The Concept of πάθος and the Division of Pleasure in Plato’s Philebus

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Abstract

In this paper, I explore the methodological principle of dividing pleasure in the Philebus. While existing literature primarily focuses on the application of the Promethean method (16d-17a) in this division, I propose a novel approach. By conceptualizing pleasure as πάθος (meaning “experience”), Socrates constantly divides pleasure based on features of πάθος, as suggested by the guideline in 31b. Epistemologically, πάθος refers to multiple physiological and psychological processes, which forms a set of clear criteria to distinguish different kinds of pleasure to construct a robust taxonomy. Metaphysically, drawing from common usages of πάθος, Plato innovatively establishes its sense as “to be acted upon,” which unifies diverse kinds of pleasure as a passive motion of the soul. Therefore, I conclude that πάθος serves as a methodological unity guiding the division of pleasure, which is rooted in its ontological function of collecting pleasures as a passive kind of coming-to-be (γένεσις).

Introduction

The notorious intricacy of the division of pleasure in the Philebus leads to a question: is there a methodological unity in this division? Scholars are divided into two positions respectively. Some scholars believe that Socrates follows a certain methodological principle when dividing pleasure. Specifically, they agree the Promethean method raised in 16d-17a is
applied in the division of pleasure, while their positions vary concerning to what extent and in what manner the method is applied. However, other scholars doubt that there is not in principle a scientifically sound method for dividing pleasure, as it is in a severely limited sense that the Promethean method is employed.  

I offer a new approach to addressing this question. Avoiding the traditional debate concerning the Promethean method, I argue that a methodologically robust principle is to conceptualize pleasure as πάθος. My primary evidence is the guideline in 31b before the division of pleasure, which claims to inquire “in what each of the two (i.e. pleasure and knowledge) is and on account of what condition it comes to be whenever it comes to be.” (ἐν ὧν τέ ἐστιν ἐκάτερον αὐτοῖν καὶ διὰ τί πάθος γίγνεσθον ὁπόταν γίγνησθον, 31b) In literature, this guideline is understudied, especially its relation to listing kinds of pleasure in the following text, which is occasionally mentioned as an unsolved puzzle (Gosling: 1975; Kelsey and Lear: 2019). Contrary to this interpretation, I argue that this guideline serves as a methodological principle in e.g., De Chiara-Quenzer (1993), Fletcher(2017), Davidson(2013), Proios(2021). More specifically, De Chiara-Quenzer, Davision, and Proios argue that the Promethean method is appropriately applied in the division of pleasure. Fletcher takes a more neutral view: the Promethean method is applied in a special way (i.e., from the unlimited many to the one) to determine that pleasure lacks a unified nature.

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2 e.g., Frede (1993: xli, 2006: 438), Kelsey & Richardson Lear (2019: 5), Hackforth (1958: 114-5). Specifically, Frede’s main claim is based on the incompleteness and numerical inexactness of the division. While Frede earlier (1993: xli) held a rather radical view that Plato intentionally suggests that the investigation of pleasure is not dialectic proper, she later (2006: 438-439) revised to acknowledge that the method is used “at least in part.” Kelsey and Lear emphasize that it is not obvious how the Promethean method is employed which is contrary to readers’ expectations, although they don’t deny the possibility of this application.

3 The translation of the text is based on Frede’s (1993) version, but there will be some modifications keeping the literal translation of πάθος. The Greek text I use is the Oxford Classical Text. In the sentence cited, I follow Frede’s translation of πάθος as “condition.”

4 Gosling (1975: 99) claims that the reason why Plato mentions this guideline in 31b2-4 is unclear, which is not obviously “listing kinds.” Kelsey and Lear (2019:5) emphasizes the guideline is concerning “the seat and cause” of pleasure rather than its kinds, which doubts the application of the Promethean method.
the division of pleasure. To draw pleasure’s dividing lines, Socrates consistently returns to conceptualize it as \( \pi\alpha\thetao\varsigma \) according to the guideline in 31b. For one thing, corresponding to “in what pleasure is”, he locates \( \pi\alpha\thetao\varsigma \) in either the body or the soul, thus categorizing pleasure based on where it takes place. For another, regarding “on account of what pleasure comes to be”, he explores the multiple dynamics of \( \pi\alpha\thetao\varsigma \) in the body and the soul, which explains the sophisticated mechanism of pleasure’s emergence and adds complexity to its division.

According to *LSJ*, the Greek word “\( \pi\alpha\thetao\varsigma \)” generally means “that which happens to a person or thing,” which is also translated as “experience.” It additionally conveys many similar meanings, such as “suffering,” “condition,” and “emotion.” Moreover, there are two other words expressing similar meanings to \( \pi\alpha\thetao\varsigma \): one is “\( \pi\alpha\thetae\mu\alpha \)” meaning “that which befalls one;” the other is “\( \pi\alpha\sigma\chio \)” meaning “have something happen/done to one.” According to Beeker’s *Etymological Greek Dictionary of Greek*, \( \pi\alpha\thetao\varsigma \) and \( \pi\alpha\thetae\mu\alpha \) are both derived from \( \pi\alpha\sigma\chio \), which thus strengthens their intimate connections. Therefore, in what follows, I assume that all those three expressions (i.e. \( \pi\alpha\thetao\varsigma \), \( \pi\alpha\thetae\mu\alpha \) and \( \pi\alpha\sigma\chio \) \( \tau\iota \)) are used interchangeably in the *Philebus* and I will use the word “\( \pi\alpha\thetao\varsigma \)” as their label.

Based on its common usage suggested by the dictionary above, Plato develops the philosophical significance of \( \pi\alpha\thetao\varsigma \) in the context of the *Philebus*. On the one hand, he frequently uses \( \pi\alpha\thetao\varsigma \) in the detailed physiological or psychological analysis of pleasure. Specifically, the meaning of \( \pi\alpha\thetao\varsigma \) as “suffering” implies the bodily destruction preceding the pain (32a1-4, 35c12-13, 45b6-9). Intuitively speaking, the meaning of “emotions” is intimately connected to multiple psychic states such as desire (35d) and a list of sophisticated emotions like anger and fear (40e, 50c). In this way, multiple usages of \( \pi\alpha\thetao\varsigma \) assist to explore different kinds
and dimensions of pleasure. On the other hand, πάθος conveys a metaphysical sense of “being acted upon” in contrast with “acting upon” (e.g., ποεῖν, ἔργον) in many Platonic dialogues (Philb. 58c-59d, Parm. 157b3-4, Soph. 248, Phdr. 270-1), as observed by Gosling (1975: 110). In this sense, drawing on its original meaning of “that which happens to a person or thing,” Plato innovatively transforms it into an ontological term to carve out the nature of pleasure. Therefore, based on its dual meanings, I argue that πάθος plays crucial roles both in the collection and the division of pleasure. Its meaning in biology and psychology assists in exploring different dimensions of pleasure, while its metaphysical significance helps to unify the nature of pleasure as a coming-to-be (γένεσις) (53c-55c).

I will begin with a methodological discussion in Section II where I demonstrate how features of πάθος assist in determining criteria for dividing pleasures. To justify this methodological role of πάθος, I will argue that pleasure is metaphysically identified with a certain kind of πάθος in Section III. Moreover, as shown in Section IV, I argue that πάθος is a passive kind of γένεσις, which harmonizes pleasure as πάθος and pleasure as γένεσις (53c-55c). Finally, I will conclude my thesis in Section V.

II. Πάθος as a Methodological Unity

The concept of πάθος serves as a methodological principle for dividing pleasure, since several features of πάθος determine the criteria of how pleasure can be divided. As shown in Figure A below, I translate this developmental process into a direct taxonomy where the features of πάθος determine each knot of categorizing pleasure. Further, since I do not intend to engage with the debate on the Promechean method to produce “the exact number” of pleasure (16d), it
does not affect my argument whether my version of the taxonomy is rigorously the final result of division. Instead, I aim to prove that πάθος crucially structures its major branches of my taxonomy, which sufficiently shows that it provides a consistent principle in dividing pleasure. In the subsequent crucial junctures of dividing and collecting pleasure, Socrates constantly revisits the concept of πάθος to answer “in what pleasure is” and “on account of what πάθος pleasure comes to be” as initiated in 31b.

**Figure A. the Division of Pleasure**

First, the perceptibility of πάθος determines the division between unperceived restorations and pleasure, which thus carves out the boundary of pleasure (42a-43c). In the world of eternal flux, we inevitably experience πάθος, namely, restorations and destructions (43a). Those changes can be further divided into perceived ones and unperceived ones, as Socrates denies that “we always notice when we are growing or experiencing (πάσχω) anything of that sort” (43b1-4). Among those two kinds of πάθος, only the first kind counts as pleasure (43c4-6). Therefore,

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5 καὶ οὔτ’ αὐξανόμενοι λανθάνομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς οὔτε τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν πάσχοντες.
although πάθος covers a broader range than pleasure, its perceptibility distinguishes pleasure from other processes.

Moreover, πάθος divides pure pleasure and mixed one based on whether there is an asymmetrical relationship between the perceptibility of πάθος and its counterpart (i.e., destruction). Pure pleasure refers to a perceptible and pleasant fulfillment based on an imperceptible and painless lack (51b).6 This process of filling thus follows another unperceived πάθος of lacking. This is most obviously revealed in the case of learning. Learning is pure pleasure in so far as its counterpart, forgetting, remains as an unperceived πάθος, which shields learning from pain regarding “only the natural experiences themselves” (αὐτὰ τὰ τῆς φύσεως μόνον παθήματα, 52a). By contrast, mixed pleasure always involves the co-perception of pain either sequentially or simultaneously, which is rendered by Wolfdorf (2013) as two senses of mixture. In a sequential mixture, pleasure is preceded by destruction, such as cooling down after “the experience of stifling heat” (τοῦ πνίγους πάθη, 32a2-3). The simultaneous mixture is best revealed in the co-perception of pleasure and pain in their juxtaposition, which accounts for the mismatch between their perceptions and real beings (41b-42c).

Regarding mixed pleasure (31b-50d), it is categorized into the following three kinds based on the locations where πάθος occurs.7 First, in mixed bodily pleasure, πάθος means two symmetrical bodily restorations and destruction (31d-32b, 44e-47c). One either experiences bodily restoration after destruction (31d-32b) or “experiences two opposite conditions at once”

6 Although there is a grammar issue concerning whether the description of imperceptible lacks in 51b is a general one, as discussed by Proios (2021: 199-201), I follow major translators to render that it applies to all pure pleasure.

7 By “location,” I mean either the body or the soul where πάθος takes place, as I’ll further explain in Section III. I use “location” to indicate the idea of “in what pleasure is” in 31b.
(τάναντία ἂμα πάθη πάσχη, 46c7-8), such as feeling hot while shivering. Second, mixed psychosomatic pleasure occurs when one is experiencing pain in the body while desiring the opposite pleasure in the soul (32c-36c, 47c). Relying on this opposition between physical and mental states, Socrates introduces desire as a new type of πάθος, since “our argument never proves that our body thirsts, hungers, or experiences anything of that sort.”8 (35d5-6) Desire, the newly discovered psychic type of πάθος, therefore crucially distinguishes psychosomatic pleasure from the bodily one. In addition, psychosomatic pleasure also involves judgment, another psychic πάθος, which is an activity of inscribing words in the soul (39a-d).9 Third, as for mixed psychic pleasure (47e-50d), one has both pleasure and pain in the soul without involving any bodily element, which is plausibly built upon psychic πάθος such as desire and judgment as well. This is because both mixed psychic pleasure and psychosomatic pleasure share a similar list of related emotions, such as fear and anger (47e, 40e).10 And ignorance of friends, the intentional object of psychic pleasure, is a mistaken judgment described as πάθος (48d8-e3).

To conclude, πάθος is a methodological unity that guides the division of pleasure. As shown in my constructed version of the taxonomy, πάθος provides a reasonable foundation for each section of division based on its features. First, the perceptibility of πάθος distinguishes pleasure from unperceived restorations. Second, the classification between pure pleasure and mixed one is determined by whether there is an asymmetrical relationship between the

8 διψήν ἄρα ἡμῶν τὸ σῶμα ἢ πεινὴν ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων πάσχειν οὐδαμὴ ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ

9 The claim that judgment is a kind of πάθος is revealed by the fact Socrates uses πάθος to indicate the activity of writing and painting, where the former is the process of making a judgment (39c10-11), which I will further discuss in Section III.(2).

10 While it remains open whether the anticipation argument (32c-41a) encompasses both psychosomatic pleasure and mixed psychic pleasure or only the former, my argument holds firm, given that 40e at least covers psychosomatic pleasure while 47e directly addresses mixed psychic pleasure.
perceptibility of the πάθος of pleasure and its counterpart. Third, as for mixed pleasure, the location of πάθος divides it into bodily pleasure, psychosomatic pleasure, and psychic pleasure.

### III. Πάθος as an Ontological Unity

To justify the methodological role of πάθος as shown in section II, I now argue that πάθος ontologically unifies pleasure, which explains why Socrates appeals to πάθος to determine distinguishing features of pleasure. Specifically, I argue that pleasure is robustly identified with a certain kind of πάθος in a metaphysical sense, which I call the “identity view.” Further, as shown in the Appendix, textual evidence also suggests an alternative claim that pleasure is circumstantially caused by πάθος, which I call the “circumstantial cause view.” I will show all reasonable evidence supporting this alternative view is in fact compatible with the identity view.

(1) The Identity View

I argue for the view that pleasure is identified with a certain kind of πάθος. This view is most strongly supported in the case of mixed bodily pleasure, which is identified with a certain kind of πάθος as a bodily restorative process. Specifically, in the passage 31e-32b, Socrates identifies a specific kind of πάθος, heating up, with a bodily destructive process “against nature” and thus pain (διάλυσις ἡ παρὰ φύσιν, τοῦ πνίγους πάθη, λύπη, 32a1-3). Drawing from the symmetrical relationship between pleasure and pain, Socrates follows the same manner to classify multiple similar types of πάθος into one form of pleasure and pain (32b6-7), where the list of πάθος includes hungers and eating, thirsts and drinking, overheating and cooling down, freezing and warming up (31e6-8). Moreover, the identity of bodily restoration and destruction

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11 τούτο μὲν τοῖνυν ἐν ἔδος τιθώμεθα λύπης τε καὶ ἱδόνης ἐν τούτοις τοῖς πάθεσιν ἔκατέρως
as πάθος reappears in many places in the following text (e.g., 35c12-13, 45b7-8, 54e6-8), where πάθος is a general term for bodily destructive processes such as thirsts, chills, and hungers, which can symmetrically refer to bodily restoration. This discussion of mixed bodily pleasure serves as a paradigm (τύπον, 32b5), which suggests that the pattern of identifying pleasure as πάθος would continue to be adopted in all following kinds of pleasure involving psychic elements.

Additionally, one may worry that πάθος in those passages can be better translated as “suffering,” because Socrates mentions it as bodily destruction much more frequently than bodily restoration. However, since Socrates does use it to refer to pleasure (e.g., 32b6-7), this imbalanced use of πάθος in pain and pleasure may suggest Plato’s rhetorical strategy, which innovatively builds a new conception of πάθος (i.e. pleasure) upon its common usage for his contemporary readers (i.e. suffering).

Regarding the three kinds of mixed pleasure, I argue that Socrates has a picture of the identity view when he mentions joint affections. By “joint affections,” I mean a third πάθος as a mixture of pleasure and pain, which arises from the juxtaposition of two separate πάθος as a common experience (47c2-3, 50d5-6, 50d5-6). This third joint πάθος must be formed out of the

12 One may point out one seeming exception to my generalization: in 35d5-6, Socrates emphasizes that our body never experiences (πάσχειν) thirst, hunger, or anything of that sort. However, I think thirst and hunger in this context convey a different meaning other than in those texts I analyze. In 35d5-6 they mean desire for bodily restoration, while in places like 45b7-8 and 54e6-8 they mean actual bodily resoration.

13 I now explain each kind of mixed pleasure. (1) Bodily pleasure is mixed “in the common experiences of the surface and outside of the body itself,” (ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς παθήμασιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ σώματος τῶν ἐπισκολῆς τε καὶ ἑντος, 47c2-3). (2) In mixed psychosomatic pleasure, body and soul “common with each other in experiences are full of pleasures mixed with pains.” (κοινῇ μετ’ ἄλληλον ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι μεστά ἐστι συγκεκριμένης ἡδονῆς λύπαις, 50d5-6). I render that the term “ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι” applies merely to the mixed psychosomatic pleasure, rather than all three kinds of pleasure, as Frede. (3) In mixed psychic pleasure, “τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐκάστοτε πάθος” is the state of the soul when we experience both pleasure and pain when watching comedies or tragedies (48a5-b2), which presumably refers to a combination of pleasure and pain.
two separate πάθη that already exist. Therefore, while the proper definition of pleasure could be either (i) the joint affection as a mixture of pain and pleasure or (ii) the single affection of pleasure that is mixed with pain, both understandings of pleasure support the identity view.

Pure pleasures can also be identified with πάθος. Sense perception (i.e. seeing, hearing, and smelling) belong to perception and thus πάθος as proved earlier (33d2-4, 34a3-5). Moreover, learning presumably belongs to πάθος. Specifically, as a kind of recollection assumed by many Platonic dialogues (Meno. 80d-86c; Phdr. 249b-250a), learning is symmetrical to forgetting implied to be πάθος in 52a5-b3.

In summary, there is at least a tendency to identify pleasure with a certain kind of πάθος. I limit πάθος to “a certain kind” because πάθος covers a wider range than pleasure such as unperceived restorations, which suggests that the relation between pleasure and πάθος is not precisely a one-to-one identity. Although I have not delineated precise features of πάθος that properly define pleasure, my emphasis lies in the notion that πάθος captures and unifies the ontological status of multiple pleasures. In this sense, my core thesis remains steadfast.

(2) The Circumstantial Cause View

I now evaluate the alternative to the identity view: πάθος is a circumstantial cause of pleasure. Inspired by Rudebusch’s (2016, 48) translation, I interpret the “circumstantial cause” as a particular cause explaining situational conditions for the emergence of pleasure. For instance, the notion of supervenience shares similarities with circumstantial causes. Πάθος serves as a circumstantial cause for pleasure in a similar way as pleasure supervenes on πάθος, akin to how mental properties supervene on physical ones. Grammatically, this idea of circumstantial causes is suggested by two expressions “διὰ τὸ πάθος” (meaning “on account of the experience”, e.g.,
In what follows, I will construct three versions of the circumstantial cause view and examine their compatibility with the identity view accordingly.

First, pleasure can be caused by πάθος while itself remaining as another kind of πάθος. There is a causal chain via πάθος, from perception or memory to judgment and pleasure, as articulated in the following three steps. First, judgment is caused by various kinds of πάθος including perception and memory (39a1-5). Those kinds of πάθος write down a sentence in the soul, which counts as judgment (39a1-5). Second, the judgment itself is classified into πάθος, as Socrates uses πάθος to indicate the activity of writing and painting, where the former is the process of making a judgment (39c10-11). This is further supported by the fact that judgment in forms of self-ignorance is also classified as πάθος (48d-e). Third, judgment influences the truth value of pleasure via πάθος (42a7-9). This is probably because pleasure uses judgment as its material and content, since “a painter follows the scribe and provides illusions to his words in the soul.” (39b) In addition to its truth value, such a kind of pleasure could thus be reasonably inferred to be caused by judgment. Therefore, there is a causal chain from perception and memory to judgment and to pleasure, the mechanism of which is crucially πάθος. Moreover,

14 There are some cases the expression “ἐν τῷ πάθει” does not necessarily lead to the circumstantial view. For instance, in 32b6-7 the phrase “ἐν τούτοις τοῖς πάθεσιν ἑκατέροις” is a logical definition, which thus conveys a strong meaning of identity. Moreover, the other two passages (50d5-6, 47c1-3) can also possibly support the identity view as shown in III.(1).

15 In detail, people usually undergo the experience of being ignorant (τοῦτο τὸ πάθος πάσχειν, 48d9) for the following three ways, such as “to judge to be wealthier.” (δοξάζειν εἶναι πλουσιότερον, 48e3)

16 “judgment...was filling up pains and pleasures at the same time with their own experiences” (αἱ δόξαι...τὰς λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς ἀμα τοῦ παρ' αὖτας παθήματος ἀνεπίμπλασαν, 42a7-9)
given its position in this causal chain, pleasure is possibly identical to one type of πάθος. In this version, the circumstantial cause view can be compatible with the identity view.

Now let us consider alternative versions of the circumstantial cause view where pleasure is no longer a distinct kind of πάθος from its cause. Suppose the possibility that pleasure is caused by a specific type of πάθος that is a bodily or psychic process that underlies pleasure, which directly gives rise to pleasure and never produces any further πάθος. For example, bodily restoration is the underlying process of mixed bodily pleasure (31d-32b), as does anticipations for mixed psychosomatic pleasure (32c), and learning for pure psychic pleasure (52a). Though debatable, a plausible candidate for this underlying process is bodily or psychic restoration.¹⁷

The second version of the circumstantial view supposes that pleasure is loosely caused by its underlying process. The expression “διὰ τὸ πάθος” (e.g., 31b3, 41c6-7, 35e9) means an explanation that can be the essence of the thing explained, which is the same as the thing but captures its deeper truth. This causal understanding is accepted by Aristotle who argues that the cause of a thing’s existence can be identical with the essential nature of the thing (An.Post. II.8.93a4-6). The Philebus may also be inclined to hold this causal view, since pleasure takes place on account of coming-to-be as if it is identical to coming-to-be (χαίρουσι διὰ τὴν γένεσιν ἄτε ἡδονῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς, 54e5-6). In this sense, “διὰ τὸ πάθος” can be an answer to the question “Why does pleasure come into being”, which captures its ontological status. Hence, the second version strengthens the identity view.

¹⁷ I use the notion of restorative processes to better illustrate “underlying processes” without being fully committed to it. Scholars who argue for the restoration model would agree with my illustration, such as Frede (1993, 2006) and Proios (2021). Those who deny this restoration model may disagree with my candidate, such as Gosling (1975) and Fletcher (2017). However, even those anti-restoration people may still agree that there exists an underlying process of pleasure, such as Ogihara (2019:108).
According to the third version, διὰ conveys a strictly causal sense where the cause and the effect must be two separate ontological entities. Otherwise, the agent and the patient can never interact, which thus entails the absence of their causal relationship. Since the underlying process does not cause any further πάθος, pleasure must be an ontological entity other than the πάθος, which thus denies the identity view.

Finally, I summarize three versions of the circumstantial view above based on the following two considerations. Initially, πάθος with a flexible meaning can refer to either multiple biological/psychological processes or the specific process that underlies pleasure. (i) When πάθος means the former, the first version is that pleasure is identical to one kind of πάθος while circumstantially caused by another type of πάθος. Moreover, when πάθος refers to a specific sense as the underlying process of pleasure, the senses of διὰ can lead to different versions of the circumstantial view. (ii) The second version suggests that pleasure is loosely caused by its underlying process, which is identified with pleasure and reveals its ontological status. (iii) The third version suggests that pleasure is strictly caused by its underlying process as two ontologically distinct entities. While (i) and (ii) can be compatible with the identity view, (iii) is competitive with it.

(3) Awareness of Pleasure

In this section, I argue against the third version of the circumstantial cause view. Given this version, what a physiological or psychological entity pleasure could be? A reasonable answer is an awareness arising from the underlying bodily or psychic process, namely, the subject’s feeling or cognitive consciousness of enjoying this underlying process. This answer speaks to our common intuition that pleasure is a feeling or an attitude toward a pleasant object or activity,
which is represented by two popular contemporary theories of pleasure, i.e. the felt-quality theory (Bramble, 2011; Labukt, 2012) and the attitudinal theory (Feldman, 1997; Heathwood, 2007). For instance, suppose that it is pleasant to eat after starving, we normally assume that pleasure is someone’s taking pleasure in the activity of eating or his desiderative attitude toward it, rather than the activity of eating itself. Further, drawing from the similarity between circumstantial causes and supervenience, pleasure is reasonably an awareness that supervenes on this physiological or psychological process.

However, identifying pleasure with awareness may lead to an undesirable consequence. According to the strict causal interpretation, awareness must be an ontological entity distinct from \(\pi\acute{\theta}o\varsigma\). Nevertheless, the text shows that awareness is an intrinsic quality of the underlying process. Such a quality can never exist independently of its underlying process, just as height can not exist apart from the body. Therefore, this contradiction invalidates this version of the circumstantial cause view. In what follows, I will explain in detail why awareness must be intrinsic to the \(\pi\acute{\theta}o\varsigma\) of its underlying process.

In terms of bodily pleasure, awareness is an internal property of its \(\pi\acute{\theta}o\varsigma\) rather than an additional entity following this \(\pi\acute{\theta}o\varsigma\). To conceptualize perception, Plato distinguishes two kinds of \(\pi\acute{\theta}o\varsigma\) (33d2) concerning the body. The first kind is limited to the body as it is extinguished in the body before reaching the soul, leaving the soul “unaffected” (\(\acute{\alpha}p\alpha\theta\eta\), 33d4). In comparison, the second kind affects the soul through the body and provokes a certain upheaval that to each and in common (33d4-d6), which is the motion called perception (34a3-4). As the motion

\[\text{__Note:__} \text{The felt-quality theory supposes that an experience is pleasant because it involves a certain way it feels. The attitudinal theory supposes that an experience is pleasant because the experiencer takes a certain attitude toward it. I think those theories tend to identify pleasure with a feeling or an attitude.}\]
reaches the soul to make the subject conscious of it, awareness of this bodily perceptual process is reasonably signified by the soul’s being affected in the second kind of πάθος. More importantly, since Socrates emphasizes the wholeness of second πάθος as a single process, awareness must belong to the joint motion of soul and body as a constitutive element. Thus, awareness can be conceptualized as perceptibility (i.e., a determinate property of the motion called perception), rather than an additional motion or entity following perception. Moreover, awareness also serves as the distinguishing property of pleasure. The distinction between perception and non-perception is parallel to that between unperceived restorations and pleasure (42c-43d). Even the simplest bodily pleasure, such as eating after starving, must involve awareness and belong to perception, which is also recognized by Frede (1993: 33, n.3; 2016, 441). Therefore, I claim that the perception of bodily restoration is a single πάθος identified with bodily restoration, rather than another distinctive entity following this restoration. In other words, perceptibility is a distinguishing property of special kinds of πάθος that are classified into pleasure, which I call awareness.

Regarding pleasure with psychic elements, awareness is still intrinsic to the πάθος of underlying processes. My position is best revealed in the pure pleasure of learning. Initially, the pain of forgetting exists not by nature, but in certain reflections on πάθος (52a8-b1). Forgetting is thus by nature “painless and imperceptible” (51b5-6), while a higher-order reflection on it causes pain and counts as another distinct process following it. By contrast, learning belongs to “perceptible and pleasant fulfilments”(51b6) and its awareness must be incorporated into its nature which accounts for perceptibility. Hence, the awareness of learning is intrinsic to learning as a specific kind of πάθος without any additional process involved. Moreover, derived from the
case of learning, the general principle of defining pleasure pertains to only natural πάθος itself (52b2-3), which presumably applies to other psychic processes such as anticipation, memory, and judgment. This generalization is further supported by the similar structure shared between learning and those processes. Particularly, learning is in a sense recollection and thus memory, due to its counterpart as forgetting (52b) and the background of recollection argument (Meno.80d-86c; Phdr. 249b-250a). Memory is further intimately connected to anticipation (34c-35e) and judgment (39a). In this sense, it is reasonable that my claim on awareness can further apply to mixed psychosomatic pleasure and mixed psychic pleasure.

After arguing for the intrinsic nature of awareness in almost all types of pleasure, I now consider two crucial objections to my position. The first objection cites the jellyfish’s pleasure as a counterexample to my argument (21b-d). Though significantly contrary to humans’ values, the pleasure of the jellyfish still counts as pleasure in an ontological sense, but it can be deprived of the seeming awareness such as memory, judgment, and calculation. In this sense, pleasure can be separate from awareness, which thus counts as another entity.

Nevertheless, I maintain that there is still an awareness at the level of bodily perception of the jellyfish’s pleasure. As argued above, awareness is a distinguishing property of pleasure, so even the simplest form of bodily restoration must raise the awareness of the soul. Further, O’Reilly’s (2019) distinction between “regional registration” and “global registration” helps to illustrate my idea. The former is the minimal cognitive condition in bodily sensation, which enables lower-level animals like jellyfish to experience pleasure. In comparison, the latter is higher-level awareness such as memory and judgment, which assists rational animals to form
subjective reflections on pleasure. Therefore, the absence of higher-level awareness does not
deny the fact that there is still lower-level awareness internal to pleasure.

Another objection pertains to the distinction between pleasure and its perception, which is
explicitly addressed in the juxtaposition of pleasure (41b-42c) and emphasized by Fletcher
(2022). Based on the analogy between the perception of sight and perception (41e), just as
eyesight is different from the object, the perception of pleasure is supposed to be different from
pleasure itself, which I call “the apparent pleasure” and “the real pleasure.” Since the perception
of pleasure in 41b-42c seems to indicate awareness, the awareness of pleasure and pleasure itself
should be two distinct ontological entities.

It is unreasonable to identify the perception of pleasure in 41b-42c with my conception of
awareness, as shown in the following two objections. First, “the apparent pleasure” can be
alternatively understood as a second-order representation of pleasure, which is apart from the
nature of pleasure and thus similar to reflections on forgetting (52a-b).¹⁹ In comparison,
awareness is intrinsic to pleasure, which thus should be different from “the apparent pleasure.”
Second, I propose another plausible reading that “the apparent pleasure” denotes ontological
reality while “the real pleasure” denotes hypothetical reality. The former is what people really
experience and manifests all ontological natures of pleasure (e.g., the unlimited and coming-to-
be). As juxtaposition necessarily involves misperception, people always experience “the apparent
pleasure,” which can be greater or smaller and thus fits into the unlimited kind (42b). By
contrast, “the real pleasure” is real in a counterfactual sense, which is hypothetically positioned

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¹⁹ This solution is limited since I do not have strong evidence supporting this second-order reading of
perception in the juxtaposition. Moreover, if perception is second-order, we do not necessarily mis-
perceive the juxtaposition of pleasure, just as we do not necessarily feel pain in forgetting. This is
contrary to the claim that mixed pleasure is always (ontologically) false in comparison with pure pleasure.
without pain and never actualized in the case of mixed pleasure. It sets up a fixed standard, which is never sufficient to explain the unlimited nature of pleasure.\textsuperscript{20} Therefore, the so-called perception of pleasure in 41b-42c is not identical to my conception of awareness but rather is what awareness lies in as a constitutive element. Based on the two objections above, as the perception of pleasure is different from awareness, the separation of pleasure and its perception does not entail the separation of pleasure and its awareness.

In conclusion, the third version of the circumstantial cause view can hardly hold true. This view requires pleasure to be identical to awareness as a distinct ontological entity caused by an underlying physiological or psychological process. However, awareness is in fact the intrinsic quality of this underlying process rather than an additional process, which thus denies this version. Therefore, pleasure is identical to this underlying process as a specific kind of πάθος, with awareness as its natural property.

IV. Πάθος and Γένεσις

In the previous section, I mainly argue that pleasure is identified with a certain kind of πάθος. Given the final argument that pleasure is a combing-to-be (γένεσις) in 53c-55c, one might question why Plato collects pleasure as γένεσις instead of πάθος. In addition, the existing

\textsuperscript{20} Proios’ (2021, 182-3) example of nicotine addicts can help to illustrate my ontological-hypothetical distinction. Suppose there are nicotine addicts whose smoking habits alter their stasis of natural harmony. As they smoke in order to restore to the altered condition of harmony, they experience an intensity of pleasure that does not accurately represent the restorative process to natural harmony. In this case, “the apparent pleasure” refers to a restoration to their altered stasis, which is actually experienced by them. In comparison, “the real pleasure” is a restoration to their original natural harmony, which is never experienced by them but exists at a counterfactual level. Moreover, “the apparent pleasure” constantly changes its intensity corresponding to the addicts’ body conditions, while “the real pleasure” remains fixed since the natural harmony of the human body never changes. This explains why “the apparent pleasure” better conveys the unlimited nature of pleasure as an ontological category.
scholarly debate adds to the complexity, as scholars have many discussions on the meaning of ἐνέσεις, and whether all kinds of pleasure fit into ἐνέσεις. In this section, I intend to address this issue. I will argue that πάθος is a passive kind of ἐνέσεις, which unifies all pleasures into the ontological category of ἐνέσεις as coming-to-be in contrast with being. In this sense, pleasure as πάθος and pleasure as ἐνέσεις can be coherent.

In the Philebus, πάθος in a metaphysical sense refers to the passive side of ἐνέσεις. Specifically, πάθος meaning “to be acted upon” is often put in contrast with ποιεῖν/ἔργον meaning “to act upon,” and together they constitute two main forms of ἐνέσεις. Socrates ends the division of knowledge with a sharp contrast between opinions and knowledge (58c-59d), which corresponds to two ontological categories respectively. Opinions address “things concerning this world order, how they come to be, how they are acted upon, and how they act,” (ὅπῃ τε γέγονεν καὶ ὁπὶ πάσχει τι καὶ ὁπῃ ποιεῖ, 59a3-4) where those three terms (i.e., πάσχειν, ποιεῖν, and γίγνεσθαι) reveal the same ontological view that the coming-to-be is ever-changing. In comparison, the proper object of knowledge is “the things that always are” (τὰ ὄντα ἀεί, 59a7), namely, “the things are always in the same state in the most unmixed way,”(59c3-4) which suggests a different ontological type of eternal beings as a counterpart of coming-to-be. Moreover, there is a structure within the realm of coming-to-be. Πάσχειν and ποιεῖν are in contrast: the former meaning “to be acted upon” emphasizes passivity, while the latter meaning

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21 Scholars typically render the ἐνέσις-οὐσία distinction as being-becoming such as Frede (1993), among which Carpenter (2011) develops a more sophisticated interpretation (i.e., a metaphysical relation of dependency-independency). However, Rangos disagrees with this interpretation and explains the ἐνέσις-οὐσία distinction as the combination of process-state and means-end oppositions.

22 Some scholars agree that all pleasures are a coming-to-be, including Carpenter (2011) and Evan (2008). Other scholars deny that this claim can apply to all psychic pleasures (Fletcher, 2017: 202, n.64) or pure pleasure (Carone, 2000: 264-270).
“to act” emphasizes activity. The same symmetrical structure also appears in the Sophist (247e) and the Phaedrus (245a3-4, 270d). Those two verbs together cover a realm of constant interactions where multiple objects keep acting and being acted upon with each other, which is summarized by the verb γίγνεσθαι meaning “coming-to-be.” Therefore, πάθος is the passive side of γένεσις.

I then analyze how this metaphysical passivity of πάθος can be applied in the discussion of pleasure. In terms of bodily pleasure, the theory of perception in 34a-c suggests that the body and the soul are affected by external stimuli. Πάθος thus remains passive regarding either mixed pleasure of bodily restoration or pure pleasure of sensations. However, regarding pleasure with psychic elements, passivity is less obvious, where merely the soul is involved and nothing else acts upon it. Rather, the soul seems to perform actively, such as recalling, learning, and making judgments. In what follows, I will address this concern.

To begin with, the soul’s nature as a self-mover indicates its passivity. As revealed in the Phaedrus (245c-d), the immortality of the soul presupposes that “only what moves itself…never stop being moved (or moving for itself).” (μόνον δὴ τὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν…οὔποτε λήγει κινούμενον, 245c7-8) Whether translated as middle or passive, the participle “κινούμενον” always implies that the soul is not only moving others but also moving itself. In this sense, the soul is also a patient being acted upon. Moreover, the context tends to support the passive reading of κινούμενον. Before the immortality argument, Socrates claims to study the nature of the soul by examining “what it does and what is done to it.” (πάθη τε καὶ ἔργα, 245c3-4, trans. Nehamas and Woodruff) This investigation is a crucial parallel with the dialectical method of studying the nature of everything through its power to “act upon what” (πρὸς τί πέρυκεν εἰς τὸ δρᾶν ἔχον, 245c3-4, trans. Nehamas and Woodruff).
270d4) and “to be acted upon by what,” (εἰς τὸ παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ, 270d5) which later applies to exactly the soul (270e-271b). The context thus shows that the immortal nature of the soul highly pertains to its passivity to be acted upon by itself.

Further, I argue that the passivity of the soul’s self-motion is emphasized in psychic processes regarding pleasure, although the soul is both active and passive. This is best exemplified in the causal chain as constructed in III.(2), which encompasses various types of πάθος from perception and memory to judgment and to pleasure. Deriving from this chain, I propose two arguments as follows. First, the passivity of πάθος is evidently revealed in judgment and can be reasonably analogized to pleasure. In the active aspect of forming judgment, previously formed πάθος in one part of the soul (e.g., perception and memory), acts upon the other part of the soul by writing down words here (ἀλῆθη γράφῃ τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα, 39a4) In the passive aspect, the latter part of the soul is left with an impression, an inscribe written down which is properly called as judgment. Therefore, judgment is a passive product of this self-motion. Similarly, pleasure as a painted picture conveys a passive sense in the same manner as judgment, since the writing of judgment is analogous to the painting of pleasure (39b-40b).23 Second, the notion of passive products is also emphasized in the causal mechanism. From perception to pleasure, it is the previous product of πάθος that acts upon the other part of the soul and thus forms a new πάθος. For instance, the πάθος of perception acts upon the soul and thus forms the πάθος of judgment (39a). In this sense, the mechanism of pleasure is dependent on all previous products of πάθος, which thus explains the significance of passivity.

23 A similar problem to Fletcher (2021): most scholars interpret painting as imagination rather than pleasure, so I can not easily state that pleasure is a drawn picture.
In conclusion, πάθος at a metaphysical level is the passive side of γένεσις, which harmonizes pleasure as πάθος and pleasure as γένεσις. In the division of pleasure, πάθος identifies pleasure as multiple passive motions of the body and the soul (31b-53c), which could be metaphysically interpreted as “being acted upon” and thus belongs to coming-to-be in contrast with being. In this sense, conceptualizing pleasure as πάθος provides an ontological foundation for the seemingly abrupt claim that pleasure is a kind of γένεσις (53c-55c), which though seems to be abruptly introduced as a mysterious doctrine. Further, as for the reason why Socrates collects pleasure as γένεσις rather than πάθος (53c-55c), I render that this passage aims to attack hedonists rather than making an identity claim, which requires the contrast between coming-to-be and being (54c-d).

V. Conclusion

In this article, I argue that the concept of πάθος serves as the methodological unity in the division of pleasure, which is rooted in its role as an ontological unity for collecting pleasure as γένεσις. Πάθος sets up a methodological principle for dividing pleasure, which determines the distinguishing features of pleasure at nearly every knot of collection and division. To justify its methodological role, I further argue that πάθος serves as an ontological unity for pleasure, since pleasure is identified with a certain kind of πάθος. Finally, I harmonize pleasure as πάθος and pleasure as γένεσις by explaining that πάθος is a passive kind of γένεσις.
Bibliographies


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Appendix
pleasure & teleological process
Identification
Status quo: teleological process of desire.

perception (33a-34a)

involvement of anticipation (32a-33c)

purely pleasurable (40a-47c)

body pleasurable (36a-36b)

bodily destructive or restorative process

introduction (51b)

non-pleasure (51a-52b)

pure pleasure (51a-52b)

pleasure & teleological process

status quo: teleological process of desire.

learning and forgetting

mixed pleasurable (46a-47c)

mixed psychic pleasures (45a-46c)

pure pleasure (51a-52b)

suffering (51a-52b)

self-destruction of mankind (51a-52b)

suffering (51a-52b)

suffering (51a-52b)

suffering (51a-52b)

suffering (51a-52b)

suffering (51a-52b)

suffering (51a-52b)