

Ottoman Imperial Legacies in the Balkans: Who is watching the watchmen?*

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Abstract

This is a research proposal outlining plans for investigating empirically the legacy of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans. It consists of several parts that will probably constitute different chapters. The first part explores the existence of a legacy of the Ottoman Empire. The second part (and maybe third) explores the mechanisms of Ottoman imperial rule in the Balkans. It examines the variation in Ottoman **state presence** and the **level of independence** that certain provinces had vis-a-vis the Ottoman center and their implication for the emergence of corruption during Ottoman times. For example, Ottoman state presence is much more visible in regular Ottoman provinces; Rumelia (Ottoman Europe) featured many more bridges, Sufi monasteries, Turkish baths, Islamic schools, mosques and inns, as opposed to Wallachia and Moldavia (regions in Romania today). Similarly, regular Ottoman provinces featured a complex Ottoman bureaucratic apparatus created to prevent fiscal overgrazing and corruption in collecting taxes. Such apparatus featured positions created for the collection of revenues, recording and inspecting tax collection, transportation of the cash collected to Istanbul, courts that could record complaints related to abuse etc. Wallachia and Moldavia had few institutions in place to prevent excessive taxation and corruption related to collection of taxes, which becomes apparent from historical narratives. The implication of excessive taxation is the creation of two powerful forces - the landed nobles and the church. I explore the implications of such excessive taxation using historical data from Wallachia from 1860s, 28 years prior to independence from the Ottoman Empire.

Thank you for taking to read this paper which could be best described as a collection of three (or maybe more) research proposals. Data collection for this project entails retrieval and digitizing materials (manuscripts, historical statistics and maps) from various libraries and archives from around the world, which is why it has been a time consuming process. This is why you will see little analysis in this iteration of the project. Any comments are welcome. Please do not cite or circulate.

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1 Introduction



This project examines the socio-political legacy of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans. The Ottoman Empire was a powerful empire at its apogee, controlling much of Southeast Europe, Western Asia, the Caucasus, North Africa and the Horn of Africa (İnalçık, 1996; Todorova, 1996). Figure 1 displays the Ottoman Empire expansion from 1300 (the approximate start date of the Ottoman Empire) until the formation of Republic of Turkey in 1923 (Popescu, 2015). The empire, named from its first leader Osman, emerged among many principalities at the frontier of Byzantium and at the foothills of Anatolia. Before the middle of the sixteenth century, the Ottomans expanded from Anatolia to the holy cities of Islam and from the Nile to the Danube, getting to rule over a multi-ethnic and multi-religious empire. The rulers of the Ottoman Empire were called *sultāns* (سلطان) or *pādīṣāhs* (پادشاه) and they understood themselves as rulers of the empire, but also as caliphs - leaders of the Islamic community. Such claims could arguably have been an important source of unity in the Islamic community within the empire (Barkey, 2005) which could have contributed to lack of religious conflicts¹.

Traces of the Ottoman Empire are visible on many levels in the Balkans. There are perceptions about such legacy on a culinary, linguistic, musical and architectural level. Cuisine is an area where Turkish influence is apparent: sarma (stuffed vine or cabbage leaves), moussaka (ratatouille) or baklava (sweet) are types of food that are common across many countries in Eastern Europe. Language is also another medium where the Ottoman legacy is present. The word apricot ("قايصى" in Ottoman, "kayısı" in modern Turkish), which is present in languages that do not belong to the same linguistics family: in Serbo-Croatian (kajsija), Albanian (kajsi), Bulgarian (kašii), Romanian (caisă), Hungarian (kajsi)². There are countless other words of Ottoman origin in languages that are spoken in the Balkans. Ottoman architecture is also visible in different parts of the Balkans: houses, bridges, mosques, monasteries, medreses, baths, etc. Some ethno-musicologists also identified Ottoman traces in old Balkan folkloric and modern pop music (Buchanan, 2007).

¹For centuries, the few conflicts that emerged between the state and the Shi'a communities emerged mostly as a result of political competition between the Ottoman state and the Safavid Iran. According to Barkey (2005), the Ottoman only used force against religious groups only when they represented a threat to state authority.

²Another similar words is the word "boot" ("چيزمه" in Ottoman; "çizme" in modern Turkish) is present in Hungarian (csizma), Serbo-Croatian (čizme), Albanian (çizme) and Romanian (cizmă).

Figure 1: Ottoman Expansion



On an elite and public discourse level, the Ottoman Empire is invoked when it comes to the general notion of development, which includes economic performance, corruption of all kinds (e.g. petty vs. grand, related to the central government vs. municipalities, related to influencing the law vs. the implementation of the law) and perceptions about corruption. For example, a Business Insider article from 2010 ([Fernando, 2010](#)) about bankruptcy in Greece contains a quote from the Finance Ministry secretary at the time, Ilias Plaskovitis who mentioned: "We very much lack a tax conscience...Some trace it back to the Ottoman Empire, when tax evasion was resistance to foreign powers". Similarly, the Ottoman Empire and the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans are sometimes used in the context of the refugee crisis. Victor Orban (the prime-minister of Hungary) invokes the hostility between the Ottomans and Hungarians in the 16th century as a justification for not opening the borders to Syrian refugees, suggesting that Christians and Muslims cannot co-exist peacefully ([Tharoor, 2015](#)).

This project questions such assumption about the social legacy of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans by addressing the following questions:

- Is there a socio-economic legacy of the Ottoman Empire today that goes beyond language, cuisine and architecture?
- If there is a legacy, what are the mechanisms whereby a political entity such as the Ottoman Empire that ceased to exist in 1922 has had a lasting legacy?

In this project, I provide a more nuanced picture of the Ottoman Empire than previous works, by arguing that the Ottoman Empire was not everywhere the same. The Ottoman state was much more present in certain parts of the Balkans such as Rumelia (territories that now belong to Hungary, Serbia, Albania, Macedonia, Greece, Croatia), as opposed to the Danubian region (Wallachia and Moldavia), which is now part of Romania, Moldova and Ukraine. This is evidenced by the assymmetric geographic spread of Ottoman bridges, Sufi monasteries (*tekkes*), Turkish baths (*hammams*), mosques and inns (*caravanserais*): they are present in Rumelia, but completely absent in Wallachia and Moldavia. Similarly, the legal status of different provinces (whether a vassal or regular province) meant that regular provinces featured full Ottoman bureaucracy, which over time became highly specialized and complex, while vassal provinces featured a local bureaucracy which was frequently

affected by the venality of tax collectors.

As far as the notion of *vassalge* is concerned, the Ottoman historiography draws a clear dividing line between regular provinces and vassal states³. The former can be characterized as Ottoman classical forms of government, while the latter mostly emerged after the second half of the sixteenth century (Kármán & Kunčević, 2013). Vassal or satellite states⁴ were territories that kept some of their administrative structure from before the Ottoman conquest⁵. According to Kołodziejczyk (2013), if one were to use modern terminology, the idea of a vassal status should be best understood as an element on a continuum between annexation and alliance.

2 Literature Review

The literature of colonial institutions and persistence of legacies is relevant for this project. Much of the economics and political science literatures argue that social norms and beliefs are direct channels through which historical background and historical legacies persist (Acemoğlu *et al.*, 2001; Arrow, 1963; Banerjee & Iyer, 2005; Dell, 2010; Dippel, 2014; Greif, 2006; North, 1990; Nunn, 2009; Patterson, 2013; Putnam *et al.*, 1993)⁶. Similarly, there is ample evidence to suggest that politics matters for development (Acemoğlu *et al.*, 2014; Dell *et al.*, 2005; Paige, 1998; Udry & Goldstein, 2008). Nevertheless, the question of the impact of historical legacies on corruption in Eastern Europe has not received sufficient attention in the literature. While there has been some historical and anthropological work on the legacy of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans (Buchanan, 2007; Brown, 1996; Jelavich, 1983; Inalcik, 1996; Todorova, 1996), there is little work that investigates such legacy empirically. Some recent work examines the impact of historical legacies on institutional development of Eastern European economies (Dimitrova-Grajzl, 2007). There is also some recent research on the effect of historical spatial proximity on cultural transmission (Grosjean, 2011b) and the persistence of former Ottoman institutions on financial sector development today (Grosjean, 2011a). In addition,

³In Ottoman terminology, such states were called *tebaʿa*, *tebaʿiyyet*, *hımāye*, *ʿināyet*, *emn u amān* or *ʿahd u mīsaq* (variations of words, which mean "protection" and "treaty").

⁴European literature has typically used the terms "tributary" and "vassal" states interchangeably to refer to these provinces.

⁵This is to say that some provinces were part of the Ottoman Empire proper, while other provinces had a "vassal" status. Some states such as Bulgaria, the Eastern Hungarian Kingdom, the Serbian Despotate and the Principality of Serbia and the Kingdom of Bosnia were vassals before being absorbed entirely or partially into the Empire.

⁶Nunn & Wantchekon (2011) identify cultural norms and formal institutions as two separate channels of the effect of slave trade in Africa. Tabellini (2010) argues that cultural norms relate to historical education and historical political institutions.

a recent article by Becker *et al.* (2016), focusing on Eastern Europe, shows that individuals living on the former Habsburg territory tend to have higher levels of trust and lower levels of corruption. The implication of their finding is that individuals residing in former Ottoman provinces trust institutions less and are more corrupt⁷. Nevertheless, on a theoretical level, such research does not take into consideration the variety of formal and informal political institutions that the Ottomans set up in the different regions of Eastern Europe, which could explain the asymmetric levels of development today. On an empirical level, such research is usually based on aggregate comparisons of the Ottoman legacy, taking the Russian and Habsburg territories as baselines (Becker *et al.*, 2016; Dimitrova-Grajzl, 2007; Grosjean, 2011a; Karaja, 2014) and does not exploit the subnational variation in colonial institutions within the same empire. This project uses variation in the assignment of vassal state status and construction of elements of Ottoman infrastructure (such as bridges, inns, Sufi monasteries, mosques etc.) to identify vertical channels of transmission for the legacy of the Ottoman Empire.

3 Project 1: Macro-Analysis of the Legacy of the Ottoman Empire

Becker *et al.* (2016) find that the Habsburg Empire still affects trust and corruption in local public services in Central and Eastern Europe today. According to their characterization, the Habsburg Empire was "fairly honest, quite hard-working and generally high-minded", in contrast to the Ottoman and Russian Empires in Eastern Europe (Becker *et al.*, 2016, p. 41). This attitude contributed to the trust of its inhabitants in the respectability of government institutions, which survived even socialism. The authors use the micro dataset of the 2006 Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) that provides measures of trust and corruption in Eastern European countries. The authors focus on the 17 countries that comprise the successor states of the Habsburg Empire and their neighboring countries. The first specification compares individuals living in communities located within the Habsburg Empire to the individuals outside (in the Ottoman and Russian Empires). The procedure is visually depicted in figure 2. The replicated results are also presented in table 1.

The second procedure is a border specification, which compares individuals living in commu-

⁷ Becker *et al.*'s (2016) measure of corruption specifically refers to individual perceptions about corruption. Corruption however is a very broad term. Kunicova (2006, p. 141) for example, argues that "the term 'corruption' subsumes many activities - from bribery, kickbacks and the embezzlement of public funds, through special interest legislation and illegal campaign finance, to vote-buying and electoral fraud". Many analytical studies refer to corruption as any activity of corrupt rent seeking, which revolves around the misuse of public office for private gain (Kunicova, 2006; Johnston, 2006; Treisman, 2000).

Table 1: Habsburgs vs. Ottomans and Russians: Becker et al. (2016: p. 58)

	Becker et al. (2016: p. 58)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Logit Trust in Courts	Logit Trust in Police	Logit Bribes to Courts	Logit Bribes to traffic police
main				
habsburg	0.141** (0.067)	0.311*** (0.064)	-0.603*** (0.100)	-0.586*** (0.088)
ageB	-0.003** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.012*** (0.001)
male	-0.074** (0.031)	0.003 (0.031)	0.014 (0.040)	0.087** (0.038)
native language being an official language	0.198** (0.095)	0.217** (0.091)	-0.201 (0.136)	-0.235* (0.130)
member of an ethnic minority	-0.016 (0.102)	-0.028 (0.091)	-0.289** (0.111)	-0.335** (0.104)
q706==atheistic/agnostic/none	-0.008 (0.064)	-0.101 (0.063)	0.187** (0.091)	0.135 (0.085)
q706==buddhist	0.335 (0.760)	-0.096 (0.438)	0.099 (0.464)	-0.417 (0.547)
q706==jewish	-0.438 (0.306)	-0.064 (0.405)	0.554 (0.399)	0.684 (0.442)
q706==muslim	-0.184* (0.107)	0.254** (0.110)	0.532*** (0.146)	0.360** (0.132)
q706==other	0.019 (0.120)	-0.201* (0.111)	0.275 (0.187)	0.262 (0.180)
going to courts for civil matter, past 12 months			1.069*** (0.087)	
interaction with road police, past 12 months				1.203*** (0.066)
Observations	15830	16232	16794	16821
Adjusted R^2				
Pseudo R^2	0.002	0.005	0.023	0.045
chi2	29.077	75.197	208.060	534.060
N_clust	850.000	850.000	850.000	850.000
ll	-23825.113	-25123.226	-15699.670	-18374.856

Coefficients and standard errors from ordered logit (ologit) estimation. Full sample. Dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is answer to the question ‘To what extent do you trust the following institutions?’ Column (1): The courts. Column (2): The police. Answer categories are: 1 = Complete distrust; 2 = Some distrust; 3 = Neither trust nor distrust; 4 = Some trust; 5 = Complete trust. Category 6 = Difficult to say set to missing in regressions. Dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is answer to the question ‘In your opinion, how often is it necessary for people like you to have to make unofficial payments/gifts in these situations?’ Column (3): Interact with the courts. Column (4): Interact with the traffic police. Answer categories are: 1 = Never; 2 = Seldom; 3 = Sometimes; 4 = Usually; 5 = Always. Standard errors (clustered at the level of PSUs) in parentheses: *significance at 10, **, ***1%. Source. Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) 2006;

Figure 2: Habsburgs vs. Ottomans and Russians



nities located within 200 km of each other on either side of the long-gone Habsburg border. This identification exploits the fact that the former Habsburg border cuts straight through five countries today - Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia and Ukraine. Communities on the two sides of the former border have been sharing a common statehood for generations (Becker *et al.*, 2016, p. 42). The procedure is visually depicted in figure 3. The replicated results are also presented in table 2. Results from both tables corroborate that modern respondents who are located in former Habsburg territories are more likely to claim that they trust courts and police and to think that it is rarely necessary to make an unofficial payment to courts and to traffic police.

There are two important limitations of Becker *et al.* (2016). First, they examine differences in responses between Habsburgs and non-Habsburgs under one border configuration although such borders changed with time. I plan to examine the robustness of their results in future iterations of this project⁸. Second, the implication of their statement: the Habsburg Empire was 'fairly honest,


⁸I completed the expansion of the Ottoman Empire Project (Popescu, 2015), which contains probably the most accurate borders using tens of maps of the Ottoman Empire from the University of Chicago, Ottoman Archives Map collections and various historical atlases. I plan to create shape files for the Republic of Venice and for the Habsburg

Table 2: Habsburgs vs. Ottomans and Russians within 200km: Becker et al. (2016: p. 59)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Trust in Courts	Trust in Police	Bribes to Courts	Bribes to traffic police
main				
habsburg	0.229*	0.169	-0.373*	-0.342**
	(0.132)	(0.109)	(0.205)	(0.174)
ageB	-0.000	0.009***	-0.006*	-0.018***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)
male	-0.018	-0.035	0.026	0.275***
	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.097)	(0.080)
native language being an official language	-0.240	0.004	0.030	0.116
	(0.188)	(0.152)	(0.311)	(0.274)
member of an ethnic minority	-0.330**	-0.309**	-0.149	-0.178
	(0.135)	(0.125)	(0.203)	(0.171)
q706==atheistic/agnostic/none	-0.567**	-0.528**	-0.223	-0.144
	(0.210)	(0.173)	(0.300)	(0.258)
q706==buddhist	-1.809**	-2.135**	0.440	-14.022***
	(0.694)	(0.944)	(0.942)	(0.587)
q706==jewish	0.239	1.005	-12.717***	-1.085*
	(1.235)	(1.201)	(0.561)	(0.643)
q706==muslim	0.575**	0.770***	-0.000	0.171
	(0.275)	(0.228)	(0.364)	(0.317)
q706==other	0.142	0.255	1.091**	0.686
	(0.418)	(0.408)	(0.499)	(0.437)
country== 11.0000	-0.247	0.174	-0.425	0.030
	(0.161)	(0.151)	(0.274)	(0.224)
country== 12.0000	-0.398**	0.137	0.422	0.276
	(0.188)	(0.175)	(0.267)	(0.263)
country== 13.0000	-1.091***	-0.438**	0.308	0.280
	(0.161)	(0.155)	(0.275)	(0.238)
country== 17.0000	-0.726**	-0.857**	1.801***	1.680***
	(0.354)	(0.295)	(0.491)	(0.509)
going to courts for civil matter, past 12 months			0.936***	
			(0.194)	
interaction with road police, past 12 months				1.104***
				(0.142)
Observations	3359	3409	3572	3574
Adjusted R^2				
Pseudo R^2	0.019	0.015	0.038	0.054
chi2	80.674	88.478	617.763	794.037
N_clust	180.000	180.000	180.000	180.000
ll	-5001.137	-5251.430	-2671.828	-3400.409

Coefficients and standard errors from ordered logit (ologit) estimation. Border sample: respondents living within 200 km of respondents on the other side of the former Habsburg border in those five countries that are partly Habsburg. Dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is answer to the question ‘To what extent do you trust the following institutions?’ Column (1): The courts. Column (2): The police. Answer categories are: 1 = Complete distrust; 2 = Some distrust; 3 = Neither trust nor distrust; 4 = Some trust; 5 = Complete trust. Category 6 = Difficult to say set to missing in regressions. Dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is answer to the question ‘In your opinion, how often is it necessary for people like you to have to make unofficial payments/gifts in these situations?’ Column (3): Interact with the courts. Column (4): Interact with the traffic police. Answer categories are: 1 = Never; 2 = Seldom; 3 = Sometimes; 4 = Usually; 5 = Always. Standard errors (clustered at the level of PSUs) in parentheses: *significance at 10, **, ***1%. Source: Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) 2006;

Figure 3: Habsburgs vs. Ottomans and Russians



quite hard-working and generally high-minded’, in contrast to the Ottoman and Russian Empires in Eastern Europe (Becker *et al.*, 2016, p. 41) is that both the Ottomans and Russian were not honest, not hard-working and not high minded. In order to refute such claim, I concentrate on the Ottomans by challenging the aforementioned claim and by exploring variation in institutional design in the Ottoman Empire and its socio-political legacy.

The variation in institutional design emerges from an extension to Becker *et al.*’s (2016) analyses, where I examined differences between Habsburgs and Ottomans at a subnational level. The results of such extensions are presented in tables 3 and 4. While no coefficient was calculated for the trust variable in table 3 because those countries were just Habsburg, Ottoman and Russian (no variation whatsoever under the border configuration proposed by Becker *et al.* (2016)), the coefficients for trust for Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia and Ukraine are the ones that are worth investigating further. In some of these countries, the difference in trust between Habsburgs and Ottomans is

Empire. Such a task should be considerably easier since I can use the North-Western border of the Ottoman Empire as a starting point, which will reduce substantially the amount of time and effort required for the speedy completion of these side projects.

statistically significant, while in others it is not. While there may be a variety of reasons why the difference is not significant (including lack of statistical power due to the low number of observations or omitted variables such as duration of Ottoman rule, population migration and population changes, government performance, etc.), there are two important variables, which may cause their results to be biased and inefficiently estimated: Ottoman state presence and provincial legal status vis-a-vis the center.

The Ottoman Empire varied when it comes to state presence, which could be operationalized as infrastructure (bridges, castles, public baths, public shelters), religious buildings (mosques and monasteries) and educational buildings (schools)⁹. A cursory glance at figure 4, shows an asymmetric distribution of Ottoman infrastructure in certain parts of the empire. For example, regular Ottoman provinces (which are now on the current territories of Macedonia, Bulgaria, Albania, Greece, Bosnia and Herzegovina, etc.) are more likely to have had Ottoman institutions such as Islamic schools (*medreses*), mosques, inns (*caravanserai*), Sufi monasteries (*tekke*) or elements of Ottoman infrastructure (bridges, Turkish baths, castles). Since Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) 2006 features respondents in all the aforementioned countries, I am planning to examine horizontal mechanisms for the transmission of trust.

3.1 Hypotheses

The main hypothesis purported in this project is that lack of state supervision leads to excessive taxation during Ottoman times (over-grazing). Excessive taxation has affected long-term development, which is potentially responsible for lack of trust today and for perception about high incidence of corruption. In order to test such logic, I plan to examine the effect of proximity to different elements of Ottoman infrastructure such as the ones enumerated above. Ottoman infrastructure such as Islamic schools, Sufi monasteries, inns, bridges are a proxy for Ottoman state presence. Places that are close to elements of Ottoman elements of infrastructure are much more likely to have benefited from close state supervision so that over-grazing and tax evasion were prevented. I plan to georeference such elements, which are visible in figure 4, calculate distances to the location of modern

⁹There is a simple logic behind this: where Ottoman infrastructure, religious and educational buildings were/are present, the Ottomans were also physically present. With the Ottoman physical presence, a whole range of complex institutions came along.

Table 3: Extension: Trust in Courts - Analysis by country

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Albania	Belarus	Bosnia	Bulgaria	Croatia	Czechia	Macedonia	Hungary
trust in courts								
habsburg	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
ageB	0.002	-0.004	-0.005	0.002	-0.000	-0.005	-0.002	0.007
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
male	0.069	0.074	-0.126	-0.107	-0.265**	0.052	-0.183	0.045
	(0.106)	(0.135)	(0.136)	(0.147)	(0.102)	(0.133)	(0.135)	(0.121)
native language	1.174*	0.025	-0.586*	0.113	0.096	0.222	-0.261	0.125
	(0.650)	(0.547)	(0.345)	(0.590)	(0.606)	(0.618)	(0.293)	(0.474)
member of an ethnic minority	-0.226	0.500	-0.681	0.439	0.426	0.072	-0.365	-0.019
	(0.424)	(0.368)	(0.640)	(0.316)	(0.348)	(0.378)	(0.279)	(0.385)
q706==atheistic/agnostic/none	-0.551*	-0.870**	-0.690	-0.387	-0.404	0.136	-0.370	0.145
	(0.311)	(0.286)	(0.451)	(0.313)	(0.280)	(0.188)	(0.450)	(0.200)
q706==buddhist	0.000	-0.496	1.069	0.000	0.000	3.639***	0.000	-14.624***
	(.)	(5.015)	(0.737)	(.)	(.)	(1.095)	(.)	(0.973)
q706==jewish	0.000	-0.040	-14.482***	0.000	-13.622***	-0.694	1.338***	-1.883**
	(.)	(0.344)	(0.943)	(.)	(1.107)	(0.456)	(0.350)	(0.819)
q706==muslim	0.014	-2.036*	-0.305	-0.288	0.534	-0.889**	0.148	0.000
	(0.279)	(1.141)	(0.234)	(0.639)	(0.431)	(0.393)	(0.414)	(.)
q706==other	-1.743**	-0.427	-0.533	-0.115	0.168	0.135	0.000	0.035
	(0.560)	(0.733)	(0.494)	(0.776)	(0.416)	(0.252)	(.)	(0.412)
Observations	965	910	952	934	920	943	938	943
Adjusted R^2								
Pseudo R^2	0.007	0.008	0.009	0.002	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.004
chi2	18.486	18.266	353.155	.	221.306	.	.	256.877
N_clust	50.000	50.000	50.000	50.000	50.000	50.000	50.000	50.000
ll	-1367.763	-1395.823	-1351.332	-1283.056	-1276.766	-1361.677	-1158.699	-1426.128

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.001$


Table 4: Extension: Trust in Courts - Analysis by country

	(1) Moldova	(2) Montenegro	(3) Poland	(4) Romania	(5) Serbia	(6) Slovakia	(7) Slovenia	(8) Ukraine	(9) Russia
trust in courts									
habsburg	0.000 (.)	0.386* (0.204)	-0.160 (0.235)	-0.086 (0.271)	0.480** (0.221)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.497 (0.466)	0.000 (.)
ageB	0.018*** (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.005)	0.003 (0.004)	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.007* (0.003)	-0.009** (0.004)	-0.012** (0.004)
male	-0.149 (0.137)	-0.135 (0.140)	0.055 (0.100)	0.103 (0.123)	-0.046 (0.124)	0.052 (0.126)	-0.140 (0.129)	-0.130 (0.136)	-0.203 (0.145)
native language	0.644** (0.258)	-0.602* (0.332)	-0.504 (0.511)	-0.426* (0.241)	0.157 (0.195)	0.461** (0.187)	0.162 (0.417)	-0.188 (0.196)	-0.113 (0.310)
member of an ethnic minority	0.566** (0.251)	-0.428* (0.239)	-0.396 (0.333)	-0.211 (0.277)	-0.216 (0.186)	0.499** (0.218)	-0.203 (0.354)	-0.622** (0.284)	0.042 (0.235)
q706==atheistic	-0.927* (0.543)	-0.619** (0.274)	0.146 (0.621)	-0.120 (0.592)	-0.411 (0.334)	-0.005 (0.186)	0.057 (0.170)	-0.253 (0.262)	-0.360 (0.261)
q706==buddhist	0.000 (.)	-1.148** (0.387)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	-14.759*** (0.737)	36.240*** (1.076)	-0.485 (1.836)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
q706==jewish	0.384 (0.288)	15.225*** (0.701)	0.000 (.)	-0.893*** (0.234)	-14.661*** (0.699)	1.001*** (0.277)	-1.024*** (0.135)	-1.396 (1.190)	0.000 (.)
q706==muslim	0.053 (0.379)	0.563* (0.306)	0.301 (1.021)	0.951 (4.241)	0.445 (0.544)	0.000 (.)	-0.189 (0.527)	0.343 (1.181)	0.212 (0.348)
q706==other	-2.162** (0.867)	-0.102 (0.730)	0.702 (0.983)	0.032 (0.272)	1.040*** (0.158)	-0.427 (0.609)	0.433 (0.272)	0.369 (0.532)	-2.695** (1.134)
Observations	907	910	937	972	924	922	896	946	911
Adjusted R^2	0.022	0.018	0.002	0.003	0.007	0.008	0.004	0.010	0.013
Pseudo R^2	.	.	4.774	.	1065.998	.	.	22.090	20.642
chi2	50.000	50.000	50.000	50.000	50.000	50.000	50.000	50.000	50.000
N_clust	-1315.966	-1408.959	-1428.929	-1431.460	-1245.008	-1342.882	-1336.034	-1242.274	-1382.302
ll									

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 4: Ottoman state presence. Source: Kiel, 1993



survey respondents using GIS software and use proximity as an independent variable.

3.2 Confounding factors: Legacy of Communism

One major confounding factor is experience with communism. All the countries under scrutiny experienced decades of communism. It could be the case that different people within countries might have been treated differently by repressive leaders or political parties. If people have negative experience with communism, they are more likely to have negative "feelings" towards communism and more likely to have passed those feelings on to their offspring¹⁰. I plan to check for such a possibility by using the following questions from LITS, which reflect to some extent people's experience with communism. If the different communist leaders treated people or their ancestors differently, that is likely to be reflected in respondents' answers to the following:

- Q.7.02. Have you or any of your parents ever been a member of the Communist Party? (both LITS 2006 and 2010)
- Q 3.01.a The economic situation in this country is better today than around 1989 (LITS 2006)
- Q 3.01.b The political situation in this country is better today than around 1989 (LITS 2006)
- Q 3.01.c There is less corruption now than around 1989 (LITS 2006)

4 Project 2: Micro-Analysis of the Legacy of the Ottoman Empire in Romania


The second project is an analysis of the Ottoman legacy in Romania. Romania constitutes an excellent place for the examination of the asymmetric institutional legacies of the Ottoman Empire that I purport in this project. Part of the country (Dobrogea) was a regular province, while part of the country (Wallachia and Moldavia) had a vassal status. One outcome that I plan to examine is development and one proxy for that is access to education¹¹. The following subsections explore in

¹⁰This is in line with recent work by Lupu & Peisakhin (2017), according to whom past episodes of political violence leave a lasting legacy on identities, attitudes and behaviors.

¹¹I am currently in the processes of digitizing (scanning, image processing for OCR optimization [page splitting, deskewing, adding/removing borders, etc] and OCR) the first census for the territories that are closest to the borders that define modern-day Romania - *Recensământul general al populației României din 29 decembrie 1930*, volume 3 on Education (Manuilă, 1938). Using census data will allow me to overcome the number of observations problem which emerges with the utilization of the LITS public opinion data. Similarly, using data that goes as far back as 1930 and comparing it with modern-day census data, allows me to see whether the hypothesized Ottoman institutional effect on development survived communism, persisting until today.

more detail the horizontal channels of transmission. Wallachia, Moldavia (vassal states), Dobrogea (regular province) and the other regular provinces are visually represented in figure 6.

Figure 5: Ottoman Institutions



4.1 Vassal vs. regular states

Different scholars provide different reasons for the existence of vassal states. For example, İnalçık (1973, p. 35) argues that some provinces had a vassal status because they were considered too expensive to establish direct Ottoman rule in, especially in a "a completely foreign country on the far side of the Danube". Rather than disturbing local structures of power, the Ottomans used these local structures of power strategically to rule and collect taxes. Similarly, using local structures of power would have led to Ottomans being perceived less as alien intruders by the local population. In exchange for military protection and some ability to self-govern, such states had their ruler nominated by the Ottoman sultan (Papp, 2013). They were subordinated to the Sublime Porte by providing a series of compulsory services, in addition to the compulsory tribute.

The Ottoman Empire had a complicated system of vassal states with different levels of auton-

omy: for example, Kołodziejczyk (2013, p. 430) argues that the vassal status could be defined by obligations such as: payment of tribute, military assistance, *hutbe*¹², etc. Nevertheless, the system of vassal states was an effective administrative method for integrating various Muslim and non-Muslim autonomous communities without forced attempts of uniformization (Papp, 2013). Such a system also granted merchant communities from places like Venice, Genova, France, England, the Netherlands special privileges. The granting of privileges was done through documents that were written in the pattern of *beṛat* or diploma (Papp, 2013). While some scholars like Papp (2013) argue that the relationship between the Sublime Porte and Muslim communities (1) and between the Sublime Porte and non-Muslim communities (2) should be treated separately, by the sixteenth century the differences between the two communities are no longer reflected in Ottoman official documents; leaders of Muslim communities receive similar letters of appointment to the leaders of Christian communities¹³. In the next section, I examine two vassal states from the Balkans for the purpose of illustrating how the sultan protected the rights of the inhabitants of those territories.

4.2 Ottoman Vassal States: The Example of Wallachia and Moldavia

Moldavia and Wallachia are the best examples of Christian vassal states in the Balkans¹⁴. The Ottoman project of power in these provinces entailed that local customs (local administration, taxation, leaders) and religion were protected. Historical sources indicate that Moldavia and Wallachia made a payment to the Ottoman Empire for the first time around 1350 in exchange for protection. In describing the level of autonomy lost, a chronicler from the 18th century (Cantemir, 1973, p. 125) notes: "Under his son, Bogdan, the glory of Moldavia went away, the *absolute power of the prince* and the *right to make peace or war*; related to this, this happened after the ruler made an agreement with the Turks and promised to pay the sultan four thousand golden coins, as a sign of recognition of vassalage¹⁵". Such agreement represents a reduction in control over international relations: the

¹²This is the obligation of Muslim vassal provinces to mention the name of the sultan during *hutbe*, which is a sermon that is delivered at the noon prayer on Fridays or on certain other occasions.

¹³The typical document type that was used to define the vassal relationship was the *ʿahdnāme*. The same name was used for documents for trade agreements and peace treaties (*capitulatio*s) with other sovereign entities such as the Habsburg Empire, Poland, France or Venice. Sometimes, variations of *ʿahdnāme* such as *sevğend-nāme*, *şulh-nāme*, *muʿāhede* would be used. The *ʿahdnāmes* could be of various types in accordance with their purpose and the Sublime Porte's relationship with the communities to which they applied.

¹⁴Another notable example of a vassal state is the Khanate of Crimea. Other regions such as the Eastern Hungarian Kingdom or Kingdom of Bosnia were vassals before being absorbed entirely or partially into the Empire.

¹⁵The original text in Latin reads: "Disparuit illico sub ipsius filio Bogdano praecipuus gloriae Moldavicae radius, absoluta Principis potestas, eique annexa belli pacisque iura, posteaquam Turcis fidem suam princeps obstrinxisset, et in feudi cognitionem quatuor aureorum millia Sultano quotannis solvere promississet." (Cantemir, 1973, p. 124)

ability to wage war or make peace, the ability to send emissaries and royal succession. On an internal level, however, both Wallachia and Moldavia preserved some state autonomy at the level of land ownership, army, financial and administrative structure.

Institutions in Wallachia and Moldavia and possibilities for abuse

Government in Wallachia and Moldavia was made out of a prince or *voievode*¹⁶ and a ruling council consisting of landed nobility (*boyars*). Princes were living in their palaces, called *kurte*, in Bucharest (in the case of Wallachia) and Jassy (in the case of Moldavia), the main administrative centers. In the absence of the prince, landed nobles were in charge of government, as illustrated by an edict from 1691 (see document 7 in the appendix). Initially, the prince's position would simply be transmitted from father to son, subsequently, the landed nobles would vote on the prince with the approval of the Sublime Porte and later on, positions of princes would be available for sale from the Ottoman vizier for a period of three years. The landed nobles would hold different public administration positions for the good functioning of internal affairs or the good functioning of the court. The income of public administrators came from the inhabitants of Wallachia and Moldavia (tax collectors were allowed to keep a tenth of money collected) and not from central coffers. Sometimes, income could also come from the prince in the form of allocation of land or tax exemptions (Stoicescu, 1968, p. 131). One representative of the landed nobility from each province would act as an ambassador (*kapukethüdası*) in Istanbul.

Profitability of public administrative positions

Stoicescu (1968) argues that the 17th century represents a fierce struggle for taking on public administrative positions, which becomes the main goal for parties of landed nobles. One chronicler (Radu Popescu) states that once the Cantacuzino family was in power, his personal clique of landed nobles wanted to "remove all the boyars in the royal court, to take all their positions away and to give positions to their kind, so that there is nobody else [to collect taxes]" ¹⁷ (Stoicescu, 1968, p. 132). Similarly, to express how lucrative public administration positions were and how rich public administrators were, the same chronicler mentions that during the rule of Constantin Brâncoveanu,

¹⁶The word "voievode", stems from the origin of voyevat in ancient Slavic, which means "fight" and denotes "commander."

¹⁷The original text in Romanian reads: "să depărteze pre toți boiarii de pre lângă curte și să ia boieriile să, le dia la ai lor, ca să fie numai ei." (Stoicescu, 1968, p. 132)

the administrators closest to the prince were "full of money, villages, vineyards, tax exemptions, no loans" ¹⁸ (Stoicescu, 1968, p. 132). The interest in the public administrative positions also explains the arduous struggle of the landed nobles from Moldavia and Wallachia against the princes who were sometimes bringing their own clientele from Istanbul. Such clientele subsequently acquired public administrative positions, who were benefitting most from the exploitation of peasants.

Evidence for abuses against peasants

In good years, community pressure would ensure tax compliance; in bad years however, the difficulty of paying one's own taxes or a share of other people's taxes could lead to a vicious circle, as more taxpayers would flee. For example, a 1654 document reveals that while collecting taxes from Dolj county, Diicu Buicescu, a *spătar*¹⁹, "being a strong boyar...put a lot of fiscal pressure on the village of Craiovița, until villagers could not pay taxes anymore and they ran away" ²⁰ (Stoicescu, 1968, p. 145). In a similar vein, in an edict from 1664 (see document 9 in the appendix), the Ottoman sultan orders judges from the administrative divisions on the shores of Danube to catch the inhabitants who ran away from Wallachia and who settled in their territory, most likely due to excessive taxation. Therefore, fiscal exploitation could go so far as inhabitants leave their villages. In such cases, landed nobles who were in charge of collecting taxes had to pay out of pocket for the peasants who ran away.

Reporting cases of over-grazing was not an option for peasants. For example, the anonymous author of the *Chronicle of the Ghiculești* (*Cronica Ghiculeștilor*) narrates how during Ioan Mavrocordat (7 October 1711-16 November 1711), the grand landed nobles over-taxed the peasants ("au sfeterisit mulți bani"). The prince got very upset (upon learning about it) but he forgot about it after he received gifts from the very taxes collected ("dar totul s-a îndreptat cu darurile date din banii sfeterisiți") (Camariano & Camariano-Cioran, 1965, p. 589). Similarly, in the 17th century when public administrators were abusive and peasants were complaining to the prince, the prince could sometimes, simply reject their complaints on the grounds that that landed noble was not a grand public administrator²¹ (Stoicescu, 1968).

¹⁸The original text in Romanian reads: "plini de bani, sate, de vii, fără bir, fără împrumutări" (Stoicescu, 1968, p. 132)

¹⁹A "spătar" is a public administrative position.

²⁰The original text in Romanian reads: "fiind un boier cîrmuitor și puternic..., a strîmtorat satul Craiovița cu biruri și cu dăjdii pînă, cînd n-a (mai) putut să plătească birurile și au fugit săteni" (Stoicescu, 1968, p. 145)

²¹For example, on April 3, 1611, when Badea the postelnic's neighbor complain that they were tricked by him into

4.3 Ottoman Regular provinces: The Example of Dobrogea

Dobrogea was a regular Ottoman province, part of the Silistra sancak²² of the vilayet²³ of Rumelia. It is situated on the terminal segment of the Danube, in proximity to the Black Sea. The Silistra unit was a strategic position to ensure better protection of Istanbul and constituted logistical support for strengthening the Ottoman advance towards central Europe. Dobrogea was conquered by the Ottomans in 1420 and it was under Ottoman control until the 19th century. During Bayazid II, Dobrogea was under the jurisdiction of a provincial governor (*sancakbey*) and then under the jurisdiction of a local judge (*kadi*), who were appointed by the center. Barkey (2005) argues that the local judges as the members of the judicial system were the representatives of the center in the empire. The judges were acting on behalf of the Ottoman Empire to maintain a bifurcated state: both a religious Islamic and secular bureaucratic entity. The judges therefore were the key interlocutor between the state and the people and between "religious administration and the interpretation of religious meanings at the local level" (Barkey, 2005, p. 11). After 1599, Silistra becomes an eyalet (state) mostly for military reasons: better protection against the Kazak raids, who were aggressively attacking Dobrogea, starting with the 16th century.

After conquest, all these territories in Dobrogea were reorganized in new administrative units for fiscal purposes. The practice of tax-farming was in place throughout regular Ottoman provinces. For example, three localities, Tulcea, Isaccea and Măcin were part of a tax-farming region that is valued between 20,000 and 100,000 akçe²⁴ (*zeamet*). Even when assessed individually, the tax (*cizye*) was paid communally; the entire community was responsible for the taxes for all people listed in the assessment register.

4.4 Institutions meant to prevent tax-collection fraud over-grazing

Tax-farming in Dobrogea, as part of the Ottoman Empire, was created with many checks-and-balances in place to prevent over-grazing, extortion and tax-collection corruption. Farming the revenue, that is contracting for its collection, was called undertaking (*iltizam*) and the contractor was

paying excessive taxes, the prince investigated with his entire ruling council, that it wasn't Badea, the postelnic who committed abuse against these neighbors ("că nu a fost Badea postelnic un dregător ca să facă silnicie acestor vecini"). The neighbors lose the suit and are taken out of the council and humiliated and beaten up ("scoși cu mare rușine și bătuți") (Stoicescu, 1968, p. 182)

²²A sancak is an administrative unit of the Ottoman Empire.

²³A vilayet is a major administrative district or province with its own governor.

²⁴Akçe is Ottoman currency.

an undertaker (*mültezim*). Awards of *iltizams*, appointments of officials, issuance of collection orders, deposit of revenues in the treasury and submission of paper accounts were all meticulously recorded. The records were checked whenever a problem arose. Tax collection proceeded in accordance with registers (*tahrir defters*), revenue laws (*kanun*) and local customs (*adet*) and tax payers were free to complain to the government if tax farmers exceeded those limits. Every undertaker accounting registers were inspected at the end of his term. Undertakers and officials could be dismissed for oppression or extortion, for not adhering to proper procedure, or for not fulfilling their contracted obligations. Any ideas that revenues were up for grabs was strongly discouraged. (Darling, 1996, p. 124).

The Ottoman financial organization (*mukataa*) was complex, involving a high number of officials with different functions. One group of officials was in charge of managing and operating the revenue source. The man in charge was an agent (*emin*), who functioned as head of the enterprise, collector of the revenues, or manager of lands. The official in charge functioned as a supervisor and decision-maker for the *mukataa*. He needed to ensure that accurate records were kept and oversee revenue submission. A scribe (*katib*) was responsible for record-keeping. The inspector (*nazir*) was responsible for appraising the correctness and completeness of the tax-farming accounts, demand detailed registers from the scribes, go over the accounts in the presence of another inspector (*müfettiş*), sign and seal them as proof of accuracy and send them on to the capital. The inspector was not to allow collection of money by anyone without a permit (*berat*). Prohibition against collection of state revenues without an authorization is frequent in judicial registers. This rule was so stringent that in 1632-33 one agent allowed himself to get in trouble for not having made his collection; for a whole year he waited unavailingly for an authorization, but without it he did not dare to proceed. Possession of an authorization identified the official collector to those from whom he collected revenue and to provincial and central officials (Darling, 1996, p. 196). The two types of inspectors (*nazir* and *müfettiş*) were also meant to ensure that tax farming rights were awarded only to suitable and capable people, able to do the work of collecting and bear the financial responsibility involved. Finally, a guarantor (*kefil*) was responsible for guaranteeing payment for all or part of the sum contracted for, in the event that the revenue source proved insufficient or the contractor defaulted.

Except the witness, the inspector and the guarantor, all officials could be recompensed from the revenues of the undertaking and as recipients of state funds, they had to be recorded in the finance department's registers. Three years was the normal term for a single undertaking, after which tax farming rights were again offered for bidding. Any financially responsible person could bid on a tax farm. The bidder and other *iltizam* employees could come from all branches of society: bureaucrats, religious personnel, military men, local elites, merchants, well-to-do farmers, widows, tribal sheikhs, members of the non-Muslim communities, even slaves.

Ottoman subjects were able to protest the actions of governments and make their wishes known from within the system (Darling, 1996). If a tax collector attempted to collect more than the amount written, 17th century taxpayers could petition for a sort of restraining order, enforceable by the soldiers of the governor. The registers in the capital were checked and the order specified precisely what could be collected. Alternatively, excessive collections might be reported by taxpayers to the judge, who could then petition for a similar order. The petition could become a tool against the powerful, transforming common people from victims into actors, legitimizing them as essential parts of the political system and delegitimizing corrupt officials, oppressive landlords and bandits.


To summarize, regular provinces featured a whole range of bureaucratic positions for tax-collection: tax operators who were appointed using a bidding system taking into account both the money offered and competence, inspectors for tax operators, record-keepers, several independent inspectors to check the accuracy of financial records and oversee revenue submission, guarantors who were guaranteeing payment for the entire sum contracted for, independent judges to adjudicate complaints from bureaucrats or peasants, etc.

4.5 Comparison

Therefore, one key difference between the vassal state and a regular province is the existence of a complex bureaucracy with very clear division of labor, that was specifically meant to prevent over-grazing, tax evasion and fiscal fraud. The Ottoman state also provided clear means for appeal, whereby people could submit a complaint to a local judge, who represented their connection point to the far-away imperial authority. The power vested in the judge allowed the Ottoman Empire to protect the legitimacy of the tax farming system while also securing the empire's tax base. The indirect consequence of the vassal status, which entailed local autonomy and protection of local canon

is the development of two powerful classes in Wallachia and Moldavia: the landed nobles (boyars) and the church. Getting public administration positions was extremely desirable for landed nobles, who by acquiring public positions, were also acquiring tax collection rights. The apparatus for tax collection, while not completely non-existent, was never quite as complex to detect, prevent and punish over-grazing, fiscal fraud and tax evasion. I am arguing that this is probably the key difference between vassal states and regular provinces that could have affected long-term development. Figure 6 summarizes the key differences in institutional design between regular and vassal provinces that have implications for incentives for corruption.

Figure 6: Ottoman Institutions



Corruption in the case of Ottoman tax-collection takes the form of the principal-agent framework as described by (Rauch & Evans, 2000) for regular Ottoman provinces, whereby the sultan delegates authority to bureaucrats to collect taxes and affects their incentive structure. The principal-agent framework is probably less applicable to the vassal principalities: the sultan is not very much concerned with how taxes are collected in vassal provinces, so long the annual tribute payment is paid. Based on the bureaucratic positions described in the previous section, there are several types of

corruption that could emerge and that probably occur with higher frequency in the Danubian principalities when taxes are collected:

- Fraud in delegating tax farming rights (governor gives tax farming right to nobles that bribe him)
- Identity fraud (different tax collector from the one authorized)
- Getting more money than prescribed in the tax registers (opposing the revenue laws and local customs)
- Misreporting in the account registers (declaring less money than collected)
- Not handing the money to the relevant authorities

5 Mechanisms at work in Vassal States: Church, landed nobles and peasants

In order to get a sense of widespread such abuses were in vassal states, I am planning to use some unique statistical data from one of the very first statistical reports that was published in Wallachia from a volume that I was able to obtain from the Berlin State Library in Germany. "Annalele Statistice si Economice" is a volume that was published one year after the union and Wallachia and Moldavia (1859) and 29 years prior to the declaration of independence from the Ottoman Empire. Such data offers a unique glimpse into the internal workings of a vassal province within the Ottoman Empire including information on who the "winners" (the dominant social classes were, their properties and how much income they are generating) and "losers" were (reflected in the amount/lack of property they possessed, but more importantly, their fiscal obligations in cash, kind and number of days of free labor vis-a-vis nobles). The data covers the years 1860-1862 and is available on a county and district level. Unfortunately, no data is available for Moldavia. A provisional list of variables is displayed in table 5.

The logic is that differences in the strength of landed nobles (*boyars*) lead to differential exploitation of peasants. Areas belonging to private individuals with more inns, forests and vineyards

Table 5: Variables to measure Landed nobles strength, church strength and exploitation of peasants

Concept: Landed Nobles Strength	Level
No. of old high boyars with public positions and their sons	County
No. of lower ranking boyars and their sons	County
No. of boyars without public positions	County
No. of properties with mills and their annual income	District
No. of properties with inns and their annual income	District
No. of properties with inns that have pubs and their annual income	District
Area of plough land in ha	District
Area of meadows in ha	District
Area of pastures in ha	District
Concept: Church Strength	Level
No. of properties with mills and their annual income	District
No. of properties with inns and their annual income	District
No. of properties with inns that have pubs and their annual income	District
Area of plough land in ha	District
Area of meadows in ha	District
Area of pastures in ha	District
Concept: Exploitation of peasants	Level
No. of tax-payers that used to be slaves	County
No. of young people that used to be slaves	County
No. of days of free work for the noble	District
Value of taxes in kind to the noble	District
Value of taxes in cash to the noble	District

from which higher annual income is derived should be associated with a greater number of peasants working on a property, with a higher value of taxes in cash and in kind being collected annually and with a greater number of unpaid days that peasants are supposed to work on the property of landed nobles. Areas that were controlled by strong landed nobles were also areas where the landed nobles had more of a free hand to set the terms for their tenants and hence, in a better position to appropriate the gains from productivity. Cultivating the lands of the landed nobles generated incentive problems for peasants, which probably reduced productivity and investment. This meant that political interests of the rural masses would have diverged substantially from that of the elite and peasants could have supported political programs that advocated expropriating the assets of the rich. Similarly, investments that could have made the land more productive were discouraged because of risk of expropriation by the landlord.

6 Broader implications: Ottomans and imperial rule?

The fact that the Ottomans ruled differently in different parts of the Empire raises questions about imperial rule beyond the Ottoman Empire. The vassal status of certain provinces does remind of indirect British system of rule in Africa, where subjects were incorporated into the "customary" mode of rule, with local authorities appointed/confirmed by the Ottoman Porte. The slight differences might emerge from the clearer legal articulations of the status of vassal provinces vis-a-vis the center. The commonly cited works that investigate the imperial rule in the context of the British Empire mention that the idea of indirect rule emerged as a solution to the challenge of ruling over a more numerous indigenous population (Mamdani, 1996)²⁵ but also as a solution to high settler mortality (where the British were dying in the newly colonized places because of local diseases, they were much more likely to set up rent-extractive institutions) (Acemoğlu *et al.*, 2001). The case of Wallachia and Moldavia can be better explained using Mamdani's theory. While it is the case that the Christian Orthodox enjoyed the status of protected subjects and overall "were granted self-rule within the Ottoman polity and judicial system" (Gradeva, 1997, p. 41), the Ottomans still wanted to be able to control these territories. One way to achieve that was by using local governors (*pământenî*) for at least two centuries: peasants respect the authority of the governor while the governor himself

²⁵Mamdani (1996, p. 18) argues that direct and indirect rule were alternative forms of rule that evolved into "complementary ways of native control". While direct rule was an urban civil power based on the exclusion of natives from civil freedoms that were guaranteed to citizens in civil society, indirect rule meant a rural tribal authority, which meant incorporating natives into a state-enforced customary order.

shows his allegiance to the sultan. The Ottomans however had to adapt to local realities, where local rulers could betray them in favor of Russians or Habsburgs and hence brought their own rulers (the Fanariot era - 1712-1821). It could be argued that Greek rulers (fanariots²⁶) were preferred due to their religious affiliations (Christian Orthodox), which made them less likely to be rejected outright from below. In contrast to medieval European states, the Ottoman state was characterized by an integration of religion into the state and the "coeval use of religious and secular law" to frame the relationship between politics and religion" (Barkey, 2005, p. 9). It re-articulated the state-society relations, transforming Islamic law in a manner that facilitated the creation of autonomous regimes (Braude & Lewis, 1982; Karpas, 2002; Kenanoğlu, 2007) within the evolving colonial Ottoman state. The ultimate goal was to ensure longevity of the Ottoman Empire, collect taxes effectively and reduce the possibility of revolt.

7 Conclusion

Overall, this project questions the assumptions of previous empirical literatures in economics and political science about the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans did not have the same institutions everywhere. Beyond the specific inner workings of the Ottoman Empire, it emphasizes the potential deleterious effects of colonial rule and delegation of power to local authorities. The three inter-related projects revolve around: (1) a macro-analysis of the effect of Ottoman state presence in the Balkans where the expectation is that proximity to Ottoman infrastructure should lower perceptions about corruption today; (2) a micro-level analysis of the effect of the legal status of different Ottoman provinces vis-a-vis the center on long-term development with the expectation that vassalage should be associated with lower development and (3) a micro-level analysis of the economic power of landed nobles and church and its impact on long-term development in a vassal region (Wallachia) where I hypothesize that places where both landed nobles and church controlled the landed and exploited the peasants should be less economically developed.

While there has been some historical and anthropological work on the legacy of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans, this project attempts to be one of the few studies that tries to examine such legacy empirically in a way that takes into account the institutional complexity of the Ottoman Empire. This project(s) is based on the creation of two original GIS file datasets (the most complete

²⁶Fanariots were inhabitants of a neighborhood in Istanbul - Fener, where mostly Greeks resided.


and accurate GIS shape files showing border changes in the Ottoman Empire from its inception until the end, using a variety of maps from library, archival and historical atlases; a GIS dataset of the architectural legacy of the Ottoman Empire in Rumelia featuring Sufi monasteries, bridges, inns, mosques, Turkish baths and castles) and the utilization of historical data from one of the Ottoman vassal provinces offering a unique glimpse into local politics of Wallachia. In addition, this project will bring to light several historical edicts that I collected from the Ottoman Archives in the summer of 2016 (a sample of three edicts together with their transliteration and translation is appended to this document). These edicts were sent by various Ottoman sultans and vizier to various provinces in the Balkans and reveal interesting and informative diplomatic aspects about the relationship between the Sublime Porte and various provinces and local politics.

8 Appendix

8.1 Document 1: Power of Boyars and Ottoman Support

[Year: 1691] Sultan Mustafa 2nd asks the deputy of the new voivode of Moldavia - Antioch Cantemir and the other landed nobles to work together to rule and protect the peasants.

Figure 7



Source: Ottoman Archives in Istanbul. Fon Kodu: A. Bab-ı Asafı; A.DVNSMHH Mühimme Defterleri; Gömlek No.: 106; Tarih: 1107 Z

Transliteration

Boğdan vilâyetin başboyarları olub voyvoda vekili olan <empty space> ve sâyır boyarlara:

Hâliâ Boğdan voyvodası olan kıldetü’l-ümerâi’l-milleti’l-Iseviyye Kantemir-oğlu Antiok voyvoda in-şâ’ -Allahu teâlâ otağa varınca Boğdan vilâyetin zabt ü rabtı ve ehalisin himâye ve sıyaneti ve terhif ahvalleriyle mukayyed ve ihtimam lazım ve mühim olub bundan akdem emr-i şerifim gönderilüb tenbih-i hümayunum olmuş idi husus-ı mezbur için kemâ-fi’ l-evvel me’ mûr ve kıldetü’ l-emâcid ve’ l-ekârim <empty space> zîde mecduhu emr-i şerifimle ta’ yın ve irsâl olmanın imdi in-şâ’ -Allahû

teâlâ voyvodanız varınca ittifâk ve ittihâd ile **Boğdan memleketin zabt ü rabtında ve reâyâ ve berâyâ ve bi' l-cümle ehalisin himâyet ve sıyânet ve sair hidemât-i alıyyemde sadâkat ve istikâmet ile hizmete her biriniz gereki gibi kayıd ve ikdam idüb** tanzim-i umûr-ı vilâyet ve hıfz ve sıyanet ahval-ı raiyetde tekâsül ve kusurdan(?) ve begayet ihtirâz eylesesiz deyü yazılmış

Evâ' il-i Ca sene <1>107

Translation

Order to the one who <empty space> while being baş-boyar (the most important boyar) he is the voyvode' s deputy and to the other boyars.

Previously, when my illustrious order was sent, my imperial warning had been given; until Antioch voivode, son of Cantemir arrives, God willing, at the residence of the one who is now voivode of Moldavia - who is (a good) example for the emirs in Christian lands -it is necessary and important that one should worry and be concerned with issues having to do with rule in Moldavia and with the welfare, protection and good of its people.

As before, for the aforementioned issue, <empty space> was named and sent, with my imperial order, who is a good example (to follow) for great and illustrious [people] -may his greatness increase!

Therefore, until your voivode arrives, with permission from the great Allah, with consensus and harmony, **each one of you should try and put effort as you should in order to rule with faith and honor for the purpose of governing and ruling the land of Moldavia and the protection and well-being of the entire population, but also for fulfilling other royal tasks of mine.**

It was written by saying: you should avoid negligence at all costs and any problems in solving the country's problems and the protection and welfare of the subjects.

Beginning of Ca, year <1>107

8.2 Document 2: Power of Church and Protection of local customs

[Year: 1617] Edict (ferman) issued probably by sultan Ahmed 1st towards Radu Mihnea, the voivode of Moldavia. The document prohibits foreign interventions in the affairs of the church; the edict asks for the strict following of the old customs, including in the relationship with the Greek Patriarchy.

Source: Ottoman Archives in Istanbul. Fon Kodu: A. Bab-ı Asafî; A.DVNSMHHM Mühimme Defterleri; Gömlek No.: 82; Tarih: 1027 Z; 72

Transliteration

Boğdan voyvodasına hüküm ki:

Vilâyet-i Boğdan'da vâki' olan **vladika ve metropolid ve sâyır papasları kadîmden âyîn-i bâtılları üzere kenîselerinde** ve ol cânibün reâyâlarına vâki' olan husûsların [kendüleri] göre gelmişken ve manastırları dahi zabt idüp âharun alâkası ve müdâhalesi yoğiken hâlîâ âyinleri üzere mâbeynlerinde olan ruhbânlıklanna hâricden dahl olunduğın" bildürüp mukaddemâ emrüm dahi virilmekle istidâ-yı inâyet eyledükleri ecelden, min-ba'd kadîmden olagelene muhâlif re 'âyâ ve berâyâyâ

Figure 8

zulumü taaddî olunduğına rızâ-yı hümayûnum yokdur; olageldüğü üzre amel olunmak emr idüp buyurdum ki:

Vardukda emrüm üzre âmil olup min-ba'd vilâyet-i mezbûrda olan kenîselerdeki vladika ve metropolid ve sâyir papaslan âyîn-i bâtılları üzere düşen husûslann görüp min-ba 'd olagelene muhâlif mâbeynlerinde olan umûrlarına hâricden kimesneyi müdâhale itdürmeyesin ve Rûm patrikânı tarafından dahi dahl olup rencide iderler imiş; anlar dahi kadîmden müdâhale itmemekle min-ba'd olagelmişe muhâlif kimesneye iş itdürmeyesin.

Top Annotation

Buyuruldu-i evvel üzerine der-kenara verilmişdir

Translation

Order to the voyevod of Moldavia

The bishop, the metropolitan and the other priests who are in the state of Moldavia; from ancient times, they are the ones who, according to their superstitious customs, solve the issues related to churches and the populations in those areas and similarly, they also possesses monasteries, nobody else can interfere; but now that interferences from outside do occur in their churchly problems, which according to their customs were solved amongst themselves. Because even previously, my order has been released and because they asked the favor to be renewed, I want to be known that I do not agree with the idea that, contrary to customs, from now on, the peasants and the free citizens of the Muslim state be affected and exploited. I order that things should be done in the same way as they have been done until now.

I order that when this (ferman) arrives, proceeding according to my will, from now on, **problems that according to superstitious customs, fall within the jurisdiction of the bishop**, the metropolitan and the other priests from the churches from the aforementioned land, to be solved by these. So, from now on **you should not allow anyone from outside that, according to**

custom, to meddle with the problems amongst themselves (priests). And even if the problems are caused by the Greek patriarchy intervention, you should not allow anyone, to oppose this tradition because also, these have not been meddling [with the problems of the church from Moldavia] from ancient times.

Top Annotation

It was given that a marginal note should be made on the side, based on the original order.

8.3 Document 3: Exploitation of tax-payers

[Year: 1664] Edict (ferman) issued probably by sultan Mehmed 4th, towards the judges (kadis) on the shores of Danube, where it is ordered that inhabitants and Romas who ran away from Wallachia and who settled in the tax farms from these kazas (administrative divisions) be returned to their places of origin.

Figure 9

Source: Ottoman Archives in Istanbul. Fon Kodu: MAD.d..Maliyeden Müddever Defterler; Gömlek No.: 6583; Tarih: 1079 Z 29

Transliteration

Tuna yalısında <empty> ve <empty> kadılarına hüküm ki

Eflak voievodesı boyarlarında Roba nam boyar hâlâ mahruse-i Edirne’ de Dersaadetime ‘arzuhal idüb kadimi **Eflak reâyâsından ve çingânelerinden bazıları kadimi kariyelerinden iki üç seneden beri firar idüb varub** zıkr olunan kadılıklarda bazı zıkudret kimesnelerin çiftliklerinde sâkin olmalarıyla **hukûk ve rüsûmları tahsilî mümkün olmamakla üzerimize edâsı lazım** gelen mal-ı mîrînin edâsında küllî zarûret ve noksan-ı tertib eylemeğin ol makule iki üç seneden berü firâr iden reâyâ her kanda bulunur ise ma’ rifet-i şer’ ile kaldırıp kadimi kariyelerine iskân itdirilmek bâbında emr-i şerif virilmeğin rica iderim deyü bildirdüğü ecelden imdi kimesnenin defter-i raiyet oğullarından olmayub Eflâk reâyâsı olduğu sâbit olduktan sonra kaldırılıb hilâf-i kanun ve defter mâni’ olunmaya deyü fermânım olmuştur büyürdüm ki hükm-i şerifim vardukta husûs-i mezbûre mukayyed olub göresin fi’ l-hakika kaziye dediği gibi ise ol takdirce iki üç seneden berü kadimi kariyelerinden firâr idüb gelüb zıkr olunan kadılıklarda vâki’ çiftliklerde sâkin olan reâyâ kimesnenin defterlü (torn) ve raiyet oğullardan olmayub Eflâk reâyâsı olduğu sâbit olduktan <sonra ma’ rifet-i> şer’ ile kaldırılıb hilâf-ı kanun ve mugayir-i defter ve emr-i hümâyûn kimesneye <dahl ve taaruz> itdirmiyessin; şöyle bilesin.

Fi 11 Za sene 1083

Translation

Order to the kadis (judges) on the shores of Danube

The boyar called Roba, who is one of the boyars of the voivode from Wallachia, submitting a petition to the Porte of Felicity, which is now in Edirne informed that for about two-three years, **some of the old subjects and Romas from Wallachia ran away from their old villages** and settled in the çiftliks (tax farms) of some strong persons from the aforementioned kazas . **Therefore, their taxes and dues cannot be collected** and hence, a whole range of difficulties and deductions in the payment of tribute that needs to be paid emerge.

For this reason, I ask that my royal order be given so that through Sharia, the subjects who thus ran away two-three years ago to be collected from wherever they are and to be put back in their old villages. So was my royal order released according to which, after it is established that someone is not one of the Ottoman subjects (reâyâ), whose names is present on the registers, but rather a subject of Wallachia, they should be removed and nobody should prevent it, that being against the law and the register. I order that:

Once my royal order gets there, you should start investigating to see whether the situation is as described by the aforementioned boyar. If it is so, those who ran away two-three years ago from their old villages and settled in the existing çiftliks in the aforementioned kadılıks, should be detained according to Sharia law, but only after it is established that their names are not present on anyone’s notebooks (torn) and they are not offspring of Ottoman subjects (reâyâ), but rather subjects of Wallachia. Do not allow anyone to do something contrary to the law and against what is written in the registers. You should know that.

11 Za, Year 1083

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