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particularism on the support for
democracy and support for shari'a in
the Arab world

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A particular view of democracy

A study into the influence of particularism on the support for democracy and support for shari'a in the Arab world

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Abstract

This paper examines the micro-foundations of the relationship between political particularism, support for democracy and support for *Shari'a* in the Arab World. Our hypotheses suggest that particularism reduces support for democracy whilst it increases support for *Shari'a* since, at the individual-level, in-group (family/clan) obligations are more binding than obligations towards the state (universal). We test our hypotheses using data from the Arab Barometer. Results suggest that, even when allowing for the correlation of the error terms, particularism significantly increases support for *Shari'a* whilst it decreases support for democracy. Our results are robust to alternative specifications of the model and to the use of techniques aimed at addressing the potential endogeneity of particularism.

JEL classification: Z10, O10, O17

Key words: *Support for democracy; Political culture; Arab world; Particularism;*

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Introduction

This paper studies the effects of political particularism on support for democracy and support for *Shari'a* in the Arab World. The so-called 'Arab Spring' has been regarded as a potential new wave of democratization, the rise of the peoples within several Arab countries against oppressive elites breathed the promise of a democratic Middle East. The question that only the future will answer is whether or not these countries and their peoples will be able to make the transition towards consolidated democracy.

One of the important aspects of getting through such a transition is whether or not the new democratic political system is regarded legitimate by its people. One of the main aspects of a political system receiving that legitimacy is whether or not its citizens feel that their values 'fit' with the values of the democratic system (Lipset, 1963). To put it differently, popular support is considered a crucial issue of regime stability, especially in emerging democracies (Diamond, 1999).

Although multifaceted, with causes and implications specific to each country, these protests were in large part moved by feelings of frustration over poor economic performance and by the refusal of the existing political systems that were perceived as corrupted and non-democratic (de Miguel, et al., 2015). The internal struggles after the Arab Spring that the countries involved have faced provide a clear illustration of the importance of studying these possible transitions and, in particular, the question whether or not the peoples within these countries indeed support democracy (Fuchs-Schündeln & Schündeln, 2015).

Several scholars so far have investigated the determinants of individual-level support for democracy. Recently, part of this literature has underlined the central role played not only by structural factors, such as institutional reform and economic development, but also by political culture (Tessler, 2002). One of the key aspects affecting democratic support and stability is the structure of the electoral system (Svolik, 2013; Panizza, 2001). Accordingly, the way that individuals, experience, assess and undergo the electoral process is likely to have an impact on support for democracy (Robbins & Tessler, 2012).

The literature about the determinants of individual support for democracy in the Arab world can be classified into three groups. The first group of studies refers to modernization theory and to its cultural implications (Inglehart & Norris, 2003; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005) according to which education, income and egalitarian gender views are significant determinants of attitudes toward democracy (Jamal, 2006). The second group of studies refers to social capital theory according to which social trust, by providing a basis for cooperation among the members of a society, is a fundamental ingredient of democracy (Jamal, 2007b; Jamal, 2007; Almond & Verba, 1963; Putnam, et al., 1994). The third group of studies focus on religiosity and on cultural traits and, as far as the Muslim world is concerned, find that there is not incompatibility between Islamic values and support democracy (Ciftci, 2012).

However, we argue that there is another determinant of individual support for democracy in the Arab world, namely political particularism. Political particularism can be defined, following Carey & Shugart (1995) and Shugart (1999), as the ability of policymakers to further their careers by catering to narrow interests rather than to broader national platforms. Political particularism implies

the existence of a loyalty between voters and political elites. This loyalty passes through family, clan and friendship obligations (Veenendaal, 2014) and, as argued by Weber (1970) and many others, contrasts with modern democratic societies where abstract rules of good conduct apply to several social situations, and not just towards a small circle of personal friends and relatives (Tabellini, 2010)¹. The manner in which politicians further their careers and the choices of voters with respect to candidates, are likely to influence how democracy is perceived, supported and manifested as well as the quality of the governments (Hicken & Simmons, 2008). As suggested by Seddon et al. (2001), politicians who are supposed to please narrow geographical constituencies are likely to advocate narrower, more particularistic policies than those who further their career by following party dictates (Milesi-Ferretti, et al., 2002). At the same time, voters, who must channel their demands through the politics, are likely to prefer candidates who are supposed to accord some benefit to the group they feel to be part of. The way how they perceive the breadth of this group determines their preferences in voting. More universalistic voters would prefer candidates who foster the interests of the entire community whilst more particularistic ones would prefer candidates who foster the interests of a narrower circle of related people (i.e. family, clan, and friends). Traditionally, democracy has been seen as the institution aimed at safeguarding the conflicting interests of the entire community of citizens or, at least, of the majority of them. Thus, particularistic voters are likely to support less democracy and democratic values with respect to more universalistic ones.

Recently in the Arab world there has been an extraordinary outbreak of Islamic movements calling for the construction of an increasingly global, Muslim identity, based on common beliefs, rituals, social practices and for a return to the *Shari'a*². These movements, apparently *universalist*, are indeed rooted in the local contexts so that the universalistic Islamic identity often coexists and is pushed by a more particularistic one (Lapidus, 2001). As suggested by Ciftci (2012), in the Muslim world *Shari'a* and democracy are two sides of the same coin and the analysis of individual attitudes toward democracy will be incomplete without considering support for *Shari'a*. In fact, the historical legacy and the so-called secular-Islamist cleavage have penetrated almost all political issues and actions in the Muslim world (Hunter, 1995) by shaping also individual attitudes (Ciftci, 2012). This does not mean that in the Arab world Islam is incompatible with democracy. Rather, this means that, as in Tessler (2011), individual opinion in the Arab world is divided about secular and Islamic governing principles and most Arab citizens voice support for both democracy and *Shari'a* that are, therefore, inextricably linked.

Given the above considerations, our hypotheses are that (1) political particularism negatively affects support for democracy in the Arab World whilst (2) it positively affects support for *Shari'a*. In our empirical specification, we will furthermore control for the modernization theory indicators (education, income, egalitarian gender views) and for some indicators of social capital (social and institutional trust), which are all expected to positively affect the support for democracy.

¹ This relates to the distinction between “generalized” versus “limited” morality introduced by Platteau (2000) and stressed by Tabellini (2010).

² The basic Islamic legal system derived from the religious precepts of Islam, particularly the Quran, the central religious text and the Hadith, the collections of the reports by the prophet Muhammad.

To empirically test these hypotheses, we fully exploit the richness of the Arab Barometer. Firstly, we show that political particularism, reduces support for democracy. We then show that this result is robust to the use of alternative specifications of the model and of econometric techniques aimed at addressing the potential endogeneity of particularism. Secondly, we investigate the simultaneous relationship between individual attitudes toward support for democracy and towards support for *Shari'a*. Overall, our findings indicate that (1) particularism reduces support for democracy. This relationship is, indeed, causal. Moreover, even when allowing for the correlation of the error terms, (2) particularism significantly increases support for *Shari'a* .

The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section two presents the data and methods, section three presents the results while section four concludes and suggests avenues for following research.

Data and Methods

Data

Our empirical analysis is based on the second wave of the Arab Barometer, a project developed in consultation with a network composed of regional barometers in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, East and South Asia³. Our sample is composed by 10 countries⁴ and covers 12,782 individuals for the period 2010-2011. The questionnaire in the Arab Barometer included, among others, questions on citizens' attitudes about public affairs and governance, religion and religiosity, social capital, family status, employment and satisfaction with the government. One key question on political particularism was also included in the questionnaire: *“In general, to what extent is it important to you that the candidate is from your family/tribe in deciding who to vote for in elections?”*. For ease of interpretation, we recoded the responses as “not important=1”, “A limited extent=2”, “A medium extent=3” and “A great extent=4”.

Our main variable for *support for democracy* is measured considering the answers to the questions:

1. *Under a democratic system, the country's economic performance is weak.*
2. *Democratic regimes are indecisive and full of problems.*
3. *Democratic systems are not effective at maintaining order and stability.*
4. *Democracy negatively affects social and ethical values in your country.*

For each item, “strongly agree” was recoded as 1, “agree” was recoded as 2, “disagree” was recoded as 3 and “strongly disagree” was recoded as 4. These four variables were then summed and transformed in an index ranging from 4 to 16 and measuring support for democracy. To assess the robustness of our results a principal component analysis was also conducted and the first factor was extracted. Moreover, a third measure of overall support for democracy was constructed by using the answer to the question: *“I will describe different political systems to you, and I want to ask you about your opinion of each one of them with regard to the country's governance – for each one would you say it is very good, good, bad, or very bad?”*. More specifically, respondents were asked to express their opinion regarding “A democratic political system”. For ease of interpretation the answers to this question were recoded with “very bad”=1 and “very good”=4.

³ <http://www.globalbarometer.net>

⁴ Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, Yemen

Support for *Shari'a* is measured with an item asking the respondents to evaluate whether a system governed by Islamic law without elections or political parties would be suitable to rule respondents' countries. The answers are given from a scale from 1 to 4 and were recoded such as "Absolutely inappropriate=1" and "Very appropriate=4". As such, this variable differentiates weak from ardent supporters of *Shari'a* (Ciftci, 2012).

Among the independent variables, we included gender and age together with a set of indicators of modernization theory. In particular, self-reported measures of education (*Level of education*), employment status (*Employment status*) and income (*Log income USD dollars*) have been used to assess whether increased wealth generate positive attitudes towards democracy. Four measures of trust were used to test the hypotheses related to social capital theory. According to this argument, general trust provides the basis for cooperation among the members of society, it enhances associational activity and reciprocity and, therefore, it is an essential element of regime stability and support of democracy. At the institutional level, institutional trust conveys legitimacy to democratic institutions. Recently Jamal (2007) has challenged this argument by showing that in authoritarian settings, such as the Middle East, a higher level of social trust is indeed associated with support for the existing regime, and hence negatively related with democracy.

Thus, in our empirical specification we added among the controls a standard dichotomous measure of generalized trust⁵ (*General trust*) together with three measures of institutional trust (*Trust Government*, *Trust Public Security*, *Trust Army*) evaluating confidence in the government, public security and in the army (Jamal, 2007, 2007b). The estimated specifications also include a variable accounting for the time spent in western countries⁶ (*Time spent in western countries*), the individual degree of interest in politics (*How interested in politics*), two measures of institutional satisfaction (*Satisfaction with the government*⁷ and *Satisfaction with democracy and human rights*⁸) and a measure of Internet use (*Internet Use*). An item about self-assessed religiosity was also used⁹ (*Self-assessed religiosity*). Summary statistics of all the variables used in our specifications are provided in Table 1.

The surveyed individuals indicated widespread support for both, democracy and *Shari'a* in every country in our sample. On average, Egypt shows the highest average score on support for democracy while Jordan the lowest one. As far as support for *Shari'a* is concerned, Saudi Arabia shows the highest average score while Lebanon shows the lowest one. Accordingly, particularism is at its highest average level in Jordan while it is at its lowest average level in Lebanon. No significant average differences emerge across gender and age¹⁰.

⁵ "Generally speaking, do you think most people are trustworthy or not?"

⁶ "During the past five years, did you spend time in a Western country?"

⁷ "Suppose that there was a scale from 1-10 to measure the extent of your satisfaction with the government, in which 1 means that you were absolutely unsatisfied with its performance and 10 means that you were very satisfied, to what extent are you satisfied with the government's performance?"

⁸ "If you were to evaluate the state of democracy and human rights in your country today, would you say that they are very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?"

⁹ "Generally speaking, would you describe yourself as...? Religious, Somewhat religious, Not religious"

¹⁰ Summary statistics by gender and age are available upon request

Methods

We first estimate a series of *OLS* regressions including cross-sectional estimation with a progressive larger set of controls and with country fixed effects. As a robustness check, in order to take into account the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, in Table 3 we report ordered logit estimation. Test statistics are based on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. We consider also estimates obtained by interacting political particularism with some indicators of modernization theory and institutional satisfaction.

One of the key issues of estimating the relationship between political particularism and support for democracy using survey data is endogeneity of political particularism that prevents the casual interpretation of the results. In fact, our main estimated parameter of interest might be reflecting reverse causation as people who support less democracy are, indeed, more particularists. Moreover, unobserved heterogeneity might result in omitted variable bias since there could be some unobserved factors that determine both political particularism and support for democracy. In order to address these issues, we apply Instrumental Variables (henceforth, IV) techniques. Our identification strategy is based therefore on the estimation of a two equations' system, the first one describing support for democracy while the second one is the first step in the IV strategy and includes our instrument for political particularism. For an instrument to be reliable it must meet at least two criteria. First, it must be correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable, in our case political particularism, conditional on the other covariates (the so-called "relevance" condition). Second, it must be uncorrelated with the error term in the explanatory equation, conditional on the other covariates (the so-called "orthogonality" condition); that is, the instrument cannot suffer from the same problem as the original predicting variable. Since it is not possible to directly test this condition, we should rely on common sense and economic theory to decide which instruments are more suitable for our variable of interest.

In our empirical strategy we use a measure of ethnolinguistic fractionalization at the country level, as the one used in Alesina, et al. (2003), as an instrument for individual-level political particularism. Within economics there has been a large and growing literature, beginning with Mauro (1995), using indexes of ethnolinguistic fractionalization either as an instrument or as an explanatory variable for various economic outcomes. A part of this literature has used cross-country data to investigate the effects of ethnolinguistic fractionalization on democracy pointing to inconclusive results.

Empirically, we find that the measure of ethnolinguistic fractionalization is not correlated with individual-level support for democracy. We believe that the level of ethnolinguistic fractionalization cannot *per se* exert a direct influence on individual-level support for democracy. Rather, it creates the premise for the individual choice. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the impact of ethnolinguistic fractionalization on support for democracy occurs through the individual-level political particularism. To put it otherwise, following Jensen & Skaaning (2012), we claim that ethnolinguistic fractionalization is a conditional factor only indirectly explaining support for democracy by moderating the effect of modernization and by increasing particularistic attitudes.

Once assessed the causal effect of political particularism on support for democracy we investigate the relationship between individual attitudes toward democracy and individual attitudes towards *Shari'a*. Empirically, we control for the dependency between the individual-level determinants of

both, support for *Shari'a* and support for democracy. Since we assume the error terms of both equations to be correlated, we run both equations simultaneously by means of a *seemingly unrelated model* (henceforth, SUR) and we estimate the full variance–covariance matrix of the coefficients.

Results

Table 2 presents the results of the OLS estimations. Political particularism has a negative and significant effect on support for democracy¹¹. This result stays virtually unchanged across all specifications of the model and is robust to the use of alternative definitions as described in section Data and reported in Table 4 and to the estimation by Ordered Logit as reported in Table 3. Indeed, in relative terms the size of the effect of particularism is sizeable, being larger than that of education, employment status, income and all other individual-level characteristics. Particularism is therefore by far the strongest factor explaining individual-level support for democracy. The inclusion of measures of interest in politics provides a test of the role of political attention in mediating particularism's impact on democratic attitudes (Evans & Rose, 2012). Column 3 of Table 2 shows that the introduction of this variable (which is negative and significantly related with support for democracy), does not attenuate the size of the coefficient for particularism which is, indeed, increased.

Among the indicators of modernization theory, education and income have positive and significant effects on support for democracy with the latter effect being greater than the former, confirming some previous findings (Lipset, 1959; Evans & Rose, 2012). Among the indicators of social capital theory, general trust is statistically significant with a negative coefficient, a result that corroborates the findings in Jamal (2007). Trust in army and Internet use turn out to be positively and significantly related to support for democracy. Religiosity does not reach statistical significance in either model, which is congruent with the findings of previous studies (Tessler, 2002).

The second and third lines of Table 5 report the results of estimating the same equation as in column 3 of Table 2 while adding interaction terms between political particularism and two indicators of modernization theory, namely education and income. While the first interaction term does not reach statistical significance, the interaction term between political particularism and income suggests that the negative effect of political particularism on individual-level support for democracy is greater as income increases. The fourth and fifth lines of Table 5 report the results of estimating the same equation as in column 3 of Table 2 while adding interaction terms between political particularism and two indicators of institutional satisfaction, namely satisfaction with the actual government ruling the country (line fourth) and with the state of democracy and human rights in the country (line fifth). It turns out that the effect of political particularism on support for democracy is greater when support for actual government increases and is smaller as satisfaction with the state of democracy increases.

The main message of the regressions in Table 2-6 is that there seems to be a strong correlation between political particularism and individual-level support for democracy and that this relationship is moderated by individual-level income and satisfaction with the government and with the state of democracy in the country of origin.

¹¹ Regressions by country are reported in Table 6

Addressing Causality

Table 7 reports IV estimation results. The first column reports the estimation of the first stage equation. The power of the instrument exceeds the conventional minimum standard of power of $F = 10$ (Stock, et al., 2002)¹². The results of the IV estimation are statistically significant and in line with our theoretical prediction: political particularism decreases support for democracy. Indeed, the size of the estimated effect is even larger when using IV, suggesting that failing to account for the endogeneity of particularism may lead to underestimate its effect on support for democracy.

Support for democracy and support for *Shari'a*

Table 8 reports the results of the SUR model. The findings indicate that, for the individual, the correlation of the residuals in the two equations is -0.1828 and that the hypothesis that this correlation is zero is rejected¹³. Therefore, given the peculiar structure of the Muslim world, is not advisable to study support for democracy without considering support for *Shari'a* (Ciftci, 2012).

Political particularism significantly reduces support for democracy whilst it increases support for *Shari'a*. This opposite effect (in the same direction) is found for education. The higher the level of education, the lower is the support of *Shari'a* and the higher is the support for democracy. Other covariates indicate that trust in government is negatively correlated with both support for *Shari'a* and support for democracy although in the latter case it is not significant. Surprisingly, the time spent in western countries is positively and significantly correlated with support for *Shari'a* while it turns out to be negatively although not significantly related to support for democracy. The same pattern is found for interest in politics. On the opposite, while religiosity does not reach statistical significance for support for democracy, it is positively related to support for *Shari'a*.

Conclusion

In this article we have further explored the underlying dynamics of individual-level support for democracy and support for *Shari'a* in the Arab world. In particular, we have investigated how political particularism affects these attitudes at the individual-level. Our results show that particularism decreases support for democracy. Indeed, in relative terms, the size of the effect of particularism is substantial, being larger than that of education, employment status, income (as posited by modernization theory) and social trust (as posited by social capital theory), hence all other individual-level characteristics. Particularism is therefore by far the strongest factor explaining individual-level support for democracy in the Arab world and its effect on support for democracy is, indeed, causal. Thus, reducing political particularism can be identified as an effective way to increase support for democracy.

Our underlying claim is that voters with a more universalistic stance would prefer candidates who foster the interests of the entire community whilst more particularistic inclined ones would prefer candidates who foster the interests of a narrower circle of related people (i.e. family, clan, and friends). This relates to the distinction between “generalized” *versus* “limited” morality introduced by Platteau (2000) and stressed by Tabellini (2010) and with the extensive literature showing that

¹² $F(1,6097) = 11.83$, $\text{Prob} > F = 0.0006$

¹³ Breusch-Pagan test of independence: $\text{chi}^2(1) = 195.075$, $\text{Pr} = 0.0000$

particularism is often associated with more widespread informal institutions (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2005), lower civic mindedness and higher corruption (Uslaner, 2002).

In this perspective, social relations in particularistic societies rely on strong ties informed by principles of tradition, conformity and benevolence inside small circles of related people (i.e., members of the family, friends, and members of the clan) while outside this small network, selfish behavior is considered morally acceptable (Tabellini, 2010). Particularism, therefore, can be conducive to several antisocial behaviors and, potentially, can undermine the cohesion of the social fabric. Thus, studying the effects of particularism is relevant to inform development practitioners and policy makers. To date, the determinants of particularism at the individual-level are still unclear and it is not easy to formulate some clear policy interventions to reduce particularism and favor universalism (Rotondi & Stanca, 2015). Some scholars have indicated education as the most promising area of intervention. In fact, as argued by Glaeser et al. (2007), education enhances social trust thus contributing to overcoming problems of collective action. The relationship between education and particularism, however, is not completely clear and further researches in this direction are needed.

Following Ciftci (2012), in this paper we have also studied how particularism affects support for *Shari'a*, another side of support for democracy in the Arab world. Our summary statistics show that supporters of democracy also favor *Shari'a* in the Arab world. At the same time, the results of the estimation of a simultaneous equation model show that when allowing for the correlation of the error terms, particularism increases support for *Shari'a*.

These findings offer new insights into challenges of building widespread support for democracy in the Arab world, particularly after the Arab spring. Our conclusions, however, should be weighed against some weaknesses of public opinion data. Greater caution is needed about the available measures of support for democracy. In fact, the existing data do not tell us anything about what respondents really mean by democracy, or, ultimately, how they perceive it. To date, data on support for democracy are diffused and several major empirical research programs are monitoring public support for democratic institutions, including, among others, the LatinoBarometer, the AfroBarometer, the European Values Survey, and the World Values Survey. The questions contained in these datasets are regularly used by scholars in different fields and demonstrate internal consistency. However, as Inglehart suggests (2003), while from a theoretical point of view the relationship between support for democracy and democratic institutions seems to be clear, there is still some doubts regarding whether, at the empirical level, high level of mass support for these items is actually conducive to democratic institutions. These and other issues should be further investigated and claim for the collaboration and the involvement of researchers coming from different social sciences, each one with his own methodology and ability in understanding the world around them. With this work we leave the door open to further applications.

Tables

Table 1: Summary Statistics

	Mean	Std.dev.	Min	Max
Support for democracy	11.18	2.90	4	16
Support for <i>Shari'a</i>	1.93	1.13	1	4
Democratic political system, how good	3.41	0.72	1	4
Support for democracy, pca	0.00	1.62	-4	3
Political Particularism	2.27	1.22	1	4
Gender	0.52	0.50	0	1
Age	37.35	13.44	18	89
Level of education	3.47	1.35	1	6
Employment status	0.49	0.50	0	1
Log income USD dollars	6.18	1.07	-3	14
General trust	0.27	0.44	0	1
Trust Government	2.50	1.10	1	4
Trust Public Security	2.33	1.08	1	4
Trust Army	1.86	1.02	1	4
How interested in politics	2.73	0.98	1	4
Internet Use	3.32	1.16	1	4
Time spent in western countries	0.25	0.81	0	4
Satisfaction with the government	3.70	2.58	1	10
Satisfaction with democracy and human rights in country	3.07	1.10	1	5
Self-assessed religiosity	1.72	0.61	1	3
Instrument				
Ethno Linguistic Fractionalization	0.42	0.21	0.01	0.67
Observations		12782		

Source. Author's elaboration from the Arab barometer

Table 2: Support for democracy, OLS estimation

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Political Particularism	-0.30*** (0.02)	-0.31*** (0.03)	-0.33*** (0.03)
Gender	0.06 (0.06)	0.07 (0.06)	0.08 (0.08)
Age	0.00** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Level of education	0.11*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.03)
Employed	0.10 (0.06)	0.07 (0.07)	0.11 (0.08)
Log income USD dollars	0.14*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.13*** (0.05)
General trust		-0.07 (0.07)	-0.21** (0.08)
Trust Government		-0.04 (0.04)	0.02 (0.05)
Trust Public Security		0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.05)
Trust Army		0.16*** (0.04)	0.17*** (0.05)
How interested in politics			-0.08* (0.04)
Internet Use			0.06* (0.03)
Time spent in western countries			0.03 (0.05)
Satisfaction with the government			-0.01 (0.02)
Satisfaction with democracy and human rights in country			0.05 (0.04)
Self-assessed religiosity			-0.05 (0.06)
Constant	10.57*** (0.29)	10.21*** (0.31)	10.71*** (0.51)
Observations	9974	9295	6114
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. OLS estimation. Dep.var. Support for democracy

Table 3: Robustness check, Ordered Logit Estimation

	Support for democracy
Political Particularism	-0.22** (0.02)
Gender	0.05 (0.05)
Age	0.00 (0.00)
Level of education	0.05** (0.02)
Employed	0.07 (0.05)
Log income USD dollars	0.09*** (0.03)
General trust	-0.13** (0.05)
Trust Government	0.02 (0.03)
Trust Public Security	-0.01 (0.03)
Trust Army	0.11*** (0.03)
How interested in politics	-0.05** (0.03)
Internet Use	0.04 [†] (0.02)
Time spent in western countries	0.00 (0.03)
Satisfaction with the government	-0.01 (0.01)
Satisfaction with democracy and human rights in country	0.01 (0.03)
Self-assessed religiosity	-0.02 (0.04)
cut1 Constant	-3.89*** (0.33)
cut2 Constant	-3.32*** (0.33)
cut3 Constant	-2.69*** (0.32)
cut4 Constant	-2.06*** (0.32)
cut5 Constant	-1.40*** (0.32)
cut6 Constant	-0.90*** (0.32)
cut7 Constant	-0.45 (0.32)
cut8 Constant	0.04 (0.32)
cut9 Constant	1.05*** (0.32)
cut10 Constant	1.66*** (0.32)
cut11 Constant	2.09*** (0.32)
cut12 Constant	2.56*** (0.32)
Observations	6114
Country dummies	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses

[†] $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Ordered Logit estimation. Dep.var. Support for democracy

Table 4: Robustness check, alternative indicators

	(1) Democratic political system, how good	(2) Support for democracy, pca
Political Particularism	-0.16*** (0.02)	-0.19*** (0.02)
Gender	0.03 (0.06)	0.05 (0.05)
Age	0.01*** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Level of education	0.07*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)
Employed	0.03 (0.06)	0.06 (0.05)
Log income USD dollars	0.06* (0.03)	0.07*** (0.03)
General trust	0.01 (0.06)	-0.12** (0.05)
Trust Government	0.04 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
Trust Public Security	0.02 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)
Trust Army	-0.06* (0.03)	0.09*** (0.03)
How interested in politics	-0.17*** (0.03)	-0.05* (0.02)
Internet Use	-0.01 (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)
Time spent in western countries	-0.05 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)
Satisfaction with the government	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Satisfaction with democracy and human rights in country	-0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)
Self-assessed religiosity	0.15*** (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
Constant	-0.16***	-0.19*** (0.29)
<hr/>		
cut1		
Constant	-3.69*** (0.34)	
<hr/>		
cut2		
Constant	-2.19*** (0.34)	
<hr/>		
cut3		
Constant	0.32 (0.34)	
<hr/>		
Observations	6740	6114
Country dummies	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. (1) Ordered logit estimation. (2) OLS estimation

Table 5: Support for democracy, interactions with particularism

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Political Particularism	-0.42*** (0.09)	-1.08*** (0.20)	-0.47*** (0.06)	-0.59*** (0.10)
Particularism*Education	0.03 (0.02)			
Particularism*Income		0.12*** (0.03)		
Particularism*Government Satisfaction			0.04*** (0.01)	
Particularism*Satisfaction with democracy				-0.08*** (0.03)
Observations	6114	6114	6114	6114
Standard Controls	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>
Country dummies	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. OLS estimation. Dep.Var. Support for democracy

Table 6: Support for democracy, OLS estimation by Country

	(1) Algeria	(2) Egypt	(3) Iraq	(4) Jordan	(5) Lebanon	(6) Palestine	(7) Saudi Arabia	(8) Sudan	(9) Tunisia	(10) Yemen
Political Particularism	0.14 (0.10)	-0.64*** (0.08)	-0.75*** (0.08)	-0.22** (0.09)	-0.23** (0.10)	-0.14* (0.08)	0.22 (0.19)	-0.33*** (0.10)	-0.41*** (0.10)	-0.02 (0.10)
Gender	0.02 (0.25)	0.61*** (0.23)	0.00 (0.20)	0.04 (0.28)	-0.02 (0.24)	-0.23 (0.27)	-0.38 (0.45)	-0.10 (0.24)	-0.09 (0.24)	-0.30 (0.24)
Age	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Education	-0.22* (0.11)	-0.01 (0.07)	-0.11 (0.09)	0.17 (0.12)	0.36*** (0.11)	0.34*** (0.12)	0.08 (0.22)	0.09 (0.09)	0.14 (0.10)	0.19* (0.10)
Employed	0.31 (0.25)	0.28 (0.22)	-0.11 (0.21)	0.14 (0.28)	-0.14 (0.25)	0.01 (0.27)	0.26 (0.43)	-0.07 (0.25)	0.20 (0.23)	-0.03 (0.26)
Income	-0.37 (0.26)	0.10 (0.13)	0.05 (0.06)	0.07 (0.19)	0.73*** (0.23)	0.21 (0.15)	0.11 (0.34)	-0.12 (0.23)	-0.02 (0.19)	-0.03 (0.19)
General trust	-0.89* (0.48)	-0.15 (0.21)	-0.53** (0.24)	-0.24 (0.25)	0.19 (0.26)	-0.00 (0.23)	-1.41** (0.58)	-0.39 (0.29)	-0.20 (0.23)	0.00 (0.25)
Trust Government	-0.21 (0.20)	0.22* (0.12)	-0.03 (0.14)	-0.07 (0.14)	0.10 (0.17)	-0.05 (0.14)	-0.22 (0.40)	0.30* (0.17)	-0.20 (0.13)	0.16 (0.16)
Trust Public Security	-0.38 (0.26)	-0.36*** (0.10)	0.02 (0.16)	-0.14 (0.15)	-0.05 (0.14)	-0.06 (0.15)	0.14 (0.38)	0.08 (0.15)	0.34*** (0.12)	-0.20 (0.16)
Trust Army	0.66*** (0.24)	-0.42** (0.21)	0.68*** (0.14)	0.28 (0.18)	0.15 (0.12)	0.15 (0.14)	0.72** (0.29)	-0.10 (0.15)	-0.28* (0.15)	0.30** (0.15)
How interested in politics	0.11 (0.19)	0.02 (0.11)	-0.16 (0.12)	-0.13 (0.12)	-0.10 (0.11)	0.01 (0.11)	0.57** (0.24)	-0.26** (0.13)	0.23* (0.13)	-0.33** (0.13)
Internet Use	0.13 (0.13)	0.03 (0.13)	-0.10 (0.10)	0.02 (0.09)	0.32*** (0.12)	0.07 (0.08)	0.26 (0.22)	-0.03 (0.09)	-0.20* (0.11)	0.04 (0.11)
Time spent in western countries	0.34*** (0.10)	-0.89*** (0.17)	0.34 (0.23)	0.28** (0.12)	0.20* (0.10)	0.37** (0.17)	0.35* (0.20)	-0.27* (0.15)	0.09 (0.11)	-0.20 (0.45)
Satisfaction with the government	0.13 (0.09)	-0.16*** (0.05)	0.32*** (0.05)	-0.00 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.07)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.51*** (0.14)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.19*** (0.06)	0.07 (0.06)
Satisfaction with democracy and human rights in country	0.19 (0.23)	0.20* (0.11)	0.53*** (0.11)	-0.14 (0.14)	-0.15 (0.12)	0.19 (0.12)	0.11 (0.21)	-0.09 (0.13)	0.04 (0.14)	-0.26** (0.12)
Self-assessed religiosity	-0.65*** (0.19)	0.70*** (0.19)	-0.77*** (0.17)	0.08 (0.19)	-0.05 (0.18)	-0.47*** (0.18)	0.33 (0.35)	-0.22 (0.19)	0.38** (0.18)	-0.39** (0.18)
Constant	10.75*** (2.22)	14.20*** (1.20)	9.27*** (1.09)	10.63*** (1.68)	5.21*** (1.94)	6.47*** (1.28)	10.13*** (3.51)	10.97*** (1.69)	12.63*** (1.45)	10.38*** (1.51)
Observations	422	861	810	595	912	551	188	723	528	524

Standard errors in parenthesis

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. OLS estimation. Dep.var. Support for democracy

Table 7: Instrumental Variables Regression

	(1) First Stage <i>Political Particularism</i>	(2) IV <i>Support for democracy</i>
Ethno Linguistic Fractionalization	0.25*** (0.07)	
Political Particularism		-1.48** (0.75)
Gender	0.03 (0.03)	0.08 (0.09)
Age	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Level of education	-0.02 (0.01)	0.00 (0.04)
Employed	-0.06* (0.03)	0.03 (0.10)
Log income USD dollars	0.10*** (0.02)	0.28*** (0.08)
General trust	0.02 (0.03)	-0.10 (0.09)
Trust Government	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.08 (0.05)
Trust Public Security	-0.02 (0.02)	0.09 (0.06)
Trust Army	0.05*** (0.02)	0.02 (0.06)
How interested in politics	0.07*** (0.02)	-0.04 (0.07)
Internet Use	-0.02 (0.01)	0.10*** (0.04)
Time spent in western countries	0.03* (0.02)	0.09 (0.06)
Satisfaction with the government	0.05*** (0.01)	-0.05 (0.05)
Satisfaction with democracy and human rights in country	0.06*** (0.02)	0.13** (0.06)
Self-assessed religiosity	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.14** (0.07)
Constant	1.31*** (0.16)	12.26*** (1.24)
Observations	6097	6114
Country dummies		Yes

Standard errors in parenthesis.

(1) First stage. OLS estimation. Dep.var. Political Particularism. (2) IV. OLS estimation. Dep.var. Support for democracy. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 8: SUR Model

	(1) Support for <i>Shari'a</i>	(1) Support for democracy
Political Particularism	0.04*** (0.01)	-0.34*** (0.03)
Gender	-0.03 (0.03)	0.08 (0.08)
Age	-0.00*** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Level of education	-0.03*** (0.01)	0.13*** (0.03)
Employed	-0.04 (0.03)	0.12 (0.09)
Log income USD dollars	-0.01 (0.02)	0.12** (0.05)
General trust	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.19** (0.09)
Trust Government	-0.03* (0.02)	0.02 (0.05)
Trust Public Security	0.05*** (0.02)	0.01 (0.05)
Trust Army	-0.02 (0.02)	0.17*** (0.05)
How interested in politics	0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07* (0.04)
Internet Use	-0.02* (0.01)	0.07* (0.04)
Time spent in western countries	0.04** (0.02)	0.02 (0.05)
satisfaction with the government	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)
Satisfaction with democracy and human rights in country	0.09*** (0.01)	0.05 (0.04)
Self-assessed religiosity	0.10*** (0.02)	-0.04 (0.20)
Constant	1.29*** (0.18)	10.54*** (0.51)
Observations	5835	5835
Country dummies	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parenthesis

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

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