
Gilt by Associations

Appointments to Federal Advisory Committees in U.S. National Security Policy

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Abstract

This is an early draft of the large-n observational chapter of my dissertation, which explains why some interest groups gain influence in U.S. national security politics while others remain marginal. Prior chapters deduce and elaborate upon a theory of interest group influence, in which I argue that groups thrive when they can provide a *moral subsidy* – third-party testimony supporting a president’s preferred policy initiative – by producing and distributing propaganda. Two principal independent variables make certain groups more likely to be effective in this regard: preference agreement with the administration, and credibility endowments such as professional status and the authority to speak on behalf of foreign populations. Extra-governmental organizations (EGOs) that provide moral subsidy become partners of the executive, gaining access to political, informational, and professional resources that give them advantages over their rivals. Others may survive, but remain excluded from policy decisions.

Here, I undertake large-n analyses of Federal Advisor Committee appointments to explain *when* interest groups get the opportunity to become influential in national security politics. I argue that the president’s incentive to enlist extra-governmental organizations increases when the White House faces stronger party opposition in Congress and public disapproval. EGOs provide leverage against opposition resistance by stoking public opinion. The analysis conducted thus far represents the initial stages of what I hope to adapt into a stand-alone paper. More work is clearly required, particularly in the interpretation of logit results. I look forward to your comments.

1 Introduction

This project examines the part that interest groups play in the politics of U.S. national security. Since at least as far back as World War I, and likely further, special interests have carried the target of suspicion on their backs that the nation’s mis-adventures abroad stem from their interference in the political process. The Senate convened the Special Committee on Investigation of the Munitions Industry in 1934 with a mission to uncover what Senator Gerald Nye (R-ND) and many others had long suspected – the nefarious influence of the munitions and banking industries acting collectively to drive the U.S. into the Great War.¹ Decades later President Eisenhower warned against the “unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex.”² More recently, international relations scholars have blamed parochial interests for the “Cold War consensus” that led to U.S. involvement in Vietnam³ or the misguided posture of the U.S. with respect to the Middle East.⁴

Few studies have attempted to provide a systematic account of the specific role that organized special interests play in national security politics – at least outside of the military procurement process. This project does just that, and this paper begins that process by accounting for when organizations gain access to the policy-making apparatus. I argue that organizations are more likely to get a seat at the table when the president’s approval ratings are low and when the opposition party in Congress is strong. The reason for this stems from the role that interest groups most effectively play in national security politics – as the producer and distributor of propaganda and the provider of public relations services for

1. After eighteen months of investigation, the Nye Committee release a report that alleged corruption and profiteering, but offered no evidence or assertion that corporate interests had any affect on President Wilson’s policy choice. See Nye Committee, in *Report of the Special Committee on Investigation of the Munitions Industry (The Nye Report)*, technical report (U.S. Congress, Senate, 74th Congress, 2nd Session, February 1935), 3–13. Nye and his fellow isolationists continued to allege undue influence by these industries, but the committee produced scant support for these these claims.

2. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Farwell Address*, Washington, D.C., January 1961, accessed May 13, 2013.

3. Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), ch. 7.

4. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 2007).

politically weak presidents.⁵

The remainder of this paper proceeds in three sections. I first situate the argument in its theoretical and historical context. I discuss both the perils of interest group influence and the possible benefits they bring to democratic governance. Next, I deduce a theory of interest group influence based on the literature on interest groups, public opinion, and executive-legislative control over foreign policy in the U.S. I introduce the concept of “moral subsidy” – legitimating third party testimony in support of a president facing persuasion deficits – and elaborate briefly on the causal mechanisms that explain why presidential administrations choose to enlist the assistance of EGOs. Finally, I test several of the core components of the theory using data on appointments to Federal Advisory Committees from 1997 to 2012. These data are particularly useful because they identify the extra-governmental affiliation of committee members. They support the claims that the legislature takes a more passive role in national security policy, and that the president’s political strength significantly affects the executive’s decision to seek moral subsidy from extra-governmental actors.

2 Pluralism, Propaganda, and Public Opinion

Twentieth century liberal theorists agree that free civic engagement enables society to constrain and control the state, but they disagree about the virtues of interest groups and their impact on U.S. governance. The pluralists argue along the lines of James Madison’s prescription in Federalist 10: that the cross-cutting cleavages among the multitude of organized constituencies contain the “mischief of faction” and prevent the capture of government by a narrow segment of society.⁶ They see a balance among competing interests, which constrain

5. Vanderbush, in “Exiles and the Marketing of U.S. Policy toward Cuba and Iraq” [in en], *Foreign Policy Analysis* 5, no. 3 (July 2009): 287–306 and Haney and Vanderbush, in “The Role of Ethnic Interest Groups in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case of the Cuban American National Foundation” [in en], *International Studies Quarterly* 43, no. 2 (June 1999): 341–361 argue that the Iraq and Cuba lobbies both played the role of marketing partner, but they do not offer a systematic empirical or theoretical account of the practice of public relations outsourcing.

6. James Madison, “Federalist #10,” in *The Federalist*, The Gideon Edition, ed. George W. Carey and James McClellan (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001); Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); David Bicknell Truman, *The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public*

the state from pursuing its own goals without accountability to the public it serves. Other liberals challenge this optimistic assessment, arguing that unequal distribution of resources systematically favors some groups and not others. The same processes that constrain the state in a balanced environment propel some groups into a position of great advantage when the government expands its capacity to serve their interests, but not the needs of others.⁷

2.1 Propaganda in the United States

The U.S. government has not had an easy time maintaining an official agency responsible for security-related propaganda targeting a domestic audience. The Committee on Public Information (CPI) managed the task during World War I, and it promptly ceased domestic operations upon the termination of hostilities in Europe. The Office of War Information (OWI) was created to maintain public morale during World War II, but was disbanded at the end of the war, having struggled throughout its existence to secure stable funding from Congress. The legislature has frequently used the power of the purse to limit the ways in which the executive could make the case for overseas military involvement to the American public.

The objection to official propaganda stems in part from its perceived anti-democratic character. Freedom of the press remains an essential component of democracy because the body politic requires open information in order to evaluate public choices. Whether in selecting policies directly or the delegates responsible for making decisions, the *demos* must know the facts and principles of an issue so they may engage in constructive debate, making good ideas better and rejecting those that lack merit. Propaganda works not to inform in a comprehensive manner, but to propagate a faith, an allegiance to a choice already made. Its purveyors seek adherents, not critics helping to improve upon a proposition. Some democratic peace theories, for instance, propose a “marketplace” that protects the

Opinion, 2 Revised (Alfred a Knopf, June 1971).

7. Grant McConnell, *Private power & American democracy*, [1st] (New York, Knopf, 1966); Theodore J Lowi, *The end of liberalism: the second republic of the United States* [in English] (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2010).

nation from misguided adventurism by weeding out bad ideas, and propaganda violates the principle of intellectual competition.⁸ More generally, it puts a heavy government thumb on the scales that people use to weigh critical policy information. For these and other reasons, U.S. government has foregone the development of official domestic propaganda institutions.

Non-official propaganda, on the other hand, is protected by the freedoms of association and speech. Three Supreme Court decisions, *Buckley v. Valeo* (1976), *Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission* (2010), and *McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission* (about an hour ago), stand out as primary assertions of the rights of private actors to spend money on political persuasion, and most groups operating under these precedents use public relations techniques that would be labelled propaganda if employed by the government. They craft messages that advocate a single correct way of thinking, demonizing opponents and rallying the faithful to the cause.

Not only is extra-governmental propaganda more permissible, it is often more effective at persuading the public of the virtues of a chosen policy. There are psychological and political reasons for this. Edward Bernays, nephew of Sigmund Freud and a pioneer in bringing psychoanalytic techniques to bear upon consumer advertising, demonstrated the power of third-party testimonial in swaying the public mind.⁹ Enlisting outside experts makes an argument appear authoritative and disinterested. Bernays, considered by many to be “the father of public relations,” brought this and many other insights into the political domain, where partisanship exacerbates the problem of gaining and preserving trust. Political competition amplifies all manner of biases that inhibit civil dialogue and rational debate. Third parties stand outside partisan politics, and their testimony can penetrate certain prejudices that presidents cannot.

Seeing the effectiveness of extra-governmental organizations, presidents have sought their

8. See Reiter and Stam, Reiter, in *Democracies at War* (Princeton University Press, January 2002); “Democracy, Deception, and Entry into War,” *Security Studies* 21, no. 4 (2012): 594–623, accessed March 22, 2013 for arguments on the democratic marketplace with respect to war.

9. Larry Tye, *The father of spin: Edward L. Bernays & the birth of public relations* [in English] (New York: Henry Holt, 2002).

assistance when building public support for security policy initiatives. The utility of public relations is greatest where no natural constituency exists behind a given policy. Much as with the introduction of a novel consumer product, demand for getting involved in a foreign crisis must be generated by marketing. This stands in contrast with many aspects of domestic policy, where the motivating crisis already imposes suffering upon the electorate. In the absence of an attack by a foreign power (state or non-state actor), the American public feels little pain from foreign problems. To get their attention, policy initiators must dispatch independent salesmen. Testimonial by extra-governmental organizations ranks among the most effective marketing tactics.

The president's power to manage access to the official security policy apparatus, combined with the reliance on extra-governmental organizations for propaganda, has shaped the development of the U.S. government itself, particularly the institutional capacities to handle the political aspects of security policy. As the U.S. moved toward full involvement in World War II, President Roosevelt collaborated with a number of groups advocating interventionism. These groups then provided important personnel to the OWI. Several years after the OWI was disbanded, President Truman created the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) with some of the same top people, tasked with coordinating the "moral" aspects of the nascent Cold War. At the beginning the Eisenhower administration, the president replaced the PSB with the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), which was in turn had its duties transferred to an expanded National Security Council (NSC) under President Kennedy. Each of these agencies was staffed (and often chaired) by people who had moved in and out of government, alternating between their official positions and the leadership of a series of public advocacy groups, including the Committee to Defend American by Aiding the Allies (CDAAA), the Committee for the Marshall Plan (CMP), and the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD). Together, these White House agencies and extra-governmental organizations came to constitute the national security "establishment" in the U.S., representing the core set of principles guiding American grand strategy through the second half of the twentieth

century.

2.2 The Value of Public Opinion

Propaganda has proven effective at shifting opinion over security actions. Public support provides value for the president in three ways, legally, politically, and strategically. First, it helps clear any formal legal hurdles to implementing the proposed policy. Second, it gives the president political leverage that extends beyond security policy. Third, it improves the prospects for strategic mission success. Conversely, failing to secure public support imposes serious costs on all three counts.

Legal Value. Presidential dominance over security policy is not absolute. While Congress often allows the president leeway over national security issues, the formal powers of the legislature remain substantial. Propaganda has congressional compliance as one of its goals. It is a form of “going public,” which has become an increasingly popular way of demonstrating to recalcitrant legislators that following the president’s lead serves their own political interests. This tactic amounts to “[f]orcing compliance from fellow Washingtonians by going over their heads to enlist constituents’ pressure.”¹⁰ A Congress made compliant in this way is more likely to delegate discretionary authority to the executive and to appropriate the required funding.

Political Value. Involvement in foreign wars is one of a small number of issues that regularly affects the electoral fortunes of the president. Along with racial issues and social welfare issues, public perception of how well or poorly the president has used the nation’s military power has a significant impact on presidential electoral outcomes.¹¹ Shaping these perceptions becomes critical for politicians seeking re-election. Whether trying to secure his own second term, to boost his party’s representation in Congress, or to firm up his own legacy, the

10. Samuel Kernell, *Going Public: New Strategies Of Presidential Leadership, 4th Edition*, 4th ed. (CQ Press, October 2006), pg. 2.

11. Steven J. Rosenstone, *Forecasting Presidential Elections*, First Edition (Yale Univ Pr, November 1983).

president has a strong political incentive to use propaganda to boost the approval of his national security agenda.

Strategic Value. A public that supports military involvement is more likely to support the policies necessary to make it work. The armed forces have an easier time recruiting and retaining personnel for popular wars. A supportive public more readily accepts the rationing of materials and supplies necessary for the war effort. The morale of soldiers on deployment improves when the public shows strong support for their mission. From full-on military engagement to involvement far short of war, public support signals the resolve necessary to carry a mission through and the credibility to fulfill promises and threats.

3 The Theory of Moral Subsidy


The theory of moral subsidy explains what allows some interest groups to thrive in contemporary U.S. national security politics, as summarized in Figure 1. There are three primary independent variables of interest.¹² Some interest groups have preferences that align with a president intent on initiating a new policy program, and some groups are endowed with characteristics that grant them credibility with the public and members of Congress – credibility that the president often does not have.¹³ These qualities include educational status, military experience, international relations expertise, and cultural identification with relevant populations abroad. Finally, presidents all suffer from persuasion deficits, but the degree and quality varies depending on the domestic and international politics of the moment. Successful groups are those that have preferences that align with the president's and the specific credibility endowments that compensate for the administration's particular per-

12. Other conventional determinants of group success apply as background conditions – for example, the ability to overcome basic collective action problems is also necessary. See Olson, in *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971).

13. The office of President of the United States has credibility endowments of its own. The power of persuasion, of the bully pulpit, is not imaginary. However, it is limited in systematic ways. See especially Edwards, in *On Deaf Ears: The Limits of the Bully Pulpit*. [in English] (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006) for an examination of these limitations.

suasion deficits. They become successful at specific moments, when the president faces a challenging foreign conflict or political weakness at home.

Figure 1: Theory of Moral Subsidy



Interest groups typically gain influence when they can provide a “legislative subsidy” to over-worked congressional staffs with broad responsibilities and little specialized training.¹⁴ They provide legislators with information about anticipated policy outcomes and voter preferences, and they explain policy decisions to the electorate.¹⁵ However, since presidents enjoy a significantly greater first-mover advantage in security policy, combined with the fact the executive branch contains one of the largest intelligence-gathering operations in the world, interest groups in security policy lose the information advantages they enjoy over legislators.¹⁶ Public inattention to foreign affairs simplifies the job of persuading voters, but

14. Richard L Hall and Alan V Deardorff, “Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy,” *American Political Science Review* 100, no. 01 (2006): 69–84.

15. See Hansen, in *Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby, 1919-1981* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991) and Truman, in *The Governmental Process*. Also, Jacobs and Shapiro, in *Politicians don't pander: political manipulation and the loss of democratic responsiveness* [in English] (Chicago, IL.: University of Chicago Press, 2000) identify “instrumental responsiveness” – the test-marketing of political rhetoric – as a major contribution of interest groups.

16. Wildavsky, in “The Two Presidencies,” *Trans-Action* 4 (1966): 7–14 goes so far as to posit sufficient executive autonomy over international affairs to create two distinct presidencies, one for domestic policy and the other for foreign policy. Schlesinger, in *The Imperial Presidency* (New York: Mariner Books, 2004) focuses on foreign policy as the context for the growth of executive power, which harkens back to Hamilton, in “Federalist #8,” in *The Federalist*, The Gideon Edition, ed. George W. Carey and James McClellan (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001). The collapse of the so-called “Cold War consensus” – and later the end of the Cold War itself – re-ignited the debate over the balance of power over foreign policy between Congress and

partisan competition, mistrust of official propaganda, and other challenges complicate the task for the president.¹⁷ This creates powerful incentives for the White House policy-makers to seek outside assistance, and interest groups meet their needs by making the moral case for U.S. involvement from a perspective that appears politically independent.

The mechanisms of the theory are fairly simple. Presidential dominance of security policy shapes the ways in which interest groups can influence policy, reducing their ability to pressure the policy initiator into taking action he otherwise would not have taken. Despite this dominance, failure to secure policy buy-in remains costly. Congress must provide funds to raise an army, and turning large numbers of citizens into effective warriors depends on public support, even with conscription. Involvement short of war requires compliance with domestic laws regarding the transfer of financial, intellectual, and material resources to combatants overseas. Interest groups whose preferences align with those of the president, and whose credibility endowments help overcome presidential authority deficits can stoke public opinion, exerting pressure on Congress to comply, which maximizes the prospect of political success. Public inattention to foreign affairs further increases the effectiveness of

the executive (Aaron Wildavsky, “The Two Presidencies Thesis Revisited at a Time of Political Dissensus,” *Society* 26, no. 5 [1989]: 54–59; Thomas E. Mann, *A Question of balance: the president, the Congress, and foreign policy* [Washington: Brookings Institution, 1990]; Randall B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay, *Congress resurgent: foreign and defense policy on Capitol Hill*, Mershon Center series on international security and foreign policy [Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993]; James M. Lindsay, *Congress and the politics of U.S. foreign policy* [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994]). More recent work brings additional to precision to the study of congressional resistance to presidential fiat in national security policy (William G. Howell and Jon Pevehouse, *While Dangers Gather* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007]) and the empowering effect that war has on the president (William G Howell, Saul P Jackman, and Jon C Rogowski, *The Wartime President* [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013]).

17. In the past, the conventional wisdom was that “the power of the presidency is the power to persuade” (Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan*, Revised [Free Press, 1991]), and that the force of presidential persuasion is especially acute in foreign policy (Kernell, *Going Public*; Brandice Canes-Wrone, *Who Leads Whom?: Presidents, Policy, and the Public* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006]). In contrast, see Edwards, in *On Deaf Ears* for a book-length treatment of the limitations of presidential persuasion. Scholars of public opinion argue that the electorate responds to events in foreign policy (Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, *The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans’ Policy Preferences* [Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992]), but that their response is conditioned by political elites (Adam Berinsky, “Assuming the Costs of War: Events, Elites, and American Public Support for Military Conflict,” *Journal of Politics* 69 [2007]: 975–997). I take the position that the public is especially susceptible to persuasion over matters of national security, but that various political circumstances constrain presidential effectiveness in the role of elite mediator.

propaganda campaigns coordinated by the administration and assisted by interest groups.

Interest groups that help the administration create and distribute propaganda are rewarded. If the policy secures passage, their first reward is the implementation of a policy they prefer. Moreover, if they help secure broad public buy-in, the mission has a greater chance of success. If the policy succeeds, the job of implementation will require further propaganda (to keep morale high) and other administration services.¹⁸ This creates opportunities for interest group members to help staff government agencies, or to form a public-private partnership that boosts the group's stature – ultimately helping it to create a robust constituency in support of its position. If the policy fails to secure passage, interest groups that cooperate with the administration propaganda campaign still become valued political allies – even following ousted office-holders into political “exile” upon being voted out of office.¹⁹

Interest groups that oppose the administration have a harder time surviving, and a terrible time expanding their influence. They do not get jobs in the expanding policy apparatus and the prospects of building a constituency depend entirely on the failure of the policy they oppose. Their counter-propaganda suffers from two principal disadvantages. First, collaboration with the administration means access to controlled information, including planning documents, strategic rationale, and sometimes even raw intelligence. Second, with the country's most tested political operatives coordinating the information campaign from the apex of state power, collaborating groups overcome coordination problems inherent in collective action. Political entrepreneurs might emerge in opposition to the administration, but few will match the effective coordination capabilities of a competent White House team.²⁰ De-

18. The expansion of foreign commitments requires a corresponding expansion of executive capacity. As mission compounds upon mission, the growing complexity further demands greater strategic coordination and the staff to manage it.

19. The Project for a New American Century (PNAC) is an excellent example of an administration in exile allied with interest group members who had helped mobilize support for military involvement – some of which had passed (e.g., Desert Storm), some of which had not (e.g., assistance to the Contras in Nicaragua).

20. All things being equal, those who ascend to the White House tend to be at least as talented at political organization as their rivals. The tools at their disposal create further advantages. As Aldrich, in *Why Parties?: The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America*, 1st ed. (University of Chicago Press, June 1995) argues, the party organization solves the collective action problem through centralization of strategic planning. I take this point one step further by claiming that the White House provides a stronger centralizing mechanism than anything available to their opponents, such as the central party committees,

prived of equal access to controlled information and operating without a clearly identified, capable leader, opposition groups will stumble over inefficiencies, including duplication of efforts, contradictory strategies, and inter-group competition.

4 Enlisting Extra-Governmental Organizations

The effectiveness of interest group propaganda derives from factors particular to security policy and from the president’s political circumstances. Security policy involves foreign populations, complex strategic considerations, and violence. Despite his prominence, the president suffers from structurally induced persuasion deficits. Partisanship causes many to doubt his credibility as a witness. He is not authorized to speak on behalf of foreign populations. The evidence he offers is subject to political constraints by which other actors are not bound. The importance of these deficits varies from case to case, but they routinely hamper the executive’s ability to command public support. Interest groups help overcome these deficits by providing moral subsidy.

Figure 2: Executive’s Decision to Enlist EGOs




Figure 2 stylizes the executive’s decision to enlist EGOs. The White House has a preference which by nature tend toward segmentation and fractiousness.

ence over whether to intervene in some foreign situation, which may entail the deployment U.S. military personnel, the provision of armaments, economic support to influence the alliance choices of foreign nations, or some other policy action short of full-scale war. If the administration prefers to abstain, the decision tree terminates. If it chooses to become involved, it must evaluate whether it has the ability to persuade the public. If it finds itself capable of handling its own propaganda campaign, it does so and the decision tree terminates. If not, it enlists the help of EGOs. This is moral subsidy.

4.1 Presidential Control Over Interest Group Access

The chief executive has substantial legal authority to manage outsider access to the policy apparatus without consulting Congress, especially on matters of national security. By controlling the conventional channels of public access to the bureaucracy, the White House removes one of the central mechanisms of legislative oversight. According to McCubbins and Schwartz²¹, Congress installs virtual “fire alarms” throughout the administration, so that groups or individuals can alert officials to problems either created or ignored by government programs. Rather than provide discrete substantive solutions to political conflicts, the legislature establishes administrative procedures that embed the contemporaneous terms of contestation within the agencies they create. They “stack the deck to benefit favored political interests.”²² Whenever a president creates an agency unilaterally, he and his advisors alone determine the constituencies, interests, and information channeled by procedural mandates. In matters of national security, the president as both chief executive and commander in chief enjoys wide latitude in structuring the policy apparatus, creating institutions that serve some interests and not others.²³

21. Matthew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms,” *American Journal of Political Science* 28, no. 1 (1984): 165–179.

22. Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast, “Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control,” *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 3, no. 2 (1987): 243–277.

23. The creation of the Department of Homeland Security presents an interesting counter-example, wherein President Bush wished to continue with the White House Office of Homeland Security he had created. In a rare instance of congressional resistance, Senator Joe Lieberman led the effort to require Senate approval of senior personnel by creating a cabinet-level department. Three factors may help explain this anomaly. First,

The Administrative Procedure Act safeguards the public's access to policy information, but national security is largely exempt from its requirements. The act mandates that all rules and regulations be published with sufficient opportunity for public comment prior to implementation, along with the "method by which [agency] functions are channeled and determined."²⁴ Section 552, subsection b explicitly states that the president may exclude national defense and foreign policy activities by Executive order; he need not consult Congress nor any other authority to grant protected status to agencies whose secrecy he wishes to protect. Moreover, intelligence operations are excluded from the act automatically. If the public or Congress wants this information released, it must fight against a claim of executive privilege or wait for unauthorized leaks by disgruntled personnel.

The president controls access to the national security apparatus by staffing its agencies without interference from rival political actors. Political appointments to bureaucratic positions are among the most important tools for controlling administrative agencies,²⁵ and presidents often have acted unilaterally in creating sub-cabinet national security offices that do not require congressional advice and consent. As long as they do not exceed the discretionary budget of White House operations, many advisory boards, presidential commissions, and agencies operate independently of the legislature. In staffing these offices, the White House and the FBI have untrammelled authority to grant security clearance to new appointees, and to assign access to compartmentalized information. Once "read in" on a program, an individual's clearance may be re-instated with relative ease even after a substantial lapse. Presidents rarely have security policy personnel forced upon them, and even temporary assignments tend to bring the same people into the process when need returns.

Senator Lieberman had strong executive branch ambitions, one of the few reasons why legislators would insert themselves into security politics. Second, the homeland focus of the agency made it more salient for the U.S. public. Third, President Bush announced his support for Lieberman's plan the day that Coleen Rowley testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on the opportunities missed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to pursue the case of Zacarias Moussaoui, the so-called "twentieth hijacker" of the attacks of September 11, 2001. The accommodation to Congress came at a moment of political weakness for the president.

24. *Administrative Procedure Act*, 1946, accessed August 19, 2010.

25. B. Dan Wood and Richard W. Waterman, "The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy," *The American Political Science Review* 85, no. 3 (September 1991): 801–828, accessed September 23, 2013.

5 Federal Advisory Committee Appointments, 1997-2012

According to the General Services Administration (GSA), the first Federal Advisory Committee (FAC) aided President Washington during the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794. Previous scholars have identified FACs as important channels of information for the executive, significant tools of legislative control over the bureaucracy,²⁶ and loci of influence for corporations and not-for-profit organizations.²⁷ Recognizing the prospect, real or merely perceived, of undue special interest influence, President Obama first discouraged in 2009 the appointment or re-appointment of federally registered lobbyists to FACs, then formally banned them a year later. Still, representatives of major corporations, trade associations, labor organizations, and various other interest groups populate FACs on a regular basis. In 1972, Congress passed the Federal Advisory Committee Act, so that “the Congress and the public should be kept informed with respect to the number, purpose, membership, activities, and cost of advisory committees.”²⁸ The act requires that the executive regularly report a range of data on FACs to the GSA. Beginning with the year 1997 and ending in 2012, these data are available for public download. I conduct the empirical analysis of the present paper using these data.²⁹

The data include every Federal Advisory Committee outside of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Reserve for each year in which they were convened, listing the name, parent agency, and each appointed member for each year in which they served. This allows analysis at the committee and member level. At both of these levels, the database includes attributes that facilitate testing several important propositions and hypotheses implied by the theory of moral subsidy. The results support the proposition that Congress

26. Steven J. Balla and John R. Wright, “Interest Groups, Advisory Committees, and Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy,” *American Journal of Political Science* 45, no. 4 (October 2001): 799–812, accessed April 2, 2014.

27. Richard T. Sylvester, David F. Scudder, and T. B. Priest, “Corporate Advice: Large Corporations and Federal Advisory Committees,” *Social Science Quarterly (University of Texas Press)* 65, no. 1 (March 1984): 100–111, accessed April 2, 2014; Gwen Moore et al., “Elite Interlocks in Three U.S. Sectors: Nonprofit, Corporate, and Government,” *Social Science Quarterly (Wiley-Blackwell)* 83, no. 3 (September 2002): 726–744, accessed April 2, 2014.

28. *Federal Advisory Committee Act*, 1972.

29. Data are available in Microsoft Access format at <http://facadatabase.gov/downloadcenter.aspx>.

takes a more passive approach to national security policy, and that the executive enlists affiliates of credibility-enhancing groups to counteract the president’s political weakness.

5.1 Committee Level Attributes

Interest Area and Category. First, the committees are identified as having one or more “interest areas” – designating the policy issues the FAC intends to address. These one hundred sixty six interest areas are grouped into forty-one “interest categories” including Food and Drugs, Transportation, and Science and Technology, for example.³⁰ Among these are two categories that bear upon national security policy, labeled National Defense and International. The core of my analysis focuses on FACs related to two categories, labeled “National Defense” and “International” – dealing with five interest areas, International Programs, Studies, and Diplomacy, International Law, International Organizations, International Economic Policy, National Security and Defense, and Overseas Security Issues.

Committee Function. Second, the database indicates one of seven “committee functions” for each FAC in a given fiscal year.³¹ Committee functions can change from year to year, but rarely do. These attributes indicate what kind of recommendations or advice the FAC expects to produce – major policy changes, scientific program advice, grant-making recommendations, and others. I confine my analysis to Non-Scientific Program Advisory Boards, National Policy Issue Advisory Boards, and Special Emphasis Panels.

Establishment Authority. Third, each committee-year has indicated an “establishment authority,” in one of four possible categories. Committees may be Authorized by Law, where Congress has granted explicit permission to the executive to convene a committee. They may be mandated by Statutory authority, created by an act of Congress that cannot be ignored

30. See Appendix for a full listing of interest categories. Committees may have more than one interest area and category. One committee, the Proposal Review Panel for Information and Intelligent Systems, has twenty eight associated categories of interest.

31. Also listed in the appendix.

by the executive. They may be created under Agency Authority alone – many agencies have broadly delegated powers to convene committees as necessary. Finally, they may be created by Presidential order. I include committees of all four such designations in the analysis, but employ the distinctions to demonstrate the validity of certain assumptions, and as a controls in several statistical models.

Meetings Fourth, each meeting convened by a committee is listed in the database. This includes the date of the meeting. I use the first meeting for a committee-year to determine the state of presidential approval (discussed below). I also use the number of meetings to gauge the level of activity and importance for a committee.

5.2 Member Level Attributes

Occupation or Affiliation. Finally, and most importantly, the data indicate the current employer or professional association for each member appointed to each committee, a point of critical interest to the current analysis. In the database provided by the GSA, this field has over 136,000 variants – clearly entered as free-form text, and too many to code comprehensively. This nearly always includes the organization, agency, or corporation that employees the appointee, and often – but not always – includes the position the appointee holds in that organization. There is little uniformity or order imposed on this aspect of the data. After filtering on Interest Category and Establishment Authority as described above, I reviewed each of the remaining distinct affiliation descriptions and coded them on the basis of forty-seven possible affiliation types of my own devising.³² The goal was to identify the type of organization associated with an affiliation as described, not necessarily the specific corporation, association, or institution.

32. There were roughly four thousand remaining distinct affiliation descriptions. See Appendix for a random sampling of 50 affiliations and a full listing of affiliation types.

5.3 Custom Coding and Additional Data

Affiliation Type. The list of affiliation types I devised was built as I familiarized myself with the raw affiliation descriptors included in the downloaded data. My goal was to sort the thousands of distinct descriptors into a much smaller set that reflects the type of activity in which the organizations general perform. Numbering forty-seven, this list is still too large for parsimonious analysis, but it serves as a bridge to two separate groupings that yield theoretical leverage – organization types and resource types.³³

Organization Types. The first of these short-lists is organization type, and reflects the corporate form the organization takes. In this categorization, associations are generally membership groups that provide a service to their members or by their members to a target population. Relief organizations, trade associations, labor unions, professional associations, and associations of government employees are all in this category. Second are profit seeking firms that manufacture goods or provide professional services, from manufacturing and engineering to staffing and management consulting. Third, government officials at the federal, state and local, tribal and territorial, and international levels are in the same organization type. Military, active duty, education and training, and retired or family-relations are a separate category from civilian government. Finally, I include a category, separate from associations, for institutions. Some, such as academic institutions are easy to tell apart. Policy research institutions, on the other hand, are often difficult to distinguish from Issue Advocacy associations. I have made a judgement call based on a review of the corporate materials available online, classifying as policy research institutions any group with exclusive recruitment that produces quasi-scholarly literature on a broad range of topics, and as issue advocacy associations any group with a narrow policy agenda and a liberal membership policy. Interest groups are most closely related to associations in this framework, with

33. See Appendix for a listing of Affiliation Types and the associated Organization Type and Resource Type. Note that Federal Executive affiliates are listed as having neither organization type nor resource type – they serve as the reference category in the tested statistical models.

institutions capturing some of the concept as well.

Presidential Approval. I use public opinion data available from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research. For each day in the scope of the downloaded data, I take the average of all available polling for presidential approval and disapproval covering that day – each day in the sample gets a value for both measures. If a day is not covered by any poll, I calculate a linear interpolation from the latest prior poll to the earliest subsequent poll. In Equation 1, x represents the current value of presidential approval (pro or con), t represents the current date, and subscripts indicate prior (0) and subsequent (1) values and dates.

$$x = x_0 + \frac{t - t_0}{t_1 - t_0} (x_1 - x_0) \quad (1)$$

For each day, I also calculate the overall average and change over the past seven, fourteen, twenty-one, and twenty-eight days, to capture lag and delta effects. I merge these presidential approval data with the member data based on the date of each member’s FAC appointment, so the dataset indicates the state of presidential approval at the beginning of each appointment term.

Presidential Party Power. To provide another measure of presidential weakness, I calculate the power of the president’s party in Congress, to track how much effective legislative resistance the executive faces in the implementation of policy.³⁴ The measure takes into account the size of the president’s co-partisan caucus in each chamber and the unity with which each caucus votes on legislative proposals. For each chamber, Equation 2 determines the Presidential Party Power value. Φ represents the party size by percentage of members in each chamber, and Θ represents their party unity. Subscripts indicate reference to the

34. I use the same adapted version of the LPPC scores used by Howell and Pevehouse, in *While Dangers Gather*, based on Brady, Cooper, and Hurley, in “The Decline of Party in the U. S. House of Representatives, 1887-1968,” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 4, no. 3 (August 1979): 381–407, accessed April 8, 2014.

president's party and the opposition.

$$PPP = \frac{\Phi_{pres} \times \Theta_{pres} - \Phi_{oppo} \times \Theta_{oppo}}{100} \quad (2)$$

I use party membership and role-call voting unity data provided by Howard Rosenthal and Keith Poole.³⁵ I merge the member and committee data with presidential party power values based on the fiscal year of the committee-year assignment and the two-year span of the convened Congress.

5.4 Hypotheses

5.4.1 *Congressional Inattention to Foreign Policy*

As a working assumption of the theory, I propose, based on prior research, that the executive enjoys substantial autonomy in foreign policy. Formally speaking, assumptions need not be tested, but doing so can avoid a nasty cut from Occam's Razor. The data available in this collection can provide further support for the proposition. Congressional reluctance to steer foreign policy will manifest in a relative inattention to foreign policy FACs.

Hypothesis 1: National Defense and International FACs will be significantly less likely to have been established by congressional authority.

5.4.2 *Policy Coordination as Psychological Warfare*

Committees with multiple interest categories are more likely to require the services of public relations partners. "Policy coordination" is often used as a euphemism for maintaining consistent policy rationale and concerted propaganda campaigns. During the early Cold War, the Truman administration established the PSB, tasked with planning what was variously called "psychological warfare," "moral warfare," "public diplomacy," and other politic ways

35. Available at www.voteview.com.

of referring to propaganda. President Eisenhower replaced the PSB with the OCB in 1953, assigning it the responsibility of policy coordination.³⁶

Hypothesis 2: Committees with a greater number of interest categories will have greater interest group representation.

5.4.3 Propaganda and Prestige

According to the theory, interest groups earn appointments to FACs based on their ability to help overcome the president's credibility problems and assist with propaganda efforts. The effectiveness of moral subsidy depends on obscuring the enlistment of surrogates in promoting the administration's agenda. Also, the president's reputation can be further damaged by revelations of manipulating public opinion by outsourcing propaganda. Because of this, FACs with greater public exposure will be less likely venues for moral subsidy. Presidential committees, carrying the prestige of the office³⁷, have the greatest exposure.

Hypothesis 3: Security policy FACs created by the president will have less interest group representation than agency-created FACs.

5.4.4 Congress and Credibility

The president needs either persuasion surpluses or moral subsidy when the when the administration initiates a policy proposal that captures congressional attention. Relative to FACs created by the president, those that convene with explicit congressional approval should see greater representation by affiliates of credibility-enhancing interest groups. The president has less incentive to enlist interest groups to resist pressure from Congress pushing its own agenda. There are few means by which the legislature can initiate national security policy without executive cooperation. Ongoing policies, such as the embargo against Cuban trade,

36. Archival research in subsequent chapters explores the activities of these agencies in greater detail.

37. According to Neustadt, in *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents*, prestige is the president's greatest institutional resource.

can constrain presidential discretion. However, overall, the administration does not need moral subsidy to resist Congress.

Hypothesis 4a: Security policy FACs created by the president will have less interest group representation than congressionally authorized FACs.

Hypothesis 4b: Security policy FACs created by the president will have more interest group representation than congressionally mandated FACs.

5.4.5 Presidential Deficits and Credibility Endowments

One of the central claims of the theory is that the executive will turn to EGOs when the administration suffers from persuasion deficits. These occur when the president's popularity falters and when the opposition party enjoys greater power in Congress. In particular, groups whose primary resource is their credibility will be especially useful for deficit-plagued executives. At both the member and group level, there should be a negative relationship between presidential strength and credibility-endowed EGO access to FACs.

Hypothesis 5: Security policy FACs will have more interest group representation when presidential party power is low.

5.5 Results

The working assumption that Congress remains passive on matters of national security is tested by the as the hypothesis that the establishment authority for a FAC is less likely to indicate a congressional mandate, or even consenting authorization. Table 1 shows the number of committees³⁸ cross-tabulated over establishment authority and whether it addresses national security issues, as indicated by having a "National Defense" or "International" interest category. This summary suggests that Congress indeed takes a more hands-off approach

38. Actually, committee-years, which weights recurring and long-running committees more heavily than short-lived FACs.

to establishing FACs in areas of national security. While the number of congressionally-mandated FACs exceeds those established by the president, the most prolific creators are executive branch agencies. Moreover, the proportion of security to total FACs created by Congress is far below the overall percentage. Only six percent of all congressionally mandated FACs are concerned with national security, compared with over nine percent of committees overall. The proportion is even lower for committees established under congressional consent to executive initiative, at just over two percent. National security FACs are just under twenty percent of all committees established by the executive without any legislative involvement (eighteen percent for agency-established committees and twenty-one percent for presidential committees).

Table 1: FACs by Establishment Authority

Establishment Authority	Security	Other	Total
Agency Authority	330	1480	1810
Authorized by Law	19	893	912
Presidential	101	383	484
Statutory (Congress Created)	269	4111	4380
Total	719	6867	7586

To test the statistical significance of these results, I run a series of logit regressions to predict the probability that a national security FAC convenes on the authority of congressional establishment. In the following model, shown in Equation 3, EA represents the binary dependent variable – whether a committee has a particular establishment authority. The primary independent variable of interest is a boolean value on whether the FAC has an interest in national security, indicated as IC_{natsec} . I also include a control for the number of interest categories listed for each committee (IC_{num}) on the premise that executive agencies are most likely to create FACs with broad agenda to coordinate policy implementation across issues.

$$Pr(EA) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 IC_{natsec} + \beta_2 IC_{num} \tag{3}$$

Table 2: Logit Analysis of FAC Establishment Authority

	MAND	AUTH	PRES	AGCY
National Security	-1.45*** (0.24)	-0.88*** (0.08)	0.82*** (0.12)	1.07*** (0.08)
Interest Categories	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.00)	0.03*** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)
Intercept	-1.66*** (0.05)	0.43*** (0.03)	-3.02*** (0.06)	-1.34*** (0.03)
Wald X^2	94.6	130.9	120.5	204.3
$P > X^2$	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Observations	7586	7586	7586	7586

Note: Standard Errors in parentheses. ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Logit analysis supports the proposition put forward. I test with binary dependent variables for all four establishment authority outcomes individually (EA_{mand} for congressionally mandated committees, EA_{auth} for those authorized by legislation, EA_{pres} for unilateral presidential committees, and EA_{agcy} for agency-created FACs). The results, shown in Table 2 lend strong support for the working assumption that Congress is less apt to involve itself in security policy than in other domains. The signs are negative on the coefficients for both dependent variables associated with congressional involvement, and the reverse is true for the two associated with the executive branch – all strongly significant. The coefficient on the control for number of interest categories is significant in three of the four models, and in the expected direction. All models show a strongly significant combined effect of the independent variables.

Next, I test hypotheses 2 through 5 regarding the affiliations of interest group appointees to FACs. In testing these hypotheses, I use logit analysis on committee-level and member-level data including only those committees in the National Defense and International categories. For committee-level analysis (Equation 4), I model the probability that a FAC will have at least one interest group appointee. In both equations, T refers to the organization type. As before, EA refers to the establishment authority of the committee, but this time it represents a series of dummy variables with presidentially established committees as the

omitted reference category. *PPP* refers to Presidential Party Power, and *PA* refers to the president’s approval rating – the subscript refers to the number of prior days have been averaged together to allow for some lag. In the committee-level analysis, the reference date is the from the time of the first meeting of the given year. For member-level analysis, it is the date of the original appointment. IC_{total} indicates the total number of committee’s interest categories, and M_{total} the total number of members on the FAC.

$$Pr(OT) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 EA_{agcy} + \beta_2 EA_{auth} + \beta_3 EA_{mand} + \beta_4 PPP + \beta_5 PA_7 + \beta_6 IC_{total} + \beta_7 M_{total} \quad (4)$$

For the member-level analysis (Equation 5), I model the probability that an appointed member be affiliated with an interest group.

$$Pr(OT) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 EA_{agcy} + \beta_2 EA_{auth} + \beta_3 EA_{mand} + \beta_4 PPP + \beta_5 PA_7 + \beta_6 IC_{total} \quad (5)$$

The difference between the two models is that the member-level analysis does not control for the number of members on the committee. I am principally interested in the results for two organization types, associations and institutions. I provide comparisons to representation by other forms of organization – business firms, the military, and government employees from the federal branches as well as state, local, territorial, and international jurisdictions.

The results of logit analyses provide good overall support for the proposed hypotheses. Committees established under agency authority are significantly associated with a greater likelihood of interest group representation (associations and institutions) at both the committee and member level of analysis, as are committees authorized by Congress. Coordinating committees, those FACs with a higher number of interest categories, have a significantly greater chance of having appointees affiliated with associations at the committee and member level, but the relationship is insignificant for institutions at the committee level and

Table 3: Logit Analysis of Committee Level Organization Type Affiliations

	ASSN	INST	FIRM	GOVT	MILI	INDY
Agency Authority	2.30*** (0.43)	1.40*** (0.31)	0.48 (0.38)	-2.12*** (0.36)	0.62 (0.33)	1.23*** (0.33)
Authorized by Law	2.67*** (0.44)	1.04*** (0.30)	0.04 (0.38)	-0.56 (0.33)	0.94** (0.35)	0.62 (0.34)
Mandated by Law	-0.03 (1.12)	-0.22 (0.62)	1.19 (0.87)	-3.18*** (0.72)	0.58 (0.67)	1.36* (0.63)
Pres Party Power	2.44* (1.11)	0.47 (1.20)	0.67 (1.36)	-0.68 (1.20)	1.18 (1.11)	1.92 (1.10)
Approval 7-day Avg.	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Interest Categories	0.10*** (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.10*** (0.03)	0.04 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)
Members	0.05*** (0.01)	0.12*** (0.01)	0.23*** (0.02)	0.17*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)
Intercept	-3.32*** (0.58)	-1.15* (0.51)	-2.70*** (0.61)	-0.49 (0.51)	-2.42*** (0.51)	-2.15*** (0.51)
Wald X^2	91.2	100.8	163.1	139.1	45.6	71.6
$P > X^2$	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Observations	619	619	619	619	619	619

Note: Standard Errors in parentheses. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

negative at the member level. Support is mixed for the hypothesis that presidential weakness, as measured by public approval and party power in congress, correlates negatively with interest group representation. At the committee level, only presidential party power has a significant coefficient, only for associations, and its sign is positive. At the member level, however, both coefficients are significant and correctly signed for associations.

There are several other interesting findings to note. First, committees are significantly less likely to have government employees appointed under agency authority than presidential authority – they are far more likely to seek outside consultation. This is also the case when the committee is mandated by law. Second, At the member level, firms seem to operate in opposition to interest groups with respect to establishment authority. However, they work similarly with respect to more direct measurements of presidential weakness. Third, the affiliations over which the model provide the least explanatory power are members of

Table 4: Logit Analysis of Member Level Organization Type Affiliations

	ASSN	INST	FIRM	GOVT	MILI	INDY
Agency Authority	2.25*** (0.20)	1.33*** (0.09)	-0.88*** (0.06)	-0.87*** (0.06)	0.15 (0.16)	0.89*** (0.19)
Authorized by Law	2.32*** (0.20)	0.57*** (0.10)	-1.39*** (0.07)	0.20** (0.07)	0.67*** (0.17)	0.91*** (0.20)
Mandated by Law	1.02*** (0.30)	1.82*** (0.12)	-1.01*** (0.10)	-1.98*** (0.20)	-0.40 (0.32)	1.83*** (0.23)
Pres Party Power	-0.99*** (0.29)	-0.19 (0.23)	-0.59** (0.22)	1.23*** (0.24)	1.27* (0.52)	0.50 (0.46)
Approval 7-day Avg.	-0.01* (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)
Interest Categories	0.07*** (0.00)	-0.06*** (0.00)	-0.04*** (0.00)	0.06*** (0.00)	-0.02** (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Intercept	-4.30*** (0.23)	-1.59*** (0.12)	-0.15 (0.10)	-1.07*** (0.11)	-3.32*** (0.26)	-3.67*** (0.26)
Wald X^2	546.4	806.4	621.6	878.7	47.4	81.1
$P > X^2$	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Observations	14888	14888	14888	14888	14888	14888

Note: Standard Errors in parentheses. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

the military. This is reasonable, since participation by members of the military in national security policy should remain fairly constant across a variety of political circumstances.

6 Conclusion

The role of interest groups in U.S. national security politics is better understood by expanding the notion of influence beyond a Dahlian conception of power – getting others to behave in a way they otherwise would not have acted. Too often, but not always, observers of politics conceive of two forms of influence – forcing policy-makers to either pursue a policy or to engage in strategic avoidance, keeping policies off the agenda at the behest of a powerful lobby. The theory pursued in this project identifies a third way, one associated with Eric Nordlinger’s conception of Type II government autonomy, wherein “[p]ublic officials then purposefully bring about a shift in societal preferences to make them congruent or consonant

with their own.”³⁹ When the administration needs help stoking public opinion, they often turn to interest groups to help with propaganda, granting access to the apparatus of national security policy-making. Analysis of Federal Advisory Committee appointments from 1997 through 2012 lends support to this theory.

39. Eric A. Nordlinger, *On the autonomy of the democratic state* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), pg. 29.

A Interest Categories

Agriculture	Energy	Medicine
Animals	Environment	National Defense
Applied Science	Federal Employment	Rehabilitation
Arts	Finance	Research
Aviation	Food and Drugs	Retirement
Basic Science	Government	Science and Technology
Business	Health	Social Sciences
Civil Rights	Honorary Award	Space
Communications	Housing and Urban	Tax
Computer Technology	International	Trade
Data	Justice	Transportation
Education	Labor	Veterans
Eligibility	Land	Water
Emergency	Legislation	

B Committee Functions

Non Scientific Program Advisory Board	Other
Scientific Technical Program Advisory Board	Regulatory Negotiations
National Policy Issue Advisory Board	Special Emphasis Panel
Grant Review	

C Random Selection of Affiliations

President, National Security Systems Sector, SPARTA
Sr. Port Captain, Maritrans Eastern Division
DIRECTOR GENERAL
Fishermens Union - AFL-CIO
Occidental International
Ostema, Schuchat & Gitlin, LLC
Westinghouse Electric Corporation
Department of the Navy
Avaya Inc.
Virginia Employment Commission
Chairman, President, and CEO, The Boeing Company
US Arms Control & Disarmament Agency
President, Brooks & Wilburn Co., L.P.A., Attorneys at Law
Senior Vice President and General Manager, Motorola Inc.
Consultant (Former VP) to American Commerical Lines
New York Mercantile Exchange
Professor, University of Texas School of Law, Austin, TX
American International Group Inc.
President, Aviles Engineering Corporation
Chairman, Virtus Investment Partners, Inc.
National Football League
Professor, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley, CA
Director, SDBU - Defense
California State Senator
Director, Engineering Graduate Programs & Lamar University Center for Ports and Waterways
Attorney, Self-employed

Oklahoma State University
Department of Energy - Director, National Nuclear Security Administration
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
Deputy Commissioner, Alaska Department of Natural Resources
US Congressman from the Seventh District of North Carolina
Prof and Chair of Mgmt and Mktg, Eastern Washington University
Vice President of Finance and Treasurer
Fmr US Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs
President, Wildlife Habitat Council, Silver Spring, MD
Chair, ABA Section on International Law & Practice
Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer, Internet Security Systems
Vice Chairman, The NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc. (former)
Comcast
Government and Regulatory Liaison
Laumeier Sculpture Park
Vice Chairman and Chief Operating Officer, PrivaSource
Sr. VP Perkins State Bank
STATE SENATOR
Senior Vice President, Corporate Communications, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., Association of American Publishers, Inc.
Purse Seine Vessels Owners Association
Securities Commissioner, Texas State Securities Board
Full Cmte. Member, New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services
Oregon Supreme Court
Brown & Welsh

D Affiliation Types, Organization Types, and Resource Types

Association - Civic and Recreational
Association - Environmental
Association - Ethnic
Association - Government
Association - Issue Advocacy
Association - Labor
Association - Military and Veterans
Association - Political
Association - Professional
Association - Relief and Service
Association - Religious and Moral Action
Association - Trade
Firm - Agriculture and Chemicals
Firm - Consumer and Retail
Firm - Energy and Natural Resources
Firm - Food and Beverage
Firm - Health and Pharmaceutical
Firm - Investment and Insurance
Firm - Legal
Firm - Logistics and Security
Firm - Manufacturing and Engineering
Firm - Media and Entertainment
Firm - Other
Firm - Public Relations and Strategy
Firm - Shipping and Trade

Firm - Management Consulting and Staffing
Firm - Technology and Telecommunications
Firm - Travel and Hospitality
Government - Federal Executive
Government - Federal Judiciary
Government - Federal Legislature
Government - Foreign and Intergovernmental
Government - State and Local
Government - Tribal and Territorial
Institution - Academic
Institution - Cultural
Institution - Grant Making
Institution - Medical
Institution - Policy Research
Institution - Religious
Institution - Social Welfare
Institution - Technical Research
Military - Active
Military - Education and Training
Military - Retired and Family
Other - Independent
Other - Unknown

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