Agreement and Circumstance

in the

Philosophical Investigations

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

> If language is to be a means of communication there must be
> agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may
> sound) in judgments. This seems to abolish logic, but does not
> do so. (*Philosophical Investigations* §242)

No passages in the *Philosophical Investigations* (*PI*) have generated greater
tensions with Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy than his perplexing remarks
on the role of human agreement in the rule-following considerations.[1] On
the basis of those remarks, Michael Dummett reads Wittgenstein as a radi-
cal conventionalist, supplying knock-down arguments against the objectiv-
ity of mathematical truth and grounding them instead as widespread con-
ventions. Crispin Wright once explored the idea that Wittgenstein is a kind
of communitarian, in which human agreement secures standards of correct-
ness. Saul Kripke reads Wittgenstein as using human agreement to soften
the conclusion of a skeptical argument yielding a form of non-factualism
about meaning.[2]

These philosophical positions attributed to Wittgenstein are each re-
spectable as a starting point for philosophical discussion. The problem is
not that Wittgenstein is too great a philosopher to have adopted them.

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[1]Following custom I take the rule-following remarks to come at *PI* §§185-242, with
the most troublesome remarks on human agreement concluding them at *PI* §§240-242. Of
course, the remarks in these sections develop various lines of thought, many of which are
introduced earlier in the text. Hereafter section numbers are to the *PI* unless otherwise
indicated.

[2]See, e.g., Dummett (1959) p. 329, Wright (1980), Kripke (1982) p.97. There are
some subtleties in attributing non-factualism about meaning to Kripke (see Byrne (1996),
Wilson (1998)), but even allowing for those subtleties, Kripke does not seem to me to
escape the broad exegetical charges I make here.

Rather, each seems remarkably uncharacteristic. Sometimes this is pointed out by evaluating the proposed positions against Wittgenstein's own standards of philosophical methodology: to "leave everything as it is", "advance no theses", and so on.[3] But Wittgenstein wouldn't be the first if he failed to live up to his own (quite austere) philosophical standards.[4] A better exegetical case is that the parts of Wittgenstein that we understand best—for example, how Wittgenstein wields the simple, but philosophically powerful notion of family resemblance—seem methodologically out of sync with each of the positions just mentioned.

Many commentators have ably identified the exegetical problem with the uncharacteristic readings. The trouble is a they have arguably not succeeded in supplanting them with a detailed reading that restores an appropriate harmony to the involvement of human agreement.[5]

The goal of this short monograph is to develop an interpretation of the rule-following sections, with special attention to the exegetical tension created by human agreement, that does restore this harmony, and then to explore a brief application of this reading. Unfortunately, due to the interconnected nature of Wittgenstein's remarks, properly situating the role of human agreement in the rule-following sections will require a complete, and at times highly controversial, reading of the structure and purpose of the rule-following sections as a whole.

Part I provides such a reading. Its crux is the attribution of a spe-

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[3]Wittgenstein's explicit metaphilosophical remarks occur around §§120-9.

[4]See Wright (1980) p.262, Dummett (1991) p.xi (both discussed at Fogelin (2009) pp.3-6) for examples of exasperated commentators who feel it best to soft pedal Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical remarks if anything is to be gleaned from his texts.

[5]See Boghossian (1989) pp.543-4 and n.6, which I return to below, for a sharp statement of the exegetical problem. In those passages, Boghossian is raising concerns about how the importance of human agreement is supposed to arise organically on the reading of the rule-following sections proposed by McDowell (1984). But he stresses, I think correctly, that the problems for McDowell are ultimately just problems for reading Wittgenstein generally. The textual tensions have driven some commentators—for example, Wright (2007)—to read the remarks on human agreement as components of a rather unsatisfying form of quietism.

cial bipartite structure to the rule-following block.[6] It identifies clues that Wittgenstein takes himself to engage in two projects which are complementary. Their complementarity, however, should not blind us to the fact that they not only address two logically distinct questions, but employ two distinct methodologies for addressing them. I'll begin in Chapters 2–4 by detailing Wittgenstein's two investigations and their relationship, doing my best to be brief where key points are treated well in the existing literature. Then, in Chapter 5, I'll explain how the notion of human agreement fits into Wittgenstein's second investigation, and conclude by discussing the extent to which Wittgenstein's treatment of agreement, and rule-following more generally, are continuous with the rest of the *Investigations* and Wittgenstein's stated metaphilosophy.

Part II applies the position attributed to Wittgenstein in Part I to worries about meaning skepticism familiar from Kripke (1982). This topic merits extended discussion, because if the reading of Part I is faithful, then the relationship between Wittgenstein and Kripke's Wittgenstein turns out to be extremely complex. Wittgenstein does not raise, let alone treat, the exact kinds of worries that Kripke draws out in his text. But neither is Wittgenstein in a position, as some commentators have suggested, to simply reject the skeptic's worries as merely presupposing confused notions attacked during the course of the rule-following investigations. The way Wittgenstein treats similar problems seems to commit him to taking the skeptical worries seriously and providing a somewhat more 'direct' resolution. Part II leaves exegesis behind and shows how the tools of Part I should be applied in coping with Kripkean forms of meaning skepticism. The result is a distinctive position found neither in the exegetical literature on

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[6]The separation of the rule-following block into two components is not without precedent. The treatment in Kripke (1982) of Wittgenstein as raising a skeptical problem, then turning to its 'skeptical solution' is perhaps the most well known example. Commentators like Minar (2011) and Goldfarb (2012) also treat the sections as roughly divided into two components or 'chapters'. But even these latter readers do not explicitly associate these components with different questions and associated methodologies.

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Wittgenstein, nor in the post-Kripkean literature on meaning skepticism. And it is one which, I claim, bears further exegetical fruit by helping us understand more clearly the somewhat mysterious Wittgensteinean notion of a 'form of life'.

Part I

Agreement and Rule-Following

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THE JUSTIFICATORY QUESTION (§185)

The *Investigations* consistently interweaves multiple topics, and it is rare for just one question to be pursued even among short strings of remarks. But if we were to isolate a single question centrally at issue in sections that have been an exegetical focus, like §185, §198, and §201, it should be one about *justification*.

This claim should be controversial. "Justification" and "reason" tend to appear only later in the rule-following block (e.g., §211, §212, and §217). And questions about justification may seem suspiciously epistemological, whereas many influential commentators take Wittgenstein's core concerns to be metaphysical. Most notably, we have the reading of Kripke (1982), who takes Wittgenstein to be a kind of skeptic concerned with the constitution of meaning-facts. But Kripke is hardly alone. Many of Kripke's strongest critics share the notion that Wittgenstein is at least tentatively raising questions about constitutive facts.[1]

Wittgenstein encourages such readings by framing his topic in the inaugural §185 (which we will come to shortly) in a way seemingly devoid of epistemic considerations. But there are important indications, notably stressed by Wright (1989b), that belie the notion that metaphysical issues alone are at issue. Most importantly, Wittgenstein undeniably displays a strong concern in the rule-following sections with (perhaps ultimately confused) senses in which rules seemingly 'guide' behavior. Such questions about guidance make Wittgenstein's questions intrinsically bound up with our own knowledge of when and how we follow rules. And this strongly suggests that even if Wittgenstein is putting in play metaphysical questions,

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[1] See, e.g., Blackburn (1984) p.282, McDowell (1984) p.331, Goldfarb (2012) pp.74-5.

the answers to those questions will be tempered by important epistemic constraints.[2]

I thus agree with Wright that epistemic concerns integrally shape the central opening question of the rule-following remarks. But I think it is dangerous to look forward in the rule-following block to the later passages which exhibit the most overt sensitivity to epistemic matters, as Wright seems to do, if we want to gain a good sense of the kind of question that Wittgenstein takes himself to be addressing. Instead, we do better to look backwards, to some of Wittgenstein's earliest formulations of the operation of rules via commands, in the *Blue and Brown Books* (*BB*). These passages provide us with a much clearer view of the context of the question implicitly raised by the opening §185, and give us much more insight into the nature of the epistemic constraints on how that question is to be answered. So let me begin by discussing two of these passages, before we get so far as looking at the *Investigations* itself.

The most instructive passages come early in the *Blue Book*, where Wittgenstein discusses a simple exchange concerning how to obey a command.

> Suppose I pointed to a piece of paper and said to someone: "this colour I call 'red'". Afterwards I give him the order: "now paint me a red patch". I then ask him: "why, in carrying out my order, did you paint just this colour?" His answer could then be: "This colour (pointing to the sample which I have given him) was called red; and the patch I have painted has, as you see, the colour of the sample. He has now given me a reason

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[2]One might think, as Wright (1984) pp.772-5, that Kripke's skeptic is sensitive to such epistemic constraints. See also Baker & Hacker (1984) p.409, and Goldfarb (1982) p.478: "Now Kripke, in saying the "fact must show how I am justified," does seem to mean that the justifications must in some sense be transparent (27, 37)." See also Kripke (1982) p.41. But I agree with Boghossian (1989) p.515-6 that any appearance of sensitivity to epistemic concerns in Kripke is an artifact of the dialectical heuristic of the skeptic-interlocutor dialog. The Kripkean skeptic's worries are resolutely metaphysical.

for carrying out the order in the way he did. Giving a reason for something one did or said means showing a *way* which leads to this action. In some cases it means telling the way which one has gone oneself; in others it means describing a way which leads there and is in accordance with certain accepted rules. (*BB* p.14)

We might call this a 'good case' of contested rule-following. It is a case where a command is issued, a doubt is presented, and then the doubt is removed by appeal to what Wittgenstein calls a "reason". Such a reason (or justification—I will use the terms interchangeably) constitutes, as Wittgenstein says, a 'way' that leads to the action. It is something like a process or procedure whose exhibition can be geared at removing doubts about whether what one did was in accord with a rule or instruction. The reason may, as Wittgenstein noted in the final sentence, operate by fitting into a pre-existing framework of accepted rules. And Wittgenstein, at least at this stage, does not impose any restriction on justifications that limits them to the 'purely' physical sphere. He grants that a justification in the above case may appeal not only to things like a color sample, but also mental images (*BB* p.14).

Furthermore, Wittgenstein notes that in response to doubts about or challenges to having followed a rule, one can supply reasons or justifications which were not one's own (objects one did not appeal to, or procedures one did not follow, but could have)—calling these justifications *post hoc* (*BB* p.14). But Wittgenstein is explicit that reasons that one actually appeals to are 'transparent' in the following sense: one's beliefs about one's own reasons don't amount to empirical hypotheses.

The proposition that your action has such and such a cause, is a hypothesis...In order to know the reason which you had...for acting in a particular way...no number of...experiences is neces-

sary, and the statement of your reason is not a hypothesis. (*BB* p.15)[3]

We should think of the simple 'good case' of contested rule-following from the *Blue and Brown Books* just discussed as providing a kind of 'picture' of how justification operates. It gives us a clear idea of what it is for a justificatory demand to be raised and how such a demand is adequately met, along with some apparent epistemic constraints on what can play the role of such justifications.

Wittgenstein, I think, has this picture of justification in mind as he raises the case of the 'Wayward Child' of §185 in the opening section of the rule-following block.[4] In this section, we're asked to suppose this child has learned to write out the integers ("judged by the usual criteria", Wittgenstein cautiously adds) and is then instructed at an order of "+n", to write down the series of multiples of n. After doing well up to 1000, we ask the child to continue the series "+2" beyond 1000, and the child successively adds four instead.

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[3]Lest this seem uncharacteristic of Wittgenstein, consider the ensuing remarks (and our remarks in Chapter 4 on Wittgenstein's notion of "grammar".)

> The difference between the grammars of "reason" and "cause" is quite similar to that between the grammars of "motive" and "cause". Of the cause one can say that one can't *know* it but can only *conjecture* it. On the other hand one often says "Surely *I* must know why I did it" talking of the *motive*. When I say: "...we *know* the motive" the statement will be seen later on to be a grammatical one. (*BB* p.15. See also *PI* p.191.)

He also goes on to criticize the idea that reasons known without conjecture are causes of which we are immediately aware.

Let me flag here that those readers that reject this assumption of transparency, even given the caveats about the notion of Wittgensteinean grammar to be reviewed in Chapter 4, should not be dismayed. It will turn out, by the end of 3, that this assumption is dialectically dispensable because its primary role is to help form the basis of a question that Wittgenstein ultimately rejects. Readers that reject the transparency assumption will likewise merely have rejected a conceptual presupposition of the relevant question, only at an earlier stage.

[4]I borrow the epithet from Goldfarb (1982).

We say to him: "Look what you've done!"—He doesn't understand. We say: "You were meant to add *two*: look how you began the series!"—He answers: "Yes, isn't it right? I thought that was how I was *supposed* to do it."—Or suppose he pointed to the series and said: "But I went on in the same way."—It would now be no use to say: "But can't you see...?"—and repeat the old examples and explanations. (§185)[5]

Though it is implicit in the text, note how naturally the case can be seen as a call for justification, in our foregoing sense. In normal cases, when someone has a misunderstanding or doubt about whether we are following a rule correctly, like the 'good case' from the *Blue Book*, the appropriate reaction is to supply a reason or justification that removes it. And in this case the child obviously has misunderstood, and is perplexed at why we are suggesting the continuation that we do. There is a very strong temptation to think that this case is just like the other normal cases of misunderstanding that we encounter. If we are correct, it seems, we *must* be in a position to justify ourselves here as we typically do—that is, it seems that the 'picture' from the good case can and should carry over. There should be a procedure, or a process one can undergo, analogous to those we exhibit in good cases, that would remove the doubt and confusion that the Wayward Child has. And note that to accomplish this the justification shouldn't, and perhaps couldn't, be a hypothetical justification *post hoc*. It should be our actual justification when we write out our continuation—the actual way we follow the rule as we do, with understanding.

On this reading, a key question raised by the opening case of §185 is the following, where 'justification' is understood by examples—that is, by analogy with 'good cases' of contested rule following.

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[5]Here and elsewhere I generally follow Anscombe's translations, but occasionally make changes, usually when I think it helps better capture the original German.

> *The justificatory question*: what justification (reason) do we
> have for following the rule in the way we do that removes the
> Wayward Child's doubt?

We can immediately note that any justification that meets this challenge
must have two features if it is to be capable of removing the child's doubts.
First, and most obviously, it should reveal why 1002 and not 1004 is the
correct continuation. Second, it should do a better job than the explana-
tions we've already provided. When we show the child previous features
of the series—say, that the order of "+2" before yielded a regular series in
the units digits ("0, 2, 4,...")—we're told by Wittgenstein that the child is
unmoved, and continues to believe that after 1000 he is continuing on the
same way he always has. The examples we gave, and the explanations that
accompanied them, were systematically misinterpreted, as any overt expla-
nation seemingly can be. But by hypothesis what justifies *us* in writing
down 1002 can't be like these, or it couldn't ground our confidence that we
were proceeding correctly, and wouldn't do its job of removing the Child's
doubt.

The next passage of the *PI* shows that Wittgenstein thinks the justi-
ficatory question is challenging enough that there is a temptation not to
address it head-on—that is, not to actually produce or describe the justi-
fication, but to presume its existence and go on to infer what it must be
like, or how we engage with it. For example, there is an immediate tempta-
tion to 'interiorize' the justification, since all overt processes and examples
can obviously be misinterpreted and misapplied. So, the thought goes, the
justification must involve a special mental act. This is precisely how the
interlocutor responds to the case of the Wayward Child.

> "What you are saying, then, comes to this: a new insight—
> intuition—is needed at every step to carry out the order '+n'
> correctly."—To carry it out correctly! How is it decided what is
> the right step to take at any particular stage? (§186)

Note the precise nature of the dialectical confusion and reply here. The interlocutor has not yet even come to the point of recognizing that there might be a concern as to whether the justification in question exists. He instead worries that we need many such justifications, or at least many mental acts (new 'intuitions' as he puts it) that repeatedly put us in touch with the same justification, to keep us on course. This is the worry the interlocutor thinks is being pressed by pointing out that error is possible at any step, which certainly is a key aspect of the Wayward Child's case. But Wittgenstein replies that his concern does not have to do with repetition, and isn't addressed by merely hypothesizing multiple mental acts. It is a worry that can be raised for a single instance, that is, at any one particular stage of development in the series. If it is a mental act which supplies us with justification for *any* step, it is this single instance of a mental act that Wittgenstein wants us to describe more closely. Until we have, we have not yet given a justification that the way we carry out that single step is the correct one—the one that accords with the command as we meant it.

In the very next line, the interlocutor picks up on the concern, and his reply to Wittgenstein instructively connects justifications for following rules with meaning. Once the interlocutor get a better sense of what Wittgenstein is asking, he takes the reply to be obvious: "The right step is the one that accords with the order—as it was *meant*." (*PI* §186) The idea here is that there is no special worry about the justification. Obviously the *meaning* of our order can fulfill that role. This is the thing we need to put the Wayward Child in contact with. But Wittgenstein dismisses the suggestion as not yet being a proper answer, as it pushes back the question as to how the order, even as meant a particular way, could do the relevant justificatory work. It's not, as Wittgenstein notes, that while 'meaning the order', we thought of the particular step the child executed incorrectly. But the interlocutor's thought seems to be that there is something about the way we mean our words which can resolve any justificatory challenge, including

that of the Child. Some such meanings, it is thought, "already traverse" all future steps, and are specially placed to do the relevant justificatory work since meanings themselves can't be misapprehended. As Wittgenstein says of a related case "What one wishes to say is: "Every sign is capable of interpretation; but the *meaning* mustn't be capable of misinterpretation. It is the last interpretation." (*BB* p.34) The interlocutor's suggestion then sets off the related task of saying what goes on when we mean something a particular way, to see if it could fulfill the justificatory demand.

Now, these are obviously just quick glosses on the opening moves of the rule-following sections. We could go on. But it is worth flagging that everything I've said—especially the idea that the question being raised here is infused with epistemological considerations, is highly controversial. So before we go further, it is worth stressing some exegetical reasons for favoring the reading I've been giving. One important reason for taking the justificatory question to be central is that it creates instructive continuities between Wittgenstein's early formulations of problems with rule-following in the *Blue and Brown Books*, the remarks in §185, and the repeated, explicit concerns with justification in the early §200s (and in the parallel sections of the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* (*RFM*)). But another equally important grounds for reading Wittgenstein this way is that it illuminates Wittgenstein's treatment of the role that dispositional facts can play in his investigation.

Suppose we treat the opening passages of the rule-following sections as raising a constitutive, purely metaphysical question like that raised by the Kripkean skeptic: "What fact constitutes your having meant *addition* by "+"?" (e.g., as opposed to having meant some 'bent' adding rule in giving your command to the Wayward Child to "+2" that vindicates the child's continuation). Once 'being in touch with the meaning' is on the table as a source of possible justification for following a rule, this question may seem scarcely distinguishable from the justificatory question I've raised. But the

questions are distinct: there no presupposition in the Kripkean question that a 'way' or 'process' we engage in when meaning our words would be a fact that constitutes our having meant them. Because of this, the Kripkean question does not even tacitly seem to invoke epistemic notions. And this shift away from the epistemological, towards the metaphysical, creates critical divergences in how the Kripkean constitutive question, and the justificatory question can be addressed.

Note, for example, that dispositions stand out as an immediate, obvious candidate to address the constitutive challenge: one meant 1004 instead of 1002 because in giving the command one was disposed to give the latter, and not the former, as the continuation. The Kripkean skeptic, of course, anticipates this strategy, and tries to argue that dispositions can't fulfill this role because they are finite, and at best descriptive but not normative.[6] But commentators have rightfully identified this as a potential weak point of the skeptic's argument. There are certain clear senses in which dispositions can be 'infinite' in that they can manifest themselves in an indefinite number of circumstances. And if we can make principled divisions between one psychological mechanism, and various kinds of interference, then we can formulate a difference between 'ideal' and 'faulty' operation of a mechanism which would undergird corresponding notions of 'correct' and 'incorrect' continuations of a series.[7]

We needn't get deeper into the debate here. The important point is that dispositional responses to Kripke's metaphysical question are immediately tempting and undeniably powerful. But accordingly, if we treat Wittgenstein as pushing constitutive questions to the exclusion of epistemic considerations, his remarks on dispositions become utterly perplexing. In the *Brown Book* passage which most closely mirrors §185, we find the following

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[6]Kripke (1982) p.22*ff.*

[7]See, e.g., Blackburn (1984) p.289-90, or Goldfarb (1982) pp.476-7. A small literature has developed around dispositionalist responses to the skeptic—see, e.g., Martin & Heil (1998), Kusch (2005), Kusch (2006), Kowalenko (2009).

exchanges.

> Or do you mean by knowing some kind of disposition?—then
> only experience can teach us what it was a disposition for.
> . . .
> "Had you asked me before what I wanted you to do at this stage,
> I should have said. . .". But it is a hypothesis that you would
> have said that. (*BB* p.142)

The interlocutor claims his dispositions line up with how the rule was to be
carried out. Wittgenstein's reply, over and over, is that this is an empiri-
cal hypothesis. And, surprisingly, beyond making this point Wittgenstein
seems to have no interest in *contesting* the dispositional claims.

> 'But surely if one had asked me which number he should write
> after 1568, I should have answered "1569".'—I dare say you
> would, but how can you be sure of it? (*BB* p.142)

Compare a similar concessive dismissal at *PI* §187.[8]

It's not merely that these would be bad replies on behalf of the Kripkean
skeptic. They simply don't *engage* with the constitutivist project. How is
it at all relevant that dispositional claims are (seemingly true) empirical
hypotheses, if we're aiming to find some way of making sense of a meta-
physical foundation for accord and conflict with a rule? Surely our favored
constitutive facts could be empirically motivated.

Note also Wittgenstein's peculiar formulation in the first *Brown Book*
passage: "do you mean by *knowing* some kind of disposition?" *Not*: "do
you mean by *having* some kind of disposition?" The second formulation is
clearly the appropriate one if we're concerned with constitutive standards.
Why impose knowledge of those standards?

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[8]Also compare §156 of the 'reading interpolation', where the hypothesis of a brain-
state mechanism underlying 'genuine' reading is seemingly dismissed for being *a poste-
riori*.

If we treat Wittgenstein as engaging with the justificatory question, by contrast, his remarks here become much more natural. Recall that, according to Wittgenstein, beliefs about one's reasons or justifications don't count as empirical hypotheses. It's quite clear, as Wittgenstein claims, that dispositional claims do constitute empirical hypotheses. So given the transparency of justification, noting this obvious fact about dispositions facilitates a straightforward one-step *reductio* of the claim that they are playing the relevant justificatory roles. Seen in this light, Wittgenstein's cursory treatment of dispositions as empirical hypotheses not only engages properly in the dialectic, but (up to concerns about the transparency of reasons, of course) is fully justified. Not only this, but Wittgenstein's persistent and intense focus on occurrent mental phenomena throughout the early rule-following sections, largely to the exclusion of sub-doxastic states, becomes much more comprehensible.

In emphasizing the centrality of the justificatory question, I've been stressing its epistemic character. But the importance of epistemological aspects of Wittgenstein's project can be overstated, as Wright (I suspect knowingly) does when he says "...the characteristic concerns of [*PI* §185-219, *RFM* VI 23-47] have, *pace* Kripke, nothing to do with the *reality* of rules, but are epistemological."[9] First, the relevant epistemic and metaphysical concerns are intertwined. There is good reason to think that justifications for following a rule in the Wittgensteinean sense could make at least a partial contribution to constitutive standards for rule-following. Second, as I will argue in Chapter 4, there is evidence of a second question, distinct from the justificatory question, that is equally central to Wittgenstein's views on rule-following, even among the sections Wright singles out. And this question does seem to have closer ties to the Kripkean question about constitution. But we are getting slightly ahead of ourselves. Before we come to the question of whether there are multiple questions at issue

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[9]Wright (1989a) p.299.

in the rule-following block, we would do best to try to understand how Wittgenstein addresses this first, justificatory demand. Let's turn to that issue now.

THE JUSTIFICATORY INVESTIGATION (X – §201)

Here the exegetical ground is well-worn. Settling that Wittgenstein is centrally raising the justificatory question should be controversial. But, allowing he is asking that question, his answer is clear: the answer is that there is no answer. We have no justification of the relevant sort. In later sections, the text is unequivocal to the point of redundancy. (And, in connection with the contention of Chapter 2, note the pervasiveness of epistemic language in these passages.)

> How can he *know* how he is to continue a pattern by himself...Well, how do I know?—If that means "Have I reasons [Gründe]?" the answer is: my reasons will soon give out. And then I shall act, without reasons. (*PI* §211)

> When someone whom I am afraid of orders me to continue the series, I act quickly, with perfect certainty, and the lack of reasons [Gründe] does not trouble me. (*PI* §212)

> "How am I able to obey a rule?"—if this is not a question about causes, it is about the justification [Rechtfertigung] for my following the rule in the way I do.
>   If I have exhausted the justifications [Begründungen] I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: "This is imply what I do." (*PI* §217)

Compare the conclusion to the section paralleling §185 from the *Brown Book* (and note the use of "justifying" in "justifying mental act"):

> *We need have no reason to follow the rule as we do...* I also
> should carry on the series 'Add 1' in the way 101, 102, etc., but
> not—or not necessarily—because of some justifying mental act.
> (*BB* p.143)

Why is Wittgenstein so confident that the justificatory question is unanswerable? And why is he so insistent?

The problem with the Wayward Child was that he was liable to misinterpret any set of examples we gave him. Meaning was suggested as the candidate to justify the proper continuation. So we're looking for something that we 'have', a kind of mental act that transpires when we mean the rule by our words, and when we understand and apply it, that is not subject to misinterpretation. That justification is thought of at least loosely on the model of normal justifications—procedures that involve paint swatches, guide books, maps, examples, and instructions that give guidance, remove doubts, and help ward off mistakes.

But Wittgenstein has been steadily undermining the idea that there could be any such accompaniment throughout the sections leading up to, and into, the rule-following block. The focus is largely on the maneuver of 'interiorizing' the justification. Wittgenstein's general method is to first note that the 'guides' of mental justification are, in no special respect, different from non-mental ones,[1] then to note that mental justifications are accordingly subject to the same kinds of systematic misinterpretations as non-mental ones.

Wittgenstein has aimed to get us comfortable with the irrelevance of the interiority of mentalistic justification by giving examples of simple rule-governed behavior where justification is manifestly public. The earliest 'language-games' considered at §2 and §7 are like this.[2] And in the course

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[1]Cf. *BB* p.4.

[2]For a helpful discussion of the importance of these early sections, and their relevance for the later stages of the *PI*, see Goldfarb (1983).

of various other inquiries, Wittgenstein has had occasion to undermine the 'isolated' significance of various mental accompaniments. For example, having something like an image occur to one can't be sufficient for understanding, because the image can be projected and applied in different ways (§139). Even adding the projection in question is no good, since the projection itself can be aberrantly projected and misapplied (§141). Having a formula or set of symbols pass through one's mind is no different. Coming up with the correct algebraic formula for a series, for example, won't suffice for knowing how to continue it, as someone who had not learned algebra and for whom those signs had no importance would not count as knowing to continue the series despite having such a formula occur to her (§159). And obviously supplying more symbols won't rectify that problem.

Throughout the sections leading up to the rule-following block, Wittgenstein makes variations on the same basic theme: we're not familiar with anything that can, on its own, guide without the possibility of misinterpretation. Not only are no justifications suited to the guiding, but our search for a justification that guides absolutely is probably already based on a misunderstanding of what the relevant kind of 'guiding' amounts to. This is part of the motivation behind Wittgenstein's extended case-study of reading as a paradigmatic instance of guided behavior (§156-178).

But how can Wittgenstein be sure his search was exhaustive? Obviously because there is a *schematic* problem here. The problem is that as soon as we produce any candidate justification, even by appeal to mental or 'interior' aids, it becomes quite clear on minimal reflection that the relevant procedure can be misapplied, and hence the justification misinterpreted.

If Wittgenstein is right about this, what are we to conclude? There are two pitfalls here that we should avoid. The first is a kind of interpretation-relativism of rules. Wittgenstein's interlocutor worries that Wittgenstein is suggesting that 'everyone is right on their own interpretation'. I take this idea to be latent in the following passage.

"But how can a rule shew me what I have to do at *this* point? Whatever I do is, on some interpretation, in accord with the rule."

. . .

"Then can whatever I do be brought into accord with the rule?" (§198)

Note that "interpretation" has at least two readings. On one, an interpretation is equivalent to an understanding, so that two individuals have differing interpretations to the extent they follow the rule differently. On another, an interpretation is something like a process—basically an umbrella term for procedures that could address the justificatory question. When Wittgenstein engages the interlocutor, he takes the second sense to be at issue.[3]

Given that understanding, we can see that the interlocutor hasn't fully appreciated the force of the schematic problem. He is still clinging to the idea that *something* is doing the relevant justificatory work, and all we've shown is that whatever does the work is consistently subject to reinterpretation. In particular, the interlocutor is doing something that is obviously illegitimate if Wittgenstein's arguments are any good (and "interpretation" is read as above): he's selectively taking a notion of 'accord' or 'agreement' with an interpretation for granted for the final use of an interpretation, while questioning it for everything else being interpreted. The lesson he takes away is that there are multiple interpretations that the rule itself can

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[3]Wittgenstein flags the ambiguity (indeed flags it as dangerous) when, in §201, he says ". . . there is an inclination to say: every action according to the rule is an interpretation." That is, every act according to a rule involves some understanding of it. He continues: "But we ought to restrict the term "interpretation" to the substitution of one expression of the rule for another." That is, we should restrict its use to something like a procedural, justificatory sense of "interpretation". If we conflate these uses, we may be misled to infer from the correct, trivial claim that every act according to a rule involves an interpretation, *qua* understanding of it, to the contested hypothesis that every act according to a rule involves an interpretation, *qua* justificatory act or process.

admit of. It's just a matter of 'where you stop'—the last interpretation you use.[4]

This is clearly problematic. As, Wittgenstein claims: "That is not what we ought to say..." but instead "...interpretations by themselves do not determine meaning" (§198). More directly, Wittgenstein presents the interlocutor with a *reductio*.

> This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if any action can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord not conflict here. (§201).

If, with the interlocutor, we hold on the idea that interpretations (by themselves) settle correctness, then given the problem of systematic reinterpretation, we're led to the bizarre conclusion that for any way of behaving we have an interpretation that shows why it is the correct way of proceeding. But this, Wittgenstein seems to suggest, is ultimately useless in the justificatory task. On that multiplicity of interpretations everyone would also be incorrect, relative to some interpretation. So we're simply unable to maintain the idea that an interpretation *on its own* settles correctness.[5] But that is a non-negotiable requirement for interpretations to fulfill the justificatory role. Getting the Wayward Child to have such a relativized interpretation

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[4]Cf. *BB* p.34.

[5]Kripke (1982) notoriously seems to take Wittgenstein to endorse the conclusion of the reasoning in this paragraph, and embrace a form of non-factualism about rulefollowing. But as many commentators have pointed out (Baker & Hacker (1984), McDowell (1984, 1992), McGinn (1984), Anscombe (1985) Wright (1989a)) it is very hard to make this reading consonant even with the next paragraph of §201, let alone the rest of the *PI* or the Wittgensteinean corpus. (There are some subtleties in interpreting Kripke on this point, however. See Byrne (1996), and Wilson (1998) with the reply by Kremer (2000).) My reading of this passage is structurally like that of McDowell (1984) (up to the stress I lay on the justificatory question in motivating it), the broad contours of which are affirmed by a number of other authors, e.g., Fogelin (2009) p.22.

is unhelpful, since the Child is free to reinterpret that interpretation in any way, including the aberrant way the Child does. As interpretations here effectively stand as a placeholder for justifications in Wittgenstein's schematic re-interpretational worry, the *reductio* aims to show that nothing at all can address the justificatory question.

I want to stress the generality of Wittgenstein's argument here, because it is needed to explain the pivotal character of §201. From this point on, the search for justifications for following a rule more or less *drops out of consideration.* This is so, even though Wittgenstein continues to focus on the issue of rule-following for at least forty sections. To be sure, the incredulous interlocutor does continue to press the justificatory/interpretational line. But rather than rehearsing versions of the schematic objection, Wittgenstein now begins simply to dismiss these worries (see especially §§209–11, 13) by insisting, on what seem to be broadly introspective grounds, that we generally follow rules successfully without any interpretive processes or justificatory acts. For Wittgenstein, it seems, the justificatory question has been addressed.

This fact raises a bit of a textual mystery. If the justificatory question of §185 is settled by §201, why does Wittgenstein continue to discuss rule-following at such considerable length?

As noted earlier, Wittgenstein often weaves together distinct, but related topics, and the later rule-following sections are no exception. And this helps address the foregoing textual question to some extent. For example, one question that remains is: just how pervasive is the problem with justification? (Wittgenstein thinks: completely. See his remarks on how the problem arises even for continuations of 'constant' series (§§214-5)). Another issue is the sense and phenomenology of 'compulsion' that may incline us to think that we have a justification that cannot be subject to different interpretations (§222, §231) but how such a compulsion, even if it existed, wouldn't help address our problem (§232-4).

But there is a seemingly much more important strand interwoven with all these remarks. As Wittgenstein phases out issues of justification and interpretation, starting as early as §197, he starts phasing in a new set of topics: practices, customs, training, regularity, familiar human behavior, and human agreement. As the interlocutor expresses increasing perplexity given the failure of the justificatory project as to how a rule, meant in a particular way, can determine what one is to do, Wittgenstein ignores the interlocutor, ostensibly trying to draw his attention to some features concomitant with familiar instances of rule-following. So it is clear that Wittgenstein intends something about attention to his new topics to allay the anxieties which arise from the abrupt termination of the justificatory investigation.

But how? One thought is that Wittgenstein is using these notions to provide a new kind of justification for following a rule—a new way of addressing the justificatory question. On this first reading, we had too narrow a focus on 'interior' acts, and should seek our justification to the Wayward Child among practices, customs, and the like. Another idea is that Wittgenstein has passed from questions about reasons to questions about causes. On this second reading, Wittgenstein is no longer interested in a justificatory story, but a causal-historical investigation of the sources of our rule-following behavior.

The problem with both proposed projects is that Wittgenstein explicitly disavows participation in each. There is ample textual evidence that the justificatory project has simply ended. As noted above, passages like §211, §212, and §217 seem unequivocal in this regard. And as regards a casual story, we have the disavowal at the end of the following exchange.

> ... Let me ask this: what has the expression of a rule... got to do with my actions? ... Well, perhaps this one: I have been trained to react to this sign in a particular way, and now I do so react to it.

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But that is only to give a causal connection; not what this going-by-the-sign really consists in. *No*; I have also further indicated that a person goes by a sign-post only insofar as there is a regular use, a custom. (§198, my emphasis)

The "No" here is Wittgenstein *in propria persona*, rejecting the interlocutor's claim that talk of training is *merely* giving a causal story.[6]

Both points together tell us that Wittgenstein is addressing a new *kind* of concern, neither one that involves supplying reasons and justifications nor one that supplies causes. The question is: if Wittgenstein is not doing either of these two things, then what exactly is preoccupying him? This is the question we must turn to next.

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[6]See also *BB* p.15, where Wittgenstein describes the attempt to supply causes when reasons give out as the manifestation of a confusion, which lapses into empirical considerations.

THE GRAMMATICAL INVESTIGATION (§199–§242)

Wittgenstein gives us a helpful clue to his new methodology in §199—that is, right at the point where questions about justification are being phased out, and his new set of topics are being phased in.

> Is what we call obeying a rule something that it would be possible for only one man to do, and to do only once in his life?—This is of course a note on the *grammar* of the expression "to follow a rule".

The emphasis on "grammar" is Wittgenstein's own.[1] Also, Wittgenstein has some helpful things to say about what grammar, and grammatical investigations, involve (well, as helpful as Wittgenstein ever gets).

> Grammar...only describes and in no way explains the use of signs. (§496)

More instructively, in *Philosophical Grammar* (*PG*):

> Grammar describes the use of words in the language. So it has somewhat the same relation to the language as the description of a game, the rules of a game, have to the game. (*PG* p.60)

In a way, this conception of grammar is quite simple: grammar studies expressions—words—and explains what their uses are. This notion of grammar plays an important role for Wittgenstein (cf. his remark on grammar and essence at §371) given *other* commitments of his, especially the connections Wittgenstein sees between use and meaning (§43). But we needn't

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[1]Curiously, the emphasis is not carried over in Anscombe's translation.

be concerned with the relevant subtleties here. What is important is that Wittgenstein has transitioned from the justificatory question to what we can call the "grammatical question".

> *The grammatical question*: how do we use the term "follows a rule"? That is, what criteria influence when we are, and are not, inclined to say that rules are being followed?

The grammatical investigation is a successor to the justificatory project. It is supposed to clarify why we were tempted by the key presupposition of the justificatory question—that there is a justification of the sort we were looking for—and show how we can cope with its failure. Wittgenstein's remarks after the *reductio* of §201 make this clear.

> It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind it. What this shows is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and "going against it" in actual cases. (§201)

Since grammar studies the uses of words, characteristic indicators that a grammatical remark is underway are those we find here: single words or short phrases in quotes that are clearly mentioned, and not used, or talk of "what we call" things, what "we are inclined to say", or "what we should say" using such expressions. And such indicators are found pervasively throughout the later rule-following sections (overt cases occur at §199, §200, §201, §207, §208, §224, §225, §235, §236, and §242, not to mention other cases implicitly implicated in the grammatical project). The grammatical investigation seems to be a project with at least as much significance to Wittgenstein as the justificatory project and, as I've said, one that Wittgenstein regards as its natural successor.

In the preface to the investigations, Wittgenstein says "I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking" (*PI* p.x). Nowhere is this remark borne out in the rule-following sections quite as frustratingly as in Wittgenstein's grammatical remarks. In a typical case, Wittgenstein isolates some factor (e.g., training, regularity, etc.), and suggests a thought experiment that contrasts its presence and its relative or complete absence. At times, Wittgenstein hints at whether, and how strongly, this influences our willingness to say that a rule was followed. But in general the legwork, both in fleshing out the thought experiment and drawing conclusions from it, is left to the reader. Shortly, I'll explain why this needn't owe purely to pedagogical perversity (or simply brevity) on Wittgenstein's part, but may be something integrally involved with Wittgensteinean grammatical methodology. For now, though, we need to do our best to try to engage in this (partially reconstructive) grammatical task, to get a sense for both the procedures it involves as well as the conclusions that Wittgenstein wants us to take from it. To this end, I'd like to go through two thought experiments given in the text that I think are instructive. These cases also, I think, give a good sense for broadly how Wittgenstein takes the grammatical investigation to pan out.

Wittgenstein leads off the grammatical investigation, in the continuation of §199 quoted above, with a striking claim about rule-following which is clearly aimed to supplant the conception of rule-following as involving an appeal to a justifying mental act.

> It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which someone obeyed a rule... a report was made, an order given or understood; and so on.—To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are *customs* (uses, institutions).

And §200 is clearly aimed at easing us into this idea by focusing on the case of chess in particular. He asks us to imagine circumstances in which

two people belonging to "a tribe unacquainted with games" sit at a chess-board and go through the moves of a game of chess ("even with all the appropriate mental accompaniments" he adds). Wittgenstein could have merely said that they were playing a game of chess, but chooses to stay at the level of rudimentary description. It is a clear invitation to consider whether or not we really *should say* these two participants are playing chess or not.

Before rushing to supply an answer, we should remind ourselves of some related cases in which the question is wholly unproblematic. In typical cases, one person would explicitly ask another to play a game of chess. They would then typically sit down to a game at a standard chess board. But in the absence of such a board, they could work out the game on paper. They might find it easier to use a system of notation that no one else used, though they could fluently supply translations between their game and a game on a board. And there also need not, in most cases, be any explicit act preceding the event to signal that a game of chess will take place. Some good friends could sit to chat over a game of chess on a weekly basis, and play casually without anything signaling the beginning or end of the game except their setting up and setting away the pieces of their chess set. Two arch-rivals in chess could pass by each other in a public place, lock eyes, and, making use of whatever objects were on hand, silently go through the motions of a fierce and intense game with complete mutual-understanding and no words exchanged. Also, there is no clear limit to how much error can be admitted before any question is raised as to whether a game of chess is being played. Two persons could make frequent and habitual mistakes, being corrected by a 'referee' or trainer of sorts, and still be playing (or at the very least 'trying to play') a game of chess.

Since we are simply concerned with the grammar of the words "to play a game of chess" we are no longer to concern ourselves with how all this is possible, but are merely to note that the cases described above would, in

otherwise normal circumstances, be classified as instances of chess-playing. Now, Wittgenstein clearly thinks there is something in the simple tribal example which works to render such unflinching attribution problematic. And there is only one salient difference between his case and those we have just been examining, namely that there is no history of game playing in the culture to which the 'players' belong.

An easy misstep here is to take the wrong direction from these words: "...if *we* were to see [the two participants] we should say they were playing chess." (§200) This can be interpreted as making a relativistic point, especially given the emphasis on "we": what one culture considers one way, another might consider in a different way. They can both be right, relative to the structure they impose upon the situation. Another culture, for example, might have a game that looks like chess, but with very different rules which yet accord with the 'game' played by the tribesmen. Members of that culture would—correctly from their vantage—consider the participants to be playing their game and not ours.[2]

This reading does not harmonize well with our earlier treatment of Wittgenstein's remarks on interpretations, nor do I think that one should feel comfortable with the implications of acquiescing to the kind of relativism it propounds.

Fortunately, some additional perspective is given when Wittgenstein strips away one further feature of the circumstances, by translating the 'moves' into actions unassociated with game-playing:

> But now imagine a game of chess translated according to certain
> rules into a series of actions which we do not ordinarily associate

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[2]Compare related remarks, with a slightly less relativistic bent, on 'taking someone into' one's community in Kripke (1982) p.110, where Kripke cites §200 as an inspiration. Kripke's suggestion is much more cautious than the ham-fisted relativism I'm setting up as a foil here. As will become clearer in Part II, especially Chapter 8, I think Kripke is onto an important and very subtle aspect of Wittgenstein's view that is no simple form of relativism. But, as will also gradually become clearer in those later chapters, I do not think that this aspect of Wittgenstein's view is properly located in the remarks of §200.

with a *game*—say into yells and stamping of feet. And now suppose those two people to yell and stamp instead of playing the form of chess that we are used to; and this in such a way that their procedure is translatable by suitable rules into a game of chess. Should we still be inclined to say they were playing a game? What right would one have to say so? (§200)

Now, as we noted before, it is quite possible to play a game of chess with non-standard chess pieces, or on paper, perhaps also translated into some non-standard notation. In the right setting, yells and stamping could do just fine. In the case Wittgenstein describes, however, we can begin to feel as though our reasons are slipping for taking what occurs as the playing of a game of chess.

This point is obviously sharpened by the justificatory project. If we begin to feel uncertainty here in attributing our description, we might take that to be a consequence of knowing too little of the tribesmen's mental life. Information about their occurrent mentality, however, will not easily help us get a foothold, which is why Wittgenstein explicitly supposes it to be given at the outset. Suppose, for example, that we were to see in their minds our official chess notation, and when each scream or stamp is performed the notation for the corresponding move (e.g. "4. Ke2") appears in the minds of both participants. The problem, of course, is that *ex hypothesi* these two participants have never seen or participated in games before, let alone games of chess. The mental appearance of these formulas (or pictures of chessboards, chessmen, arrows, and so forth) are as peculiar as the appearance of "x^2+4" in the mind of someone who has never learned to calculate. So any uncertainty we felt originally is not going to be cleared up by 'peering into their minds.'

The uncertainty is compounded when we start asking after the permissibility and correctness of the moves (cf. §205). One tribesman stamps, which, we can suppose, translates into a move of castling. We can also sup-

pose the hypothetical board position, given our translation, would make castling at this point permissible given the rules of chess. But is the stamping a 'permissible move' for the (alleged) game played by the tribesman? We should keep in mind that there are many possible games like chess. For example there is a variant of chess, in which castling is not permissible given this board position. Another variant doesn't allow castling at all. If the stamp is a permissible chess move, then we know that the tribesman is not playing either of these variants. Indeed, we know they are not playing one of thousands of variants of chess, with slightly different rules, numbers of pieces, board shapes, and so on. But how? It can't be just because he and his partner allow the move, or even are disposed to allow it, 'on reflection'. For surely, as we noted before, it is possible for a pair of players to make a single mistake that they couldn't rectify on their own. Also keep in mind that if the tribesmen are playing chess, they are playing in accord with prescriptions for stamps and yells that don't occur, and for which the tribesmen may exhibit all sorts of reactions, including indifference or confusion. I think when we recognize these points we may find ourselves very reluctant to say these tribesmen are 'playing chess'. Worse, it becomes hard to give any description of their behavior on which what they are doing is correct, or incorrect, according to some set of rules. Any set of rules with the specificity of something like chess begins to seem unprincipled.

It's uncertain whether we even can say the tribesmen are playing a game at all. One might think, given how hard it is to talk of correctness and incorrectness here, that we should just say they are 'making a game up as they go along'. But even that can be made uncertain. Suppose they are strict with their stamps and yells, and chastise themselves when they make a 'bad move'. That would be behavior very uncharacteristic of 'making things up as you go', but would get us no closer to saying which exact moves are, and are not, in accord with the rules they are following. (The chastising, after all, should itself be possibly mistaken.)

I won't try to press such doubts further here. Instead, I want to reconsider the importance of the translation of the tribesmen's playing into stamping and yelling. In normal circumstances, I said, such translations wouldn't necessarily affect our willingness to say a game of chess was played. I think in the abnormal circumstances Wittgenstein asks us to imagine, though, the translation is also irrelevant. Once we realize the problems for ascribing chess-playing behavior to the stamping and yelling tribesmen, those same problems persist when we 'translate back' into a setting where they sit at a table, and move objects that resemble familiar chess pieces. None of the worries I raised above (about which of many games were played, for instance) depended on these factors.

Appreciating this is important for understanding why Wittgenstein says that of course *we* would call what they are doing "playing a game of chess". Wittgenstein is saying that we would be tempted hastily, and perhaps erroneously, to make that attribution, because of two features of the case. The first is that we normally, and reasonably, would base the fact that a game is being played on precisely the 'local' evidence in the case. In normal circumstances, that evidence is entirely sufficient because some of the circumstances which Wittgenstein asks us to alter (whether the participants have been initiated into game-playing, say) are appropriately taken for granted. The second factor is that saying that someone is playing a game of chess as a description can give a useful picture, minimally, of what sort of physical facts obtained in the circumstances. That is, we have already given much true information if we describe the situation as one in which 'it was exactly *as if* they were playing a game of chess.' Drastically changing the appearance of the 'moves' cuts away the motivation stemming from these two factors, and reveals the description of the event as a game of chess to be much more controversial than it originally might have appeared. The translation into stamps and yells is for pedagogical purposes, but is 'grammatically' irrelevant.

Let's now contrast Wittgenstein's case with that mentioned briefly above of the two rivals who play silently without preparation, and without normal pieces. We can flesh out that picture by imagining the mental phenomena we described for the members of the tribe to be exactly what is going through the heads of these two players (they both think in standard chess notation, say). In the original case, I claimed, we had no doubt that the rivals were playing chess. However in the case of the tribesmen it becomes challenging to maintain this. So what Wittgenstein is aiming to show is that *holding fixed* other features, acquaintance with games (which, typically, would involve a recognizable practice of playing games, induction into it, perhaps through training, and so on) plays a significant role in whether or not we are willing to say that a game of chess (a game governed by its particular rules) is being played in an isolated case. At the very least, it is a factor that influences our confidence in saying this.

Wittgenstein clearly thinks that this kind of point, in conjunction with the failure of the justificatory project, shows us that attributions of rule-following in general (and not merely in the context of game-playing) tends to presuppose a special kind of setting, analogous to the kind presupposed in attributions of chess playing. After rehearsing the *reductio* against interpretation-relativism, and giving the chess case, he says:

> And hence also 'following a rule' is a practice. And to *think* one
> is following a rule is not to follow a rule. Hence it is not possible
> to follow a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was following
> a rule would be the same thing as following it. (§202)

There are arguably different senses of privacy used in the *Investigations*. Here, "private" is probably just being used to indicate mentality. Wittgenstein constantly speaks in the *Blue Book* of thinking, intending, and expecting as 'private' processes where it seems clear he is mainly contrasting

mental occurrences and events with 'material' ones, like physical movements of one's body.

> There is an objection to saying that thinking is some such thing as an activity of the hand. Thinking, one wants to say, is part of our 'private experience'. It is not material, but an event in private consciousness. (*BB* p.16)

> "But meaning, intending, thinking, etc., are private experiences. They are not activities like writing, speaking, etc." (*BB* p.42)

It's worth clearing this up since §202 can mislead us into thinking that Wittgenstein's arguments already are supposed to accomplish the work of the 'private language' sections (roughly, §243–§317) in which Wittgenstein discusses (among other things) whether there could be a language of sensation-talk that only one person could understand (§242, §256). The remarks here are better read as another way of saying that an isolated 'justifying mental act' isn't sufficient for understanding. As such the 'anti-privacy' remark isn't a new claim, but one implicit in §201, and bolstered by reflections on the challenges in capturing correctness conditions on the basis of occurrent mentality in the chess example of §200.[3]

I think reflection on §200 goes a reasonable ways to motivating the claim that obeying a rule *of chess* is part of something like a practice. But it's not obvious that it shows this for rules generally (it's not obvious we can extrapolate from something as idiosyncratic as chess to something as seemingly universal as calculating, for example). But the placement of this

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[3]Note also, for example, that the next remark of the interlocutor, at §205, precisely contrasts practices and mental processes. There is another possible non-mentalistic reading, in Goldfarb (2012) p.82, of "privately" here as meaning roughly "on one's own", which also distances the remarks here from the privacy sections. Such a reading does implicitly provide answers to questions about whether an individual could follow a rule over time, in isolation, which I would prefer to leave unanswered. Setting that aside, it would do just as well for my purposes here.

remark after the key failure of the justificatory project helps motivate trying to understand accord with a rule generally in this way. In any event, a point I want to stress is that more work needs to be done—and much of it is work that Wittgenstein is expecting his readership to do on its own.

Some of this work, but not all of it, is prompted by other sections in the grammatical investigation. But sometimes Wittgenstein seems to be considering other features than 'customs'—at least in these sense that games are customs. Consider §207.

> Let us imagine that people in [an unknown country] carried on the usual human activities and in the course of them employed, apparently, an articulate language. If we watch their behavior we find it intelligible, it seems 'logical'. But when we try to learn their language we find it impossible to do so. For there is no regular connection between what they say, the sounds they make, and their actions; but still these sounds are not superfluous, for if we gag one of the people, it has the same consequences as with us; without the sounds their actions fall into confusion—as I feel like putting it.
>
> Are we to say that these people have a language: orders, reports, and the rest? There is not enough regularity for for us to call it "language".

This grammatical thought experiment is a rare case where Wittgenstein is explicit about his verdict, evidence that he took the case for that verdict to be quite strong. We can see why one might think this. If we commit ourselves to there being a language here, we must say what its expressions are, and what they mean. But given the strong irregularities posited, the task seems impossible. The best we could do is take some recurring expression and try to treat its meaning as something like a gerrymandered function from contexts to its disparate uses. Such an assignment is going to look

explanatorily useless, and *ad hoc.* And it also leaves open worries about misuses of expressions. The problems here, as before, don't have to do with too little knowledge of what is going on in the speakers' minds, or too little knowledge of their dispositions. We can suppose that their occurrent mentality and dispositions are as similar to ours as they can be, up to being as erratic as the spoken or written symbols given at the outset. The added information provided won't help overcome either of the foregoing problems.

Note that the problem here is not obviously put best by saying that the speakers 'lack a custom' or 'lack training'. There is at the very least an appearance of training, and many familiar kinds of customs (for example, I see no reason why the thought experiment couldn't be elaborated in a way that made us inclined to say that this community has institutional punishments for crimes, like theft, or a custom of welcoming and feeding strangers). The problem is best stated, as Wittgenstein does, as a lack of linguistic regularity (where of course we are presupposing, and making use of, our concept of regularity in making this assessment). So we have another grammatical lesson: the presence or absence of regularity influences our willingness to say that a language is present (and that the rules bound up with the commands of language are followed or disobeyed). An obvious worthwhile way to extend the thought experiment is to adjust the levels of regularity, to get a sense for just how much regularity, in the presence of other normal rule-following behavior, is needed to make the attribution of a language more plausible.

But let's not pursue these thought experiments further. There are too many, and too many variations on them, to consider here, if we want to fully bolster the kinds of claims that Wittgenstein makes. My goal is not to do this, which would take a much, much longer book. Rather, it is to get a sense for what Wittgenstein's project is, what its upshot is, and how it relates the justificatory project. Looking at the cases of §200 and §207 positions us to extract lessons that bring answers to these questions into

view. There are several points worth making in this regard.

First, when we shift from the justificatory investigation to the grammatical investigation, not merely our question but our methodology has changed. The justificatory question, according to Wittgenstein, involves a false presupposition—that we possess a justification that could alleviate doubts as fundamental as those of the Wayward Child. Wittgenstein thinks that presupposition runs deep, and that its assumption is gradually encrusted with mythologies surrounding the acts of meaning, understanding, intention, and judgement, designed to perpetuate it. The main task is just to expose the presupposition *as* a presupposition, and then more or less to let the facts about occurrent mentality and other accompaniments speak for themselves.

When we undertake the grammatical investigation, by contrast, the goal is to make no presuppositions about the nature of rule-following, meaning, or understanding, but merely to see how we are inclined to apply the terms "follows a rule", "means", and "understands", so as to expose any unnoticed features that influence their application. The key idea here seems to be that there are general, pervasive features of our actual surroundings that have such an influence, but that we overlook these features precisely because of their pervasiveness (cf. §129). The fact that humans are exposed to a practice of game-playing, for example, has this status in §200. The proper methodology to reveal the relevant features is then the use certain kinds of targeted thought experiments, like those we just undertook, in which we disrupt familiar features of our surroundings to reveal their significance.

A second point about the grammatical investigation concerns the relationships among the verdicts of our thought experiments. One might think that Wittgenstein is advancing a single core feature (customs, uses, or agreement perhaps), or at least some group of features, that exhaustively undergird our applications of "follows a rule". But Wittgenstein's diction and organization actively discourage this interpretation. Wittgenstein will

occasionally raise a feature to salience, only to partially undermine or supplant it. I've already noted how this occurs for §200 and §207. In §200, the setting of a custom or practice is stripped away, but then customs are potentially added back in §207, with a certain kind of regularity stripped away instead. A similar kind of 'swapping' of features actually occurs much more forcefully in the transition from §206 to §207. In §206, shortly after stressing the importance of thinking of rule-following as a custom or use, Wittgenstein asks how to treat different reactions to the training that inducts us into practices such as obeying commands—how are we to say 'who is right?' He continues:

> Suppose you came as an explorer into an unknown country with a language quite strange to you. In what circumstances would you say that the people there gave orders, understood them, obeyed them, rebelled against them, and so on?
> The common behavior of mankind is the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language. (§206)

Wittgenstein responds to the question of what constitutes correct behavior with a different question about whether there are commands at all. We can't explore the ideas here thoroughly, but Wittgenstein says, not implausibly, that recognizing the presence of commanding involves relying on some conception of ordinary behavior. Part of what is at issue here may be the characteristic marks of rational or intelligible behavior (e.g., self-preservation, pain-avoidance). But even more fundamentally than this, Wittgenstein may be alluding to common identifiable reactions—familiar indicators of an expression of joy, or distrust, a reaction of displeasure, or confusion, or distraction and so on. In any event, the rough idea is clear: that we lean on these features—the 'common behavior of mankind'—in recognizing when a command was made, and which one was made (compare §142, and especially §54). The (of course controversial) suggestion seems to

be that these are what help us settle when, and what, someone is commanding, as opposed to being mere *evidence* of something else that is doing that work. The way to test for this, as usual, is to engage in a thought experiment in which *everything else* besides that behavior (including occurrent mentality, and so on) is held fixed and 'in full view', while only 'ordinary behavior' in the broad sense described is dramatically changed. If willingness to say whether a command was made, or obeyed can change under these assumptions, then such features are indeed helping us settle what counts as the correct way of obeying—or at least, are part of the 'grammar' of such ascriptions—even in the cases of original interest where we have divergent reactions to training. I submit that Wittgenstein suspects that when we engage in the relevant thought experiments, this does occur.

I've been brief, and abstract, in this description of §206 because I'm much less interesting in whether we can make good on the points of that section than in the nature of its relationship with §207. No sooner than Wittgenstein stresses the importance of familiar human behavior, he considers a case in §207 where by stipulation we have *all* the 'common behavior of mankind': rational and intelligible behavior, and the familiar human expressions and reactions. But we've subtracted a *different* feature, namely regularity. As we've noted, Wittgenstein is unequivocal that this undermines our willingness to say language is used, and orders followed.

The juxtaposition seems geared at undermining the idea that there is just one feature of behavioral settings which influences our willingness to apply rule-following talk. And there is also the issue, for each feature, of just how much influence it has, especially depending on the varying presence of other key features. For example, the notion of 'training' crops up intermittently (e.g., §198, §206), but is never quite singled out for isolated investigation (though Wittgenstein comes close at *RFM* VI-42). I suspect training is implicitly relevant to the case of calculating prodigies, mentioned in §236, who give the correct answers to calculations but can't say how.

Wittgenstein asks "Are we to say that they do not calculate?" This seems to be a case where training may have some limited relevance. That is, if the prodigies required some significant amount of training to give the right answers, even if much less than a normal student, this would significantly ease the treatment of the prodigies as calculating—just much more quickly and efficiently than we do. But of course many other features will influence the case—for example whether or not they can follow, and correctly evaluate, the steps of an implicit calculation when it is supplied to them, and whether or not the prodigies can apply the results of their calculations (e.g., to simple actuarial cases), and so on.

So Wittgenstein seemingly identifies multiple features of the circumstance of behavior that influence our willingness to treat that behavior as involving rule-following. The features are no doubt interrelated to some extent. The notion of training or teaching is connected to that of a practice or custom. Those notions in turn presuppose some amount of regularity. It is hard to appreciate whether induction into a practice is taking place without relying on familiar indicators of rationality, or pleasure and frustration. No feature seems sufficient on its own to generate rule-following behavior. Stripping away any one feature completely tends to be highly problematic. But the presence of each factor comes in degrees, and it is far from clear there are some unique baseline presence of each that provide a necessity constraint on rule-following.[4]

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[4]Many commentators tend to ignore the cautiousness with which Wittgenstein draws attention to circumstantial features. Others attribute it to perversion or uncertainty. Fogelin (1987) p.143, for example, expresses confusion at why "perhaps" appears in §198:

> Let me ask this: what has the expression of a rule—say a sign-post—got to do with my actions?...Well, perhaps this one: I have been trained to react to the sign in a particular way, and now I do so react to it.

Fogelin seems to chalk this up to an odd failure of nerve. But the modal is much less plausibly read as a marker of uncertainty, than an appreciation of complexity.

The structure of these remarks is familiar from, and clearly evokes, earlier sections of the *Investigations*, where Wittgenstein elaborates the notion of 'family resemblance' in defending a methodology of supplying case studies as a way of explaining a concept (§§65-75). Wittgenstein even explicitly invokes the idea for the specialized case of rule-following among prodigies: "Are we to say that they do not calculate? (A family of cases.)" (§236). So it would be remarkable if we didn't have an equally complex criss-crossing structure of features for the case of rule-following generally. What Wittgenstein is doing in the grammatical investigation, then, is true to that earlier methodology: he is indeed looking for *criteria* for having followed a rule, but not in any way that would supply something like necessary and sufficient conditions for its presence. Rather, the goal is to clarify the structure of a network of non-exhaustive, open-ended, overlapping criteria that underlie the concept's application.

This methodology is proprietary to Wittgenstein, and hardly uncon-troversial, so one can of course take issue with its application here. But Wittgenstein has adduced a powerful array of considerations in its favor. Most notably, Wittgenstein draws attention to the difficulty in adducing necessary and sufficient criteria for the simplest, most mundane concepts like that of a game or of a chair, and gives helpful metaphors to help us understand how and why we might latch onto a network of interrelated features in applying a concept that we can't articulate with anything like a definition. An objector to the methodology owes us exhaustive characteri-zations of the simple concepts Wittgenstein uses as examples, or must face a question Wittgenstein raised about time, but could have equally raised about meaning: "... why should one be puzzled just by the lack of definition of "time", and not by the lack of definition of "chair"?" (*BB* p.26).

In any event, I don't mean to defend the methodology of assembling case-studies to elucidate family-resemblance concepts here. The important point—the second point I want to make—is that the grammatical investi-

gation is clearly employing this methodology. Any evaluation of Wittgenstein's remarks must take this into account.

This second point is worth stressing, if we want to address a third issue: "is Wittgenstein, like Kripke's skeptic, asking questions about what facts *constitute* meaning (or rule-following)?" I rejected this question as the one with which Wittgenstein *begins* the rule-following sections. But since I'm attributing a bipartite structure to those remarks, with a grammatical investigation that supplants the initial justificatory investigations, the question of whether constitutive standards are at issue in the text again becomes as pressing for me as for other commentators.

Interpreters, we may note, are sharply divided on this issue. One one side of the debate, besides Kripke himself, we have an early claim of Wright: "I think the real problem posed by the [Kripkean] Skeptical Argument is acute, and *is* one of Wittgenstein's fundamental concerns."[5] In between, there are interpreters who frame Wittgenstein's methodology as involving a perhaps *feigned* interest in constitutive terms (see n.1 above). And on the other side, we have interpreters like Baker and Hacker, who seem to find constitutive concerns largely absent from the text. Consider this following claim about the notion of human agreement which, as we'll soon discuss, also arises in the grammatical investigations: "For Wittgenstein, agreement is a framework condition for the existence of language-games, but is not *constitutive* of any game. Hence it is not part of the criteria for whether *A understands* 'plus' or 'red'."[6]

The issue here is complicated by the fact that most authors do not make explicit and clear the distinction between the two kinds of investigations—justificatory and grammatical—that Wittgenstein engages in. It is easy (as

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[5]Wright (1989b) p.237

[6]Baker & Hacker (1984) p.438. See also Goldfarb (2012) for a somewhat more intricate reading on which Wittgenstein *begins* by considering constitutive standards (in what I've considered the 'justificatory sections') but seeks to undermine 'unconditional' constitutions—constitutions in the absence of the kinds of circumstantial features I'm discussing under the heading of 'grammatical remarks'.

we will see in the next section) to inadvertently assimilate remarks properly belonging to the first investigation to second, and vice versa. But a deeper problem is that the notion of 'constitution' at issue is more than a little unclear as well. It can be helpful, and true, to say that customs, regularity, and the like help constitute rule-following (and hence help constitute what counts as following rules correctly) for Wittgenstein, as long as certain caveats are kept in mind. Let me try to clarify the relevant notion of constitution that I think emerges with the relevant caveats in place.

First, let me say again that 'constitutive facts' are clearly not, or not directly, up for discussion in the justificatory investigation. We might put this by saying that the justificatory project is inherently first-personal. There are epistemic constraints on that project that we saw immediately rule out certain kinds of facts—dispositional facts, for example—as capable of filling out a justificatory role. But it's not clear that such constraints should be imposed *a priori* on constitutive facts. When we transition to the grammatical investigation, by contrast, we broaden our investigation to a third-person perspective, and it is clear that in this perspective we are to take all information into consideration, not just 'local' accompaniments and occurrent mentality.

In the course of this investigation we ask: what criteria influence whether we apply the term "follows a rule"? As Baker and Hacker noted above, the answers belong to what Wittgenstein sometimes calls "framework" (§240), but much more often, simply "surroundings" or "circumstances" ("Umgebungen" or "Umstände").[7] But Wittgenstein at times is also happy to use the language of constitution:

> . . . a move in chess doesn't simply consist in [nicht allein darin besteht] moving a piece in such-and-such a way on the board—
> nor yet in one's thoughts and feelings as one makes the move:

[7]See, e.g., §29, §33, §35, §87, §117, §154, §156.

44

but in the circumstances that we call "playing a game of chess",
"solving a chess problem", and so on. (§33)

Or consider again the reply to the interlocutor below, which seems to imply an interest in constitutive facts.

But that is only to give a causal connection; not what this going-by-the-sign really consists in [worin dieses Dem-Zeichen-Folgen eigentlich besteht]. No; I have also further indicated that a person goes by a sign-post only insofar as there is a regular use, a custom. (§198)

On the other hand, Wittgenstein occasionally seems to reject such talk, for example at *Zettel* §16: "The mistake is to say that meaning consists in something [Meinen bestehen in etwas]."

We can explain Wittgenstein's apparent ambivalence here by clarifying some senses in which it would indeed be a mistake to say meaning consists in something. First, according to Wittgenstein, the grammatical investigation reveals that many of the characteristic features that support talk of meaning, or rule-following, are quite general facts about practices or underlying regularities—things which, if we choose to speak of them as facts, are 'spread out' in space and time. To say that there is nothing in which rule-following consists might merely be to say that there is nothing in which it *locally* consists. Consider a question adapted from another example of Wittgenstein's that is used to illustrate the rough idea behind the importance of circumstantial features: what does a friendly smile consist in?[8] It wouldn't be unreasonable to reply "there is nothing that it consists in" as a way of claiming that nothing about the shape of one's mouth, for example, makes a smile friendly. A 'friendly smile' that is transposed to a harsh face, or one with wild eyes, or even the face of a murderer standing over her victim, are not friendly. If Wittgenstein is correct about *any* of

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[8]*BB* p.145. See also *PI* §539.

his grammatical points, then an act of rule-following is a bit like making a friendly smile. Transposed from circumstance to circumstance, the same physical activity, along with dispositional behavior and occurrent mentality, could constitute following different rules, or no rules at all. So this is a first, very weak, sense in which it makes sense for Wittgenstein to deny that rule-following (meaning, understanding) consists in anything.[9]

But there is a further sense yet in which we can deny that rule-following 'consists in something', connected with the point about family resemblance recently stressed. If we ask "what does being a game consist in?" there are broadly Wittgensteinean grounds for rejecting the question, or at least a presupposition that tends to come along with it. If Wittgenstein is right, there are no exhaustive, statable criteria for something's being game. But Wittgenstein does not suggest, and few if any commentators have attributed to him, the view that this therefore means there are no games, or no facts about games, and so on.[10] Nor does Wittgenstein think we need to completely reject the question "what is (or what constitutes) a game?" What we need to jettison, according to Wittgenstein, is the idea that for a term to

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[9]Readers may detect an affinity between these remarks (and the thought experiments I sometimes undertake) and those made by semantic externalists. This is no coincidence, and no anachronism. Many authors have noted that Wittgenstein's remarks seem to commit him to something like a form of social semantic externalism. But it is rarely noted what kind, and how thoroughgoing, a semantic externalist Wittgenstein seems to be. As will become clear, he is not only an externalist about content but about content*fulness*. He is also an externalist about force, and attitude. See in the latter regard *PI* §583, §586, and especially §584 and *RFM* VI-34 which directly evince the 'cut and paste' thought experiments characteristic of externalist arguments, but aimed at much broader effects.

[10]Or, at least, so it seems to me. Wilson (1998) p.115 claims that it "not very controversial" as a piece of interpretation that the family resemblance remarks are meant to teach us that words like "game" do not have 'classical realist' satisfaction conditions, and so "chess is a game" does not have classical realist truth conditions. (Wilson maintains, however, that this is compatible with there being facts about whether chess is a game, in an important sense of "fact"). I do not see this as a central lesson of the family resemblance remarks. Instead, I take their force to be that "game" has no non-trivial, informative analysis, which I regard as being compatible with "game" having satisfaction conditions.

be meaningful its use must be bound by definite, stateable criteria, or that understanding the meaning of a term consists in grasping such criteria. If we are asking the question "what does meaning something (following-a-rule, understanding) consist in?" in way that presupposes the existence of such criteria, then the first step is to purge the question of that assumption. In the *Blue Book*, Wittgenstein is quite explicit about this.

> If we study the grammar, say, of the words "wishing", "thinking", "understanding", "meaning", we shall not be dissatisfied when we have described various cases of wishing, thinking, etc. If someone said "surely this is not all that one wishes to call 'wishing'", we should answer "certainly not, but you can build up more complicated cases if you like...The idea that in order to get clear about the meaning of a general term one had to find the common element in all its applications has shackled philosophical investigation; for it has not only led to no result, but also made the philosopher dismiss as irrelevant the concrete cases, which alone could have helped him to understand the usage of the general term. (*BB* pp.19-20)

If we bear the two foregoing caveats in mind, there is a perfectly legitimate question of the form "in what does her meaning (following the rule, understanding) consist?" This question can be asked while presupposing the existence of 'supporting circumstances', in which case the answer can be something like "the speaking or writing of these words", "the fact that the formula occurred to her" and so on. And if we don't presuppose the existence of supporting circumstances, we can address the question by performing thought experiments like those Wittgenstein recommends in order to tease out a network of features, in open-ended relationships, that influence how the term is applied from case to case. Wittgenstein clearly

thinks that such a task is useful, appropriate, and in some ways addresses a legitimate concern that underlies the original question about constitution.

The temptation to see the remarks on supporting circumstances as doing more than this is strong, even for careful interpreters. For example, Paul Boghossian, in a discussion of unclarities in the reading of McDowell (1984), seems to find these shortcomings indicative of a more general tension to be found in Wittgenstein's work itself.[11] The exegetical obstacles, according to Boghossian, come in trying to reconcile the "obvious transcendental and constitutive pretensions of the rule-following considerations" with the "rejection of analyses and necessary and sufficient conditions...tied to extremely important first-order theses about meaning, including ...the family-resemblance view of concepts." But once we recognize the limited sense of constitution that Wittgenstein's projects allow, it is hard to see anything but perfect harmony here. The 'constitutive pretensions' are supposed to be simple judgments on the basis of thought experiments. And the verdicts of these judgments are the upshot of a descriptive grammatical methodology that the family-resemblance considerations characteristically *motivate*—not a methodology in tension with them. One might question whether Wittgenstein has properly identified the features that are the product of those investigations, of course. But this would be a philosophical, not an exegetical, problem.

In a similar vein, Wright has recently despaired of finding any positive answer in Wittgenstein to questions about constitution, and finds the result deeply dissatisfying.

> So we have been told what does *not* constitute the requirement
> of a rule in any particular case: it is *not* constituted by our
> agreement about the particular case, and it is *not* constituted
> autonomously, by a rule-as-rail...But we have not been told
> what does constitute it; all we have been told is that there would

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[11]Boghossian (1989) p.544, n.6.

48

simply be no such requirements were it not for the phenomenon of actual, widespread human agreement in judgement. How can he possibly have thought that this was enough?...It is no good searching Wittgenstein's texts for a more concrete positive suggestion about the constitutive question. Indeed his entire later conception of philosophical method seems to be conditioned by a mistrust of such questions.[12]

Some of Wright's worries here concern the role of human agreement in particular, which awaits treatment in the next section. But setting that issue aside, there is a striking reaction that Wright exhibits to what he takes as an evasion: a lack of a clear, positive answer to the question of what constitutes following a rule, that Wright thinks indicative of a form of quietism.

But, as I have tried to stress, to reject assumptions that go into questions about constitutive standards isn't obviously to reject those questions entirely. There is a perfectly legitimate question about constitution that Wittgenstein feels it is very important to address, and that he seemingly tries to address with the only methodology one can, by his lights. Wittgenstein is no more a quietist about what meaning, or rule-following consists in, than he is about what being a chair consists in. We might add: he is also no more an anti-realist, an anti-reductivist, a non-factualist, or a skeptic about meaning than he is about chairhood.

Indeed complaints like those Wright makes are seemingly anticipated directly in Wittgenstein's early remarks on family-resemblance, and its role in his project of clarifying what it is for something to be a language.

For someone might object against me: "You take the easy way out! You talk about all sorts of language-games, but have nowhere said what the essence of a language-game, and hence of

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[12]Wright (2007) p.488.

49

language, is: what is common to all these activities, and what makes them into language or parts of language...

And this is true.—Instead of producing something common to all that in which we call language, I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all,—but that they are *related* to one another in many different ways. And it is because of this relationship, or these relationships, that we call them "language". (§65)

One might say, as Wittgenstein does of Socrates on knowledge, that it's striking that Wright, and many other commentators, do "not even regard it as a *preliminary* to enumerate cases..." (*BB* p.20).

Of course, such considerations can mislead commentators in somewhat different ways. I believe Baker and Hacker speak misleadingly, if not incorrectly, when in the quote given earlier they say that human agreement isn't among the criteria for understanding.[13] But the discussion of this point is best returned to later. With our circumscribed sense of 'constitution' in hand, we're able to return to my third point above, about the relationship between Wittgenstein and he Kripkean skeptic.

When the skeptic asks the question of what constitutes our having meant addition by "+", it is clear from the answers Kripke surveys that he is not countenancing that "meaning" could be a family resemblance term that lacks a clear demarcation in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. Kripke does introduce his investigation with a caveat: "Many well known and significant topics—for example the idea of 'family resemblances', the concept of 'certainty'—are hardly mentioned."[14] But as regards family

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[13]There is a reading on which this can be true: we often justifiably 'presuppose' framework facts like agreement—we don't always need to 'check' for them before applying a term. This is connected with a general point, that grammatical framework facts don't necessarily constitute justificatory material. But Baker and Hacker's comment is hard to read as denying criteriahood in that very limited sense.

[14]Kripke (1982) p.vii.

resemblance, this is still an understatement: apart from the foregoing disclaimer, the term "family resemblance" does not appear in Kripke's text *at all.*

This not at all to say that Wittgenstein's way of addressing the skeptic is transparent from the existing texts. On the reading I'm giving, Wittgenstein is engaging with something like the skeptic's question, but purged of some crucial assumptions that the skeptic is tacitly building into it.[15] But I think it's also fair to say that Wittgenstein does not directly anticipate or address the special and powerful kinds of skeptical challenges that Kripke raises. The methodology Wittgenstein exhibits gives us some more or less clear guidance for grammatical thought experiments that start to engage with the Kripkean skeptic's worries (provided the skeptic is eventually willing to countenance the claim that "meaning" is a family resemblance term), and I think it is an interesting question, not prejudged by anything I have said here, how a Wittgensteinean investigation would fare when confronted directly with distinctively Kripkean skeptical challenges. We will take up these questions again, but not until Part II. There is no sense in trying to guess how, hypothetically, Wittgenstein would address Kripke's puzzles, until we have a much firmer grip on how Wittgenstein treats the problems that *actually are* his focus. So with a firmer sense of the purpose and methodology of the grammatical investigations, we must turn to tackling the most notoriously perplexing passages in the rule-following block: those on human agreement.

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[15]In addition to ignoring the possibility that "meaning" is a family-resemblance term, the skeptic also seems to ask the constitutive question with another, deeper, presupposition: that answers must 'determine' what counts as a correct answer by 'anticipating' or containing that answer in a way that, say, dispositions might. This is arguably an assumption that Wittgenstein would want to do without, especially in light of the conclusion of the justificatory investigation. But this idea requires much more substantial defense. This is best left to an extended discussion of these issues in Part II.

AGREEMENT (§§240-242)

I've noted that Wittgenstein discusses a number of interrelated circumstantial features in the course of the grammatical investigations, but I deliberately left one such feature—human agreement—for last. Human agreement is, again, obviously connected to other features that surface in the grammatical investigations. Most notably, the existence of a custom or 'regular use' seems to presuppose some measure of human agreement. But also, cases of human agreement presuppose enough regularity for agreement to arise. And 'familiar human behavior' helps us identify cases in which two interacting persons agree. And so on.

But in the remarks where Wittgenstein most explicitly discusses human agreement, namely §§240-242, he is clearly singling it out for special attention. It is not merely that Wittgenstein selects agreement as the topic to dramatically cap off the rule-following block. Rather, the peculiar things that Wittgenstein says about human agreement seem to indicate that it is special among circumstantial features that undergird our willingness to speak of rules being followed, or not.

This special treatment has led some commentators to ignore the multiplicity of circumstantial features Wittgenstein is adducing in the grammatical investigation, and to claim that agreement is the one 'real' constitutive fact—the feature that really does the work of securing accord and conflict with a rule on its own. This lands us back into the methodological and exegetical problems that the reading I've been giving is geared at avoiding. So we should be wary of treating the special attention given to human agreement as indicative of its exclusive importance.

Fortunately, there is a natural reading of §§240-242 on which agreement

doesn't play an exclusive foundational role, in light of the structure we've imposed on the rule-following sections so far. On this reading, agreement receives special treatment because there is a special objection to the idea that it can play any constitutive role, even as part of a network of features underlying our willingness to speak of rule-following. In fact, there are two such objections, one presented in §241, and another in §242. Wittgenstein takes both objections seriously, and the three final sections of the rule-following block aim to raise and rebut them. But to fully appreciate this, it is worth spending some time getting clearer on what roles agreement does, and does not, play in the Wittgensteinean grammatical investigation.

To begin, we should note that the German "Übereinstimmung", like its English translation "agreement", is multiply polysemous. It can denote agreement in the sense of accord, as between a rule and its application or between procedures (his playing agrees with the score, her movements don't agree with the stage instructions, etc.). It can denote a shared belief (both Jack and Jane, never having met, were nonetheless in agreement that Lanie should be imprisoned). And it can denote an occurrence of mutually recognized shared belief that is typically the product of deliberation. In this sense, agreement is 'arrived at' or 'reached'. (After meeting, Jack and Jane came to the agreement that despite their shared views, they would leave Lanie in peace for the greater good).

I'll call the first type of agreement *concordant* agreement, the second *concurring* agreement, and the third *contractual* agreement. Contractual agreement is largely irrelevant to either of Wittgenstein's rule-following investigations. It's also worth stressing that unlike with concordant agreement, concurring agreement is always between persons (i.e., thinkers).

The distinction between concordant and concurring agreement is worth bearing in mind because the former, but not the latter, is relevant to the justificatory project, and *both* concepts of agreement figure in the grammatical investigations, but in different ways.

For example, when setting up the justificatory question, Wittgenstein takes a key idea at issue to be concordant agreement.

> ...But that is just what is in question: what, at any stage, does follow from [the sentence "after *each* number that he writes, he should write the second after it"]. Or, again, what...we are to call "agreement" ["Übereinstimmung"] with that sentence...(§186)

Indeed, the only kind of agreement that there can be with a sentence, or a sentence as meant a particular way, is concordant agreement.

Now, the idea that we could explain or justify what counts as concordant agreement to someone like the Wayward Child drops out with the failure of the justificatory investigation.[1] But the concept of concordant agreement resurfaces in a very different role in the grammatical investigations. For example, the idea that we can detect a notion of concordant agreement underlying our uses of "follows a rule" or "means" comes back in cases like that of §207—the passage discussing a hypothetical completely 'irregular' community of would-be language users. There, we saw that regularity (which is obviously closely connected with concordant agreement) plays a very significant role in a grammatical investigation of what underlies our willingness to say orders are given and obeyed. And concurring agreement is present in the grammatical investigations as well. It must, after all, be concurring, and not concordant, agreement that is at issue in §§240-2, which talk of *human* agreement, e.g., agreement between mathematicians.

Keeping the notions of agreement, and their role in Wittgenstein's various projects, separate is crucial in the later rule-following sections. This is because remarks aimed at completely different purposes intermingle as Wittgenstein phases out the justificatory project and phases in the grammatical. This can make it extremely easy to misconstrue what notion of

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[1]Though we can 'explain' or convey it for more receptive tutees simply by giving examples, as Wittgenstein stresses in §208.

agreement is at issue in a given passage, or what role that agreement is supposed to play in it.

To take one example, Goldfarb criticizes Kripke for putting human agreement in a foundational role, citing a passage from the later rule-following sections.

> ...for Kripke, agreement among speakers is, in some sense, to ground ascriptions of meaning or adherence to a rule. Wittgenstein, however, puts no such onus on agreement, I believe. Agreement is exhibited in rule-following, but does not ground it.
>
>> The word "agreement" and the word "rule" are *related* to one another; they are cousins. If I teach anyone the use of one word, he learns to use the other with it. (*PI* §224)[2]

But the passage cited is off target. The safest reading of §224 is one on which concordant, and not concurring, agreement is at issue, whereas Kripke clearly sets concurring, not concordant, agreement in a foundational role. §§224-5 continue a dialectic begun back in §208, where the interlocutor mistakes Wittgenstein's grammatical purposes in §207 (where concordant agreement is at issue) for justificatory ones.

> Then am I defining "order" and "rule" by means of "regularity"?— how do I explain the meaning of "regular", "uniform", "same" to anyone? (§208)

Wittgenstein goes on to stress in §208, §§215-6, and §§224-5, that all these notions and the notion of "agreement" are conceptually 'interwoven'. None can be used to explain the other—they are equally foundational in that they tend to be taught conjointly by instructional examples (of the kind

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[2]Goldfarb (1982) pp. 484-5. For a similar reading of this remark see Minar (2011) p.284.

that clearly won't help the Wayward Child). The points seem to stress that although Wittgenstein is appealing to several notions like (concordant) agreement in the grammatical project, these appeals are of no help in resuscitating the justificatory project. Concordant agreement, and a host of related notions, each lie at justificatory bedrock.

I think Goldfarb's broader exegetical criticism of Kripke has force, for reasons related to what I've stressed about the senses of 'constitution' in the previous section. But that criticism goes astray if it claims that agreement plays no foundational role for Wittgenstein, even if this is qualified by saying it is no foundational role *like* that Kripke sets for it. Both concordant and concurring agreement play something like a foundational role in the grammatical project, which as I've noted is a project not entirely unlike Kripke's. It is merely that the way the relevant questions are raised and addressed is marked by a distinctively Wittgensteinean methodology.

The passages Goldfarb appeals to offer just example of a setting where Wittgenstein shifts briskly between different senses of "agreement", and different roles that they play. Indeed, sometimes, with a distinctively Wittgensteinean perversity, such shifts will occur within the scope of a single passage.

> A language-game in which someone calculates according to a rule and places the blocks of a building according to the results of the calculation. He has learnt to operate with written signs according to rules.—Once you have described the procedure of this teaching and learning, you have said everything that can be said about acting correctly according to a rule. We can go no further. It is no use, for example, to go back to the concept of agreement, because it is no more certain that one proceeding is in agreement with another, than that it has happened in accordance with the rule. Admittedly going according to a rule is also founded on an agreement. (*RFM* VII-26)

Out of context, these remarks border on contradiction. If, as Wittgenstein claims, there's nothing more to say about acting correctly according to a rule, even by appeal to the notion of agreement, why does Wittgenstein then *immediately* say more about rule-following—by appeal to agreement, no less? And how, in particular, can he say that rule-following is *founded* on an agreement?

The remarks become intelligible once we can separate out Wittgenstein's two projects, perhaps along with two notions of agreement. When Wittgenstein says that we can go 'no further' than describing what we actually do, this means we get no further in a justificatory sense: we don't arrive at anything more basic that will help explain why one way of acting accords with a rule, and the other does not. "Rule" and "concordant agreement" are, as Wittgenstein notes, conceptually intertwined. (Note that the first kind of agreement mentioned in the foregoing passage is unambiguously concordant since it is agreement between proceedings, and not persons, thus bolstering the earlier proposed reading of §224).

But when Wittgenstein concedes that agreement is *foundational* for rule-following, he means grammatically: what we count as having followed a rule turns in part on whether there is a certain measure of agreement. Given that both concordant and concurring agreement play a role in the grammatical project, Wittgenstein could mean either here, though I suspect the most natural reading takes Wittgenstein to be talking about concurring agreement, since this is the most natural reading of "agreement" that admits of the indefinite article.

Baker and Hacker cite the above passage as part of their evidence that Kripke has gone astray in taking community agreement to be constitutive of rule-following.[3] But they don't note that the first kind of agreement discussed in this passage is clearly concordant and not concurring agreement, and that the former is not directly relevant to Kripke's claims. Worse, they

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[3] Baker & Hacker (1984) p.438. Curiously, their translation omits the indefinite that helps motivate reading the last "agreement" as concurring.

criticize Kripke for failing to recognize that following according to a rule is 'fundamental' for Wittgenstein, citing *RFM* VI-28 and then appealing to the foregoing passage to further spell out the idea. But they fail to comment on the final sentence of the latter passage where Wittgenstein claims that agreement is foundational for rule-following. That is, they don't remark on the obvious exegetical puzzle that arises from the last claim in the cited passage if rule-following is indeed fundamental. How can rule-following be founded on *anything* if it is fundamental, let alone founded by appeal to a notion with which it is to some extent conceptually interwoven? Two notions of 'founding' are required to make proper sense of Wittgenstein here. And, as before, once these notions are separated out, it is not clear this passage has the kind of direct force against Kripke that Baker and Hacker claim.

Wittgenstein's casual shifts between different projects and different senses of agreement require extreme exegetical caution, especially when addressing the question of whether agreement is foundational, or constitutive, or part of a 'reduction'. If asked "Does Wittgenstein put agreement in a foundational role?" we must recognize the question is massively ambiguous. We should answer: "Neither concordant nor concurring agreement is placed in a foundational *justificatory* role—the justificatory project fails. Neither concordant nor concurring agreement is placed in a foundational *constitutive* role, if what is meant by that presupposes the existence of necessary and sufficient conditions for following a rule, or following it correctly. Wittgenstein rejects the idea that there are such conditions. But *both* concurring and concordant agreement are put in a foundational *grammatical* role, in that the presence or absence of both can, and perhaps in degrees always do, form some important part of circumstances that influence our willingness to say that, and which, rules are followed."

So much for disambiguating Wittgenstein. Now, we've already discussed how the notion of concordant agreement figures in the grammatical inves-

tigation in our discussion of §207. But we need to get a little clearer on just how the notion of concurring agreement operates, and why this notion raises special objections that Wittgenstein feels compelled to rebut. Let's begin with §240.

> Disputes do not break out (among mathematicians, say) over the question whether a rule has been obeyed or not. People don't come to blows over it, for example. That is part of the framework on which the working of our language is based (for example, in giving descriptions).

The first sentence helpfully signals that concurring agreement is at issue. The second reminds that identifying such agreement often relies on ordinary human behavior. The third tells us that such agreement is a feature that facilitates the working of our language. This last remark is too straightforward if just interpreted as telling us that if we all disagreed constantly, we wouldn't speak with each other. The point is more helpfully taken as grammatical: if there are unusual amounts of disagreement, we may lose our willingness or ability to say that a word has a particular meaning, or even that a language is spoken.

Let me give a thought experiment that I think clarifies what Wittgenstein has in mind. Suppose we came upon an isolated community of humans, or humanoids, that we can call the Waywards. The Waywards are like us, but a little more primitive intellectually. They have a number system, which we can suppose for simplicity involves numerals like ours, and they can count using this system, and so on. But they learn very few operations over it. Among them is an operation "$+n$", or "n more" which is taught the way we would be taught it for small numbers. And with just a few examples, most tutees say they understand and continue on their own to everyone's satisfaction.

Now it is rare that the "$+n$" operation is performed on numbers larger than 1000, but when it is almost all Waywards continue "1004, 1008, ...". Even more rare are applications past 2000, after which many (but substantially fewer) Waywards continue "2006, 2012, ...". The Waywards who don't continue that way mostly evince the signs of uncertainty, confusion, or exasperation that we would if we were asked to add two to a number so large that we had trouble writing it out or 'thinking it all at once'. And so on (e.g., "3008, 3016, ..., 4010, 4020, ..."), with more and more Waywards having trouble continuing into the higher thousands, until, say, around 8000 or 9000 none can go on (though they claim that there must be an answer beyond this point, they just have trouble settling it.)

When Waywards do perform these calculations they do so 'as a matter of course'. That is, when there are a thousand balls in a bin and one instructs "bring two more" a Wayward who knows how many balls there are will grab four more without further ado. Nothing noteworthy 'passes through her mind' (in rare cases, maybe symbols occur to her like "$+2$" or "1000+2=1004").

Throughout all this there are many instances of what certainly look like 'errors'. Occasionally someone will be told to "bring 2 more" of 1008 seeds and will bring 2 or 3 or 5. Occasionally someone is asked to continue the series "$+2$" starting from 1008 on paper and writes something other than "1012". Sometimes these Waywards will be corrected by other Waywards, who usually just says things like "look what you've done!" or "pay attention". And for small numbers, in the 1000s say, the general reactions are "oops" or "of course", just as when we correct someone who turns right on the instruction "turn left" and we point out their mistake. For the higher thousands these corrections are more or less helpful, depending on how easily the Wayward keeps such 'large numbers' 'in mind'.

Whether a Wayward can continue high in the series follows no special pattern. For example, it's not always the case that someone who can

continue the series further along can always do so. There are no identifiable 'experts', though there are perhaps 'favorable circumstances' of certain kinds (e.g., being well rested, or calm) that help certain Waywards along.

Now, consider one such Wayward: Wallace. Wallace has never been good at 'calculating'. He has great trouble continuing the "$+n$" series beyond 1000, and simply can't go beyond 2000. But Wallace gets by in Wayward society just fine nonetheless. He is presently haggling with another Wayward over the price, in a beaded currency, for an unusually luxurious new woven hammock. Wallace demands 2024 beads, but is offered 2006. Like any good haggler Wallace tries to eke out a little more payment "just give me two more beads, and we've got a deal".

Did Wayward Wallace *mean* something by these words? If so, what did he mean?

I think in such circumstances, there is a strong, if not irresistible, pull to claim that Wallace made an offer to sell the hammock for 2012 beads. This is so even though nothing in Wallace's occurrent thought, nothing in his verbiage, and possibly nothing in his (sub-dermally individuated) dispositions, considered independently of Wallace's circumstances, singles out that particular number. Indeed, I think that there is an equally irresistible pull to much stronger general claims, like: "by "$x+n$" Waywards in general designate the series we would describe as "$x + ((\lfloor \frac{x}{1000} \rfloor + 1) \times \text{n})$"".

If any of this is right, surely we recognize that we could construct similar examples for different series. That is, I could have equally well described behavior of the Waywards as 'following' a different slightly irregular series other than the one they do. One could imagine that we came across an archipelago, with each island inhabited by a different set of such 'wayward adders'.

Now, finally, suppose that we come across some community, the Hyperwaywards, who like the Waywards that teach and learn orders of the form "$+n$", and everything is as described up to 1000. But when 'calculations'

are performed above 1000, there is near total chaos. Many, many of the Hyperwaywards continue the series confidently in line with some slightly irregular series, others with respect to other irregular series. Some continue it in what we would say is a completely lawless way before they lose confidence. In general, we find high degrees of confidence among most Hyperwaywards in their continutation, though some are much more confident than others, and a few are unsure. And of course, many individuals are reluctant to 'add' from a very early stage.

Consider a Hyperwayward also named "Wallace" who, like our original Wayward Wallace, is engaged in a transaction of hammock for beads. Again Hyperwayward Wallace demands 2024 beads and is offered 2006. And Hyperwayward Wallace says "just give me two more beads, and we've got a deal". (We could add: the seller agrees and hands over some number of beads, Wallace's lawyer protests that this is not the correct amount, a bodyguard weighs in, and things come to blows.)

Did Hyperwayward Wallace *mean* something by these words? If so, what did he mean?

Here I think there is a strong, if not irresistible, pull to the claim that Hyperwayward Wallace didn't successfully make an offer to exchange the hammock for 2012 beads, or 2011, or 2013, or any particular number. The issue has nothing to do with Wallace, or even the local circumstances of the transaction—we could suppose those are a 'local' copy of the circumstances of Wayward Wallace and his transaction. There seem not to be enough surrounding circumstances to make us confident to pronounce one way or another.

If this is right, then Wallace didn't properly issue an offer at all. And the same would go for the other uses of "+2" by the Hyperwaywards, at least for applications over 1000. It should be relatively clear that the principal difference between the cases I've adduced is the presence or lack of Wayward or Hyperwayward agreement. Note that agreement obviously isn't the *only*

important feature here. Regularity plays a crucial role. (If we come across an island where all citizens agree in a continuation, but one that we can't describe by any, even highly irregular, function, should we say that they are continuing a series? Which one? This is just one small step in the direction of the completely irregular community of §207 (cf. *RFM* VI-45).) And we can now also certainly note how all my examples leaned on customary human behavior, and reactions, including training, and so on.

It should be noted that there is obviously a strong affinity between the thought experiments I've just given, and those involved in the social forms of semantic externalism of Burge (1979, 1986). This should come as no surprise: to claim that concurring human agreement helps determine when, and what, rules are followed *is just*, by definition, to embrace a special form of semantic social externalism.[4]

In any event, these examples exhibit what I think Wittgenstein is alluding to when he says that human agreement forms part of the framework out of which our language operates in §240. It is worth stressing that there is no 'general lesson' here, given the kind of methodology Wittgenstein espouses. We learn that sometimes, some amount of agreement matters, given some other circumstances. That's all. We can do other thought experiments to

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[4]See n.9 above, especially for worries about anachronism. Cf. also *PI* p.193 for appeal to notions of 'expert judgment' about color. Indeed, I think something somewhat similar to the thought experiment I've just given is essentially what Wittgenstein has in mind at *PI* p.192:

> Does it make sense to say that people generally agree in their judgments of color? What would it be like for them not to?—One man would say a flower was red which another called blue, and so on.—But what right should we have to call these people's words "red" and "blue" our 'colour-words'?
>
> How would they learn to use these words? And is the language-game which they learn still such as we call the use of 'names of colour'? There are evidently differences of degree here.
>
> This consideration must, however, apply to mathematics too. If there were not complete agreement, then neither would human beings be learning the technique which we learn. It would be more or less different from ours up to the point of unrecognizability.

determine how much agreement matters, in light of which changes in other circumstances. If Wittgenstein is right, there is no 'recipe' for meaning to be gleaned from all this. Just a better appreciation for the interrelated network of considerations that already influences our attributions.

There is an important question that I want to flag, but that I will not address because it is quite controversial, and to some extent unnecessary to make the points I want to here. The issue concerns whether rule-following always requires agreement between multiple persons. Could the agreement of one person with herself over time (in conjunction with other very favorable circumstances) be sufficient? It would be nice to avoid this question by saying that agreement with oneself isn't possible. But *pace* Norman Malcolm, the notion of intrapersonal concurring agreement makes perfect sense: the later Wittgenstein, for example, agreed with the early Wittgenstein on certain matters, and not on others.[5] I think that in some circumstances agreement between multiple persons has what seems to be an ineliminable supporting role. But when other circumstantial features are very favorable, it could be that one person's global 'agreement with themselves' over a long period of time is sufficient. I won't take a stand on this issue here (though by the end I will say a few words about its importance).[6]

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[5]Malcolm (1986) p.173. The source of Malcolm's odd claim is, I suspect, a conflation of concurring with contractual agreement.

[6]It's worth noting that Wittgenstein himself seems ambivalent about the issue. In some passages (e.g. *RFM* VI-45) he presses questions that implicate an analogy between rule-following and communal practices like trade. But in the *Investigations*, more often Wittgenstein uses language that implicates that he *doubts* whether there couldn't after all be a 'lone' rule-follower over time. For example, *PI* §199, my emphasis: "Is what we call obeying a rule something that it would be possible for only one man to do, *and to do only once in his life*?" Why add the part after the comma, if Wittgenstein thought, and indeed thought he had established, it was superfluous? This of course raises another question: can Wittgenstein afford to be ambivalent on this issue? I'll argue later that he absolutely can—this issue just isn't at all central to his core claims, at least in the rule-following sections. Another question concerns the importance of a notion of 'community'. When agreement matters, does being part of a particular 'community' of agree-ers matter? What does it mean to be 'part of' such a community? Does being physically located with them matter, for example? Being part of the same species? Who

Setting these issues aside, so far in §240 we have a grammatical remark just like any other—there is no special place that human agreement occupies (say, in contrast to regularity, or familiar human behavior). But Wittgenstein clearly thinks that there are some important missteps we can make in appreciating the grammatical involvement of human behavior. A first worry of this kind is immediately raised by the interlocutor.

> "So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?" — It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the *language* they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life. (§241)

The worry is easy to understand: if human agreement plays any foundational role in helping to settle standards of correctness, even in the limited ways I've been canvassing, one can wonder whether this implies that human agreement somehow settles the facts. And that would indeed be a striking consequence of the Wittgensteinean view.

But it should be relatively clear from our foregoing thought experiments that there is no such implication. There are some important cases where our taking something to be true contributes to its being true. But this is not a contribution to 'the facts'. It contributes to correctness only by contributing to what we mean. For example, a Wayward's instruction of "+2" past 1000 is correctly continued with 1004. A correct continuation of our instruction "+2" is 1002. There's no conflict here because, as we noted earlier, our inclination is to say that we *mean different things* by "+2". As Wittgenstein says, with emphasis, the contribution of agreement is to what language we speak. And it is not nearly as surprising that circumstances could influence what is true, or correct, in that way.

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one chooses to defer to? I suspect many of these considerations can sometimes play a role, and sometimes not. But exploring the issues requires much more space than I have here and, again, aren't necessary to appreciate the general exegetical claims I'm making.

The reply here essentially invokes the contemporary semantics/meta-semantics distinction: (roughly) the distinction between the content of an expression and the factors that ground the expression's content.[7] And related remarks in the *RFM* confirm that this is roughly what is intended. The interlocutor worries that the contingency of human agreement will affect our ability to state necessities.

> What you say seems to amount to this, that logic belongs to the natural history of man. And that is not combinable with the hardness of the logical 'must'.
>
> But the logical 'must' is a component part of the propositions of logic, and these are not propositions of human natural history. If what a proposition of logic said was: Human beings agree with one another in such and such ways (and that would be the form of the natural-historical proposition), then its contradictory would say that there is a lack of agreement. Not, that there is an agreement of another kind. (*RFM* VI-49)

Wittgenstein's reply is that the contingent facts that influence what we count as saying don't become part of the content of what is said. Otherwise, as Wittgenstein notes, the negation of what we say would deny the existence of our contingent agreement, which it clearly does not. The contingent facts are something like conceptual presuppositions of making necessary claims, not part of what is thereby claimed.[8] Wittgenstein is quite explicit that our agreement doesn't determine what is correct in any deeper sense than this. For example: "'$25^2 = 625$' ...could be true even if people did not calculate at all" (*RFM* VI-30).

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[7] Roughly, because "content" in this characterization might be better replaced with "semantic value". See Yalcin (forthcoming). One might wonder what metasemantics has to do with a 'form of life'. This is a complex issue, though we'll return to consider it in Chapter 9.

[8] Compare similar claims about how facts 'grounding' the practice of measurement do not enter into 'what is measured' in *RFM* VII-1.

The interlocutor's objection, from the contemporary standpoint, is a little unsophisticated. But there are more troublesome versions of the basic worry that have arisen for interpretations of Wittgenstein other than those I am giving. Consider a standard objection to the communitarian view of Wright (1980), on which to be correct is to agree with the actual dispositions of one's community. An obvious worry is that it seems that an entire community could be disposed to apply a term incorrectly. For example, an entire community might be disposed to call a cow on a dark night "horse". Surely that wouldn't make these attributions correct. This leads us down the path of refining communitarian views to find 'optimal' conditions under which we find unfailing attributions.[9]

Wittgenstein's view doesn't forbid the possibility that an entire community could be wrong, disposed to be wrong, or even disposed to be wrong under 'optimal circumstances', however those might be specified. As I alluded to above, the piecemeal, case-by-case approach doesn't seek to state a general criterion for the involvement of agreement that could easily come into conflict with such claims. But it is worth saying something more: I think there is a general, if somewhat loose, way to give a class of cases where a community tends to be 'unable to be wrong' on the Wittgensteinean view as I'm presenting it. These are cases which are justificatorily basic for the community. That is, if we come to an application of a term, and questioning that application raises a justificatory challenge that, given the use of the term by the community, cannot *in principle* be met, then we have probably arrived at cases which constitute the 'bedrock' on which their linguistic practice is founded—the bedrock that helps us settle *what* they are saying, if anything at all.[10]

Identifying cows in the dark, or zebras by sight at the zoo, is not ob-

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[9]Boghossian (1989) pp.534*ff* has a helpful overview of the dialectic.

[10]These remarks should be tempered by an idea that Wittgenstein revisits often: that a practice, or the rules governing a game, can shift over time, and are not always precisely delimited. It should also be tempered by the recognition that there is an interrelated host of features that help us settle what counts as justificatory bedrock.

viously like this. If you doubt that such-and-such a figure in the dark is a horse, and not a cow, it is clear that shining a light on it and identifying its revealed features would be a way of resolving that worry. If you are worried the zebras are cleverly painted mules, there are clear procedures to remove those doubts: dabbing their coats with turpentine, for example. Further doubts can be raised, and those doubts removed. But what can we show to the Wayward child to convince him 1002 is the correct continuation of "+2" as we meant it? It's no coincidence then that Wittgenstein habitually treats simple mathematical examples and color identifications in the rule-following remarks. These are the kinds of judgments which plausibly lie at justificatory bedrock. This helps explain why the idea that we could all be disposed to misidentify cows, or zebras, even in good circumstances, seems to make perfect sense. But it also explains why, when we are confronted with a Wayward-like people who can carry their series "+2" along well into the billions, and obstinately do so even in the face of all challenges to their pattern, it starts to feel absurd to say "they all *really* mean what we do by "+2", they just constantly misuse it."

So neither the interlocutor's first objection, nor the more sophisticated variation just considered, has force against Wittgenstein. At bottom, the first of these two objections involves a simple misunderstanding of what Wittgenstein's view is. But in the next section, Wittgenstein seems to be aware that there is a deeper problem in the vicinity of the interlocutor's worries.

> If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments. This seems to abolish logic, but does not do so. (§242)

The interlocutor's original objection forces us to draw a distinction which I glossed as a semantics/metasemantics distinction. In more Wittgensteinean

terms, it is a distinction between features which are grammatically foundational for (say) a technique of giving descriptions on the one hand, and applying the technique to make descriptions on the other. Speaking the language is not subject to relevant standards of correctness: there is no 'correct' language in the same sense as a correct way of using one.

But can Wittgenstein really say this? I noted at the outset of this section that concurring agreement is characteristically an agreement in beliefs, or what is said. But how can agreement in what is believed or said play a foundational role in undergirding our sense of when something *is* believed or said? Using the semantics/metasemantics distinction: how can semantic facts about certain expressions make contributions to their metasemantics? Or, using more Wittgensteinean terminology, we seem to be using something that is 'practice internal' to be part of the support for (a criterion for) the existence, and nature, of the practice. Does this make sense?[11]

Wittgenstein seems to think so. The opening line of §242 indicates that agreement in judgment—human agreement—does indeed play a role just like agreement in definition: it is a criterion for our speaking the same language. This point tends to be under-read. Consider a gloss on §242 given by Baker and Hacker.

> A language must be *learnable*—it must be possible to teach

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[11]It's worth mentioning that the issue here for Wittgenstein is roughly analogous to worries of covertly smuggling in intentional notions in giving the definition of 'ideal' conditions for a reduction of semantic notions in dispositional or informational terms. See also Boghossian (1989) pp. 545-7 for a discussion of an analogous worry for Wright's treatment of 'judgment-dependent' facts. McDowell seems to show sensitivity to roughly this issue at McDowell (1992) pp.50-1, and proposes reading Wittgenstein as able to sidestep the issue. I think McDowell is right to think that Wittgenstein is in part interested in a "deconstruction of the peculiar way of thinking that makes [a constructive account of how human interactions make meaning and understanding possible] seem necessary" if this is directed at justificatory worries. But I think it is overstated if it means to be directed against constitutive ambitions generally. As I've stressed, Wittgenstein is interested in a limited constitutive project, and this renders him unable to sidestep the issue here completely. Some response is called for on my reading, and Wittgenstein seems to concede as much at §242.

others what the expressions of one's language mean. This in turn implies that there must be extensive agreement not only in definition (or, more broadly in explanations of word meaning) but also in judgments (PI §242), for a learner's mere mastery of definitions without broad consensus in judgments with proficient speakers would betoken lack of understanding.[12]

Baker and Hacker describe failures of agreement as 'betokening' misunderstanding, that is, providing *evidence* of misunderstanding. But this point, though doubtless often true, is much weaker than Wittgenstein's. This is cleared up in the *RFM*, where Wittgenstein explicitly states that agreement in judgment is a *criterion* of agreement in the meanings of words, in the very same sense in which agreement in definitions is.[13]

> We say that, in order to communicate, people must agree with one another about the meanings of words. But the criterion for this agreement is not just agreement with reference to definitions, e.g., ostensive definitions—but *also* an agreement in judgments. (*RFM* VI-39)

The foundational situation is odd, as Wittgenstein himself notes, admitting that it "sounds queer" and "seems to abolish logic" (again, by incorporating contingencies into statements that should be necessary). Note, by contrast,

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[12]Baker & Hacker (1995) p.138.

[13]Note Wittgenstein's claim that concurring agreement is a criterion for what one means, given the relationship between meaning and understanding, almost directly contravenes Baker and Hacker's claim that agreement isn't a criterion for understanding, which I contested above. Another, even weaker reading seems to occur in Fogelin (2009) pp.33-4, where Fogelin treats these remarks as part of a 'defactoist', pure description. Fogelin seems to think Wittgenstein raises questions about possible disagreement only to dismiss them as non-actual: "But suppose that such disagreements happened constantly for all color ascriptions: What would determine who was right and who was wrong? Well, they do not happen constantly! That's the fact of the matter."

that Baker and Hacker's point is almost trivial, and couldn't raise any such suspicions.[14]

There are actually two different worries one can have about the dual framework/practice-internal role played by concurring agreement. The first is a kind of circularity worry: how can one coherently say that *agreement in judgments* influences our willingness to say that *judgments* are made? Doesn't the former notion presuppose the latter? Wittgenstein actually doesn't seem troubled by this problem, and I do think he has some right ignore it. The claim that the presence of agreement influences our willingness to make attributions is intelligible and informative: the thought experiment involving Waywards and Hyperwaywards shows this. Wittgenstein is in part able to avoid a circularity challenge because he allows that ordinary human behavior, and regularity, play a role in getting the foundational framework up and running. The 'behavior characteristic of agreement' can suffice as a description (given some other favorable circumstances) until we're confident we have a suitable practice in play. Then because the relevant behavior actually constitutes the agreement (in these circumstances), we can legitimately and informatively say that it is the agreement itself that is partly foundational. This seems to me to be essentially what happens in the Wayward/Hyperwayward case.[15]

But noting these points doesn't yet address the second worry that Wittgen-

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[14]Goldfarb (2012) pp.88, I believe, latches onto the basic point of the section when he says that, in it, Wittgenstein is "trying to undermine such a sharp distinction between what is said within a framework (judgments) and what is said outside it and is constitutive of it (definitions)." But Goldfarb fails to situate §242 as the conclusion of a dialectic beginning at §240 that is spurred on by the conception of grammatical investigation I have been working with. Accordingly, he partly turns to §241 to address the worries, claiming that the agreements in judgment in question are "not agreement in any ordinary sense", and is less than perfectly clear on how the subsequent analogy with measurement is supposed to operate in undercutting the challenge Wittgenstein is considering.

[15]Note, relatedly, that when there 'isn't agreement', we can't say that there isn't agreement *in judgments*—the existence of *things being judged* is precisely what gets undermined in the Hyperwayward case. This idea is borne out with a helpful analogy with measurement in *RFM* III-74:

stein takes more seriously: how can we allow the blurring of semantics and metasemantics, the foundational and the founded, without incorporating contingencies into the necessary? Wittgenstein gives one quick remark as response, the final claim in the rule-following block.

> It is one thing to describe methods of measurement, and another to obtain and state results of measurement. But what we call "measuring" is partly determined by a certain constancy in results of measurement. (§242)

Note how perfectly this is read as aiming to address the worry I've described. "It is one thing to describe the methods of measurement": it is one thing to describe what takes place when one measures, the technique or practice that constitutes (in the limited sense I've developed) measuring. That is, it is one thing to engage in the descriptive task of giving the grammar of "measures". "…and another to obtain and state the results of measurement": it is another thing to engage in acts of measuring, which are classified by the word "measures". "But what we call "measuring" is partly determined by a certain constancy in results of measurement": that is, part of what constitutes the grammatical foundations, or framework, which contributes to our willingness to call something an act of measurement, are relationships among the very acts of measurement *so-construed*: namely, constancy in those acts of measuring.

The claim here is that a grammatical investigation of the notion of "measuring" reveals the exact same *kind* of circularity that Wittgenstein thinks we uncover in a grammatical investigations of "rule-following". Wittgenstein's response here is to call attention to a simpler case that he thinks has

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> *No* yardstick, it might be said, would be correct, if in general they did not agree.—But when I say that, I do not mean that they would all be *false*.

I think this is precisely why Wittgenstein leans on ordinary human behavior when discussing these cases, talking of "peaceful agreement", "not coming to blows", and so on. It is also one reason I think he says that these aren't agreements "in opinions" (as if one could easily have the contrary opinion) but in a form of life.

an analogous structure, where we can see more clearly how the blurring of grammatical foundations and practice-internal actions raises no troubles.

The point that the structure is analogous seems right. Consider the following case: We come across a people that has instruments like rulers, with symbols aligned at various intervals on them. The people occasionally line up the instruments with objects in their environment—say, certain kinds of bugs. They then copy the symbol aligned with the outermost interval lining up with the bug. The only oddity is that these instruments grow and shrink wildly, sometimes with the weather, or the time of day, and sometimes without any obvious warning.

We see a member of this population walk up to a bug, align the instrument, and copy the symbol. Was this a measurement? As in the case of §200, we might say so out of deference to the similarities it bears to our practice of measurement. But it isn't easy to maintain this attribution in the face of questions like "what exactly is being measured?" Length? This doesn't seem right—what length should we say is recorded by a given measurement? For example, which of the many symbols records the length of a given bug *accurately*? Any choice seems unprincipled. But can one measure without there being something one measures?

Note that as soon as we reintroduce constancy in the state of the measuring instruments (and provided other, 'normal' circumstances), these worries evaporate, and we can feel free to talk of measurement, and measurement of lengths in particular, once more. We can even say when a measurement was done 'inappropriately' (the instrument was held at the wrong angle, the wrong symbol was copied) or when the measurement was inaccurate (the ruler expanded or contracted), and so on.[16]

At times, when discussing the importance of justificatorily fundamental, and grammatically foundational, certainty, Wittgenstein makes the kind of

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[16]We should allow that adding appropriate circumstances can rescue the intelligibility of a practice here that is similar enough to ours that we may indeed call it "measuring". For a discussion, see *RFM* I-5, I-140, III-74, VII-1, VII-15.

analogy I've been developing between constancy in measuring equipment, and agreement in rule-following, quite explicitly. For example *RFM* VI-28: "The certainty with which I call the color "red" is the rigidity of my measuring-rod, it is the rigidity from which I start. When I give descriptions, *that* is not to be brought into doubt. This simply characterizes what we call describing."

Now, if the analogy holds, we do seem to find the same kind of duality for the results of measurement that we find for concurring judgments about whether a rule was followed. We can helpfully understand what distinguishes the good case as one in which the procedure counts as "taking measurements", from the bad case, by saying that in the good case there is constancy in the measurements taken. If we say this, we're claiming that something that is (in some sense) 'technique-internal' contributes to our willingness to say the technique is applied.

I think Wittgenstein is right to think that, in this case, there is no temptation to think that the way that technique-internal actions and outcomes are integrated into grammatical foundations leads the contingencies of the latter to 'infect' the former. That is, there is no temptation to conclude that *part of what is measured* is the regularity in measurements. It's not even clear what that would amount to.

There is no argument here: just an analogy that is meant to, and seemingly does, speak for itself. The analogy with measurement gives a simpler and clearer picture of how the features of regularity that play the relevant foundational roles for the existence of a technique (or really: for our willingness to say the technique is present) are relevantly 'presupposed' by the technique. The features of regularity present in instances of what we happen to call "measuring" are 'presupposed' by the technique merely in the sense that this regularity is required to give those instances the kinds of purposes that we customarily associate with measurement (cf. §142). It is the fact that we care about those purposes that seemingly influences our

judgment that the technique is in fact being employed (or, again, that we are willing to say that the technique is employed).

The intriguing fact is that elements of the technique itself, even elements that pervade it like regularities in technique-internal actions or outcomes, can play this role as well, without thereby being part of what the technique is 'concerned with'. For example, the pervasive regularities in measurement just help allow it to have the typical purposes we associate with making measurements, without it being the case that part of what we measure are the existence of the regularities. So too, Wittgenstein claims, the pervasive regularities in our judgments help allow descriptions made in assertion, say, to have the typical purposes we associate with the role of giving those descriptions, without part of what is being described being that we all tend to agree in many important cases of how descriptions are to be applied.

At the very least, this is all it seems Wittgenstein that means to do with the example. So whether or not one finds the analogy with measurement compelling, there is an important exegetical point to take away. This is that Wittgenstein's remarks are hardly placing human agreement in a deeper foundational role than other circumstantial support for the practice of rule-following. Quite the opposite: they are aimed at making us more comfortable with the idea that it can play a role exactly like other kinds of circumstantial support, like regularity or 'customary human behavior', even in the face of the pervasive 'practice-internality' of human agreement. What this means is that the remarks here, far from conflicting in any ways with the simple, presuppositionless grammatical methodology, are precisely aimed at securing it.

PHILOSOPHICAL GRAMMAR AND WITTGENSTEIN'S METAPHILOSOPHY

This concludes my primary, exegetical work on the rule-following block. But before pressing on, I want to make two remarks: one general remark about the overall organization of the rule-following sections, and another about Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy.

First, what is the importance of human agreement in relation to the failure of the justificatory project? As I noted earlier, Wittgenstein intends the grammatical investigations to allay worries connected with the failure of the justificatory project. One reason that I think Wittgenstein caps off the rule-following sections with remarks about human agreement is precisely because those remarks have the most direct pacifying potential.

This is because the issue of human agreement in a way brings us right back to the justificatory issues raised by §185. It may have seemed like an anomaly that we never come across someone like the Wayward Child, so that it was a mere contingency that we hadn't faced a justificatory challenge at this level of 'depth'. But what we've learned is that the absence of such characters is a precondition for the existence of the kinds of justifications with which we're familiar—a precondition for the point of giving and clarifying orders, following rules, and so on. It's not merely that for ordinary justifications (examples, diagrams, etc.) to do the work they usually do, we must have some measure of agreement in how individuals respond to them. That much is obvious, but doesn't really help us come to grips with the motivations for positing philosophically loaded notions of interpretation, justification, meaning, and understanding. Realizing that recalcitrance obstructs our normal justifications is completely compatible with the idea that

there must be something that we have, broadly on the model of an interpretation, that the Wayward Child lacks and that the ordinary justifications and interpretations simply don't get across.

Once we've recognized the grammatically foundational status of our agreement (and hence of the lack of wayward children) we can start to appreciate that the call for justification that the Child's behavior seems to raise to salience is not revealing the absence of justification which any kind of practice could avoid. The call for justification is so deep, that it is starting to disrupt the very circumstances in which talk of meaning or justification make sense. The pervasiveness and familiarity of those circumstances, our resulting (reasonable) inattentiveness to them, and the familiarity of ordinary occurrences of doubt and justification may conjointly lead us to the sense that there is something which *should* be producible to the child. If we are in that mindset, the termination of the justificatory project may seem intolerable, and the positing of 'occult' processes of meaning and understanding inevitable.

The grammatical investigation is supposed to make us see that, by our own lights, all the relevant kinds of practices or techniques with which we're familiar must have, among many other features, an unquestioned set of actions, or a presupposed set of outcomes, as their foundation. These foundations are required so that that the practice or technique can have the point that it does. The technique of describing is no different. If we can bring ourselves to accept this, then we'll accept as a matter of course that the justificatory project terminates, and along with this acceptance related concerns about the seemingly unintelligible nature of acts of meaning and understanding should vanish. The motivations for thinking that there are important 'hidden' aspects of these occurrences, needed to ward off foundational justificatory worries, have been undercut.

In light of this, I should make a concession regarding human agreement. I stressed earlier that it is a mistake to think that human agreement plays

a special role in the grammatical investigation. But that was not entirely accurate. It has no special foundational role, but it does have a special dialectical and pedagogical purpose. Namely, it has a special role in making us comfortable with the termination of the justificatory project, and so perfectly rounds out the discussion which §185 initiated.

Having made this concession, let me make a final remark on metaphilosophy. I hope it is relatively clear how the foregoing reading of the rule-following sections is largely in accord with remarks like the following.

> Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it.
>
> For it cannot give it any foundation either.
>
> It leaves everything as it is. (§124)

> Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains or deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us. (§126)

From what we've seen, Wittgenstein engaged in a two step process. In the first step, a foundational demand that philosophy was supposed to meet—a demand for a strange and unusual form of justification—was precisely rejected. The rejection itself just involved actually 'looking' to see whether there was any such justification, and finding there wasn't. In the second step, Wittgenstein aimed to get us more comfortable with this conclusion by more 'looking'—although where we were supposed to look may have initially seemed surprising. The idea that linguistic use needed a special justificatory foundation which philosophy could provide was replaced with a methodology on which we explored the grammar of potentially confusing notions like "meaning", "understanding", and "accord". And on the construal of grammar we worked with, everything was open to view (the

'interior' as well). The methodology takes our uses (including our disposi-
tions to revise uses in light of certain evidence, and so on) as a given, and
describes them. Wittgenstein clearly thinks there were no special kinds of
justifications for uses, at least not of a kind parallel to those sometimes
sought in, for example, the foundations of mathematics. As Wittgenstein
plausibly says, grammar, in his sense, is 'arbitrary' up to concerns about
the purpose and utility of certain linguistic practices (§497).

The main upshot of the grammatical investigation is a series of 're-
minders' (§127)—an attempt to raise to salience features so pervasive that
they tend to be ignored. For example: that we all typically agree on the
results of basic calculations, that we all exhibit familiar kinds of reactions
to mistakes and successes, that we are all inducted into practices by certain
kinds of training, and so on. Earlier I stressed that recognizing the role
these features play involves recognizing a *kind* of foundation—just one very
unlike that sought in the justificatory project. And Wittgenstein indeed
acknowledges that the reminders of familiar occurrences that we ignored
will reveal to us that they are foundationally important, in *some* sense.

> The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden
> because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to
> notice something—because it is always before one's eyes.) The
> real foundations [eigentlichen Grundlagen] of his enquiry do not
> strike a man at all ... we fail to be struck by what, once seen,
> is most striking and most powerful. (§126)

Indeed there is such a tight fit between the methodology in the rule-following
block and the metaphilosophical remarks occurring in the §120s that it
would be surprising if he didn't have former specifically in mind as he wrote
the latter.

Let me pass from Wittgenstein's overt metaphilosophy to some more
important methodological continuities in the *Investigations* by asking a key

question: how might one *oppose* Wittgenstein on matters of rule-following, meaning, and agreement? There are three ways.

First, one could actually identify and describe the justification that Wittgenstein claims to be lacking in the justificatory investigation. This, I submit, is a very unlikely path of resistance. Wittgenstein seems right to expose the idea of such a justification as an undefended presupposition, to the extent it is at all attractive.

Second, one could accept that terms such as "meaning", "rule-following", and the like, express family resemblance concepts, and that the way to elucidate such notions is through grammatical investigation. But one could reject some of the particular upshots of the grammatical investigations I've attributed to Wittgenstein here.

But it is worth flagging that I've consistently gone well beyond what Wittgenstein actually claims in the text. Early on, I suggested that the fact that Wittgenstein leaves the grammatical investigatory work to his readers, largely only giving hints of his own opinions, may be indicative neither of pedagogical perversity nor simple brevity, but instead bound up with a distinctively Wittgensteinean methodology. And this would make sense if Wittgenstein was less committed than he lets on as to which exact circumstantial features are relevant, and how much relevance they have. Explicitly, Wittgenstein mostly only suggests some directions that he finds helpful for grammatical investigation—some areas that he thinks yield helpful grammatical insights. If one comes up with *other* results from these investigations, it is not clear that one has thereby overturned the general force of Wittgenstein's remarks. Rather, even if the upshot of one's own consideration of circumstantial support looks different—even very different—than the one I've attributed to Wittgenstein, it wouldn't be clear that one had undermined the core aspect of his project: to reject the presuppositions of the justificatory investigation, and to supplant those by exploring the grammar of the relevant notions involved until that failure is no longer seen

as problematic.[1]

To really run counter to Wittgenstein here, then, we need a much more forceful rejection of his results: we need either to reject the coherence of the notion of family resemblance and its application to intentional terms, or to reject the methodology that Wittgenstein thinks is required to investigate family resemblance concepts, or to defend a result of the grammatical investigation which completely undermines our confidence in the existence of a coherent use of terms like "meaning", "understanding", and "accord". It is at least possible that considerations like those adduced by the Kripkean skeptic could do this last job, if properly deployed. But we should already be a little suspicious of how neatly the Kripkean skeptic can engage with Wittgenstein. Note, for example, that the Kripkean skeptic's conclusion is that there is no statable fact or set of facts in which meaning something consists. And this, in a way, is just the starting point for Wittgenstein of recognizing that meaning is a family resemblance concept like "game" or "chair", not the beginning of a downward spiral into non-factualism. We'll be discussing in great detail how the engagement between these two characters might go very soon.

But the broader exegetical lesson for now is this: The methodology of the rule-following sections is far from being out of sync with his metaphilosophy or the idiosyncratic methodology of the best appreciated sections like those on family resemblance, as many commentators have claimed. On the contrary, it is *so intimately bound up* with a characteristically Wittgensteinean perspective, that it is almost impossible to resist Wittgenstein on these matters without ultimately rejecting the broad outlook that consti-

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[1]This is especially true of the highly contested issue of whether, according to Wittgenstein, it could have been the case that only one person followed a rule given many opportunities *over time*, or whether he only means to deny the possibility of a history of mankind in which only one person followed a single rule *only once*. There is almost an obsession with this issue in the literature, as if it were critical to settling whether or not Wittgenstein is worth taking seriously. On the reading I'm giving, these concerns aren't getting at anything very important to Wittgenstein's investigation.

tutes the very heart of his later philosophy of language.

Part II

Kripke's Wittgenstein

WITTGENSTEIN AND KRIPKE'S WITTGENSTEIN

CHAPTER 8
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THE SKEPTIC'S CHALLENGE REVISITED

THE ROLE OF FORMS OF LIFE

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