anttila 1972/1989, Hock 1986/1991, Hock, Joseph 1996, 2009, Campbell 1999, among others mention these (and other) examples.

[6]   On these, see Sugarman and Butters (1985ab).

[7]   These were produced by my older son David in 1982–84, when he was between the ages of 2 and 4.

[8]   In the interests of accuracy, a few minor details should be noted: the innovative forms of *pati-* are generally found for this word only when it means 'husband', though some instances with the other meanings occur as well; the innovative genitive singular of *jani-* is found only in Vedic Sanskrit; finally, *sakhi-* was not originally an *i*-stem (as shown by the nominative singular *sakhā* and accusative singular *sakhāyam*) but came to have many *i*-stem forms — it is possible, therefore, that the innovative forms noted in (4) were not replacements for true *i*-stem forms, an observation which does not, however, vitiate the value of these developments for the present study.

4.	GEN.SG	patyur	janyus	sakhyur
	DAT.SG	patye	——	sakhye
	INST.SG	patyā	——	sakhyā

The occurrence of such innovative forms for these i̠-stem nouns suggests strongly that *pati-* (etc.) was at some point considered part of the (closed) class of kin-terms. Either speakers classified these nouns in with the kin-term category — a plausible step given their meanings — and they therefore received the inflection appropriate for this category, or else they changed their inflection and secondarily came to be included in this category. Either view allows for an interpretation under which the analogy can be taken as prima facie evidence for the category membership of *pati-* (etc.) and indirect evidence for the occurrence of a reanalysis placing these nouns in the kin-term category. The latter scenario seems preferable, however, for it provides some motivation for the analogical changes in inflection — the reanalysis of category-type would require some inflectional change. An implicit principle here is that analogy is motivated most when it involves elements of the same category. Such a principle has direct implications for claims about category membership for a linguistic element, and as such allows analogy to provide insight into the form of speakers' internalized grammars, in this case, their assignment of nominal declensional categories.

Another example in which analogy provides a view of category membership in a grammar comes from the extension of a lengthened past-tense prefix (the "augment") in Ancient Greek. In this case, the analogy attests to the creation of a new category in the grammar, whereas the Sanskrit case demonstrates rearranging of members of existing categories. With verbs beginning with a consonant, the expected form of the augment was *e-*, as in (5a), whereas with vowel-initial verbs, the augment took the form of lengthening of the initial vowel, as in (5b):

5. a. PRES *lú-ō* 'I loosen' / PAST *é-lu-on* 'I was loosening'
    b. PRES *elpízō* 'I hope' / PAST *ḗlpiz-on* 'I was hoping'.

However, with a small class of consonant-initial verbs, all having a meaning that can be characterized as modal in value, an unexpected long augment *ē-* is found as a variant to the expected short-augment form:

6. a. *boúlomai* 'I wish/PRES' / *ēboulómēn* 'I wished/PAST'
    b. *dúnamai* 'I can/PRES' / *ēdunámēn* 'I could/PAST'
    c. *méllō* 'I intend/PRES' / *ḗmellon* 'I intended/PAST'.

The basis for the creation of the long-augment forms seems to have been a reanalysis of the pattern with the verb *ethélō* 'I want' and a subsequent generalization of a newly-created pattern to other modal verbs. In particular, *ethélō*, for which an expected long-vowel augment form *ḗthelon* 'I wanted' occurs, had a variant present form

thélō; the relationship between the present *thélō* and the past *éthelon* permitted speakers to reanalyze the augment-prefixation process to allow long augments with at least some consonant-initial verbs. This new prefixation process then spread to verbs semantically related to the model, *(e)thélō* 'want', giving the forms indicated in (6). The extension of this new pattern can be schematized via a four-part (proportional) analogy, as in (7):

7. *thélō* : *éthelon* :: *boúlomai* : X, X → *ēboulómēn*.

What resulted, then, from this morphological change was the creation of a new category in the grammar, by giving morphological expression to a relationship among *boúlomai*, *dúnamai*, *méllō*, and *(e)thélō* that was only semantically based prior to the spread of the long augment. To the extent that a prior connection among these verbs can be taken as a prerequisite for the spread of the innovative morphological category marker *ē-*, it can be said that the analogy sketched in (7) offers a retrospective insight into the structure of lexical relationships obtaining in Ancient Greek before the spread of *ē-*, i.e. into the organization of the grammar of Greek at that stage.

4. Further Examples — Morphological Changes Bearing on Modern Greek "Clitics" as Affixes

The utility of examining morphological change for the insights it can provide into the form of particular grammars has now been established, and it is possible therefore to use this result as a way of arguing for a specific analysis of a synchronic phenomenon, if appropriate morphological changes are to be found. As it happens, the question of how to analyze the weak pronouns of Modern Greek offers just such a case, for there is some controversy as to how best to analyze them — in particular as clitics or as affixes — and certain morphological changes have occurred with these forms that, when interpreted along the lines suggested here, provide support for one of these analyses. In order for the controversy to be understood, though, some background is first necessary.

The matter of category membership for a given element, i.e. as a word or an affix or something intermediary, namely a clitic, is a tricky one to decide, and clearly, some set of criteria is needed as the basis for classification. Although many such criteria for distinguishing among words, clitics, and affixes have been proposed, the collection put forth in Zwicky (1985, 1987), and Zwicky, Pullum (1983) has been particularly influential and can be adopted here. The "Zwicky criteria" overall present the strongest basis for making categorial decisions, for they are internally consistent and they all correspond to generally well-known and widely recognized facts about morphology. And, most important, virtually all can be derived from the architecture of the overall theory of grammar that Zwicky assumes, specifically a highly modular system, in which the modules in part correspond to different "components" of grammar recognized in traditional frameworks, with a very restricted interaction among the different modules, and with a monostratal phrase-structure

syntax that is maximally general in that it refers to classes of items and not to individual lexemes per se in its statements and further has a rule-to-rule mapping between syntax and semantics and a rich sub-system of grammatical features.

Among the criteria that Zwicky proposes for distinguishing words, clitics, and affixes from one another are those given in (8), with an indication in parentheses of what the criterion distinguishes between:

8. a. high degree of selectivity in combinatory possibilities (affix/nonaffix)
    b. morpho(phono)logical idiosyncrasies (affix/nonaffix)
    c. semantic idiosyncrasies (affix/nonaffix)
    d. parallel to morphophonological process (affix/nonaffix)
    e. strict ordering (nonword/word)
    f. phonological dependence (nonword/word).

There are many more, but these are the ones that are most relevant for the discussion below. In general, the criteria can be interpreted to mean that affixes are characterized by a high degree of idiosyncrasy in their realization and behavior, and nonaffixes, i.e. clitics and words, by a high degree of regularity and predictability in realization and behavior. This general characteristic falls out from the theory because in Zwicky's model of grammar, the occurrence of clitics and words in particular phrasal positions is licensed by the syntax, and all such syntactically licensed elements must correspond to overt and fully regularly derived phonological material and must have a direct and transparent, hence nonidiosyncratic, semantic translation; other behavioral characteristics, such as extent of independence of one sort or another, most typically of a phonological nature, provide the basis for distinguishing between clitic and word.[9]

Based on these criteria, it can be argued, as in Joseph 1988, 1990, 2002, that the weak pronominal forms of Greek are verbal affixes, not true clitics (despite their traditional labeling as "clitic pronouns"). A sampling of the relevant evidence bearing on this question is given in (9):

9. a. Selectivity: in general weak pronominals occur only with verbs, though accusatives occur also with adverb *kalós* 'welcome' and genitives occur with some prepositions (e.g. *brostá mu* 'near me') and with a few adjectives (e.g. *mónos mu* 'on my own')
    b. Morphophonological idiosyncrasies:
    i. 2SG.GEN /su/ + 3ACC /t-/, e.g. NTR.SG /to/ → [st-] (e.g. [sto] 'to-you it'
    ii. voicing exceptionally is triggered on weak 3SG/PL pronouns (for at least some speakers, in some speech styles), by future *ϑa* and modal *na*, e.g. /ϑa to káno/ → [ϑa do káno] 'I will do it'

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[9] Zwicky (1994) goes one step farther and argues that "clitics" are really just atypical words or atypical affixes and thus that there is no need to recognize a basic morphological/syntactic category of "clitic". That further refinement to the characterization of clitics, which I personally endorse and have found particularly productive to apply (see Joseph 2002), is immaterial to the point made here.

c. Semantic idiosyncrasies: ordinarily intransitive verbs can nonetheless occur with weak pronouns in an idiomatic sense, e.g. *pu ϑa tin pésume*, literally "'where' + FUT + her/WK.ACC + fall/1PL" means 'Where will we go?'

d. Processual realization: MASC/NTR distinction is realized (for many speakers, at least in rapid/casual speech styles) as voicing on initial segment of verb, e.g. [*to bíraksa*] 'I bothered him' vs. [*to píraksa*] 'I bothered it' (from /*ton píraksa*/ vs. /*to píraksa*/)

Despite these indications, the affixal analysis, though reasonably well-supported, is not entirely "robust"; for example, the irregular voicing in (9bii) is not pan-Greek, the processual realization in (9d) is not for an entire pronoun but rather only for one feature in the bundle that defines a weak pronoun, and the use of idiomatic expressions as a source of semantic idiosyncrasies may be misleading, for there are examples of phrasal idioms with clear clitic elements (e.g. **How's the boy?** in English). Still, the case can be made for an affixal analysis,[10] and, in line with the general thrust of argumentation advocated herein, further evidence can be adduced from various morphologically based changes involving these forms.

In particular, several interesting analogies and reanalyses have occurred that are best understood if the elements participating in the changes are of the same category. In that way, the morphological change offers some insight into the categorical status of the elements in question. For instance, the canonical order of co-occurring indirect and direct object "clitics" with imperatives, where they appear post-verbally, is for the indirect object to precede (i.e., occur to the left of) the direct object, as in *δós-mu-to* 'give(SG)-to me-it'; innovatively, however, the opposite order for the "clitics" can be found, i.e. *δós-to-mu*. Significantly, according to Householder, Kazazis and Koutsoudas 1964, the source of this innovation is the analogical influence of the plural imperative based on the plural *δós-te-mu* 'give-PL-to me', due to the similarity of the plural morpheme -*te*- with the direct object "clitic" -*to*-. This analogy argues for the "clitic" *to* as an affix since its counterpart in the analogy, the plural marker -*te*, is an affix; as noted above in section 3, categorial identity between the elements involved in an analogy makes for a more motivated, and thus more likely, analogy.

A similar case is the reanalysis implicit in the innovative Northern dialect mediopassive 2PL imperatives, e.g. *kimísas* 'sleep(PL)!', with an apparent 2PL genitive "clitic" pronoun on it, for expected *kimiϑíte* (Thavoris 1977), with the mediopassive inflectional affix -*ϑí*- and the plural ending -*te*. This innovative form is based on a reinterpretation of the 2SG form *kimísu*, with stem *kimi*- and inflectional ending -*su*, as having as an ending, i.e. as the appropriate inflectional affix, the genitive 2SG "clitic" *su*. This reinterpretation argues for the affixal status of "clitics" since "clitics" are here being analyzed in parallel fashion to an inflectional affix and ultimately treated as such, with "clitic" -*sas* taking the place of the inflectional markers.

Finally, in several Northern Greek dialects, e.g. of Thessaly and Macedonia, a reanalysis took place by which a few imperatival verb-stems, e.g. *pé*- 'tell', together

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[10]   In Joseph 1988, 2001b, I develop arguments from dialectal data within Greek for the affixal analysis.

with a 1SG genitive "clitic" object -*m*-, came to be treated as new imperatival stems (Thavoris 1977); the status of a sequence like *pe-m*- 'tell-me' as a stem is revealed by the fact that these dialects show new plural imperatives with the plural ending -*ti* added onto *pe-m*-, thus *pém-ti* '(you/PL) tell me!'. That is, from the way *pe-m*- incorporates the -*m*- into the stem and from the way the plural morpheme is positioned relative to the -*m*-, it appears that speakers treated the "clitics" as mere stem formatives, i.e. as affixes. While in principle one might suppose that anything can be renalyzed as anything else, with no limitations on the reanalysis, another interpretation is that there must be a categorial proximity in the elements involved for the reanalysis to be effected. Once again, then, a morphological change provides a clue as to the manner in which speakers classified a given element.

5. Conclusion

Ultimately, evidence of the sort presented here and the line of argumentation developed here tie in with the now-current (e.g. Labovian) view of "diachrony-in-synchrony", i.e. that diachronic changes correlate with and result from synchronic events, in the Labovian model, from synchronic variation. In a real sense, therefore, as Joseph & Janda (1988: 194) put it, enunciating a position reiterated and discussed more fully in Janda and Joseph (2003: 121–122, and cf. especially fn. 137), "language change is necessarily something that always takes place in the present and is therefore governed in every instance by constraints on synchronic grammars". This view requires a significant reconsideration of the role of diachronic evidence in the evaluation of synchronic claims and theories. Diachrony is not just something that "happens" in language but rather is tied closely to synchronic states and the stances that speakers take and the decisions they make in forming those states; inasmuch as those states represent speakers' linguistic competence, language change, especially involving morphology, truly serves as a "window on the form of linguistic competence".

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