

# $\phi$ ronesis

rationality and practical wisdom



University of Chicago  
Social Sciences 122  
March 1-2, 2024

Jason Bridges, University of Chicago  
Anastasia Giannakidou, University of Chicago  
Jean-Baptiste Gourinat, CNRS Paris-Sarbonne  
Philippe Huneman, Panthéon-Sorbonne  
Matthieu Husson, CNRS Observatoire de Paris  
Kristján Kristjánsson, University of Birmingham  
Pavlos Kontos, University of Patras  
Matthew Landauer, University of Chicago  
Gabriel Lear, University of Chicago  
Christine Noille, CNRS Paris-Sorbonne  
Alda Mari, CNRS École Normale Supérieure  
Sorin Adam Matei, Purdue University  
Josiah Ober, Stanford University  
C.D.C Reeve, University of North Carolina  
Nancy E. Snow, University of Kansas  
Christopher Wild, University of Chicago



THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO  
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OF KNOWLEDGE

# Phronesis: Reflections on rationality and practical wisdom.

University of Chicago  
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## **A. Invited Speakers**

Jean-Baptiste Gourinat, CNRS Paris-Sarbonne  
Philippe Huneman, CNRS Panthéon-Sorbonne  
Matthieu Husson, CNRS Observatoire de Paris  
Kristján Kristjánsson, University of Birmingham  
Pavlos Kontos, University of Patras  
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Sorin Adam Matei, Purdue University  
Josiah Ober, Stanford University  
C.D.C Reeve, University of North Carolina  
Nancy E. Snow, University of Kansas

## **B. Chair and Comment**

Matthew Landauer, University of Chicago  
Gabriel Lear, University of Chicago  
Jason Bridges, University of Chicago  
Christopher Wild, University of Chicago  
Anastasia Giannakidou, University of Chicago

## **C. Scientific Coordinator**

Anastasia Giannakidou, University of Chicago  
Pavlos Kontos, University of Patras  
Matthieu Husson, CNRS Observatoire de Paris  
Alda Mari, CNRS École Normale Supérieure

## **D. Organizing Committee**

Anastasia Giannakidou, University of Chicago  
Zoe Gavriilidou, University of Chicago  
Katerina Chatzopoulou, University of Chicago  
Karen Chanagkian, University of Granada

## FRIDAY, MARCH 1

LOCATION OF BOTH DAYS: SOCIAL SCIENCES ROOM 122

9:30	Coffee/Breakfast
9:45	<p>Opening remarks:  <b>Emmanuel Koubarakis</b>, Consul General of Greece in Chicago.  <b>Anastasia Giannakidou</b>, Frank J. McLoraine Professor of Linguistics; Director, Center for Hellenic Studies; Co-Director, Center for Gesture, Sign, and Language; Faculty Fellow, Institute on the Formation of Knowledge.</p>
10:00	<p><b>Phronesis: philosophical underpinnings.</b>  <b>C.D.C Reeve</b>, University of North Carolina. The Structure of Practical Wisdom.  <b>Pavlos Kontos</b>, University of Patras, Greece. Phronêsis and Hope.  Chair and commentary: <b>Matthew Landauer</b>, University of Chicago.</p>
12:00	Lunch Break
13:00	<p><b>Phronesis: Phronesis in the polis.</b>  <b>Josiah Ober</b>, Stanford University. Practical reason before Aristotle.  <b>Jean Baptiste Gourinat</b>, CNRS Paris-Sorbonne. The Stoic notion of phronesis within the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions.  Chair and commentary: <b>Gabriel Lear</b>, University of Chicago.</p>
15:00	Coffee Break
15:30 - 17:30	<p><b>Phronesis: Phronesis in psychology and education.</b>  <b>Nancy E. Snow</b>, University of Kansas. Phronêsis and Provosts: How Phronêsis can help Administrators Enact Change in Higher Education.  <b>Kristján Kristjánsson</b>, University of Birmingham. Teaching practical wisdom: new developments.  Chair and Comment: <b>Christopher Wild</b>, University of Chicago.</p>
18:00	Dinner



SATURDAY, MARCH 2

LOCATION OF BOTH DAYS: SOCIAL SCIENCES ROOM 122

10:00	Coffee/Breakfast
10:30	<p><b>Phronesis: Phronesis and philosophy of science.</b> <b>Philippe Hunneman</b>, Institut d'Histoire et de Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques (CNRS/ Université Paris 1 Sorbonne). Phronèsis from an evolutionary viewpoint: costs, benefits and minimal rationality. <b>Matthieu Husson</b>, Systèmes de Référence Temps Espace (SYRTE), CNRS, Observatoire de Paris, Sorbonne Université. Prudentia est memoria, intelligentia, et providentia: Prudence and the temporality of late medieval astronomical practices. Chair and commentary: <b>Jason Bridges</b>, University of Chicago.</p>
12:30	Lunch Break
13:30	<p><b>Phronesis: Phronesis, language, and mass communication.</b> <b>Sorin Adam Matei</b>, Purdue. Digital Phronesis: The practical wisdom of networked lives. <b>Alda Mari</b>, CNRS Ecole Normale Supérieure, Institut JeanNicod. The pragmatic distortions of truth and trust in social networks. <b>Christine Noille</b>, CNRS Paris-Sorbonne. La prudence en rhétorique: éthos, pathos, logos. Chair and commentary: <b>Anastasia Giannakidou</b>, University of Chicago.</p>
15:30	General discussion, final remarks.
18:00	Dinner

C.D.C Reeve, University of North Carolina

***The Structure of Practical Wisdom.***

Description: To have practical wisdom (phronêsis) one must have the virtues of character. Practical wisdom is the same state of the soul as political science (politikê). The tensions created by these two facts about practical wisdom are explored and a resolution of them proposed.

Pavlos Kontos, University of Patras

***Phronêsis and Hope.***

Aristotle has explored the ways in which we anticipatively recognize, explore, appraise, and deal with “moral luck.” Luck is not simply a scandal that calls for retrospective judgments and tests our proneness to feel bad for things we did unwillingly or our readiness to compensate others for the harms we unintentionally caused them. It becomes a vital concern of our active engagement with the world of practical matters. Aristotle’s questions are: Who is really capable of discerning bad luck from good luck? What is a virtuous and what a vicious engagement with luck? What has moral luck to do with the temporality of action? What kind of ethical deficiency or impairment is the cause of our incapacity to correctly accommodate luck in our actions and plans? Which is the pertinent paradigmatic virtue and of what type (ethical or intellectual) is it?

I will investigate Aristotle’s notion of elpis (hope) to answer the above questions. Hope, for Aristotle—and correctly so, as I will argue—, is not an emotion or feeling, but the excellence of our future-directed practical sight that allows us to reconcile the resilience of our character traits and the hospitality of the world with our undertakings. Such hoping-well is nothing else but an accomplishment that only the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom (phronêsis) is capable of.

Josiah Ober, Stanford University

***Practical reason before Aristotle.***

In a recent book (Ober 2022) I sought to recover a Greek intellectual tradition concerned with instrumental rationality, understood as means to ends reasoning: aka practical reason. Systematic theorizing about practical reason began with the Sophists and historians and was incorporated into the Socratic tradition, in Xenophon's treatises, Plato's dialogues as well as, ultimately, in Aristotelian phronesis. Unlike the well-known Socratic concern with the rationality of ends ("reason's own desire"), theories of instrumental rationality make no strong claims about the intrinsic value of the ends that are sought by individual or collective agents, or about the psychological origins of desires. Instrumentalism is concerned with rational choice-making under conditions of uncertainty. It aims to discover the available option that maximizes the agent's expectation of utility (however defined by the agent). In many cases this requires the choice-making agent to account for the preferences and beliefs of other individual and collective agents and the relative likelihood of possible outcomes. As such, the method resembles a non-mathematical form of what is now called game theory. My paper will draw from the book, seeking to clarify its central argument.

Jean-Baptiste Gourinat, CNRS Paris-Sarbonne

***The Stoic notion of phronesis within the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions.***

The Stoics did not endorse the Aristotelian distinction between the ethical and the noetic virtues but, in line with their Socratic inspiration, deemed all the virtues to be phroneseis or forms of knowledge (epistemai). They also adopted and even contributed to standardize the Platonic classification of the cardinal virtues, that includes phronesis as a species. Thus, they hesitated between a general and a specific sense of phronesis, and between a Socratic-Platonic sense of phronesis in reaction to Aristotle's views and a more specific sense in which phronesis regulates actions and 'duties' (the kathekonta). In Stoicism, the Aristotelian importance of phronesis was not lost but was given a different function and a different position. The views of the Stoics, in turn, reshaped the later Platonic and Aristotelian traditions.

Philippe Huneman, CNRS Panthéon-Sorbonne

***Phronèsis from an evolutionary viewpoint: costs, benefits and minimal rationality.***

Current decision theory has arguably elaborated a description of what philosophers used to call 'practical rationality' in terms of maximisation of a cost-benefit ratio. This has been implemented in evolutionary biology, within the subfield of « behavioral ecology », by using the notion of fitness as a metrics for costs and benefits, and by importing tools from game theory when strategic interactions are considered (i.e., actions, such that their payoffs depend upon what others are doing) (Maynard-Smith 1982). In this context, similarities between economics and evolutionary biology can be developed (as analysed in Andre et al. 2006). Therefore, some researchers tried to account for practical rationality in naturalistic terms, as a result of natural selection itself. This would result in a natural history of phronèsis, and also in an extension of phronesis towards many non-human animal species.

Even though one could discuss whether those theoretical developments are still faithful to an aristotelian inspiration, the present talk will only consider the rationale for such accounts and assess their prospects as a general framework for understanding phronesis.

Matthieu Husson, CNRS Observatoire de Paris

***Prudentia est memoria, intelligentia, et providentia: Prudence and the temporality of late medieval astronomical practices.***

In the last decades, the 'practical turn' in history of sciences produced an extensive scholarship showing in multiple cases how knowledge is dependent on complex networks of human beings, natural species, objects and phenomena. In these studies, the material dimension of scientific practices is a central means to study the local epistemic cultures entangled in these networks. The temporality of scientific practices, as perceived by historical actors, is comparatively, less addressed by historians of sciences in spite of the fact that it seems to be also a key element in understanding local epistemic cultures. This is especially clear for astrological and astronomical practices which are somehow intrinsically concerned with time and temporality. In this presentation, I wish to explore the potential of the notion of prudentia as a tool to analyze the temporality of late medieval astronomical practices attested in Latin sources. In particular, I



will rely on Aquinas' (and Cicero's) view of prudentia, as composed of memoria, intelligentia and providentia to identify different facets of the sources bearing to the way they articulate a specific relation to time.

Nancy E. Snow, University of Kansas

***Phronêsis and Provosts: How Phronêsis can help Administrators Enact Change in Higher Education.***

It is hardly a secret that many higher educational institutions are hurting. Among the ills currently faced are problems with faculty morale, tenure in jeopardy, the rise of the use of temporary adjuncts who are underpaid and overworked, the ongoing siloization of different units, an increased focus on assessment and numerical "bean-counting" at the expense of more robust values, and the rise of the "hard sciences" at the expense of the humanities. Even if leaders in higher education acknowledge these as problems to be addressed, the resources available to them are often scant and conceptually thin. The aim of this presentation is to examine how Aristotelian phronêsis can be used by higher level administrators to promote institutional change through cultivating sets of virtues and values in their institutions. I will use as a case study the example of the Provost of the University of Kansas, Dr. Barbara A. Bichelmeyer, who, in my view, uses phronêsis or a very similar form of reasoning to approach values-based change at my present institution. Phronêsis provides a sophisticated way of thinking about values that offers a framework for collective long-term change geared toward institutional flourishing or eudaimonia. The flourishing of higher educational institutions, I'll argue, cannot be attained without attentiveness to the flourishing of the societies of which they're parts.

Kristján Kristjánsson, University of Birmingham

***Teaching practical wisdom: new developments.***

In the first part of the talk, I explain the construct of phronesis as it has been developing in the literatures on moral psychology and moral/character education. I then elaborate on attempts to "measure" phronesis development (e.g., pre-and-post educational interventions). I end by exploring the Aristotelian concept of collective phronesis from his Politics and its educational implications.

Christine Noille, CNRS Paris-Sorbonne

***La prudence en rhétorique: éthos, pathos, logos.***

In Thomas Aquinas's questions on prudence (*Summa Theologica*, IIa, IIae, qu. 47-56), prudence is the *recta ratio agibilium*, the right reason for action. This anchoring of the cardinal virtue of prudence in reason is first and foremost an anchoring in reasoning: prudence is, again for Thomas Aquinas, *a consideratio quaedam eorum quae circumstant*, a consideration of circumstances. The exercise of consideration is thus a training of the eye, at once inspecting and respecting circumstances, evaluating and prioritizing with a view to making a decision and taking action. In the prudential process of sovereign decision-making, the *consultatio* stage is thus foundational. And preceding the actual act of decision-making, the discursive verbalization of deliberation and reasons for action in a prudential discourse becomes a piece of bravura for historians and epic poets.

We'll take a closer look at the rhetoric of prudence taught by the humanities, and in particular by the rhetoric class, to highlight the *ethos* of the prudens - characteristic of the statesman - his *logos*, i.e. the topical resources (or *loci*) of his argumentation, and finally the range of passions on which he plays, between fear and assurance: for prudential deliberation in rhetoric cannot be restricted to a pure exercise of the *ratio*.

Sorin Adam Matei, Purdue University

***Digital Phronesis: The practical wisdom of networked lives.***

Over the last two decades, the yarn of our lives has been threaded through the weft of digital networks. A new social compact has emerged that we did not anticipate or even understand very well. We gave ourselves to others, often strangers or unaware of their presence. In exchange, we got an audience for our opinions or a support network for our needs and worries. With the benefits of an enhanced presence in the world came the cost of exposure to public ridicule or worse. Is this trade-off worth it? In this presentation, I propose that the give and take brought about by a networked digital life is the essence of our new life.

Furthermore, I will argue that the new life rooted in choices and trade-offs demands practical wisdom rather than a quest for Manichean certainties. Digital life is, in other words, phronesis ready. The argument will focus on three examples of central trade-offs involved in the digital, networked lifestyle: security vs. privacy, collective embeddedness vs. individualistic affirmation, and freedom of expression vs. collective efficacy.

Alda Mari, CNRS École Normale Supérieure

***The pragmatic distortions of truth and trust in social networks.***

(Joint work with Marie Boscaro and Anastasia Giannakidou)

Gaining and maintaining trust through communication entails a first necessary step of determining the veridicality of the utterances exchanged by the interlocutors, whether they are assessed as true or not. The linguistic veridicality framework (Giannakidou and Mari 2021) posits linguistic devices serve as clues to forming and recognizing the veridicality judgment. For instance, if my doctor utters the bare assertion "The virus has spread" and shows me the scan, I will trust him and take the event of the virus spreading to be true (veridical). However qualified variants involving, for instance, modality ('might') such as "The virus might have spread" weaken the claim by adding uncertainty (non-veridicality). Evidence plays a central role in determining veridicality judgments and in triggering different formulations. The doctor will use the bare assertion if she has reliable evidence while she will prefer the modal formulation if the evidence is partial, indirect or non-sufficiently reliable.

This talk studies the distortions of the grounding of veridicality judgments in social networks, in the perspective of rhetorical pragmatics as referring to linguistic behavior among non-rational and non-cooperative agents. Based on a corpus study of over 4000 tweets, it shows that, in social networks, assertions are ground in very poorly reliable evidence, and that modal statements are issued even when based on evidence as unreliable as rumors. Overall, we show that epistemic vigilance, as revealed by the use of bare and modal assertions, is lowered in comparison with the standards adopted among rational agents, and that trustworthiness can follow even from almost complete absence of proof.



C. D. C. Reeve is ΔKE Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Adjunct Professor of Classics at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA. He is the author most recently of *Aristotle's Theology: The Primary Texts* (Hackett, 2022), *Aristotle's Chemistry: On Coming to Be and Passing Away & Meteorology 1.1–3, 4.1–12* (Hackett, 2023), and *Aristotle's Dialectic* (Hackett, 2024). His *Aristotle On Practical Wisdom* was published by Harvard in 2013.

Pavlos Kontos is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Patras. Some of his recent publications include: *Introduction to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics* (Palgrave: 2023), *Aristotle on the Scope of Practical Reason* (Routledge: 2021), *Evil in Aristotle* (ed.; Cambridge University Press: 2018), and *Aristotle's Moral Realism Reconsidered* (Routledge: 2013). Currently, he is working as a co-editor, alongside C.D.C. Reeve, on *Aristotle: The Complete Works*, which is set to be published by Hackett in 2025.




Josiah Ober is Constantine Mitsotakis Professor in the School of Humanities and Science, Professor of Political Science and Classics, Professor of Philosophy (by courtesy at Stanford University and a Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution. He is the founder and director of the Stanford Civics Initiative. He joined the Stanford faculty in 2006, having previously taught at Princeton and Montana State Universities. Ober's scholarship focuses on historical institutionalism and political theory, especially democratic theory and the contemporary relevance of the political thought and practice of the ancient Greek world. He is the author of *The Civic Bargain; How Democracy Survives* (with Brook Manville (2023), *The Greeks and the Rational: The Discovery of Practical Reason* (2022), *Demopolis: Democracy before Liberalism* (2017), *The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece* (2015) and other books and articles.





Jean-Baptiste Gourinat is currently Directeur de recherche (Senior Researcher) at the CNRS and Director of the “Centre de recherches sur la pensée antique Léon Robin”, a CNRS research unit at Sorbonne Université, Paris. Educated at the Ecole Normale Supérieure (Paris, 1985-1990) and Paris-Sorbonne University [now Sorbonne University] (PhD 1993, Habilitation 2006), he is specialized in ancient philosophy, with a focus on ancient dialectic, Stoicism, Aristotle and the Neoplatonic tradition. His main publications include *Les stoïciens et l’âme*, Paris, 1996, *La dialectique des stoïciens*, Paris, 2000 and *Plotin, Traité 20, Qu’est-ce que la dialectique?*, translation and commentary, Paris, 2016.

Philippe Huneman is Director of Research at the Institut d’Histoire et de Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques (CNRS/ / Université Paris I Panthéon Sorbonne) in Paris. He is a philosopher of biology, working on issues related to evolution and ecology, especially the ideas of organism and of natural selection, and generally on the nature and modes of biological explanation. He recently published *Death: Perspectives from the Philosophy of Biology* (Palgrave-McMillan, 2022) and *Why? The philosophy behind the question* (Stanford UP 2022), after he coauthored *From evolutionary biology to evolution and back* (Springer, 2022), with five philosophers or biologists and economists. His last published book comes out in 2023, *Les sociétés du profilage. Evaluer, optimiser, prédire* (Paris: Payot). He is series coeditor of the book series *History, Philosophy and Theory in Biology* (Springer).





Matthieu Husson is a researcher at the CNRS PSL-Paris Observatory working in the history of astral science team. His research addresses the history of astronomy in Europe (1200-1550) with a focus on the mathematical practices of astronomers and their interaction with the broader social and cultural world of the late medieval and early modern period. Additionally, a consistent research effort is also made in the direction of the digital humanities and their interface with artificial intelligence especially for natively digital critical edition of the non-discursive elements of astronomical sources (tables and diagrams). Finally, he is developing as well a research on the historiographical practices of (European) astronomers and the emergence of 'global' histories of astronomy (1200-1800)

Nancy E. Snow joined the KU Philosophy Department as a tenured full professor in late August, 2022. She was formerly Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Institute for the Study of Human Flourishing at the University of Oklahoma. Her research interests are in virtue ethics, moral psychology, and virtue epistemology. She is the author of *Virtue as Social Intelligence: An Empirically Grounded Theory* (Routledge, 2010), *Contemporary Virtue Ethics* (Cambridge University Press, 2020), and seventy papers on virtue and ethics more broadly. She is the co-author (with Jennifer Cole Wright and Michael T. Warren) of *Understanding Virtue: Theory and Measurement* (Oxford University Press, 2021), has edited or co-edited seven volumes. She is the series editor of "The Virtues," a fifteen-book series published by Oxford University Press. From 2014-2022, she has either co-directed, been the PI on, or been heavily involved with interdisciplinary grants totaling a little under \$10 million. In addition to other projects, she is currently editing a book on hope, authoring a monograph on hope, and planning work on a monograph on virtue ethics and virtue epistemology.



Kristján Kristjánsson (PhD in Philosophy, University of St. Andrews) is Professor of Character Education and Virtue Ethics in the Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues, University of Birmingham, UK. His research orientation is that of Aristotle-inspired philosophical scrutiny of theories in educational psychology and values education, with special emphasis on the notions of character and virtuous emotions. He has written extensively on themes in moral education, educational psychology, moral philosophy, and political philosophy. Professor Kristjánsson is the author of *Social Freedom* (C.U.P., 1996), *Justifying Emotions: Pride and Jealousy* (Routledge, 2002), *Justice and Desert-Based Emotions* (Ashgate, 2006), *Aristotle, Emotions and Education* (Ashgate, 2007), *The Self and Its Emotions* (C.U.P., 2010), *Virtues and Vices in Positive Psychology* (C.U.P., 2013), *Aristotelian Character Education* (Routledge, 2015), *Virtuous Emotions* (O.U.P., 2018), *Flourishing as the Aim of Education* (Routledge, 2020), *Friendship for Virtue* (O.U.P., 2022), and *Phronesis: Retrieving Practical Wisdom* (with Blaine Fowers; O.U.P., 2024). He has published over 150 articles in international journals and is the editor of the *Journal of Moral Education*.



Christine Noille is a professor at Sorbonne University. Her research areas are rhetoric and literary theory. She has published numerous works on 17th-century literature. She founded the digital journal *Exercices de rhétorique* and she serves as the director of the Center for the Study of French Language and Literatures.

Sorin Adam Matei is Associate Dean of Research and Graduate Education of the College of Liberal Arts and Professor of Communication of the Brian Lamb School of Communication of Purdue University. He studies the relationship between information technology, group behavior, and social structures. His current interests focus on modeling and simulating the role of communication and information processes in collaboration and conflict, spanning from knowledge production to military command and control. He has published several books and tens of articles in the Journal of Communication, Communication Research, Information Society, and Foreign Policy. His work was funded by the National Science Foundation and is conducted in collaboration with colleagues from various campus units, such as Computer Science and Engineering.



Alda Mari is Directrice de Recherche at CNRS, at Ecole Normale Supérieure/EHESS/PSL University, in Paris. She is a formal semanticist with a strong background in Greek, and oriental languages -- including Sanskrit and Vedic -- as well as in computational semantics. Her work focuses on modality, subjectivity and time. She is the author of several papers in highly renowned venues and the co-author with Prof. Giannakidou of two books, The University of Chicago Press and CUP, on modality, attitudes and speech acts.





Matthew Landauer is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. He is the author of numerous scholarly articles on democracy, rhetoric, and ancient Greek political thought, as well as *Dangerous Counsel: Accountability and Advice in Ancient Greece* (Chicago 2019). He is currently working on a book on ancient theories of the mixed constitution.

Gabriel Richardson Lear is the Chair of the John U. Nef Committee on Social Thought and a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Chicago. She received an MPhil in Classics from Cambridge and a PhD in Philosophy from Princeton. Her first book, *Happy Lives and the Highest Good: An Essay on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics* (Princeton, 2004), is about the relationship between morally virtuous action and theoretical contemplation in the happiest life. She continues to publish on aspects of Aristotle's ethics. In addition, she has published a number of articles about the status of *to kalon* (the beautiful, the fine) in Ancient Greek ethics and about the intersection of ethics and poetics in Plato's philosophy. She co-edited *Plato's Philebus: A Philosophical Discussion* (Oxford, 2019), which was the inaugural publication of the international Plato Dialogue Project.



Jason Bridges works in the philosophy of action and mind. He is currently writing a book on agency and the irreducibility of the mental. He has also written on practical reasoning and inference, the nature of mental content, animal minds, and a range of issues in the philosophy of Wittgenstein. He received his PhD from UC Berkeley.



Christopher Wild is the Peter B. Ritzma Professor of Germanic Studies, Theater & Performance Studies, and the College. He has published widely on the intersections of religion with literature, theater, art, and philosophy in Early Modern Europe. His most recent book, *Descartes' Meditative Turn: Cartesian Thought as Spiritual Practice* (Stanford University Press), will be out next month. Currently, he is also serving as the Faculty Director of the Parrhesia Program for Public Discourse, which is dedicated to putting the Chicago Principles into practice.

Anastasia Giannakidou is the Frank J. McLoraine Professor of Linguistics and the College at the University of Chicago. She studied Classical Philology and Linguistics at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki in Greece, and received her PhD in Linguistics from University of Groningen in the Netherlands. She is the founder and director of the Center for Hellenic Studies Center at the University of Chicago which was founded in 2019. Anastasia's main interest is the study of how meaning is produced with language— and pursues linguistic and philosophical analysis grounded in classical Hellenic thought and modern analytical philosophy. Anastasia studies the way beliefs and attitudes shape people's linguistic choices in communication, and overall the relationship between language, thought and reality, and how this relation is reflected in grammar. She is the author of numerous research articles and books, most recently, *Truth and Veridicality in Grammar and Thought* with the University of Chicago Press. She is currently working on a new book on uncertainty called *Modal Sentences* which will be published with Cambridge University Press.



