

Heidegger Meets Rödl:
Originary Temporality as a System of Forms of Predicative Unity

The triads of *Being and Time* are all supposed to be grounded in the triad of originary time. Originary time is an equi-originary triad of three moments or ecstasies which I refer to with the upper-case terms Future, Been-ness, and Present in order to distinguish them from the ordinary terms future, past, and present. The ecstasies are supposed to be non-sequential. And Heidegger worries that originary time is so un-time-like that he must justify calling it time at all—a worry that would be misplaced if the ecstasies had the temporal characteristics that belong to the moments of the care structure. The moments of the care structure (ahead-of, already-in, amidst) are sequential and time-like. Originary time is supposed to ground the care structure; it is supposed to operate one level further down from the care structure.

Scholarly attempts to explicate originary time have uniformly failed to locate it at a deeper level. They proceed to explain originary time as if it were derived from the care structure. That is, they are content to find nothing in originary time that goes beyond the temporality that is already manifest in the care structure. They either don't seem to notice this, or are troubled by it and don't know what to do about it, or they take this as evidence of a failure on Heidegger's part. This paper is a stage in a larger project that attempts to make sense of originary time as Heidegger described it. In that larger project I rely heavily on Sebastian Rödl's *Kategorien des Zeitlichen*, taking his triad of forms of temporal predication to behave in just the way that the moments of originary time are supposed to behave. In this paper I introduce Rödl's triad of forms of predicative unity and show how those forms can assist us in making sense of Heidegger's puzzling descriptions of the triads of Division I.

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§1. Introduction

Sebastian Rödl's *Kategorien des Zeitlichen*¹ challenges traditional views of the way that logic relates to asserting, judging, thinking. The logical ground of thinking is widely held to be a logic of inferential relations, a logic that knows only a single, atemporal form of predication, which can take the form of Frege's concept or the predicate of the first-order predicate calculus. This inferentialist logic is more or less explicitly allied with various forms of empiricism, all of which are subjected to critical scrutiny in *Kategorien*. According to the traditional view, temporal logics are constructions that are built upon the foundation of atemporal logic. Rödl wants to turn this picture on its head. He makes the case that atemporal logic—unbeknownst to itself—stands upon a temporal logical ground. Atemporal logic, the logic of inferential relations, presupposes a temporal logic, which is concerned with the way that assertions, thoughts, or judgments relate to intuitions. The engine of this temporal logic is not a single predicate but a system of three temporal forms of predication. The three forms are forms of the predicative unity of temporal categories.

I would like to make the case that Rödl's system of temporal forms of predication is Heidegger's originary temporality with its equi-originary triad of ecstasies. I want to convince you that with Rödl's *Kategorien* we get a glimpse of the same mountain that Heidegger describes when he talks about originary temporality.² In this paper I have a more modest goal: to introduce Rödl's temporal forms and to demonstrate that Rödl's forms, once we understand them, provide immediate assistance in our attempts to understand what Heidegger is talking about in some of his crucial but puzzling descriptions of the moments of various triads. The path I will take is one that shows how Rödl's forms help us rather than one that argues why it is that they should help us. I will begin by working through the triad of forms of predication, trying to get at what each of the three forms is and why each form requires the other two. I want to get Rödl's triad of

¹ Rödl, *Kategorien des Zeitlichen*.

² The story about two mountains that turn out to be one is Frege's. One explorer, looking to the north, sees the mountain that is named 'Afla'. Another explorer, in another place, looks south and sees the mountain named 'Ateb'. The two mountains are later discovered to be one and the same. "[T]he content of the proposition 'Ateb is Afla' is in no way a mere consequence of the principle of identity, but rather contains a valuable piece of geographical knowledge." Frege, *Brief an Jourdain*, 128 [321].

forms into the tool chest, so to speak, so that I can draw on them in my attempts to elucidate Heidegger's temporal forms. Among the Heideggerian puzzles I will focus on are these: What does Heidegger mean when he says that Dasein is 'ahead of itself' or that Dasein is its 'not yet'? What is the common thread, if any, running through the Present moments of Heideggerian triads (e.g., telling [*Rede*], falling, conscience, the who, the Present)? These questions are puzzling when we try to understand them armed only with an inferentialist logic. Rödl's triad of forms will help us get a handle on Heidegger's triads and, in particular, will help us make sense of a kind of time (originary time) that is non-sequential.

I will present these ideas of Rödl without giving a full justification of them and without showing in any systematic way how Rödl's and Heidegger's structures map onto each other. For a full justification of what Rödl is doing, I refer the reader to Rödl's work itself. I am asking the reader to take up Rödl's temporal forms the way a private eye takes a tip that just comes in over the transom. Such a tip may be helpful even if we have not fully explored its provenance. In the course of exploring Rödl's triad of forms we will come to appreciate the extent to which there is a parallel between the projects of Rödl and Heidegger. Rödl wants to show that inferentialist logic does not stand on its own but is, rather, grounded in a temporal logic. Developing this logic leads to an equi-originary triad of temporal forms. Heidegger wants to show that occurrentness does not stand on its own but is rather grounded in existence. Developing the sense of this way of being issues in the equi-originary triad of originary temporality.

Dasein is ahead of itself. Dasein is its not yet. How are we to understand these sentences? Telling and falling, as the Present moments of two different Heideggerian triads, should be grounded in the same temporal form: the Present. How are we to make sense of this? Is this Heidegger as the Zen master who says something incomprehensible and then leads us to enlightenment by a slap to the head? Let us see if an understanding of Rödl's triad of forms of predication can open up a way to understand Heidegger's koans.

The tradition has tried to understand logic as fundamentally atemporal. Certain logics purport to be temporal logics but, working only with a single form of predication, they do not

succeed at representing the temporal.³ Rödl shows that attempts to construct temporal logic upon a foundation of atemporal logic are misguided. Atemporal logic presupposes a universe of objects each of which *is* in such a way that it can be plugged into the single form of predication (whether we think of this as the Fregean concept or $F(x)$). Rödl describes the transcendental or temporal logic that is inherent in the structure of this presupposed universe of objects. His logic investigates the form that thoughts (assertions, judgments) must take in order to be able to relate to intuitions. Atemporal logic investigates inferential relations; temporal logic investigates intuition-relatedness. Temporal logic, rather than being built upon atemporal logic is the ground of it.

Working through Rödl's temporal forms will help us identify and look beyond certain limits of the logic of occurrentness. What atemporal logic cannot capture turns out to be familiar to us, provided that we take off our traditional-logic hats. Identifying these temporal logical forms to which we are oblivious as traditional atemporal logicians but which are actually familiar to us can give us a leg up in understanding some of the puzzling aspects of Heidegger's triads.

§2. Rödl's Temporal Forms of Predication

Rödl shows in *Kategorien des Zeitlichen* that deductive logic, the logic that investigates inferential relations, presupposes a temporal, transcendental logic, which is a logic of intuition-relatedness. In short, the way that a proposition of deductive logic is articulated into concept and object presupposes, is derived from, transcendental logic. What deductive logic presupposes, a universe of objects with properties, involves a system of three forms of predication that are required for the object of deductive logic to be what it is and to relate to the predicate the way that it does. The single form of predication that belongs to deductive logic turns out to be an atemporal derivative of the temporal forms. Rödl does not connect these forms with Heidegger in *Kategorien*, but he might well have done so.

³ See Rödl's analysis of the failure of attempts to capture the logical form of the temporal in deductive logics. *Kategorien des Zeitlichen*, 87–98 (Quine), 98–102 (Lewis, Putnam), 102–11 (Pryor).

Rödl's transcendental logic investigates the logical form of intuition-related thoughts (or assertions or judgments). In the German text Rödl often uses the word '*Aussage*' ('assertion'); in the English translation he uses the word 'thought'. These words are not generally interchangeable. But what is being investigated in *Kategorien* can be described either way.⁴ Rödl takes a thought (or assertion or judgment) to be something that is not tied to a particular utterer or time or place.⁵ He thus makes a distinction between the thought, which is not primarily linguistic, and the sentence, which is. "[A] sentence joins a determination-word to a thing-word, a thought, a thing to a determination."⁶ "It is raining today," said yesterday, and "It was raining yesterday," said today, are different sentences but expressions of the same thought. It will be important to keep this distinction in mind when we try, as we will below, to understand what it means for a copula to be bi-polar or tri-polar.

That Rödl's investigation is a logical one does not mean it is limited to inferential relations. He uses the word 'logic' in a broader sense to refer to the study of the understanding. The subject of his study is the form of thinking as such.⁷

While we are interested in logic rather than linguistics, we must nevertheless be clear about certain linguistic concepts that come into play in what follows. In particular, we must have at least a preliminary understanding of the terms 'tense' and 'aspect' as I, following Rödl, will be using them in what follows. The distinction between tense and aspect is described in different ways by different scholars, it shows up and gets talked about differently in different languages, and the way we understand it is influenced by the set of ideas or predispositions that Rödl is trying to get us to notice. The point of this preliminary look at the distinction is not to enter into linguistic debates about it, but to prepare ourselves to enter into Rödl's temporal logic.

⁴ "[E]s [ist] ebenso möglich zu sagen, was man denkt, und zu denken, was man sagt. Und natürlich ist etwas, das man denkt, etwas, das man ebenso urteilen kann, indem man es ja nämlich bejaht. Es ist daher gleichgültig, ob wir sagen wir untersuchten Gedanken oder Aussagen oder Urteile; das ist derselbe Gegenstand." ("I can say what I think and think what I say. And what I think I may judge, by affirming it. Therefore it is a matter of indifference whether we say that we are investigating thoughts or statements or judgments; this is one topic.") Rödl, *Kategorien des Zeitlichen*, 24 [I:1].

⁵ See *ibid.*, 23–24 [I:1].

⁶ "Ein Satz verbindet ein Dingwort mit einem Bestimmungswort, und eine Aussage verbindet ein Ding mit einer Bestimmung." *Ibid.*, 33 [I:8].

⁷ See *ibid.*, 26 [I:3].

The *tense* of a verbal expression tells us about the time at which something occurs in relation to the time of the utterance of the expression. What is spoken of may be situated at a later time than the utterance (future) or at the same time as the utterance (present) or before the utterance (past). The *aspect* of a verbal expression tells us about the temporal structure (temporal flow, temporal mode) of what is said. We may say that Larry ran to school, or that Larry was running to school, or that Larry used to run to school. These are all descriptions of something that happened in the past. As a matter of tense, we can say that they are all past as opposed to present or future. But while the three utterance are in the same tense (in the way that I will be using the term), they differ with respect to the way that the described event or occurrence is viewed in its internal temporal structure. ‘Larry was running to school’, taken simply, describes something that was in progress, something that took place over a span of time. Depending on the context, it could also mean that during some earlier period Larry had the custom of running to school. ‘Larry used to run to school’ spells out explicitly that we are talking about a custom that Larry had during some earlier period of time, with the added implication that Larry doesn’t do this anymore. With the words ‘Larry ran to school’ we might describe a particular instance of Larry’s running to school taken as a whole without focussing in on the running’s beginning, middle and end—though it surely had these. The same words, in a particular context, could mean that Larry had the custom of running to school or that Larry was in the process of running to school. All of these differences are differences of aspect. That these words can have such different aspectual meanings is a feature of a particular language: English.

There are complexities on all sides here that I am trying to steer around. I do so because my present purpose is merely to draw attention to the basic distinction between tense and aspect. An excellent treatment of the complexities can be found in Bernard Comrie’s *Aspect*. “Tense,” Comrie tells us, “relates the time of the situation referred to to some other time, usually to the moment of speaking.”⁸ As a general definition of ‘aspect’ he offers “the formulation that ‘aspects are different ways of viewing the internal temporal constituency of a situation’.”⁹

⁸ Comrie, *Aspect*, 1–2 (footnote omitted).

⁹ *Ibid.*, 3 (footnote omitted).

‘Tense’ is also used in a broader sense. When we speak of the perfect tense in the English language, for example, we are referring to a category that involves both tense in the narrower sense and aspect. Comrie does not wish to deny that the word ‘tense’ is employed in different ways:

The difference in French between *il lisait* and *il lut*, or in English between *he was reading* and *he read*, is not one of tense, since in both cases we have absolute past tense. It is in this sense that we speak of aspect as being distinct from tense, and insist on such oppositions as that between perfective and imperfective being treated as aspectual, even where the grammatical terminology of individual languages has a tradition of referring to them as tenses.¹⁰

It will be important to keep in mind that while Rödl points to various features of thought that we are accustomed to thinking of as linguistic or grammatical, for the most part he is doing so in order to say something about logic. “If thought is temporal on account of its form, then tense and aspect signify logical forms. They are categories of grammar, not of the grammar of this or that language, but of the grammar of language. They are categories of *logical* grammar.”¹¹ So, for example, when he refers to one of the forms of predicative unity as being that of aspect, the point is not primarily a linguistic one. German does not have a progressive verb form, but it is nonetheless possible in German, by means of context and certain turns of phrase, to express assertions that have a progressive sense. Or, as Rödl points out, the verb forms of the Finnish language do not distinguish between present and future, “which does not prevent Finns from distinguishing what is from what will be. The contrast of tense is a transcendental-logical form; we do not understand it in virtue of arbitrary features of the morphology of certain languages, but insofar as we think thoughts relating to intuition at all.”¹²

I will now turn to the three forms of predication. I will try to make my way into this presentation by considering what it means that the deductive logician, in working with the single form of predication of deductive logic, is in fact presupposing a world of objects that is governed by the temporal forms, though this presupposition generally goes unrecognized. Deductive logic

¹⁰ Ibid., 3.

¹¹ Rödl, *Kategorien des Zeitlichen*, 116 [IV:1].

¹² Ibid., 154 [V:8].

—while it might appear to be self-standing—actually must be preceded by, or grounded in, a temporal logic that gives the forms of intuition-related thinking.

§2a. The First Form: The Externally Temporal Form of Predication

We may approach the first of Rödl's temporal forms of predication by considering the single atemporal form of predication of first-order predicate logic: $F(x)$ (or Fx , or $x \in F$, etc.). (I will sometimes refer to this form of predication as 'concept and object.')

The logician assumes a universe of objects. A (deductive, atemporal) logical system contemplates that there is some universe of objects and some set of predicates defined over these objects. To be is to be a member of the universe, with the properties that are spelled out by the predicates. The way of being that corresponds to this—being a distinct object with properties—is precisely the way of being that Heidegger calls 'occurrentness'. *That* objects are, and *how* they are, is presupposed by the assumed universe of objects. All objects *are* in the same way.

In contrast to the atemporal form of predication, let us now consider Rödl's first form of predication, which will turn out to be the form from which the atemporal form is derived. Rödl's first form is the bipolar form 'is/was'. Thoughts of this form combine a substance with a state in a bi-polar contrast of present and past. This contrast shows up in language as tense. 'The glass is full' asserts of the glass that it is now in the state of fullness. The assertion bears within itself the contrast with a past time when the glass may or may not have been full. (I will omit consideration of the future for the sake of simplicity.) 'The glass is full' does not say that the glass is atemporally, tenselessly full. It says that the glass is full now, in contrast to another time when it may or may not have been full.

Part of the picture here is that it is central to our being able to think *about* anything, that we be able to place it within a framework of earlier and later. The idea that this is an essential feature of thinking about anything should shed its strangeness as we proceed. The idea is not

new. Rödl quotes Gareth Evans: “[A] capacity to keep track of the passage of time is not an optional addition to, but a precondition of, temporal thought.”¹³

For Frege, what a concept is and what an object is are determined by the predicative unity of concept and object. Rödl, in contrast, takes “[t]he predicative unity of tense [to] define[] the categories of substance and state: what falls under determinations in the present or in the past is a substance, and what determines substances in the present or in the past is a state.”¹⁴ What abides through change is substance; the changeable determinations of the underlying substance are states.

Rödl says of this form of predication that it is ‘tense-determined’. He also says that it is ‘externally temporal’, meaning that an assertion that has this form represents a unity of substance and state *at* a particular time. It is about something that “has a temporal position and thus stands in temporal relations to other things.”¹⁵ We will contrast this below with the aspect-determined form, which is ‘internally temporal’ meaning that it is “temporally extended and thus contains temporal difference within itself.”¹⁶ This distinction between external and internal will become clearer as we move now to the aspect-determined, internally temporal form.

§2b. The Second Form: The Internally Temporal Form of Predication

We may make the following externally temporal assertions at the same time without contradiction: ‘(yesterday) *a* was F’ and ‘(today) *a* is not F but is rather G’. What is expressed here is not *just* that some thing was F and now some thing (which may or not be the same thing) is not F but G. What is expressed is that something was F, and now *that very same thing* is not F but G. My use of *a* in the two sentences was meant to indicate that the same substance is involved in both assertions. This idea of sameness of substance is part of the idea of substance and state. That is, substance and state are articulated in such a way that it is the substance that abides and the state that is changeable. In our use of externally temporal assertions we already

¹³ Evans, *Understanding Demonstratives*, 309 (quoted by Rödl, *Kategorien des Zeitlichen*, 79 [II: 18]).

¹⁴ Rödl, *Kategorien des Zeitlichen*, 129 [IV:13].

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 144 [V:1].

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

have a sense for what it means that *a* is an identical substance that can be differently determined at different times.

That the same glass was full yesterday and empty today means that the same glass must have changed from full to empty. But the externally temporal form of predication is unable to say anything about change. Change does not happen at a time; it happens over some span of time, however short it may be. If we are to be able to distinguish the case of the glass that was full and is now empty, from the case of two different glasses, one of which was full and the other of which is now empty—that is, if we are to be able to think the identity of a substance from one time to another—then we must be working with something more than the externally temporal form of predication. In other words, there is nothing in the externally temporal form that lets a thinker connect with what is intuited so as to make sense of the identity of an object from one time to another. Today I look behind Door No. 1 and see a red cube and a yellow sphere. Tomorrow I look and see a yellow cube and a red sphere. Did the red thing change colors and become a yellow thing? Or did the cube change its shape and turn into a sphere? To even understand the question requires something more than the externally temporal form of predication

The something more that we need is Rödl's second form of predication. If the same thing can be *F* at one time and *not-F* at another, this presupposes that it can change from being in a state to not being in it. Such change involves continuity in the thing that changes. That is what distinguishes 'something changing from *F* to *not-F*' from 'something being *F* followed by something (which may or may not be the same thing) being *not-F*'. This is the idea of *a* doing something, or changing, or moving in the Aristotelean sense. This is Rödl's second form, which he calls the tri-polar copula *was doing / is doing / has done*. It combines the temporal categories of substance and movement-form.

The second form shows up in language as the contrast between the progressive and the completed aspect. "Larry was running to school" is a past progressive assertion. That he was running to school can be true without it being the case that he ever made it to school. If he did make it, then we can say that "Larry has run to school" or "Larry arrived at school" (two ways of

saying that the action that was in progress was completed). Or it might be that something intervened and Larry (while he *was* running to school) interrupted (or was interrupted in) his action. It could be that he fell and broke his leg and wound up in the hospital instead of school, or it could be that he realized when he had almost arrived that it was a holiday, and turned around and went home.

Rödl calls this form ‘aspect-determined’ and ‘internally temporal’. What is said in the assertion is not something that is just *at* a time, there is an extending or stretching or progressing that is internal to the assertion. This spanning of time is related in a peculiar way to the future. To be doing something is to be aiming now at, or being toward, some future end. The relation to the future is problematic when viewed from the standpoint of deductive logic, which has no way of representing this form. To be doing something does not mean that the doing will be completed. Nor does it mean a prediction or some kind of probability that the doing will get done. Attempts to capture this using the single, atemporal form of concept and object fail. One can of course define a predicate ‘was running to school’, and another predicate ‘has run to school’, but these two predicates, atemporal in form, are logically unrelated. Just as the externally temporal, tense-determined predicate, involving as it does the contrast between ‘is’ and ‘was’, cannot be represented by two logically unrelated, atemporal predicates ‘is’ and ‘was’, neither can the aspect-determined predicate, involving as it does the contrast between progressive and completed aspect, be represented by, in this case, three logically unrelated atemporal predicates ‘is doing’, ‘was doing’, and ‘has done’.

Someone might object that the relation between ‘was running’ and ‘has run’ is just a matter of content, that the relation between them does not need to show up in the forms of predication. This objection is similar to the objection that might be made by an advocate of sentential logic who claims that the refinements of term logic (a logic that makes distinctions within sentences) are unnecessary since any statement that is constructed in predicate logic can be represented in sentential logic by just assigning a letter to it. Now what the advocate of sentential logic says here is true but quite beside the point. The logical articulation within the statement is not reflected in the sentential logic, which is therefore powerless to solve a simple

sylogism. ‘All men are mortal’ can be represented by the letter *A*. ‘Socrates is a man’ can be represented by *B*, and ‘Socrates is mortal’ by *C*. *A* is true. *B* is true. What does that say about *C*? Nothing. Likewise, the atemporal form of predication cannot capture that part of the “meaning” of ‘is running’ that is contributed by its form. Logical form does not concern itself with meaning, but it does concern itself with the form that makes meaning possible.

Note that without the internally temporal form there can be no externally temporal form. That is, if we could not make sense of something doing something or changing, then we would be unable to make sense of something having the continuity of identity necessary for there to be a substance that can be in a state at one time and not in it at another.

§2c. The Third Form: The Time-General Form of Predication

The externally temporal form depends on the possibility of the identity of a substance at different times, but this form is not itself able to represent the persisting of a substance that is necessary for there to be such an identity. The internally temporal form does just that. It combines a substance and movement-form. Likewise, while the internally temporal form represents change, it is not able to represent the general laws that govern substances and allow us to distinguish one kind of change from another. Consider the assertion “the bee is returning to its hive.” If I see a bee returning to its hive, I am seeing movement toward an end, even though the end is not present. (That is, the arrival at the hive if it occurs at all will only occur in the future, and, we may assume, the hive itself is not present, as in, it is off behind the barn.) But if the end is not present, how do I recognize it? How is it that I see it flying to its hive rather than to the flower bed beyond the hive? If I see a rock falling to the ground (past my 11th floor window), how do I recognize that it is the ground to which it is falling? If I see Larry running to school (running down Emerald Street from Sixth toward Fifth), how do I recognize that he is running to school? After all, he could run anywhere from where he is now. (The question is not How can I know this with certainty. It is How can the idea of it make sense at all, so that it makes sense to investigate whether it is true or not.) If I see something happening I must be seeing what I see as the instantiation of a law or rule. When I see that a rock is falling to the ground, I see it falling to

the ground because I know that that is what rocks do as a rule. When I see that a bee is returning to its hive, I see it doing so because I know enough about bee behavior to recognize that that is what it is doing. When I see that Larry is running to school, I see him running to school because I know that that is what Larry does at 7:50 on weekdays. Rocks fall to the ground. Bees return to their hives after collecting a certain amount of nectar. Larry runs to school on school days. The predicative unity of these thoughts is that of Rödl's third form.

The third form of predication is the form in which a law or rule is thought. Rödl gives as the formula for this form simply '*does*' [*tut*]. It is a time-general form. "Bees return to their hives" is a sentence that uses the linguistic form of the present tense in English, but as a matter of temporal logic it is an assertion that has no tense. (That is, it is not saying anything about now as opposed to yesterday or tomorrow.) This form, which combines a substance-form with a movement-form, enables us to give a sense to (and thus to recognize) that an instance of the substance-form is doing something. Bees return to their hives. The bee that just took off from the gladiola is returning to its hive. The time-general form asserts what a substance does as a rule. What this 'as a rule' means is problematic if we attempt to explicate it using atemporal logical forms.¹⁷ The generality of a time-general thought is not that of universal generalization, which is to say, it is not a compound of externally temporal assertions. It is general with respect to substances and general with respect to time, but that does not mean it applies to every instance of the substance at every time.

Without the time-general form we would not be able to think *doing* (the internally temporal form) and without that we would not be able to articulate being at a time into substance and state (the externally temporal form).

There is a subsidiary form that we should touch on here. If I say "That little thing flying around over there is a bee" or "Elsie is a cow," I am identifying a particular substance as belonging to a substance-form. Rödl calls this kind of thought a 'form thought'. I am able to recognize a particular substance because I recognize the substance-form. It is the time-general

¹⁷ See Rödl, *Kategorien des Zeitlichen*, 196–201 [VI:19–23].

form of thought that represents the laws of substance-forms. Form thoughts are not externally or internally temporal, nor are they time-general. Rödl calls them “timeless.”¹⁸

§3. Relating Rödl’s Forms to Heidegger

Let’s have a look now at the way that Rödl’s triad of temporal forms can shed light on some questions that can arise from a study of *Being and Time*. I will proceed by taking up the following questions in turn. What light can Rödl’s internally temporal form of predication shed on the Future moments of Heidegger’s temporal triads (§3a)? How can Rödl’s time-general form of predication help us find a thread that connects the various Present moments of Heideggerian triads (the who, falling, being-amidst, telling, conscience) (§3b)? To round out the trio, we will then look at the connection between the externally temporal form and Heidegger’s Been-ness moments (§3c). Finally we will touch on the question: What do the temporal forms of predication tell us about the the limits of the logic of occurrentness? Why is it that the logic of occurrentness cannot represent availability or existence (§3d)?

Before taking up these questions it is worth noting that Rödl’s triad of forms provides a straightforward example of the kind of equi-originary triad that shows up in such profusion in *Being and Time*. The idea of equi-originariness seems simple enough: Each of the three moments of the triad only makes sense in connection with the other two; each can only be what it is together with the other two. So it cannot be that one stands on its own and supports the other two, or that one of the three could have come first.

As simple as this may sound, there will be moments in what follows when we will pause to note that something strange seems to be going on and that the strangeness is flowing somehow from the equi-originariness of a triad. A question that will arise is this: Is Heidegger playing fast and loose with his triads when, for example, the moments of a triad are now made to appear distinct from one another, and are then suddenly talked about as if they were almost indistinguishable?

¹⁸ Ibid., 204 [VI:25].

Heidegger's equi-originary triads sometimes behave strangely. In his interpretation of Kant, for example, Heidegger takes the transcendental power of imagination to be the root of sensibility and understanding, the two stems of cognition. Heidegger develops this to the point of considering the equi-originary triad of pure intuition, pure imagination, and pure understanding. This triad behaves in a way that seems to be at odds with how things are supposed to behave. The three moments are described as if they were distinct, but then they are described as if they were one. The moments of Heidegger's triads seem to keep intruding on one another. Dasein never understands without its understanding being both a finding and a telling understanding. We think we are examining one moment but we keep finding ourselves in another.

Rödl's triad of forms provides us with a well-behaved example of an equi-originary triad that we can turn to in order to sort out what is going on in cases like these. Each of the three forms of predication is distinct, but none of the three can be what it is without the other two. That means when we investigate one moment we sometimes find ourselves in the middle of a different one. The externally temporal form, for example, involves a contrast between the way a substance is at one time and at another. To think the predicative unity of tense, then, we must be able to think the identity of a substance at different times, for which we need the internally temporal, aspect-determined form of predication. The externally and internally temporal forms are distinct, but each requires the other. Just how this equi-originariness works is sometimes easier to see with Rödl's forms than with Heidegger's. Rödl's forms can function as a kind of workshop before making the move to the Heideggerian show.

When Heidegger is just starting to present his analysis of being-in as such, he remarks that "The phenomenon of the equi-originariness of constitutive moments has often been disregarded [*mißachtet*] in ontology as a consequence of a methodologically unbridled tendency to derive anything and everything from some simple 'origin'."¹⁹ He then launches into the series of characterizations of Dasein's being-in-ness: Dasein as the being of the between, as the there, the clearing, disclosedness. It is this idea of equi-originariness that John Haugeland's coin

¹⁹ GA 2:131.

metaphor is meant to shed light on. The view that Heidegger wants us to abandon takes the who to be here, the world over there, leaving us with a problem of how the one makes contact with the other. Haugeland called this the barbell view of being-in: the who on one side, the world on the other and, connecting the two (almost incidentally) a thin relation of some kind, the bar. Haugeland's metaphor for the equi-originary triad is a coin. The who is the heads. The world is the tails. Connecting the two faces—not incidentally, but in a way that lets the two faces be what they are—the metal: being-in. The problem of equi-originaryness (figuring out how the moments of an equi-originary triad can be distinct at the same time that they are one) is the problem of originary temporality.

§3a. The Internally Temporal Form and the Future Moments of Heidegger's Temporal Triads

One way that Rödl can help us understand Heidegger is by helping us make sense of what it means that Dasein is ahead of itself. Dasein's being ahead of itself is the Future moment of the care structure, the moment of existence in contrast to the moments of facticity and falling. Rödl's second form of predication, the aspect-determined, internally temporal form, offers us a way to think about the ahead-of-itself. Once we see this, we can then recognize the same temporal form at work in the other 'leading' or Future moments of Heidegger's triads, including understanding (the Future moment of the triad findingness, understanding, telling) and death (the Future moment of the triad anxiety, death, conscience).

We have seen that atemporal logic has no way to represent what is thought in Rödl's second form of predication, the internally temporal, aspect-determined form. I can define an atemporal predicate 'is driving in nails', and then assert "Is-driving-in-nails (John)." This predicate, however, which purports to be temporal as a matter of content but is not as a matter of form, fails to represent the predicative unity of aspect, which requires a contrast between the progressive and the completed aspect.

But notice that what atemporal logic cannot say is something that is as familiar to us as going for pizza. The difficulty comes when we try to understand it using only the single form of predication that joins concept and object. We all know what it is to be going for pizza, yet the

atemporal logician tries to represent it with a form that is not rich enough to capture it. Rödl's internally temporal form connects a substance with a movement-form (the stone is falling to the ground, the bee is returning to its hive, I am going for pizza). Rödl points out that in this form we have a relation between the present of the movement and its end which is a *future* possibility. "The strange internally extended presence of a movement . . . consists in the fact that a movement's form, and thus its end, which the form designates, is present in the movement as it is progressing."²⁰ This characteristic of the internally temporal form, that its predicate is a movement in which an end is present, is familiar to us (unless we have put on our atemporal-logician hats). This familiar characteristic can help us make sense of such expressions as 'Dasein is ahead of itself', 'become who you are', 'Dasein is essentially outside itself', 'Dasein is its not yet'. Let's take a brief look, with an eye on Rödl's internally temporal form of predication, at the ahead-of-itself, understanding, and death.

Being-ahead-of-itself. Care is the unitary phenomenon of the being of Dasein. Heidegger spells this out as "ahead-of-itself-already-being-in-(the-world-)as being-amidst (intraworldishly showing-up entities)."²¹ Being ahead-of-itself is the Future moment of the care structure, it is the moment that corresponds to existence (that is, the Future moment of the triad existence/facticity/falling). Heidegger introduces the ahead-of-itself in this way:

Being toward one's ownmost ability-to-be means, however: Dasein is in each case already ahead of itself in its being. Dasein is always already 'out beyond itself,' not as a comporting toward other entities that it is not, but rather as being toward the ability-to-be that it itself is.²²

These expressions 'being ahead of oneself,' 'being out beyond oneself' are puzzling—or they should be if we are paying attention. Can a number be greater than itself? Can a piece of chalk be to the right of itself? Rödl's internally temporal form of predication gives us a way to think concretely about what expressions like this might mean. In the thought '*x* is doing *y*' an end is present in the peculiar way that the end of a movement is present in it. In thinking this form we think a movement that extends toward its end. The end, which is a kind of future possibility, is

²⁰ Rödl, *Kategorien des Zeitlichen*, 173 [VI:1].

²¹ GA 2:192.

²² *Ibid.*, 191–92.

present now in the case of a doing. But it is present in a peculiar way. It is not present as something that will necessarily be completed. It can be true that x is doing y even if the doing is never completed. So the future is actually present but as a possibility. It is this idea of a being-toward-an-end that atemporal logic cannot capture. It is this being-toward-the-end of a movement that gives us a clue to understanding the ahead-of-itself.

Understanding and the Not Yet. Dasein, as the entity that has an understanding of being, is always pressing into possibilities. In the understanding, Dasein “is its possibilities as possibilities.”²³ The internally temporal form of predication is a manifestation of Dasein being its possibilities. In projecting onto possibilities Dasein does not grasp them as things with properties that are positioned at some point in the future (although something like this can certainly be derived from its possibilities). Rather it extends toward them as possible ways of becoming what it can be. In the projecting of possibilities, Dasein is a kind of open space of its own possibilities (or those of the anyone self). It is in the light of these possibilities that other entities show up in their possibilities. “Projection is the existential being-makeup of the *Spielraum* [space of free play, elbow room] of the factual ability-to-be.”²⁴ Projection is the form of any possible *doing* or *happening*. In being toward its possibilities, Dasein is being toward its possible ends in such a way that particular ends can show up for it.

It is worth noting that to the extent that we are engaged in investigating ontology, we are interested in all this at the ontological, not the ontic, level. When we speak of Dasein relating to its possibilities, it is easy to hear this sounding in an ontic register (I can run to school or go for pizza). We are interested, however, in looking through the ontic to the being, or form, of the doing.²⁵ We are interested in the way that Dasein relates to, the way that Dasein is, its possibilities in general. Heidegger puts the warning thus: “Projecting has nothing to do with comporting-oneself toward a thought-out plan, according to which Dasein organizes its being, but rather, as Dasein, it has in each case already projected itself and is, as long as it is,

²³ Ibid., 145.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ The word ‘doing’ already points us to the form of the doing rather than the ontic content of any particular doing. The verb ‘to do’ is a pro-verb. It functions as a variable for any particular doing.

projecting.”²⁶ The examples we have been looking at, examples making use of the internally temporal form of predication, are examples of particular thoughts. With these examples we are trying to get into view the forms of thought itself. We can say that Dasein, as the entity that understands being, is itself internally temporal. It is toward its possibilities, in general, in such a way that it can be toward some particular end, such as, going for pizza.

“Dasein is constantly ‘more’ than it factually is,” but it is “never more than it factually is.”²⁷ That is, Dasein is always more than it could be if it were a thing with properties, but it is never more than it is factually, facticity being equi-originarily bound up with existence.

Dasein is existentially that which, in its ability-to-be, it is not yet. And only because the being of the ‘there’ receives its constitution through the understanding and through the understanding’s character as projection, only because it is what it becomes (or alternatively, does not become), can it say to itself understandingly, ‘Become what you are’.”²⁸

It is easy to pass lightly over the expression ‘become what you are’ as if it were a new-age slogan.²⁹ But it is more than that. In being toward its possibilities, Dasein is toward its possible ends, and these possibilities are present in the peculiar way that the ends of the *doings*, in the ontic examples we have been exploring, are present. If Dasein is taken to extend, as the entity that understands, from now into possibilities, if Dasein is taken to be, in its understanding, internally temporal, then the air of paradox dissipates. If I try to understand ‘what I am not yet’ as an atemporal property, or as a state that I am in at a moment in time, then I get tied up in contradiction. But if I allow that I might have this peculiar relation to the future—in the way that I have a relation to the future in any doing, as when I am running to school or going for pizza—then the idea of becoming what I am or of being my not yet appears in a different light.

Being-toward-death. We found that the internally temporal form of predication captures something of the ahead-of-itself, and of the moment of being-in that corresponds to the ahead-of-itself, the understanding. It should come as no surprise that the internally temporal form also

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ This is true notwithstanding the fact that Heidegger is quoting Nietzsche, who himself was alluding to Pindar. For a good treatment of the antecedents of this phrase, see Babich, “Nietzsche’s Imperative.”

helps us get a sense of what Heidegger means by ‘being toward death’. Understanding is a projecting onto possibilities. In being toward death we have an intensification of this projecting. Being toward death is a projecting onto the uttermost possibility: “the possibility of the impossibility of every comporting toward _____, of every existing.”³⁰

And just as with the understanding, Dasein is its not yet, in being toward death Dasein is the uttermost form of the not yet: “In Dasein—as the [entity that is] being toward its death—its uttermost not-yet, before which all other not-yets are to be found [*vorgelagert sind*], is always already included.”³¹ The not-yet is not something that Dasein does not have, not some state that it is not in now but will be later. And the uttermost not-yet is not something that Dasein will have at the moment of its demise; it is not something that Dasein has at a point in time at all, rather it is the end that is present now as that toward which Dasein is. This is Dasein as the understander of being, Dasein as internally temporal. We have in being toward death the form of any comporting that is Dasein’s comporting.

“The end that is meant with death does not signify a being-at-an-end [*zu-Ende-sein*] of Dasein, but rather a being toward the end [*Sein zum Ende*] of this entity. Death is a way to be that Dasein takes on as soon as it is.”³² Dasein *is* toward its end in the way that something internally temporal is toward its end, not in the way that something externally temporal might be at an end.

Dasein’s being toward death is the form of any comporting that is Dasein’s own, just as Rödl’s internally temporal form of predication is the form of any doing. “The anticipatory becoming free for one’s own death frees [one] from the lostness in the possibilities that accidentally thrust themselves upon one, in such a way, that it lets the factual possibilities that lie before the non-overtakable possibility be for the first time authentically understood and

³⁰ GA 2:262. Heidegger’s text uses ellipsis points to represent an unfilled place. I have replaced such points in quoted text with blanks (‘_____’) so that I can reserve ellipsis points for indicating omitted text.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 259.

³² *Ibid.*, 245.

chosen.”³³ I stretch ahead to the non-overtakable possibility, death. All of my possibilities lie before that one.

§3b. Rödl’s Time-General Form and the Present Moments of Heidegger’s Temporal Triads

I turn now to Rödl’s third form of predication, the time-general form. Considering why the externally and internally temporal forms require a third form, the time-general form, can give us a clue to what the Present moments of Heidegger’s triads have in common.

When we see that *a* is doing *x*, we see, so to speak, the end of *a*’s doing even though the end is not there to be seen. How do we know that the bee is returning to its hive if the hive is off behind the barn? Well, we don’t unless we know something about bee behavior. If we know what bees do in general, if we know the laws that govern ‘the bee’, then we may see that the particular bee that has had its fill in the garden just now is returning to its hive. We are able to recognize that *a* is doing *x* (internally temporal) because we know that *a*’s do *x* (time-general). Rocks fall to the ground. Bees return to their hives. Larry runs to school. Time-general thoughts combine a substance-form and a movement-form. They let us think about what this kind of thing does as a rule. The possibilities that are in play when I look to see what *a* is doing are brought into focus—or perhaps we can say they are articulated—by what I know about what *a*’s do as a rule. I have just spelled this out as if it were a two step process, first generate possibilities, then narrow them down according to rules. In fact, the two “steps” occur simultaneously: The possibilities that show up are the ones that are articulated by the laws of what *a*’s do as a rule.

I want to look briefly at the Present moments of some of Heidegger’s triads (the who, falling, being-amidst, conscience, telling) and show that in each case the Present moment relates to the Future moment of the corresponding triad the way that the time-general form of thought relates to the internally temporal form. The point of this exercise is to show that these Heideggerian moments, which appear to be somewhat disparate, are in fact closely related. The parallel with Rödl’s time-general form helps bring this to light.

³³ Ibid., 264.

The Who. Just as what shows up in Rödl's internally temporal form as *doing* something can only show up as it does because of what can show up in the time-general form, in which the laws come to light that govern *doing*. So too do Heidegger's Future moments require their corresponding Present moments, in which we find something like the law according to which the Future moment does what it does (is-in, exists, is towards its death, understands).

Being-in is the leading moment of the triad (who-)being-in-the-world. The reader of *Being and Time* must work to get away from misconceptions about the human being that would have us think of it as a subject thing that stands in some kind of a relation to an object thing. The world turns out to be nothing like an object thing; and the who or self likewise is nothing like a subject thing, but we can nevertheless ask who it is that is-in the world. The answer is that proximally and for the most part, the who is the anyone-self, but to the extent that a case of Dasein is authentic, the who is its own self. The question of the who can be put another way. When we ask who it is that is-in the world, who it is that comports (toward intra-worldly entities, others, and itself), we are asking about who it is that actualizes or brings about the being-in. Another way of coming at this is to ask: According to what rule or law is Dasein doing what it is doing? To the extent that Dasein *is* in an everyday way it is comporting as the anyone-self does, that is, it is comporting in accordance with the laws of the anyone-self.

To the extent, however, that Dasein is comporting authentically, it is comporting in accordance with its own self. Another way of saying this is that it comports according to a rule or law that it gives itself. This is part of what Heidegger means when he says that the conscience says nothing. The conscience calls Dasein away from the law of the anyone, but the conscience does not then direct Dasein to follow some other law from outside Dasein. Rather, the conscience calls Dasein away from the voice of the anyone, calls it to itself. The conscience doesn't tell Dasein what it should do, the conscience calls Dasein back to itself so that Dasein can tell itself what it should do. What is Dasein doing? Why is Dasein doing it? It is doing what one does, or it is doing what it itself chooses to do. It is doing it because that is what one does, or it is doing it because that is what it itself chooses to do. These questions go to Dasein's

self, to the who. The who stands to being-in as the time-general form of thought stands to the internally temporal.

Falling and Being-Amidst. It is the who that is-in-the-world, and it is so either as the anyone self or as its own self. It is the who that has to choose between two modes of being-in: the inauthentic or the authentic. The inauthentic mode shows up as Dasein's falling (being-amidst), which is the Present moment of the care structure. "The self of everyday Dasein is the anyone-self that we distinguish from the authentic, that is, from the individually grasped self."³⁴ For the most part what I do is what *one* does. For the most part the law that governs my doing is the law of the anyone-self. We see here the connection between the who and falling. "As the anyone-self, individual Dasein is dispersed in the anyone and must first find itself. This dispersal characterizes the 'subject' of the way of being that we recognize as concerned absorption in the world that shows up immediately for us."³⁵ This way of being is the falling of everyday Dasein, the moment of the care structure that is spelled out as being-amidst entities. "The anyone-self, for-the-sake-of-which Dasein is in an everyday way, articulates the assignment-contexture of significance."³⁶ The anyone-self articulates significance. Articulation is the hallmark of *telling*. But here we see that it is the *who* that articulates significance and in doing so simultaneously articulates itself. The network of possibilities that was explored in Heidegger's description of world, the assignment-totality, is brought home out of the future to the present of an articulation.

Conscience. The alternative mode is the authentic. The self of everyday Dasein is the anyone self. Conscience calls Dasein back from the anyone to its own self. The anyone relieves Dasein from having to choose from its own possibilities. "It remains uncertain who 'really' [*eigentlich*] chooses. This choiceless being-carried-along by no one, through which Dasein gets caught in inauthenticity, can only be reversed if Dasein individually fetches itself back to itself out of its lostness in the anyone."³⁷

³⁴ GA 2:129.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid., 268.

It is the conscience that calls Dasein out of its lostness and summons Dasein to itself. Lost in the world, Dasein “fails to hear its own self in listening to the anyone-self.”³⁸ Falling Dasein lets itself be drawn into the world, drawn toward understanding itself in terms of the entities with which it is fascinated. Conscience calls Dasein to resist this pull into the world and to follow up instead the countermovement to falling. Falling’s countermovement is a much neglected topic in *Being and Time*. It is through following up the countermovement to falling that the analytic of Dasein was able to penetrate to the care structure, to anxiety, death and conscience, and to the other ontological structures of Division II. In what Heidegger calls Dasein’s fleeing from itself we are able to observe this countermovement. “Dasein’s flight is a flight *in the face of* itself. In the before-which of the flight Dasein[-the-fled-from] comes up directly up ‘behind’ [Dasein-the-flee-er].”³⁹ Dasein comes up directly behind itself. Dasein exists in the tension between two poles: the anyone self and the authentic self. This tension between Dasein as the anyone self and Dasein as its own self plays itself out in the Present moments of Heidegger’s triads. The who, falling and conscience are all concerned with Dasein’s self-hood. According to what law is Dasein being-in, existing, being-toward-death? Dasein’s existing is governed by what the anyone does or—if Dasein heeds the call of conscience—by what it itself does. These are the precincts of the time-general form of predication. Internally temporal Dasein is governed by the time-general. What Dasein is doing is guided by the law that Dasein lets itself follow.

We have now surveyed the who, being-amidst, falling and conscience. Each of these moments has to do with the actualizing of the self. Each has to do with the law according to

³⁸ Ibid., 271.

³⁹ GA 2:184. “. . . daß die Flucht des Daseins Flucht *vor* ihm selbst ist. Im Wovor der Flucht kommt das Dasein gerade ‘hinter’ ihm her.” Both the Macquarrie and Robinson and the Stanbaugh translations appear to take the second ‘*ihm*’ to refer to the ‘*Wovor*’, perhaps because they thought that had Heidegger meant to refer to ‘*Dasein*’ he would have used the reflexive form ‘*sich*’. But in these paragraphs Heidegger repeatedly uses ‘*ihm*’ reflexively instead of ‘*sich*’. We might also observe that the ‘*Dasein*’ referred to by the second ‘*ihm*’ is not the ‘*Dasein*’ that is the subject of the sentence but the ‘*Dasein*’ of the previous clause. Dasein is not coming up behind the *Wovor* as these translations seem to read it, Dasein *is* the *Wovor*. If we understand Dasein to be coming up directly behind itself we can make better sense of the last sentence of the paragraph: “Within the ontic ‘away-from’ that lies in the turning-away [of falling], the before-which of the flight can be understood and conceptualized in a phenomenologically interpreting ‘turning-thither’” (185).

which Dasein is-in-the-world. Just as any *doing* is seen to be what it is—and is what it is—according to some law, the expression of which would be a time-general assertion, so is Dasein’s being-in a carrying out of what anyone does or of what Dasein itself does.

Telling. What about telling [*Rede*], the Present moment of being-in (findingness/understanding/telling)? Dasein’s being-in is always a finding, telling understanding. The understanding is always articulated by telling. “That which is articulated [membered, *das Gegliederte*] as such, in the telling articulation [*Artikulation*], we call the significance-totality.”⁴⁰ Dasein does not just generate possibilities willy-nilly. The projecting of possibilities is always already articulated (and is thus guided) by some telling. Take the bee returning to its hive. If I don’t know much about bees, and I see a bee flying by, I will not be able to tell much about where it is going. If I am a student of bee behavior, I can see that this bee is returning to its hive. We can see in the latter case how my projecting of the ontic possibilities of this bee’s activity is guided by my knowing that bees return to their hives in the kind of situation I am seeing. My projecting is guided by a telling that articulates it. Telling works here to articulate the projecting understanding in the way that a time-general thought is necessarily working to let the internally temporal *doing* show up.

Even my recognizing that this thing moving through the air is a bee, flows not from my combing through some unguided heap of possibilities. Above, we identified the form-thought, which is related to Rödl’s third form of predication, the time-general form. It is by means of the form-thought that we identify a substance as an instance of a substance-form. “Elsie is a cow.” “That thing is a bee.” This identification is made possible by the general laws of substance-forms that can be expressed using the time-general form of predication. If I recognize that this thing flying about is a bee, my recognition flows from my knowing something about what a bee is in general. What I know about bees and bee behavior allows me to tell or articulate what it is that I am seeing.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 161. German has two words that are generally translated as ‘articulation’. *Artikulation* emphasizes the cutting of something at the joints; *Gliederung*, which might be more accurately translated as ‘membering’, emphasizes the members or parts that are found between the joints.

This is not a two-step process for Heidegger. It is not that I grind out all of the possible ways of taking what I see and then sift through the possibilities with some set of articulating concepts that narrow the possibilities down to what I think I am really seeing. Understanding and telling are equi-originary. The possibilities upon which Dasein projects are always already guided by telling. And what Dasein can tell is guided by the possibilities that it projects. This point is made repeatedly in different ways by Heidegger. It is brought out especially clearly by the fore-structure, in which we see that in any understanding there is always already a fore-having, a fore-sight, and a fore-conception. The fore-sight is a projecting of possibilities and the fore-conception is an articulating telling.

My being able to tell that this thing is a bee and my being able to tell that the bee is returning to its hive, involve Rödl's time-general form of predication. It is the time-general form that allows me to see the actual present, that allows me to articulate individual substances and identify their movements. This involvement of the time-general in the internally temporal can help us see how the Present moments of Heideggerian triads relate to their corresponding Future moments. And it can help us see how Present moments that otherwise may appear quite disparate are in fact related to one another.

§3c. Rödl's Externally Temporal Form and the Been-ness Moments of Heidegger's Temporal Triads

We would have some reason to doubt the parallel I am drawing between Rödl's and Heidegger's triads if the externally temporal form of predication did not map in some meaningful way onto the Been-ness moments of Heidegger's triads. In some ways the externally temporal form is the easiest to understand. That is because the familiar form of predication of deductive logic is a degenerate form of the externally temporal form. It strips the *is* part out of the bipolar copula *is/was* and tries to understand it on its own. So we take $F(x)$ to mean *x is timeless*,

tenselessly F, but in order to make sense of that, we sneak into our understanding a pre-ontological understanding of the *is* as externally temporal.⁴¹

What does the unity of substance and state have to do with the Been-ness moments of Heideggerian triads? The internally temporal form helped us understand something about Heidegger's Future moments—the not yet, the projecting of possibilities—something that cannot be represented by the unity of substance and state. The time-general form helped us understand something about Heidegger's Present moments—the law that guides projecting, the law according to which Dasein is-in—something that likewise cannot be represented by substance and state. In contrast, the Been-ness moment has to do with what is completed in some way or other, with what is as having been.

Anything that is happening goes over into a past in which it has either happened or it has not, in which case something else has happened. As the future passes over into what is as having been, the movement, which cannot be represented as externally temporal, resolves into something that can. What is as having been can thus be viewed through the lens of the unity of substance and state. It is confusion on this point that lets Davidson think he has managed to represent progressive movement with the single copula of deductive logic.⁴² Rödl points out that Davidson, in his attempt to work out the logic of progressive happenings as events, uses only examples that involve completed movements.⁴³ To the extent that we are looking at what 'has been'—even the portion of an on-going movement that has already been completed can be seen to have passed over into a state. The breakfast is being cooked. Once the breakfast has been cooked, we can also say that the breakfast is a cooked breakfast.

⁴¹ A consequence of detaching the copula *is* from its temporal roots is that there remains no grounding within the logic for the articulation of object and concept. The articulation is actually a temporal one, but a deductive logic that does not recognize its temporal roots cannot admit this. See Rödl, *Kategorien*, 47–55 [I:19–25]. (Of particular interest is the discussion of Dummett's noticing that there is a problem here: "I am therefore forced to conclude without either endorsing the central feature of Frege's philosophy [the context principle; S.R.] or rejecting it; I can do no more than to say lamely that the issue is one whose resolution is of prime importance to philosophy." Dummett, "The Context Principle," 19 (*quoted in* Rödl *Kategorien*, 55 [I:25]).)

⁴² See, e.g., Davidson, "Action Sentences."

⁴³ See Rödl, *Kategorien des Zeitlichen*, 178 n. 3 [VI:4 n. 2].

The Been-ness moments of Heidegger's triads—already-in, facticity, world, findingness—correspond then (in a way that is less urgent for us because of our familiarity with this form) to the externally temporal form of predication. It is important to note here what we are not saying. Dasein, in its being as having-been, can never be captured by the unity of substance and state. That is what Heidegger means when he says that Dasein is never factual, that Dasein is, rather, factical, which is to say, Dasein's factualness (facticity) is always equi-originary with its existing and falling.

§3d. The Limits of the Logic of Occurrentness

An observation is in order here about the way that the triad of temporal forms of predication can shine some light on the limits of the logic of occurrentness. If Heidegger is right in any of a number of his priority claims in Division I—that, for example, understanding is prior to knowledge,⁴⁴ that availability is prior to occurrentness,⁴⁵ that interpretation is prior to assertion⁴⁶—then there should be something about understanding, availability, interpretation, and so on, that eludes the logic of occurrentness.

Rödl's temporal forms of predication provide us with a way to concretely demonstrate certain failings of the logic of occurrentness. His internally temporal, aspect-determined form shows us something that the single form of predication of atemporal logic cannot represent. Movement is not a state. Likewise, his time-general form cannot be represented using the tools of atemporal logic. 'Cows eat grass' is not a universal quantification of externally or internally temporal assertions, nor is it a prediction or a statement of probability. Rödl's forms of temporal predication open up avenues for exploring how it is that the logic of occurrentness (or of first-order predicate logic) fails to be able to capture or represent availableness and, *a fortiori*, existence. I will touch on this here, but treating it in any detail is beyond the scope of this paper. That the logic of occurrentness must fail in this way follows from the whole priority-reversing

⁴⁴ See GA 2:59–62.

⁴⁵ See, e.g., *ibid.*, 87–88.

⁴⁶ See, e.g., *ibid.*, 158–60.

story of *Being and Time*. I will point to just a few places where we see this moving near the surface of Heidegger's text.

Dasein must be already understandingly in a world if it is to enter into the relation to a thing that we call knowing or cognizing it. The "fixed staring at something purely occurrent"⁴⁷ (the mode of relating to something that corresponds to the logic of occurrentness) is necessarily embedded in a more involved relation in which "being-in-the-world, as concern, is taken by [or fascinated with] the world of its concern."⁴⁸ This text is from an early section of *Being and Time* that is giving a quick first run at the priority reversals that are to come. While it may not be clear when we first read these pages, we can say in light of what follows that knowledge being grounded in the understanding implies that there should be some way or ways in which the logic of occurrentness fails to be able to represent availability.

At the end of Section 18, wrapping up the discussion of involvement, significance and worldishness, Heidegger discusses explicitly the feasibility of representing significance in a system of relations. He does so in response to an imagined objection, that the assignments of available entities are nothing more than relations between things and as such are just something thought about things, as opposed to making up part of their being. But his discussion sheds light directly on our question of whether a logic of occurrentness could be rich enough to represent availability.

The assignment-contexture [*Verweisungszusammenhang*], which, as significance, constitutes worldishness, can be taken up formally in the sense of a system of relations. But we should observe that such formalizations level the phenomena to such an extent that the real [*eigentlich*] phenomenal content goes missing, especially when we are dealing with such 'simple' relations as those that are contained within significance. These 'relations' and '*relata*' of the in-order-to, the for-the-sake-of, the with-which of an involvement oppose, in accordance with their phenomenal content, every mathematical functionalizing; they are also not something that is thought, something first posited in a 'thinking', but rather relations within which concernful about-sight [*Umsicht*] as such in each case already maintains itself.⁴⁹

So the assignment-contexture of the workshop could be taken up as a system of relations. We could define polyadic predicates specifying the relations between, say, the hammer and each

⁴⁷ Ibid., 61.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 88.

other item of equipment in the workshop, but this would “level the phenomena.” The temporal forms of predication can help us see why this is the case. The relations of the in-order-to and the for-the-sake-of are quintessentially temporal relations. The paradigmatic in-order-to is a being present, a being available, to be used in a movement. The hammer is an ‘in-order-to-drive-in nails’. This is a version of the time-general assertion, ‘hammers drive in nails’. Heidegger will call the in-order-to the ‘horizon of the Present’. As we saw above, we can construct an “atemporal” predicate ‘in-order-to-drive-in-nails (x)’ or the dyadic predicate ‘in-order-to-drive-in (x, y)’, but this will not help us capture what Dasein does in understanding the workshop because such predicates cannot combine to give us a logic that relates to *what is*. Likewise, the for-the-sake-of, which involves a being toward the end of a movement, and which lets the in-order-tos of equipment show up, cannot be represented by the single form of predication of atemporal logic. Heidegger will call the for-the-sake-of the ‘horizon of the Future’. What I am doing, what the hammer is for, what the hammer *is* as an item of equipment, require a system of externally temporal, internally temporal and time-general forms of predication.

[I]t is on the basis of the worldishness of the world that [available] entities in their ‘substantial’ ‘in-themselves[-ness]’ are for the first time discoverable. And only when intraworldly entities can show up in general, is there the possibility in the field of these entities, to make accessible that which is only just occurrent.⁵⁰

For occurrent entities to be able to show up, available entities must first be discoverable. The logic of occurrentness cannot, on its own, represent the available; it is, rather, grounded in the “logic” of the available.

I will leave the details of the logic of the available to another day. I have touched on the subject here not only because I want to point out a promising direction for future work, but because I think that getting even a glimpse of how Rödl’s temporal forms of predication can show us the limits of occurrentness can help us see the parallels between Rödl’s and Heidegger’s projects.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 88.

§4. Priority Reversal and Temporal Triads

I have introduced Rödl's system of forms of temporal predication and attempted to show how understanding this system can help us understand some of Heidegger's paradoxical descriptions of his own temporal triads. Understanding the internally temporal form of predication allows us to recognize the characteristic gesture of the Future moments of Heidegger's triads; understanding the time-general form and the way that it relates to the internally temporal form lets us recognize the gesture of the Present moments; and the externally temporal form lets us see what is at work in the Been-ness moments.

I want to close by pointing out a broader parallel between the projects of Rödl and Heidegger. The tradition that Rödl is criticizing takes inferentialist logic with its single form of predication to be the ground upon which language and thought stand. According to the inferentialist, temporal logic is a derivation or elaboration of atemporal logic; atemporal logic is prior to temporal logic. Rödl reverses this. He shows that temporal logic is prior to atemporal logic and what emerges in this demonstration is an equi-originary triad of temporal forms that provides the ground for the simpler unitary form.

Heidegger is criticizing a cartesian view that takes all being to be of one kind: the kind that Heidegger calls occurrentness. There is one form of being, one structure that belongs to being: being a thing with properties. A proponent of this occurrentist view would have to regard the other structures of being that Heidegger talks about as derivations or elaborations of this single structure of being. *Being and Time* shows that this is the wrong way around. Occurrentness is grounded in existence. And what emerges from Heidegger's analysis of existence is an equi-originary triad of temporal forms that ultimately grounds the simpler unitary form.

When we approach Heidegger's triads, a question that presses itself upon us at some point is *Why triads? Why threes?* And the answer that comes all too easily is that time is triadic in the sense of past, present, and future. Rödl's triads suggest another kind of answer. He presents us with a system of equi-originary forms, the moments of which do not have to do, in an obvious way at least, with a succession in time. That is, the threefoldness of his forms is not the

threefoldness of past, present, and future. The threefold-ness of his forms has to do rather with with tense, aspect, and the time-general. It is this non-sequential triad of temporal forms—temporal in the sense that they make possible the showing up of time—that will lead us to an understanding of Heidegger’s originary temporality with its triad of non-sequential ecstasies. Rödl’s triad and Heidegger’s triad are the same mountain.