ELECTIONS IN NON-DEMOCRACIES*

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Free and fair elections are the cornerstone of a democratic system, but elections are common in other regimes as well. Such an election might be a pure farce, with the incumbents getting close to 100% of the vote. In other instances, incumbents allow opposition candidates to be on the ballot and run campaigns, limit electoral fraud, e.g., by inviting international observers, all to make elections appear fair. In our model, the incumbent is informed about his popularity, and having a fair election allows him to signal his popularity to the people. After casting their vote, heterogeneous citizens decide whether or not to participate in a protest, and they are more willing to do so if they expect others to protest as well. We demonstrate theoretically that regimes that have a high level of elite repression are less likely to have fair elections, but regimes with a high cost of protesting for ordinary citizens make fair elections more likely.

In a non-democratic regime, having an election or not, allowing a serious opponent to take part or preventing opposition leaders from running, and choosing the extent to which the population is informed about the outcome are all parts of the incumbent's strategy set (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Besley and Kudamatsu, 2008; Bueno de Mesquita *et al.*, 2003; Svolik, 2012). At the same time, even winning an election does not guarantee staying in power as the incumbent may still be vulnerable to mass protests (Bueno de Mesquita, 2010; Shadmehr and Bernhardt, 2011; Edmond, 2013). The non-democratic leader is interested not only in maximising his chances to get more votes than his opponent, but in projecting strength, persuading the populace in his overwhelming support. The fact that the people can interpret not only the election outcome, but the leader's own decisions such as allowing opposition candidates to run, as signals of his strength or weakness, complicates the incumbent's problem.

This article builds a theory of competitive elections in nondemocracies. We model an incumbent leader who faces possible mass protests and tries to minimise their scope. He might choose to run in a competitive election, which, even if not perfectly fair and fraudless, is informative about his relative popularity, or to run effectively unopposed in an election that is all but a sham. The problem is that to have competitive election one needs real opposition, which might be all but fledgling if the regime is sufficiently repressive (see Section 1 for anecdotal evidence). However, what is a problem for a popular dictator may be an opportunity for one that fears to show his unpopularity, because citizens would not necessarily interpret running unopposed as a sign of weakness, but possibly as a natural feature of a repressive regime where no one dares to

challenge the dictator. Our question therefore is how the repressive nature of the regime affects the competitiveness and fairness of elections.

Our main result and prediction is that elite repression and oppression of common citizens affect elections in countervaluing ways. In a *repressive* regime, where challenging the dictator is costlier, the citizens are less likely to view the dictator who runs unopposed as weak. As a result, the dictator will be under less pressure to have competitive elections to signal his strength or popularity, and therefore regimes that are repressive against the elites will have fewer competitive elections.

On the other hand, in a *cruel* regime, where participation in mass protests is costlier for citizens, only citizens who are very sceptical about the dictator's chance of survival would be inclined to protest. Since the private information of protesters is also informative about whether others will protest, the intensity of the desire to protest will be higher following an uncompetitive election. This means that raising the cost of protest dissuades fewer protesters following a non-competitive election relative to a competitive one, and as such the incumbent now strictly prefers to allow a competitive election. In other words, communicating the dictator's popularity through a competitive election has a higher impact on the marginal protester in a crueller regime, which makes this option more tempting for the incumbent. Thus, crueller regimes will have more competitive elections. Both these predictions are in line with the regression results that we provide in the empirical part of the Appendix.

There is a substantial literature in political science that strives to explain elections held by autocrats (see Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009, Miller, 2015 and Gehlbach *et al.*, 2016, for recent surveys). Przeworski (2009) describes 'plebiscitary elections,' which the regime uses to demonstrate that it can 'force everyone to appear in a particular place on a particular day and perform the act of throwing a piece of paper into a designated box' (Magaloni, 2006, and Blaydes, 2008, find evidence of this motive in Mexico and Egypt, respectively). Simpser (2013) suggests that electoral fraud can be used to demonstrate strength by showing the capacity to organise fraud. In our view, this argument does not explain why signalling capacity by the regime must take the form of elections rather than, say, mass rallies or enforcing state-approved haircuts (as in North Korea).

Another proposed role of elections is to define and enforce power-sharing or rent-sharing agreements among the elites (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006; 2007; Boix and Svolik, 2013). This is a plausible explanation for elections in countries with several political forces the conflict between which is strong enough to guarantee fairness of elections, but it is arguably less applicable to autocratic regimes with barely any ethnic or factional cleavages. Perhaps more importantly, the regime would likely use parliamentary or gubernatorial elections to achieve power-sharing and rent-sharing, whereas our article seeks to explain elections to the high office and our predictions are in line with evidence on such elections. [1]

Yet another explanation deals with gathering information and learning about local issues through elections. Martinez-Bravo *et al.* (2017) study the case of local (village-level) democracy in China. Miller (2015) finds that a negative shock to the authoritarian election results prompts autocracies to spend more on education and social welfare. A similar argument is used in

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[1] Our cross-country analysis in the Appendix B demonstrates a robust correlation between elite repression and cruelty on the one hand and incidence of fair elections on the other. Reasonable objections could be raised about interpretation of variables, definition of fair elections and quality of measurement, as well as consistency of measurements across countries and over time (though we partly address the latter concern by using country and year fixed effects in most specifications). Most critically, our results establish correlations, not causation. Nevertheless, the results are difficult to reconcile with extant theories of nondemocratic elections, which provides support for the theory we present.

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Lorentzen ([2013](#)) to explain China's tolerance of local protests and in Egorov *et al.* ([2009](#)) to explain cross-country and cross-time variation of media freedom in non-democratic regimes. While this theory provides a good explanation of local elections, it falls short of explaining national elections: after all, a representative poll of relatively few people would be a much cheaper and less risky way to gather information. An advantage of our explanation is that competitive election to the high office may be one of very few, if not the only, means for a nondemocratic regime to disclose its popularity.[2]

Our article contributes to a broader and growing literature on mass protests in non-democratic regimes. Early models of protests and regime change include Acemoglu and Robinson ([2006](#)), which assume that from time to time potential dissidents ('the poor') are able to overcome the collective action problem and coordinate on protests. In Bueno de Mesquita ([2010](#)), protests are modelled as a coordination game with multiple equilibria, and the vanguard of revolution moves first, thus altering the focal point for mass protesters (see also Shadmehr and Bernhardt, [2014](#)). The vanguard, however, does not have any informational advantage over the mass followers, and as such has no information revelation or signalling motive, as the incumbent does in our article. Shadmehr and Bernhardt ([2011](#)) model protests as a two-person coordination game and show that limiting public information available to citizens might increase the likelihood of protests as each individual citizen is forced to rely on others' information to a larger extent. Several papers study the role of information in protests using the global games approach (Persson and Tabellini, [2009](#); Edmond, [2013](#)), which assumes that citizens have private information on either the regime's strength or the common benefits from changing the regime.[3] We take a different approach by assuming that citizens' private information corresponds to their personal attitudes to the regime, which are not overridden by revelation of public information. This allows us to get a unique equilibrium for *any* public signal that the dictator may produce, which contrasts with the global games approach, where uniqueness of equilibrium is guaranteed only if the public signal has sufficiently high variance.

Several studies address the relationship between protests and elections in nondemocracies. In Edmond ([2013](#)), the dictator has a costly technology to jam the signal available to citizens who might want to protest; citizens do not participate in any elections prior to protests, and do not make any inference based on their results. Little ([2013](#)) studies electoral fraud with rational voters; in his paper, however, the dictator does not possess superior information and his decisions do not have informational value to the citizens. In a model in which both fraud and protests are decisions made by unitary actors, Kuhn ([2010](#)) argues that protests are only possible if the election is won by the incumbent by a narrow margin and there is evidence of fraud. In Little *et al.* ([2015](#)), the results of an election convey the same information to the dictator and the citizens, and the main question is whether or not the dictator agrees to step down voluntarily after losing. Gehlbach and Simpser ([2014](#)) study dictators' incentives to manipulate election results in a two-person 'sender–receiver' model (see also Rozenas, [2016](#), and Luo and Rozenas, [2018](#)). In a related paper, Fearon ([2011](#)) treats the threat of protests as the only means for the society to enforce regular elections, which are in turn critical for accountability and public goods provision. While studying closely related questions like fraud, none of these papers focuses on the reasons

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[2] Another theory worth mentioning is that elections are done to appease the international community (see, e.g., Joseph, [1999](#), on elections in African countries post independence). While theoretically plausible, this theory would likely predict both more repressive and crueller regimes to have more elections, as such regimes have less to fear.

[3] For theoretical foundations of global games, see Carlsson and van Damme ([1993](#)) and Morris and Shin ([1998](#)). Edmond ([2013](#)) provides an extensive discussion of the modelling technique as applied to informational manipulation in a political context (see also Angeletos *et al.*, [2006](#); [2007](#)).

to have competitive and fair elections in the first place and generate predictions that our model does.

Our article is also related to the literature on violence and political repressions in non-democracies. Padró i Miquel (2007) shows how the use of force and fear helps to extract rents; Padró i Miquel and Yared (2012) analyse politics under the threat of violence. In Egorov and Sonin (2015), the winner of a power contest decides the fate of the loser and may execute the latter in order to prevent him from challenging his position again. In Acemoglu *et al.* (2008), powerful coalitions are able to eliminate political opponents until a stable coalition is formed. At the same time, Guriev and Treisman (2019) argue that violence is much less common in modern dictatorships than in the past. Our article contributes to this literature by highlighting the differential role of elite repression and oppression of common citizens, and their effect on competitiveness of elections.

The rest of the article is organised as follows. Section 1 discusses examples of elections in non-democracies. Section 2 introduces the setup and Section 3 analyses the model. Section 4 briefly discusses possible extensions, while Section 5 concludes. The Appendix contains the proofs and supplementary empirical evidence.

1. Nondemocratic Elections

Authoritarian regimes, like democracies, typically have constitutions that stipulate regular elections. Many of these elections are pure farce with no actual competition (see, e.g., Simpser, 2013, for an overview and a comprehensive review of the political science literature), but many are competitive, even if skewed in favour of the incumbent (Howard and Roessler, 2006). In this section, we present some of the most typical, well-studied examples, demonstrating the range of competitiveness in authoritarian elections. In the empirical part of the Appendix, we use our data set to show, in particular, that even countries with a minimal democracy score might have elections that are judged as free and fair by external standards.

Of course, in non-democracies, unfair elections are most common, but even such elections have different shades. In 1987, 1993 and 1999, Hosni Mubarak, the president of Egypt, who took power after President Sadat was killed in an aborted coup attempt in 1981, held 'elections' in which no other candidate was allowed to run. In 2005, Mubarak allowed some of the opposition candidates to be on the ballot, but these elections were neither free nor fair: some opponents were jailed and the reported results apparently fraudulent (Meital, 2006; Blaydes, 2008). In early 2011, Mubarak faced mass protests, was abandoned by his key supporters and ended up under house arrest on corruption charges. The Mubarak pattern, that of a string of 'overwhelming victories' followed by loss of power due to mass protests was repeated in other 'Arab Spring' countries (see, e.g., Weeden, 2008, on 1999 presidential elections in Yemen). In Europe, Alexander Lukashenko, the president of Belarus who unseated the incumbent in the country's last competitive elections in 1994, held elections in 2001 and 2006, which were not recognised by the international community as free and fair. In 2010, he allowed multiple opposition candidates to be on the ballot only to have most of them jailed on the election night; in 2015, the main opponents were not allowed on the ballot again.

The examples of Mubarak and Lukashenko, leaders with very different personal backgrounds in very different polities who nevertheless used the same tactics with respect to elections, might suggest that non-competitive elections are the standard in authoritarian countries. Nevertheless, it is apparently important for many autocrats to demonstrate willingness to stand for

reelection. Following the events of the Arab Spring in late 2010–early 2011, Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan's ruler since independence in 1991, rejected a plan to have a referendum that would extend his term for another eight years. Instead, he announced that he will run for re-election even though his term from the previous election in 2005 would have expired in 2012 (he won this re-election bid on 3 April 2011, with 95.5% of the vote). Vladimir Putin, the paramount leader of Russia since 1999, ran for his fourth term in 2018 and despite barring the main opposition leader from running, he made sure that a candidate from the communists (the largest opposition force in Russia in the 1990s and early 2000s) remained on the ballot, even despite direct violation of the law by the latter.[4]

Elections with some opposition candidates on the ballot while some others being barred hardly meet the standard of free and fair elections. Nevertheless, even in nondemocratic countries there are elections that pass this bar, or, at least, are recognised by international observers (from OECD countries) as being without significant fraud. In our data set, which covers 72 non-democracies between 1990 and 2011, roughly a half (92 out of 187) are classified as fair (see the Empirical Appendix for a precise definition). These cases include, e.g., elections in Yemen in 1999 and 2006 (polity score = –2), where the incumbent Ali Abdullah Saler won with 96% and 77% of the vote, respectively, and in Cameroon in 2004 and 2011 (polity score = –4), where the incumbent Paul Biya won with 71% and 78% of the vote, respectively.

Having an election, especially competitive one, may carry a significant risk to the incumbent. In 1986, Ferdinand Marcos, the Philippines' popular president turned authoritarian leader, was announced the winner of the presidential elections with 75% of the vote, yet mass protests forced Marcos to flee the country, ending his 20-year rule. In Chile, where Augusto Pinochet had been a military dictator since 1973, escalating protests and international pressure forced him to have a referendum in October 1988. He stepped down in 1989, abiding by the results of the referendum, despite the closeness of the vote (Angell and Pollack, 1990). In 1994, Joaquín Balaguer, a long-time leader of the Dominican Republic, was announced the winner of the presidential elections by a narrow margin (less than 0.1% of the total vote), but pressure from domestic opposition and international community revealed massive electoral manipulation, and Balaguer had to step down. In Yugoslavia in 2000, the incumbent Slobodan Milosevic finished second in the first round with 39% of the vote; he resigned following the mass protests before the scheduled run-off. In late 2015, the opposition decisively won the Myanmar elections organised by the military junta, which was certain of their control of the electoral process.[5]

Still, for every dictator who was ousted as a result of an election, there is someone like Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia, or Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania, who all faced mass protests unrelated to elections, and later house arrest, exile and firing squad, respectively. Thus, minimising the scope and danger of protests is a real concern for dictators, and our article addresses precisely the question of using elections to achieve this goal.

One important aspect of nondemocratic politics is that for potential opposition, involvement in politics usually comes at a great personal cost. Capable potential opposition leaders may choose different occupations or face repression, assassination, or exile and finding a credible opposition leader, or at least a sparring partner, may be a luxury not every dictator can afford even if it carries signalling benefits. Egorov and Sonin (2015) list dozens of potential contenders who were executed or killed on the incumbent's orders since the 1950s. Intimidation and harassment of

[4] *The New York Times*, 1/25/2018, 'Victory in Russia Election Assured, Putin Seeks High Turnout.'
[5] *The New York Times*, Nov. 15, 2015, 'Victory by Aung San Suu Kyi's Party Catches One Group Off Guard: The Government'.

opposition leaders and would-be candidates are even more wide-spread (see, Birch, 2011, for data on candidate intimidation among other types of electoral malpractice, and Gibney *et al.*, 2016, for data on political terror). In 2008, facing death threats and attempts on his life, Zimbabwe's Morgan Tsvangirai had to withdraw from the second round of the presidential vote after getting 47.3% in the first round to long-term incumbent Robert Mugabe's 43.1%. In Philippines, Benigno Aquino Jr., an exiled leader of opposition who negotiated his return with the government, was assassinated in the airport upon his return to the country in 1983; there has never been a definitive investigation. In Russia, Boris Nemtsov, a former popular governor, a former first deputy prime-minister, and an opposition leader, was killed near the Kremlin in 2015.

The above examples allow us to make several observations. First, in a non-democratic regime, having an election or not, allowing a serious opponent to take part or forbidding opposition leaders from running, and choosing the extent to which the population is informed about the outcome are all parts of the incumbent's strategy set. Second, the incumbent's choice to run unopposed or against nominal opponents does not mean that he perceives his support as strong. Instead, it either means an objective lack of serious opposition, especially if the regime's prior actions (intimidation, repression, assassination) prevented opponents from getting into politics or attracting voters' attention and support, or that the incumbent is afraid to face the opposition in a competitive election. It is the desire to appear strong, or equally the fear of appearing weak, that makes leaders allow opposition on the ballot and have elections that pass the international observers' fairness bar. Finally, while autocrats hardly ever lose elections, mass protests are a real threat, which dictators might face both if they have elections and if they do not.

2. Theory

We consider a two-period model of political competition in a nondemocratic context. There are two politicians, the incumbent (*D* for dictator) and the opposition leader (*C* for challenger), and a continuum of citizens who can replace the dictator after the first period either at the ballot box, or by protesting afterwards. The election can be either fair and competitive, or a pure farce, with the dictator running effectively unopposed.[6] The latter may happen for one of two reasons. First, the incumbent might prevent the challenger from running, or impose insurmountable burdens on his campaign. Second, the challenger or his key supporters may be too intimidated to organise a campaign, or may prefer to skip the race for strategic reasons.[7] Our key assumption is that if the election is not competitive, the citizens know this fact, but cannot distinguish between the two explanations. Substantively, this captures the idea that in repressive dictatorships, a lack of opposition fighting for power should be viewed as normal, and citizens do not know if the dictator tried extra hard to run unopposed in this particular election.[8] On the technical side, this

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[6] We think of an election as fair and competitive if the challenger is on the ballot, is allowed to run a meaningful campaign and there is no fraud at the counting stage. A pure farce is an election where the dictator is the only candidate on the ballot, barring perhaps some token opposition. In reality, there are various intermediate cases, some discussed in Section 1, for example, allowing the challenger on the ballot, but ensuring that his campaign is handicapped or committing massive fraud. For simplicity, we model only the two extreme cases, and assume that once the challenger is on the ballot, the election is fair.

[7] Notice that if the dictator and the challenger played a zero sum game, the dictator wanting a free election would correspond precisely to situations where the challenger would want to avoid it. We discuss this idea in more detail in Section 4.

[8] As an example, the popular opposition leader Alexei Navalny was not registered as a candidate in 2018 Presidential election in Russia because he was not eligible due to his prior criminal conviction. This conviction was widely viewed as arbitrary and illegitimate outside of Russia, and was formally overturned by the European Court of Human Rights

assumption prevents unravelling, in that a dictator who prevents the challenger from running is not inferred to be the worst possible type (see Dye, 1985).

Both in the case of a competitive election and in the case of a pure farce election, if the dictator wins, each citizen decides whether or not to protest, and the number of protesters determines the chances of the incumbent to stay in power. There is no discounting, and each politician gets utility A every period he is in power.

Both politicians are characterised by their abilities, a_D and a_C, which are drawn from the same normal distribution $\mathcal{N}(a_0, \sigma_a^2)$,[9] and neither is observed by the citizens. However, citizens observe their personal economic well-being, which is a signal about the incumbent leader's ability: if in period $j \in \{1, 2\}$ politician $P \in \{D, C\}$ is in office, citizen i gets a payoff

$$r_i^P = a_P + \delta_i^P. \tag{1}$$

This specification captures several important features. First, citizens observe their own well-being, but not that of their fellow citizens. Thus, by the end of the first period, they hold heterogeneous beliefs about the dictator's ability a_D. Second, they expect their utility to remain the same as long as the incumbent stays in office: for each citizen, the individual shock δ_i^P depends on the politician in power, but not on the period;[10] all δ_i^P are assumed to be independent and distributed as $\mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_\delta^2)$. Third, citizens do not have any extra information about the challenger's ability a_C by the end of the first period.

Let us denote the expected net gain of citizen i from regime change by b_i:

$$b_i = \mathbb{E}a_C - r_i^D = a_0 - a_D - \delta_i^D. \tag{2}$$

Citizen i benefits if the dictator is replaced with the challenger when $b_i > 0$, and is worse off otherwise.

The dictator knows his own competence, and thus the actual distribution of people's attitudes, $\mathcal{N}(b, \sigma_\delta^2)$, where $b \equiv a_0 - a_D$. He decides whether to allow the challenger on the ballot, and thus have a free election, or to prevent him from running. If the challenger is allowed to run, the probability that he will do so is η, which is decreasing in elite repressiveness of the regime, denoted by k: $\eta = \eta(k) \in (0, 1)$, with $\eta(k)$ decreasing in k.[11] Importantly, while citizens observe whether or not the challenger is absent from the ballot, they do not know the reason why. If the challenger is not on the ballot, the incumbent is re-elected unanimously. If both politicians are on the ballot, then citizens vote for either D or C; we will show that sincere voting, where i votes for the challenger if and only if $b_i > 0$, is a part of a unique equilibrium. We assume that the incumbent wins elections if the share of votes he gets, τ, is at least $\tilde{\tau} \in (0, 1)$, $\tilde{\tau} = \frac{1}{2}$ being the

in 2017 (though upheld by the Russian Supreme court in early 2018). Nevertheless, following this conviction, a poll (https://www.levada.ru/2015/02/05/rossiyane-ob-aleksee-navalnom-4/) showed that among those who knew about the conviction, only 7% viewed it as unjust, another 27% had no opinion, whereas the rest had opinions if it was too severe, to lenient, or just right, but did not question its legitimacy. In other words, a 2/3 supermajority agreed that the conviction is legitimate and thus makes Navalny ineligible to run.

[9] The assumption that abilities are drawn from the same distribution is not important; all results would go through if $a_D \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu_D, \sigma_D^2)$ and $a_C \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu_C, \sigma_C^2)$.

[10] This assumption captures the idea that each politician pursues policies which create winners and losers in the society. In the model, this creates conflict of interest, which guides citizens' voting and protesting behaviour (see Bueno de Mesquita, 2010). All the results will go through if instead of holding heterogeneous expectations about their payoffs should the incumbent stay in power, citizens receive heterogeneous taste shocks which affect their decisions to vote and to protest.

[11] In Section 4, we present a simple microfoundation of this negative relation between η and k. In a working paper version, we modelled repression as a strategic decision made by the incumbent, with similar results. The current setup is adopted as the simplest one that allows us to focus on testable comparative statics.

most natural threshold. In the main model, we assume that once the challenger is on the ballot, votes are counted fairly; below, we discuss the case where the dictator cannot commit to fair counting and show that our results are robust to this extension.

After the election, if the dictator wins the vote, he may still lose power as a result of mass protests. We follow Persson and Tabellini (2009) in assuming that the probability of dictator leaving the office, π, equals the share of population protesting. Each individual in the society makes the decision to protest independently and simultaneously. A citizen who decided to protest gets a disutility of $-c$ (where $c > 0$), which accounts for the likelihood of being shot, wounded, fired from the job, etc.; we expect c to be higher in more cruel regimes. At the same time, a citizen gets an extra 'warm glow' utility, which reflects personal satisfaction from protesting against the hated regime and personally contributing to the dictator's departure.[12] We make the simple assumption that the warm glow utility of citizen i is proportional to his economic dissatisfaction with the regime b_i introduced in (2). More precisely, if citizen i protests and the dictator leaves, i gets an extra utility of αb_i. Citizen i gets some part of this warm glow, γb_i with $\gamma < \alpha$, even if he protested unsuccessfully; this captures the possibility that a sufficiently dissatisfied citizen may protest even if he does not expect the protest to bring him immediate benefits (e.g., the 'Arab Spring' in Tunisia started with a young merchant self-immolating; there were similar episodes following the failure of the Prague Spring in 1968). Clearly, these preferences and intuitions are reversed for a person who strongly supports the dictator (i.e., if b_i is negative and large in absolute value); such a person would never protest as there is no benefit from protesting, only a cost.

The payoffs from protesting are summarised in the following matrix:

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
 & \text{Dictator leaves} & \text{Dictator stays} \\
\text{Citizen protests} & \alpha b_i - c & \gamma b_i - c \\
\text{Citizen stays home} & 0 & 0
\end{array}
\tag{3}
$$

We further make the following assumptions about the parameters in (3):

ASSUMPTION 1. $c > 0$, $\alpha > \gamma > 0$.

The assumption that $\gamma > 0$ is important: it implies that there is always an agent who protests (for b_is high enough, protesting is a dominant strategy). The second assumption, $\alpha > \gamma$, captures the increasing-differences intuition: if citizen i wants the dictator to leave ($b_i > 0$), his propensity to protest is higher if the dictator leaves than if the dictator stays. Indeed, this is equivalent to:

$$
\alpha b_i - c > \gamma b_i - c,
\tag{4}
$$

which simplifies to $\alpha > \gamma$.

Finally, we maintain the following assumption, which ensures the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium. The assumption provides that there is a sufficient variation in citizens' idiosyncratic payoffs from the incumbent's rule. In other words, an individual's attitude toward the dictator, b_i, is not a too good predictor of other citizens' attitudes.

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[12] Persson and Tabellini (2009) introduced this parameter to capture the 'warm glow' that an individual may experience from (successfully) defending the idea he/she firmly believes in, such as defending democracy or overthrowing a much-hated dictator. We assume that some 'warm glow' from protests may be experienced even if the uprising ultimately fails (γb_i in the top-right cell). This is in line with the recent (and growing) literature about ethical actions and warm glow in voting (e.g., Feddersen *et al.*, 2009; see Cherepanov *et al.*, 2013, for experimental evidence).

ASSUMPTION 2. *The variance of individual taste shocks is sufficiently large:*

$$\sigma_\delta > \frac{1}{2\sqrt{2\ln 2}} \frac{c(\alpha - \gamma)}{\gamma^2}. \tag{5}$$

The timing of the game is as follows.

(1) The competencies of the incumbent and challenger, a_D and a_C, are realised.
(2) Each citizen i gets utility r_i^D; the incumbent learns his competence a_D.
(3) The incumbent decides whether to allow the challenger to run or not. If he decides positively, the challenger gets on the ballot with probability $\eta(k)$.
(4) If the challenger is not on the ballot, the game proceeds to Step 6.
(5) Each citizen votes, the votes are counted and the tally τ is announced. If $\tau < \tilde{\tau}$, the dictator is removed from office and the game moves to Step 7 with the challenger in power for the second period.
(6) Each citizen decides whether or not to protest with their payoffs given by (3). With probability π, where π is the share of those who protest, the challenger becomes the new leader and with probability $1 - \pi$, the incumbent stays in power.
(7) Each citizen i gets their second-period utility r_i^P, both politicians get their payoffs and the game ends.

In this game, the dictator's strategy maps b into a binary decision whether or not to prevent the challenger from running. Citizen i acts in two stages: in the voting stage, his strategy maps b_i into a vote for D or for C, and in the protesting stage, his strategy maps (b_i, τ) into a binary decision to protest or not, with $b_i \in \mathbb{R}$ and $\tau \in [0, 1] \cup \{\varnothing\}$, where we say that $\tau = \varnothing$ if the challenger was not on the ballot. We are interested in perfect Bayesian equilibria in pure strategies, where furthermore citizens vote sincerely (so those with $b_i < 0$ support the dictator and those with $b_i > 0$ support the challenger). We discuss below why such strategies are natural in this game where votes serve as a signal relevant for protests. Throughout the article, F and f are the c.d.f. and p.d.f. of a standard normal distribution, respectively.

3. Analysis

Our analysis proceeds as follows. First, we study citizens' decisions. We start with the decision to revolt for any public information they may have at this stage and show that under Assumption 2 there exists a unique equilibrium which takes the threshold form: citizens with low b_i do not protest and citizens with high b_i protest. This is true both in the case where citizens know the value of b and when they only know its distribution, regardless of what this distribution is. We then study citizens' voting decisions and show that sincere voting is an equilibrium. After that, we analyse the incumbent's decision whether or not to prevent the challenger from running. Finally, we formulate testable predictions.

3.1. *Protesting*

We start with characterising individuals' decisions to protest. Denote $b = a_0 - a_D$ and $\delta_i = -\delta_i^D$; with this notation:

$$b_i = b + \delta_i, \tag{6}$$

where δ_i is distributed as $\mathcal{N}\left(0, \sigma_\delta^2\right)$. This represents b_i, which is known to citizen i, as a sum of the common component b and a zero-mean idiosyncratic shock δ_i. Suppose that by the time of protests (Stage 6), after taking all public information (whether or not the election was competitive and if so, its outcome τ) into account, b is believed to be taken from some distribution G. (This G will depend on the decisions of both the dictator and the challenger, but we keep the notation simple for now.) Thus, we study the decision of citizen i to protest if he thinks that b is taken from distribution G and he also observes his b_i. Notice that (6) implies that b_i is also a signal about b, which is relevant to citizen i because it determines the distribution of signals of other citizens, on which they base their decisions to protest; this, in turn, will determine the probability of success and this is valuable information for citizen i making the decision.[13]

Each citizen i, knowing b_i, updates her priors on the distribution of b, thus getting distribution $G_{b_i} = G \mid b_i$.[14] Because of the simple equation (6) that links b and b_i, we prove (the formal statement and its proof are in the Appendix) that G_x first-order stochastically dominates G_y whenever $x > y$: for any $\xi \in \mathbb{R}$ such that $0 < G(\xi) < 1$, we have $G_x(\xi) < G_y(\xi)$.

In a pure-strategy equilibrium, each individual i decides whether or not to protest. Consider the set of protesters: let R_G denote the set of $x \in \mathbb{R}$ such that a citizen who got $b_i = x$ decides to protest. It is natural to expect (see the Appendix for the full proof) that this set takes a form $R_G = [z_G, +\infty)$, where individual i with $b_i = z_G$ is indifferent.[15] If so, the share of protesters, and thus the chance that the dictator loses office, equals:

$$\hat{\pi}_G = \hat{\pi}_G(b) = \Pr(b + \delta_i > z_G) = 1 - F\left(\frac{z_G - b}{\sigma_\delta}\right). \tag{7}$$

However, someone who does not know b (e.g., citizen i with $b_i = x$) needs to integrate over all possible values of b; for this person, the perceived probability of success is:

$$\pi_x = \Pr\left(b + \delta_j > z_G \mid b + \delta_i = x\right) = 1 - \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} F\left(\frac{z_G - b}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dG_x(b). \tag{8}$$

With a slight abuse of notation, we write π_x instead of π_{G_x}. In Appendix, we show (Lemma A1) that π_x is increasing in x, and so citizens who got a higher b_i become more optimistic about the size of protests, even though they are aware of a fixed threshold strategy that other citizens use. Intuitively, a high b_i serves as a signal of their individual (low) utility under the incumbent regime, and since it is also a signal of the aggregate, such citizens believes that many other people feel bad about the incumbent as well. Thus, more of them fall above the protest cutoff z_G, and therefore the share of protesters and the chance of success is higher.

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[13] The protesting game has a lot in common with global games (Carlsson and van Damme, 1993), which are often used to get unique equilibria in games with strategic complementarities such as currency attacks or mass protests. In this article, we make a departure from the standard approach. Technically, we assume that b_i is not merely a signal about the aggregate variable b; it is also a parameter that enters the payoff of citizen i directly. There are two reasons for this approach. First, we believe that citizens have heterogeneous benefit from removing the dictator; their conflict of interests would not vanish if they met together and aggregated their signals, and thus it is realistic to think of b_i as a preference parameter which just happens to be informative of the whole distribution. Second, we are interested in a unique equilibrium even if there is no uncertainty about the underlying variable b, because in our model the dictator has the ability to reveal b by organising fair competitive elections.

[14] More precisely, G_x is the probability distribution of b conditional on $b + \delta_i = x$, given by $G_x(y) = \Pr(b \le y \mid b + \delta_i = x) = \frac{\int_{-\infty}^y f\left(\frac{x-\xi}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dG(\xi)}{\int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} f\left(\frac{x-\xi}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dG(\xi)}$.

[15] An open interval $R_G = (z_G, +\infty)$ is also possible, but we can just assume that the indifferent individuals protest without any loss of generality.

For any individual i with $b_i = x$, the expected continuation utilities from protesting and staying at home are equal to:

$$\mathbb{E}U_p(x) = \pi_x \alpha x + (1 - \pi_x) \gamma x - c + [\pi_x a_0 + (1 - \pi_x) x] \tag{9}$$

$$\mathbb{E}U_s(x) = [\pi_x a_0 + (1 - \pi_x) x], \tag{10}$$

respectively. The terms in brackets reflect the second-period utility and are the same in both cases, as no single individual may affect the chance of success. The threshold citizen with $b_i = z_G$ must be indifferent between protesting and not. Consequently, the cutoff z_G must satisfy:

$$z_G = \frac{c}{(\alpha - \gamma) \pi_{z_G} + \gamma}. \tag{11}$$

Taking into account (8), which must hold for $x = z_G$, we conclude that the equilibrium threshold z_G is defined by the following equation:

$$z_G = \frac{c}{(\alpha - \gamma) \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} F\left(\frac{b - z_G}{\sigma_G}\right) dG_{z_G}(b) + \gamma}. \tag{12}$$

In the Appendix, we prove that for any distribution G of b, the threshold z_G exists and is unique.[16]

PROPOSITION 1. *For any posterior distribution G of beliefs about the difference between politicians' competencies, $b = a_0 - a_D$, that is obtained by the time of protests using publicly available information, there exists a unique protest equilibrium. It is characterised by threshold $z = z_G$ given by (12) that determines which citizens (those with $b_i \geq z_G$) participate in the protest.*

This threshold z_G is increasing in c, the cost of protests and decreasing in α and γ, the utilities that a citizen receives from participating in successful and unsuccessful protests, respectively. Moreover, if distribution G_1 first-order stochastically dominates G_2, then $z_{G_1} < z_{G_2}$. In particular, if the average attitude b is publicly known, then the participation threshold z_b is decreasing in b.

While the detailed proof is relegated to the Appendix, it is instructive to see the work of our mechanism in the special case when the difference in abilities b is public information, and thus the posterior distribution G is an atom at b. Equation (12) then becomes:

$$z_b = \frac{c}{(\alpha - \gamma) F\left(\frac{b - z_b}{\sigma_\delta}\right) + \gamma}, \tag{13}$$

where we again abuse notation and write z_b instead of z_G (likewise, we will use $\hat{\pi}_b$ instead of $\hat{\pi}_G$). Existence follows, since as left-hand side varies from $-\infty$ to $+\infty$, the right-hand side increases from $\frac{c}{\alpha}$ to $\frac{c}{\gamma}$. Uniqueness is less obvious as the right-hand side is also increasing in z. Intuitively, as the protest threshold z becomes higher, the success of protests become less likely, and thus fewer citizens are willing to protest. As a result, a citizen must hate the dictator very much to be willing to protest, which also raises the threshold. Thus, there is a potential for multiple thresholds due to the following strategic complementarity: more citizens protesting makes the

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[16] Notice that the threshold z_G is known to both politicians and citizens, since function G is common knowledge. The probability of success, however, is in the eye of the beholder. The dictator D knows the true value of b and thus the true distribution of $\{b_j\}$, whereas citizens have heterogenous beliefs, except for the case where G is degenerate and b is common knowledge.

success of a revolt more likely, and this encourages even more people to protest. However, uniqueness follows from Assumption 2; it ensures that the derivative of the right-hand side with respect to z is less than 1. The same Assumption 2 guarantees that there are no non-threshold equilibria.

If b is not known, then (12) exhibits an additional effect in the right-hand side as G_z becomes a different distribution as z changes. Specifically, as z increases, the threshold citizen updates on the distribution of b and becomes more confident in the success of the protests. This mitigates the effect that $F\left(\frac{b-z_G}{\sigma_\delta}\right)$ is decreasing in the threshold z, and thus the derivative of the right-hand side of (12) cannot exceed 1 in this case as well. In other words, a decrease of the threshold not only makes citizens more enthusiastic about the probability of success; it also has the opposite effect: the threshold citizen is more sceptical about the overall negative attitude towards the dictator as compared to the challenger, b. This alleviates the strategic complementarity effect described earlier, and makes uniqueness of equilibrium easier to obtain. Importantly, Proposition 1 does not impose any restrictions on the distribution G, which makes it applicable for any revelation strategy of the dictator.

The comparative statics is simple, but instructive. The threshold is lower, and thus the probability of success is higher, if protests are less costly (c is low), because for any fixed chance of success more people are willing to protest. Similarly, if a person who dislikes the dictator has a stronger incentive to protest (either α or γ is higher), more people will protest. Now, if for two distributions G_1 and G_2, the former dominates the latter, then the chance of success if all citizens above a certain threshold protest is higher under G_1 than under G_2; this, in turn, makes more people willing to protest in the former case. This last part has general implications: a dictator who is perceived to be incompetent or who faces an opponent believed to be competent will face a lower threshold z_G and thus larger-scale protests.

3.2. *Voting*

Consider citizens' voting behaviour. Their preferences are simple: a citizen i with $b_i < 0$ wants the dictator to stay in office, while citizen with $b_i > 0$ wants to see him replaced. Thus, sincere voting strategies prescribe individuals to vote for the incumbent if and only if $b_i < 0$. This is indeed an equilibrium, for the simple reason that each citizen is infinitesimal. This also involves no dominated strategies; however, the standard reasoning for such voting behaviour is not sufficient. In this game, not only the voting outcome matters, but also the protests that may follow, and the share of votes that the dictator gets will serve as a signal about b, which will in turn affect z_b, the protest threshold.

Fortunately, voting and signalling incentives of citizens are aligned. Suppose, for the sake of the argument, that citizen i controls a small but positive mass ε of votes, and other citizens vote sincerely. Suppose that he wants the dictator to stay ($b_i < 0$). If he deviated and voted against the dictator, it would have two effects. First, the dictator would lose elections with probability at least as high. Second, for any voting decisions of other citizens, the dictator's vote share will decrease. Thus, other citizens would believe that the share of those with $b_i > 0$ is higher, so b is higher than it actually is. This would decrease the protest threshold and increase the chance that the dictator loses the office, which is unambiguously bad for citizen i regardless of whether he protests or not. Hence, such a citizen would not want to deviate. Similarly, a citizen with

$b_i > 0$ would not deviate because a deviation would increase the chance of the dictator winning elections, and also lead to smaller-scale protests.

PROPOSITION 2. *Sincere voting strategies, where citizens with $b_i \leq 0$ vote for the incumbent dictator D and those with $b_i > 0$ vote for the challenger C, constitute a voting equilibrium in undominated strategies. In this equilibrium, the share of votes obtained by the dictator is:*

$$\tau(b) = F\left(\frac{b}{\sigma_\delta}\right). \tag{14}$$

We thus restrict attention to equilibria where voters use sincere voting strategies.[17]

3.3. *Incumbent's Decision*

We now consider the dictator's decision to allow a fair election or prohibit the challenger from running. To understand the incumbent's decision, consider the perception of the threshold citizen with $b_i = z_G$ about the size of the protests. He believes that the share of protesters and the probability of success equal π_{z_G}, which may be less than $\hat{\pi}_G$, the objective probability of success, or greater than that. If $\pi_{z_G} < \hat{\pi}_G$, the dictator expects larger-scale protests than the threshold citizen. For such a dictator, revealing the true value b to citizens would be dangerous: all citizens, including the threshold one, will update their beliefs and think that for the same protesting strategies (with threshold z_G), the share of protesters would be higher: $\hat{\pi}_G > \pi_{z_G}$. But in this case, the citizen who got $b_i = z_G$ would no longer be indifferent; he would strictly prefer to protest, as would citizens with slightly lower signals. This would make protests even bigger and overall, the threshold would decrease, further endangering the dictator. In case $\pi_{z_G} > \hat{\pi}_G$, the logic is the opposite. Here, the threshold citizen z_G is too optimistic about the chances to oust the dictator. Revealing true b would make him more sceptical, and he would then strictly prefer to stay at home. Thus, fewer people would protest, thus increasing the chance that the dictator survives. Consequently, we have the following result about the dictator's incentives to reveal the information he has on b in face of protests.

Let G denote the *ex ante* distribution of b. Ideally, the dictator would have elections if and only if $b < b_G^*$, where b_G^* solves $z_G = z_{b_G^*}$ (so the share of protesters are the same with and without elections; in the Appendix we show that this threshold exists and is unique). But he faces two problems. First, it is possible that the share of votes that the dictator receives, $\tau(b)$, satisfies $\tau(b_G^*) < \tilde{\tau}$, so there are dictators who would want to have fair elections because of their signalling value, but are afraid of losing. But even when this is not a constraint, there is a second problem: citizens know that a dictator who does not allow fair elections comes with b taken not

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[17] We cannot claim that sincere voting is the only equilibrium in undominated strategies. Indeed, consider the opposite strategies: vote for the dictator if and only if $b_i > 0$, i.e., only if person i wants the dictator to lose elections. If such a person with $b_i > 0$ deviated and voted against the dictator (suppose again, for the sake of the argument, that he controls a small positive mass of votes), there would be two effects. First, the chance that the dictator loses elections would be higher. Second, in case he wins, he would get fewer votes. However, since the voting strategies in this candidate equilibrium are reversed, the change in vote tally would be interpreted by Bayesian citizens as more support for the dictator, not less, and this would reduce the share of protesters (see Proposition 1). Citizen i wants the dictator to lose power and thus protests to be large-scale. Thus, if he believes that he is unlikely to be pivotal (which must be true if the dictator dared to have competitive elections), then deviation to sincere voting is not profitable because of signalling value that this vote carries. Such voting strategies will deliver the same results as sincere voting as everyone will update correctly.

Fig. 1. *The Distribution H_y for $y = b_E$. The Dictator Opts for Fair Election if $b < b_E$, and the Challenger Runs with Probability η.*

from G, but from another distribution $H_{b_G^*}(\cdot)$, where for any y, $H_y(x)$ is defined as:

$$H_y(x) = \begin{cases} \dfrac{(1-\eta)\,G(x)}{1-\eta G(y)} & \text{if } x < y \\ \dfrac{G(x) - \eta G(y)}{1 - \eta G(y)} & \text{if } x \geq y \end{cases}. \qquad (15)$$

This distribution first-order stochastically dominates G, and thus the protest threshold under $H_{b_G^*}$ would be $z_{H_{b_G^*}} < z_G = z_{b_G^*}$, and since the inequality is strict, $z_{H_{b_G^*}} < z_b$ for some $b > b_G^*$. If so, the dictator would be better off revealing such value of b. This argument suggests unravelling: since dictators with sufficiently low b have elections, those who do not are believed to know that b is high, and the borderline ones have to have elections to reveal that b is not too high.

However, there is a limit to this unravelling, even if the constraint $\tau(b) \geq \tilde{\tau}$ is not binding. To see why, notice first that for any belief about the distribution of b for dictators who failed to have competitive elections, the dictator's best response must follow a threshold rule: have elections if and only if $b \leq y$. Then the posterior distribution of citizens' signals (before taking b_i into account) is given by H_y. Notice that this distribution converges to G in distribution both when $y \to -\infty$ and when $y \to +\infty$, but G first-order stochastically dominates H_y for any finite y, implying $z_{H_y} < z_G$. Thus, if y is very low, so elections are almost always pure farce, then some types of incumbents would be willing to reveal b. On the other hand, if y is sufficiently high, so almost every incumbent allows competitive elections whenever he can, then failure to do so would not be held against the dictator, and in particular would not be a strong signal about b. In this case, sufficiently unpopular dictators would not want to have fair elections. Ultimately, there is a threshold $y = b_E$, and it is unique; this threshold satisfies the condition $z_{H_y} = z_y$. The distribution H_y for $y = b_E$ is depicted on Figure 1.

We are now ready to formulate the main result of the article, which establishes existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, as well as comparative statics.

PROPOSITION 3. *There exists a unique threshold b_E such that the dictator chooses fair elections if and only if $b \leq b_E$. The threshold satisfies $\tau(b_E) \geq \tilde{\tau}$, but does not depend on $\tilde{\tau}$ otherwise. Furthermore, the threshold b_E is (weakly) increasing in c and in η, and thus decreasing in k (everywhere 'strictly' if $\tau(b_E) > \tilde{\tau}$), i.e., a repressiveness against the elite (high k / low η) makes fair elections less likely, while a cruel regime (high c) makes fair elections more likely.*

In equilibrium, both competitive elections and pure farce happen with positive probabilities. Existence follows quite naturally from the argument above. To show uniqueness, we use

that function z_{H_y} is strictly quasi-convex, and its lowest point corresponds precisely to the equilibrium.[18] This is an interesting property in itself: it suggests that of all possible thresholds for having fair elections, the equilibrium b_E makes the dictators who choose to have the pure farce elections worse off, in that they are going to face protests of the largest scale.

To see the intuition for comparative statics, suppose first that the repression level is low, so the opposition leader is ready to run almost surely, if allowed. Then η is high, and if the challenger is absent from the ballot, the inference is that the dictator prohibited him from running and is therefore considering himself unpopular. In this case, without competitive elections the protests will be larger, which is more dangerous for the dictator. This makes him more willing to have elections. In contrast, in a repressive regime, the absence of an opposition leader from the ballot is not necessarily blamed on the dictator's unpopularity. Thus, more repressive regimes are less likely to have free elections, because citizens do not infer much if the election is not competitive.

The effect of cruelty toward protesters (higher c) is only a bit more subtle. A higher cost of protests discourages participation in protests, both with and without fair elections. However, there is an additional effect: a lower number of protesters makes citizens more pessimistic about the success of an uprising, which further decreases participation in protests. The first effect is similar in size in both cases, but the second effect is more pronounced if citizens are better informed about the dictator's popularity. Intuitively, after an increase in c, only citizens who have very negative opinions about the dictator (have high b_i) would keep protesting. If they do not know the realisation of b, they would think that other citizens are also negative about the dictator, because their high b_i serves, in particular, as a signal about higher b. This belief that other citizens hate the dictator makes them more willing to protest, and this makes marginally more citizens protest. In contrast, when b is known, citizens to not use their b_i to update on b. Consequently, a higher cost of protests c is more likely to deter citizens who know the true value of b, and this makes the dictator more willing to reveal his popularity by having fair elections.

4. Robustness and Extensions

In this section, we briefly discuss robustness of the main model with respect to four possible extensions, the endogenous participation of the challenger, the implications for the dictator's choice of cruelty and repressiveness of his regime and, finally, the international pressure.

4.1. *Endogenous Participation of Challenger*

In the main model, we assumed that repressiveness of the regime, k, negatively affects η, the probability that the challenger is able to get on the ballot if the dictator does not prohibit him from running. This parameter, η, can be microfounded as follows.

Assume that to emerge on the political scene and to get on the ballot, the challenger needs support of at least some share of citizens. To model that, assume that there is a continuum of activists who dislike the dictator; for simplicity, they are distinct from the citizens who vote and protest. They would be willing to demonstrate support to the challenger if the cost of doing so, which equals repressiveness of the regime k, does not exceed their willingness to protest. The

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[18] In other words, $y = b_E$ is the unique minimand of z_{H_y} over $(-\infty, \tilde{b}) \cap$ (support of G) and satisfies $0 < G(b_E) < 1$. Ostaszewski and Gietzmann (2008) prove as similar result in the context of a model of (non-)disclosure of information in Dye (1985) (see also Acharya *et al.*, 2011), and Shadmehr and Bernhardt (2015) do so in a model of state censorship.

utility from supporting the challenger is w_i for activist i, where w_i is taken independently from distribution with c.d.f. Φ. Let us assume that the probability of getting on the ballot equals that share of activists who supported the challenger.

In this setup, each activist makes an independent decision whether or not to show support for the challenger. She does so if $w_i \geq k$, thus, the share of activists who show support equals $1 - \Phi(k)$. If so, we have that the probability of getting on the ballot equals $\eta = 1 - \Phi(k)$, which is a decreasing function of k. Thus, this simple model microfounds the assumption that η may be thought of as a decreasing function of repressiveness of the regime against political opposition, k. However, incorporating this in the main model would have produced an additional layer of cumbersome formulae without changing the qualitative results.

4.2. *Endogenous Repressiveness and Cruelty*

In this article, we focus on a short-run decision, whether to have fair election or not in order to maximise the chance of staying in power. This question is novel in the formal literature, which justifies our focus. Over a longer horizon, the dictator's prospect of facing this tradeoff may affect his long-run decisions on how to run the country. Among these is the choice of cruelty parameter c and repressiveness against opposition k. For example, increasing c might involve investment in the army and the police force, or staffing them with the most loyal individuals. Increasing k likely involves imprisonment, torture and killings of possible contenders.

The model above suggests that increasing c cannot hurt the dictator, and the only downside may be the cost of doing so. At the same time, this model implies a nontrivial tradeoff related to k. By choosing a high k, thus cleansing the political field so that η is close to zero, the dictator loses the ability to have competitive elections even if he wants to. This failure to properly communicate his popularity might actually ignite mass protests. Of course, if the dictator chooses a low k, it would be likely that strong opposition leaders are available, but on the flip side the dictator would be pressured to have competitive elections or effectively admit that he is weak and unpopular. Both these extremes are unlikely to be optimal, giving rise to an interesting trade-off. Modelling it explicitly is beyond the scope of the article; nevertheless, the model can be readily extending to study the decision to encourage or repress opposition as part of a broader strategy of the incumbent. For example, one might expect the regime who expects to be more popular to also opt to be more liberal, because it would want to retain the ability to signal popularity; conversely, a regime that expects to face economic hurdles might opt for more repressive policies.

4.3. *International Pressure*[19]

Suppose the international community incentivises the dictator to run competitive elections, for example, by applying sanctions if the election is not free. If the cost of not having free elections is r, then a unique equilibrium exists, and the threshold $b_E(r)$, above which the dictator prefers to run unopposed, is increasing in r. In other words, such pressure would make competitive elections more likely.

It may be, however, that the goal of the international community is to have the regime overthrown. In this case, such pressure may backfire. Indeed, since the threshold of protest

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[19] We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting to discuss this as an extension.

participation is quasi-convex with the minimum achieved at the equilibrium level $b_E(0)$, the chance of survival for a dictator who defies the pressure will be, on average, higher, not lower. In other words, while such a policy would pressure some marginal dictators to have elections, it would actually help those who do not by improving citizens' posterior beliefs about their popularity.

Interestingly, the model suggests that the international community might be more successful if it tries to affect a different margin. For example, if it provides certain guarantees to the challenger and thus encourages him to run, it would also have a positive effect on the dictator's readiness to have competitive elections without the side effect mentioned above. Indeed, such a policy would effectively increase η, which would imply that citizens would think more negatively about a dictator who decides to run unopposed. In equilibrium, the threshold b_E will increase, and thus the international community will be successful in having more competitive elections.

5. Conclusion

In this article, we built a theory of elections in nondemocratic polities. The incumbent decides whether or not to have free and fair elections with the goal of signalling his popularity. However, citizens do not know if the dictator runs unopposed (or at least with no credible opponents) because he prevented the challenger from running, or because the regime is so repressive that such a challenger failed to emerge. We establish existence of a unique equilibrium with intuitive comparative statics which, however, differentiates our theory from those in the literature. A regime that is more repressive towards opposition leaders has, in equilibrium, a lower probability of free elections and this relationship is persistent: the past repressiveness makes new repressions more effective in maintaining power. A regime that is crueller towards common people—at least those who dare to protest—has a higher probability of free elections.

Our model is simple, tractable and allows for testable predictions, but it is not without limitations. Most importantly, the interaction between the incumbent and the opposition is one-shot. It would be interesting to analyse having free elections at different times of the incumbent's tenure as a dynamic problem for the dictator; it is equally interesting to study the competition among possible opposition leaders in the shadow of an authoritarian incumbent and how the presence of such an incumbent affects their desire to participate in elections, coordinate on a single candidate, etc. Empirically, it would be interesting to look deeper at the incumbent's decisions such as whether or not to call for elections that were not scheduled or at opposition's decision to actively campaign of boycott the election.

Appendix A: Proofs

To prove the propositions, we start with several lemmas.

LEMMA A1. *Suppose agent i got $b_i = x$ and agent j got $b_j = y$, and $x > y$. Then G_x first-order stochastically dominates G_y: For any $z \in \mathbb{R}$ such that $0 < G(z) < 1$, we have $G_x(z) < G_y(z)$.*

Proof of Lemma A1. Let us prove that for two values of b_i, x and y such that $x > y$, G_x first-order stochastically dominates G_y (wherever $G(z) \in (0, 1)$).

We need to prove that $G_x(z)$ is decreasing in x for any fixed $z \in \mathbb{R}$ such that $G(z) \in (0,1)$. We have

$$G_x(z) = \frac{\int_{-\infty}^{z} \frac{1}{\sigma_\delta} f\left(\frac{x-\xi}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dG(\xi)}{\int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} \frac{1}{\sigma_\delta} f\left(\frac{x-\xi}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dG(\xi)} = \frac{1}{1 + \frac{\int_{z}^{+\infty} f\left(\frac{x-\xi}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dG(\xi)}{\int_{-\infty}^{z} f\left(\frac{x-\xi}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dG(\xi)}}.$$

This is decreasing in x if and only if

$$\ln\left(\frac{1}{G_x(z)} - 1\right) = \ln \int_{z}^{+\infty} f\left(\frac{x-\xi}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dG(\xi) - \ln \int_{-\infty}^{z} f\left(\frac{x-\xi}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dG(\xi),$$

is increasing in x (for $0 < G_x(z) < 1$ the left-hand side is well-defined). Differentiating with respect to x, we get

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial x}\left[\ln\left(\frac{1}{G_x(z)} - 1\right)\right] = \frac{\int_{z}^{+\infty} \frac{1}{\sigma_\delta} f'\left(\frac{x-\xi}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dG(\xi)}{\int_{z}^{+\infty} f\left(\frac{x-\xi}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dG(\xi)} - \frac{\int_{-\infty}^{z} \frac{1}{\sigma_\delta} f'\left(\frac{x-\xi}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dG(\xi)}{\int_{-\infty}^{z} f\left(\frac{x-\xi}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dG(\xi)}.$$

But for normal distribution, $\frac{f'(a)}{f(a)}$ increasing in a, thus $\frac{f'\left(\frac{x-\xi}{\sigma_\delta}\right)}{f\left(\frac{x-\xi}{\sigma_\delta}\right)} > \frac{f'\left(\frac{x-z}{\sigma_\delta}\right)}{f\left(\frac{x-z}{\sigma_\delta}\right)}$ if $\xi > z$ and $\frac{f'\left(\frac{x-\xi}{\sigma_\delta}\right)}{f\left(\frac{x-\xi}{\sigma_\delta}\right)} < \frac{f'\left(\frac{x-z}{\sigma_\delta}\right)}{f\left(\frac{x-z}{\sigma_\delta}\right)}$ if $\xi < z$, and therefore

$$\frac{\int_{z}^{+\infty} f'\left(\frac{x-\xi}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dG(\xi)}{\int_{z}^{+\infty} f\left(\frac{x-\xi}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dG(\xi)} = \frac{\int_{z}^{+\infty} f\left(\frac{x-\xi}{\sigma_\delta}\right) \frac{f'\left(\frac{x-\xi}{\sigma_\delta}\right)}{f\left(\frac{x-\xi}{\sigma_\delta}\right)} dG(\xi)}{\int_{z}^{+\infty} f\left(\frac{x-\xi}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dG(\xi)} > \frac{\int_{z}^{+\infty} f\left(\frac{x-\xi}{\sigma_\delta}\right) \frac{f'\left(\frac{x-z}{\sigma_\delta}\right)}{f\left(\frac{x-z}{\sigma_\delta}\right)} dG(\xi)}{\int_{z}^{+\infty} f\left(\frac{x-\xi}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dG(\xi)} = \frac{f'\left(\frac{x-z}{\sigma_\delta}\right)}{f\left(\frac{x-z}{\sigma_\delta}\right)}$$

$$\frac{\int_{-\infty}^{z} f'\left(\frac{x-\xi}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dG(\xi)}{\int_{-\infty}^{z} f\left(\frac{x-\xi}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dG(\xi)} = \frac{\int_{-\infty}^{z} f\left(\frac{x-\xi}{\sigma_\delta}\right) \frac{f'\left(\frac{x-\xi}{\sigma_\delta}\right)}{f\left(\frac{x-\xi}{\sigma_\delta}\right)} dG(\xi)}{\int_{-\infty}^{z} f\left(\frac{x-\xi}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dG(\xi)} < \frac{\int_{-\infty}^{z} f\left(\frac{x-\xi}{\sigma_\delta}\right) \frac{f'\left(\frac{x-z}{\sigma_\delta}\right)}{f\left(\frac{x-z}{\sigma_\delta}\right)} dG(\xi)}{\int_{-\infty}^{z} f\left(\frac{x-\xi}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dG(\xi)} = \frac{f'\left(\frac{x-z}{\sigma_\delta}\right)}{f\left(\frac{x-z}{\sigma_\delta}\right)}.$$

This proves that $\frac{\partial}{\partial x}[\ln(\frac{1}{G_x(z)} - 1)] > 0$, and thus $G_x(z)$ is decreasing in x for any z. □

LEMMA A2. *Suppose that it is public information that $b \sim G$, and citizens i protests if and only if $b_i \in R$, where R satisfies the following: If $x > \frac{c}{\gamma}$, then $x \in R$; if $x < \frac{c}{\alpha}$, then $x \notin R$. Then the probability of success as perceived by citizen i with $b_i = x$,*

$$\pi_{G_x} = \Pr\left(b + \delta_j \in R \mid b + \delta_i = x\right), \tag{A1}$$

is increasing in x (strictly if G is not degenerate).

Proof of Lemma A2. Consider the probability of success for a fixed and known value of b:

$$\hat{\pi}_R(b) = \Pr\left(b + \delta_j \in R\right) = \int_{x \in R} \frac{1}{\sigma_\delta} f\left(\frac{x-b}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dx. \tag{A2}$$

Take two citizens with values b_i equal to x and y with $x > y$; we have

$$\pi_{G_x} = \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} \hat{\pi}_R(b) \, dG_x(b),$$

and, similarly, for y. By Lemma A1, G_x first-order stochastically dominates G_y. Therefore, to prove that $\pi_{G_x} \geq \pi_{G_y}$, with strict inequality if G is not degenerate, it suffices to prove that $\hat{\pi}_R(b)$ is increasing in b.

To do this, consider the following cases. Suppose first $b < \frac{c}{\alpha}$. We can rewrite (A2) as

$$\hat{\pi}_R(b) = 1 - F\left(\frac{\frac{c}{\gamma} - b}{\sigma_\delta}\right) + \frac{1}{\sigma_\delta} \int_{x \in R, \frac{c}{\alpha} < x < \frac{c}{\gamma}} f\left(\frac{x - b}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dx.$$

Since $b < \frac{c}{\alpha}$, then $x > b$ in the integral, thus $f(\frac{x-b}{\sigma_\delta})$ is decreasing in its argument and thus increasing in b, and so $\hat{\pi}_R(b)$ is increasing in b.

Second, consider the case $b > \frac{c}{\gamma}$. Let us rewrite (A2) as

$$\hat{\pi}_R(b) = 1 - \int_{x \notin R} \frac{1}{\sigma_\delta} f\left(\frac{x - b}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dx$$

$$= 1 - F\left(\frac{\frac{c}{\alpha} - b}{\sigma_\delta}\right) - \frac{1}{\sigma_\delta} \int_{x \notin R, \frac{c}{\alpha} < x < \frac{c}{\gamma}} f\left(\frac{x - b}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dx.$$

Here, $x < b$ in the integral, so $f(\frac{x-b}{\sigma_\delta})$ is increasing in its argument, and thus decreasing in b; consequently, $\hat{\pi}_G$ is increasing in b in this case as well.

Finally, consider the case $\frac{c}{\alpha} < b < \frac{c}{\gamma}$. In this case, differentiating with respect to b under the integral (this is a valid operation here) yields

$$\frac{d\hat{\pi}_R(b)}{db} = \frac{d}{db}\left(1 - F\left(\frac{\frac{c}{\gamma} - b}{\sigma_\delta}\right) + \frac{1}{\sigma_\delta} \int_{x \in R, \frac{c}{\alpha} < x < \frac{c}{\gamma}} f\left(\frac{x - b}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dx\right)$$

$$= \frac{1}{\sigma_\delta}\left(f\left(\frac{\frac{c}{\gamma} - b}{\sigma_\delta}\right) - \int_{x \in R, \frac{c}{\alpha} < x < \frac{c}{\gamma}} \frac{1}{\sigma_\delta} f'\left(\frac{x - b}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dx\right)$$

$$= \frac{1}{\sigma_\delta}\left(f\left(\frac{\frac{c}{\gamma} - b}{\sigma_\delta}\right) - \int_{x \in R, \frac{c}{\alpha} < x < b} \frac{1}{\sigma_\delta} f'\left(\frac{x - b}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dx - \int_{x \in R, b < x < \frac{c}{\gamma}} \frac{1}{\sigma_\delta} f'\left(\frac{x - b}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dx\right)$$

$$> \frac{1}{\sigma_\delta}\left(f\left(\frac{\frac{c}{\gamma} - b}{\sigma_\delta}\right) - \int_{\frac{c}{\alpha}}^{b} \frac{1}{\sigma_\delta} f'\left(\frac{x - b}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dx\right)$$

$$= \frac{1}{\sigma_\delta}\left(f\left(\frac{\frac{c}{\gamma} - b}{\sigma_\delta}\right) + f\left(\frac{\frac{c}{\alpha} - b}{\sigma_\delta}\right) - f(0)\right).$$

The last term is obviously positive for $b = \frac{c}{\alpha}$ and $b = \frac{c}{\gamma}$, It is also positive for $b = \frac{1}{2}(\frac{c}{\alpha} + \frac{c}{\gamma})$ by Assumption 2. Indeed, for such b, the last term is positive if and only if $2f(\frac{\frac{c}{\gamma} - \frac{c}{\alpha}}{2\sigma_\delta}) > f(0)$, which is equivalent to $\sigma_\delta > \frac{1}{2\sqrt{2\ln 2}}c(\frac{1}{\gamma} - \frac{1}{\alpha}) = \frac{1}{2\sqrt{2\ln 2}}\frac{c(\alpha - \gamma)}{\alpha\gamma}$. Since $\alpha > \gamma$, this follows from Assumption 2.

It remains to show that the last term in positive for $b \in (\frac{1}{2}(\frac{c}{\alpha} + \frac{c}{\gamma}), \frac{c}{\gamma})$ (the case $b \in (\frac{c}{\alpha}, \frac{1}{2}(\frac{c}{\alpha} + \frac{c}{\gamma}))$) is symmetric). Let $w = \frac{1}{2\sigma_\delta}(\frac{c}{\gamma} - \frac{c}{\alpha})$ and $x = \frac{1}{\sigma_\delta}(\frac{1}{2}(\frac{c}{\alpha} + \frac{c}{\gamma}) - b)$. For a fixed w, consider the function $h(x) = f(x - w) + f(x + w)$. In terms of function h, we know that $h(0) > f(0)$ and $h(w) > f(0)$, and we need to show that $h(x) > f(0)$ for $x \in (0, w)$.

To do this, it suffices to show that h is quasiconcave on $(0, +\infty)$ for any w. We have

$$\frac{d}{dx}h(x) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}}\left((w-x)e^{-\frac{(x-w)^2}{2}} - (w+x)e^{-\frac{(x+w)^2}{2}}\right)$$

$$\frac{d^2}{dx^2}h(x) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}}\left(\left((w-x)^2-1\right)e^{-\frac{(x-w)^2}{2}} + \left((w+x)^2-1\right)e^{-\frac{(x+w)^2}{2}}\right).$$

The derivative $\frac{d}{dx}h(x)$ equals zero if and only if

$$\frac{1-t}{1+t} - e^{-2w^2t} = 0, \tag{A3}$$

where $t = \frac{x}{w}$. If $w \leq 1$, the equation (A3) has a unique solution $t = 0$, so $x = 0$ is a global maximum and h is quasiconcave. If $w > 1$, (A3) has two nonnegative solutions: $t = 0$ corresponds to a local minimum $x = 0$ and another root $t = t^*$, to a global maximum $x = x^* = wt^*$; this proves the quasiconcavity of h on $(0, +\infty)$ in this case as well.[20]

We have thus shown that $h(x) > f(0)$ for $x \in (0, w)$, since this is true for $x = 0$ and $x = w$. This finishes the proof that $\frac{d\hat{\pi}_R(b)}{db} > 0$ for $b \in (\frac{c}{\alpha}, \frac{c}{\gamma})$. Therefore, $\hat{\pi}_R(b)$ is strictly increasing in b on $b \in (-\infty, +\infty)$, and this completes the proof. □

Proof of Proposition 1. Let us first consider the case of a degenerate distribution G, so assume b is known. In this case, citizens know $\hat{\pi}_G$, which equals π_{G_x} for any x. Thus, $\mathbb{E}U_p(b_i) \geq \mathbb{E}U_s(b_i)$ if and only if $b_i \geq \frac{c}{(\alpha-\gamma)\hat{\pi}_G+\gamma}$. Therefore, there must exist a threshold $z = z_b \in (-\infty, +\infty)$ such that citizens with $b_i \geq z_b$ protest and those with $b_i < z_b$ do not.

Since $\hat{\pi}_G$ is given by (7), this threshold $z = z_b$ constitutes an equilibrium if and only if $Q(z) = 0$, where

$$Q(z) = z - \frac{c}{(\alpha-\gamma)\left(1-F\left(\frac{z-b}{\sigma_\delta}\right)\right)+\gamma}. \tag{A4}$$

By the Assumptions 1 and 2, $\frac{dQ(z)}{dz} > 0$, and thus $Q(z)$ is an increasing function of z. Indeed,

$$\frac{dQ(z)}{dz} = 1 - \frac{1}{\sigma_\delta}\frac{c(\alpha-\gamma)f\left(\frac{z-b}{\sigma_\delta}\right)}{\left((\alpha-\gamma)\left(1-F\left(\frac{z-b}{\sigma_\delta}\right)\right)+\gamma\right)^2} > 1 - \frac{1}{\sigma_\delta}\frac{c(\alpha-\gamma)}{\gamma^2}\frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} > 0,$$

because $\sqrt{2\pi} > 2\sqrt{2\ln 2}$. Moreover, $\lim_{z\to-\infty}Q(z) = -\infty$ and $\lim_{z\to+\infty}Q(z) = +\infty$. This means that there is exactly one value of $z = z_b$ such that $Q(z) = 0$. This proves that there exists a unique equilibrium.

Now consider the case where b is not an atom and is distributed with c.d.f. G. Let us show that the equilibrium must take the form of a threshold. Suppose that the set of values b_i such that

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[20] Indeed (A3) becomes 0 for $t = 0$ for any w. Differentiating the left-hand side yields

$$\frac{d}{dt}\left(\frac{1-t}{1+t} - e^{-2w^2t}\right) = -\frac{2}{(1+t)^2} + 2w^2e^{-2w^2t},$$

which equals zero if and only if $1 + t = \frac{1}{w}e^{w^2t}$; thus, the derivative has no positive roots if $w \leq 1$ and a unique positive root if $w > 1$. This proves that for $w \leq 1$, (A3) is a monotone function, and it is decreasing rather than increasing, because it is negative if t is large. This also proves that for $w > 1$, (A3) has a unique positive root. Indeed, it has root because the left-hand side is positive for small t (if $w > 1$) and is negative for large t. If it had two roots $0 < t_1 < t_2$, then the derivative would have to equal zero at some points $t_3 \in (0, t_1)$ and $t_4 \in (t_1, t_2)$, but we just showed that it has only one root. Thus, the root t^* is unique, and the function changes its sign from positive to negative, i.e., it is a global maximum on $(0, +\infty)$.

citizens with these realisations protest in equilibrium is R_G. Citizen i protests if and only if

$$x \geq \frac{c}{(\alpha - \gamma)\pi_{G_x} + \gamma}. \tag{A5}$$

Since $\pi_{G_x} \in [0, 1]$, citizens with $b_i > \frac{c}{\gamma}$ must protest and citizens with $b_i < \frac{c}{\alpha}$ must not (these types have a dominant strategy), thus $\{x : x > \frac{c}{\gamma}\} \subset R_G$ and $\{x : x > \frac{c}{\gamma}\} \cap R_G = \varnothing$. Therefore, Lemma A2 is applicable, which implies that π_{G_x} is increasing in x. Since the left-hand side of (A5) is increasing in x and its right-hand side is decreasing in x, it must be that a citizen i protests if and only if $b_i \geq z_G$ for some z_G.

It remains to show that the equilibrium threshold exists and is unique. The threshold $z = z_G$ must satisfy $\tilde{Q}(z) = 0$, where

$$\tilde{Q}(z) = z - \frac{c}{(\alpha - \gamma)\left(1 - \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} F\left(\frac{z-b}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dG_z(b)\right) + \gamma}. \tag{A6}$$

Let us prove that

$$\frac{d}{dz} \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} F\left(\frac{z-b}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dG_z(b) < \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}\sigma_\delta}. \tag{A7}$$

Notice that the following identity holds, due to integration by parts:

$$\int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} F\left(\frac{z-b}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dG_z(b) = F\left(\frac{z-b}{\sigma_\delta}\right) G_z(b) \Big|_{b=-\infty}^{b=+\infty} + \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} G_z(b) \frac{1}{\sigma_\delta} f\left(\frac{z-b}{\sigma_\delta}\right) db$$

$$= \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} G_z(b) \frac{1}{\sigma_\delta} f\left(\frac{z-b}{\sigma_\delta}\right) db.$$

Using this last formula to differentiate with respect to the second inclusion of z (in $G_z(b)$), we have

$$\frac{d}{dz} \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} F\left(\frac{z-b}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dG_z(b) = \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} \frac{1}{\sigma_\delta} f\left(\frac{z-b}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dG_z(b) + \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} \left(\frac{\partial}{\partial z} G_z(b)\right) \frac{1}{\sigma_\delta} f\left(\frac{z-b}{\sigma_\delta}\right) db$$

$$< \frac{1}{\sigma_\delta} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} + 0 = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}\sigma_\delta},$$

where we used the fact that $G_z(b)$ is decreasing in b, as proved in Lemma A1. This proves (A7), which we now use to substitute the numeraire in

$$\frac{d\tilde{Q}(z)}{dz} = 1 - \frac{c(\alpha - \gamma) \frac{d}{dz} \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} F\left(\frac{z-b}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dG_z(b)}{\left((\alpha - \gamma)\left(1 - \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} F\left(\frac{z-b}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dG_z(b)\right) + \gamma\right)^2} > 1 - \frac{1}{\sigma_\delta} \frac{c(\alpha - \gamma)}{\gamma^2} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} > 0.$$

This shows that $\tilde{Q}(z)$ is strictly increasing in z and the equilibrium threshold $z = z_G$ is unique. Its existence follows, as before, from that $\lim_{z \to -\infty} \tilde{Q}(z) = -\infty$ and $\lim_{z \to +\infty} \tilde{Q}(z) = +\infty$. Consequently, there is a unique equilibrium threshold z_G for any distribution G.

Let us now prove the comparative statics results. If b is fixed, then treating Q (from (A4)) as a function of z, c, γ, α, b, we get

$$\frac{\partial Q}{\partial c} = -\frac{1}{(\alpha - \gamma)\left(1 - F\left(\frac{z-b}{\sigma_\delta}\right)\right) + \gamma} < 0$$

$$\frac{\partial Q}{\partial \alpha} = \frac{c\left(1 - F\left(\frac{z-b}{\sigma_\delta}\right)\right)}{\left((\alpha - \gamma)\left(1 - F\left(\frac{z-b}{\sigma_\delta}\right)\right) + \gamma\right)^2} > 0$$

$$\frac{\partial Q}{\partial \gamma} = \frac{c F\left(\frac{z-b}{\sigma_\delta}\right)}{\left((\alpha - \gamma)\left(1 - F\left(\frac{z-b}{\sigma_\delta}\right)\right) + \gamma\right)^2} > 0$$

$$\frac{\partial Q}{db} = \frac{1}{\sigma_\delta} \frac{c f\left(\frac{z-b}{\sigma_\delta}\right)}{\left((\alpha - \gamma)\left(1 - F\left(\frac{z-b}{\sigma_\delta}\right)\right) + \gamma\right)^2} > 0.$$

Moreover, we already showed that $\frac{\partial Q}{\partial z} > 0$. Consequently, $\frac{\partial z_b}{\partial c} > 0$, $\frac{\partial z_b}{\partial \alpha} < 0$, $\frac{\partial z_b}{\partial \gamma} < 0$, $\frac{\partial z_b}{\partial b} < 0$. If b is not known but is distributed as G, the same comparative statics with respect to c, α, γ follows by differentiating $\tilde{Q}$ (from (A6)) with respect to these variables (this is analogous) and using $\frac{\partial \tilde{Q}}{\partial z} > 0$, also established above.

Finally, consider two distributions of b, G_1 and G_2, such that G_1 first-order stochastically dominates G_2. Then we have

$$1 - \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} F\left(\frac{z-b}{\sigma_\delta}\right) d\,(G_1)_z\,(b) = \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} \left(1 - F\left(\frac{z-b}{\sigma_\delta}\right)\right) d\,(G_1)_z\,(b)$$

$$> \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} \left(1 - F\left(\frac{z-b}{\sigma_\delta}\right)\right) d\,(G_2)_z\,(b)$$

$$= 1 - \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} F\left(\frac{z-b}{\sigma_\delta}\right) d\,(G_2)_z\,(b),$$

because $1 - F(\frac{z-b}{\sigma_\delta})$ is a monotonically increasing function of b. We thus have $\tilde{Q}(z_1; G_2) < \tilde{Q}(z_1; G_1) = 0$. But $\tilde{Q}(z_2; G_2) = 0 > \tilde{Q}(z_1; G_2)$, and this implies $z_2 > z_1$. □

Proof of Proposition 2. If such strategies are followed, then the share of votes that the dictator gets is given by (14). Consider a citizen with $b_i < 0$ who in equilibrium votes for the dictator, and suppose that he deviates to voting for C. For a citizen with an infinitesimal share of votes ε, this deviation will result in the dictator getting $\tau' = \tau(b) - \varepsilon$ votes, and other citizens observing τ' and concluding that the value of b is $b' = \sigma_\delta F^{-1}(\tau') > b$. As a result, the dictator gets fewer votes and this weakly decreases his chance of winning elections (weakly because he could, in principle, only have elections where he would win by a wide margin, and if citizens knew that this is his strategy, then a deviation by an infinitesimal citizen had zero chance to prevent him from winning). At the same time, all citizens except for the one who deviated choose strategies based on the cutoff $z_{b'}$ rather than z_b. Since $b' > b$, $z_b > z_{b'}$, and hence strictly more people participate in protests as a result of this deviation. Consequently, such a deviation by a citizen with $b_i < 0$ increases the chance that the dictator will leave office. It also does not affect this

This means that for such b, the dictator would be better off if b is revealed. It remains to prove that $\pi_{z_G} > \hat{\pi}_G(b)$. Notice that $Q(z_G; b_G^*) = 0$ and $b < b_G^*$ imply $Q(z_G; b) < 0$ (this follows from the proof of Proposition 1); since $\tilde{Q}(z_G) = 0$, we have

$$\int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} F\left(\frac{z_G - \xi}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dG_{z_G}(\xi) > F\left(\frac{z_G - b}{\sigma_\delta}\right),$$

and thus

$$\hat{\pi}_G(b) = 1 - F\left(\frac{z_G - b}{\sigma_\delta}\right) < 1 - \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} F\left(\frac{z_G - \xi}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dG_{z_G}(\xi) = \pi_{z_G},$$

so $\pi_{z_G} > \hat{\pi}_G(b)$.

If $b > b_G^*$, then, analogously, we get that $z_b < z_G$ and $\hat{\pi}_G(b) < \hat{\pi}_b$, so the dictator is better off concealing b, and $\pi_{z_G} < \hat{\pi}_G(b)$.

It remains to prove that $G(b_G^*) \in (0, 1)$. Suppose not; consider the case $G(b_G^*) = 0$ (the case $G(b_G^*) = 1$ is analogous). This means that $b \geq b_G^*$ in the support of the distribution G and thus in the support of the conditional distribution G_{z_G}, and consequently,

$$\int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} F\left(\frac{z_G - \xi}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dG_{z_G}(\xi) < \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} F\left(\frac{z_G - b_G^*}{\sigma_\delta}\right) dG_{z_G}(\xi) = F\left(\frac{z_G - b_G^*}{\sigma_\delta}\right),$$

(the inequality is strict, because G is assumed to have no atoms and is therefore nondegenerate). But this contradicts (A8), and the contradiction completes the proof. $\qquad\square$

Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose that without competitive elections, b is distributed according to some distribution H^*. Then there is a protest threshold $z_{H^*} \in (\frac{c}{\alpha}, \frac{c}{\gamma})$ and, by Lemma A3, the dictator would prefer to have elections if and only if b satisfies $z_b \geq z_{H^*}$, i.e., when $b \leq y$ for some y. Consequently, the equilibrium decision to have elections must take the form of a threshold. Moreover, this threshold y must satisfy $\tau(y) \geq \tilde{\tau}$, because the opposite would imply that some dictators with b satisfying $\tau(b) < \tilde{\tau}$ have competitive elections and lose; this cannot happen in equilibrium because cancelling elections yields strictly higher utility.

Consider the distribution $H_y(x)$ given by (15) for different y. Clearly, as $y \to -\infty$ or $y \to +\infty$, $H_y(x)$ pointwisely converges to the same distribution $G(x)$. Consider the function $s_y = z_{H_y}$; this function maps $[-\infty, +\infty]$ to $(\frac{c}{\alpha}, \frac{c}{\gamma})$ and is continuous, therefore, its image is compact. In what follows, we show that it is strictly quasiconvex on the support of G and has a unique minimum which is interior.

It is straightforward to see that y such that $\tau(y) \geq \tilde{\tau}$ is an equilibrium threshold if and only if $z_y = s_y$: sufficiency follows from Lemma A3 and necessity follows immediately from continuity of all functions involved. Since the function $y \mapsto z_y$ maps $(-\infty, +\infty)$ onto $(\frac{c}{\gamma}, \frac{c}{\alpha})$, we have $z_y < s_y$ for y high enough and $z_y > s_y$ for y low enough. Therefore, there exists y for which $z_y = s_y = z_{H_y}$, therefore, there is an equilibrium (provided that there is such y satisfying $\tau(y) \geq \tilde{\tau}$). If for all such y, $\tau(y) < \tilde{\tau}$, then $\tilde{b}$ satisfying $\tau(\tilde{b}) = \tilde{\tau}$ is an equilibrium, because for all $b \leq \tilde{b}$, $z_y > s_y \equiv z_{H_y}$, and thus the dictator prefers to have elections. Therefore, an equilibrium exists, and moreover, in the latter case, it is unique.

Take some value y for which $z_y = s_y$, and let us prove that s_y is quasiconvex with minimum achieved at y. First, take $y' > y$, and consider the distribution H' given by

$$H'(x) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } x \leq y \\ \frac{G(x) - G(y)}{G(y') - G(y)} & \text{if } y < x \leq y'. \\ 1 & \text{if } x > y' \end{cases}$$

It is straightforward to verify that $H_y \equiv pH' + (1-p)H_{y'}$, where $p = (G(y') - G(y))/(1 - G(y))$, and since $y' > y$, $p \in (0, 1)$. Now, we know that $z_{H_y} = z_y$. Now, the distribution H' first-order stochastically dominates the degenerate distribution concentrated in y, and by Proposition 1, $z_{H'} < z_y$. From this it follows that $z_{H_{y'}} > z_y$. Indeed, suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that $z_{H_{y'}} \leq z_y$. Then using the function $\tilde{Q}(z)$ defined by (A6), we have $\tilde{Q}(z_y; H_y) = 0$, and also $\tilde{Q}(z_{H_{y'}}; H_{y'}) = 0$ and $\tilde{Q}(z_{H'}; H') = 0$, and thus $\tilde{Q}(z_y; H_{y'}) \geq 0$ and $\tilde{Q}(z_y; H') > 0$. This implies that from the standpoint of person with signal z_y, $\pi_{(H_{y'})_{z_y}} \geq \pi_{(H_y)_{z_y}}$ and $\pi_{(H')_{z_y}} > \pi_{(H_y)_{z_y}}$. At the same time, for a given threshold z_y, $\pi_{G_{z_y}} = 1 - \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} F(\frac{z_y - \xi}{\sigma_\delta}) dG_{z_y}(\xi)$ is linear in the distribution function, and thus satisfies $\pi_{(H_y)_{z_y}} = p\pi_{(H')_{z_y}} + (1-p)\pi_{(H_{y'})_{z_y}}$, a contradiction. Thus, $z_{H_{y'}} > z_y$.

In the case $y' < y$, let H'' be given by

$$H''(x) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } x \leq y' \\ \frac{G(x) - G(y')}{G(y) - G(y')} & \text{if } y' < x \leq y. \\ 1 & \text{if } x > y \end{cases}$$

It is straightforward to verify that $H_{y'} \equiv pH'' + (1-p)H_y$, where $p = (G(y) - G(y'))/(1 - G(y'))$, and since $y > y'$, $p \in (0, 1)$. As before $z_{H_y} = z_y$. The degenerate distribution with an atom in y first-order stochastically dominates H'', and by Proposition 1, $z_{H''} > z_y$. From this it follows that $z_{H_{y'}} > z_y$. Indeed, suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that $z_{H_{y'}} \leq z_y$. From Proposition 1, we have $\tilde{Q}(z_y; H_y) = 0$, and also $\tilde{Q}(z_{H_{y'}}; H_{y'}) = 0$ and $\tilde{Q}(z_{H''}; H'') = 0$, and thus $\tilde{Q}(z_y; H_{y'}) \geq 0$ and $\tilde{Q}(z_y; H'') < 0$. This implies that from the standpoint of person with signal z_y, $\pi_{(H_{y'})_{z_y}} \geq \pi_{(H_y)_{z_y}}$ and $\pi_{(H'')_{z_y}} < \pi_{(H_y)_{z_y}}$. But since $\pi_{G_{z_y}}$ is linear in G, we have $\pi_{(H_{y'})_{z_y}} = p\pi_{(H'')_{z_y}} + (1-p)\pi_{(H_y)_{z_y}}$, a contradiction. Thus, $z_{H_{y'}} > z_y$ in this case as well.

We have proven that any y such that $z_y = s_y$ is a unique global minimum of s_y, which proves uniqueness of such y. It is straightforward to see that $G(y) \in (0, 1)$; indeed, if $G(y) = 0$, then H_y first-order stochastically dominates the atom in y, and thus $s_y = z_{H_y} < z_y$, and if $G(y) = 1$, then, similarly, $s_y > z_y$; in either case $s_y \neq z_y$, a contradiction.

Let us prove that s_y is indeed quasiconvex; this would prove the result that s_{b_e} minimises s_y over $(-\infty, \tilde{b}) \cap$ (support of G) even if $\tau(y) \geq \tilde{\tau}$ constraint is binding. Take $y' > \tilde{y} > y$ and let us show that $s_{y'} > s_{\tilde{y}}$. Since the equation $s_y = z_y$ has exactly one solution, we must have $z_{\tilde{y}} < s_{\tilde{y}}$. Consequently, $s_{\tilde{y}} = z_{\tilde{y}'}$ for some $\tilde{y}' < \tilde{y}$. Thus, in some vicinity of $\tilde{y}$, we have $y' > \tilde{y}'$. We then can use the same argument as before: for example, if $y' > \tilde{y}$, take H''' given by

$$H'''(x) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } x \leq \tilde{y} \\ \frac{G(x) - G(\tilde{y})}{G(y') - G(\tilde{y})} & \text{if } \tilde{y} < x \leq y'. \\ 1 & \text{if } x > y' \end{cases}$$

As before, $H_{\tilde{y}} \equiv pH''' + (1-p)H_{y'}$, where $p = (G(y') - G(\tilde{y}))/(1 - G(\tilde{y}))$, and $p \in (0, 1)$. Now, we know that $z_{H_{\tilde{y}}} = s_{\tilde{y}} = z_{\tilde{y}'}$. Now, the distribution H''' first-order stochastically dominates the degenerate distribution concentrated in $\tilde{y}'$, and by Proposition 1, $z_{H'''} < z_{\tilde{y}'} = z_{H_{\tilde{y}}}$. Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that $z_{H_{y'}} \leq z_{\tilde{y}'} = z_{H_{\tilde{y}}}$. Consequently, $\tilde{Q}(z_{\tilde{y}'}; H_{\tilde{y}}) = 0$, and also $\tilde{Q}(z_{H_{y'}}; H_{y'}) = 0$ and $\tilde{Q}(z_{H'''}; H''') = 0$, and thus $\tilde{Q}(z_{\tilde{y}'}; H_{y'}) \geq 0$ and $\tilde{Q}(z_{\tilde{y}'}; H''') > 0$. Then, as before, from the standpoint of person with signal $z_{\tilde{y}'}$, $\pi_{(H_{y'})_{z_{\tilde{y}'}}} \geq \pi_{(H_y)_{z_{\tilde{y}'}}}$ and $\pi_{(H''')_{z_{\tilde{y}'}}} > \pi_{(H_y)_{z_{\tilde{y}'}}}$. At the same time, we can again show that $\pi_{(H_{\tilde{y}})_{z_{\tilde{y}'}}} = p\pi_{(H''')_{z_{\tilde{y}'}}} + (1-p)\pi_{(H_{y'})_{z_{\tilde{y}'}}}$, a contradiction. Thus, $z_{H_{y'}} > z_{\tilde{y}'} = z_{H_{\tilde{y}}}$, and so $s_{y'} > s_{\tilde{y}}$. The case $y' < \tilde{y} < y$ is considered similarly, and this proves quasiconvexity.

Finally, let us prove the comparative statics results. First, notice that for any y, z_y does not depend on η (η does not enter equation (A4)). Let us show that for any y, z_{H_y} is decreasing in η. It suffices to prove that $H_{y;\eta}$ first-order stochastically dominates $H_{y;\eta'}$ if $\eta > \eta'$, i.e., that for any x, $H_{y;\eta}(x)$ is decreasing in η. Differentiating, we get

$$\frac{dH_{y;\eta}(x)}{d\eta} = \frac{-G(x)(1-\eta G(y)) + (1-\eta)G(x)G(y)}{(1-\eta G(y))^2}$$

$$= \frac{G(x)(G(y)-1)}{(1-\eta G(y))^2} < 0,$$

if $x < y$, and, similarly,

$$\frac{dH_{y;\rho}(x)}{dt} = \frac{-G(y)(1-\eta G(y)) + (G(x)-\eta G(y))G(y)}{(1-\eta G(y))^2}$$

$$= \frac{G(y)(G(x)-1)}{(1-\eta G(y))^2} < 0,$$

if $x \geq y$. This shows that if η increases, then z_{H_y} decreases. This means that, since b_E satisfied $z_{b_E} = s_{b_E}$, then after η increases to η', we have $z'_{b_E} = z_{b_E} = s_{b_E} > s'_{b_E}$. This means that under η', the equilibrium threshold that satisfies $z'_{b'_E} = s'_{b'_E}$, must also satisfy $b'_E > b_E$. Consequently, b_E is increasing in η.

To show that b_E satisfies $\tau(b_E) = \tilde{\tau}$ if η is close to 1, suppose not; then there is a limit point $\bar{b} = \lim_{\eta \to 1} b_E$. Then the distributions $H_{\bar{b};\eta}$ converge, in distribution, to a distribution with support on $(-\infty, \bar{b}]$. But at the same time, the degenerate distributions with atoms in b_E converge, in distribution, to one with atom in $\bar{b}$, which first-order stochastically dominates the former limit. This means that in the limit, $z_{\bar{b}} < z_{H_{\bar{b};\eta=1}}$, and this contradicts that $z_{b_E} = z_{H_{b_E(\eta);\eta}}$ for all η. This contradiction proves that $\tau(b_E) = \tilde{\tau}$ (i.e., $b_E = \bar{b}$) for η sufficiently close to 1.

Conversely, if η approaches 0, then $b_E(\eta)$ is decreasing, and converges to some point b'. In this case, distributions $H_{y;\eta}$ converge G for any fixed y. This means that distributions $H_{b_E(\eta);\eta}$ converge to G, and thus $z_{H_{b_E(\eta);\eta}}$ converges to z_G. Similarly, $z_{b_E(\eta)}$ converge to $z_{b'}$. But $z_G = z_{b_G^*}$ by definition of b_G^*; thus, $z_{b_G^*} = z_{b'}$. This implies that $\lim_{\eta \to 0} b_E(\eta) = b' = b_G^*$.

To demonstrate the comparative statics result with respect to c, take any c, and suppose that b_E is the threshold. At this threshold, $z_{b_E;c} = z_{H_{b_E};c}$. Now suppose that c increases, say, to $c' > c$. Then, for a given b_E, both z_{b_E} and $z_{H_{b_E}}$ increase (see Proposition 1). However, $z_{H_{b_E}}$ will increase by a lower margin than z_{b_E}. Indeed, at b_E, $\frac{\partial Q(z)}{dc} = \frac{\partial \tilde{Q}(z)}{dc}$, but $\frac{\partial Q}{dz} < \frac{\partial \tilde{Q}}{dz}$, as follows from the proof of Proposition 1. Therefore, $\frac{\partial z_{b_E}}{\partial c} > \frac{\partial z_{H_{b_E}}}{\partial c}$, and this implies that $z_{b_E;c'} > z_{H_{b_E};c'}$ for $c' > c$. Thus, the equilibrium threshold under c', b'_E which satisfies $z_{b'_E;c'} > z_{H_{b'_E};c'}$, must satisfy $b'_E > b_E$. □

Appendix B: Empirical Evidence

The model above makes two predictions that are testable using cross-country data. First, repressiveness of the regime against the opposition makes fair elections less likely. Second, cruelty of the regime towards protesters makes fair elections more likely. Our analysis below tests these hypotheses, and thus complements the anecdotal evidence discussed in Section 1.

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Table B1. *Free Elections in Non-Democracies.*

Albania	**1991 (3-2)**, **1992 (6-1)**, 1996 (3-3), **1997 (6-1)**, **2001 (6-1)**	Lebanon	**2005 (6-0)**
Algeria	**1995 (1-4)**, **2004 (3-1)**, 2009 (3-1)	Liberia	**2011 (7-1)**
Argentina	1995 (7-0)	Malawi	**1994 (6-0)**, **2004 (7-1)**, **2009 (6-0)**
Armenia	1996 (0-6), 1998 (6-1), 2003 (5-0), **2008 (5-0)**	Malaysia	**1990 (5-1)**, 1995 (4-1), 1999 (4-1), 2004 (4-1), **2008 (6-0)**
Azerbaijan	1993 (1-4), 1998 (0-7), 2003 (0-7), 2008 (0-7)	Mali	1997 (6-0), **2007 (7-0)**
Bangladesh	1996 (6-0)	Mauritania	1992 (0-6), 1997 (0-6), 2003 (0-6)
Belarus	2001 (0-7), 2006 (0-7), 2010 (0-7)	Mexico	1994 (4-0)
Benin	1991 (6-0), **2011 (7-0)**	Mozambique	**1994 (5-0)**, **1999 (5-0)**, **2004 (5-0)**, 2009 (5-0)
Burkina Faso	**1991 (0-5)**, **1998 (0-4)**, 2010 (2-2)	Myanmar (Burma)	1990 (0-7)
Burundi	**2010 (7-1)**	Namibia	**1999 (6-0)**, 2004 (6-0), **2009 (6-0)**
Cambodia	**1993 (3-2)**, **1998 (3-1)**, **2003 (3-1)**, 2008 (3-1)	Nepal	**1991 (5-0)**, **1994 (5-0)**, **1999 (7-1)**, 2008 (7-1)
Cameroon	1992 (1-5), **2004 (1-5)**, **2011 (1-5)**	Nicaragua	**1990 (6-0)**
Central African Rep.	**1993 (5-0)**, **2005 (1-2)**, 2011 (1-2)	Niger	1996 (0-6), **2004 (7-1)**
Chad	**1996 (1-3)**, **2001 (1-3)**, 2006 (1-3), 2011 (1-3)	Nigeria	2003 (4-0), 2007 (4-0), **2011 (4-0)**
Colombia	1998 (7-0), **2002 (7-0)**, **2006 (7-0)**, **2010 (7-0)**	Papua New Guinea	**1997 (4-0)**, **2002 (4-0)**, **2007 (4-0)**
Congo Brazzaville	**1992 (6-1)**, **2002 (0-4)**, 2009 (0-4)	Paraguay	**1993 (7-0)**, **2000 (7-0)**
Croatia	**1992 (1-4)**, 1997 (0-5)	Peru	**1995 (3-2)**
Cuba	1993 (0-7), 1998 (0-7), 2003 (0-7)	Poland	1990 (5-0)
Dominican Rep	**1990 (6-0)**, 1994 (5-0)	Romania	**1992 (5-0)**
Ecuador	**2009 (5-0)**	Rwanda	2003 (0-3), 2010 (0-4)
Egypt	**1993 (0-6)**, 2005 (1-4)	Senegal	**1993 (2-3)**
El Salvador	1994 (7-0), **1999 (7-0)**, **2004 (7-0)**	Sierra Leone	**2002 (5-0)**
Equatorial Guinea	2009 (0-6)	Singapore	1991 (2-4), 1997 (2-4), 2001 (2-4), 2011 (2-4)
Estonia	**1995 (7-1)**	Sri Lanka	1999 (6-1), 2010 (4-1)
Ethiopia	**1995 (3-2)**, **2000 (3-2)**, 2005 (1-4)	Sudan	**1996 (0-7)**, 2000 (0-7), 2010 (1-3)
Fiji	**2001 (6-1)**	Tajikistan	1994 (0-6), 1999 (2-3), 2006 (1-4)
Gambia	1996 (0-6), **2001 (0-5)**, **2006 (0-5)**, 2011 (0-5)	Thailand	2006 (0-5), 2011 (7-0)
Georgia	**1992 (5-1)**, **1995 (6-1)**, 2000 (5-0), 2008 (7-1)	Togo	**1993 (1-3)**, 1998 (1-3), **2003 (1-3)**, **2005 (1-5)**, **2010 (1-3)**
Ghana	**1992 (1-2)**, **1996 (3-1)**	Tunisia	1994 (1-4), 1999 (1-4), 2004 (1-5), 2009 (1-5)
Guatemala	**1990 (4-1)**, **1991 (4-1)**	Turkmenistan	1992 (0-9), 2007 (0-9)
Guinea-Bissau	**1994 (5-0)**, **2000 (5-0)**	Uganda	**1996 (0-4)**, 2001 (0-4), 2006 (1-2), **2011 (1-2)**
Guyana	**1992 (6-0)**, 2001 (6-0), **2006 (6-0)**, **2011 (6-0)**	Ukraine	**1994 (7-0)**, 1999 (7-0), 2004 (6-0), **2010 (6-0)**
Haiti	**1995 (7-0)**, 2000 (1-3)	Uzbekistan	2000 (0-9), 2007 (0-9)
Iraq	1995 (0-9)	Yemen	**1999 (1-3)**, **2006 (1-3)**
Kazakhstan	1995 (1-5), 1999 (1-5), 2005 (0-6), 2011 (0-6)	Zambia	**1991 (6-0)**, 1996 (3-2), 2001 (5-0), **2006 (5-0)**
Kenya	1992 (0-5), 1997 (2-4), 2007 (7-0)	Zimbabwe	**1990 (0-6)**, 1996 (0-6), 2002 (1-5), 2008 (1-5)

Notes: The table lists country-years where democracy score was below 8 and there were elections to the high office where the incumbent participated. OECD countries are excluded. Country-years where the election (or all such elections if more than one) was fair according to our definition are in bold. Democracy and autocracy scores (polity measure is defined as their difference) are in parentheses.

Data

Our main data set is a panel that covers 72 countries with observations ranging from 1990 to 2011 (totally 187 country-years listed in Table B1). We focus on elections to the high office in which the incumbent or his official successor was running; this information was obtained from NELDA dataset (Hyde and Marinov, 2012). The dependent variable is an indicator of election fairness,

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which is equal to 1 if OECD ('western') monitors were present and did not report significant vote fraud, and zero otherwise (also from Hyde and Marinov, 2012). The main explanatory variables are proxies for repression costs and costs of protesting. For costs of repression, we use the Political Terror Scale (Gibney, Cornett, Wood, Haschke, and Arnon, 2016) as an indicator of the spread and the extent of political terror. In most specifications, we use the index published by Amnesty International, but we also use the one by the U.S. Department of State as robustness check. For costs of protesting, we use the index of Physical Integrity Rights in The CIRI Human Rights Data set, 'an additive index constructed from the Torture, Extrajudicial Killing, Political Imprisonment, and Disappearance indicators' (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay, 2014). It ranges from 0 (no government respect for protection against torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance) to 8 (full government respect). We normalise both indices, so repressiveness of the regime (from Political Terror Scale, corresponding to k in the model) ranges from 0 (few repressions) to 1 (many repressions), and cruelty of the regime also ranges from 0 (low cruelty, corresponding to low c in the model and high Physical Integrity Rights in CIRI) to 1 (high cruelty). Our controls include democracy and autocracy scores from Polity IV Project (Marshall *et al.*, 2016), media freedom from Freedom House (inverted, so higher score corresponds to freer media) and standard economic data such as logarithm of GDP per capita and total population.

After merging the data sets, we removed OECD countries, given our focus on non-democracies. Then, we focused only on country-years where the country held an election to the high office (according to the definition in Hyde and Marinov, 2012) with the incumbent participating[21] and that happened when the country's Polity IV democracy score was below 8; we use the full sample as a robustness check. Finally, we removed country-years in which one of our key variables or controls were missing. This resulted in an unbalanced panel that consists of 187 country-years with elections, spanning 72 countries and years between 1990 and 2011.[22] Of these, 95 elections are coded as 'not fair' and 92 elections as 'fair'. Table B1 presents the list of these country-years, with fair elections highlighted in bold, and shows the democracy and autocracy scores in parentheses. One can see that the polity score, defined as democracy minus autocracy, is far from a perfect predictor of fairness of elections.[23] E.g., Gambia (polity scores –6 or –5) had two fair elections in 2001 and 2006 and two unfair in 1996 and 2011, while Guyana (polity score +6) had fair elections in 1992, 2006 and 2011, but unfair in 2001. The summary statistics of all variables is presented in Table B2.

The three key variables are taken from different datasets compiled by different scholars, which decreases the chance of correlations driven by expert bias. The advantages and disadvantages of the PTS and CIRI indices of political terror have been discussed since the inception of the latter; see, in particular, Cingranelli and Richards (2010) and Wood and Gibney (2010). Despite obvious similarities, PTS appears to incorporate political violence in general,[24] whereas CIRI

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[21] If a country in a given year had more than one election to the high office where the incumbent run, we took the minimum fairness; most such examples are due to runoff elections.

[22] The upper bound 2011 is imposed on us by data availability (an updated version of the NELDA dataset contains years up to 2015, but the CIRI dataset only contains years up to 2011). The lower bound of 1990 is chosen for two reasons: first, before that the set of countries was considerably different, and second, this allows to avoid the unrelated Cold War ramifications.

[23] Other variables do not seem to adequately capture the difference between fair and sham elections either. For example, according to NELDA, opposition was allowed in 93% of elections in our sample (174 out of 187), so this variable clearly does not capture the difference between real and token opposition.

[24] For example, PTS Codebook (http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/Data/Files/PTS-Codebook-V120.pdf) states: "The assassination of a political challenger, for example, is counted the same way as the killing of a suspected criminal

Table B2. *Summary Statistics.*

	Source	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Observations
Democracy	Polity IV	3.13	2.63	0	7	187
Autocracy	Polity IV	2.53	2.57	0	9	187
Executive constraints	Polity IV	3.70	1.53	1	7	187
Media freedom	Freedom House	0.38	0.17	0	0.77	162
Log population	WDI	16.10	1.12	13.43	18.92	187
Log GDP per capita (2005USD)	WDI	6.94	1.12	4.85	10.50	184
Extrajudicial killings	CIRI	0.50	0.35	0	1	187
Disappearances	CIRI	0.23	0.36	0	1	187
Torture	CIRI	0.79	0.30	0	1	187
Political prisoners	CIRI	0.60	0.38	0	1	187
Cruelty	CIRI	0.53	0.24	0	1	187
Repression (Amnesty International)	Amnesty Intl.	0.47	0.25	0	1	187
Repression (Dept. of State)	US Dept. of State	0.50	0.24	0	1	187
Observers	NELDA	0.84	0.36	0	1	187
Western observers	NELDA	0.89	0.32	0	1	161
Violations reported	NELDA	0.35	0.48	0	1	147
Partly fair = Obs. & W.Obs.	Our definition	0.76	0.43	0	1	187
Fair = Partly fair & not(Violations)	Our definition	0.49	0.50	0	1	187
Year		2000.5	6.46	1990	2011	187

focuses on violence committed by the government and/or on its behalf.[25] This important difference, as well as the fact that the indices are not strongly correlated (the correlation coefficient is only 0.7, which falls down to 0.49 after controlling for country fixed effects), suggests that despite similarities, these indices measure materially different aspects of violence. We therefore treat these indices as reflecting different aspects of political terror, and relate them to repressiveness k and cruelty c in our model. For citizens deciding to protest against the incumbent, the danger is violence from government-related actors; thus, we proxy cruelty with the index based on CIRI dataset. For potential politicians who decide whether or not to run for office, political violence is the main threat, so we use the PTS index to proxy for repressiveness. Of course, there might be numerous ways in which repressiveness correlates with less fair elections, so its negative effect on fairness is not a particularly strong test of the theory. However, the prediction that the regime's cruelty leads to fairer election is highly nontrivial and truly tests the theory.

Results

In Table B3, we present our main findings. Columns (1)–(8) are fixed-effects panel regressions, whereas columns (9)–(11) do not include country fixed effects; in all cases, year fixed effects are

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or a random by-stander. General police brutality, for instance, will be taken into account even in the absence of explicit repressive policies. As such, it is worth to point out that the PTS does not exclusively measure repression."

[25] Cingranelli and Richards (2010) draw, in particular, the following contrast (emphasis there): "The human rights scores reported by the CIRI project represent the human rights practices of governments. Human rights practices refer to the *actions of government officials* and actions by private groups *if instigated by government* directly affecting the degree to which citizens can exercise various types of human rights. [...] The PTS measures human rights *conditions*, which refer to the degree to which citizens can exercise various types of human rights, as affected both by governmental and other actors. Nongovernmental groups (NGOs) such as revolutionaries, gangsters, or terrorists also may violate human rights independently from the government and may worsen the human rights conditions in a country."

Table B3. *Main Evidence.*

					Dependent variable: election is fair						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Repression	−0.43*		−0.69***	−0.60**		−0.80***	−0.71***	−0.59**	−0.09	−0.23	−0.16
	[0.24]		[0.23]	[0.25]		[0.24]	[0.25]	[0.29]	[0.21]	[0.17]	[0.19]
Cruelty		0.54***	0.74***		0.45**	0.65***	0.71***	0.60**	0.12	0.46***	0.43**
		[0.19]	[0.20]		[0.21]	[0.22]	[0.24]	[0.27]	[0.21]	[0.17]	[0.18]
Log(GDP per capita)				−0.21	−0.11	−0.20	−0.18	−0.18	−0.14***	−0.11***	−0.11***
				[0.22]	[0.24]	[0.22]	[0.20]	[0.20]	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.03]
Log(population)				−0.58	−0.35	−0.53	−0.45	−1.69**	−0.08**	−0.10***	−0.09**
				[0.64]	[0.61]	[0.58]	[0.58]	[0.75]	[0.04]	[0.03]	[0.03]
Democracy							0.07	0.07		0.02	0.03
							[0.07]	[0.09]		[0.04]	[0.04]
Autocracy							−0.00	0.03		−0.09***	−0.06*
							[0.07]	[0.08]		[0.03]	[0.03]
Executive constraitns							−0.04	0.07		−0.04	−0.04
							[0.12]	[0.15]		[0.06]	[0.06]
Media freedom								0.06			0.39
								[0.67]			[0.29]
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Countries	72	72	72	71	71	71	71	67	71	71	67
Observations	187	187	187	184	184	184	184	161	184	184	161

Notes: The unit of observation is an election. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if election was fair and zero otherwise. Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.

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Table B4. *Repression and Cruelty.*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Dependent variable: election is fair									
Repression (Amnesty Int'l)	−0.73***	−0.74***	−0.64**	−0.61**	−0.80***					
	[0.24]	[0.26]	[0.25]	[0.24]	[0.24]					
Repression (US. Dept. of State)						−0.44	−0.36	−0.26	−0.16	−0.65**
						[0.27]	[0.27]	[0.24]	[0.24]	[0.27]
Extrajudicial killings	0.42**				0.34*	0.46**				0.40*
	[0.16]				[0.19]	[0.19]				[0.21]
Disappearances		0.34***			0.27**		0.32**			0.30**
		[0.13]			[0.13]		[0.15]			[0.14]
Torture			0.24		0.10			0.25		0.17
			[0.18]		[0.19]			[0.18]		[0.19]
Political prisoners				0.02	−0.07				−0.04	−0.17
				[0.11]	[0.11]				[0.12]	[0.10]
Log(GDP per capita)	−0.31	−0.15	−0.22	−0.21	−0.26	−0.27	−0.09	−0.16	−0.15	−0.24
	[0.22]	[0.23]	[0.22]	[0.23]	[0.24]	[0.23]	[0.24]	[0.23]	[0.24]	[0.25]
Log(population)	−0.81	−0.45	−0.54	−0.58	−0.66	−0.71	−0.32	−0.41	−0.46	−0.58
	[0.53]	[0.63]	[0.64]	[0.65]	[0.57]	[0.54]	[0.61]	[0.62]	[0.64]	[0.56]
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Countries	71	71	71	71	71	71	71	71	71	71
Observations	184	184	184	184	184	184	184	184	184	184

Notes: The unit of observation is an election. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if election was fair and zero otherwise. Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.

included and standard errors are clustered at the country level. In columns (1), (2), and (3), the fair dummy variable is regressed on measures of repression and cruelty, separate and together. To put it in a perspective, column (1) shows that one standard deviation increase in repression decreases the probability of fair election by roughly one-fifth of a standard deviation; column (2) says that one standard deviation increase in cruelty increases the probability of fair election by roughly one-quarter of a standard deviation. Thus, these effects are not only statistically significant, but also sizeable and important. Columns (4)–(6) report the same regressions with basic time-varying controls (log of GDP per capita and log of population). Columns (7)–(8) add time-varying political controls, first democracy, autocracy, and executive constraints (from Polity IV) and then index of media freedom (from Freedom House); introduction of the latter reduces the sample considerably. Still, in both columns, however, the two variables of interest, repression and cruelty, are significant at 5% level, the former having negative sign and the latter having positive one, as predicted.

The last three columns (9)–(11) replicate columns (6)–(8), but without country controls. The coefficients at repression and cruelty retain their signs, but not their statistical significance, except for cruelty in (10) and (11). We document these regressions for the sake of completeness, but the problem of omitted variables is likely too big to take these specifications seriously.

In Table B4, we take a deeper look into repression and cruelty variables. Specifications (1)–(5) use the same measure of repressions based on Amnesty International data as before, while (6)–(10) use the measure based on the U.S. Department of State data. In all specifications its effect is negative, though the latter measure is significant only in one out of five specifications (however, the more demanding one). We attribute it to various political considerations that could contaminate the latter measure; this also highlights why the measure by Amnesty International is our

Table B5. *Robustness.*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Dependent variable: election is fair									
	Logistic regression		No year fixed effects		All values of democracy		Incumbent running or not			
Repression	−11.71**	−14.32**	−0.61***	−0.55**	−0.42**	−0.38*	−0.54***	−0.52***	−0.03	0.02
	[5.17]	[6.20]	[0.23]	[0.24]	[0.20]	[0.20]	[0.20]	[0.20]	[0.41]	[0.37]
Cruelty	13.26**	20.44**	0.74***	0.77***	0.31	0.41*	0.49**	0.49**	−0.30	−0.38
	[5.43]	[8.14]	[0.24]	[0.24]	[0.22]	[0.22]	[0.20]	[0.22]	[0.54]	[0.54]
Incumbent running									−0.37	−0.36
									[0.28]	[0.28]
Repression ∗ n Incumbent running									−0.66	−0.71
									[0.51]	[0.47]
Cruelty ∗ Incumbent running									0.88*	0.96*
									[0.53]	[0.50]
Log(GDP per capita)	−5.92*	−9.98	−0.08	−0.07	−0.10	−0.07	−0.01	−0.06	−0.09	−0.07
	[3.57]	[6.22]	[0.24]	[0.23]	[0.21]	[0.21]	[0.20]	[0.20]	[0.21]	[0.21]
Log(population)	−20.34**	−28.93*	−0.10	−0.08	−0.32	−0.11	−0.46	−0.37	−0.42	−0.34
	[10.06]	[15.02]	[0.57]	[0.57]	[0.54]	[0.54]	[0.48]	[0.52]	[0.52]	[0.55]
Democracy		0.80		0.07		0.14**		0.07		0.05
		[0.86]		[0.07]		[0.06]		[0.05]		[0.05]
Autocracy		−1.61		0.00		0.04		0.02		0.01
		[1.20]		[0.06]		[0.06]		[0.04]		[0.04]
Executive constraitns		−4.23*		−0.01		−0.15		−0.07		−0.08
		[2.30]		[0.13]		[0.11]		[0.09]		[0.08]
Year			−0.01	−0.01						
			[0.01]	[0.01]						
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Countries	30	30	71	71	96	96	73	73	73	73
Observations	103	103	184	184	306	306	214	214	214	214

Notes: The unit of observation is an election. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if election was fair and zero otherwise. Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.

preferred choice.[26] In Table B4, we also look at the four components of cruelty, i.e., extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture, and political imprisonment, separately (our measure of cruelty is the arithmetic mean of these four measures). Specifications (1)–(4) and (6)–(9) present these components separately, while (5) and (10) introduce them together. 'Extrajudicial killings' and 'disappearances' are consistent in being statistically significant across specifications; 'torture' has a consistently positive sign but is never significant. Despite that the 'political prisoners' component is never statistically different from zero, we decided to keep it as part of cruelty index mainly for consistency with Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay (2014). Our results would hold if we measure cruelty as average of extrajudicial killings, disappearances, and torture only.

Table B5 presents several robustness checks. In (1) and (2), we replace linear probability regression with logistic regression, with and without extended controls. In (3) and (4), we remove year fixed effects while keeping year as a control variable. In all these cases, the variables of interest are significant at 5% level. Specifications (5)–(10) are run on an extended data set. In (5)–(6), we consider countries (non-OECD) with all values of democracy (now including 8, 9, and 10), and notice that while all point estimates are closer to zero and some are not statistically significant, the signs are consistent. Lastly, in (7)–(10) we again exclude democracies, but add

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[26] See also Qian and Yanagizawa-Drott (2009; 2017) for discussions on political determinants of discrepancies between Amnesty International and U.S. Department of State data on human rights violations.

Table B6. *Alternative Specifications.*

	Dependent variable: election is fair					Dependent variable: election is partly fair				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Not to high office		High office and not							
Repression	−0.30	−0.26	−0.37**	−0.49*	−0.49**	0.08		0.01	−0.06	−0.01
	[0.36]	[0.32]	[0.16]	[0.22]	[0.20]	[0.19]		[0.20]	[0.20]	[0.20]
Cruelty	0.31	0.29	0.22	−0.01	0.01		0.20	0.19	0.21	0.30
	[0.27]	[0.26]	[0.17]	[0.25]	[0.25]		[0.18]	[0.19]	[0.20]	[0.20]
High office				−0.24	−0.34**					
				[0.16]	[0.15]					
Repression ∗ n High office				0.13	0.15					
				[0.22]	[0.20]					
Cruelty ∗ High office				0.45	0.57**					
				[0.28]	[0.28]					
Log(GDP per capita)	−0.36	−1.18	−0.08	−0.05	−0.04				−0.20	−0.17
	[0.28]	[0.27]	[0.17]	[0.17]	[0.16]				[0.23]	[0.24]
Log(population)	−1.14	−0.98	−0.36	−0.39	−0.51				−1.15**	−1.03**
	[0.96]	[0.88]	[0.44]	[0.43]	[0.52]				[0.50]	[0.51]
Democracy		0.06			0.04					0.08*
		[0.13]			[0.05]					[0.05]
Autocracy		−0.05			−0.04					−0.04
		[0.07]			[0.03]					[0.05]
Executive constraitns		0.05			0.01					−0.12
		[0.19]			[0.07]					[0.10]
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Countries	56	56	82	82	82	72	72	72	71	71
Observations	144	144	358	358	358	187	187	187	184	184

Notes: The unit of observation is an election. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if election was fair and zero otherwise. Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.

country-years where the election was to the high office, but the incumbent was not running. Columns (7) and (8) produce consistent results, even though with smaller point estimates as compared to the corresponding regressions (6) and (7) in Table B3. Lastly, specifications (9) and (10) add interactions of the dummy whether the incumbent is running with repression and cruelty. The signs of interactions suggest stronger effect of the respective variable (repression and cruelty) when the incumbent was running than when he was not, though only the latter is marginally statistically significant. Overall, Table B5 suggests that our estimates are fairly robust to changes in specification and to considering alternative restrictions of the sample.

Lastly, Table B6 considers two kinds of 'placebo' specifications. First, we consider elections that are not necessarily to the high office (e.g., parliamentary elections in a country that is by constitution a presidential republic). In columns (1) and (2) we consider such elections exclusively, and see that neither of coefficients of interest is statistically significant, though they retain the sign. In (3)–(5), we consider both elections to the high office and not, and see that repression still has a negative and significant effect, while the effect of cruelty all but disappears. This suggests that while repressive nature of the regime is still negatively correlated with fairness of elections, cruelty is less consequential in elections that are not to the high office. Second, instead of considering 'fair' as the dependent variable, in columns (6)–(10) we consider 'partly fair' variable, defined as having western observers; the difference with 'fair' is that here we allow for violations to be reported. In these specifications, neither of the variables of interest is

significant. This suggests that our results are not driven by the presence of western observers or their willingness to monitor, but rather by whether or not these observers found major violations.

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Replication Package

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