LEO STRAUSS

XENOPHON (1963)

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Department of Political Science, The University of Chicago

Edited and with an introduction by Christopher Nadon

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Editor's Introduction: Strauss on Xenophon, 1963

Christopher Nadon

I.

Leo Strauss was controversial even in his own day, perhaps most so for his belief in the existence and widespread practice of esoteric writing in the Western philosophic tradition. But among the other peculiarities that distinguished him from his contemporaries, the attention he lavished on the obscure and marginalized Xenophon might run a close second. By the end of his life, Strauss had devoted three books and numerous articles to this author, more than to any other single figure he treated. In doing so, he knew he was swimming against the current, that is, against the "powerful prejudice which emerged in the course of the nineteenth century and is today firmly established" that considers Xenophon to be "so simple-minded and narrow-minded or philistine that he cannot have grasped the core or depth of Socrates' thought."[i]

Why Strauss would have expended so much energy rehabilitating this despised figure is not immediately evident, although perhaps we can gain some perspective by recalling that the characterization of Xenophon's reputation just quoted is something of an exaggeration. Take, for example, the case of Curzio Malaparte, the Italian political writer and novelist, a contemporary of Strauss and, like him, the beneficiary of a classical education. His autobiographical novel, *The Skin*, published more or less contemporaneously with Strauss's *On* Tyranny, recounts the conquest of Italy by the Allies in World War II. There Malaparte gives a portrait for his Italian readers of "one of the most admirable men I have ever met," Jack Hamilton, a colonel in the American army. To show how "a man of culture and refinement" could at the same time possess "an almost childlike simplicity and innocence," how an American could love Europe while becoming neither "deracinated nor decadent," Malaparte can do no better than to make him a great reader and lover of Xenophon. While waiting to cross a bridge over the Voltorro near Capua, Malaparte and Hamilton find themselves discussing Winckelmann's concept of beauty among the ancient Greeks. Over and against the Gothic and funereal style of Homeric Greece, the American colonel defends the joyful, harmonious imagery of Hellenistic Greece, a spirit recaptured, according to him, in the "French Greece" of the eighteenth century. The mention of a "French Greece" prompts Malaparte to ask, "Well, what then would be the American Greece?" That, replies Jack Hamilton, would be "the Greece of Xenophon."[ii]

Might Strauss have turned to Xenophon in part to accommodate himself to American tastes, to demonstrate to his new compatriots that he is not a typically effete European egghead? It would perhaps have been too difficult for Strauss, as Xenophon himself had done, to persuade those skeptical of intellectual pursuits that they need not prevent one from taking command of an army of mercenaries behind enemy lines. But he could at least show that he was himself a partisan of the practical and pragmatic. However inadequate, this thesis gains some plausibility if we turn to the original forward to *On Tyranny* written by Alvin Johnson, the newly retired director of the New School and the man largely responsible for establishing its "University in Exile" where

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[i] Leo Strauss, *Xenophon's Socratic Discourse* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), 83.
[ii] Curzio Malaparte, *The Skin* (New York: Signet, 1954), 13-14.

Strauss worked off and on for his first decade in the United States. Here's Johnson in his own words from the Forward:

"It was my good fortune, after a brief slavery in classical scholarship, to escape into the logomachies of economic theory. For relief I often turn to the classical authors. Having no responsibility to classical scholarship, I turn to what I like. I like Seneca and Xenophon.
"I think of Xenophon as the first American, who like the American, looks "with keen untroubled gaze, to the instant heart of things." [iii] Xenophon and the Americans are often charged with superficiality because we are eye-minded and fail to see the things that aren't there . . .
"Like most Greeks, Xenophon was curious about other men's lives, whether a man in a given station enjoyed true happiness. What indeed was true happiness? Xenophon speculated on the point, but no more than an American did he break his head on it. He wanted pragmatic answers, not nebulous ultimacies."[iv]

To strengthen the connection between Strauss's turn to Xenophon and his arrival in the New World, one could point out that both the first journal article and first book that he wrote in English were devoted to Xenophon: "The Spirit of Sparta or the Taste of Xenophon" and *On Tyranny*. Of course, the desire or need to present Xenophon to an American audience could have a less flattering, if still practical, motive. In *On Tyranny*, Strauss stressed the cumbersome and introductory character of the work, something he hoped would not be necessary for a future generation "properly trained in their youth." In other words, he wrote that book, at least in part, for those with a defective training. A study of Xenophon would particularly suit this end because "Xenophon uses far fewer devices than Plato uses even in his simplest works. By understanding the art of Xenophon, one will realize certain minimum requirements that one must fulfill when interpreting any Platonic dialogue, requirements which today are so little fulfilled they are hardly known."[v] Strauss would seem then to turn to Xenophon as the simple man's Plato. But even if we simpletons can admit this as an appropriate strategy, we might still wonder why we should concern ourselves with Platonic dialogues in the first place.

Strauss gave a different, although similarly instrumental, account of his turn to Xenophon in a letter to Julius Guttman dated May 20, 1949. Guttman did not share Strauss's interest in Xenophon. Their point of contact centered on Maimonides, although, as we will see, in Strauss's mind there was a special affinity between the rabbi and the general. But here he is explaining to Guttman why he selected Xenophon as the focus of *On Tyranny*.

"As far as Maimonides is concerned, there is a still more profound difficulty here. If my hunch is right, then Maimonides was a "philosopher" in a far more radical sense than is usually assumed today and really was almost always assumed, or at least was said. Here the question arises immediately of the extent to which one may responsibly expound this possibility publically—a question that certainly makes the problem of esotericism immediately a timely or, as one says these days, an 'existential' one. This was one of the

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[iii] Johnson alters this verse from Kipling's poem "An American" by substituting "heart" for "need."
[iv] Leo Strauss, *On Tyranny: An Interpretation of Xenophon's* Hiero (New York: Political Science Classics, 1948), vii-ix.
[v] Leo Strauss, *On Tyranny* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 26.

reasons why I wanted to present the problem in principle of esotericism—or the problem of the relationship between thought and society—*in corpora vili*, thus with respect to some strategically favorable, non-Jewish object. I choose Xenophon, partly due to the connection with the problem of Socrates, partly because the assumption is that if *even* Xenophon, this seemingly harmless writer, then all the more . . . "[vi]

Xenophon appears here as a convenient *corpus vile*, a strategically favorable stand-in for someone else, an analogy Strauss would return to in *Thoughts on Machiavelli* where he claimed that "Machiavelli uses Livy as a *corpus vile* by means of which he can demonstrate how he has tacitly proceeded in regard to the *corpus nobilissimum*."[vii] That Strauss did in fact discover esotericism first in Maimonides and not Xenophon or the classics can be shown by the correspondence between Strauss and his friend Jacob Klein. But that same correspondence also shows that he considered Xenophon of more than instrumental interest, as does even the conclusion of the letter to Guttman: "The little writing [*On Tyranny*] is a preliminary study. At some point I should like to finish the interpretation of Xenophon's four Socratic writings."

Again, Strauss seems to have come to the discovery of esotericism somewhat gradually through the study of Maimonides. Writing from New York in January and February of 1938, he tells Klein that "Maimonides is getting more and more exciting," now that he has seen that far from being a believing Jew, Maimonides is "a truly free mind," indeed, an Averroist who handles religion with "infinite refinement and irony."[viii] Guided by this discovery and inspired by a passage in Avicenna that claimed "the treatment of prophecy and the Divine law is contained in [Plato's] *Laws*," Strauss turned to study the *Laws* with particular attention to Plato's use of *polynoia* or "ambiguous speech." At the same time he drew confirmation of the existence of classical esotericism from other quarters: "I am now reading Herodotus, who—I swear it as a Catholic Christian—is also an esoteric writer, and one in perfection. In short," Strauss concludes, "it is happening . . . again." A fortnight later, he writes, "I find myself in a state of frenzy that is consuming me: after Herodotus, now Thucydides too." And always Strauss is thinking of how these other writers contribute to his understanding of Plato, and again, most especially of Plato's *Laws*, the book he now declares to be "Plato's greatest work of art."[ix] So the trail of discovery seems to have gone from Maimonides to Plato to Herodotus to Thucydides. Where in this does Xenophon fit?

Xenophon makes his first appearance in the correspondence with Klein on November 27th, 1938, some ten months after Strauss's fully self-conscious discovery of the esoteric tradition.

[vi] Leo Strauss Papers, quoted in Heinrich Meier, *Leo Strauss and the Theologico-Political Problem* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 24, n. 32. What Strauss says here of *On Tyranny* may well apply as well to his first article on Xenophon, "The Spirit of Sparta or the Taste of Xenophon," which he composed at the same time he was working on "The Literary Character of the Guide for the Perplexed."

[vii] Leo Strauss, *Thoughts on Machiavelli* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1958), 142.

[viii] Strauss to Klein, January 20 and February 16, 1938, quoted and translated in Laurence Lampert, "Strauss' Recovery of Esotericism," in *The Cambridge Companion to Leo Strauss*, edited by Steven Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 63-64. The German original can be found in Leo Strauss, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 3, edited by Heinrich and Wiebke Meier (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 2001), 545, 550 (henceforth cited as *GS*).

[ix] Strauss to Klein, October 15 and November 2, 1938, in Lampert, 66-67; *GS*, vol. 3, 556, 558.

"Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon," Strauss writes, "are not historians, but authors of exoteric protreptic writings." He is particularly taken with the *Education of Cyrus*, which he now sees as "a wholly great book of sublime irony" in which "what Socrates is, is shown through his caricature of Cyrus. Only through that medium does Xenophon show the true, hidden Socrates, whereas he shows the manifest Socrates in his *Memorabilia*. His Socrates image is therefore *not fundamentally* different from that of Plato."[x] The similarity of Plato and Xenophon is the theme of another letter from August 18, 1939: "The agreements [of Xenophon] with Plato are simply astounding, at times so astounding that one asks oneself astounded: are Xenophon and Plato at all different people?"[xi] But here we return to the same problem we began with: For if Plato and Xenophon are identical, why substitute the one for the other, why write on Xenophon and not Plato especially when, according to Strauss, Xenophon's satire of Sparta in the *Lacedaemonian Constitution* is "a feat in the art of writing which is surpassed only by Plato's *Laws*"?[xii] Again, it could be that this second-rater is easier to handle. Perhaps Strauss simply indulged his own tastes or affinities with Xenophon. It is Xenophon, not Plato, whom he calls his "special *Liebling*," above all for having "the courage to clothe himself as an idiot" and developing "a whole system of secret words exactly as in Maimonides," tactics very much to Strauss' own tastes.[xiii]

Or, as in the case of Maimonides, there may have been external reasons not to initiate his explication of esotericism with Plato. While exposing Plato would not seem to threaten or undermine any living religious traditions, there was then, as there continues to be today, a prominent school of thought that accounts for the many contradictions and doctrinal inconsistencies in his writings by assigning them to different periods of intellectual interest and development over the course of his life. This "early-middle-late" understanding of Plato's works crumbles if one admits the possibility of his esotericism. It would therefore be altogether understandable if a recent immigrant, poor and without regular employment, might choose to put off taking on the classical establishment at this particular moment in his career. Yet even in the midst of discovering the great similarities between Xenophon and Plato, Strauss also notes a difference: "There is no question anymore that Xenophon's Socrates is *identical* to the Platonic—only Xenophon shows Socrates *still* more disguised, *still* more *as he visibly was* than Plato. And besides, he's far more aristocratic (= more obscene) than Plato. I think you will laugh a lot when you read my essay ["The Spirit of Sparta"] and see it in the text (the filth, of course I will not translate). The philologists are indescribable idiots."[xiv] Strauss was more discreet when he diagnosed the shortcomings of the philologists in print. In the "Spirit of Sparta," he attributes their underestimation of Xenophon to the fact that "they do not take into consideration the Aristophanean inclinations of Xenophon."[xv] What I think this means is that while Plato and Xenophon have essentially the same understanding of Socrates, their rhetorical presentations of him, and of philosophy more generally, differ, as do, perhaps, their intended audiences. This thesis gains some support from the first session of the 1963 Xenophon course transcript, where

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[x] Strauss to Klein, November 27, 1938, in Lampert, 68; *GS*, vol. 3, 559.
[xi] Strauss to Klein, August 18, 1939, in Lampert, 73; *GS*, vol. 3, 579-80.
[xii] Leo Strauss, "The Spirit of Sparta or the Taste of Xenophon," *Social Research* 6 (1939): 529-30.
[xiii] Strauss to Klein, February 16, 1939, in Lampert, 69-70; *GS*, vol. 3, 567.
[xiv] Strauss to Klein, February 28, 1939, in Lampert, 72. This letter also casts a different light on Strauss's later, if playful, claim that Xenophon should be our primary source for information about Socrates since "he showed by deed that he was willing to be a historian" (*Xenophon's Socratic Discourse*, 83).
[xv] "Spirit of Sparta," 511.

Strauss offers this arresting comparison of how Plato and Xenophon recast the official charges against Socrates.

"Now if you compare these three versions, the authentic version, Plato's version, and Xenophon's version, you see that Plato takes much greater liberties with the text of the indictment than Xenophon does. Xenophon takes a very small liberty. That reveals the character of the writings of the two men. Plato is in a crude way crudely spoken, infinitely more obvious than Xenophon is. I myself have gone through a time after Xenophon's way of writing dawned upon me, where for quite some time I couldn't stand Plato anymore, because that was too loud compared with the still voice of Xenophon, who speaks like a man of the people to men of the people; only those who listen will hear something of a higher order."

Xenophon's rhetoric draws special consideration from Strauss in the Introduction to *On Tyranny*:

"It is reasonable to assume that the temporary eclipse of Xenophon—just as the temporary eclipse of Livy and of Cicero—has been due to a decline in understanding of the significance of rhetoric: both the peculiar "idealism" and the peculiar "realism" of the nineteenth century were guided by the modern concept of "Art" and for that reason were unable to understand the crucial significance of the lowly art of rhetoric. While they could thus find a place for Plato or Thucydides, they completely failed duly to appreciate Xenophon."[xvi]

On this reading, "the far more aristocratic" Xenophon gains in interest not on account of any affinity with practical American tastes, but due to his being particularly foreign to modern sensibilities, a theme Strauss returned to in the Introduction to *Xenophon's Socratic Discourse* (p. 84): "Our age boasts of being more open to everything human than any earlier age; it is surely blind to the greatness of Xenophon. Without intending it, one might make some discoveries about our age by reading and rereading Xenophon."

But this aspect of Xenophon's utility leaves his modern interpreter with a difficult task. Strauss apparently wishes to make Xenophon better known and taken more seriously. But to make him popular or familiar might deprive his writings of some of their value. Perhaps the rebarbative rhetoric of Strauss's last two books on Xenophon was influenced by this concern. Yet however important Strauss thought "the lowly art of rhetoric," he also considered it merely instrumental, even if "an indispensible instrument to philosophy."[xvii] It must therefore be quite flexible or adaptable. Might there then be certain advantages to Xenophon's way of presenting philosophy that make his "still voice" preferable, at least in some circumstances, to Plato's "crude" and "loud" one? Or, to pose the question somewhat differently, are there defects in Plato's rhetoric that Xenophon's either lacks or perhaps even counteracts?

"Political philosophy" is a phrase that means several different things in Strauss's usage. But one meaning is that of a philosophy that is politic, that is, aware of its precarious relation to civil society and hence careful to take into account its own effect on civil society and to defend its

[xvi] *On Tyranny* (1991), 26.
[xvii] *On Tyranny* (1991), 27.

reputation. Unlike the Socrates of Aristophanes's *Clouds*, philosophers who are acute understand that they need to engage in a philosophic politics that aims not at the provocative establishment of philosopher-kings, but rather, as Strauss writes in *What Is Political Philosophy?*, at the more moderate goal of "satisfying the city that the philosophers are not atheists, that they do not desecrate everything sacred to the city, that they reverence what the city reverences, that they are not subversives, in short, that they are not irresponsible adventurers but good citizens and even the best of citizens."[xviii] Strauss calls Socrates's most impressive contribution to this cause—the decision to sacrifice his life in order to preserve philosophy in Athens—"a political choice of the highest order."[xix] He declares Plato's continuing efforts in this direction "a resounding success." Strauss expands: "What Plato did in the Greek city and for it was done in and for Rome by Cicero, whose political action on behalf of philosophy has nothing in common with his actions against Catiline and for Pompey. It was done in and for the Islamic world by Farabi and in and for Judaism by Maimonides." Yet no sooner does Strauss describe Plato's resounding success than he wonders "whether or not it has been too successful," i.e., it has not been a success, or at least not an unmitigated success.[xx] In connection with this Strauss cites a passage from the *Life of Nicias* where Plutarch claims Plato avoided the fate of Socrates and made philosophic studies popular by living an outwardly decent life and "by subjecting natural necessity to divine and more excellent principles."[xxi]

Certain consequences of this dimension of Platonic politics were of concern to Strauss at least as early as 1933-34. In his unpublished *Hobbes's Critique of Religion*, he describes Hobbes's motive for elaborating a new political science.

"If order and peace were finally to come about, what was required, as it seemed, was a politics resting solely on the self-sufficient reflection of man. Such a politics had been elaborated by classical philosophy. But the philosophic politics that rested on the foundation conceived by Socrates had not only not refused an association with theology; it had also not *been able* to refuse this; in any case it had provided theological politics with some of its most dangerous weapons. Hence, a *new* politics was required that would not merely be independent of theology but also make any relapse into theological politics impossible for all future time."[xxii]

Might Xenophon have been of particular interest to Strauss at least in part because his apologetic rhetoric runs much less risk of providing theology with such arms? For not only does Xenophon's Socrates shy away from any doctrine of the "idea of the good," he shies away from "the ideas" altogether. Certainly his treatment and practice of piety, at least in the *Memorabilia*, is such that even Hobbes would have approved.[xxiii] Or, as Strauss put it in a letter to Klein from February 1939, for Xenophon "*sōphrosunē* is essentially self-control in the expression of

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[xviii] Leo Strauss, *What Is Political Philosophy?* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), 126.
[xix] Ibid., 33.
[xx] Ibid., 126-27.
[xxi] Plutarch, *Life of Nicias*, chapter 23.
[xxii] Leo Strauss, *Hobbes's Critique of Religion*, translated by Gabriel Bartlett and Svetozar Minkov (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 28.
[xxiii] Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, 4.6; Hobbes, *Behemoth* (London: Bohn, 1860), 214-17.

opinions."[xxiv] This moderation may well have been what kept Xenophon from having his Socrates discourse on various Platonic topics such as the best regime, the parts of the soul, or the continued existence of the soul in some afterlife. If there are no Xenophontic doctrines, there can be no Xenophontic school. And without schools one can hardly have a philosophic tradition. And a "philosophic tradition" is for Strauss what "immaterial substance" was for Hobbes, words or vibrations of the air we can make and string together with our mouths, but in reality oxymorons signifying nothing. It might seem strange to attribute such a view to Strauss, who was himself the founder of a school and presented himself as a student of the Great Tradition.[xxv] But if there was one thing Strauss was convinced of, it was that political necessities must sometimes be met with actions that fall something short of rational coherence. He knew and would seem to approve of the Ciceronean maxim that "The very nature of public affairs often defeats reason."[xxvi] If, then, one must found a school, perhaps best to incorporate within it a cornerstone whose irregularities pose a constant threat to the integrity of the edifice. That irregular, to use the term in its military sense, would be Xenophon.

II.

Strauss published the following works devoted directly to the study of Xenophon: "The Spirit of Sparta or the Taste of Xenophon," *Social Research* 6 (1939): 502-536; *On Tyranny: an Interpretation of Xenophon's Hiero* (New York: Political Science Classics, 1947); "Restatement on Xenophon's Hiero," first published in French as "L'action politique des philosophes" in *Critique* (October and November 1950), then expanded into "*Mise au point"* in *De la tyrannie* (Paris: Gallimard, 1954), and in English and revised slightly for *What Is Political Philosophy?* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), 95-133, and in later editions of *On Tyranny*; "Greek Historians," a review of W. P. Henry's *Greek Historical Writing* in which Strauss also gives a brief interpretation of Xenophon's *Hellenica*, *Review of Metaphysics* 21 (1968): 656-666; *Xenophon's Socratic Discourse: an Interpretation of the Oeconomicus* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970); and *Xenophon's Socrates* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972).[xxvii]

These efforts spurred a renewed interest in Xenophon among political theorists and students of political philosophy that has borne fruit in new and reliable translations of a number of Xenophon's major works published with interpretive essays by Cornell University Press,[xxviii] scholarly articles and books,[xxix] and a even a special issue of *Polis* devoted entirely to

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[xxiv] Strauss to Klein, February 16, 1939, in Lampert, 70.
[xxv] Strauss, *Xenophon's Socratic Discourse*, 83.
[xxvi] Leo Strauss, *The City and Man* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 22.
[xxvii] These last two works are now available only from St. Augustine's Press, South Bend, Indiana.
[xxviii] Xenophon, *The Education of Cyrus*, translated by Wayne Ambler (2001); *Memorabilia*, translated by Amy Bonnette (2001); *The Shorter Socratic Writings: Apology of Socrates to the Jury, Oeconomicus, and Symposium*, translated and edited Robert Bartlett (2006); and *Anabasis*, translated by Wayne Ambler (2008). The revised and expanded edition of *On Tyranny*, edited by Victor Gourevitch and Michael Roth (1991) also contains a translation of Xenophon's *Hiero*, revised and corrected by Seth Benardete.
[xxix] W. R. Newell, "Tyranny and the Science of Ruling in Xenophon's *Education of Cyrus*," *Journal of Politics* 45 (1983): 889-906; Christopher Bruell, "Xenophon," in *History of Political Philosophy*, 3rd ed., edited by Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 90-117; Gerald Proietti, "Xenophon's Sparta: An Introduction" *Mnemosyne* 98 (1987); W. R. Newell, "Machiavelli and Xenophon on Princely Rule: A Double-Edged Encounter," *Journal of Politics* 50 (1988): 108-30; Richard

Xenophon.[xxx] Strauss's influence on classists has been more limited and often indirect, with the notable exception of W. E. Higgens, *Xenophon the Athenian: The Problem of the Individual and the Society of the Polis* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1977). Yet, if in 1995 a classics professor writing a study of Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* could justify her complete neglect of Strauss's work by alleging "the fact that several of [his] disciples have been active in contemporary conservative politics in the United States,"[xxxi] another writing a monograph on Xenophon's *Hellenica* in 1993 argued for the necessity to read that work esoterically, even if mention of both the term and Strauss's works were studiously avoided.[xxxii] Michael Lipka's 2002 study of Xenophon's *Constitution of the Lacedemonians* still considers Strauss's attempt to find irony throughout the work to be "unfounded," but then goes on to admit that at least three passages are in fact ironic.[xxxiii] More recently, Vivienne Grey finds Straussian interpretations of Xenophon to be "perverse," but her engagement with them is far from dismissive.[xxxiv] This is slow but steady progress of a kind.

The 1963 transcript covers a considerable number of Xenophon's works. Session 1 is introductory but devoted in large part to the *Memorabilia,* as is the whole of session 2. Sessions 3, 4, and 5 take up the *Oeconomicus*; [xxxv] session 6, the *Hiero*; session 7, the *Ways and Means* as

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Ruderman, "The Rule of a Philosopher-King: Xenophon's *Anabasis*," in *Politikos* II: Selected Papers of the North American Chapter of the Society for Greek Political Thought, edited by Leslie G. Rubin (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1992), 127-143; Kenneth C. Blanchard, Jr., "The Middle Road of Classical Political Philosophy: Socrates' Dialogues with Aristippus in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*," *Review of Politics* 56 (1994): 671-96; Christopher Nadon, "From Republic to Empire: Political Revolution and the Common Good in Xenophon's *Education of Cyrus," American Political Science Review* 90 (1996): 361-74; Jacob Howland, "Xenophon's Philosophic Odyssey: On the *Anabasis* and Plato's *Republic*," *American Political Science Review* 94 (2000): 875-89; Christopher Nadon, *Xenophon's Prince: Republic and Empire in the* Cyropaedia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Thomas L. Pangle, "Socratic Political Philosophy in Xenophon's *Symposium*," *American Journal of Political Science* 54 (2010): 140-52.

[xxx] *The Political Thought of* Xenophon, edited by Dustin Gish and Wayne Ambler, in *Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought* 26:2 (2009).

[xxxi] Sarah Pomeroy, *Xenophon's Oeconomicus: A Social and Historical Commentary* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 24

[xxxii] Christopher Tuplin, *The Failings of Empire: A Reading of Xenophon,* Hellenica, *2.311-7.5.27* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1993).

[xxxiii]Michael Lipka, *Xenophon's Spartan Constitution* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2002), 55; cf. 16, 101, 116.

[xxxiv] Vivienne Gray, *Xenophon's Mirror of Princes: Reading the Reflections* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 177.

[xxxv] The edition of the *Memorabilia* and *Oeconomicus* used by the class is Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, translated by E. C. Marchant (Cambridge: Loeb Classic Library, 1923); for the *Hiero Ways and Means*, and *Lacedaemonian Constitution*, Xenophon, *Scripta Minora*, translated by E. C. Marchant (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Loeb Classic Library, 1925); *Education of Cyrus*, Xenophon, *Cyropaedia*, 2 vols., translated by Walter Miller (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Loeb Classic Library, 1914). For the *Athenian Constitution*, the class used the translation found in Xenophon, *The Whole Works of Xenophon*, translated by Ashley Cooper, Spelman, Smith, Fielding, and Others (New York: Bangs Brothers, 1855), 693-702, although either Strauss or the reader for the course has modified the translation quite significantly throughout in the direction of greater literalness.

well as the *Athenian Constitution* or *Old Oligarch*, which is often considered spurious; and session 8, *The Constitution of the Lacedaemonians*. The final eight sessions are devoted to the *Education of Cyrus*, a work of importance, as we have seen, for Strauss's discovery of Xenophon, yet one on which he published very little. The transcript also contains many general formulations on the relation between ancient and modern political philosophy, including a discussion of what Strauss took to be "the only theoretical loophole in classical philosophy," one that provided "the opening wedge" for Machiavelli (session 9). It also allows us to see the extent to which Strauss read Xenophon as contemplating the metaphysical and theological aspects and implications of his arguments even when those views were not explicitly voiced. And in the classroom, Strauss seems to have been in some respects more willing to drop his own Xenophontic moderation than he was in his published writings on the subject, especially in the final two books on Xenophon, which he claimed in a letter to Gershom Scholem "are not the last thing I have written, but I believe they are the best and part of it may be of interest to you."[xxxvi] Let me give two such examples taken from the lectures devoted to the *Memorabilia*.

In chapter fourteen of book 3 of the *Memorabilia*, Xenophon relates a speech Socrates made criticizing a glutton for eating only meat without bread. In *Xenophon's Socrates*, Strauss offers the following gloss: "The occasion was that one present ate the meat 'itself by itself,' i.e., without the bread. In accordance with this the last speech of the Book deals with Socrates' interpretation of a term 'used in the tongue of the Athenians.'"[xxxvii] This interpretation of the passage confirms, I think, Strauss's claim in the Preface to that work that he "could without impropriety have been more prolix." A word to the wise may be sufficient, perhaps even unecessary, but for the rest of us it casts little light on the text. Here is the treatment he gave the same passage in session 2 of the 1963 course:

"Now here comes the greatest beauty which cannot be well brought out in the translation, the beginning of paragraph 2. This fellow was eating the meat, itself by itself; which is the favorite Platonic expression for the ideas. He ate, as it were the idea, in its purity. You see that is a Xenophontic joke, which of course presupposes—for no one would make it who didn't know of these things and understand them. So I thought this would be of some help for the understanding of Xenophon's way of speaking about philosophy. One cannot understand Xenophon if one doesn't think about the philosophic matters. But he writes in such a way that you can completely miss it."

If Strauss hesitated in print to engage in "the loathsome business of explaining a joke," he overcame such scruples more easily in class.[xxxviii] The second example concerns the peculiar definitions of envy and leisure given in the *Memorabilia*. In *Xenophon's Socrates*, Strauss highlights the peculiarities of the definitions by showing that they could not in fact apply to a reasonable man. He then concludes the page or so of analysis with the following sentence: "The foregoing interpretations are not incompatible with an alternative interpretation according to

[xxxvi] Strauss to Scholem, November 17, 1972, *GS*, vol. 3, 764-65.
[xxxvii] *Xenophon's Socrates* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), 91.
[xxxviii] *On Tyranny* (1991), 28.

which one would have to refer the two definitions to the gods: are the gods envious? do the gods have leisure?"[xxxix] Here is what he said of the same passage in class (session 2):

"So the gods like the man who acts well. The gods like him. But what does this imply? They are not envious of his felicity. The view that the gods are envious of the happy man, the man of felicity, amounts to the absurdity that the gods are envious of their friends. And now you understand the definition of envy. When he spoke of envy as dissatisfaction, displeasure, at the well-being of one's friends he had in mind the great question of the envy of the gods. This I believe is the only explanation."

So what Strauss apparently took to be "the only explanation" turns in print into an allusion to an unelaborated alternative appended to an extended but in his view defective interpretation.

The usefulness of the course transcript lies not simply in the elucidation of particular passages in Xenophon, although it is undeniably helpful here. And it would be foolish to assume that the views Strauss expressed in class were as a rule more candid or revealing than his books. Consider, for example, the lawyerly, i.e., almost sophistical, way he justifies passing over the most interesting (and central) section of the *Memorabilia* in class:

"What we are doing today is of course indefensible because we merely take out a kind of snippets from the *Memorabilia.* But since we must have an inkling of the *Memorabilia* when we want to understand Xenophon, we chose, reasonably, what at first glance is the most theoretical part of the *Memorabilia,* which is the definitions. Now let us turn then to chapter nine of the third book."

"We chose, reasonably, what at first glance is the most theoretical part of the *Memorabilia*, which is the definitions." This seems to me a justification worthy of a first-rate trimmer. Once seen, it puts us on our guard against taking what follows simply at face value or definitive. Thus the chief benefit of this course transcript would be to remind us of how allusive and elusive Strauss was willing to be, not only in class but especially in print, and to therefore heighten our awareness of the demands he places on his readers in any context.

[xxxix] *Xenophon's Socrates*, 81. There exists in the Strauss archives the beginning of an essay on the *Education of Cyrus* that would seem to date from the late 1930's.

The Leo Strauss Transcript Project

Leo Strauss is well known as a thinker and writer, but he also had tremendous impact as a teacher. In the transcripts of his courses one can see Strauss comment on texts, including many he wrote little or nothing about, and respond generously to student questions and objections. The transcripts, amounting to more than twice the volume of Strauss's published work, add immensely to the material available to scholars and students of Strauss's work.

In the early 1950s mimeographed typescripts of student notes of Strauss's courses were distributed among his students. In winter 1954, the first recording, of his course on natural right, was transcribed and distributed to students. Strauss's colleague Herbert J. Storing obtained a grant from the Relm Foundation to support the taping and transcription, which resumed on a regular basis in the winter of 1956 with Strauss's course "Historicism and Modern Relativism." Of the 39 courses Strauss taught at the University of Chicago from 1958 until his departure in 1968, 34 were recorded and transcribed. After he retired from Chicago, recording of his courses continued at Claremont Men's College in the spring of 1968 and the fall and spring of 1969 (although the tapes for his last two courses there have not been located), and at St. John's College for the four years until his death in October 1973.

The surviving original audio recordings vary widely in quality and completeness, and after they had been transcribed, the audiotapes were sometimes reused, leaving the audio record very incomplete. Over time the audiotape deteriorated. Beginning in the late 1990s, Stephen Gregory, then administrator of the University's John M. Olin Center for Inquiry into the Theory and Practice of Democracy funded by the John M. Olin Foundation, initiated digital remastering of the surviving tapes by Craig Harding of September Media to ensure their preservation, improve their audibility, and make possible their eventual publication. This project received financial support from the Olin Center and from the Division of Preservation and Access of the National Endowment for the Humanities. The remastered audiofiles are available at the Strauss Center website: https://leostrausscenter.uchicago.edu/courses.

Strauss permitted the taping and transcribing to go forward but did not check the transcripts or otherwise participate in the project. Accordingly, Strauss's close associate and colleague Joseph Cropsey originally put the copyright in his own name, though he assigned copyright to the Estate of Leo Strauss in 2008. Beginning in 1958 a headnote was placed at the beginning of each transcript: "This transcription is a written record of essentially oral material, much of which developed spontaneously in the classroom and none of which was prepared with publication in mind. The transcription is made available to a limited number of interested persons, with the understanding that no use will be made of it that is inconsistent with the private and partly informal origin of the material. Recipients are emphatically requested not to seek to increase the circulation of the transcription. This transcription has not been checked, seen, or passed on by the lecturer." In 2008, Strauss's heir, his daughter Jenny Strauss, asked Nathan Tarcov to succeed Joseph Cropsey as Strauss's literary executor. They agreed that because of the widespread circulation of the old, often inaccurate and incomplete transcripts and the continuing interest in Strauss's thought and teaching, it would be a service to interested scholars and students to proceed with publication of the remastered audiofiles and transcripts. They were encouraged by

the fact that Strauss himself signed a contract with Bantam Books to publish four of the transcripts although in the end none were published.

The University's Leo Strauss Center, established in 2008, launched a project, presided over by its director, Nathan Tarcov, and managed by Stephen Gregory, to correct the old transcripts on the basis of the remastered audiofiles as they became available, transcribe those audiofiles not previously transcribed, and annotate and edit for readability all the transcripts including those for which no audiofiles survived. This project was supported by grants from the Winiarski Family Foundation, Mr. Richard S. Shiffrin and Mrs. Barbara Z. Schiffrin, Earhart Foundation, and the Hertog Foundation, and contributions from numerous other donors. The Strauss Center was ably assisted in its fundraising efforts by Nina Botting-Herbst and Patrick McCusker of the Office of the Dean of the Division of the Social Sciences at the University.

Senior scholars familiar with both Strauss's work and the texts he taught were commissioned as editors, with preliminary work done in most cases by student editorial assistants. The goal in editing the transcripts has been to preserve Strauss's original words as much as possible while making the transcripts easier to read. Strauss's impact (and indeed his charm) as a teacher is revealed in the sometimes informal character of his remarks. Readers should make allowance for the oral character of the transcripts. There are careless phrases, slips of the tongue, repetitions, and possible mistranscriptions. However enlightening the transcripts are, they cannot be regarded as the equivalent of works that Strauss himself wrote for publication.

Nathan Tarcov, Editor-in-Chief
Gayle McKeen, Managing Editor
August 2014

Editorial Headnote

This transcript is based upon existing audio files of the course and the original transcription. The course had sixteen sessions, of which four audio files have survived: sessions 8 (incomplete), 11, 12, and 16. The transcript of the remaining sessions is taken from the original transcript. The original transcript can be consulted in the Leo Strauss archive in Special Collections in the University of Chicago Library.

The transcriber abridged most of the passages read aloud. The full content has been supplied by the editor, taken from the editions of the texts assigned for the course. Original spelling has been retained. Citations are included for all passages.

In the sessions for which there are audio files, it is clear that Donald Reinken served as reader of the selected passages from the text, and he is designated by name. In the sessions from the original transcript, the reader, who is most likely to have been Reinken, is designated simply as "Reader."

The transcriber often indicated that a student's question was "unclear" or "inaudible." We have represented this with ellipses in square brackets: [. . .] Ellipses original to the transcript have been retained. In sessions based on the remastered audiofiles, ellipses represent inaudible words.

Greek words were handwritten in the transcript in Greek script. In most instances they have been simply transliterated; when the editor found them incorrect, they appear in square brackets.

The texts assigned for the course were:

Memorabilia, Oeconomicus, Symposium, Apology, trans. E. C. Marchant and O. J. Todd (Loeb Classical Library)(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1923).

Hiero, in Xenophon, *Scripta Minora*, trans. E. C. Marchant (Loeb Classical Library)(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925).

Ways and Means, trans. E. C. Marchant and G. W. Bowersock (St. Edmundsbury Press, 1925)

Athenian Constitution, in *The Whole Works of Xenophon*, trans. Maurice Ashley Cooper, et al. (London: Jones and Company, 1832).

Constitution of the Lacedaemonians, trans. E. C. Marchant and G. W. Bowersock (St. Edmundsbury Press, 1925)

Cyropaedia I and II, trans. Walter Miller (Loeb Classical Library)(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1914).

This transcript was edited by Christopher Nadon, with assistance from Tiffany Bratt, Robert Garrow, Steven Klein, Misha Mintz-Roth, and Evan Weiss.

For general information about the history of the transcription project and the editing guidelines, see the general headnote to the transcripts above.

The Transcript

Session 1: no date
Introduction

Leo Strauss: Now we turn to our subject. Now the first question is: Why do we turn to Xenophon? If we may assume that the study of political philosophy is a legitimate enterprise then surely the study of the origin of political philosophy is particularly defensible. Now the origin of political philosophy: that means, according to an old tradition, Socrates. And Socrates has this special position: not only that he is the originator of political philosophy, but also that he is distinguished by his way of life and not merely by his teaching, his way of life, including his death. And there are very few political philosophers who stand out not only because of their teaching but also because of their way of life. Now Socrates never wrote, and the most famous presentation of Socrates's teaching as well as life is that given by Plato. But in the case of Plato one always fears or is worried about the possibility that Plato has given to Socrates much of what was his own and not yet Socrates. At least as a corrective to the Platonic presentation of Socrates we need Xenophon, who lacks these peculiar qualities which tempted or seduced Plato into in a way magnifying Socrates.

I cannot remain silent about the fact that Xenophon has a rather bad reputation today. He had a very high reputation until the end of the eighteenth century, but then things changed, and it is quite interesting to see who was the first to attack Xenophon's reputation. This was the famous German historian of Rome, B. G. Niebuhr.[i] I didn't know whether he was an ancestor of Reinhold Niebuhr (I have never made any genealogical studies about that), but at any rate Niebuhr was, apart from being a scholar, a statesman in old Prussia and a very distinguished man in this respect. Now why did he debunk Xenophon? This is very interesting. This was in the early nineteenth century, the reaction to the French Revolution, to this attempt of Napoleon especially to establish a universal European empire suppressing the nationalities like the Germans. An emphatic patriotism was very powerful in Germany at that time. This was the basis of Niebuhr's attack. Because what had Xenophon done? In Xenophon's age there was this almost constant conflict between Athens and Sparta; and Xenophon was present at the battle of Coronea between Sparta and Athens on the wrong side, meaning on the Spartan side. Now this was of course simply spoken very unpatriotic. But Niebuhr did not consider the fact[1] with which we are so familiar, that a man may in decency be on the wrong side. Think of the many Germans and Italians who fought in the American army in the Second World War and some other things of this kind: a certain political fact of the utmost importance, that patriotism, dedication to the country may be in conflict with higher duties. The cleavage between the country and its constitution—this great and difficult phenomenon which is so familiar to us in our age, was so familiar in our age, was [also] so familiar in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in the centuries of religious wars and which was so thoroughly familiar to the Greeks—had been blurred for a few generations.

[i] Barthold Georg Niebuhr, historian of Greece and Rome. See *Lectures on Ancient History*, 3 vols., trans. L. Schmitz (London: Taylor, Walton, and Maberly, 1852).

But Niebuhr's case was of course a very special case, and Xenophon's bad reputation is not due to any consideration of this kind. One can say Xenophon is peculiarly alien to modern taste. Both Plato's divine madness plus dialectics, and Thucydides's stern hard-headedness and a sense of tragedy find immediate response. But Xenophon has neither of these two things. Xenophon could at best be characterized by a term coined by the classicists of the eighteenth century: noble simplicity and quiet grandeur. And as you know, these qualities are not in a very great demand in our age, nor were they in the nineteenth century. By studying Xenophon and becoming appreciative of the character of his approach, we help ourselves indirectly toward a better understanding of ourselves as children of the twentieth century. It is that part of our heritage we can say which is particularly alien to us today. So it is not a loss of time.

It is more important to raise the question how we should read Xenophon. And I believe part of the bad reputation he has is due to the fact that he is not read in the manner he wishes to be read. Let me give you a few examples. In his *Anabasis,* which in a way is an autobiographic work of a campaign of which I will speak later, in which he participated and distinguished himself,[2] he describes the marches an army made from the coast into the interior of Asia Minor. He says: "They came to a city which was large, and prosperous, and inhabited."[ii] A few days later they come to a city which was "large and prosperous." Well, what does this mean? Well, all inhabitants had left it, therefore it was no longer inhabited. In this particular context in the first case of this kind he takes the trouble to say a few lines later that the inhabitants had left the city. I will later on explain this in a somewhat more coherent manner.

Let me give you another example. There was a battle there, [and] the right side, at least from Xenophon's point of view, lost. The generals, by an act of treachery, were taken prisoner by the Persian king, and all these generals were executed by the Persian king. And now he speaks of these various generals and gives a description of their character. One of them is a man called Meno, who is a hero of a Platonic dialogue, the dialogue entitled *Meno*. And Xenophon speaks about this Meno as a very bad fellow, a complete gangster and crook, and treacherous. Nothing was more dangerous than to be his friend. And the only people he respected were his enemies, because they watch themselves, and he despised his friends. Now this man was also captured, and whereas all other generals were beheaded by the Persian king, Meno was tortured to death for a whole year. Now one wonders why the Persian king should be so particularly anxious about the moral virtue of these Greeks that he punished the vice of the Greeks in such a particularly harsh way. Now Xenophon doesn't answer this question. The only answer which he gives is this: that after having said that Meno, in contradistinction to the other generals, "was not merely beheaded which is thought to be the quickest death"—"thought to be" because there is a variety of opinion on that subject—"but being tortured for a whole year as a wicked man found his end." Now Xenophon adds this point. He says "he is said" to have been tortured for a whole year and only died at the end of the year.[iii] So in other words, Xenophon makes it clear that perhaps it is too beautiful to be true that the Persian king should have punished vice in this particularly appropriate manner.

I will give you another example. First, I will give you some facts and we will see what he means. At the beginning of the *Education of Cyrus* (which I do not have here), when he speaks of the

[ii] *Anabasis* 1.2.6, 23.
[iii] *Anabasis* 2.6.29.

parents of the founder of the Persian Empire he says [that] Cyrus's father is said to be Cambyses and his mother is universally admitted to be Mandane. I hope you get the point. Yes? Good. Now these are a few specimens of his way of writing. Let me read to you a passage from the *Anabasis*, the end of the speech which Xenophon himself gives there, the end of the fifth book: "It is noble as well as just and pious and more pleasant to remember the good things rather than the bad things."[iv] This is, one can say, the principle: Xenophon prefers to speak of the good things. He is unfortunately compelled sometimes to speak of bad ones, but he does this in a most restrained manner. For example, when these people had left the city, he will not say it is a deserted city; he will simply say it is a city wealthy, and large, and not inhabited. Do you see the point? The bad thing, that it was deserted, is not explicitly mentioned. This is his general procedure. It is noble and just and pious and *more* pleasant, because it is not unpleasant to remember of course the evil which one has overcome. It is enjoyable, but it is still more enjoyable to remember nice things, honors and so forth. This is the way in which Xenophon generally writes, and we must now begin to see what this means.

He makes things more pleasant than they are, not being blind to the unpleasantness but simply because he thinks it is harsh to do it, it is not nice to do it: a certain gentleness. What does this kind of writing mean? In some of the manuscripts of his works he is called the orator Xenophon. He is an orator. And people compare him all the time, and can't help comparing him with Plato on the one hand, because of Socrates, and [with] Thucydides, because he continued Thucydides's *History* and wrote a *History of Greece* which is a continuation of Thucydides's *History*. Xenophon is not a philosopher as Plato nor a historian like Thucydides, but a rhetorician. Yes, he is a rhetorician of a special kind. In the *Anabasis* he tells of a comrade in arms, Proxenus, who had been a pupil of a famous teacher of rhetoric, Gorgias. And by describing the difference between Proxenus, his comrade in arms, and himself, he throws light on his kind of rhetoric as distinguished from that of Gorgias or Proxenus or any other rhetorician. Proxenus was obviously a very fine man. He was also beheaded by the Persian king. He was only beheaded, not tortured to death because he was really a nice man. He was a pupil of Gorgias. And what were his virtues? He was wonderfully good at leading gentlemen, thinking it perfectly sufficient to praise or abstain from praising. But when he had to do with tough guys, the mass of the soldiers, he was absolutely helpless because he couldn't be stern; he couldn't be tough. Xenophon, however, succeeded excellently in both things, in guiding gentlemen as well as tough guys. This is an indication of the difference of what we may call Socratic rhetoric and the ordinary kinds of rhetoric.

By the way, this is confirmed—this analysis of Gorgias and all this kind of rhetoricians is confirmed by what Aristotle says at the end of the *Ethics* about the characteristic of the sophists. Very briefly, the criticism amounts to this: that these rhetoricians or sophists are too sanguine. They believe in the omnipotence of *logos*, which means both reason and merely persuasive speech. *Logos* has great limitations, and there is a recalcitrance to reason and speech on the part of most men. And therefore rhetoric cannot take the place of political science or of politics and cannot even be a very important part of it. In this respect there is agreement between Xenophon and Aristotle.

[iv] *Anabasis* 5.8.26.

In passing, I might mention that in the ordinary presentations of the teachings of the so-called sophists, they are compared with Machiavelli and Hobbes and such men. Now I think there is an element of truth in that, as in all such comparisons. But in the decisive respect it is wrong, because rhetoric did not play any role for Machiavelli or Hobbes, whereas rhetoric was of utmost importance for the sophists. This much I had to say in order to counteract the prejudice against Xenophon which leads to his neglect.

Now let me first turn to a general survey of Xenophon's writings so that we all have an inkling of what this layout of the course means. Now Xenophon wrote, in the first place, four Socratic writings, four writings devoted to Socrates: the *Memorabilia*, the *Oeconomicus*, the *Banquet*, and the *Apology of Socrates*. This is one large part of his work, but you must not think that these are very fat books. The whole Socratic writings are contained in a very small volume. "S" means Socrates. Yes? Now there is another block of writings. One is called the *Education of Cyrus* and the other is called the *Ascent of Cyrus*. *Anabasis*: "ascent." These titles are very funny, incidentally, because the *Education of Cyrus*—we must see what that means. Here the *Ascent of Cyrus* is[3] only the first book of the *Cyrou Anabasis*, but the whole book called the *Ascent of Cyrus* is only the subject of the first book, at the most of the first two books, and the rest deals with [the] *descent* of the Greeks, led by Xenophon to the sea.[v] Now these of course are two very different Cyruses. This was the founder of the Persian empire and this is two or three generations after Cyrus. I do not remember now the exact genealogy, but we are entitled to take them together as a single Cyrus because we read in the *Oeconomicus*, chapter 4, paragraph 16 to 19,[4] [which] will be read to us immediately.

Reader:
"There is a story that Cyrus, lately the most illustrious of princes, once said to the company invited to receive his gifts, 'I both myself deserve to receive the gifts awarded in both classes; for I am the best at stocking land and the best at protecting the stock.'"

LS: That deals with agriculture, and even this prince is a farmer, you know, that is said in praise of farming.

Reader:
"Well, if Cyrus said that, Socrates, he took as much pride in cultivating and stocking land as in being a warrior."
"Yes, and upon my word, if Cyrus had only lived, it seems that he would have proved an excellent ruler. One of the many proofs that he has given of this is the fact that, when he was on his way to fight his brother for the throne, it is said that not a man deserted from Cyrus to the king, whereas tens of thousands deserted from the king to Cyrus. I think you have one clear proof of a ruler's excellence, when men obey him willingly and choose to stand by him in moments of danger. Now his friends all fought at his side and fell at his side to a man, fighting round his body, with one exception of Ariaeus, whose place in the battle was, in point of fact, on the left wing." (*Oecon*. 4.16-19)

[v] Strauss mixes up the titles of the *Education of Cyrus* and the *Anabasis*. The text has been corrected so that the titles match his description.

LS: This is of course the younger Cyrus. But "it is said that Cyrus who has become the most famous king of course." The younger Cyrus never became a king. In other words, Socrates, who had this information of course only through Xenophon—i.e., the historical Socrates didn't have it, and Xenophon knew quite well the difference between the two men—identifies them. This gives us a right to regard them in a way identical, so the conclusion which we can draw now is simply that there are two poles of Xenophon's work: Socrates and Cyrus. Socrates, a philosopher, as we say; and Cyrus, the statesman, king, and general. Therefore this raises immediately the question: What is the relation between these two things? What is the relation between philosophy and politics, including generalship?

Now if you would read *Memorabilia*, book 3, chapter 1, you would see that Socrates possesses the art of the general perfectly. And that means what Socrates states there: he who possesses the art of the general is a general; the mere fact that he has a few stars or not is wholly irrelevant. Generalship consists in the knowledge, in the art, and this Socrates possesses. So Socrates, in other words, is not simply a philosopher: he is a philosopher-general.[vi] But there is this difference: that Socrates does not teach the art of generalship, whereas he teaches, for example, the art of farming; whereas Cyrus, the general, surely is not a philosopher and does not teach philosophy. So there is a certain important difference here[5] which we notice right away.

Now these two men, Socrates and Cyrus, are linked by a third individual who knew them both, and may I ask who that is? Xenophon himself. Xenophon is the link between the two, because Xenophon fought on Cyrus's side against Cyrus's brother, the Persian king. Xenophon as the link presents, therefore, as it were in his being the problem of the relation between this and that, which we may call between theory and practice. That is a provisional difference between Socrates and Cyrus which we have not yet considered, which is also very obvious and which you wouldn't think of because it is so obvious. But perhaps Mr.____ can help us.

Student: Cyrus is a foreigner.

LS: Let us use a harsh word: a barbarian. That is the way in which they would have called it. So that is a Greek and that is a barbarian. And this brings us to another subject: Greekness. Now Xenophon has taken care of that by entitling one of his books *Hellenica*, things Greek; one shouldn't translate it *Greek History*, as is ordinarily done. It means simply things Greek; it reveals to us Greekness. And the book of Xenophon is of course the *Anabasis*, without any doubt.

Now Cyrus is a barbarian but more specifically a Persian, the founder of the Persian Empire. Among the Greeks we find a fundamental split into two poles, like the two poles Cyrus and Socrates, or Greek and barbarians, and that is Sparta and Athens. There is a great kinship between Sparta and Persia. The Persian Constitution described in the first book of the *Cyropaedia* is an idealized Persia, and Athens is rather removed from that. We now have access to some other writings of Xenophon, the writings dealing with Athens politically, the *Athenian Constitution* and *On Revenues*, which is the earliest preserved treatise in political economy. We will see that. And then he wrote also the *Spartan Constitution*.

[vi] Strauss says "a philosopher dash general."

We have now almost covered the whole ground, except one point. Generalship, we have seen, is a very big theme. Now among the arts subordinate to generalship, the most impressive is that of the commander of cavalry, of course, you know. You must not forget that even today the tanks and such troops came into being partly by the transformation of cavalry. At any rate, these men on horseback had doubtless a dignity which no man unhorsed can possibly have. Therefore Xenophon devoted a treatise to the *Cavalry Commander*, and another one *On Horsemanship* altogether. But there is a also an image of the art of war which is most important and has always been regarded as important for understanding the art of war, and that is hunting. Now the gentleman hunter will be on horseback and accompanied by his dogs, of course, and therefore Xenophon also wrote a treatise *On Hunting*, and hunting with dogs.

I think we have now covered—no, we have not yet covered the whole thing, because here is a Greek thinker, and here a non-Greek ruler. And this raises of course the question, especially for the Greek: What about Greek rulers? One is the *Agesilaus* and the other is the *Hiero*, Agesilaus being what we can call a legitimate king of Sparta, and Hiero being a Greek tyrant. This is a survey where I think no Xenophontic writing has been omitted. This may suffice for a general orientation.

We are inevitably more interested to begin with, at any rate, in the Socrates side than in the Cyrus side of Xenophon, although we will devote the latter part of this course to the Cyrus side. But we prepare that by studying Socrates a bit; therefore we have to discuss briefly the Socratic writings of Xenophon, the four Socratic writings, by themselves. Now how are they related? The *Memorabilia* is a book consisting of four books, and the first two chapters of the first book are devoted to the defense of Socrates against the charge that he had committed a capital crime. The bulk of the work is devoted to a different subject. Now let us read the beginning of chapter 3 of the first book of *Memorabilia*.

Reader:
In order to support my opinion that he benefited his companions, alike by actions that revealed his own character and by his conversation, I will set down what I recollect of these. (*Mem*. 1.3.1)

LS: This is the title for the rest of the book: Socrates's benefiting his companions. Now what does benefiting his companions mean? What does the habit of benefiting one's companions mean? This question is answered for us by Xenophon, who is an honest man and answers all our questions. At the end of the *Memorabilia,* if you will read the last paragraph.

Reader:
All who knew what manner of man Socrates was and who seek after virtue continue to this day to miss him beyond all others, as the chief of helpers in the quest of virtue. For myself, I have described him as he was: so religious that he did nothing without counsel from the gods; so just that he did no injury, however small, to any man, but conferred the greatest benefits on all who dealt with him. (*Mem*. 4.8.11)

LS: Let us stop here. Literally translated, "as to benefit those who made use of him in the most important matters." Under what virtue does this fall, benefiting people whom one knows?

Justice. So the bulk of the *Memorabilia* is devoted to justice in this broad sense of benefiting human beings.

The first two chapters deal with a refutation of the charge against Socrates. The charge begins: "Socrates commits an unjust act" by doing such and such things. Refuting the charge means Socrates did not commit the unjust things. Socrates was just, but now in a narrower sense of justice where justice means legality or lawabidingness. So we can say that the *Memorabilia* as a whole is devoted to Socrates's justice, and from this it follows that the three other Socratic writings are not thematically devoted to Socrates's justice. But what is the principle underlying the partition into three of the other Socratic writings? Now this is simple. *Memorabilia* 1.1.19.

Reader:
For, like most men, indeed, he believed that the gods are heedful of mankind, but with an important difference; for whereas they do not believe in the omniscience of the gods, Socrates thought that they know all things, our words and deeds and secret purposes. (*Mem*. 1.1.19)

LS: Let us stop here: "the things said, what is done, and what is silently deliberated." Three things. All human actions are divided into three: speaking, doing, and silent deliberation. Now if you would look at the beginning of the three other Socratic writings, you would see that each of them is devoted to one particular aspect: the *Oeconomicus* to Socrates's speaking or conversing; the *Apology of Socrates* to Socrates's silent deliberation; and the *Banquet*, which is in the middle, to Socrates's action. Here I have to make a qualification. Socrates's action is discussed together with the actions of the other men, because Socrates is not the only man who acts in the *Banquet*. The acts are moreover described as playful actions of gentlemen. So Socrates was in a way not an acting man at all; he acted only playfully as gentlemen act playfully.

This brings us to another question. So this I think is the arrangement of these Socratic writings. but it brings up another question. Is it not most unsatisfactory to have a discussion of the playful actions of gentlemen and not a representation of the serious acts of gentlemen? Where would we have to look for that in Xenophon? The *Hellenica*, the *Greek History*. And for the following reason: because the *Hellenica* do[es] not tell us at all what they are about. This is the only book ever written which begins with the word "Thereafter." Have you ever seen a book the first word of which is "Thereafter"? Now people have a very good excuse for this very extraordinary beginning: this is a continuation of Thucydides's *History*. And therefore he says "Thereafter," namely, where Thucydides had stopped. Now in the first place, I would say no ordinary continuator of the work of another man would do that. Without being prolix, he would say: "What has happened up to this point has been written by Thucydides the son of Olorus, and now here I, Xenophon of Athens, will continue it." One can show very easily by taking the end of the *Hellenica*; the *Hellenica* ends practically with the word "Thereafter." Now that of course cannot be literally true. It means this: the end of the *Hellenica* is the battle of Leuctra, 362. And everyone had expected—again, there was a great mess in Greece—everyone had expected that if this battle is decided either way, this disorder, this chaos, will stop. But it so happened that after the battle of Leuctra the mess was greater than before. And then he goes on to say that, "But what happened 'thereafter' I leave somebody else to tell." So I think we are entitled to say he begins with "Thereafter" and ends with "Thereafter," and this is a very important message which this procedure conveys. What we call history is a sequence of thereafter, thereafter, thereafter,

thereafter. One thing is common to each "thereafter": the world in confusion. And if you look at the annals of all times and places, at least among all civilized nations, you will find that there was always confusion, conflict, transitional periods, or however you will call it. And therefore it is a thoughtful and not a careless beginning.

This much about the writings. Now I would like to say a few words of Xenophon's presentation of Socrates in particular by giving you some examples from the *Memorabilia*, which of course is his most important and most extensive Socratic writing. How does Xenophon present the justice of Socrates? The book is divided into a number of parts (I cannot go into that now), but one particularly clear part is book 3, chapters 1 to 7. And these seven chapters deal with how Socrates dealt with men who were desirous for the noble or beautiful things, for example, for political honors. And the first man is a young man who wants to be a famous general, a man like Agamemnon. He doesn't succeed so very well in that, but the desire for this noble thing is there. And then there are other anonymous people at the beginning. And then we ascend; we come to a live general, which is high, Nicomachides—his very name indicates his interest in battle and victory. And this is a very charming piece, where we find this sentence which should be the motto of a book devoted to the principles of economics: Do not despise the economic men. Today there is no danger, but in Greece there was a danger. Good. And then we come to Pericles, of course not the famous Pericles, but his son Pericles; and then we come to our friend Glaucon, whom you know from Plato's *Republic*. And now let us read the beginning of that Glaucon chapter. Chapter 6.

Reader:
Ariston's son, Glaucon, was attempting to become an orator and striving for headship in the state, though he was less than twenty years old; and none of his friends or relations could check him, though he would get himself dragged from the platform and make himself a laughing-stock. Only Socrates, who took an interest in him for the sake of Plato and Glaucon's son Charmides, managed to check him. (*Mem*. 3.6.1)

LS: Let us stop here. You see, why does Marchant translate it this way? "Socrates being benevolent to Glaucon for the sake of Charmides the son of Glaucon and for the sake of Plato." Why does he invert the order? It is criminal. So you see, we are prepared. When we turn to the next chapter, you will find a conversation between—one thing I must say: Socrates had no interest in Glaucon for his own sake. That's clear. He is interested in Glaucon for the sake of others, and these are of course closer to Socrates, naturally. Xenophon ascends in chapter 7, which is devoted to a conversation between Socrates and Charmides, the son of Glaucon, also a relative of Plato, the Charmides to whom one Platonic dialogue is devoted. So now what do you expect after having seen Xenophon ascending from Glaucon to Charmides? And Charmides you see is after all not from the top drawer. Here it is necessary to mention the patronym, Charmides, the son of Glaucon. And then he mentions another name without patronym, because in that case you don't need it: Plato. Now the rational thing would be chapter 8: Plato. This would be interesting to see a conversation between Socrates and Plato, of which there is no evidence. Let us look at the beginning of chapter 8.

"When Aristippus attempted to cross-examine Socrates," and so on. Chapter 8 and to some extent chapter 9 deal with Aristippus. Now Aristippus as a placeholder for Plato is unbelievable.

But what—why could Aristippus be used to some extent as a placeholder for Plato? What does Aristippus have in common with Plato? He was a philosopher, the founder of the so-called Cyrenaeic School. But the interesting thing in Xenophon's scheme is this. So we have this: ascent from the beginning of the third book until we come to Charmides, who is the highest. Charmides was in his way a great man—he became one of the leaders of the Thirty Tyrants after the oligarchic revolution—but he was apparently a man who combined wickedness with great charm. That appears already from the Platonic dialogue *Charmides*. But he was not an average man. And then we have here Aristippus. And then it goes down very easily; that you will see when he comes later to craftsmen, and then to a beautiful woman of loose manners, and then to a man who had a very poor physique, and then simply nameless people whom Socrates met on various occasions, to the end, chapters 13 and 14. Here the peak, Plato, is missing. We have to figure it out. This is not the only case. In the first chapter of book 4, Xenophon begins as it were from the beginning and speaks of how differently Socrates approached different people: how he talked to type number 1, say, first the best men; and then people who have this kind of defect; and people who have that other kind of defect, and so on. And so Socrates adapted himself to the capacity of different types of human beings. Now let us look at the beginning of book 4, chapter 2.

Reader:
I will now show his method of dealing with those who thought they had received the best education, and prided themselves on wisdom. (4.2.1)

LS: So this is another defective type, obviously, because these are not the best men who believe they are perfectly educated and are proud of their wisdom, without any good reason of course. This he shows by the example of one individual called Euthydemus. And Euthydemus is the addressee of Socrates in the rest of book 4, not in all chapters but almost throughout the whole book. So chapters 2 to 6 of the *Memorabilia* are devoted to Socrates talking to Euthydemus, a rather low class man from the description. There are other low-class types. How Socrates talked to the best types, whose character he described at the beginning of chapter 1 of the fourth book we have to figure out. Xenophon makes this explicit—no, first we turn to book 1, chapter 6, paragraph 14.

Chapter 6 is a conversation between Socrates and a sophist, which is very important. We cannot read that. And Socrates tries to explain to Antiphon his way of life. Now perhaps we read paragraphs 13 and 14, because they are a general statement about the difference between the philosopher and the sophist. Yes?

Reader:
"Antiphon, it is common opinion among us in regard to beauty and wisdom that there is an honourable and a shameful way of bestowing them. For to offer one's beauty for money to all comers is called prostitution; but we think it virtuous to become friendly with a lover who is known to be a man of honour. So it is with wisdom. Those who offer it to all comers for money are known as sophists, prostitutors of wisdom—" (1.6.13)

LS: What they now call intellectuals. Yes? In a way also professors, but that is not so simple. I cannot explain that now.

Reader:
"but we think that he who makes a friend of one whom he knows to be gifted by nature, and teaches him all the good he can, fulfils the duty of a citizen and a gentleman. This is my own view, Antiphon. Others have a fancy for a good horse or a dog or bird: my fancy, stronger even than theirs, is for good friends. And I teach them all the good I can, and recommend them to others from whom I think they will get some moral benefit. And the treasures that the wise men of old have left us in their writings I open and explore with my friends. If we come on any good thing, we extract it, and we set much store on being useful to one another."
For my part, when I heard these words fall from his lips, I judged him to be a happy man himself and to be putting his hearers in the way of being gentlemen. (*Mem.* 1.6.13-14)

LS: "Happy" is perhaps a weak translation of it. "A blessed man," I would translate that. Now this is something which Socrates did according to Xenophon: reading with his friends the books of the wise men of old, and to fish there for treasures. Not a single example of this Socratic pastime is given anywhere by Xenophon. Just as he omits a conversation between Socrates and Plato, and he omits conversations between Socrates and what he calls good natures, men possessing good natures, he also omits a reference to that. I could give other examples.

By the way, there is a conversation between Socrates and Xenophon, chapter 3 of the first book, which only confirms what I said, because Xenophon is treated very badly by Socrates, and he is called by Socrates, as no one else is called by Socrates, "you fool" and "you wretch." Does this remind you of anything?

Student: Comedy.

LS: In Aristophanes's *Clouds*, Socrates there calls his pupil such names. In other words, Xenophon presents his relation to Socrates in an entirely ironical manner. The principle is stated in book 4, chapter 6, paragraphs 13 to 15. Here we have to watch Marchant with particular care.

Reader:
Whenever anyone argued with him —

LS: That is too weak. "Whenever anyone contradicted him on any subject without having anything clear to say but asserted without any proof that someone was wiser or a better statesman or more courageous or anything else of this kind than someone else, then Socrates led the whole *logos*, the whole argument back to the premise in about the following manner." Namely, what is a statesman? What is a statesman? And this is developed in paragraph 14. Now "when the speeches were thus led up to the premise the very contradictors came to see the truth." In other words, after we know what a statesman is, what a true statesman is, we can easily see whether Pericles is a better statesman than Themistocles or whatever the issue might have been. Now let us go on. This he did when he talked to contradictors.

Reader:

Whenever he himself argued out a question, he advanced by steps that gained general assent— (*Mem*. 4.6.13)

LS: That is again not precise enough: "whenever he himself went through something by speech"; in other words, when he had the initiative and not other people, then he walked through things most universally admitted, believing that this constituted the safety of speech. Therefore he had succeeded more than anyone else I know, when he spoke, in making his listeners agree. He said that Homer gave Odysseus the quality of being a safe speaker, i.e., being able to lead the speeches through things which are agreeable, which seem to be true to human beings.

Now Xenophon distinguishes here two kinds of Socratic dialectic. The one he uses when he talks to contradictors, and the other he uses when he talks to noncontradictors; in other words, when he talks to people who merely listen. In the first case, he proceeds in a manner so the truth itself becomes evident to the contradictors. In the second case, he reaches most successfully agreement among all listeners. He does not ascend to the fundamental premises, to the hypothesis as it is called here. But he walks through commonly agreed opinions without ever leaving the sphere of commonly agreed opinions. Now why Xenophon calls the first type, by which he means the intelligent people, why he calls them the contradictors, the somewhat derogatory title, that is a long question, but it is fundamentally the same thing which we have mentioned before. Contradictors—one would have to go through all speeches: Who is a contradictor and who is not a contradictor? And also what the contradiction concerns; I mean, the contradiction may be very low class and uninteresting.

I could specify the points I have made today by speaking about the first chapter of the *Memorabilia*, and I may do that. But first let me see whether I have made myself clear, and any objections, contradictions, and questions are welcome. Yes?

Student: How reliable is Xenophon's account of Socrates?

LS: How can one say? It all depends. When you read Xenophon as you would read Talcott Parsons[vii] or *The Reporter*, or even some better things, then you would of course get the impression that Xenophon is either a kind of retired colonel, Colonel Blimp type, or an English public schoolboy. The latter is the more favorable impression. There is one translator of Xenophon of the last century, Dakyns,[viii] who read him in this spirit of the English schoolboy and therefore his translation and his whole handling of Xenophon is superior to what we find elsewhere—in other words, a man who could not possibly have understood the substance of Socrates. This is I think a fairly general view today. So in other words, a nice gentleman—perhaps a nice gentleman, even that is questionable—but let us say a nice gentleman but of the more equestrian rural type who cannot possibly have understood Socrates. That is a very common view today. There are all kinds of theories [about] which Socrates that is, since it cannot be the genuine Socrates—the Socrates of Antisthenes, and I don't know whom—hypotheses which can all be refuted, but at first glance.

[vii] Talcott Parsons (1902-1979), American sociologist.
[viii] H. G. Dakyns (1838-1911).

I imply, of course, that if one understands Xenophon, one will arrive at a different view. But let me illustrate it a bit. One of the best students of Greek philosophy in the last generation was John Burnet,[ix] the editor of Plato. Now Burnet has this view of the situation: that Xenophon of course understood absolutely nothing of Socrates; that he was attracted to Socrates because of Socrates's outstanding military reputation—you know, at Delium when he retreated with Laches, and at Potidaeia when he saved Alcibiades—and also other things. Now the funny thing is that all these things are known to us through Plato. Xenophon doesn't say a word about that. Xenophon only says that Socrates was a just man, both in peace and in wartime in campaigns. In other words, being a dutiful citizen; when he was drafted he went out on a campaign, but nothing about any military reputation of Socrates. But this grave and fantastic error of Burnet shows of course how powerful the prejudice is. People—and learned people do not make such blunders if they are not absolutely under the spell of a very powerful prejudice. I am sure it is wrong, and I believe I can give some examples. Xenophon says very little about the most important questions on the surface. And one can say he states them in such a way as to create the impression that he knows very little about them or cares very little about them, that he is chiefly interested in Socrates as a kind of stump preacher, on the stump, saying: "Be virtuous! Be temperate!" and all this kind of thing. You know? That is the impression you get from quite a few passages. But when you read these passages more carefully you see they contain many, many other things. But I must say that all these so-simple speeches—which at best are charming, and many of which are, if read superficially, simply insipid, there is no question—all are very well thought through and contain very deep thoughts.

I give you a single example, if I remember that well, and that is a very personal question of Socrates. Socrates was married to Xanthippe, a very well-known woman. And Socrates's son Lamprocles was highly displeased with his nagging mother, and he came to Socrates to complain about it. And Socrates doesn't even dream of talking to Xanthippe about it: he tried to change his son. But Xenophon doesn't say that.[6] There is no conversation between Socrates and Xanthippe, there is only this conversation with his son Lamprocles. Well, I mention only one point. He complained about the fact that his mother—Socrates asked him: Does she bite you? Which, after all, is a great misfortune. And then he says: No, but she tells me things which no man can stand to hear; insults. And then he says: Have you ever been to the theater? Yes. Have you ever heard what terrible insults these actors throw at each other's head? Yes, says Lamprocles, but they don't mean it! Socrates, immediately: Does your mother mean it? You see, the beautiful joke is the ambiguity of "meaning." In one way, the mother does mean it, surely, but in a deeper sense of course she doesn't. The ambiguity of "meaning" is a trick. In all these stories, if they have no other visible virtue [they] have this kind of virtue, but many more.

Now I will answer your question in a more specific way. Now when he speaks in the first chapter of the *Memorabilia* about the first part of the charge which was to the effect that Socrates does not believe in the gods believed in by the city, he speaks of Socrates's pious conduct and then also he turns to a somewhat graver issue in paragraph 10.

Reader:
Moreover, Socrates lived ever in the open—

[ix] John Burnet, Scottish classicist (1863-1928).

LS: In other words, there cannot have been any impious things going on in private because in the morning when the day began he was already in the open the whole day. So everyone can know what he did, and there was nothing unsavory about that. Yes?

Student:
for early in the morning he went to the public promenades and training-grounds; in the forenoon he was seen in the market; and the rest of the day he passed just where most people were to be met: he was generally talking, and anyone might listen. Yet none ever knew him to offend against piety and religion in deed or word. (*Mem*. 1.1.10)

LS: Now wait a moment. You see, the picture he gives [is] of Socrates always in the open, so that everyone could know what he did. And in addition, he is always talking, so there cannot be this possibility of someone always in the open all the day and keep[ing] his thoughts to himself. Then you wouldn't know; but since he is talking all the time, he is absolutely open. Now we come to the point: He didn't do anything impious by deed or speech.

Reader:
He did not even discuss that topic so favored by other talkers, 'the Nature of the Universe': and avoided speculation on the so-called 'Cosmos' of the Professors, how it works, and on the laws that govern the phenomena of the heavens: indeed he would argue that to trouble one's mind with such problems is sheer folly." (1.1.11)

LS: He doesn't translate literally enough, but the main point is correct. Socrates regarded studies of the *phusis* and the *cosmos* as simple folly. Yes? Go on.

Reader:
In the first place, he would inquire, did these thinkers suppose that their knowledge of human affairs was so complete that they must seek these new fields for the exercise of their brains; or that it was their duty to neglect human affairs and consider only things divine? Moreover, he marveled at their blindness in not seeing that man cannot solve these riddles; since even the most conceited talkers on these problems did not agree in their theories, but behaved to one another like madmen. (1.1.12-13)

LS: You see, a very simplistic criticism which any smatterer who has ever heard of philosophy would naturally have: A variety of schools, a variety of opinions; a revolt of simple common sense against all sophistication. That is part of the colonel aspect. Now let us go on.

Reader:
As some madmen have no fear of danger and others are afraid where there is nothing to be afraid of, as some will do or say anything in a crowd with no sense of shame, while others shrink even from going abroad among men, some respect neither temple nor altar nor any other sacred thing, others worship stocks and stones and beasts, so is it, he held, with those who worry with "Universal Nature." (1.1.14)

LS: Let us stop here. You see what madness is. Madness is always a form of extremism. Either, for example, to fear nothing, not to fear even the fearful things; or the other, to fear everything, a

mouse or what have you. And in the other cases too: To do everything in public without any sense of shame; and the other, to be so fearful that you don't even mingle with human beings. Extremes. Now in the same way.

Reader:
so is it, he held, with those who worry with "Universal Nature."

LS: "Worry" is of course a beautiful word. Also from a popular point of view: people who worry about things of no concern to them, say, about the other side of the moon. This was not coined by Xenophon. Good. Yes. What do they do?

Reader:
Some hold that *What is* is one, others that it is infinite in number: some that all things are in perpetual motion, others that nothing can ever be moved at any time some that all life is birth and decay, others that nothing can ever be born or ever die. (1.1.14)

LS: Let us stop here. You see Socrates says: Just as in the common kinds of madness, madness consists in extremism, also among these worriers the madness shows itself as extremism. For we have here the three examples: Some say being is one, and the others they say being is infinite in number; some say everything is always in motion, others say nothing ever moves; again some of these madmen say all things come into being and perish, and the others say nothing ever comes into being and perishes. These are extreme views.

Now just as in the first cases of ordinary madness, we discern easily the mean, which is not mad, namely, to fear not all things or nothing but to fear the things which should reasonably be feared. We are here led also to a mean which is free from the defects of this extremist madness. Now which are these used here? To repeat, let us go step by step: Being is one; being is infinite in number; what is in between? Both are mad views. Because being is one is absurd, for example, Mr. X from Mr. Y. But being in number one is also absurd, that is not perhaps so easy to state, but what is the mean between the two? Being is finite. Finite. And what can this mean, since there are obviously—infinite means innumerable, and since there are innumerable human beings in spite of all population figures. And if you don't believe it in the case of human beings you will believe it in the case of rats, mice, and lice, which have never been counted. Since in one sense obviously innumerable, infinite beings, what can this mean?

Beings many, but finite? I will tell you. We will find evidence for that in the *Oeconomicus*: the classes. The classes of things are finite; in this sense is being finite. You see? That is one point. Now the next point. Everything is always in change, that is one madness, the other, nothing ever changes. Well, what is the middle? Some things never change, others frequently or always change. I mean these are in the simplest way the views which everyone who has ever read Plato knows. Here they are indicated. Why Xenophon leaves it at these and similar remarks—there are more of course, and especially interesting we will find in the *Oeconomicus* about that; in a very practical context, how to arrange your household furniture and other equipment, the doctrine of the kinds and classes or forms is indicated. Why Xenophon proceeded in that manner is a long question, but that he understood these things is also not a question. Yes?

Student: This will probably become clear later on, but does Xenophon know Plato?

LS: Does he not say "Plato"?

Student: Did he know him personally?

LS: So he knew at least of Plato. You see, then we come into the sphere of what would have to be called gossip but is now called biography. Here is an instance of this. The question is: How old were they? When they were born and when did they die? Xenophon left Athens when, in connection with Cyrus's expedition, 401?

Student: 400.

Student: 399.

Another Student: That's the death of Socrates.

LS: Yes, that was Socrates's death. I think Xenophon was not present in Athens when Socrates died, so 401. Now how old was Xenophon? Because Plato's age we know. Plato was born[7] [428-27], so Plato was about twenty-six years [old] when Xenophon left. How old was Xenophon at the time? If I remember roughly, there is evidence for his being at the time about forty years old, and so older than Plato. This has been contradicted by the same Burnet, on the following beautiful ground. In the *Anabasis*, a Greek traitor who happens to be acting on behalf of the Persian king and talking on behalf of the Persian king to Xenophon as a representative of the Greeks calls Xenophon, "young man," [*ō neaniskos*]. And then he says: Well, this applies only to very young men. Xenophon was probably eighteen years old when he left Athens, as barely out of high school, so to speak. But the context—I have heard of people addressing men in their fifties [as] "young man," namely, when they say something which only a young man should really say. In other words, that is not proof at all, the occasional use of the expression "young man." So I would say it is reasonable to assume that Xenophon was already of some maturity, roughly the same age or perhaps even a bit older than Plato. He surely knew him, I have no doubt about that. You see, there are many stories told, but the gossips of antiquity and especially of late antiquity are as bad as the modern gossips. For example, when Plato says in the third book of the *Laws* that the education of Cyrus—you see, book title of Xenophon—was very bad, that is a dig at Xenophon. In other words, these people, mostly German professors, read people like Plato and Xenophon as if these had also been professors at close-by universities making digs at each other. That is of course absurd, because if one understands the third book of the *Laws* and if one understands the *Education of Cyrus*, one sees that there is no serious difference between them. They make gossip out of these things. One knows nothing about that.

The only thing we can know is, when one has understood Xenophon and has understood Plato, to see how this is related. I believe—on the basis of what I understood, which is of course not the whole thing—I believe there is a fundamental agreement between the two, [a] fundamental agreement between the two men. Now there are agreements which are quite striking. For instance, Plato wrote so many dialogues on Socrates, as you know; there is only a single work of Plato in the title of which the name of Socrates occurs: the *Apology of Socrates*. There is only a

single work of Xenophon in which the name of Socrates occurs: the *Apology of Socrates*. Plato wrote a *Banquet*, Xenophon wrote a *Banquet*. Now of course there are infinite theories [about] who ripped what from whom. Did Plato imitate Xenophon, or vice-versa? Since we know nothing about the dates of composition, nothing can be said about that. There is no antagonism of any kind, only Xenophon refuses to speak explicitly—explicitly—about the higher things. I mean such things as the whole doctrine of ideas, mathematics, everything going with that: the idea of the good. You will not find these things in Xenophon.

Someone told me once a long time ago, unfortunately he didn't have the practical wisdom to make a note of it, that he had read in a Renaissance writer that Xenophon was the watchdog of the Socratic circle, meaning that he defended the position—the tradition, one could almost say—against its enemies, and this was the task to which he had dedicated himself. This is a sensible view, which of course does not do sufficient justice to Xenophon but explains to some extent the difference between his treatment and Plato's. But I think it is not necessary to sell you Xenophon, because you will read it and form you own judgment. Is this satisfactory for the time being?

Student: Plato reverenced Parmenides and "the one." It seems from the passage we just read that Socrates rejected both positions as extreme, that there is a deviation of opinion, because Socrates was more reverential to the opinion that being is one.

LS: That is not so simple, because when this question is thematically discussed by Plato in the *Sophist*, the Eleatic Stranger (Socrates not speaking here, but the Eleatic Stranger) is a spiritual descendant of Parmenides, closer to Parmenides than Socrates ever was. This Eleatic Stranger speaks of the necessity of committing parricide: they have to murder Parmenides, of course not the human being, who was dead a long time ago, but to murder his *logos*, his thesis, namely that being is one. There is no question. You must also not forget: here no names are mentioned. It is less impolite to reject a nameless opinion than to speak about a great man who happened to have this opinion by using his name. There is no difference. No, what I want to show is only this. Here we have a clear indication of the philosophic position taken by Socrates as Xenophon understood it. [8]There are obvious differences. Xenophon, one can say, is much more pedestrian. For example, Plato in his dialogues never speaks in his own name. Never. Xenophon always speaks in his own name, even when he reports only some conversation Socrates is supposed to have had. He says: I have heard that he had this conversation. He is always the living link between the reader and the Socratic story. That is one very obvious difference. But on the other hand, there is a simple sign of the difference between Plato and Xenophon. When you read the accusation, the charge against Socrates in the first paragraph of the *Memorabilia*, you see he says the charge against him was about the following, roughly the following. He says "to this effect." This is very ambiguous. That could mean literally or not literally, but Xenophon makes it quite clear that he does not quote literally.

Now it so happens that the text of the charge against Socrates is known, because a later writer, Diogenes Laertius, quotes it literally. Now when Plato quotes the charge in the *Apology*, Socrates quotes it "roughly this." Now if you compare these three versions, the authentic version, Plato's version, and Xenophon's version, you see that Plato takes much greater liberties with the text of the indictment than Xenophon does. Xenophon takes a very small liberty. That reveals the

character of the writings of the two men. Plato is in a crude way, crudely spoken, infinitely more obvious than Xenophon is. I myself have gone through a time, after Xenophon's way of writing dawned upon me, where for quite some time I couldn't stand Plato any more, because that was too loud compared with the still voice of Xenophon, who speaks like a man of the people to men of the people: only those who listen will hear something of a higher order. I have a note here. He substitutes *eispherōn*. This is one point. I think that is the only change he makes. "Importing," only a little change by which I think he wants to make clear the character of his writing. Now there is any other point you would like to bring up? Yes?

Student: You say the *Banquet* is about the playful acts of gentlemen, and no work about the serious acts of gentlemen unless you turn to the *Hellenica*. I wonder if a case can be made for the *Oeconomicus*.

LS: But at the beginning, he says it is said "Socrates conversing," i.e., speaking. You must also not forget, where does Socrates farm? He has a perfect knowledge of farming. Oh, this, by the way, is one of the things one can easily use for discrediting Xenophon. Socrates proves to have a complete knowledge of the art of farming, although he never worked on any farm, of course. And then the farmer-gentleman to whom he talks says: How come you know all these things? How do we go about planting turnips? And then Socrates says: Well, this way. And then he says: But how do you know all these things? And then Socrates says: Well, I once walked past a farmer planting turnips, and then I kept it in mind. And this proves that all knowledge is recollection. The famous thesis, which is here obviously—yes, but some people think he was so dumb, Xenophon was so dumb that that is really all he understood of the doctrine. This is one of the many other signs which one can use for making a strong case against Xenophon's intelligence but which will then break down the moment one begins to read some other passages in Xenophon.

So what was your question? No, I would say the serious actions of gentlemen. I believe that is so. There is another proof of that, namely, when you read the *Greek History* you see especially in the later books a number of explicit excursuses. By an "explicit excursus," I mean "and now let us return to where we left off." Now if my memory does not deceive me, all these excursuses deal with Greek tyrants. That means tyrants are not the subject of the *Greek History*. But according to the simple schema the tyrant is not a gentleman. A book dealing with the serious deeds of gentleman will therefore necessarily exclude any tyrant.

There are some other things which I do not remember now. I think that is defensible. But we must never forget behind these details, which are important because they are the only key unlocking Xenophon. We must never forget the simple, immediately intelligible question: the question of philosophy and politics, the question of theory and practice which goes through the whole book. And each part has many subdivisions; and in political thought proper, the question clearly presented by the antagonism of Athens and Sparta, democracy versus oligarchy—in a way even kingship, because there were Spartan kings. And then this alternative, non-Greek but very important, namely, the absolute king, the Persian monarchy. This is of course the great theme of the *Cyropaedia,* where Xenophon shows how a constitutional monarch, through his native gifts as well as through his education, becomes an absolute monarch and an empire

builder. This is the theme of the *Cyropaedia*. Of course, what Xenophon thought of this interesting experiment, that we will see when we read it.[9]

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[1] Deleted "that."
[2] Deleted "when."
[3] Moved "the."
[4] Deleted "what."
[5] Deleted “with.”
[6] Deleted "You only have."
[7] Deleted "438-437."
[8] Deleted “that.”
[9] Deleted "Well, since there is no further question, we will meet again next Tuesday."

Session 2: January 8, 1962
***Memorabilia*, book 1**

Leo Strauss: I thank you for your very helpful paper.[i] You made many points which are subtle. Now in the first place, you begin with a very sound remark: that Socrates as he appears here, not only in this particular passage but especially here, is Socrates as described by Aristotle. There is no question. And this [Aristotle] proves[1] in his historical survey, and Xenophon himself has proved by his *Greek History*, at any rate, that he was or could be a historian. So one could say, if one wishes that for the historical Socrates, we turn to Aristotle and to Xenophon rather than to Plato. That is a sound beginning; whether it is very important I leave here open.

The next point which you made which was very important is your comparison of the definitions in book 3 with those in book 4. And you described this difference on the whole correctly, by saying in book 3 they are as it were handed out by Socrates, and in book 4 the definitions are dialectical, conversational. It was also very good what you said, that the addressee in the fourth book is chiefly Euthydemus, but also Hippias. And you explained the relation between this simple citizen and the world famous Hippias very well: they are both fools of the same kind. I think that was very well done. Now when you entered into the details, you saw clearly that the key issue throughout is what is, what is the relation of virtue and knowledge. Or it is asserted, at any rate, that virtue is identical with knowledge, but with this difference: that at least to some extent the knowledge concerned is defined in book 4 as knowledge of the law, whereas there is no legal knowledge implied in the knowledge mentioned in book 3. I think that is a very good remark. And you brought this together with the fact that in the discussion of politics in book 3 there is no reference to the actual regime, whereas in book 4 such a reference is made. The actual regime has of course much more to do—these regimes are all defined in terms of law, in addition. This was very sound. Now there are certain points where I am not convinced by what you said. We will take these points up when we come to them. You discerned in the discussion of courage in the third book a distinction between true courage and a courage which is not true courage, and with that I could agree. But the details we must see. We turn to that later.

You asserted—if I understood you correctly; it was not always easy to understand you—[that] physically, [2]the natural difference among men regarding courage is identical with the natural difference among men regarding intelligence. Did you not say that?

Student: Yes. I think it amounts to that.

LS: Well, this would have to be proved. I did not quite understand what you meant by your remark that the whole discussion of virtue and knowledge in the third book is followed by a definition of envy, how you interpreted that. Indeed, it appears quite suddenly and it does not seem to many any sense. What did you say about it?

Same Student: [. . .]

[i] Strauss responds to a student's paper, read at the beginning of the session. The reading was not recorded.

LS: It is a bit far-fetched. But even if I disregard that, the definition of envy in itself is extremely strange. I mean not only the place where it occurs. Do you remember the definition?

Same Student: Yes. It is pain felt at the good fortune of friends.

LS: But a *friend*. Now look at envy. Generally, can you say that envy is essentially displeasure at the good fortune of friends? For example, if Mr. Jones is envious of Mr. Miller's becoming alderman of a certain ward, are they friends?

Same Student: No.

LS: They may not be enemies in any harsh sense, but surely not friends. Good. We will try to solve that.

What we are doing today is of course indefensible, because we merely take out a kind of snippets from the *Memorabilia*. But since we must have an inkling of the *Memorabilia* when we want to understand Xenophon, we chose, reasonably, what at first glance is the most theoretical part of the *Memorabilia*, which is the definitions.

Now let us turn then to chapter 9 of the third book. I mentioned last time the context. I cannot expect that you remembered, therefore I will remind you of it. Book 3, the book by itself, dealing with how Socrates treated men who are desirous for the beautiful or noble or fine things—well, the ambitious men. And he starts from a very insignificant nameless individual, some fellow who wants to become a general: a kind of Agamemnon, and he obviously will never become an Agamemnon. This much is perfectly clear. And then he ascends gradually. At a certain point a named individual is mentioned, a man who had been a general—his whole body covered with scars which he exhibits to the public. And then we go on and finally we reach Glaucon, Plato's brother, and then Charmides, a very outstanding man, a future tyrant. And then we expect at this point to hear Plato, Socrates in a conversation with Plato. This doesn't come off. Instead we get another philosopher, that is, Aristippus. That is the point at which we are. That is at the beginning of chapter 8. And then Socrates converses with nameless people in the rest of chapter 8 and 9. And then he comes down to craftsmen, low-class people socially, and then to a loose woman, chapter 11, still lower. And then to Epigenes, who is treated very badly because he has no other defect than that he has a poor body, but apparently he is still lower than that beautiful woman because she at least has a good body. And then we come in the last two chapters, 13 and 14, to nameless individuals, and these are apparently wholly insipid conversations in which, however, Socrates too proves to be of use to human beings, to benefit human beings. This is roughly the order. So we are here at the top of the argument of book 3. So one must consider the locus of the argument. Yes?

Student: I didn't see in the first seven chapters a simple ascent. There is a cavalry leader in chapter 3. He would be inferior to the man who had been general.

LS: Let us look at it. It is not terribly important now, but still let us check on that. The first was a young fellow who wanted to become a general; then someone elected for generalship; and the

third, it seems to be lower, that's quite true, namely, he was elected to be a commander of cavalry, which is lower than general. That's quite true. And I could not take care of your objection now without rereading it, which I haven't done. Maybe you are right; maybe there is a difficulty here. At first glance there surely is one. But in the next case, surely, a name, the first name is mentioned, and that means he must have been known: Nicomachides. Everyone knows who that is. And then the son of Pericles and so on. I cannot solve the difficulty now. But it is a difficulty at first glance. All right, but let us leave it. Are you satisfied with this qualification? Good.

Now the main point is that we are here at the top, or close to the top, of the argument of book 3. What we will read in book 4 is, in a way, the whole book 4. Then the question: How is the top of book 3, and that means the top of the whole argument of books 1 to 3, related to book 4, which is a kind of repetition of the whole argument? In simple terms: What definitions are better, higher, those given in book 3 or those in book 4? That is the question.

Now let us then see what happens. It begins with the remark that Aristippus tried to refute Socrates as he himself had been refuted by Socrates a former time. That is in book 2, chapter 1. So he wanted to get back at Socrates, and therefore he starts a conversation. But Socrates is not concerned so much with dialectical victory or with refuting Aristippus than with helping his companions: "And therefore he did not answer as those answer who are afraid that the *logos*, discussion, might become entangled, but as people answer who are convinced to do what is proper to the highest degree."[ii] Now I translated roughly; the text is difficult, and it is everywhere changed because people don't think it can be translated as it has come down to us. This would lead us into an infinite question. We keep this only in mind: Socrates is here not the beginner, as he ordinarily is, that he says: Tell what is that? But someone asks Socrates, and Socrates is on the defensive. Now what did Aristippus ask Socrates? Whether he knew something good. And he expected Socrates would say "yes," and then Socrates would say, to give an example, "Money is good"; and then he would show him how bad money can be, or any other thing. And Socrates, in order to avoid that, gives which answer? He says: "Do you mean whether I know something good for fever?" "No," says Aristippus. "For *opthalmia*, eye disease?" Not that either. "For hunger?" Also not for hunger. "But," he says, "if you ask me whether I know something good, it is not good for something, then I don't know it and I don't need it."[iii] That is the first round. So what does this mean? To be good means to be good for something, then I don't know it and I don't need it. That is the first round. So what does this mean? To be good means to be good for something. There is no absolute good—flatly contradicting Plato, of course, with his idea of the good. A simple, practical man's view, [a] retired colonel: a good thing is good for something. And that is Socrates's opinion. Very good. It makes some sense, doesn't it?

And now Aristippus goes on and asks him again whether Socrates knew something beautiful, which is the same word as fine or noble. Socrates says, "Many things." He didn't say that before. Now are the beautiful things all similar to each other? And Socrates says, "Some of them are dissimilar from each other in the highest possible degree." So there is an infinite variety of dissimilar beautiful things. But Aristippus says, "But how can the beautiful be dissimilar to the beautiful?" A famous Socratic or Platonic question. If we call all these things, however

[ii] *Memorabilia* 3.8.1. Strauss's translation or paraphrase.
[iii] *Memorabilia* 3.8.1-3.

dissimilar, "beautiful," there must be something which they all have in common, and [that] something is the beautiful itself. Is this clear, that there must be something in common, and that this is of course what the definition is about, this common element? And then Socrates answers, shies away from this terrific question, and gives examples. For example, he says: "One man is good for running and another good for wrestling." Now he doesn't say "good" here, [but] "beautiful."[iv] Something may be beautiful for that purpose. Socrates explains only why there can be an infinite variety of the beautiful without having however accounted for the oneness of the beautiful in all these cases.

Now we cannot read the whole thing. What does this argument with Aristippus, which ends shortly afterwards, lead to? The good is always good for something. The beautiful proves to be the same as the good. So the good and beautiful or noble are the same thing, and they are always relative—not in the meaning relative to the private opinion of every idiot, but relative to the situation. Not in a present-day relativistic way; relative to something: relative to running, to suffering from pneumonia, or whatever else it may be. Good. Let us try to understand that before we go into any details. What does this mean? We can use a common term for the good and the beautiful, a term with which you are all more than familiar: values. All value is relative: it means always valuable for something, and of course there is nothing of rhyme and reason there. There [is] nothing of an ordering principle, nothing said about that. Whether it is valuable for the salvation of a man's soul or valuable for getting rid of a headache, nothing of this comes into consideration; and surely no attempt is made for one moment to say what does valuable mean as applied to all these things. Very low level of the argument. What does this mean?

This is the whole conversation with Aristippus. I mention in passing that in the discussion regarding the good things, Socrates never swears. In the discussion regarding the noble or beautiful things he swears three times, without having been seduced into that by Aristippus doing it in the first place. Ordinarily the other man swears first and Socrates follows suit, but here is one of the rare cases where Socrates swears, as one can say, spontaneously. Now what is his position? Nothing is simply good. Everything is good or beautiful with a view to what? Is this clear? What follows from that, if this is true, if nothing is good in itself? Let us speak practically, not presupposing any highfalutin' doctrines. As you have seen from Mr.___'s report, a lot is said later on about virtue. In fact, virtue is the theme, the chief theme. It follows, of course, that virtue is not simply good. Virtue must be good for something. It cannot be good in itself, but something else. In this discussion[3] nothing is simply good, like wealth, or the other examples given, because it can also be bad. Virtue too will sometimes be bad. Is that not a necessary consequence? If everything good—let me repeat the points. Nothing is simply good: (a) anything good can also be bad; (b) anything good is good only relative to something else. One can say it is a completely unenlightened utilitarianism, and Socrates has frequently been called a utilitarian. Good for something, but what about that "for"? That comes up. Of course always good for human beings; that is taken for granted. What about man himself, or what about the individual man himself? If he is the point of reference to something else, is he not somehow presupposed to be good, if everything by reference to him becomes good? What is that? We do not know. But we get an illustration in the sequel, and this illustration is given in the absence of Aristippus. For some reason, Socrates did not wish to discuss this, what comes now, in the presence of Aristippus, and we will have to figure out why Socrates didn't wish to do that. Now what is the example? The

[iv] *Memorabilia* 3.8.4-5.

example which Socrates takes is of houses. Houses. We speak of good houses, fine houses. With a view to what do we call them good or beautiful? That is discussed in the sequel. Now we cannot read all this. I will only try to give you an indication by a simple schema: One point we should read, in paragraph 10 at the end, when he summarizes the argument regarding houses.

Reader:
"To put it shortly, the house in which the owner can find a pleasant retreat at all seasons and can store his belongings safely—"

LS: "The belongings" is literally translated "the beings." But this is idiomatic Greek: the things which belong to him. But "the beings" has also the other implication. "The most safe manner." Yes?

Reader:
"is presumably at once the pleasantest and the most beautiful. As for paintings and decorations, they rob one of more delight than they give." (*Mem*. 3.8.10)

LS: Now what Socrates presented before was this very sober view of housebuilding: utility, utility, utility, and no ornamental nonsense, which is simply foolish. But the point of view—you see here he speaks of one thing with emphasis. He make here a distinction: he himself, where he said "the owner"; "he himself." Of course he is "he himself"; he is the point of reference to everything good, bad, fine or ugly, the man, the individual human being. "And where he escapes all unpleasantness of the seasons in the most pleasant manner and can put down the beings in the safest manner." Here the distinction between pleasant and safe. Now this is indeed the point. I make it in the form of a diagram.[v] Socrates starts here first from the two considerations: beautiful and good, and then beautiful and useful. So the good is the useful. But what does beautiful mean? And then he replaces beautiful by pleasant. Now we have an important answer, because everything useful is useful for something. Is it not intrinsically good but good only with a view to what is useful? But that is the *x* which is no longer merely useful but is choiceworthy for its own sake. And we seem to receive the answer: the pleasant. The pleasant; and then pleasant and safe. Safe—naturally, that is one form of the useful. Because if you have—what should it be? I don't know; what any of you would like best, say, some preserved fruit[4], and you deposit it safely in a cool room with a view to future pleasure. So that would be useful in a particular way for future pleasure. Pleasure would remain the highest motive. Good. Let us leave it at that.

Here we can make one passing remark. Aristippus, a man mentioned before, can be said to have been the first teacher of hedonism, the doctrine that the good is identical with the pleasant. He was the founder of the so-called Cyrenaic school, which is the first hedonistic school of which we know. This only in passing. Socrates seems, as it were, after Aristippus—in other words, not to show him how wise Aristippus is; only after he left does he say that. Let us leave it at that for one moment. But now we get a somewhat different impression when we read the sequel, where we left off. The end of chapter 8.

Reader:

[v] Presumably Strauss writes on the blackboard.

For temples and altars the most suitable position, he said, was a conspicuous site remote from traffic; for it is pleasant to breathe a prayer at the sight of them, and pleasant to approach them filled with holy thoughts. (*Mem*. 3.8.10)

LS: So now he goes over from houses in general to houses of the gods and altars, and here which consideration alone is mentioned? Pleasant. Only pleasant; there is nothing said of utility here. Now what is the implication? What can this mean? So temples have no utilitarian purpose, only a purpose of pleasing. What can this mean? What is the contribution of that to the issue of hedonism? Well, if the emphatically good is the pleasant, then temples are infinitely better than houses. Is that not obvious? And this is surely not what Aristippus meant. This we know. So you see hedonism is not such a simple thing as Aristippus seems to have thought. This much we can say. But there is one more point. You remember that beautiful is transformed into pleasant and good is transformed into the useful or the safe. The last step of the argument, however, is pleasant and beautiful. We learn surely this much: that we have not yet solved the question of the relation of the beautiful and the good. Yes?

Student: Can you explain how you see beautiful as opposed to pleasant in the last step?

LS: But you see the point is that he does not here explicitly speak of the beautiful. By implication you can say he does, when he speaks of *propōdestatēn*, the "most appropriate," "most seemly." That is of course akin to the beautiful, but it is not explicitly said.

So what appears is this. The distinction between the beautiful and the good, which is inevitable, it seems—was inevitable surely for the Greeks; we come back to that more than once—is very difficult to maintain, and yet somehow it must be maintained. The relation between the pleasant and the beautiful is also complicated in itself. For example, beautiful means emphatically the resplendent, say, honor, great honor, victory. This is a special kind of pleasure, you can also say, but also distinguished from the pleasures in the ordinary sense, the pleasures of the senses. I will not go into that now. Let us leave the question open and see what we learn from the sequel.

After this initial discussion of the good and beautiful, and after having, as it were, moved from the surface a bit but by no means solved the difficulty, he turns now to the more concrete question of the virtues, i.e., of the good or noble—beautiful—habit. And of course that is the most interesting part of the question of the good and beautiful. Now Socrates is here asked by someone, an anonymous man, whether courage, manliness, is teachable, comes by teaching, or by nature. Here the ordinary question, "What is?" is not raised. The question raised is: Is courage, whatever [it] may be, teachable or by nature? But it is of course not Socrates's fault, because he didn't begin it. Someone else began it, and this other fellow did not think it necessary to raise the question what courage is, because everyone knows what it is. Good. But this is a good reason for Socrates not doing it, then; it is not a good reason for Xenophon doing it. Do you see the difference here? Because why did Xenophon arrange things so that someone else asks the question: "Is courage teachable or natural?" instead of raising first the question: "What is courage?" And we must see later why Xenophon doesn't raise the question, "What is courage?" Good.

Now we must keep one great thing in mind. We have heard before from the mouth of Socrates that nothing is simply good, hence that no virtue is simply good. No virtue is simply good. And we must not forget that. Now while the question "What is virtue?" is not raised, it is in fact answered. And what is the answer, the clear answer given by Socrates? What is that?

Student: [. . .]

LS: No, no, that is not the decisive point. It is not explicitly given, but it is given in fact, namely, strength of the soul. Strength of the soul. [For] those who like to know a bit more about the way in which people like Xenophon write, I might mention the fact that in the first part of chapter 8, where you find an enumeration of good things, nine good things are mentioned, and the central one is strength. Now strength might also mean strength of the body. Strength of the body is not universally good. If you have any doubt about that, I advise you to read book 4.2.32, where Xenophon gives this very low example of the badness of bodily strength, namely, if you are very strong you might be drafted into the army in wartime. And this proves that bodily strength is not a good. But the implication is, of course,[5] [and this] is crucial: strength of the soul is universally good. So we cannot leave it entirely at this general, sweeping remark that there is nothing good which is not also bad. Does the term "strength of the soul" remind you of something you have heard? Did we not read Rousseau last quarter? And haven't we found that definition in Rousseau too, strength of the soul? There are many men in between who said it, but just in passing, so that has a long career afterward: virtue is strength of the soul. Yes?

Student: If virtue is strength of the soul and that might be taken to be a universal statement, does that contradict the first statement that nothing is simply good?

LS: It would seem to. Let me dispose of a minor incorrectness. Virtue is strength of the soul. Courage is a certain kind of the strength of the soul, namely, strength of the soul in regard to fear-inspiring things, death, wounds, and other things. Good. I think it contradicts the first thesis, so that in other words the general statement that there is nothing good which is not also bad is simply not true. It needs a qualification. There is one or the other thing which is simply good; and if you don't believe me, I ask you to make an experiment. Can strength of the soul on any level ever be bad? On the lowest level, that strength of the body can be bad, we have seen; you may be drafted into the army and expose yourself to all kinds of dangers to which you would not be exposed if you were not drafted into the army. But what about strength of the soul? Because after all, someone who has a weak body can have a strong soul. Can this strength of the soul [ever] do him[6] any harm as such? Accidentally, connected with something else, but then the something else will do him harm, not the strength of the soul. But let us make that experiment and see whether you find a case where strength of the soul harmed a man.

Student: [. . .]

LS: If we have time we will run across a passage where we find almost a statement to this effect, that something is simply good, and we consider its relation to the strength of the soul. But let us leave it—

Student: I could give a deliberately fallacious one, how strength of the soul is to be understood as wisdom: a brave man might rush in and get a cat out of a burning building, but if he were a little stronger-souled he might consider whether it were better . . .

LS: You give the whole show away, Mr.____, because what he is aiming at, I believe, is that strength of the soul, if it is not identical with wisdom, is at least very much akin to it.

Student: I didn't mean to let the cat out of the bag.

LS: Didn't you also speak of cats as well? However this may be. Now the difficulty here is, and this was the point raised by Mr.____, that he also identifies courage in this context, courage with daring, boldness, which of course can be very bad and surely is not always good. Let me first finish this point. Now courage, and in a way virtue, in general requires both nature and care, nature and training as I think; and he proves this by a number of questions. But we still have one great question which has not been answered: Is courage good? Because what I said about strength of the soul, this is of course not explicitly said. So we are still completely bewildered. You remember from what we have heard before that everything good is also bad from a different point of view. Is courage, or virtue in general, always good? Let us read the end of paragraph 3.

Reader:
"Hence it is clear that all men, whatever their natural gifts, the talented and the dullards alike, must learn and practice what they want to excel in."

LS: "That in which they wish to become worthy of being mentioned." That would seem to mean virtue is good if a man wishes to become famous. So that thing for the sake of which virtue is good is honor. From this point of view, honor would be a higher good than virtue. But we must see whether this really works out. Now your question.

Student: [. . .]

LS: Well, may I restate your question? What is this strength of soul? When we hear the expression "strength of soul," I think we must have some notion, but of course it can mean also lower things. For example, there is a thing they have called for about two hundred years energy. An energetic man. Did you ever hear that? And this is partly a substitute for what was formerly called strength of soul. So we must leave this open. What I wanted to bring in was only this consideration. Perhaps there is something which is unqualifiedly good, and not as all other things qualifiedly good, namely, things which can also be bad. Do you see that? Now then this was the summary of the discussion regarding courage. There the question of "What is courage?," to repeat, was not raised.

In the sequel it is stated explicitly that all virtue is wisdom. All virtue[7] of course would apply retroactively also to courage, if courage is indeed a virtue. But is courage a virtue? This we don't know. I believe it has never been said. It has never been said, if I remember well. Let us keep in mind this question. We are now confronted with the assertion that all virtue is wisdom, and this is the crucial, very well-known Socratic assertion.

Now how does he begin at the beginning of paragraph 4? "He did not distinguish wisdom and moderation." This could also be translated: "He did not separate from each other wisdom and moderation," and this is the better translation insofar as it is deeper, and can be maintained throughout Xenophon. Whereas the assertion that he did not distinguish them is refuted already in book 4, where he clearly distinguished wisdom from moderation. But for the time being, it reads as if Socrates simply had identified wisdom and moderation and again identified moderation with continence (*enkratia*). Wisdom—we know what wisdom is, we don't have to define it. Moderation has an enormous range of meaning but it is, for example, also used by Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics*: when he speaks of moderation it means temperance regarding the sensual pleasures.

Student: In the translation, they use the word "prudence" instead of "moderation."

LS: Well, sometimes *sōphrosunē* can have the sense [of] prudence in certain contexts. It can also mean modesty. For example, someone not thinking highly of himself, and being sensible in that because he shouldn't think highly of himself, is also called *sōphrōn*, moderate. I will translate this Greek word always by "moderation" even if it is hard in the context, in order not to minimize the difficulties. Now to repeat, here Socrates seems to say wisdom equal to moderation equal to continence. And this is of course an extraordinary view of wisdom,[8] [though] it is not a completely strange view, [as] when we speak in popular parlance of philosophy today. I mean not only today but for many generations, because today philosophy has no longer any meaning, as you know. It means exactly the same as unreasoned habit; for example, if someone speaks of the philosophy of foreign relations of an unintelligent Secretary of State. I have expressions like this, not exactly like this, that I made up myself: It is my philosophy to take a hard boiled egg for my breakfast, where it simply means a habit. It can also be of course a wholly unreasoned habit. Let us forget what philosophy means today; that is simply disgraceful and disgusting. But in a more respectable popular tradition, when you say: "He behaves like a philosopher," for example, in the case of misfortune or adversity or whatever it may be, or also on other occasions, that has a certain sense to a certain extent. Now philosophy in this popular meaning comes close to continence, a kind of self-control not only regarding the pleasures, but also regarding fears and grief. But still one must say it is a very popular view of philosophy. And surely that is one reason why they think Xenophon understood nothing of philosophy, because his Socrates can make such remarks. That the same Socrates makes also other remarks they do not consider at the same time, and therefore they can be satisfied with that. Good.

Now what does this mean? Socrates did not separate wisdom and moderation. He did not separate knowledge and use, knowledge and choice: to know that something is good means also to act on that knowledge, otherwise you do not truly know it. To know means to choose. The distinction between knowledge and choice, between theory and practice, is not possible. This implies, of course—that is the famous story discussed in the first book of Aristotle's *Ethics*—that Socrates, who was said to have taught that, had to deny the possibility that a man may know the right and yet do the wrong. Famous case: *meliora proboque, deteriora sequor*.[vi] I know the better things and I approve of them, and yet I follow the worse course. Some people [9]know they shouldn't do it under any circumstances, yet do it. You must have heard, read in books, of such

[vi] Ovid, *Metapmorphoses* 7.20-21.

people. And Socrates seems to have been such a blind man that he did not know of these things, although Greek poetry was full of such examples.

Now this is also applied in the sequel to justice, but in no case here does Socrates define wisdom, or moderation, or continence, or justice. But one thing is clear now. The goodness of virtue is now taken for granted, although we had been told at the beginning nothing can be simply good. Now it is simply taken for granted that virtue is simply good. How can he do it? How can he now take it for granted that virtue is good, although we have been told nothing is simply good, but is also bad. We must use our head a bit for that. Yes?

Student: I think it is because virtue means knowing how to use things.

LS: Very good, but can you make it quite one hundred percent clear to the meanest capacity?

Student: In section 8, a thing is good only if used for the purpose for which it is employed. Well, virtue is knowledge about the purposes, and therefore virtue tells you how to use things properly.

LS: Now I will try to explain it very simply. Let us take an example. When Aristippus asks Socrates this insidious question, he expected Socrates to say, for example: Health is good. Good. And then he would show him the cases where health was bad: If that fellow had been sick at that time, he would not have committed that murder and would never have been hanged. Good. Everything in particular can be bad. But then of course the question arises: In the cases in which it is bad, not to touch it; and the cases in which it is good, to prefer it. Is it clear? Now what is it which enables a man to choose the things insofar as they are good, and reject the things insofar as they are bad? That is wisdom. And therefore it follows from the very denial of anything simply good that there must be something simply good. Is it clear? If you think not merely of the brute fact of denial, but of the ground of the denial—the denial means of course that in some cases, say, health is good, and in other cases health is bad. It is a reasoned distinction. Now a stupid man would simply leave it at the denial and forget about the reason, which one can never do, you see, because the reason gives you a hint also of the principle, whereas the mere brute fact of denial is not clear. And then you arrive at this conclusion. You understood the main point very well.

Student: You say wisdom is like the best law or a good law, because a good law commands you to do what you ought to do and not to do what you ought not to do.

LS: [10][It] is not clear to me what you mean by that.

Student: Wisdom is like the good law.

LS: But it has an infinite flexibility which the good law doesn't have; therefore that example is not good. But it is like a law insofar as it commands and forbids, which is what you meant, yes? Good. Now was there any other point regarding these things, this point here? I think we have made some headway.

So after having made clear that all virtue is some wisdom, he must also speak of vice: tell us, as it were, see whether this works when we look at the vices. If virtue is wisdom, vice is ignorance. That is clear. This seems to be still more strange than to say virtue is wisdom. When we speak of a vicious man, we don't mean an ignorant man; we know many ignorant men who are not vicious, very good-natured ignorant men whom no one would call vicious. So Socrates has to take this up and he does that in paragraph 6 of chapter 9. And quite abruptly he says: "Madness, he said, is indeed opposed to wisdom, but he did not say that ignorance is madness." So what he does is this: he changes now the terms. We should have expected wisdom/ignorance, and he says well, no, let us speak of madness. Wisdom/madness. Do you see? And this of course affects naturally the meaning of wisdom. Of two terms which are correlative, if the meaning of one is changed the meaning of the other terms is affected too. What does he mean by that? What does it amount to? Let us read the sequel.

Reader:
Nevertheless he did not identify ignorance with Madness; but not to know yourself, and to assume and think that you know what you do not, he put next to Madness." (*Mem*. 3.9.6)

LS: So you see here one point: Ignorance means now ignorance of one's self. And hence wisdom means what? Self-knowledge. Good. Yes? But may I say also now this lack of self-knowledge; he did not say it is madness. He said it was very close to madness. Now go on.

Reader:
"Most men, however," he declared, "do not call those mad who err in matters that lie outside the knowledge of ordinary people: madness is the name they give to errors in matters of common knowledge. For instance, if a man imagines himself to be so tall as to stoop when he goes through the gateways—"

LS: He can be very explicit, you see that. Now go on.

Reader:
"or so strong as to try to lift houses or to perform any other feat that everybody knows to be impossible, they say he's mad. They don't think a slight error implies madness, but just as they call strong desire—"

LS: *Eros*.

Reader:
"so they call a great delusion madness." (*Mem*. 3.9.7-8)

LS: Yes. Here Socrates refers to the difference of his usage from popular usage. Popularly a man is not called mad until he is strikingly mad. But in a more sophisticated sense of the word, madness [is] everyone who lacks self-knowledge—and not only in such a crude way that he thinks he is ten feet fall when he is only four feet tall; that is not a serious case. But if someone thinks, for example, he knows he can pass the preliminary examination (to take a simple example) and he is not properly prepared, that is also madness, although we ordinarily don't call such a man mad because it would lead to an unreasonable enlargement of the sphere of madness.

Of course Socrates means that in a way every man is mad, because who can claim of himself that he knows himself? So that the opposite of wisdom, to come back, is madness.

Now what do we learn about wisdom from this? At least this much: That wisdom in any form—moderation, self-knowledge—is wisdom if one chooses what is most conducive to one's self on that basis. Now let me explain that. We had started from the most general question: What is good? And we have seen [that] good is always relative to something, to the purpose at hand, but ultimately to the individual himself. Now how can you choose what is good for you in this situation if you don't know yourself? Is it not clear? Therefore there can be no goodness, no choice of the good, without self-knowledge. And it is also clear that in this act knowledge and choice are inseparable from one another; and of course Socrates was famous for his demand for self-knowledge—that you probably know from the general literature on the subject.

Now these things are rich with many more implications, but it would only be confusing if I were to speak of that now coherently. But one point I must mention, otherwise we will not understand the context. We have here seen wisdom opposed to madness. Of course in ordinary language the opposite of wisdom is not madness but simply stupidity: unwisdom or however you call it. But it is common to use madness as the opposite of moderation. For example, from political usage in Athens: the antidemocrats, the better people, regard themselves as moderate people. They are not as noisy and passionate as the common people. And how do they call the *demos*? *Mainomenoi*: madmen, because they are so emotional, as they would say today. So madness is really the opposite of moderation. But since Socrates has here identified wisdom and moderation, he could understand madness as the opposite of wisdom. But there is also another opposite of moderation, very frequently used, where moderation has a richer meaning—not merely temperance regarding food or drink—and that is *hybris*, let us say insolent pride. Now *hybris* is of course not in its primary meaning the same as madness. For example, if you take a fellow like Alcibiades, *hybris* incarnate, he is not a madman, precisely, but a man full of *hybris*. But still both are understood as opposites of moderation. The madmen as well as the man of insolent pride have one thing in common, of course: they lack self-knowledge. Either self-knowledge in the narrower sense or self-knowledge in the wider sense that they do not have knowledge of the limitations of man as man, which would be more the case of a man of *hybris*.

We turn now to the next subject, which is introduced without any introduction: envy. And envy is defined as displeasure at the well-being of one's friend. And that is surely a strange statement, because look at what we understand by envy—or if you think that is perhaps a modern prejudice, read Aristotle's definition of envy in the *Rhetoric*: you will see there is no limitation whatever to the friends. That is strange. Let us leave that open as a great riddle. We may be able to solve that later. The next subject is leisure, also introduced without any justification. Now what does he say? Leisure is a kind of doing something. In other words, leisure is not inactivity, laying on a hammock or something of this kind. Namely, what? Because even those who play backgammon and those who make fun, you know, sit together in a bar and make jokes—even they do something; they are not inactive. Good. But what kind of doing is it? That kind of doing which consists in doing the worse instead of the better. That would seem to be it because he says—let us read paragraph 9. Looking or examining leisure what it is . . . Yes?

Reader:

[Considering the nature of Leisure],[vii] he said his conclusion was that almost all men do something. Even draught-players and jesters do something, but all these are at leisure, for they might go on and do something better. (3.9.9)

LS: You see, that's the point. They are at leisure. Why? Because they could do something better. Is that it? Now leisure then would mean doing the worse instead of the better. Is that it? Because they could do something better. If that is the reason we call the gamblers being at leisure, because they could do something better, then it means to be at leisure doing the worse instead of the better. Is this not the meaning? Well, I ask your help, because this is very difficult.

Student: Is this like sin, always missing the mark of what you could have done?

LS: All right. That is even more general, what you say. Say leisure is sinning. All right. Now let us go on, what does he say in the sequel?

Reader:
But nobody has leisure to go from a better to a worse occupation. If anyone does so, he acts wrongly, having no leisure. (3.9.9)

LS: Yes. Now here he seems to say just the opposite. Is that not so? Absence of leisure, *ascholia*, is going from the better to the worse, and means acting badly. It is difficult, very difficult. Let me make a provisional suggestion, which is in no way a solution of the difficulty, remaining closer to ordinary understanding and common sense. And let us take the second suggestion: Leisure is a kind of doing which consists in doing the better instead of the worse. If that is so, then leisure would be identical with doing well. Now this is of course a view which we know from other famous Greek writers, Aristotle especially: the leisurely activities are the good, the highest activities, because leisure doesn't mean relaxation. Relaxation is low—which we need, but it is a low thing. And then comes leisure, and leisure is the highest activity of the mind. Never forget that our word "school" is derived directly from the Greek word for leisure. It is highly ridiculous, I admit that, but it is nevertheless remarkable. It reminds us of what a school should be, and not of what it is in all cases. It is meant to be the place where we are engaged in the highest activity of which we are capable. That is [what is] meant by school. Therefore if you are interested, you can ask for money for a research project about higher education: there would be a justification for it. I don't believe you would get the money. Good.

And now he turns suddenly to politics for the first time. Politics, practical activity, is surely not leisure, and perhaps the darkness of paragraph 9 is due to the fact that after having spoken first of the virtues in general he turns now to politics. Now what does he say about politics? What is the general thesis here? Very simply: Ruling, kingship, is knowledge. Just as he had said before "Virtue is knowledge," he now says kingship or ruling in general is knowledge. And he says the men ordinarily called rulers or kings are not rulers at all because they are ignorant. And he gives five examples: "Neither those who have the scepter nor those who have been elected by anybodies, nor those who have been elected by lot, nor those who have come to rule by force, nor those who have come to rule by deceit are rulers, but those who know how to rule." The center is those who have been elected by lot, and this is as it should be. Why? Why is election by

[vii] The opening phrase of the paragraph is missing from the transcript and is supplied here in brackets.

lot in the middle? Which regime is characterized by election by lot? Democracy, I see. And Socrates lived under a democracy. So this is of course a criticism of all ordinary regimes, but emphatically of democracy as it was understood in classical antiquity. Sure. And the center that is always the rule, whatever is in the center is most important in the context. And how does he go on to say—but there are of course great difficulties if somebody says Macmillan[viii] is not a ruler, is not a Prime Minister, it would be absurd. He is obviously Prime Minister, because he has been legally elected. And therefore great objections arise and they are discussed in the sequel. The implication of course is this: the ruler or king is a kind of physician of the soul. Well, have you ever seen a physician who has not properly trained for that? Or the other example is a pilot. He is also a possessor of an art. But then an objection is raised in paragraph 12 that the tyrant is under no obligation to obey the sensible man; obviously not. And tyrant stands here for any ruler who doesn't have the knowledge of ruling. What does he say? Read paragraph 12.

Reader:
If anyone objected that a tyrant[ix] may refuse to obey a good counselor, "How can he refuse," he would ask, "when a penalty waits on disregard of good counsel? All disregard of good counsel is bound surely to result in error, and his error will not go unpunished."
If anyone said that a despot can kill a loyal subject— (3.9.12-13)

LS: "Despot" is of course nonsense: "a tyrant." That he[x] always does, I know.

Reader:
"Do you think," he retorted, "that he who kills the best of his allies suffers no loss, or that his loss is trifling? Do you think that this conduct brings him safety, or rather swift destruction?" (3.9.13)

LS: What does he say then? The tyrant will not remain tyrant if he doesn't listen to wise people. More precisely, the tyrant is tyrant only if he participates in wisdom through listening to the wise. Now what is true of the monarchs, the illegitimate monarch, is of course also true of the illegitimately ruling few or many. All ordinary regimes are tyrannical regimes. But they can last as tyrannies only if they listen to some extent to wise people. It is of course very nastily expressed, since he chooses the most hateful example, the example of the tyrant. Now the tyrant is tyrant only by participating in knowledge through obeying the man who knows how to rule, and this man who knows how to rule would be an ally of the tyrant from the context—a collaborator, as they say, using twentieth-century language.

Student: Would it be also possible to interpret that paragraph to mean that while a tyrant might maintain his rule without the best counsel, but that some form of providential punishment might keep the tyrant in bounds?

LS: I think we should leave it here at what he means: knowledge is so essential to ruling that an ignorant man or body of men rules only by virtue of some vicarious participation in knowledge. Such a vicarious participation for example can be being subject to a law framed by a wise man,

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[viii] Harold Macmillan, British Prime Minister from 1957 to 1963.
[ix] In the translation, "tyrant" is "despot."
[x] That is, the translator.

you know, or to a constitution which is in principle unalterable. Now if this is so, then the rulers, however ignorant, participate in wisdom by being subject to that unchangeable law.

Student: But there are tyrants who simply refuse to be subject to the law.

LS: You see what Socrates says: They will be destroyed. This is not quite sufficient, probably; I will admit that. And therefore we can leave it only for the time being at this observation: that in this chapter, in this discussion, the key thesis is "Virtue is knowledge," ruling is knowledge. Vice is ignorance. Subjection is ignorance. A man who is a subject in the true sense of the word subject is an ignorant man. The wise man can never be a subject, that is also implied. Now how this is compatible with very well known facts in all ages, that perhaps we must find out later. But you see how necessary it was for Xenophon to write more than these few pages, because we are left here in the dark.

The time is proceeding. In paragraph 14 Socrates is again asked a question, just as in the case of courage, and now here he is asked: What is the most preferable thing? And the answer is: Doing well. Doing in the emphatic sense: *doing* well; you know, not as it is frequently used—he is doing well, meaning he has a nice income and nice kids and so—but doing, acting, well. And this acting well, *eupraxia*, as distinguished from *eutuchia,* being lucky. To be lucky, that depends entirely what kind of luck you have. But the thing which is most preferable to everything else is doing, acting well. And this means to do well, of course, after having learned it and after having undergone the proper training. Here we have an answer to our question. At the beginning, an infinite variety of things which are good but which are only relatively good; they can also be bad. And we obviously need a principle for distinguishing between the point of view from which these things are good and the point of view from which these things are bad. The primary answer was: the individual. What is good for him in any particular situation is good, and what is bad for him in a particular situation is bad. But the individual is much too indefinite, because the individual himself can be bad, and so what is good for a bad man is less good than would be good for a good man, and all other kinds of individuals. In other words, we have to know, we have to have a better answer than merely self-knowledge.

What does it mean to know oneself? It means of course to know whether and to what extent one is good and the extent to which one is bad. It is impossible to speak of any other self-knowledge. For example, if you know that you are given to wasting money, to spending more money than you have, this is absolutely unenlightening if you don't know that this is a bad habit. So self-knowledge means knowledge of oneself in the light of goodness and badness. So what is the good and bad in the light of which the point of reference, the individual, has to be viewed. And here the answer is given: Doing well, acting well, the virtuous life.

But someone could still raise the question: Why is doing well good? Why is what is ordinarily called by the Greeks happiness or felicity good? Could not one raise this question perhaps? Let us read paragraph 15.

Reader:

"And the best men and dearest to the gods," he added, "are those who do their work well; if it is farming, as good farmers; if medicine, as good doctors; if politics, as good politicians. He who does nothing well is neither useful in anyway nor dear to the gods." (3.9.15)

LS: Yes. You see, here he seems to say goodness or felicity seems to consist in usefulness. The man who acts well is useful, of course, to others. That is one point of view. And the other point of view mentioned is beloved by the gods. This seems to imply felicity is not intrinsically good, but good with a view to (a) other human beings and (b) to the gods. So the question is again open. I mention now only one implication. It is here taken for granted that the good man is beloved by the gods or, which is in Greek the same word, that he is a friend of the gods. So the gods like the man who acts well. The gods like him. But what does this imply? They are not envious of his felicity. The view that the gods are envious of the happy man, the man of felicity, amounts to the absurdity that the gods are envious of their friends. And now you understand the definition of envy. When he spoke of envy as dissatisfaction, displeasure at the well-being of one's friends, he had in mind the great question of the envy of the gods. This I believe is the only explanation.

So it is very late, but since we have so many things to discuss next time, I must at least say a few more words about the discussion in *Memorabilia*, book 4. Now what are the difficulties which we had in book 3 here? I think they are two. The first is, it is not clear what is the principle of order among the innumerable good and beautiful things: which is higher, which is lower, and which is the highest good, of course, too. And second: In what sense is virtue knowledge, and in particular in what sense is kingship knowledge? Now the discussions in book 4 are addressed to Euthydemus, a man who is probably lower in rank than the addressees of book 3, chapters 8 to 9. How does it begin? We turn to the beginning of chapter 3 of the fourth book.

Let me try to translate the beginning literally: "Socrates didn't hurry his companions to become skilled in speech and skilled in deeds and skilled in devices." Devices can also mean plumbing. It can also mean wiles. He didn't hurry them. "But he thought that prior to that they should acquire moderation."[xi] So the basic stratum of the Socratic teaching concerns moderation, before they acquire any other virtue. Now this is divided into two parts, as you will see when you read the beginning of chapter 3 and chapter 4. Moderation is now something very different from wisdom. Moderation consists of two parts, piety and justice. They are no longer understood now as parts of wisdom. And piety means—it is not formally defined, but it appears from the context—revering the gods and honoring them, being grateful to the gods. This is Euthydemus's formulation. Or being pleasing to the gods by sacrificing to them as the law of the city dictates. And it is perfectly clear that this does not have anything to do with wisdom insofar as everyone can hear what the *nomos* dictates and obey it. This much about piety, which was not even mentioned in the parallel in book 3.

The next subject is justice. Socrates's assertion here is—not Hippias, Socrates: Just [is] equal to legal. And legal means of course what the law of the city says. And Hippias says: If this is so, how can justice be in any sense respectable? Because what foolish laws there are, and all kinds of things. Let us see Socrates's answer to that in chapter 4, paragraph 14.

[xi] *Memorabilia* 4.3.1.

Reader:
"Laws," said Hippias, "can hardly be thought of much account, Socrates, or observance of them, seeing that the very men who passed them often reject and amend them."
"Yes," said Socrates, "and after going to war, cities often make peace again."
"To be sure."
"Then is there any difference, do you think, between belittling those who obey the laws on the ground that the laws may be annulled, and blaming those who behave well in the wars on the ground that peace may be made? Or do you really censure those who are eager to help their fatherland in the wars?"
"No, of course not." (4.4.14)

LS: "By Zeus, not I." This is absurd to blame soldiers who behave well in war and for the same reason—but what is the *tertium comparationis*? What does war have in common with change of laws? Is it not funny? Is it not extremely strange? What is it? I believe one can explain it as follows. Let us do it this way: Here we have war and peace, that's clear. War is change and peace is stability. That is the assertion. Does this make sense?

Student: I thought the comparison was that just as war can pass into peace, the law might be amended, so repeal of law is the equivalent of passing peace, and war—

LS: Well, war is a disturbance of security, is it not? The change of law corresponds to war and peace corresponds to the stability of law. Now I think what is commonly said is that every change of law is a disturbance, at least in former ages, and war of course also is a disturbance of ordinary security. But the implication [is that] just as war as disturbing things requires discipline and good order, the change of law too requires discipline and good order. And what is that? Take the present day American parallel. What is the disciplined change of law?

Student: Amendments.

LS: No, you don't need amendments for change of law. Constitutional change of law is the orderly one, and unconstitutional change is the disorderly one. But they didn't have a constitution in this way in ancient times, but there were other provisions made for orderly change of law. More generally stated, there must be some higher law, because if you can change a law, then the law is not binding on the changer; otherwise you couldn't change it. But if there is a difference between good changes and bad changes, between orderly changes and disorderly changes, then the changer, while not being subject to the ordinary law, must be subject to a higher law. In America it is clear: the Constitution. But what is the equivalent for Socrates or Hippias? The unwritten laws, he says here. Therefore he turns to unwritten laws in the sequel, and this is an extremely important passage about the unwritten laws and is strangely different from the ordinary understanding of unwritten laws. One special example is: incest is an unwritten law. And why? Because it leads to bad offspring. He doesn't speak of natural laws. Not a word is said about it. But he means something like a natural law, a natural law being a law which is self-enforcing. Now this has a great implication, that incest between parents and children is against the unwritten laws but not of course incest between brothers and sisters. Exactly the same point as in Plato's *Republic*, exactly the same point, where also only incest between the different generations but not within the same generation is forbidden.

In the next chapter, [chapter] 5, let us also look at the beginning. Here they change the text quite illegitimately. "How he made his companions more skilled in action I will say now."[xii] And then he speaks of their education in continence. So this is from now on something very different. Here we had moderation. You remember in book 3 we had wisdom equal to moderation equal to continence. That's now changed. Wisdom is different from moderation (we will see that later) and moderation again is different from continence. What is continence? It has a wide meaning, not only the continence regarding pleasures but also regarding fears, and lack of continence, incontinence, is slavery. So continence is freedom. I suggest tentatively that continence is that strength of soul of which he spoke in book 3. Then strength of soul is not wisdom, but [it] is the foundation of wisdom. That continence is the foundation stone of virtue is explicitly said in book 1, chapter 5.

Now let us turn to paragraph 6 in chapter 5.

Reader:
"As for Wisdom, the greatest blessing, does not incontinence exclude it and drive men to the opposite?" (4.5.6)

LS: Let us stop here. You see what he does here? He slips in—that is the only proper designation—the most important remark occurring in the whole book, what the greatest good is. He doesn't say "a very great good" *megiston agathon*, but he says with the article *to megiston agathon*, "the greatest good," the highest good, is wisdom. Now if wisdom is the highest good, then continence cannot be the highest good. Continence is only a foundation for it. So is moderation. It is made clear in the sequel. Let us read only the last two paragraphs of this same chapter. Paragraph 11.

Reader:
"Socrates," said Euthydemus, "I think you mean that he who is at the mercy of the bodily pleasures has no concern whatever with virtue in any form."
"Yes, Euthydemus; for how can an incontinent man be any better than the dullest beast? How can he who fails to consider the things that matter most, and strives by every means to do the things that are most pleasant, be better than the stupidest of creatures? No, only the self-controlled have power to consider the things that matter most, and, sorting them out after their kind, by word and deed alike to prefer the good and reject the evil."
And thus, he said, men become supremely good and happy and skilled in discussion. The very word "discussion," according to him, owes its name to the practice of meeting together for common deliberation, *sorting*, *discussing* things after their kind: and therefore one should be ready and prepared for this and be zealous for it; for it makes for excellence, leadership, and skill in discussion. (4.5.11-12)

LS: All right. Now there is one point. This is perhaps to be taken as a somewhat more precise definition of what wisdom is—wisdom, which we know now is not identical with moderation or with continence. And he says it has to do with conversation, in Greek *dialegesthai*.[xiii] And you

[xii] *Memorabilia* 4.5.1.
[xiii] This is the word used at 4.5.12. At 4.6.1, the word used is *dialektikōterous*.

know the word "dialectics," which is now in so very common use, is derivative from that. But the Greek word, *dialegesthai*, which is the middle form (I can't explain the rudiments of Greek grammar), a more elementary form of the same word as *dialegein*, and that means to sunder, separate. And dialectics, as Socrates understands it, is separating things according to their kinds or tribes. We will hear of that more later in another writing. This is understanding. This was Socrates's concern. Therefore the question "What is a thing?" always concerns the kind of thing. You never ask the question, "What is Mr. Miller?"; you ask "Who is Mr. Miller?" The answer to "What is Miller?" is, of course, "A human being." But the question "What is?" concerns the question "What is a human being?" Always the kind of thing, and you can never understand a kind as kind if you do not see it in contradistinction to other kinds. Simple example: the traditional definition of man as an animal who possesses speech is intelligible only by counterdistinguishing man from other animals. By sundering the kind you understand the peculiarity of each kind. At the beginning of the next chapter—yes?

Reader:
I will try also to show how he encountered his companions to become skilled in discussion. Socrates held that those who know what any given thing is can also expound it to others—

LS: Well, "what each of the beings is" literally translated. So this is not in any way limited here. It concerns all beings. Socrates did always this. Yes?

Reader:
on the other hand, those who do not know are misled themselves and mislead others. For this reason he never gave up considering with his companions what any given thing is. (4.6.1)

LS: "What each of the beings is"—he repeats that. The best manuscript reads here, "therefore he never ceased considering in the midst of the companions what each of the beings is," not necessarily with them. I think that is the best reading. That is really the good reading. However this may be, in the sequel he explains—no, there is one thing we must consider, the next point. The discussion of what is piety, as an example, what is piety? The answer: piety means knowledge of the laws regarding the worship of the gods. Virtue is knowledge. Piety is a virtue, hence it must be a kind of knowledge. And what kind of knowledge? The knowledge of the laws regarding divine worship. Now of course this is atrocious. Don't you believe that Alcibiades knew these laws very well when he profaned the mysteries and mutilated the statues of Hermes?[xiv] So then he was a pious man. And a simple fellow who didn't know all these laws—well, take another example: a shyster, an unscrupulous shyster is of course a juster man than the most honest man who has no legal training, because the simple man who has no legal training doesn't know the laws, or very little, whereas the shyster knows them very well indeed, especially if he is employed by the syndicate. Then he has to know them very well, otherwise he would be wholly useless to them. Now what is the paralogism committed here? What is the point? Let us read in paragraph 3 of this same chapter.

Reader:
Soc: "Then will not he who knows these laws know how he must worship the gods?"
Euth: "I think so."

[xiv] Thucydides, *History*, 6.27-29, 53, 61.

Soc: "Then does he who knows how he must worship the gods think that he must do so according to his knowledge, and not otherwise?"
Euth: "He does indeed."
Soc: "And does everyone worship the gods as he thinks he ought, and not otherwise?"
Euth: "I think so."
Soc: "Then will he who knows what is lawful about the gods worship the gods lawfully?"
Euth: "Certainly." (4.6.3-4)[xv]

LS: And so the consequence follows. You see that someone may know how he ought to act and not act accordingly, this simple and obvious difficulty is completely disregarded. The argument is a simple paralogism. In other words, Xenophon indicates here this understanding of the identity of virtue and knowledge is a misunderstanding: this is not the way in which Socrates meant it. And the other examples are all to the same effect.

Paragraph 7 deals explicitly with wisdom, and wisdom is here identified with knowledge or science. The word *epistēmē* is the word which was translated into Latin as *scientia* and is now our word science. Now the most perfect science would be knowledge of all beings. Such knowledge is not available for man, and therefore only an approximation to it is possible. Then the good and beautiful are defined and are simply identified with the useful, which we have seen cannot be ultimately valid. Yes?

Student: Isn't it good Platonic doctrine, though, that the very highest forms of knowledge—the man who comes to know them at least in certain way will act virtuously?

LS: Well, that is a bit more complicated, as we have seen. We must have a certain preparation. Only take the closest condition: continence. You must have acquired continence, otherwise [11]we can never become knowing in these high matters. Very simple practical example: If someone is constantly hungry or thirsty or is afraid of everything—the Aristotelian example of every fly in the room—how can he think, how can he ever concentrate? There must be a basis laid. But this basis is not itself knowledge; that is acquired by habituation. That is what Plato always implied.

Student: Only a certain kind of knowledge arrived at in a certain way is wisdom.

LS: Well, there are kinds of knowledge which are not—as Aristotle makes clear, someone can be a very good blacksmith and can have a lousy character. That is perfectly possible. But the higher the subject is, the less this is possible. May I state it in simple commonsensical terms? These highest things require a high degree of perceptivity, sensitivity. Now if a man possesses this sensitivity, he has of course this sensitivity also towards his own actions and feelings. Do you see that? He simply can't stand them. He can't do that. In other words, what Socrates and Plato seriously meant is that it is impossible to be a philosopher without being a decent chap. There are some examples from the history of philosophy which seem to disprove it. I believe they prove only that these men were not genuine philosophers, but it is a long question. No, it shows in their philosophy. If someone cannot control the lower things—or let me put it this way: to the extent to which he cannot control them, he cannot think freely. This is I think an empirical proposition which is susceptible to being tested empirically. But we must first have some

[xv] In the translation, the speakers are not identified; here we have supplied their names.

knowledge of what philosophy is, otherwise we might say: I know so many philosophy professors who have bad characters. But there of course the identity of philosopher and philosophy professor is arbitrarily assumed.

In paragraph 10 to 11 he deals again with manliness or courage. It is shown that it presupposes knowledge of the fear-inspiring things. Obviously a very small child running into fire cannot be called courageous, because he doesn't know that this is a fearful thing; but then he goes over from knowledge in the sense that you know that fire is dangerous or that a lion is dangerous, from knowing in the common sense of the word to knowing in the emphatic sense. I do not know how I can bring it out in English. It would be hard even to bring it out in Latin.[12] [*Nosco*] means simply "to know"; for example, "I know that guy." But the other word, [13][*scio*], means: Yes, perhaps, knowing and understanding. The illegitimate interchange of knowing the fearful things and understanding the fearful things permits Socrates here to assert even of course that it is knowledge or wisdom.

In the paragraph about the rulers, paragraph 12, nothing is said about the element of knowledge or understanding in kingship. Five regimes are mentioned: kingship, tyranny, aristocracy, plutocracy and democracy. Aristocracy in the middle. May I ask why? It must be the most important, but from what point of view? What would you suspect? I would suspect that Xenophon regarded aristocracy as the best regime. How does he define it? "Aristocracy is a regime where the offices are filled from those who "fulfill" or better "complete the laws."[xvi] Every law is in need of completion, because application to special case[s] requires a judgment. But what is the ordinary term for the man who completes the law in this sense, who interprets the laws? How is that quality called which enables a man to interpret the laws so that they fit this particular situation? Equitable men. Equity. Justice is generally obeying the law, but equity is that improvement for the laws, the equitable interpretation. Now the Greek word for equity is *epieikeia* and the equitable men are called *epieikes*. And this was used in common language synonymously with the better people, i.e., with those who are supposed to rule in an aristocracy. So one can say aristocracy is the rule of the equitable people, of the people who are by virtue of their intelligence and training able to interpret the laws fairly, equitably.

One point I must mention, which will be found amusing by some of you. I have spoken of the structure of book 3 before, beginning with nameless men, rising to a height, and going down again. Here again the last two chapters are devoted to conversations with nameless people. Let us turn to book 3, chapter 14, paragraph 2. Let us also read paragraph 1.

Reader:

Whenever some of the members of a dining-club brought more meat than others, Socrates would tell the waiter either to put the small contribution into the common stock or to portion it out equally among the diners. So the high batteners felt obliged not only to take their share of the pool, but to pool their own supplies in return; and so they put their own supplies also into the common stock. And since they thus got no more than those who brought little with them, they gave up spending much on meat. (3.14.1)

[xvi] *Memorabilia* 4.6.12.

LS: You see, that is one of the little stories about Socrates's education. Now the next one.

Reader:
He observed on one occasion that one of the company at dinner had ceased to take bread, and ate the meat by itself. Now the talk was of names and the actions to which they are properly applied. (3.14.2)

LS: "Names" mean here of course in the strict sense, words—words in general.

Reader:
"Can we say, my friends," said Socrates, "what is the nature of the action for which a man is called greedy? For all, I presume, eat meat with their bread when they get the chance: but I don't think there is so far any reason for calling them greedy?"
"No, certainly not," said one of the company. (3.14.2)

LS: I must say one thing, otherwise you will not understand it. The word is *opsaphagos*. Now *phagos* is eater and *opson* is what you eat in addition to the bread. For the Greeks the bread was the center and you added something to the bread, which could be meat or fish, more commonly I believe fish than meat. That was called *opson*. The man who was called *opsaphagos,* an eater of the *opson*, who ate little of the bread, and most of this much more desirable thing. A glutton, in other words. Go on.

Reader:
"Well, suppose he eats the meat alone, without the bread, not because he's in training, but to tickle his palate, does he seem a greedy fellow or not?"
"If not, it's hard to say who does," was the reply.

Here another of the company queried, "And he who eats a scrap of bread with a large helping of meat?"

"He too seems to me to deserve the epithet," said Socrates. "Aye, and when others pray for a good wheat harvest, he, presumably, would pray for a good meat supply."

The young man, guessing that these remarks of Socrates applied to him, did not stop eating his meat, but took some bread with it. When Socrates observed this, he cried: "Watch the fellow, you who are near him, and see whether he treats the bread as his meat or the meat as his bread." (3.14.3-4)

LS: Well, literally, "whether he takes meat in addition to his bread or the bread in addition to his meat." These are very nice stories, but you must admit they are not highly philosophic in any way. Now the beauty here is [that] the question was about words. Now according to the view of sensible people throughout the ages—and not all men are always sensible—the question of words, linguistic analysis, is of a much lower rank than the question of substance, because sensible men will be careful regarding their words but they know that the words are in the service [of] speaking of the things. Good. So since this is a very low discussion, they speak here

and only here about words, while on the higher level, chapters 8 and 9, they spoke of what are the things, or the being of things. Good. And now here comes the greatest beauty which cannot be well brought out in the translation, the beginning of paragraph 2. This fellow was eating the meat, [*opson*], "itself by itself," which is the favorite Platonic expression for the ideas. He ate, as it were, the idea in its purity. You see, that is a Xenophontic joke, which of course presupposes—for no one would make it who didn't know of these things and understand them. So I thought this would be of some help for the understanding of Xenophon's way of speaking about philosophy. One cannot understand Xenophon if one doesn't think about the philosophic matters, but he writes in such a way that you can completely miss it. Good.[xvii]

[1] Deleted "that" and moved "Aristotle."
[2] Deleted "that."
[3] Deleted "that."
[4] Deleted "good"
[5] Deleted "that is."
[6] Moved "ever."
[7] Deleted "and."
[8] Deleted "—that the wise—still."
[9] Deleted "who"
[10] Deleted "That."
[11] Deleted "you cannot"
[12] Deleted "[?]."
[13] Deleted "[?]."

[xvii] This appears to be the end of the second lecture, as the next sentence begins a discussion of a student paper. The original transcript does not indicate a break.

Session 3: no date
***Oeconomicus* 1**

Leo Strauss: I liked your paper very much.[i] I do not agree with every remark you made. I mention only a few points which I thought were very good. I do not agree with this schema, but something shines through which you perhaps brought out more clearly in your paper. The art of household management is, you said, a womanly art, and this womanly art proves to be the political art. That's very funny, but that is what he suggests. We must see what this means. Then you saw very clearly also this tug of war as it were between the art of farming and the art of war, which is better. There is something implied here: the art of farming is a substitute for the whole art of earning one's living, and the art of earning one's living is somehow akin to the art of war. That sounds very funny, doesn't it? But perhaps not so much to us as it appeared to the Greek gentleman. Have you ever heard a comparison of the art of war and the economic art? Is there a thing which they are thought to have in common?

Student: Game theory?

LS: No, those are purely academic things. But from real life: struggle, fighting. You may have heard of the word "competition." This is, I believe, an important element. Now there is a considerable literature on the subject [of] the spirit of capitalism, especially stemming from Max Weber's famous essay on the subject.[ii] Now the spirit of capitalism means, according to Weber, this view: that the accumulation of capital is morally good if not even an end in itself. There have always been people who were eager to amass money. Avarice is a vice as old as the world. But that people who were themselves not avaricious but teachers of mankind, as it were, taught other people to be in this particular way avaricious, this is the novel thing. And this surely exists in modern times. But in all the premodern literature the only approximation to that is to be found in Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*, an extremely modern book. Mr.____ became aware of it when he noted the fact that increasing one's wealth and not merely administering it is described here as the function of the economic art. We will take this up later.

I believe you made life a bit difficult for some of your colleagues by speaking all the time of paradises. I don't believe that those who haven't read—does he translate "paradise"? Well, it would be simpler to translate it "park." Since the word "paradise" didn't exist with these theological connotations in classical Greek thought, it is also a bit misleading. One must also be sometimes very simple. Good.

Now there is a question which Mr. ____ raised and which I transfer to you. "Could you give a brief summary of those aspects of the last assignment that will be important to keep in mind during the remainder of the course?" Which of the subjects of last time are taken up in the first seven chapters of the *Oeconomicus*? Were you reminded of any of the subjects of last time?

Student: I believe there was the matter of knowing as discernment.

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[i] Strauss responds to a student's paper, read at the beginning of the session. The reading was not recorded.
[ii] *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parsons (1930). First published as *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist der Kapitalismus* (1905).

LS: So in other words, more generally stated, the question [is this]: Is virtue identical with knowledge, or does it have an excess beyond knowledge? This question comes up. We will take it up. Secondly, the question, "What is good?" Does it not come up all the time? The definition of property: property is the sum total of good things a man possesses. Therefore, what are the good things? These are two of the things; there will be more.

Let us now begin with a coherent discussion of our assignment. This is the *Oeconomicus*, the Socratic *logos*, the Socratic discourse among Xenophon's writing. In the other Socratic writings, including the *Memorabilia*, these are not simply Socrates's *logoi*. They have always an additional function. Here the *Oeconomicus* has no other function but to present to us the Socratic *logos*. Why does Socrates or Xenophon choose for that purpose *oikonomia*, management of the household? We can say economics if we keep in mind always that economics here means management of the household. Why does he choose that? What would be the first candidate, if Socrates had only one subject to speak about, a single chance, what would he pick?

Student: [. . .]

LS: Perhaps not quite. We haven't read the whole *Memorabilia*, but a lot is made of the royal or kingly art in the *Memorabilia*. So this would seem to be a much more proper subject, the royal or political art. Why does he choose economics? Our hero here is Critobulus, as we have heard. Do you know anything of Critobulus, about his family connections? That is of some help.

Student: He is the son of Crito.

LS: The son of Crito, the famous Crito who tried to save Socrates from jail. Now let us see in the *Memorabilia*, if you look up book 2, [chapter] 9, beginning, this is the conversation with Crito.

Reader:
I remember that he once heard Crito say that life at Athens was difficult for a man who wanted to mind his own business. (2.9.1)

LS: Period. So that is old Crito. He wants to mind his own business. This is the famous formula of Plato's *Republic* where justice is minding one's own business. Now in its popular meaning, of course, what does it mean to mind one's own business? What is the practical meaning of that?

Student: [. . .]

LS: To lead a retired life, not a political life, not a busybody, not a politician. So you see the son of Crito will of course also lead a retired life, but he must do something. What does he do? He takes care of his private affairs, of his private property. He is an economist. This much we can say now. Now this was regarded at that time as the style of life of the better people who would not go into the marketplace and talk to these madmen, the *demos*, but who would lead a private life—and rather inconspicuous because otherwise they would get into trouble. There were people called the sycophants, who made life miserable for these men as you would see from this chapter, 2.9 in the *Memorabilia*, where Socrates discusses the subject.

Now there is another point. The book begins in a very strange way, as you will have seen: "I have once heard him conversing about household management also in about the following manner."[iii] He doesn't even say, "I heard about Socrates." Strange. Now if you would look through the *Memorabilia*, you would find a single chapter which begins in exactly the same way, and that is book 2, [chapter] 4, and that chapter deals with the [same] subject, friends. This rings a bell, doesn't it? Somehow friends is a great theme of this book, the *Oeconomicus*. And you see also that friendship is not in itself a political relationship, but a private relationship. Good. This much in the way of a very general introduction. Now let us turn to the first chapter.

The subject is then: What is household management? And Socrates begins by asking Critobulus: "Tell me, Critobulus, is economics the name of some science or art as medicine and smithing and housebuilding or carpentry?" "I think so." "Now can we say as we say of these arts what the work of each is, so also what the work of each is, so also what the work of economics is?" And then Critobulus says: "It seems to me the work of a good household manager to manage his own household well."[iv] He does not say what the work of the household manager is, but the work of the *good* household manager. How come? For example, if he were asked what a carpenter is, he wouldn't give the work of a good carpenter, but of the carpenter. Why does he define household management only in terms of good household management? These are two different things. A man may be a shoemaker and not a good shoemaker after all. Yes?

Student: I think he wants to hear what Socrates says first.

LS: This is not a question, this is an answer. Socrates had not asked what the work of a good household manager is, but what the work of a household manager is. Well, I believe one can give this answer: everyone except paupers, whom we can disregard because of their utter irrelevance, manages a household somehow, without ever having learned any art of it. So the interesting thing in the case of household management is a good household manager, whereas whatever other art you exercise, in however poor a manner, you must have learned it. I mean, even the poorest shoemaker knows something which the non-shoemaker doesn't know at all. So this throws a first light on the art of household management. It is much closer connected with the prescientific stage, if I may say so, than the other arts. If you become a shoemaker, you have to go through some apprenticeship. To become a household manager, that is not necessarily the case because you at a certain moment get some property and you have to administer it, even if the administration consists in spending it immediately. That is also an act of household management—of poor household management surely, but household management nevertheless.

Now the next point which is made, which Socrates makes, is [that] he divorces this art of household management from one's own household. Socrates says: "Well, if someone knows how to manage, he will know also how to manage another man's household."[v] So in other words, a poor man who has no household could nevertheless possess the art of householdings, couldn't he? A poor man can be an economist. Critobulus introduces in the next paragraph a slight change: not simply managing well one's household, but increasing one's household or estate.

[iii] *Oeconomicus* 1.1.
[iv] *Oeconomicus* 1.1-3.
[v] *Oeconomicus* 1.4.

And that is of course a very great step, but which is here only slipped in, and we must discuss this later. In paragraph 5 a further step is made: a household is not limited to being a part of a single city. Well, someone may own a few acres of land in another city. Now we can go further and can say a man may own a household without being a citizen at all. Cannot a *metic*, a resident alien, can he not possess land or manage land? So it is even divorced in a way from the *polis* altogether.

Then the tough discussion begins in paragraph 6, in which it is asked: What precisely is that household of which we have been speaking? And we learn that the totality of a man's possessions is his household. And the possessions, what are they? Well, of course not used matches. No one would ever count them; perhaps a playing child would, but no grown-up would. So possessions are the sum total of the *useful* things, of the things good for a man, which he possesses. What each can use.

Now this leads to the great difficulty we had last time, the conversation with Aristippus. If someone possesses, say, cases of whiskey, and uses them in order to ruin his mind or health, are these really goods? Are these values? Of course not. They are bad things for him. So only those things which a man has which he uses, which he can use usefully, are good. This has very great consequences, because a man may be very rich and may make the poorest use of his wealth; then in a sense he doesn't possess any property, according to this statement. The famous communistic consequences drawn in Plato's *Republic* are implied in that, because from this it follows of course that no one can own properly speaking anything except what he can use well and for as long as he uses it well. But there is of course one interesting case which is at the borderline: someone may own something which he cannot use, for example, he can't ride on horseback, but he has a horse. Well, there is a simple way out: he can sell it. So that is also one way of indirect use. Whereupon Socrates says: "Yes, if he understands how to sell well"; for otherwise he might contribute to his ruin in the very act of selling. Let us now turn to the beginning of paragraph 12.

Reader:
"Yes," commented Socrates, "provided he knows how to sell; but again, in case he sells it for something he doesn't know how to use, even then the sale doesn't convert it into wealth, according to you."
"You imply, Socrates, that even money isn't wealth to one who doesn't know how to use it." (*Oecon*. 1.12)

LS: Well, one should translate it differently, because the word which is translated into "wealth" has also the ordinary meaning (although derivative) of money. And what he says here is then this: You seem to say, Socrates, that not even silver, coin silver, is money if a man doesn't know how to use it. So we are speaking now really of money, and money is now defined as a thing which is useful, which one can use well. This alone gives it the character of money. Dollars are not money for him who does not know how to use it; for example, he would spend them for an absurd purpose. An especially important point comes up in paragraph 14.

Reader:
"Then money—"

LS: Silver.

Reader:
"Then silver is to be kept at a distance, Critobulus, if one doesn't know how to use it, and not to be included in wealth."

LS: More literally: "the silver if someone doesn't understand how to use it, should be thrown away so far, that it is no longer even money."

Reader:
"But how about friends? If one knows how to make use of them so as to profit by them, what are they to be called?"
"Wealth, of course." (1.14)

LS: That must be translated literally: "'Money, by Zeus,' said Critobulus." Is it not very interesting? Even the friends, when you can use them, are money. Mr. Macpherson has written a book which I have not yet read on Hobbes and Locke with the title *Possessive Individualism*.[vi] It is not a bad word for Hobbes and Locke, but if this here is not possessive individualism I don't know what it is. Everything is viewed from the point of view of usefulness, even the human beings, even the friends. I spoke last time of this utilitarian strain in Xenophon's Socrates which you find everywhere. One must only never forget that it is only a very small part of the story, but it comes up everywhere. Friends are money. I mentioned the fact that friends is a subject going through the whole book. Let us keep in mind friends are here viewed as money. What follows from that in the sequel we will see later. And in the next paragraph.

Reader:
"Yes, and it follows from what you say that enemies too are money[vii] to anyone who can derive profit from them."

LS: Obviously. Yes?

Student:
"Well, that is my opinion."
"Consequently it is the business of a good estate manager to know how to deal with enemies so as to derive profit from them too."
"Most decidedly."
"In fact, Critobulus, you cannot fail to notice that many private persons have been indebted to war for the increase of their estates, and many princes too." (1.15)

LS: The text they translate wrongly; they take a wrong text: "and you see indeed Critobulus how many estates of private men have been increased from war, and how many houses of private men have been increased from tyrannies." The last conclusions are drawn. No holds barred: anything which contributes to increasing your wealth, i.e., the sum total of things useful to you, every such way is good. And since one can become rich by war, since one can become rich by tyranny, why

[vi] C. B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke* (1962).
[vii] In original: "wealth"

not? Later on we must see whether it is so simple.[4'] The book ends with an indictment of tyranny, as you may have seen, very legitimately, because in the first round of the argument tyranny comes in as a respectable source for wealth. Good. At this point, however, Critobulus interrupts. You emphasized that in your paper, Mr. ____. It is the first interruption. What does he say?

Reader:
"Yes, so far so good, Socrates. But sometimes we come across persons possessed of knowledge and means whereby they can increase their estates if they work, and we find that they are unwilling to do so; and consequently we see that their knowledge profits them nothing. What are we to make of that? In these cases, surely, neither their knowledge nor their property is money.[viii]" (1.16)

LS: You see, that's another point. If everything useful is money, techniques of course are money. Sciences and arts are money. That is trivial; it follows necessarily. But if knowledge, [if[possession of knowledge is money, how come[1] there are people who possess knowledge and don't have money? Vulgar money. Let us make a distinction between money and vulgar money. Does this question strike you as funny, especially in this context? Why?

Student: Socrates.

LS: Exactly. You see, we must think all the time also of Socrates, which we have not yet done. Now what about Socrates as an economist? We must never forget this question. So what is the situation of Socrates? We must see what we will learn about that. What Critobulus does at any rate by raising this question is of course the question of knowledge and virtue. Hitherto it has been suggested to us tacitly that the economic art is virtue because this is the art by virtue of which we acquire or possess good things and repel and throw away the bad things. Virtue is knowledge. And now we see Critobulus says: "But there are people who possess lucrative arts and yet they don't get any money." That's one special form of the question of virtue and knowledge. But Socrates gives here an answer which was reported by Mr. ___. It is very simple: If they possess knowledge but do not use it, they are slaves of a sort, namely, slaves of desire. This amounts to an admission that virtue is not simply knowledge. Men may possess knowledge and yet be subject to desires or vices like laziness, softness of the soul, and carelessness. That can coexist with knowledge. But Socrates gives a more precise definition in paragraph 18.

Reader:
"What, no master over them, when, in spite of their prayers for prosperity and their desire to do what will bring them good, they are thwarted in their intentions by the powers that rule them?" (1.18)

LS: Namely, the vices or desires. Now what does he say here? He qualifies the statement: there are people who possess knowledge and are poor. And he gives the answer: these—how does Locke put it?—are the lazy and irrational. Every rational and industrious man will be rich, and if

[viii] In original: "wealth"

someone is not rich it is surely proof that he is lazy and irrational.[ix] But Socrates makes here a qualification which one can easily overlook. He says: "How will they not be irrational if praying or wishing to be prosperous or happy [*eudaimonein*—LS] they are prevented from acquiring money?" So in other words, a third factor is stated: there is needed not only knowledge and freedom from low desires but also a positive desire, the desire to be prosperous. Now let us apply this to Socrates. If Socrates is poor, what explanation would we get at this stage?

Student: There is no desire on his part.

LS: He does not have the desire for happiness in this sense. So he may very well possess the art of getting rich, the art of economics, and yet be free from this desire. What this means we must see later. In the enumeration of vices mentioned here in the following paragraph, one vice is strikingly absent because from the present point of view it wouldn't be a vice, and that's avarice, because avarice wouldn't harm any man's lucrative activities, of course. It might even be an incentive for that. This is roughly the discussion of the first chapter, and let us now turn to the second chapter. At the beginning Critobulus again opens the discussion.

Reader:
"Well, I think you have told me quite enough about such passions as these, and when I examine myself I find, I think, that I have them fairly well under control; and therefore, if you will advise me what I should do to increase my estate—" (2.1)

LS: You see, increase comes up now all the time.

Reader:
"I don't think those mistresses, as you call them, are likely to hinder me."

LS: The mistresses are the desires.

Reader:
"So do not hesitate to give me any good advice you can: unless, indeed, you have made up your mind that we are rich enough already, Socrates, and think we have no need of more money?" (2.1)

LS: Now Critobulus diagnoses himself in this way. He would apply the whole lesson to himself, being a sensible man, not merely listening as if it were of no concern to him, but trying to apply it to himself. He has the required self-control, that he knows. He has self-knowledge, so he is not under the spell of these desires, but he does not possess economic knowledge, economic science. That he does not possess, but perhaps he doesn't need it. Perhaps he does not need to increase his wealth since he is sufficiently wealthy. What does Socrates tell him? We don't have time to read this. Socrates applies it to himself: I am sufficiently wealthy because I have everything which I need, but Critobulus, you are positively poor—although you are a millionaire by the vulgar standards, according to the strict standards, you are a poor man. Paragraph 4.

[ix] God gave the world "to the use of the industrious and rational (and labour was to be his title to it); not to the fancy or covetousness of the quarrelsome and contentious." John Locke, *Second Treatise of Government*, sec. 34.

Reader:
"And in spite of that estimate, you really think you have no need of money and pity me for my poverty?"
"Yes, because my property is sufficient to satisfy my wants, but I don't think you would have enough to keep up the style you are living in and to support your reputation, even if your fortune were three times what it is." (2.4)

LS: Well, "style," *schēma*—the pomp with which you surround yourself and the reputation. You know, status symbols, you have heard of that. He must appear in the world as a very big man, and this costs money, and for this purpose he doesn't have enough at all. Now here we see, by the way, what Socrates meant before when he said: If a man wishes to be happy ("wishes to be prosperous," as he translated it), if he wishes to be renowned in the community as a man to look up to, then he needs lots and lots of money. And Socrates does not have this desire. Yes?

Student: If this reply of Socrates is to be taken seriously, then how would you compare that with paragraph 16 of the previous chapter, where Critobulus is speaking about those who know how but don't increase their wealth, which makes [this] the line of reasoning: Socrates does know how and has increased his wealth just to the point where it meets his needs.

LS: But we still have the question, perhaps only for gossipy reasons: What is the trade which Socrates is exercising? What are his means of support, to state it in terms of police query? That would be a question. We must keep this in mind; we will get an answer very soon. Good. And so Socrates shows various ways how many things he needs for his friends, for sacrifices, for fellow citizens as allies. Why does a man need allies, a private man? That is a question we will take up later. And especially the worst point of course is that Critobulus is careless, and therefore he has these enormous wants and doesn't exert himself. Naturally he is very poor. As for Socrates, paragraph 8.

Reader:
"Now, if I ran short of money, no doubt you know as well as I do that I should not lack helpers who would need to contribute very little to fill my cup to overflowing. But your friends, though far better supplied with means to support their establishment than you, yet look to receive help from you." (2.8)

LS: You see, that is a very complicated relation. You see how delicately Socrates avoids the word "friends" when he speaks of himself, and he speaks of friends only[2] [as] Critobulus's friends. But the implication is clear: Socrates lives on his friends. Now we understand the depth of that statement that "friends are money, by Zeus." Good. So here we have a provisional answer to the question what are Socrates's invisible means of support. Good.

This question of the friends: that is an important subject of the *Memorablia*, the friends. Seven chapters—book 2, chapters 4 to 10—are devoted to the subject "friends," and chapter 9 is the chapter dealing with Crito's friend problem. We must read that, by all means.

Reader:

I remember that he once heard Criton say that life[51] at Athens was difficult for a man who wanted to mind his own business. "At this moment," Criton added, "actions are pending against me not because I have done the plaintiffs an injury, but because they think that I would sooner pay than have trouble." (*Mem*. 2.9.1)

LS: These are the famous sycophants. You know? There was no state attorney in Athenian law; the accusations were made by everyone who wished. Everyone who wished. Now these men who wished were not ordinarily public-spirited citizens but people who lived on these charges—in other words, a kind of legal blackmail. Someone comes to a man and says you have done these and these things, and my duty as a citizen compels me to inform the city of what you did. And he says, please don't do it, my kids, you know, and so on, I will do you any favor you want if you don't accuse me. And then he says: How great a favor? And so on, and the deal is closed. Now these men of course looked especially for rich people. Do I have to explain why they preferred rich people to poor people? No. And Crito was a very wealthy man. Then how does Socrates treat it?

Reader:
"Tell me, Criton," said Socrates, "do you keep dogs to fend the wolves from your sheep?"
"Certainly," replied Criton, "because it pays me better to keep them."
"Then why not keep a man who may be able and willing to fend off the attempts to injure you?"
"I would gladly do so were I not afraid that he might turn on me." (*Mem*. 2.9.2)

LS: You see? Yes?

Reader:
"What? Don't you see that it much pleasanter to—"

LS: In other words, he was a sycophant of sycophants, and therefore he was a relatively honest man. He blackmailed the blackmailers. And so they get him, and everything is fine, and Archedemus is always welcome in Crito's house, naturally. Let us read the end of this chapter. The last sentence.

Reader:
Henceforward Archedemus was respected— (*Mem*. 2.9.8)

LS: Well, "he was one of Crito's friends and was honored by the other friends of Crito." Do you believe that Socrates honored this blackmailer of blackmailers? I am sure not. And I will draw this inference: Socrates does not belong to the friends of Crito. The friends of Socrates do not appear in this book[x] at all. Well, if you use the word friends in a loose sense, meaning a man to whom you are benevolent, then of course Crito was a friend of Socrates. But in a deeper sense he was not. Good. What is the application to the question with which we are now concerned? In other words, Socrates has friends of another kind. This was the connection. Good.

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[x] Strauss could also mean here "book" as in book 2 of the *Memorabilia*.

Let us return to the argument. Critobulus has now[5] come to see that he is in need of increasing his wealth. He is in need of the art of increasing his wealth, or of household management. And then he doesn't have it. He does the next best thing. He asks Socrates to become his, Critobulus's, ruler. A classic situation, you know, on the highest plane in Plato's *Republic*: the nonphilosophers must become reconciled to the rule of philosophers. And Socrates is now given this wonderful opportunity to become the ruler of Critobulus. What does he do? Read paragraph 10.

Reader:
"Well, Socrates, I see that you understand one process by which wealth is created—how to create a balance." (*Oec*. 2.10)

LS: "Excess."

Reader:
"So a man who saves on a small income can, I suppose, very easily show a large surplus with a large one."

LS: Yes. This is of course again the question of Socrates's economic art. What is the single wealth-producing work which Socrates possesses? That is not identified here, but everyone seems to know that he has one. What is that? He does not call it a science or art; he calls it a wealth-producing work. We do not know what it is. Socrates is now truly in a fix. He demonstrates to Critobulus that Critobulus needs a ruler, and it is understood that Socrates could be the ruler here. And Socrates must become Critobulus's ruler, the manager of his household. How can he get out of that fix? There is a similar theme in a Platonic dialogue, *Theages*, where young Theages, who wants to become very great in the city—if possible, a tyrant—asks Socrates to be his trainer in tyranny. And Socrates also has to get out of this difficulty. Mr. ___?

Student: I just wondered about the name Archedemus.

LS: [3]Yes, *archē* reminds of ruler, and *dēmos* [of people]. Yes, you can—

Student: [. . .]

LS: No, he doesn't rule. He is really only the dog, the watchdog. Good. Now let us see, where were we? How does he get out of that? What is Socrates's answer when Critobulus says: "Manage my estate, increase my estate"? Socrates has a simple answer to that: since he doesn't have an estate himself, he can never have learned the art of managing an estate; and in addition, no one ever gave him his estate for learning how to administer it by trial and error, naturally. Good. So Socrates simply doesn't possess the art of increasing one's wealth. Yes?

Student: I think it is because Socrates wants a few draughts of instant science that he is not willing to take pure knowledge, science for itself, but only because of its practical results.

LS: For the time being, we know nothing of the art of household management, and of course also of shoemaking and the other practical arts. We know nothing of these high things. They

come up, if they come up, much later. But one thing already is clear: the art of household management is hitherto the highest art because it is the art of acquiring the good things, acquiring them, keeping them, and increasing them. So it is the art of living, so to say, the highest art of which we have ever heard. And Socrates disclaims possessing this art, which of course is very bad because we have seen from the very beginning that everyone is in a way manager of his household, and Socrates manages quite well—how, we don't know, but still he keeps body and soul together all the time, is married, has children. So he possesses the art, so this is therefore not a good answer. But still Critobulus is not able to refute him, and Socrates leaves it therefore at: "I don't possess this art, but I will bring you to a master of that art." Just as if someone would come to Socrates and wishes to learn flute playing and Socrates would tell him: "Well, if I can't teach you that, but so and so is a master of the art of flute-playing and I will bring you into contact." Or the other case, in Platonic dialogues people want to have training in forensic speaking or something of this kind, and he says: "Well, I know Protagoras, I shall introduce you to Protogoras"—or Gorgias or whoever it is—"and you will learn from him." Who is that fellow—Evenus in the *Apology*, and Callias wanted someone for the educating of his sons and Socrates brings him into contact. Same here. Yes?

By the way, [about] this remark, if I may make only this point regarding the end of this chapter, there is of course something else which we need. We see the first thing we need is knowledge, let us say art, science. Then we need continence, let us say, in addition. But even if we have both, that does not yet guarantee success. We need something else. What is that?

Student: Temperance.

LS: That is the same as continence, the control of the desires.

Student: The wish, the active wish, to do it.

LS: That is true. Yes?

Student: You need property.

LS: Yes, we need that indeed. That is quite true. But since it is not here a theme in the same way, let us put it here in a lower rank and call it with a good Aristotelian title: equipment. How's that? But we need something on the highest plane in addition to these things. Well, Mr. ___, you referred to it in your paper: luck. For example, if you have a farm you are a very industrious worker and you know how to plow and reap excellently, and yet there may be a very bad weather and all of your work goes for nothing. And therefore the Greek word for that is chance, *tychē*. You must have good luck. And therefore one needs the gods. That is the end of this chapter. But you wanted to say something else, Mr. ___, or am I mistaken? No. Now let us turn then to the beginning of chapter 3. I am sorry, Mr. ____?

Student: You say that if you compare this disavowal by Socrates of knowing the art with what preceded, that it is not a very good argument. But you can make anything stricter out of the fact. For instance, he says even a poor man could know this art.

LS: Could.

Student: Could.

LS: Sure. How would you explain it then? If Socrates possess[es] the economic art but refuses to teach it, that would be the question: Why would he refuse to teach it?

Student: This is essentially what I am trying to say.

LS: I believe we have not yet sufficient material for the answer. One answer would be [that] perhaps he regards Critobulus as a hopeless case. Could be; we don't know. Let us wait. We don't have sufficient data available yet. "Data" is a perfectly legitimate term if it is construed in the plural, because it is a plural in Latin, not a singular as it is used in social scientese: "the data is a symbol." And therefore one can use it. It is much older than social science, data, going back to classical antiquity, mathematics especially: "the given things."

Student: Let me just anticipate. Later Socrates proves to know as much as the gentleman of affairs.

LS: I grant you Socrates possesses the economic art, but he doesn't wish to teach it. Or perhaps he only doesn't want to teach it to Critobulus. This we do not know. We must wait. Now let us read the first paragraph of chapter 3.

Reader:
"Socrates," exclaimed Critobulus on hearing this—

LS: That is quite an important phrase which occurs quite frequently in this dialogue: "After having heard this Critobulus said." That occurs quite frequently. It always calls for special consideration. After all, he could have simply said: "Thereupon Critobulus said." But "he has heard" means you will not understand the sequel if you do not reconsider what he asserted, as it were, after it had sunk in and thereupon Critobulus said.

Reader:
"I don't intend to let you go now, until you have proved to my satisfaction what you have promised in the presence of our friends here to prove."
"Well, then," said Socrates, "what if I prove to your satisfaction, Critobulus, to begin with, that some men spend large sums in building houses that are useless, while others build houses perfect in all respects for much less? Will you think that I am putting before you one of the operations that constitute estate management?"
"Yes, certainly." (3.1)

LS: Let us stop here. You see, this passage and the whole sequel has been deleted by some editors because there is a genuine difficulty here: a sudden turn in the argument. But of course deletion is the most stupid, the most lazy, thing you can do. You must see whether that makes sense. I suggest this explanation. This is not the beginning of the conversation altogether; there has been discussion going on for some time. Then at a certain point, when Socrates says: "Tell

me, Critobulus, is economics the name of some art?" only then Xenophon records it. And we get an inkling of what the subject was before. In that earlier part of the conversation, which is not recorded, Socrates must have made a promise to Critobulus, because no promise had been made in the recorded part. And what was that? Of course this can only appear from the sequel. It is however already indicated in the passage we have read: "Would I not seem to show you one of the economic works, of the works of household management?" This was apparently a promise to Critobulus by Socrates to give him an enumeration of the works of the householder. Then it was necessary to say first what is householding; and then after this has been explained, he turns now to the promised subject. This is very important for the whole sequel which comes now. The first subject which he mentions is housebuilding. You need a list here. So how shall I call it? [LS writes on the blackboard] HB, yes? Housebuilding. Good. And I will here make another thing: Socrates and Critobulus. And I will put a plus sign when he knows the subject and a minus sign when he doesn't. Now what about the art of housebuilding? Do they know it? Read the next paragraph.

Reader:
"And what if I show you next the companion to this—that some possess many costly belongings and cannot use them at need, and do not even know whether they are safe and sound, and so are continually worried themselves and worrying their servants, whereas others, though they possess not more, but even less, have whatever they want ready for use?"
"What is the reason of this, then, Socrates? Is it not simply this, that the former stow their things away anywhere and the latter have everything neatly arranged in some place?"
"Yes, by Zeus,[xi] arranged carefully in the proper place, not just anywhere."
"Your point, I take it, is that this too is an element in estate management?" (3.2-3)

LS: Let us stop here. So this second item is what is within the house, let us call this furniture in the widest sense. In this case the cause of success is known to Critobulus. Some can keep order, and others don't. So we give him a plus. And I would assume that Socrates also knows that: the art of keeping order among one's things. But since no remark of this kind occurred regarding housebuilding, I would assume that both know nothing of housebuilding. Let us see. Let us go on. Paragraph 4.

Reader:
Soc: "Then what if I show you besides that in some households nearly all the servants are in fetters and yet continually try to run away, whereas in others they are under no restraint and are willing to work and to stay at their posts? Won't you think that here too I am pointing out to you a notable effect of estate management?"
Crit: "Yes, by Zeus;[xii] very much so." (3.4)

LS: So, management of slaves. Since nothing is said about the cause why some men are good at keeping slaves and others bad at keeping them, I assume that is also a subject beyond the knowledge of both. Now let us turn to the next paragraph.

[xi] In original: "of course"
[xii] In original: "of course"

Reader:
Soc: "And that when men farm the same kind of land, some are poverty-stricken and declare that they are ruined by farming, and others do well with the farm and have all they want in abundance?"
Crit: "Yes, by Zeus;[xiii] for maybe some spend money not on necessary purposes only but on what brings harm to the owner and the estate."
Soc: "Perhaps there are such people. But I am referring rather to those who haven't the money to meet even the necessary expenses, though professing to be farmers.
Crit: Now what can be the reason of that, Socrates?" (3.5-6)[xiv]

LS: "Cause." You see here is the question of the cause. The man of knowledge knows the cause: "What would be the cause of this, Socrates?" Yes?

Reader:
Soc.: "I will take you to these too; and when you watch them, you will find out, I fancy."

LS: This would seem to be nothing which Socrates knows: farming. Critobulus does not. Socrates will show him, will lead him there to see this man is successful for this reason. Yes?

Student: [. . .]

LS: But is there any reference to causes?

Student: [. . .]

LS: Yes, the mere fact. But is there any reference to cause there? No. I admit it is a gamble what I am doing now. But let us see whether it doesn't make sense. Yes?

Student: [. . .]

LS: Let us see. Let us first get just a survey of the economic works—of the economic functions, as they say today. Now let us go on with the next paragraph, paragraph 7.

Reader:
Soc: "Then you must watch, and try to experiment whether you are capable of understanding. At present I observe that when a comedy is to be seen, you get up very early and walk a very long way and press me eagerly to go to the play with you. But you have never yet invited me to see a drama of real life like this." (3.7)

LS: This is quite interesting. You see the predicament of Critobulus, why he is so poor as an economist: he is much more interested in comedy than in farming. And he induces even Socrates to get up very early in the morning and induces him to look at the comedies together with him. And the word "eagerly" can as well refer to going with him, or persuading him, as to looking at

[xiii] In original: "Yes, of course"
[xiv] The translation does not identify the speakers. We have supplied their names here.

the comedy, so that one could translate that he is persuading Socrates eagerly to look at the comedies. Now this is a fine economist. Now go on.

Reader:
Crit: “You think me ridiculous, don’t you, Socrates?”
Soc: “You think yourself far more so, I am sure—”

LS: “By Zeus.”

Reader:
Soc: “And I suppose I show you that some have been brought to penury by keeping horses, while others prosper by doing so, and moreover glory in their gain?”
Crit: “Well, I too see and know instances of both; I am not one of the gainers for all that.”
Soc: “The fact is you watch them just as you watch the actors in tragedy or comedy, not, I suppose, to become a playwright, but for the pleasure of seeing and hearing something. And perhaps there is no harm in that, because you don’t want to write plays; but seeing that you are forced to meddle with horses, don’t you think that common-sense requires you to see that you are not ignorant of the business, the more so as the self-same horses are both good to use and profitable to sell?”
Crit: “Would you have me break in colts, Socrates?”
Soc: “Of course not—” (3.7-10)

LS: “No, by Zeus.” Very emphatic.

Reader:
Soc: “no more than I would have you buy children to train as agricultural laborers; but horses and human beings alike, I think, on reaching a certain age forthwith become useful and go on improving.” (3.10)

LS: Now the next point, that is horsemanship. It seems that Socrates knows that too. Critobulus does not know it. Now we come to the next item. Go on.

Reader:
Soc: “I can also show you that husbands differ widely in their treatment of their wives, and some succeed in winning their co-operation and thereby increase their estates, while others bring utter ruin on their houses by their behavior to them.”
Crit: “And ought one to blame the husband or the wife for that, Socrates?”
Soc: “When a sheep is ailing,” said Socrates, “we generally blame the shepherd, and when a horse is vicious, we generally find fault with his rider. In the case of a wife, if she receives instruction in the right way from her husband and yet does badly, perhaps she should bear the blame; but if the husband does not instruct his wife in the right way of doing things, and so finds her ignorant, should he not bear the blame himself? Anyhow, Critobulus, you should tell us the truth, for we are all friends here. Is there anyone to whom you commit more affairs of importance than you commit to your wife?”
Crit: “There is not.”
Soc: “Is there anyone with whom you talk less?”

Crit: "There are few or none, I confess." 5'
Soc: "And you married her when she was a mere child and had seen and heard almost nothing?"
Crit: "Certainly."
Soc: "Then it would be far more surprising if she understood what she should say or do than if she made mistakes."
Crit: "But what of the husbands who, as you say, have good wives, Socrates? Did they train them themselves?"
Soc: "There's nothing like investigation—" (3.11-14)[xv]

LS: Well, literally, "Nothing like having another look at the matter."

Reader:
Soc: "I will introduce Aspasia to you, and she will explain the whole matter to you with more knowledge than I possess." (3.14)

LS: Good. Now does Socrates know the art of training wives? It is admitted that Critobulus doesn't. So I mean, taking this list as a sheer hypothesis, I think in the light of the whole that will make sense. The art of keeping order among one's things is possessed by Socrates and by Critobulus. Not too difficult to possess that. The art of housebuilding, neither possesses that. The art of treating slaves neither possesses. What can Socrates possibly teach Critobulus? The art of farming and the art of breeding horses. Now in the book he will teach the art of farming; we will come to that next time. This was the choice which Xenophon had to make, as it were—or Socrates: Shall he teach him the art of farming or breeding horses? Does this ring a bell in some of you, that the possibility is that Socrates might teach the art of breeding horses? There is here a reference to a very vicious inclination of Critobulus which ruins him as an economist: that he goes to the comedies. And there is a very famous comedy in which Socrates is the hero and has to do with horsemanship in an indirect manner: the *Clouds*. The young man who comes to Socrates in the *Clouds* has ruined his farming father by horsemanship—not by breeding horses, but by being too much concerned with horses. This is somehow the background. We will hear more of that later. I thought we should keep this in mind, these two arts are of special importance. You see, it is interesting, this art which Socrates cannot teach. Of course, there is a difficult question: Socrates is of course a well-known figure, but we do not know when this conversation took place, whether Socrates was married at the time.

Student: Is the choice difficult for Xenophon, who was so interested in horses?

LS: This subject is discussed to some extent by Marchant in the introduction to the translation, and he has very strange notions of what a man of normal intelligence could do. You see, Xenophon had a farm; surely after having been exiled, the Spartans gave him a farm. He was a horseman. In other words, that Xenophon would give Socrates his arts, you know, of course is artistically absurd. Either Xenophon was such an idiot that he wanted to present the art of farming through the mouth of Socrates in spite of all incredibility of Socrates teaching the art of farming, or it means something in the context. How could Socrates teach the art of farming? Now Xenophon explains that to us later, how Socrates, who has never been a farmer, perhaps

[xv] The translation does not identify the speakers. We have supplied their names.

had never set his foot on a farm—how Socrates could be a competent teacher of the art of farming is explained later. So similarly, Socrates could perhaps teach the art of horsemanship but he doesn't do it. We must see this later.

We have now a survey of the important economic arts. Not all are mentioned here by any means; some of them will be mentioned later. But these are the economic works, I should say. The subdivisions of the economic art are, in the broadest sense—since management of the house, of the household, requires of course a house; and therefore the art of housebuilding is a subordinate art and in a way belongs to it: the interior of the house, interior decoration, anything going with that, and keeping the interior in order, obviously. Slaves, naturally; servants, male or female, farming, horses (we come to that later) and naturally, the wife. But this is not a complete enumeration. We will see later on something more.

Now we turn in the next chapter. Critobulus brings up, determines, the subject. Let us read the beginning of chapter 4.

Reader:
"Surely, Socrates, there is no need to go through the whole list."

LS: Whole list, meaning, of lucrative arts.

Reader:
"For it is not easy to get workmen who are skilled in all the arts, nor is it possible to become an expert in them. Pray select the branches of knowledge that seem the noblest and would be most suitable for me to cultivate: show me these, and those who practice them; and give me from your own knowledge any help you can towards learning them." (4.1)

LS: So he wants to learn those arts which are "reputed to be the finest," the most resplendent, because he is concerned with pomp and circumstance. We must never forget that. He wants to be happy in this sense. Thereupon Socrates develops the judgment which the *polis* has on the banausic arts. What are the banausic arts? The ordinary crafts of ordinary craftsmen. And he is especially concerned with the judgment of cities reputed to be good at war, what they say; and they all have a bad view of the ordinary crafts, but a high view of farming. And then he adduces the highest authority, and who can be the highest authority from the point of view of pomp and circumstance? The king of Persia. Compared with him the richest Greek is a pauper. And what does the Persian king do? And now we learn to Critobulus's and to our surprise that the Persian king is a passionate cultivator of the soil. Now this has a great implication. What was the judgment of the key Greeks about farming? We know that from Xenophon; we don't have to go to inscriptions or such things. Let me be more precise: At first glance the highest Greek authority in any such matters is the city of Sparta, and what did the Spartans think about farming? The gentleman does not farm, that is done by Helots or such people. And now Socrates turns from the highest Greek authority—Sparta—to the highest authority simply—Persia—in order to get approval for farming. Why is the Persian king the highest authority simply, higher than Sparta?

Student: Older.

LS: And more powerful. In other words, from the point of view of mere (how do you say?) prestige, the image, the Persian king is much higher than Sparta. And this is in a way the basis for the *Education of Cyrus*. Because what Cyrus did was greater than what any Greek did. The Greek who out-Cyrused Cyrus came after: Alexander the Great. Up to the time Cyrus was the most terrific man known to the Greeks from the point of view of ruling and empire. Yes. And then in this connection this difficulty arises to which Mr. ____ referred, what precisely is the relative rank of farming and of warring? Let us read paragraph 15.

Reader:
"And some say, Critobulus, that when the king makes gifts, he first invites those who have distinguished themselves in war, because it is useless to have broad acres under tillage unless there are men to defend them; and next to them, those who stock and cultivate the land best, saying that even stout-hearted warriors cannot live without the aid of workers." (4.15)

LS: So in other words, they seem to be of equal rank, in a way. Farmers need warriors, and warriors need farmers. But still, doesn't the Persian king make a distinction of rank between the two?

Student: He invited the warriors first.

LS: How can you explain this strange procedure? Why does he give the higher rank to the warriors? Since they need each other mutually, there would seem to be equality of rank.

Student: If you are a warrior and run out of food, you can go raid somebody's else land.

LS: And?

Student: If you are a farmer, you depend on your farm and either on the art of war to protect you or not to interfere with your farming in order to get your food. The warrior is more independent.

LS: But still he is dependent on food. Let us read the next paragraph.

Reader:
"There is a story that Cyrus, lately the most illustrious of princes, once said to the company invited to receive his gifts, I myself deserve to receive the gifts awarded in both classes; for I am the best at stocking land and the best at protecting the stock." (4.16)

LS: You see. But this is interesting: the king—this is the third possibility. Here you have the farmer, and then you have the warrior, and then you have the ruler, of course, in ascending order. For some reason the ruler is higher. And since the helpers in ruling are the warriors rather than the farmers, the warriors occupy a higher rank. Again, Plato's *Republic*: Is it not exactly the same? The rulers, the soldiers or guardians, and then the farmers and artisans.

Student: The warriors increase the wealth; the farmers only maintain the status quo. The warriors are more ruthless in acquisition.

LS: Yes. But still we have not yet investigated whether ruthlessness is bad. For the time being we are still in this horizon, but still, something has changed. The point of view of splendor comes in: the form of acquisition is preferred which is more resplendent, and this is not the same as simply being good at acquisition regardless of how you acquire. In other words, the political point of view supervenes and affects the primarily economic.

In the sequel it becomes clear, and that is quite a change, that the virtue of the ruler (paragraphs 18 and 19) becomes the great theme, a subject we had not been expecting. There is an almost insensible shift from the management of the household to the art of ruling. In this connection a story is told of the famous Spartan general Lysander when he visited the younger Cyrus. Lysander was a very big shot at the end of the Peloponnesian War, the most famous Spartan at that time. And he is full of admiration of Cyrus, you know—after all, Cyrus is next in line for the Persian throne and Cyrus proves to be a cultivator of the soil, which no Spartan gentleman would dream of doing. So here even a Spartan gentleman becomes converted to farming, at least in his thought. He cannot do it in practice. This much up to this point. This implicit critique of Sparta is very important. It will become thematic in other Xenophontic writings.

Here comes then in chapter 5 an encomium of the art of farming, highly rhetorical. At the end, in paragraph 17, he says: "Finely did he speak who said that farming was the mother and nurse of the other arts." I believe that is no other man than Gorgias himself. I had a note somewhere—in Themistius, *Orationes*, 30th.[xvi] I have not looked it up now, but I suppose there must be something there. By the way, in reading such a rhetorical speech[4] one must be particularly awake, because the rhetoric sweeps you off your feet and you simply say: Well, it is just nice sounds and has no structure. It has a very clear structure. I will only indicate to you how Xenophon indicates it. In paragraph 2 he says "in the first place" [*prōton*], paragraph 3, beginning,[5] "then," *epeita*. The same expression occurs again in paragraph 3 a little bit later. Then you have at the beginning of paragraph 5 again, "then." And in paragraph 12, at the beginning, "furthermore." There are five items. And this indicates the plan of the whole thing. The central part is at the end of paragraph 3, including paragraph 4, let us read that. Furthermore.

Reader:
"she produces or feeds the ingredients of many delicate dishes; for the art of breeding stock—" (5.3)

LS: More literally, "the art of breeding sheep." It is interesting that the art of sheep-breeding is singled out, and not cattle.

Reader:
"is closely linked with husbandry; so that men have victims for propitiating the gods with sacrifice and cattle for their own use. And though she supplies good things in abundance, she

[xvi] The Contantinopolitan senator Themistius's oration praises agriculture as one of the greatest sources of law and of justice, and states that "[a]griculture supplies everyone else . . . Whether a person is a painter or a sculptor, whether we are talking about merchants or sailors—well, why do I need to go through every occupational category? There is simply no one who does not need agriculture." Oration 30, "Should One Engage in Farming?" in *The Private Orations of Themistius*, trans. Robert J. Penella (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 184-88, 188.

suffers them not to be won without toil, but accustoms men to endure winter's cold and summer's heat. She gives increased strength through exercise to the men that labour with their own hands, and hardens the overseers of the work by rousing them early and forcing them to move about briskly. For on a farm no less than in a town the most important operations have their fixed times." (5.3-4)

LS: You see, he speaks here of those who work with their own hands. And who are they? Slaves, in the context of the whole thing. This art of farming gives strength to the slaves working on the farm. This is of some importance. Why? Let us read paragraph 14.

Reader:
"Moreover, husbandry helps to train men for corporate effort. For men are essential to an expedition against an enemy, and the cultivation of the soil demands the aid of men. Therefore nobody can be a good farmer unless he makes his labourers both eager and obedient; and the captain who leads men against an enemy must contrive to secure the same results by rewarding those who act as brave men should act and punishing the disobedient. And it is no less necessary for a farmer to encourage his laborers often, than for a general to encourage his men. And slaves need the stimulus of good hopes no less, nay, even more than free men, to make them steadfast." (5.14-16)

LS: Why do slaves need more hope than free men?

Student: They have less to hope for.

LS: I see. In other words, they are very badly off. In addition, they work very hard and get out in the fields. They become healthy and very strong. Does this make some sense? Does it throw some light on the situation?

Student: They may become dangerous.

LS: I see. You understand now why the citizens need allies, not against foreign enemies, but in the country itself. There is a beautiful description in the *Republic*, I think in the ninth book, [of] what happens to a man who has many slaves, and if suddenly he would be alone with the slaves, what fate he would have.[xvii] So this problem of slaves is present. Let us consider from this point of view paragraph 11. You must never forget that Socrates is speaking.

Reader:
"To me indeed it seems strange, if any free man has come by a possession of pleasure pleasanter than this, or has found out an occupation pleasanter than this or more useful for winning a livelihood." (5.11)

LS: The simple question is, then: Why, Socrates, are you not a farmer? Why not, indeed? Perhaps it has something to do with the question of slaves. Perhaps. There is one Platonic incident which we must consider. At the beginning of the dialogue *Protagoras*, a young fellow called Hippocrates wakens Socrates in the very early morning because Protagoras has come to

[xvii] *Republic* 578e-579b.

Athens and he wants to meet Protagoras, and he assumes somehow that Socrates, who knows these intellectuals, will of course be able to introduce him. And Hippocrates is very tired because he has been up very late. He had been hunting a runaway slave the day before. This is described as a matter of course. Everyone would do that; a slave is a piece of property like any other. Socrates's silence about the subject is most revealing—I mean, not that Socrates was an abolitionist—that was absurd at that time, but he wouldn't be able to do that. That I think is clear.

Yes, let us see. We have now—yes, there is one point at the end of this chapter to which I must draw your attention. And this is very much connected with that, in paragraph 19.

Reader:
"Well," said Socrates in reply, "I thought you knew, Critobulus, that the operations of husbandry no less than those of war are in the hands of the gods. And you observe, I suppose, that men engaged in war try to propitiate the gods before taking action; and with sacrifices and omens seek to know what they ought to do and what they ought not to do; and for the business of husbandry do you think it less necessary to ask the blessing of the gods?" (5.19-20)

LS: This subject of the gods we have discussed before. The supplement to art and continence is good luck. But what I have in mind here are these expressions which don't come out in the translation: "Warlike deeds" and "agricultural deeds" or actions. This parallel between war and agriculture goes through the whole thing, as we have seen. Now[6] in the first paragraph of the next chapter Critobulus repeats that expression with a slight change.

Reader:
"Well, Socrates, I think you are right when you bid me try to begin every undertaking with the gods' help, since the gods control the works of peace no less than of war." (6.1)

LS: "That the gods are no less in control of the peaceful works than of the warlike works." So it is not Socrates but Critobulus who calls them peaceful. Socrates calls them agricultural. The other term is the same in both cases: warlike. Socrates does not call them the peaceful deeds. And that has something to do with that great theme. That is not simply peace, not only because of the competitive element, to which we will come later, but also because of the slaves involved. That is not a simply peaceful relation. There is a very powerful passage on the slaves in the *Hiero*. We will come to that. The citizens protect one another against violent death on the part of foreigners and of slaves. That is the enemy within. Good.

Here in this first paragraph Critobulus wants Socrates to continue his interrupted discussion of the works of economics. Something is then lacking. Is an item lacking, or are merely the details of these six enumerated items lacking? That would be the question. Could there be any items lacking? Is there not a part of management of the household which is not in among these six? Nothing far-fetched.

Student: Raising of children.

LS: Exactly. Children are not discussed at all in the book, and we must see why. And I think we have to consider the sheep. Cattle raising is not discussed in that book. That's also a question. We must see whether we can find an answer to that. But sheep surely should be in because they are clearly mentioned. The sequel, paragraph 2, makes clear that there are items missing. Read paragraph 2.

Reader:
"I suggest then," resumed Socrates, "that we should first recapitulate those points of our discussion on which we have already reached agreement, in order that we may try to agree as thoroughly, if possible, when we go through the remaining steps." (6.2)

LS: So in other words, there are other items which are not mentioned. This is a summary, a repetition, a recapitulation. In every good writer there is never an identical repetition. Never. There are always deviations. They may seem trivial, but they are never trivial. Now here there is a very manifest addition, where Marchant would surely say this was never said before, and I am sure some nineteenth century Germany editor would say this was inserted by someone else and has to be taken out. Now let us read this addition, paragraphs 6 to 7, namely, where the question comes up why should he become a farmer and not have any other trade.

Reader:
"We said that the clearest proof of this would be forthcoming, if in the course of a hostile invasion the husbandmen and the craftsmen were made to sit apart, and each group were asked whether they voted for defending the country or withdrawing from the open and guarding the fortresses." (6.6-7)

LS: "Guarding the walls."

Reader:
"We thought that in these circumstances the men who have to do with the land would give their vote for defending it, the craftsmen for not fighting, but sitting still, as they have been brought up to do, aloof from toil and danger." (6.7-8)

LS: Now this is an extremely interesting question, in itself it is purely military, but with a very broad political bearing: Who are the best soldiers? Now I learned when I was younger the following fact of experience, that up to the First World War, the general rule was the peasants, the peasantry. But in the First World War, for the first time, in these highly industrial battles of the Somme and other places the industrial workers proved to have better nerves for that kind of war than the peasants. That was at least what I heard in Germany, and I suppose in Britain and France it will not have been different. Now this long tradition of millennia, [that] the peasantry is the basis of the army, is a very interesting question. What is the basis for it? Was it really so that the peasants were better soldiers? Now in this particular case it is clear, but this doesn't make them better soldiers. That they get more angry when their farms are devastated than the burghers, that is a story you read everywhere in Thucydides and also in Aristophanes—you know, that the farms were devastated by the Spartans so that they had to live for years in the city. They were of course highly dissatisfied and burning with indignation against the damned Spartans, whereas the workers and the tradesmen suffered much less in this way from the war. But this is clear, that it

has nothing to do with the fact that they are better soldiers but that they are more warlike in this particular manner. Now these arguments given here do not of course in any way settle the issue. You know, this doesn't prove it. There is a later passage where this came up. Let me see whether I remember it in this way. There is however a very powerful political argument in favor of the peasantry against the urban craftsmen and workers, which some of you will remember from Aristotle. When Aristotle discusses democracy in the sixth book of the *Politics* and raises the question "What is the best democracy?," what does he say?

Student: It's agricultural, because the farmers will be outside of the city and will not congregate.

LS: They will not come to the assemblies, either to the deliberative or to the law courts. And they are glad if they come to town only once a year to elect the magistrates, and don't want to assemble every day as the urban *demos*. This is of course a strictly political reason, that the gentlemen, the higher-class people, prefer a deferential *demos* who in addition can't help but be deferential, and on very solid grounds, to a *demos* which is not deferential. This is surely a purely political [and] not a military argument of very great force, naturally, because in this whole argument in favor of the peasantry from a military standpoint of view, Xenophon constantly refers, at least here, to considerations of what is thought, what is believed, what is held—the ideology, as they call it now. Those are not necessarily solid reasons. I think we must keep this very important question in mind. Then there is another point which Socrates adds in paragraph 9, in chapter 6.

Reader:
"For this occupation seemed to the be the easiest to learn and the pleasantest to work at—" (6.9)

LS: This is another thing which he slips in: "easiest to learn." He hadn't said that before. But this will be a large subject later on. Paragraph 10, by the way, has also to do with the soldiers question.

Reader:
"Moreover, since the crops grow and the cattle on a farm graze outside the walls, husbandry seemed to us to help in some measure to make the workers valiant. And so this way of making a living appeared to be held in the highest estimation by our states—" (6.10)

LS: "Cities," of course.

Reader:
"because it seems to turn out the best citizens and most loyal to the community."

LS: Well, "the most benevolent," literally. That is what I mentioned before. These are the rural, deferential people, who don't make so much fuss against the gentlemen as the urban workers and craftsmen would do. Paragraph 11.

Reader:
"I have already heard enough, I think, Socrates, to convince me that it is in the highest degree honorable, good and pleasant to get a living by husbandry. But you told me that you have

discovered the reasons why some farmers are so successful that husbandry yields them all they need in abundance—" (6.11)

LS: And so on. "The causes," more literally translated. Knowing the causes means of course to have true knowledge. Socrates has knowledge of the causes why some farmers succeed and others fail. He possesses the art of farming and therefore he could truly teach it. Now of course there is one difference, and this may dispose of a difficulty which one of you felt. Socrates may not possess the art of managing the household in general, but he may possess this important part of it, which is the art of farming. Is that not possible? Because after all, in order to possess the art of managing the household, you must not be only good at sowing and harvesting and so on at the right time, but also at selling the produce to the extent to which you don't need it, and a man may be very good as a farmer and very poor as salesman. That is a way out of this difficulty [of] why Socrates doesn't wish to teach it. So he would only be able to teach him how to raise the best produce but not how to sell it, and also how to buy the various things required for the farm. So Socrates should then teach the art of farming. Still Socrates doesn't do it. He brings Critobulus to another man—how does he say it?—a good and noble man. One should translate it freely, as it is ordinarily translated: a perfect gentleman. A perfect gentleman. And now the subject is very much enlarged. We have seen there was first an enlargement from the art of managing the household to the politico-military art, and now we get into the highest theme of moral philosophy, the perfect gentleman. The connection is this: the perfect gentleman earns his living as a gentleman farmer. And therefore of course farming must also be discussed. But perfect gentlemanship is not the same as farming, and therefore it is a much higher theme. The ultimate justification of farming is that it is the activity of the perfect gentleman, and therefore this is really the highest cause. Yet something strange happens. Instead of raising the question "What is perfect gentlemanship?"—the same question in a way as the question, "What is virtue?—nothing of the kind. What do they do instead? They look at a perfect gentleman. They just look at him. So if the question were raised, "What is a rabbit?," we look at a rabbit. Seems to be very sound; but still, we know in advance, of course, what is a rabbit. That this is a rabbit and not a cat, that we know. But how do we know that we look at the right fellow that this is a perfect gentleman? How do they know that?

Student: Reputation.

LS: Reputation. Perfect gentlemanship appears primarily in the element of *doxa*, opinion. And Socrates describes briefly his predicament because, literally translated, the term means good and beautiful. Now, so when he saw a beautiful man he thought: Well, he is likely to be good. And he was disappointed in more than one case, and therefore he had to play by ear, meaning, directed by what people say to this man Ischomachus. And so one day he meets Ischomachus, who is ordinarily very busy either on the farm or in the marketplace, but when he has some leisure, [he is] sitting at a temple, the yard of a temple, and is free. He is waiting, has an appointment with people who have not turned up. That is a question of order, that you are on time and insist that others are on time. And he, [Socrates], asks him point blank: What are you doing, that everyone calls you a perfect gentleman? Without any inhibition, he asks him. Now Ischomachus is of course amused by this straightforwardness, and at the same time he is also pleased that he has such a good reputation. And so he begins, and you will see in paragraph 3 of chapter 7 he says: "He laughed about the question by doing what he called a perfect gentleman,

and pleased as it seemed to me, he said, when they talk to you about men that they give me this name I do not know; but when they come to me for some taxes of some kind, they never say perfect gentleman, they just call me plain Ischomachus with my father's name."[xviii] Ischomachus, son of X, like Socrates the son of Sophroniscus, which is not a political title but it is a more high-class thing to be called by the father's name—that was at least in Athens the case. He doesn't give us his father's name, which is a great pity because we cannot identify him. It was a rather common name in Athens. I will later on give you a hypothesis [about] which Ischomachus this particular one is, but we are not yet in any way prepared for that.

Now he is never indoors. He is always outdoors—his face shows it, [a] ruddy face—never indoors, because the work indoors is done by his wife. Therefore the subject becomes—Socrates is absolutely surprised that his wife played such a terrific role in Ischomachus's life. The first four chapters of this relatively short part, 7 to 10, deal with the wife, and the man's activity comes in only in chapter 11. That's very strange. The wife first, and then the man: against the natural order. This is of course not done accidentally. There is one very great model of that where the women come first, in a very great piece of literature, then the men.

Student: *Lysistrata*?

LS: That is a comedy, where it is turned around, obviously. The *Lysistrata* is a completely upside down thing, where the women are on top. No, in Homer, in the *Odyssey*, in the *Nekria*, when Odysseus goes down to the dead. Which book is it? I don't remember.

Student: Eleven.

LS: The women are first, and then the men. Of course, whatever the Homeric reason may have been, why the women are first is one question; why the women come here first is another question. I mention this only as a problem. Now we know of course one thing about this great subject: that Socrates is as ignorant in this sphere as Critobulus, and therefore it is immensely important to listen to Ischomachus, who is such an expert on the managing of his wife. And this chapter is I think simply charming, and I hope no one of you has deprived himself of the great joy of reading it. We cannot read that here.

Well, Ischomachus is altogether the educator of his wife because she was not yet fifteen, and before marriage she was brought up under the old principle for girls to hear as little as possible, to see as little as possible, and to speak as little as possible. She only learned that she must behave modestly. This was of course a very good lesson, but not sufficient, and he has to give her the true education. Now what is the first subject of education?

Reader:
"Pray tell me—" (7.9)

LS: No: "By the gods," a very enlarged invocation.

Reader:

[xviii] 7.3. Strauss's translation.

"By the gods[xix] tell me, Ischomachus, what was the first lesson you taught her, since I would sooner hear this from your lips than an account of the noblest athletic event or horse-race?" (7.9)

LS: This was about begetting of children, the first subject. Now this conversation was obviously at the beginning of their marriage, and we don't know how long a time ago that was. It seems however quite some time ago. Now the fact that this account of wife-training is presented as taking place right after marriage explains why there is no section about the management of children in this book, because they didn't have children at that time. That is of some help for the understanding of this. Children are mentioned in paragraph 12, [and] are called allies. Life is war, even in peace, and you need allies all the time; and of course the children are the most natural allies. This is again not Socrates; we must keep this in mind. Socrates is not in this sense a warrior. Then he develops the quality in marriage, the moderation. But moderation is of course too vague a term. What the wife has to do is "keep things in the best shape and increasing them as much as possible nobly and justly."[xx] That is the decent art of managing the household. So the great moral qualification comes in: increasing your wealth, but nobly and justly. This excludes tyranny and other criminal acts, that goes without saying.

Then he gives a long description of the relation between husband and wife on the basis of the natural distinction of the two sexes. The natural distinction is traced to the god. Paragraph 16 we might read.

Reader:
"And what do you see that I can possibly do to help in the improvement of our property," asked my wife.
"Why," said I, "of course you must try to do as well as possible what the gods made you capable of doing and the law sanctions." (7.16)

LS: Yes, more literally translated: "what the gods have planted you to be able to do." This word "planting" is the same root as the word *physis*. So the distinction between *physis* and *nomos* of which we spoke is here obviously intended. "And what the *nomos* praises together with nature." Nature and law agree in giving different functions, but mutually supporting functions, to the two sexes. The woman is compared to a queen bee. Now I know very little about bees, but even if I knew everything about bees it wouldn't be of any help because we would have to know what Xenophon knew about bees. He has never written about bees. But I looked up Virgil's *Georgics*, [the] fourth *Georgic,* which deals with beekeeping, and I found there that according to this view bees do not have sexual reproduction, but reproduction takes place by spontaneous generation from carcasses and flowers and other things.[xxi] And that was also the view of Aristotle, so that seems to have been the ancient view. So we must keep this in mind.

Now then he develops at some length the theme of male and female and in other species, and the specifically human. The specifically human is that men have children for helpers in their old age. That was a famous theme in pre-Socratic thinking, that in all species of animals the raising of offspring and caring of them, this is natural; but in the human race there is also an expectation of

[xix] In original: "Pray tell me"
[xx] *Oeconomicus* 7.15. Strauss's translation.
[xxi] Virgil, *Georgics* 4, ll.281-314.

repayment when the parents are old. This doesn't exist in the other species. The ordinary view was that this is a convention, due to *nomos*. And the second point which he mentions as specifically human is that men live in shelters, which is of course not simply true, because the beasts given as an example also have a kind of house. But at any rate, the distinction between shelters, houses, inside and outside, is then used as the basis for the distinction between the two sexes. The work inside is being done by the women, and the outside is to be done by the men—and as a matter of fact this distinction of the functions of the household, inside or outside, becomes the basis for the understanding of the natural distinction between the two sexes. One may say Ischomachus gives here a kind of economic physiology and psychology of the sexes, understanding it in terms of the household functions; women of course have more of fear, men have more of boldness. One point I think should be especially mentioned in paragraph 33.

Reader:
"How? she stays in the hive," I answered, "and does not suffer the bees to be idle; but those whose duty it is to work outside she sends forth to their work; and whatever each of them brings in, she knows and receives it, and keeps it till it is wanted. And when the time is come to use it, she portions out the just share to each. She likewise presides over the weaving of the combs in the hive, that they may be well and quickly woven, and cares for the brood of little ones, that it be duly reared up. And when the young bees have been duly reared up and are fit for work, she sends them forth to found a colony, with a leader to guide the young adventurers." (7.33)

LS: What does this mean, if we retranslate it into human terms? What is already implied in the simile of queen bee as such? The woman is the government, distributing to each what is just. And such a function as sending out colonies, who does that? Of course, the government. So we are confronted with this strange thing that the female or womanly is the political, and the male is not the political. How strange. But that [this] is not a peculiarity of Xenophon is shown by this simple fact. In Plato's *Statesman* the art used for making clear what the function of the statesman is is the art of weaving, a distinctly female art, and known to be such in classical antiquity. Now what then is the male activity, if politics—which includes of course generalship, generalship being subordinate to statesmanship—what then is the male art par excellence, if the highest political art is female?

Student: Philosophy.

LS: Does it make sense? Are not the philosophers precisely the people who sit and talk inside, *eudon*, like women? You know, that is the view of the real citizen. The philosophers are talkers. They sit in the houses and talk, exactly what women are supposed to do. They don't go out to the marketplace. Well, the reason, I think, is this: the political man in the highest sense, including the king, belongs to the *polis*; [he lives within]—even if he conquers other cities, it is still for the *polis*.[7] The man who goes outside of the *polis*, the man who lives in this sense outside, is the philosopher. Because he transcends the *polis*. That is I think the reason behind that.

At the beginning of paragraph 35, that is very charming, this fifteen year old girl. What does she say?

Reader:

“Then shall I too have to do these things?” said my wife.
“Indeed you will,” said I; “your duty will be to remain indoors and send out those servants whose work is outside, and superintend those who are to work indoors—” (7.35)

LS: Let us read paragraph 37, then.

Reader:
“One of the duties that fall to you, however, will perhaps seem rather thankless: you will have to see that any servant who is ill is cared for.”
“Oh no,” cried my wife, “it will be delightful, assuming that those who are well cared for are going to feel grateful and be more loyal than before.” (7.37)

LS: So she has the root of the matter in herself, obviously. Yes. She knows how to be respected, and she has a certain amount of ambition. Yes?

Reader:
“Why, my dear,” cried I, delighted with her answer, “what makes the bees so devoted to their leader in the hive, that when she forsakes it, they all follow her, and not one thinks of staying behind?” (7.38)

LS: You see now the great implication: if the queen bee is her model, she must go outside. In other words, this is an indication of what I indicated. It has also a purely comical implication of what I will speak later.

One last word is this. I think the last paragraph of this chapter shows that the conversation has taken place a long time ago between Ischomachus and his wife. In other words, it was not immediately after their honeymoon [but] many years ago, because he says: “I seem to remember.” That he wouldn’t say about what happened in the last year or so. Why is this important? Here we have an example of teaching: Ischomachus teaching the art of the household, a form of virtue. He teaches it. And the question of course is: she acquired that knowledge, and if virtue is knowledge, she has become a perfect wife. Now this of course is a great question. Did she become a perfect wife or not? No answer is given here. We must keep this open. That is always a simple practical test, not only in Xenophon but also in Plato, of this famous thesis virtue is knowledge. Now Socrates teaches virtue, in a way. They acquire knowledge. Do they become good men? That is always a question. Here the question is: Did she become a good woman? We will take this up later.

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[1] Deleted "that."
[2] Deleted "of."
[3] Deleted [?]."
[4] Deleted “piece”
[5] Deleted "[?]."
[6] Deleted "Socrates."
[7] Moved "lives within."

Session 4: no date
***Oeconomicus* 2**

Leo Strauss: You made a number of points which I have not observed and where you may very well be right. [i] You compared the qualities of the maid with those of the wife on the one hand, and of the bailiff on the other. And you observed certain differences which are very well worth considering. On the other hand, you did not bring out certain points which were implied in what you said; but only one more step and the thing would become much clearer. For instance, what you said at the end, that Ischomachus teaches his bailiff justice: Now this means Ischomachus teaches virtue. This is one of the gravest questions raised by Socrates: Can virtue be taught? Now if even Ischomachus can teach virtue, Socrates surely can. And this is of course of eminent importance, and I don't have to labor the point that the question[s] whether virtue is knowledge and whether virtue can be taught belong together. Because if something is knowledge, say mathematics, it can be surely taught. This point we have to consider later.

I would make only two more points which you brought up. The first concerns how to understand Xenophon. And I was glad to see that you have reached the conclusion that the way in which Marchant reads Xenophon is not quite sufficient. There is a certain stratum which Marchant doesn't reach. Now Marchant is of course an extreme case, I admit that, but the common way of reading is closer to Marchant than to the one which I believe is wise. The most fundamental question you raised concerned order, *taxis*, and you referred to the difference between the modern view of order and the classical view. Can you state this a bit more clearly?

Student: [. . .]

LS: Well, there is of course a connection between our notion of order and the classical notion, known to everyone of you by the fact that until a very short time ago, to some extent even up to today, people speak of natural laws—laws of nature, say, Newton. And this is order, nature's order. But what is the difference between the typically modern concept and the typically classical concept?

Student: [. . .]

LS: Yes, that is there too. *Logos* is, after all, a mathematical word. Well. Yes?

Student: [. . .]

LS: That is one thing, but still this is of course a question whether this is the, how shall I say, modern philosophy of science in contradistinction to modern science itself. That could be a question. So it is something more elementary. Well, when people speak today of what they seek in science, natural or social, [it] is some regularities of behavior. But regularity means something different. For example, when you say today of a man [that] his behavior is irregular—he steals, is

[i] Strauss responds to a student's paper, read at the beginning of the session. The reading was not recorded.

always late, and cheats in examinations, and other irregularities—then this may very well be regular in another sense, namely, say it may become the habit of a society and then it is a regular behavior in that society. Do you see what I mean, what I am driving at? The classical notion is more akin to what we mean now by irregular, namely, insofar as the order is a good order, not necessarily the regularity of behavior irrespective of whether the behavior is good or bad. That is, I think, a crucial implication which would need a closer analysis.

So now let us turn then to a coherent discussion of the assignment. We cannot afford the luxury we indulged in last time, namely, that we don't consider any limitations of time, and therefore I have to be much more selective than I was last time. But I must remind you of the overall context. We are dealing with economy, with the economic art, which is the art of increasing one's estate. And one's estate means the totality of the good things which one has. All good things are here viewed as objects of appropriation or exploitation. Friends are money. All activities are viewed as means for appropriation, including war and tyranny. Tyranny is a way of getting rich, very rich. It is clear that a tyrant doesn't have to give an account of his expenses as Mr. Adamowski[ii] has to do. That is obvious. A man like Khrushchev, he can spend as much as he likes and no one has a right to ask him. Good. But in order to be a good economist in this sense, you have to control all your desires except your avarice. This you may indulge. The Greeks would call that love of gain. Your love of gain you may indulge as much as you can. So love of gain is presupposed to be good, contrary to the popular notion according to which love of gain was a defect. You know? And there is one Platonic dialogue where this is subject is the theme, and that is the *Hipparchus*, which you might read. Yes?

Student: [. . .]

LS: Surely. I come to that. But we have to see first the first stratum of the argument. Justification of love of gain without any strings attached is the first statement. But here comes a qualification: good things are good things only if one knows how to use them. This implies the question: Is there not a limit beyond which a man can no longer use what he has or acquired? And here, the difference between Socrates and Critobulus, as Mr. ____ pointed out, is decisive. Socrates has few wants and hence is wealthy, even if in absolute terms he may be a poor man. Critobulus has many wants, and hence he is poor. Why is he poor? On account of his ostentation, of his concern with ostentation. How did Veblen call that? Conspicuous consumption.[iii] He is a man of conspicuous consumption. There is no limit to what a man must acquire if he is concerned with ostentation. And at this point indeed the question arises which of these ways of life is preferable: that of infinite acquisition, ultimately in the service of ostentation, and that of limited acquisition, where we do not yet know what the end of such a life would be. But we have now reached agreement. Good.

Now it is Critobulus who brings up the nonutilitarian point of view by speaking of a noble way of life. That is in the fourth chapter. Now this at first doesn't mean anything more than what was formerly called ostentation, something which makes a good show. Noble, fine, is the same word: what is impressive. But it shifts into something different. He is concerned with ostentation. Now this agrees partly, however, with the point of view of the good as distinguished from the noble or

[ii] Benjamin Adamowski challenged incumbent Richard J. Daley in the 1963 mayoral election in Chicago.
[iii] See Thorstein Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions* (1899).

fine. As Socrates makes clear, good condition of the body and soul and concern with one's friends and the city, which are sober terms without any ostentation implied, are also a reason for having wealth or acquiring it. Is this clear? Socrates could not take care on a large scale of the wants of his friends because he doesn't have enough. So therefore a reasonable man can say: I want to help my friends with money, and therefore I want to acquire. That is a decent thing to do. But here the question would have to be raised: Why are friends and the *polis* useful things? Because the reference is still the self-interest of the individual. Let us limit ourselves to the question of the *polis*. Why is the *polis* useful, from the very low practical point of view? Think of a man who wants to be rich. Why must he admit that the *polis* is useful?

Student: Protection.

LS: Absolutely. He would be robbed of everything he acquires if there were no *polis*. So that is strictly practical. One needs the *polis*. Good. That is the utilitarian point of view, but the point of view of the noble or fine has entered and the two lines are now united at a certain point, the good and the noble, in the perfect gentleman, which means, literally translated, the good and noble man. Mr. ___?

Student: [. . .]

LS: That I did not observe. But that is a good point. Now how would you explain that?

Student: [. . .]

LS: Well, what is the expensive honoring of the gods? What does it mean? Which actions are meant? Sacrifice. Now the question is: What does Socrates think of the reasonableness of sacrifices? If Socrates would have thought sacrifices an unreasonable action, then he would not stress it. Here we don't have evidence for that. But there is a Platonic dialogue dealing with it. Do you know which, dealing with the reasonableness of sacrifices? The *Euthyphron*, which one would have to read; and one can say that Socrates indeed shows there that sacrifices [1][are] something unreasonable, because [2][they presuppose] that a god has needs. And sacrifices [are] a kind of trade, where men trade with the gods, and this is somehow an absurd notion. Yes. That is not difficult to understand.

Now the first subject then which comes up after the introduction of Ischomachus, and after Ischomachus has become the teacher, is gynecology. Not in the medical sense, a *logos* about women. And this is chiefly a dialogue between Ischomachus and his wife. It is not a dialogue between Ischomachus and Socrates here. Although that is very funny when you read it—and it won't come out in the translation, I believe, but it would come out in the Greek—where you do not know whom Ischomachus is addressing. When he says: "Woman, do that," does he mean Socrates, or does he mean his wife? That is very funny, and more than funny.[3] [There are] large sections, for example in the seventh chapter, from paragraph 10 to the end, where Socrates is absolutely silent. And he is silent most of the time. Ischomachus is here cast into the role which is ordinarily occupied by Socrates, and this of course has a variety of reasons. That is really extraordinary, that Ischomachus plays the role of Socrates here, the teacher of virtue. Well, one of these reasons is of course that it is a matter of teaching virtue, and this for some reason must

take on the form of a dialogue according to Xenophon or Socrates; and secondly, because it draws our attention to something which Socrates cannot do but Ischomachus can, namely, teaching his wife. Sure. Yes, this is also humorous. Mr. ___, you have a point?

Student: [. . .]

LS: That could be. But perhaps the difficulty concerns the education of women. But if by entering into the details one would see the key point is not the womanish side but something common to both sexes, then one would have to go beyond that. Do you see what I mean? It could throw light on the education of human beings in virtue as such and not merely on the education of women. But primarily what you say is sound. I mention only the highest point of view which emerges in this discussion in chapter 7. That is the distinction between nature and *nomos*, *physis*, and *nomos*. *Physis* [is] identified with what the gods do. The great theme of chapter 8 and following is order, *taxis*. And three examples are given first: a chorus, an army, and a man of war. It is of course extremely funny: this unbearable pedant, when he explains to his wife how he formed this order by armies, as if she wanted to become a non-commissioned officer or perhaps even more than that. But still this is surely a most important example of order, although the example is misplaced in this particular conversation. Let us read in chapter 8, the ninth paragraph.

Reader:
"If I want a type of disorder—"

LS: "A disorder seems to me to be similar."

Reader:
"I think of a farmer who has stored barley, wheat and pulse in one bin; and then when he wants a bannock or a loaf or a pudding, must pick out the grain instead of finding it separate and ready for use." (8.9)

LS: What seems to be implied here is this: when there is no order, there is need for sundering. There is disorder and sundering, separating the various kinds is then needed. But now what they are doing all the time, as will become clear in the sequel, is sundering, separating things. This implies [that] it seems to be that the first thing for us, as Aristotle would say, is disorder. We are confronted with primarily some disorder, and we have to find the underlying order. Now they speak about the order in [a] household. Each thing must be in its place, in its proper place, because if you don't know where you have your gloves it is almost as bad as if you had no gloves—although it is not quite as bad, but it is almost as bad. So the "where" is of crucial importance. Now *the* example of order, however, is not supplied by the chorus, the army, or the man of war, but by the Phoenecian merchantmen of all things. Were there no Athenian merchantmen, or Corinthian, or whatever? Why did he do that? You remember that in the earlier conversation Cyrus, the Persian prince, was the example of the farmer-warrior. Here it was a Persian, there it is a Phoenican. Why?

Student: Are not the Phoenecians famous even to the Greeks as the greedy people?

LS: Exactly. *The* merchants. So here Ischomachus reveals his taste: in spite of being a perfect gentleman, he is fundamentally a merchant. And this will come out in the sequel with utmost clarity. In Plato's *Republic*, for example, 436a and other passages, the Phoenecians are singled out[4] [as] the traders par excellence. What does one have to consider in ordering things? In the first place, how many and where; how many shoes for men and where they are placed. These are two principles of order, if I may now use a terrific word, categories: the where and the how many; the quantity and the place. We will find some other such forbidding things here. In paragraph 15 to 16, we find another dialogue within the dialogue: a dialogue between Ischomachus and the Phoenecian is told in a dialogue between Ischomachus and his wife; and[5] a dialogue between Ischomachus and Socrates is told in a dialogue between Socrates and Critobulus. In Plato there are also examples of such dialogues within dialogues within dialogues. And this is a subject which would itself need a long discussion. We cannot do that now.

It is made clear that order appears to be not only good in the sense of profitable or convenient, but also beautiful to look at. That is another radically different consideration. And in this connection it is especially interesting. Paragraph 20, which we might read.

Reader:
"There is nothing, in short, that does not gain in beauty when set out in order. For each set looks like a troop of utensils, and the space between the sets is beautiful to see, when each set is kept clear of it, just as a troop of dancers about the altar is a beautiful spectacle in itself, and even the free space looks beautiful and unencumbered." (8.20)

LS: "And clean," "pure." Beautiful and pure. So that is interesting: How can something where there is nothing be beautiful and pure? By the surroundings. But that even the void can be beautiful and pure is an extraordinary thing, isn't it? It is of course not useful.

Student: Would this have also an application to the art of writing?

LS: Perhaps. It is worth considering. Good. Everything is in its place. But there can also be places in which there is nothing. You must not forget, there is no notion of space here. Place. Everything is put in its place, but there may be a place with nothing in it; and this place may become, as we say today, meaningful in spite of its emptiness, because of the place it occupies in relation to other places. Let us read the crowning paragraph, the end, because this puts a key question. Up to here he has described the beauty of order.

Reader:
"We can test the truth of what I say, dear, without any inconvenience and with very little trouble. Moreover, my dear, there is no ground for any misgiving that it is hard to find someone who will get to know the various places and remember to put each set in its proper place. For we know, I take it, that the city as a whole has ten thousand times as much of everything as we have; and yet you may order any sort of servant to buy something in the market and to bring it home, and he will be at no loss: every one of them is bound to know where he should go to get each article. Now the only reason for this is that everything is kept in a fixed place." (8.21-23)

LS: He knows the [place, *chōra*], the cause why even a foreign slave can find the corner grocery store without any difficulty, because everything is in its place. Now comes the paradox. Yes?

Reader:
"But when you are searching for a person—"

LS: "For a human being."

Reader:
"you often fail to find him, though he may be searching for you himself. And for this again the one reason is that no place of meeting has been fixed." (8.23)

LS: Literally, "No place has been fixed where everyone ought to stay." Now what he almost suggests is this: How wonderful would be a world where everyone would always be in his place. Would it not be wonderful? Now what does this mean if we generalize that? A world without change, without *stasis*, where *taxis* is primarily what they call now a static order. And it is a great question, a great theoretical question: Can order be compatible with change, with motion? This question will be taken up later, in the next chapter. Yes?

Student: [. . .]

LS: Sure, that is a funny thing. That is of course a refutation of his whole "philosophy" by deed, sure. That will come out even more later. Yes?

Student: I notice with regard to both the army example and the merchantman example the reason of order is self-preservation or safety.

LS: Ultimately, perhaps, but primarily of course the preservation of the things.

Student: They talk also about victory in war and about safety on the high seas. The storm is mentioned. This is in contrast with convenience and with beauty in the household.

LS: What?

Student: Self-preservation.

LS: Why should there be a contrast if you can find everything when you need it? For example, a gun: if you have to shoot at a burglar, it is convenient to know always where it is because it contributes to self-preservation, and yet beautiful if everything is well-ordered. You can find your toothbrush, your gun, or whatever you might need at any time.

Student: But Ischomachus in the conversation with his wife mentions self-preservation besides convenience and beauty.

LS: Because self-preservation, by God, is not enough; because self-preservation can be achieved even by a very poor man, and they are concerned with being rich. Self-preservation is only an

implication. You know? Self-preservation does not become the theme here. I mean, after all, if you are practical, that you are compelled to think of your self-preservation occurs very rarely—I mean, not perhaps in Chicago, but very rarely. Most of the time you think of comfortable self-preservation, if I may quote Locke, i.e., some conveniences or beautiful things rather than self-preservation. If the house you are in burns down and you are not sure whether you can get out in time, this is an occasion for thinking of self-preservation; but that is in quiet times, in peace, in a well-policed city, very rare. Only in a very radical consideration, as Hobbes, for example, made[6], would it come out as being at the bottom of even these tiny things like the toothbrush. Good.

Now this next chapter still deals with order. And now the subject of order is developed in the sequel. We can only read a part, unfortunately. Let us read paragraph 8.

Reader:
"We also put by themselves the things consumed month by month, and set apart the supplies calculated to last for a year. For this plan makes it easier to tell how they will last to the end of the time. When we had divided all the portable property tribe by tribe, we arranged everything in its proper place. After that we showed the servants who have to use them where to keep the utensils they require daily, for baking, cooking, spinning and so forth—" (9.8)

LS: So a division of everything into tribes, and each tribe is assigned a special place. There is a separation: this here, separate from that. The phrase reminds of a passage (this I mention in passing; that might be of interest in a broader study) in the ninth book of the *Odyssey*, verse 220, we read: "Each kind was penned by itself, the firstlings apart, and the summer lambs apart, apart too the younglings of the flock."[iv]

"Apart" is in Greek *chōris*, the same phrase is used by Xenophon. That occurs in a description of Polyphemus's cave, Polyphemus the Cyclops. This is the prepolitical man, i.e., the economical man, the man who has a household but is not a member of a *polis*. And this is a man who is very orderly, as you see here, and at the same time a cannibal. So in other words, this orderliness does not yet guarantee some other things. And I believe that if one would study the *Oeconomicus* in connection with these verses of the *Odyssey*, and in connection with what Aristotle says at the beginning of the *Politics* about economics, one would find some very interesting things. Yes?

Student: Can tribes be understood here as categories?

LS: I come to that. Don't use that word. I took this liberty, for which I ask your forgiveness. Let me use it once more and then it is out. We have seen the two[7] [categories] hitherto were where and how many. And now comes the consideration of the tribes. But how would this look in the form of a question, like where, and how many?

Student: What kind.

LS: Or what, simply what. And you will see there is also distribution according to the seasons, at what time they will be needed: when. But the central consideration is indeed what: what kind,

[iv] Homer, *The Odyssey*, trans. Samuel Henry Butcher and Andrew Lang (New York: P. F. Collier & Son Co., 1909), 125.

what tribe, as he calls it here. That is quite true. And it is a sundering, *legein*; that it was called also in a passage of the *Memorabilia* in 4.6. Sundering kind from kind. By the way, this term, "kind," occurs in the same meaning in the first chapter of Genesis. That is very interesting that this fundamental consideration is equally present there too. But one thing must strike us: What about these tribes? What do we understand ordinarily by a tribe, and what is also of course the kind of things distinguished by Polyphemus in his cave? Here they are artifacts, so they are not strictly speaking tribes. I mean, a pot doesn't generate a pot; they are artifacts, so all things which are ordered here are artifacts. And what has this to do with the question we have found at the end of chapter 8? Is Ischomachus such a fanatic of order that he wishes that everything would always stay in its place and never move? Well, artifacts as artifacts never move, is that not true? Sometimes artifacts do move, but men have put the movement into them. There is not *perpetuum mobile*. The engine or the airplane is of course a non-moving thing; it is moved only by virtue of the fact that man puts motion into it. So his preference for sheer standing still is connected with his preference for the artifacts. Artifacts are also the key thing in Plato's simile of the cave at the beginning of the seventh book of the *Republic*. Now we go on.

In the sequel he discusses the maid, the housekeeper. He explains what qualities she must have: continence, she must have a good memory, and so on. These things she must have by nature, although that is not said—but these are things which she is not taught. She is taught benevolence toward master and mistress, concern or interest in the increase of the household, and[8] she is taught to be just. So she must have some moral qualities, as we call it. But she is in a subservient position. The wife, in contradistinction, is not indeed the legislator but the guardian of the law.

Paragraph 15. She occupies the position of the Council, the City Council, which is the government in the nondemocratic regimes[9]. So she is the government, as we have seen it before. And he points out something which is of no surprise to us, I believe: that the wife, the government, has an immensely great interest in her governing, because it is her house. So here we find again the connection with self-interest which is there always presupposed at the base of it. Because these are her own things, this makes it easy for her to exert herself. Young as she is, this much she knows: she is not working for someone else but for herself. Good. At the beginning of chapter 10, Socrates praises Ischomachus's wife and thinks she has a manly mind. Naturally, if she is the governor she must have a manly mind. You remember we have discussed this before. I would like to say only one point in connection with what I said last time: *Prima facie*, of course, government is a manly affair. That goes without saying. Women at home, and the *polis* is the affair of the men. How is the verse in Homer?

Student: [*polemos d'andressi melēsei pasi*][v]

LS: In the conversation between Hector and Andromache, Hector says to Andromache: "Let war be the business of men." And war and *polis* of course belong together. And here we learn that for some strange reason it is really a womanly affair, government, *polis* and war. Now this is I think the key to Plato's famous thesis of the equality of the two sexes in the *Republic*, which is not limited to Plato. We see this also here implied. Now the irony of the *Republic* is not that the women should be warriors and governors, but that they should be philosophers. That is the irony, because of the fundamentally feminine character of government and war. We have proof of that,

[v] Homer, *Iliad* 6.493.

simple empirical proof. When you look at political history you find a number of outstanding women, you can pick them as you like: Catherine, and Elizabeth I,[vi] and quite a few others; and also those who did not govern but really governed the governors, like the grandmother of Jan van Olden, the Dutch statesman. He was afraid; he was twenty and had already to be a member of the Council of State, and he was naturally frightened. And she told him: My grandson, you don't know with how little wisdom the world is governed. And that gave him the necessary courage. So she knew what governing is.[vii] So you find of course outstanding businesswomen infinitely shrewder than their husbands, and so on, but this is all fundamentally the same kind of thing, the active life. The question is the theoretical life. Now this is of course something which one should not say today for obvious reasons, but one must nevertheless say this was the view of mankind until a short time ago. It has not been entirely refuted. If you look at the history of philosophy, the thirty great names, there is not a single woman among them. That is true. But the shocking thing in classical antiquity was not that concern with philosophy, because perfect gentleman are not particularly interested in that, but regarding politics, government.

Yes. What is the new problem we have not yet solved? In paragraph 2 of chapter 10.

Reader:
"Thereupon Ischomachus took up his parable. 'Well, one day, Socrates, I noticed that her face was made up: she had rubbed in white lead in order to look even whiter than she is, and alkanet juice to heighten the rosy color of her cheeks; and she was wearing boots with thick soles to increase her height.'" (10.2)

LS: Let us translate a bit more literally: "So that she seemed to be even whiter than she was, and that she might appear redder than the truth, and she was wearing high shoes so that she might seem to be taller than she was by nature." So these three things are taken together, as you see: to be, truth, and nature. And they are distinguished from and opposed to seeming and appearing. And seeming and appearing is of course untruth. This subject is here discussed in Xenophon's homely manner. And Ischomachus tries to convince his wife that this is no good, that she doesn't achieve what she wishes to achieve by these spurious means. What we seek, we can say (for this is the way we can render Ischomachus's thought), is the naked truth—now applied here primarily, of course, to the female body. Men naturally desire the natural. Let us read paragraph 7 as an example.

Reader:
"'Then please assume, my dear, that I do not prefer white paint and dye of alkanet to your real colour; but just as the gods have made horses to delight in horses, cattle in cattle, sheep in sheep, so human beings find the human body undisguised most delightful.'" (10.7)

[vi] Catherine the Great of Russia; Elizabeth I of England.
[vii] We have been unable to identify van Olden. In his Basic Principles course (1961), Strauss refers in a similar vein to Charles V (1500-1558), who was born in Flanders, inherited the Spanish Empire in 1516, and was elected Holy Roman Emperor in 1519. In 1506 he became ruler of the Habsburg Netherlands. His aunt, Margaret of Austria (1480-1530), acted as regent 1506-1515 and then again 1519-1530.

LS: So in other words, that is natural: a natural desire in human beings for the natural, unadorned, human body. Good. She is of course properly humiliated, and nevertheless she wishes to be—how does she put it? What does she answer in paragraph 9?

Reader:
"'Nothing,' he said, 'only she gave up such practices from that day forward, and tried to let me see her undisguised and as she should be. Still, she did ask whether I could advise her on one point: how she might make herself really beautiful, instead of merely seeming to be so.'"

LS: One moment: "how she would appear to be truly beautiful, and not merely seem to be so." Now that is a refinement. Hitherto "to appear" seemed to be simply opposed to "to be." Now we learn that being can very well appear as it is, and that is not mere seeming. She wished to appear beautiful by being beautiful, whereas what she did with these cosmetics was seeming to be beautiful. Let us read the sequel. How does one bring that about? Now we must first finish that. Next paragraph.

Reader:
"'And this was my advice, Socrates: "Don't sit about forever like a slave, but try, God helping you, to behave as a mistress: stand—"'" (10.10)

LS: Yes, "stand." In other words, she should no longer sit but she should stand up and go to the loom. What then is the answer to our interesting question: How is appearing of being as distinguished from mere seeming to be achieved, in the most general terms?

Student: By action.

LS: By motion. Sitting is of course one clear form of resting. Motion, exactly—that brings it about. By doing and looking, this is brought about, this union of order and motion for which we have been seeking in vain. Let us read paragraph 12.

Reader:
"'Besides, when a wife's looks outshine a maid's, and she is fresher and more becomingly dressed, they're a ravishing—'" (10.12)

LS: "Ravishing," *kinētikon* in Greek. That is derivative from motion. She appears to be causing motion—well, of course also implying what is implied in ravishing, but the primary term is motion. By motion she creates motion. And that is a higher form than mere static order of the artifacts of which we have heard so much before. Yes. Let me see where we are now. Yes?

Student: This strongly echoed Critobulus's last words. He said he wanted to deserve the reputation of being a gentleman, that is, to be and show forth that—

LS: But that is of course a question. There is a parallel, there is no question. But that is a much more difficult question: Are the nice looks due to healthy activity? Is this exactly the same as the relation of reputation of honesty compared with genuine honesty? Is this clear? Let me make it in the form of a formula: Good looks in relation to healthy activity equal to good reputation in

relation to true decency. There is surely a similarity.[81] The good looks is what everyone can see. and they bespeak, generally speaking, healthy activity. Good reputation is something which you see or rather hear immediately. Everybody says: What a fine man, which bespeaks decency. But that is not such a simple thing, perhaps this is not a good proportion. Perhaps the relation between good reputation and true decency is more complicated than the relation between good looks and a healthy activity. But it is quite right that you bring it up. That is a question rather than an answer. Mr. ___?

Student: [. . .]

LS: This is still not entirely excluded. But is it not still true that all artifices of cosmetics are of very limited value? They may be sufficient in a ballroom but they are not sufficient within marriage, as is pointed out. You know? Good. You must use your imagination a bit.

Student: Everyone has been brainwashed by television commercials.

LS: Not quite. There is a very simple protection against that because they contradict themselves and each other. I mean, it is impossible that Bufferin and aspirin can be *the* perfect proof against headaches, even if they say all doctors recommend [them]. So this contradiction alone would induce every man with a bit of sense not to believe either. Yes, Mr. ___?

Student: Are you offering this formula on the board with any emphasis behind it?

LS: No. But it is a very neat statement, I believe, of the problem. Is the relation of visible beauty to bodily health identical to the relation between audible reputation and underlying decency? Of course not, because what is going on within a man can much better be concealed than his health, his bodily condition. I believe this is not a difficult question.

We have then discussed in this gynecology questions of the utmost importance: nature and law; order in its relation to rest and motion; and also the great question of being and appearing. We can bring this into connection perhaps with the *physis*/*nomos* question, nature/convention question. In chapter 7 they were presented as simply in harmony, but then via the question of order and the connection of order and rest, we were compelled to raise the question: Can there be order in natural things, i.e., in things changing and moving? Whereas there[10] obviously can be order among the artifacts: we produce them in an orderly manner and put them down in an orderly manner. Now then we have seen that not all appearing is semblance, not all beauty is conventional. There is natural beauty. The woman who is active, that is natural beauty; and perhaps it is not identical with all conventional beauty, but there is natural beauty. But the main point which I would like to emphasize is that in all these examples here, the beautiful or noble, in contradistinction to the good, is specifically human. Brutes are not concerned with beauty. They are concerned with the good: they need food, sleep, as well as human beings do, but they are not concerned with beauty. I remind you of one very simple thing, the nightmare of every owner of a beautiful bitch. I know at least two friends who are in this very difficult situation. This dog is absolutely unconcerned. She may be the most finely-bred lady, and any bum, ugly and old, is good enough for her. So you see beauty is a human concern. The good is more fundamental and in a way the highest concern. But the specifically human is in the sphere of beauty. Good.

At the beginning of chapter 11, we learn that the gynecology is incomplete, naturally, for we haven't yet heard how Ischomachus's wife acted later on, for example, and especially as a mother. That we do not know. Chapter 11 gives us a description of the life of Ischomachus the man, the husband, but in contradistinction to the life of Socrates. It is literally the central chapter of the *Oeconomicus*. It is surely in fact the central chapter. Now we note to our surprise that Socrates was already renowned for his way of life at the time he had the conversation with Ischomachus. He was renowned for talking and measuring the air. These were accusations hurled against him by the comic poets, especially Aristophanes. In noncomical terms, it means that he was renowned for combining rhetoric and the study of nature. But he did not yet at that time know what perfect gentlemanship is, what the human things are.

This same view is underlying the most famous passage about Socrates's life, which occurs in Plato's *Phaedo*, where Socrates describes what he did when he was young:[viii] when he was studying Anaxagoras and other things, studying natural philosophy, and then he got into certain difficulties and then a change took place. This is Xenophon's version of the same event. At a certain moment Socrates begins to study the human things. Here is the first stage. He approaches the natural man.[11] Since [not] all human beings are comprised under the heading perfect gentlemanship, he asks *the* perfect gentleman in Athens, Ischomachus: What is it what you do, so that you are called a perfect gentleman? An absolutely sound empirical procedure. Now the *Oeconomicus* shows how Socrates studied the human things, not how he transmitted the results of his studies—that you find in the *Memorabilia*—but how he studied them. Socrates's conversation, we can say, is here presented. Now we learn from the sequel in paragraphs 3 to 6 that the poor Socrates wishes to become a good man, *hombre*. He does not wish to become a *kaloskagathos*, a perfect gentleman, because in order to be a perfect gentleman you have to be wealthy in the ordinary sense, and Socrates isn't wealthy.

So here we have the two ways of life: the perfect gentleman's and Socrates's. And this is a very nice story. Socrates and the horse is an absolutely beautiful story, I think. People run after a horse which was famous, and everyone admired it. And then Socrates asks the groom: "Does the horse have money?" After all, the human beings whom we admire all have money, in the first place. And then the groom says (how does he put it?): He looked at me as if I [12][were] not even sane—not only inexperienced or a babe in the woods, because he doesn't know that, but only an insane man cannot know this thing that a horse cannot have money. How can a horse have money?, the groom asks. And then he gained courage again and said: If a horse, without having any money, can become good provided it has by nature a good soul, then it should be possible for a human being, too, if he has by nature a good soul—which Socrates takes for granted that he has. Watch that. That is good. So this is then what happens.

And it is made clear in the sequel, in paragraph 8, the point which we know already. Three things are required: wisdom or prudence, care, *epimelēs*, and good luck. So there is no question that knowledge alone would be sufficient.

In these paragraphs, 8 and 9, which were reported by Mr. ___, the difference between Ischomachus and Socrates becomes perfectly clear. Socrates brings out the fact that he is not

[viii] *Phaedo* 96a ff.

concerned with honor in the city. And that is of course the major concern of Ischomachus. And this is a provisional delineation of the two ways of life: concern with being honored in the city, Ischomachus, perfect gentleman; and not concerned with it, Socrates. Paragraph 18 calls for our brief attention. Let us read that.

Reader:
"'After I have finished, [the servant gives the horse a roll]—'" (11.18)

LS: How does he translate that, the boy having given[13] [the horse a roll]? This is literally taken from Aristophanes's *Clouds*, verse 32. And this is probably not the only borrowing from comic poets, but in this case we can know it. Now there it is said not by Socrates, of course, but by Pheidippides, Socrates's pupil in the *Clouds*. In the *Clouds* Socrates converts Pheidippides from horsemanship to philosophy, and he teaches him rhetoric, i.e., to make the weaker *logos* the stronger one. In the *Oeconomicus* Socrates learns from Ischomachus perfect gentlemanship. It is an exact reply to Aristophanes's attack on Socrates. So, far from corrupting the young as Aristophanes says there, Socrates learns perfect gentlemanship from the highest authority in perfect gentlemanship, namely, Ischomachus. There is a reference to this question of the weaker *logos* and the stronger one at the end of the eleventh chapter when Ischomachus says: I cannot make the weaker *logos* the stronger one. Let us read that at the end of the chapter.

Reader:
"'Pretty well, when it is to my interest to speak the truth—'"

LS: "Then I win easily," in the argument with his wife.

Reader:
"'But when lying is called for, Socrates, I can't make the worse cause appear the better—'"

LS: Literally, "I cannot make the weaker *logos* the stronger one." And what does Socrates say?

Reader:
"'Perhaps, Ischomachus,' I commented, 'you can't make the falsehood into the truth!'" (11.25)

LS: That is an entirely different proposition. To make a weaker *logos* a strong one is merely a feat of rhetoric, and surely Ischomachus is not such a good rhetorician that he can do that. But Socrates says the really tough thing would be to make the untruth into truth, which no one can do. Good.

You see, the discussion of the two ways of life, the Socratic and the Ischomachean, is very short: only one chapter. We have three chapters devoted to the bailiff or supervisor. Everything you might have missed in Ischomachus because Xenophon made it so relatively short you get fully in the section on the supervisor or bailiff. You will see this from the sequel. Because Ischomachus has educated his bailiff, he presents to Socrates how he educated him. He educated him in the first place to benevolence to his master, and he does this by benefiting him. Now he does not go into the question here to which Socrates somehow alludes: Is benefiting the sure way to benevolence? This raises the grave question of gratitude. Are all men grateful? And Ischomachus

seems to take it for granted, and Socrates is not so sure of that. The starting point of course is that all men are benevolent to themselves, but this does not necessarily mean that they will be benevolent to their benefactors.[14] But however this may be, benevolence is of course not enough: he must also be a man of diligence, *epimelēs*. And in this point, when the question of how to make people care comes up, Socrates has to learn that he does not yet know. Paragraph 9 to 10.

Now there are of course people, as Ischomachus makes clear, who cannot be made caring, carer, namely, those who are intemperate regarding wine, sleep, and sex in an extreme manner. They are hopeless cases. But it is entirely different with those who love gain. We have seen this before. While this is also of course a vice, it is economically a virtue, one could say, whereas the other things are also economical vices. Now they are made caring by praise and blame together with punishment. This comes up still more in the sequel. But the key point is in the thirteenth chapter, paragraphs 3 to 5: the supervisor or bailiff must be a man born to rule, born to command, an *epitropos*. He must be a man born to command. In other words, what strikes one in such figures as Marshal Montgomery[ix] is something which you have to find in every bailiff if he is to be a good bailiff. And therefore we are not surprised to see that Ischomachus raises the claim [that] he can make men kingly, which is the highest form of people born to rule, because a statesman who rules for a short time in a republican commonwealth is nothing compared with a king who rules throughout his life. How are men made rulers or kings? This is of course of the utmost importance. The answer is shockingly pedestrian. The other living beings learn to obey by means of stick and carrot. This is also the method of educating most human beings. But in the case of man, something else is needed in addition to stick and carrot in the highest cases, and that is *logos*, speech; i.e., in the first place, praise. Appeal to their desire for praise. A donkey or a sheep is not concerned with it. In the case of dogs, dog lovers believe it and non-dog lovers deny it, but in the case of men it is perfectly clear that the love of praise plays a role in the better type of man. So this is crucial. I will say a few words about that later. Let me only first finish the general survey.

In chapter 14, the bailiff also needs that kind of justice which consists in not stealing. It was said before that he needs distributive justice. He must give his underlings what they deserve. If he was good he gets better food and more food. And if he didn't work well he gets less and worse food. This is distributive justice. But he needs in addition that kind of justice which consists for example in not stealing, which developed would be what Aristotle means by commutative justice rather than distributive justice.[15] [This is connected to] paragraph 9 of the fourteenth chapter. This we should perhaps read.

Reader:
"'On the other hand, if I discover that a man is inclined to be honest not only because he gains by his honesty—'"

LS: The word for honesty means, literally translated, justice.

Reader:

[ix] Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery of the British Army (1887-1976).

"'but also from a desire to win my approbation, I treat him like a free man by making him rich; and not only so, but I honor him as a gentleman.'" (14.9)

LS: "As a perfect gentleman." So in other words, slaves—he is speaking of slaves—can be perfect gentlemen. How amazing. Slaves can be perfect gentleman. Why? Provided they have the incentive of the perfect gentleman, and that is love of praise. Yes?

Student: In one sense, the discussion started in 11 seems to continue a long way. Socrates gives a program: First, tell me how you keep yourself healthy; last, tell me how you make yourself richer. He does not explicitly say he wants to hear how Ischomachus deals with his friends and his fellow citizens. Now we have not come, but we will come, to how Ischomachus makes himself richer. We have come to how he keeps himself strong. Is this not how he treats his money, friends?

LS: Let me put it this way, connected with that: How did he become the perfect gentleman? Now he could not make himself a perfect gentleman because he started as a child, but by describing the way in which he educates his bailiffs and indirectly his slaves, he shows how he became a perfect gentleman. And there is no essential difference between a good slave, and a good perfect gentleman, and a good king. What this means I will take up in a minute, only let us first continue that. What exactly is the point? The virtue of the master is not essentially different from that of the slave. Not essentially different. This is of course the opposite of what Aristotle teaches at the beginning of the *Politics*. At the beginning of the *Politics*, Aristotle takes issue with the view that the kingly art, the political art, and the economic art are identical. And this implies of course that the virtue of the king and the virtue of the householder, and even perhaps the virtue of the slave, are not essentially different. This is what Plato had suggested, especially in the *Statesman*, but which Xenophon suggests in the *Oeconomicus*, as well in the *Memorabilia*, especially the chapter on Nicomachides, 3. 4, where Socrates has this beautiful sentence: "Do not despise the economic man," because what you need to be a good householder is exactly the same [as] what you need in order to be a general and a statesman. Why does Xenophon do that? Xenophon goes even further than Plato by saying that[16] the bailiff and even the slave, if he is virtuous, is the same as the statesman or a king. Now this of course raises a very important question regarding the present situation in political science. Does that ring a bell? I mean the kinship between what Xenophon says, in different terms. No one speaks anymore of virtue, but in different terms, and what they say now. Yes?

Student: In administration, administration is the same whether it involves public administration or administration of a business enterprise.

LS: In other words, the abolition of the essential difference between the public and the private, sure. The abolition of all these differences. Yes?

Student: The Supreme Court is studied as a small group.

LS: Very good. Sure. I mean, you take the small group, say, of people here in the South Side, say, the PTA of the Lab School,[x] and you take the small group around Lenin in the Switzerland in 1916: same political importance, sure. But what is the difference between this SS[xi] approach and Xenophon, or for that matter, Plato? This I think we should try to understand. The present-day sociological view denies the difference between the political and subpolitical with a view to abolishing all essential differences, *all* essential differences, because naturally what the sociologists do is only a preparation for what the psychologists do, and the psychologists prepare only what the animal psychologists do, and they prepare ultimately only what the biochemists do. That is the whole background. Whereas in Xenophon, here the essential difference between the political and the subpolitical is denied precisely with a view to bringing out the most important essential difference, namely, between everything "quote social unquote" and the philosophic way of life. That is I think the key point. In other words, Xenophon's distinction (while of course not ultimately tenable, as he knew better than anyone else) clarifies nevertheless, whereas what is done by the sociologist only obscures. Xenophon is concerned with bringing out the character of ruling human beings as such, whether it takes place on the farm and is exercised by slaves or whether it takes place on the grandest scale in the case of Cyrus, the king of Persia, whereas the present-day sociologists are not interested in the phenomenon of ruling. They reduce ruling to one ingredient of social interaction. Is this not true? I mean, the government: rulers, ruled. But that is [a] superficial, popular, folksy view. In fact, there are all kinds of action and interaction understood fundamentally as a mechanical system of some sort. And Xenophon knows that there is rule of men over men, and he wants to understand it both in its positive responsibilities and in its essential limitations, because what Socrates does is not ruling, however it might have to be called. Differently stated, when Socrates or Xenophon makes clear here by implication that there is no essential difference between the virtue of a conqueror of the world, like Cyrus, and the humble bailiff who commands twenty slaves on a farm, he means by that [that] there is a radical difference between all these forms of this kind of virtue and the kind of virtue which Socrates has. We can call that—this is called perfect gentlemanship, and Xenophon as it were makes a gift of this beautiful term to everyone who wishes to have it, including bailiffs and slaves. But then what Socrates does is not perfect gentlemanship. Is it not perfect gentlemanship? By the way, this distinction between a good man and a perfect gentleman, in Greek *agathos* and *kaloskagathos* plays a great role.

There is a very interesting discussion at the end of Aristotle's *Eudemian Ethics* that does not occur in the *Nicomachean Ethics.* It is therefore not sufficiently considered. And there it is taken up from a different point of view, and that is that the Spartans are concerned only with being good men and that means they are utilitarians, fundamentally. And the perfect gentleman is concerned with both utility and honor. That is only an illustration of the fact that this distinction was made not only by Xenophon but also by Aristotle. Good.

Socrates's virtue: how shall we call it if we do not call it perfect gentlemanship? Of course we can say, following Xenophon's usage, he is a good man but not a perfect gentleman. One can also say, with perhaps greater right, this is rather called wisdom. But what is wisdom? What is

[x] PTA is the acronym for "Parent-Teacher Association." The Lab School refers to The University of Chicago Laboratory Schools.

[xi] Presumably Strauss refers here to the social science or again the South Side approach, not the Schutzstaffel approach.

wisdom? We should have learned something from today's assignment of what wisdom means, so that we do not simply repeat the well-known, and therefore too well-known, definitions. With what is Socrates concerned above all, and all his helping other people is derivative from that which he does by himself? Well, we have seen today: [xii]order. We have seen the difference between being and appearing or seeming. These are the kinds of things with which Socrates is concerned. In other words, the difference between Socrates and the perfect gentleman is fundamentally the same as the difference between two kinds of dialectic, of which Xenophon spoke at the end of the sixth chapter of the fourth book of the *Memorabilia*. Mr. ___, whom I saw in my office a few days ago, made a complaint, if I understood him well, a perfectly reasonable complaint that I somehow seem to take for granted that Xenophon writes, say, differently than everyone today would write. But my answer would be this, which occurred to me much later, after you left: that in the first meeting I had spoken of this passage especially, of how the *Memorabilia* is built up, and especially of Xenophon's making a distinction between the various kinds of human beings, and Socrates speaking to these different kinds differently. Now this permits at least the hypothesis that perhaps Xenophon in writing wrote differently for different people, say, for perfect gentleman on the one hand, men who in the best case would be perfect gentleman[17],[18] men of the active type, and men who in the best case would be theoretical men. This would be my answer to your complaint. Good.

We have a few more minutes and we know next time we will discuss the rest of the *Oeconomicus*, which deals then with the art, with the knowledge which a perfect gentleman should preferably have, and that is the art of farming. And we will learn quite a bit, not only about farming but also about Socrates as possessing the art of farming, and certain modifications of the art of farming which we have perhaps never thought before. But is there any point? Mr. ____?

Student: I didn't understand your last remarks concerning two things. One, the definition of wisdom as applied to Socrates's concern with order. I was under the impression it was Ischomachus's concern.

LS: Can you help me?

Student: Order turns out to be the distinction of things.

LS: [*Kata phulas diekrinomen*]. Sundering things according to their kinds. Now what is done in a visible manner by the householder who puts the pots here and the pans there is done in a less visible but at least equally clear manner by the thinker who distinguishes between dogs, which he doesn't necessarily put in one stable, and the donkeys in other stables. But there are, so to speak, metaphorical stables into which he puts them, and these metaphorical stables prove on reflection to be much more real than the real stables which the householder uses, because they are not artifacts. That is a typically Socratic way—we can also say Platonic way—of looking at things: to recognize in the humble things like pots and pans and how they are ordered the highest things. They all reflect these higher things, just as Plato recognizes in love of gain, a low thing, the highest, because love of gain, love of something good, something good to me, is also, of course,

[xii] There is a lengthy blank space in the original transcript here, indicating perhaps that there were some inaudible words.

if properly understood, love of the highest good. 8' And then that is love of gain which is highly desirable and in fact absolutely necessary. And when he takes *eros* and sees in *eros* also something transcending all concern with the survival of one's blood, if I may say so—family, sexual perpetuity—and sees the concern with that which is always permanent, lasting, intrinsically not dependent on any human activity natural or artificial, that is the Platonic, the Socratic, way of seeing. [This is] the peculiar homeliness which we see in Xenophon most massively but which we see also in Plato, only in Plato we find very rhetorical and inspiring passages which have no direct parallel in Xenophon. But we have in Plato also this humble thing all the time. Yes?

Student: Does the difference between Socrates and the gentleman raise the difference of method, or is it a difference of substance?

LS: What do you mean by method?

Student: The method of classification. Ischomachus will order pots and pans, whereas Socrates will do this with ideas.

LS: But ideas are kinds, primarily. Never forget that.

Student: But it is a different matter. A pot is not—

LS: He limits himself to the artifacts. He makes a division only of things man-made for the use of man. But things made by man for the use of man are necessarily derivative, because in the first place, they presuppose natural materials out of which they are made; and secondly, the maker, man, is not made by man, is not made by man for the use of man. And so the whole sphere of the artificial is secondary compared with the sphere of the natural beings. And regarding the natural beings, Ischomachus is so to speak wholly impervious, with one exception. Where does nature come in very massively? When he comes to his art. What is the difference between the art of farming and almost all other arts, perhaps all other arts? With the exception of one art which might be a form of farming.

Student: Farming is dependent on the elements.

LS: But can you tell me: How do you get shoes? You have first to kill an animal or fell a tree; and then after you have killed that living being, then you prepare the dead part of the dead animal or that tree and make shoes of it. How do you get a plum? Who makes a plum? The living tree. So *physis* is much more present in the art of farming, or for that matter cattle raising, than in all other arts. So this is again the supplement. You know, just as we have seen [that] this fanatic of order wishes to have everything dead so that it will stay in its damn place, and yet then he is compelled, however, when he is confronted with his wife—at least in that case she must move, because otherwise she would have only artificial beauty and no natural beauty; and in the same way this fanatic of art, *technē*, is then compelled to have recourse to that art which is most akin to *physis*, to nature, because what the farmer does is only a very small part of what the earth does. You wanted to say something?

Student: The farmer follows nature while the other arts change nature.

LS: To a much higher degree. Good. Is there one more question? Mr. ___?

Student: I wondered why in chapter 11 he started out talking about loyalty was necessary.

LS: "Loyalty" he doesn't say. "Benevolence" is the Greek word.

Student: And then in chapter 13 or 14 he comes back to honesty.

LS: Honesty is justice.

Student: And I was wondering what the difference was.

LS: Have you never seen a man, or woman for that matter, benevolent to another human being and absolutely dishonest? That is easy. X being benevolent to Y may steal from Z and many other people. He doesn't ask him to be benevolent to human beings in general. This might conceivably imply justice. It might. But he is supposed to be benevolent to his master. Now this benevolence to the master—he could be benevolent to the master and nevertheless steal from the master. Is this not possible? Oh, yes. Well, he is rich enough; whether I drink this other bottle of whiskey or not doesn't make him poorer. Is that not possible? He would never betray the master to anyone else. But to steal a little bit would go together with it. Benevolence is of course a very convenient thing, but it is not in itself proving a high character. That can mean all kinds of things. Sometimes it is perhaps more convenient to be benevolent than to be malevolent. That can be a very low motive for benevolence. But justice is a different matter.

Student: It would certainly be different in the context, but I thought the underlying concern as far as Ischomachus was concerned was about the same in both cases.

LS: But unfortunately the translation is not good enough. But even if you take the translation, you would have to see what the consequences of what he calls loyalty are and what the consequence of his justice are, and the implication surely is that an occasional stealth from the master would not be in contradiction to the benevolence. Therefore the virtue of justice has to be introduced in addition to benevolence.

So next time, Mr. ___.

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[1] Deleted "is"
[2] Deleted "it presupposes"
[3] Deleted "Socrates is for."
[4] Deleted "for."
[5] Deleted "is told in."
[6] Deleted "it."
[7] Deleted "considerations."
[8] Deleted "since."

8

[9] Deleted "[?]."
[10] Deleted "is."
[11] Deleted “to approach—namely.”
[12] Deleted “was”
[13] Deleted "a role to the horse."
[14] Deleted “But however this is not so sure of that. The starting point of course is that all men are benevolent to themselves, but this does not necessarily mean that they will be benevolent to their benefactors."
[15] Delete "in this connection in."
[16] Deleted "there is."
[17]Deleted “on the one hand.”
[18] Deleted "man who in the best case would be perfect gentleman."

Session 5: no date
***Oeconomicus* 3**

Leo Strauss: There are certain points which you made which I believe do not stand up.[i] And this is partly due to the fact that you had to rely, as practically everyone does, on the translation. For example, the passage in *Memorabilia* 3.9.4 to which you referred, Socrates does not identify in any way wisdom and prudence—this is what the translator does—but wisdom and moderation. That is very different.

Now let me try to remind you of the distinctions which go through the whole work. By the way, we have seen in reading the passage in the *Memorabilia* that what he says in the third book is restated in the fourth book. And the relation of wisdom and moderation becomes really clear only in the fourth book, not in the third. So that is only a provisional statement. But the analysis which is underlying, the statement surely in the *Oeconomicus* is very simple.

There are three elements required for success: knowledge, care, and favor of the gods—or to call it by the human corollary, piety, because it is to be assumed that the favor of the gods is given more to the pious than to the impious. So the three things are needed. To say one is the decisive thing, that one cannot say; for without knowledge and care the favor of the gods would not come.

Student: [. . .]

LS: Say an absolutely ignorant man who knows nothing whatever of farming, and in addition doesn't do any work on his farm, might be prosperous as a farmer. Do you mean to say that?

Student: [. . .]

LS: Well, you can say that compared with the simplistic thesis knowledge is perfectly sufficient, which is sometimes, or seems to be, sufficient. To that extent you are right. But if one states it clearly: knowledge, care, [or] diligence, and let us call it piety—these are the three. But then there is the great question regarding knowledge. And you translated it as it were in connection with what he said in the *Oeconomicus*, chapters 15 following, by "prudence," and this I think is simply wrong. That may also be partly due to the translator, but let us forget about it.

The key word here is art, in this case of course the art of farming. So what you need is art, care, and piety. The question which you have in mind and which we must not forget, of course, is: Where does moral knowledge, where does prudence—that is what is meant by moral knowledge—come in at all? In other words, can you be a prosperous farmer by possessing the art which any crook could possess, of course: care, which every crook could possess? Does moral knowledge come in here somehow, in piety? That would be the question.

Now since we have a lot of material and limited time, I suggest that we start now with a discussion. We have to finish the *Oeconomicus*, unfortunately, today. Now at the beginning of today's assignment, the beginning of chapter 15, Socrates makes the repetition regarding the

[i] Strauss responds to a student's paper, read at the beginning of the session. The reading was not recorded.

qualities of the bailiff. And as you would see if you would compare it with what precedes, he omits justice, which had played such a role in Ischomachus's statement. We must see later on what that means. It cannot be mere forgetfulness.

Socrates induces Ischomachus at this point to turn to his art, the art of farming. He now speaks of the art, of the purely cognitive element. Now Ischomachus begins with a praise of farming and says it is a wonderful art. It is the most philanthropic art. Now "philanthropic" means in Greek "loving human beings," nothing more. And this does not have a very high meaning. It is comparable to: Some people love dogs, others love donkeys, and others love human beings. It does not mean necessarily more than that. The art of farming is philanthropic in this sense because it is very kind to men. You don't have to exert yourself to learn it, especially because it is so easy to learn. Say, theory of functions would not be philanthropic, because you have to work very hard to understand it. And now in paragraph 5 of the fifteenth chapter, read that, please.

Reader:
"'Ah, but I think, Ischomachus, that I quite understand your account of these matters—I mean how to teach a bailiff; for I think I follow your statement that you make him loyal to you, and careful and capable of ruling and honest.'" (15.5)

LS: "And just." So you see that is very strange, because this was in a way the same as what Socrates said in the beginning of chapter 15, and he seems not to have heard what Ischomachus said in paragraphs 1 to 4 of this chapter. He doesn't seem to have heard that praise of the philanthropic character of farming. And of course, needless to say, the editors, especially the nineteenth-century editors, cut out this part. That is the easiest way of disposing of any difficulty. Now Socrates hadn't heard the praise of farming or, which is perhaps better, he pretends not to have heard it, and this gives him an opportunity to repeat the statement, to repeat the statement regarding the bailiff, as we have seen in what has been read. Now he brings in justice, of which he had not spoken before. He thus draws our attention to the quality of justice in the bailiff which he had dropped. Now what can this mean? In his praise of the art of farming, Ischomachus had spoken of an art, the art of farming, as if it were a living being, an animate being which loves men like dogs, horses, and so on—especially dogs, which loves human beings and is gentle. This is the quality which certain animals have and which the art of farming has. Now this raises an important question: Can an art be philanthropic and gentle? That is a question. Now let us turn to paragraph 11, where we find an answer.

Reader:
"'The truth is that, whereas other artists conceal more or less the most important points in their own art, the farmer who plants best is most pleased when he is being watched, so is he who sows best. Question him about any piece of work well done: and he will tell you exactly how he did it.'" (15.11)

LS: "He will not conceal anything [of] how he did it." Now here is the point: all arts other than farming—we can say all arts, properly speaking—conceal. But now to conceal is obviously not philanthropic, because to conceal means to conceal from human beings. So in other words, the question to which an allusion is made here: What about the philanthropic character of art? Or

differently stated: Is there a natural harmony between knowledge and what we may call humanitarianism? In the case of farming that is true, at least that is Ischomachus's contention. And as for the other arts, there is this strange thing that there are secrets of a trade. You know that this happens even up to the present day in the more lucrative parts of the arts, surely, but also in others. There are trade secrets of builders and of other artisans, and this has implications beyond the arts in the narrow sense. Ischomachus develops in the next chapter the thesis that farming is easy to learn. There is nothing multicolored about it. "Multicolored": that is a term of dispraise; complicated, sophisticated. The opposite to it is simple, one color. And simple is frequently used as interchangeable with just: simple man, straightforward man; there is nothing multicolored about him. This is the characteristic of the art of farming. The farmer has to know[1] [the] nature of the land. The term nature occurs here very clearly, and this nature however is not, as the nature of other things are, hidden so that you have to be a scientist of sorts to understand it, but this nature of the earth is open. One can know it by passing by. He gives the example of sailors. They pass by the land and they can point out without even touching it that this is good land and that is bad land, and if that is not easy knowledge I don't know what it is. We will see later what this means. Paragraph 9 in chapter 16.

Reader:
"'First, Ischomachus, I think I should be glad to learn, for this is the philosopher's way, how I am to cultivate the land if I want to get the heaviest crops of wheat and barley out of it.'" (16.9)

LS: Is this very heavy irony, or what? Surely one thing is clear: Socrates speaks here of himself as a philosophic man, philosophic *hombre*. That is important. The term philosophy does not appear so frequently in Xenophon that it doesn't call for our attention. Now if Benjamin Franklin had written that, no one would be surprised. You know this wider use of the word "philosophy": there is an institution called the American Philosophic Society in Philadelphia,[ii] which deals also with such matters, where philosophy has the simple meaning [of] any knowledge of nature for the most humble practical purposes—you know, the sense in which Benjamin Franklin and others in the eighteenth century understood it.

Now this is of course not Socrates's understanding and not Xenophon's understanding. And here it is indeed ironical. It brings up the question again: Does Socrates wish to become a farmer? After all, he proves to be a perfectly competent farmer, as we find out. He knows everything; he only didn't know that he did, and yet he never had the slightest incentive to become a farmer. Let us read the sequel.

Reader:
Isch: "'Well, you know, I take it, that fallow must be prepared for sowing?'
Soc: "'Yes, I know.'
Isch: "'Suppose, then, we start ploughing in winter?'
Soc: "'Why, the land will be a bog!'
Isch: "'How about starting in summer?'
Soc: "'The land will be hard to plough up.'
Isch: "'It seems that spring is the season for beginning this work.'

[ii] Founded in 1743 by Benjamin Franklin.

Soc: "'Yes, the land is likely to be more friable if it is broken up then.'" (16.10-12)[iii]

LS: You see, Socrates knows that. I think everyone even today who would not live in cities like Chicago would have this kind of knowledge of farming, which could be had by just walking by. But let us see what this item really means. We turn to chapter 17, paragraphs 2 to 3.

Reader:
"'For as soon as autumn ends—'"

LS: "When the autumnal time comes."

Reader:
"'all men, I suppose, look anxiously to God—'"

LS: "To the god," meaning the god who rains, Zeus.

Reader:
Isch: "'to see when he will send rain on the earth and make them free to sow.'
Soc: "'Yes, Ischomachus, all men have made up their minds, of course, not to sow in dry ground if they can help it, those who sowed without waiting to be bidden by God having had to wrestle with many losses.'

Isch: "'So far, then,' said Ischomachus, 'all the world is of one mind.'" (17.2-3)

LS: More precisely, "all men." That is universal knowledge. All men are of one mind.

Reader:

"'Yes,' said I, 'where God is our teacher we all come to think alike. For example, all agree that it is better to wear warm clothes in winter, if they can, and all agree on the desirability of having a fire, if they have wood.'" (17.3)

LS: Let us stop here. So we have here seen something. We have spoken first of knowledge of nature, not of everything, but of the earth. The nature of the earth, of the land, is easy to know. And now we see what this means. If something is so easily accessible, all men know it. And they know it not by learning, by instruction, but by nature. So the suggestion is made here then that there is such a thing as a natural knowledge of nature, a knowledge which all men, at least all grown up men, in fact possess without any instruction. Of course we must raise here a question regarding a much more important subject, at least theoretically more important, than agriculture: Is there such a natural knowledge of the principles of action, of what we call morals, of the just things? We must keep this in mind as a question. Difficulties arise only under certain conditions. Paragraph 4, where we left off.

[iii] The translation does not identify the speakers; we have supplied their names.

Reader:

"But," said Ischomachus, "when we come to the question whether sowing is best done early or very late or at the mid-season, we find much difference of opinion, Socrates." "And god," said I, 'does not regulate the year by fixed laws; but in one year it may be advantageous to sow early, in another very late, in another at mid-season." (17.4)

LS: In other words, here, where god or nature does not follow a clear order, there men disagree, there doubts arise. Applied to just things, there is a variety of just things in different places and countries, and therefore [there] will be difficulties which do not arise in the sphere of farming. Now we cannot go into the agricultural details here.

Student: [. . .]

LS: Surely. But the question, of course: Is there not in all change something unchangeable implied? Namely, when the change takes place always in the same manner, say, spring, summer, fall, winter. Then of course there is an unchangeable in the changeable, the rule of the change. There are all kinds of references all the time to the other arts, some jocular ones—for example, in paragraph 7 he compares the art of casting seed with the art of playing a lyre. You have to do it in both cases evenly. Now with the idea being of course that it is infinitely easier to learn to cast seed evenly than to play a lyre evenly. Again, to illustrate the particular humanity or philanthropy of the art of farming. Paragraph 8.

Student:
Isch: "'Certainly. But suppose that some of the land is rather light and some rather heavy?'
Soc: "'What do you mean by that?' I interrupted. 'By "light" do you mean "weak," and by "heavy," "strong"?'
Isch: "'Yes, I do; and I ask you whether you would give the same quantity of seed to both kinds, or to which you would give more?'
Soc: "'Well, my principle is this: the stronger the wine, the more water I add; the stronger the bearer, the heavier the burden I put on his back; and if it is necessary to feed others, I should require the richest men to feed the greatest number.'" (17.8-9)

LS: "The more powerful ones." You can say the stronger ones, the financially stronger ones. Yes?

Reader:
Soc: "'But tell me whether weak land, like draught animals, becomes stronger when you put more corn into it.'
Isch: "'Ah, you're joking, Socrates,' he said, laughing—" (17.9-10)

LS: What is the joke? Socrates says if the land is weaker, inferior, then you put more seeds into it, and if it is stronger you put less seed into it, which of course is absurd, because [of] the ambiguity of the words of the weak and strong. Socrates knows it very well. And Socrates does

not commit an error because he thinks it obvious that one cannot commit a mistake about that; it is a joke of Socrates. Now Socrates is joking in this work, obviously, much more than anywhere else, at least [than] in the *Memorabilia*. Words like "here Ischomachus laughed"—that is very rare in a Xenophontic or Platonic work, that someone is said to have laughed. You can count these very easily. Socrates of course never laughs. Once: Socrates laughed once. He jokes frequently, but that it is said he jokes is extremely rare. In this book it abounds just as oaths abound. There are proportionately many more oaths than in the whole *Memorabilia*. And this goes together, because I think that is still intelligible. In comedies, for example, people swear all the time. It is something unserious: "By Zeus!" Where in serious conversation people don't do it. This only in passing.

Paragraph 15 let us read, because there is always—in spite of the manifest importance of the immediate subject, farming, there is always another subject underground. Let us read paragraph 15.

Reader:
Isch: "'Don't you think, then, that we have good reason for putting on men to hoe?'
Soc: "'No doubt; but I am reflecting, Ischomachus, on the advantage of bringing in an apt simile. For you roused my wrath against the weeds by mentioning the drones, much more than when you spoke of mere weeds.'" (17.15)

LS: "The weeds itself." Now here he brings up the question of similes or images. We are told what a simile means: substituting something else for the thing itself. Not calling it a weed, but the drones of farming. And why does one do that? Why does one make similes? At least in one important case, in order to arouse anger against the thing itself. If you could call it only weeds, you could be neutral; but if you call it drones, then all your animosity against drones is applied to the weeds. So this of course would also imply this: someone who does not fall victim to the substitution, to the substituted image, who sees always the thing itself—the weeds—and is not impressed by the fact that they can be called drones, could not become a farmer because a farmer needs that incentive in order to work hard. Do you see? The passion of anger is conductive to care. And he who does not have this passionate incentive will lack this element. He will not be a farmer. This is an indication of the whole subject of rhetoric of course.

In chapter 18 there is nothing of special importance, as far as I can see. Chapter 19 deals with fruit trees. The method is always the same: that Socrates proves to know the whole thing from just passing by and this has supplied him with competent knowledge of farming. And this shows so clearly how limited the significance of knowledge in the case of farming is: Socrates knows everything, and yet he is not a farmer. At least factor B, care, is absent and we must see why. Let us read paragraph 12, because that is one of the slight irregularities which lead to deletions on the part of the editors.

Reader:
"'About vine planting then, Socrates, your views are again exactly the same as mine—'"

LS: This subject had not been mentioned before. What does Socrates say?

Reader:
"'Does this method of planting apply to the fig too,' I asked?" (19.12)

LS: That is all we need. Did you notice anything? An obvious irregularity. This is not methodic. Socrates does twice the same thing, or Ischomachus does twice the same thing. Ischomachus brings up a subject and Socrates pretends not to have heard it. That is a little example, but is enough to make clear the way in which Xenophon writes. What is the subject which Ischomachus brings up and which Socrates doesn't want to bring up?

Student: The vine.

LS: Why? Can you imagine why Ischomachus is so interested and why Socrates is so disinterested?

Student: You can do things with grapes that you don't do with figs.

LS: Please, what?

Student: Wine.

LS: You see, that was a typical scientific statement which you made—you know, where you do not recognize the real facts of life. Sure. So that's it. And what is behind that? Why should Ischomachus wish to bring it up and Socrates wish not to bring it up? Pardon?

Student: [. . .]

LS: No, I think it is so that Socrates is not quite sure whether Ischomachus has not too keen an interest in imbibing, and Socrates wants to oppose it. It is not necessary therefore to change the text. I mention only one parallel. In other words, it is due to Socrates's concern with continence. In the *Clouds*, at verse 417, the *dikaios logos*, [the just speech]—can it be the *dikaois logos* already so early in the play? The praise of the old way of life, at any rate; the old way of life versus the modern, Socratic, sophisticated way of life: it praises abstention from wine as a sign of the good old times, whereas now everybody is drunk all the time. So that fits in of course very well.

Now in the sequel there comes a general observation where the substratum comes again into the open. We have to read that. Paragraph 14 following.

Reader:
Isch.: "'You do! Then what is there in it that you don't understand? Is it that you don't know how to put the crocks on the top of the clay, Socrates?'

Soc: "'Of course there is nothing in what you have said that I don't know, Ischomachus. But I am again set thinking what can have made me answer 'No' to the question you put to me a while ago, when you asked me briefly, Did I understand planting? For I thought I should have nothing to say about the right method of planting. But now that you have

undertaken to question me in particular, my answers, you tell me, agree exactly with the views of a farmer so famous for his skill as yourself! Can it be that questioning is a kind of teaching, Ischomachus? The fact is, I have just discovered the plan of your series of questions! You lead me by paths of knowledge familiar to me, point out things like what I know, and bring me to think that I really know things that I thought I had no knowledge of.'

Isch: "'Now suppose I questioned you about money,' said Ischomachus, 'whether it is good or bad, could I persuade you that you know how to distinguish good from false by test? And by putting questions about flute-players could I convince you that you understand flute-playing; and by means of questions about painters and other artists—'

Soc: "'You might, since you have convinced me that I understand agriculture, though I know that I have never been taught this art.'

Isch: "'No, it isn't so, Socrates. I told you a while ago that agriculture is such a humane, gentle art that you have but to see her and listen to her, and she at once makes you understand her.'" (19.14-17)

LS: Do you see the point? The serious thought which is here jokingly appealed to is that men know what they do not believe to know. Socrates doesn't believe to know the art of farming, and in fact he possess it without knowing it. Now this must ring a bell at least with some of you.

Student: Plato. *Meno*.

LS: What is the point which Plato makes? Knowledge is recollection, but one doesn't know that one knows it. Once you start teaching a man, then knowledge, understanding, proves to be recollection. Now what does Plato mean by that? What does he have in mind? And in Plato of course it does not refer to farming; that is a joke. But in Plato it refers to, for example, mathematics, but above all to what Plato calls the ideas. Learning is recollection because every man possesses by nature knowledge of the ideas. Every human soul has seen the ideas prior to birth; this makes it a human soul. You see the parallel: here also this knowledge is natural to the extent that it has not been acquired with effort. That is a common thing. Needless to say that these two kinds of knowledge are very different. The knowledge of ideas in the primary sense has not been acquired by effort, that is a common thing, but the fundamental problem is the same. As the basis of all acquired knowledge, there is natural knowledge. The joke is that you apply the term natural unacquired knowledge to farming. We have only to substitute for Socrates someone in Chicago who never left Chicago, and he would be unable to answer quite a few questions of Ischomachus which Socrates can answer with ease, because Socrates had to see at least once this agricultural process to know that. It is not *a priori* knowledge, as they say. Yes?

Student: You say every man possesses knowledge by nature knowledge of the ideas. Is this a common sense use of the word *eidos*, that everyone knows commonsensically what *eidos* means?

LS: Not *eidos*, necessarily. That is a Greek word which may not have a direct equivalent. Let me state it now very simply. There is a fundamental harmony between the human mind and the

whole. That is what that means. And the alternative is that there is no harmony, and hence our knowledge is based entirely on our organizing the data so that they become orderly for us—the modern view, especially of Kant but not only of Kant. That is what he means. There is a natural harmony between the human mind and the whole. That doesn't mean that all men know everything without any effort, very far from that, but as human beings they have in them the elements which guarantee the possibility, not more. Yes?

Student: Do you want to pursue this?

LS: No, but if necessary, of course.

Student:[iv] Because I am not sure these contradict each other, whether they could not be reconciled. Perhaps I don't understand.

LS: Well, according to Kant, and Kant is only the most radical interpreter of that view, the thing in itself, as he calls it, the world in itself, is inaccessible. But what we can do is to construct an orderly whole—what he calls the phenomenal world—and that we do by virtue of the categories with which we are by nature equipped. But this whole as we understand it is not the true whole, because otherwise there would have to be a natural harmony. And this is in a way the key difference between the moderns and the ancients.

In these examples which we read in paragraph 16, Ischomachus mentions as an example where it is difficult to know the right from the wrong, the true from the false, money. Socrates would distinguish between the good soil and bad soil, a good crop and a bad crop, but he cannot make a distinction between good money and false money. Important[ly], Socrates knows the art of farming; he does not know the economic art, because how can you be a good economist if you cannot distinguish between good and bad money? Yes?

Student: I have a problem here. Socrates is supposed to know the art of farming and yet knowledge is unimportant in farming.

LS: It is important in the sense that it is so easy to come by. But something may be very easy to come by and very important; the simplest example which I can think of is air. Air is very easy to come by. Almost everywhere you can go you have air. It is the commonest thing in the world, and yet you must admit, if you were deprived of it for a very short time, you cannot live. So air is extremely important and extremely easy to come by. Why could there not be kinds of knowledge which are extremely important and yet easy to come by? We ordinarily disregard the things which are so very easy to come by, and that is for practical purposes reasonable. It goes as a matter of course, and yet it is by no means theoretically unimportant to know what we may take for granted.

Student: [. . .]

LS: Oh no, he didn't take the example of a donkey. He took the example of the earth. How can you distinguish a good cow from a bad cow? The minimum you would have to do is to try to

[iv] Likely the same student who asked the preceding question.

milk it. And you cannot milk it by looking at it, honestly. It may be all right as far as our milk supply is concerned, but she may be a very nasty customer to the milker. Which also would, I take it, take away from its value, wouldn't it?

Student: [. . .]

LS: Yes. So in other words, farming is the special art even distinguishable from cattleraising. And here take also dogs. Dogs can be very deceptive regarding their qualities. They can pretend to be very nice and then they suddenly snap. The earth doesn't do this kind of thing. So we have now at the end of chapter 19 acquired perfect knowledge of the art of farming.

And now a grave question arises and is raised by Socrates at the beginning of chapter 20. Since everyone possesses the knowledge or art of farming, the good farmer can be distinguished from the bad farmer—not by knowledge, but by something else, and this is care. Let us read the beginning of chapter 20.

Reader:
"And now I asked, 'How is it then, Ischomachus, if the operations of husbandry are so easy to learn and all alike know what must needs be done, that all have not the same fortune? How is it that some farmers live in abundance and have more than they want, while others cannot get the bare necessaries of life, and even run into debt?'" (20.1)

LS: You see: All know it, but not all do it. Do you see application of this distinction to another sphere?

Student: Knowledge and virtue.

LS: For example, let us assume there is part of moral knowledge, at any rate, of which one could say all have it, and one can say with absolute certainty that not all act on it. So this is the whole question again: Is moral knowledge like farming, as easy of access, or is it perhaps rather like one of the other arts which not all possess? Yes?

Student: [. . .]

LS: But in the case of farming, I believe it is obvious. Perhaps Plato and Socrates didn't mean it in the other respect as simply as it is sometimes stated in the histories of philosophy, and even by Aristotle in his *Ethics*—Aristotle of course understanding it better but thinking it worthwhile to discuss it even on its own terms. You know, after all, Plato and Socrates would even not provisionally say something which is not worth discussing. Good. Let us continue.

Reader:
"'Oh, I will tell you, Socrates. It is not knowledge nor want of knowledge on the part of farmers that causes one to thrive while another is needy. You won't hear a story like this running about: The estate has gone to ruin because the sower sowed unevenly—'" (20.2-3)

LS: You see, he really lays it down thick. Even the meanest capacity can understand that. Yes?

Reader:
"'or because he didn't plant the rows straight, or because someone, not knowing the right soil for vines, planted them in barren ground, or because someone didn't know that it is well to prepare the fallow for sowing, or because someone didn't know that it is well to manure the land. No, you are much more likely to hear it said: The man gets no corn from his field because he takes no trouble to see that it is sown or manured. Or, The man has got no wine, for he takes no trouble to plant vines or to make his old stock bear. Or, The man has neither olives nor figs, because he doesn't take the trouble; he does nothing to get them.'" (20.3-4)

LS: I hope this point is now perfectly clear. Good. As it should be. Now let us see paragraph 10; atill Ischomachus speaking.

Reader:
"'All know exactly how it is produced—'"

LS: Namely, manure.

Reader:
"'and it is easy to get any amount of it; and yet, while some take care to have it collected, others care nothing about it. Yet the rain is sent from heaven, and all the hollows become pools of water, and the earth yields herbage of every kind which must be cleared off the ground by the sower before sowing—'" (20.10-11)

LS: Now let us stop here. So it is extremely easy. How is it then possible that many people do not do the thing which is so extremely easy? Or is there an ambiguity in the word "easy"? Farming is the easiest of all arts, we have heard. When you talk to farmers, especially old style, they will not agree with you; and if you have tried to work on a potato field, for example, in the autumn or so, you will also say it is not in every sense easy. In what place is it difficult? On the back, for example, as distinguished from the brain. So in other words, we have to take this other thing also into consideration. Paragraph 13.

Reader:
"'Suppose a man to be wholly ignorant as to what the land can produce, and to be unable to see crop or tree on it, or to hear from anyone the truth about it, yet is it not far easier for any man to prove a parcel of land than to test a horse or to test a human being?'" (20.13)

LS: "And still more than a human being." Yes? Why?

Reader:
"'For the land never plays tricks, but reveals frankly and truthfully what she can and what she cannot do.'" (20.13)

LS: The earth is never deceiving. It is absolutely honest. More than a horse and much more than a human being. And yet—next paragraph.

Reader:
"'I think that just because she conceals nothing from our knowledge and understanding, the land is the surest tester of good and bad men.'" (20.14)

LS: That is all we need. Precisely because the earth is absolutely honest she is the best tester of human beings. Yes. And the next paragraph, paragraph 15.

Reader:
"'Husbandry is the clear accuser of the recreant soul.'" (20.15)

LS: Well, literally: "of the bad soul." In all other cases there may be doubt, however slight. Here there can be no doubt. Go on.

Reader:
"'For no one persuades himself that man could live without bread; therefore if a man will not dig and knows no other profit-earning trade, he is clearly minded to live by stealing or robbery or begging—or he is an utter fool.'" (20.15)

LS: Yes?

Student: Is good and bad here in terms of whether you are active or slow?

LS: Here is this particular case it has to do with slothfulness, one form of badness which is laziness. Yes?

Student: What if a man is not interested in farming, as Socrates isn't?

LS: Very well, you have to state it differently. If this is really true, what he says here, let us apply it to Socrates. Well, what about Socrates? Socrates is obviously not a farmer. And on the other hand, does he have a moneymaking art? Yes?

Student: [. . .]

LS: But still is this a moneymaking art? It is a long question. Three things are mentioned which are alternatives to possessing a lucrative art—farming, or any other—and that is stealing. There is no evidence that Socrates ever stole; robbing, there is no evidence of that. Then begging: Look at one of these wealthy fellows like Crito, whether they might not in certain nasty moods have the feeling that they have to take care of Socrates, that Socrates is a beggar. He lives in ten thousandfold poverty, as he puts it. The jocular element is here, but is very interesting. We must never forget the paradoxical fact that Socrates, who doesn't exercise a lucrative art, is teaching a lucrative art. That is not the same in modern times: Lord Keynes taught the art of economics, and I understand exercised it in a magnificent way. He earned subsequently millions of pounds, lost

them again, and recovered them.[v] This is true, there is no difficulty here because deed and speech are in full agreement; but here in the case of Socrates, deed and speech do not entirely coincide. There is also a very neat distinction in this paragraph: "He who does not know another lucrative, moneymaking art, nor is willing to farm." Strictly speaking, this is not knowledge which you need to farm. Much more important is the willingness to farm. This is in passing. Paragraph 21, please.

Reader:
"'These, then, are the evils—'"

LS: We know these now. Negligence, forms of negligence.

Reader:
"'that crush estates far more than sheer lack of knowledge. For the outgoing expenses of the estate are not a penny less; but the work done is insufficient to show a profit on the expenditure; after that there's no need to wonder if the expected surplus is converted into a loss.'" (20.21)

LS: I think this makes it abundantly clear that the art of farming is not identical with the art of household management. The art of farming is a part of it but not the whole, because someone can be an excellent farmer and be very inept in the balancing of expenditure and income. That is clear.

Now Socrates we know possesses the art of farming. That has been proved beyond a shadow of a doubt. But there is no evidence yet that he possesses the art of household management, and therefore we see how right he was when he said: "I can't teach you, Critobulus, the art of household management." This he doesn't know, but he does know the art of farming. But these are two very different things. In paragraph 23, which we might read, there is an important reference.

Reader:
"'Well farmed land,' he would say, 'costs a large sum and can't be improved;' and he held that where there is no room for improvement there is not much pleasure to be got from the land: landed estate and livestock must be continually coming on to give the fullest measure of satisfaction." (20.23)

LS: Livestock. After all, this is a book on management of estates. I know very little about Greek agriculture or so, but on the basis of this book alone we would know that livestock does play a role: horses have been mentioned, [and] especially the art of shepherding, you remember? For sheep Xenophon surely makes clear, and of course also cows. Why is he absolutely silent about cattleraising? If you look at other ancient books on economics, for example, Virgil's *Georgics*, you have cattleraising with beekeeping,[vi] and I know beekeeping was very important in Attica. So why does he speak only about farming in the narrower sense? What is the reason for that?

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[v] John Maynard Keynes, influential economist and civil servant, served in the British Treasury during World War I. Between the wars he amassed a large personal fortune from the financial markets. As bursar of King's College, Cambridge during those years, he also greatly enhanced its financial position.
[vi] *Georgics* 4, ll. 281-314.

Student: [. . .]

LS: Oh no, he was not a vegetarian. No, there is no doubt about it. And in addition, horses are not eaten, ordinarily at least. And he wrote books on horses, and you could say that he wanted to treat horsebreeding in a special book. But this is not a good enough explanation. It must have artistic meaning in the work. Yes?

Student: [. . .]

LS: Why should this be the case? Do you mean . . . no, I don't believe so.

Student: [. . .]

LS: Yes, if you are especially interested in discovering a special breed. But also improvement of land is possible. I don't believe there is any artificial fertilizing going on in agriculture. I don't think so. But there are things you can do to the land and surely which you can do to trees. He had spoken about trees. Someone else raised his hand. Well, I suggest the following explanation.

We started in chapter 7 from a bipartition, a fundamental bipartition, the two sexes: the woman in the house, inside; and the man or husband, outside. And this has a certain deeper significance, because the woman inside, the true governor—the political is female; and man outside, farming, *physis*, nature. Now let us look at animals. Where are the animals? Are they inside or outside? We have one example which was discussed at some length, and that was bees. Bees have of course housing [and] live inside as much as men do, and needless to say that cattle also have stables. Farming the corn or trees, that is clearly an outside activity; the activity regarding cattle is not so simply outside. But this only in passing.

In this section which begins here, Ischomachus develops a conceit of his father which is highly interesting. This father loved agriculture so much that whenever he saw a run-down farm he bought it and improved it. And he did this again and again. Now paragraph 24.

Reader:
"'I assure you, Socrates, that we have often added a hundredfold to the value of a farm. There is so much money in this idea, Socrates, and it is so easy to learn, that no sooner have you heard of it from me than you know as much as I do, and can go home and teach it to someone else, if you like.'" (20.24)

LS: You see, he doesn't believe that Socrates would do it but only that he might teach it to others. Did you see that? Now let us go on here.

Reader:
"'Moreover, my father did not get his knowledge of it at secondhand, nor did he discover it by much thought—'"

LS: Literally, "by worrying" which is a favorite term or joke at philosophy. They are worrying. Obviously they worry about things about which one doesn't have to worry.

Reader: "'but he would say that, thanks to his love of husbandry and hard work, he had coveted a farm of this sort in order that he might have something to do, and combine profit with pleasure. For I assure you, Socrates, no Athenian, I believe, had such a strong natural love of agriculture as my father.'" (20.24-26)

LS: "By nature," yes. No one taught him. No one exhorted him. By nature his heart went out to farming. That is the meaning of this. Yes?

Reader:
"Now on hearing this I asked, 'Did your father keep all the farms that he cultivated, Ischomachus, or did he sell when he could get a good price?'
"'He sold, of course—'" (20.26)

LS: "He sold, by Zeus!" You observe this simple question of Socrates.

Student:
answered Ischomachus, 'but, you see, owing to his industrious habits, he would promptly buy another that was out of cultivation.'
"'You mean, Ischomachus, that your father really loved agriculture—'" (20.26-27)

LS: "By nature," "truly by nature a lover of agriculture."

Student:
"'as intensely as merchants love corn. So deep is their love of corn that on receiving reports that it is abundant anywhere, merchants will voyage in quest of it: they will cross the Aegean, the Euxine, the Sicilian sea; and when they have got as much as possible, they carry it over the sea, and they actually stow it in the very ship in which they sail themselves. And when they want money, they don't throw the corn away anywhere at haphazard, but they carry it to the place where they hear that corn is most valued—'" (20.27-28)

LS: Yes, "most honored," which is the same, yes.

Reader:
"'and the people prize it most highly, and deliver it to them there. Yes, your father's love of agriculture seems to be something like that.'"

LS: Good. Let us read the next paragraph.

Reader:
"'You're joking, Socrates," rejoined Ischomachus; 'but I hold that a man has a no less genuine love of building who sells his houses as soon as they are finished and proceeds to build others.'"
"'Of course—'" (20.29)

LS: "By Zeus."

Reader:
"'By Zeus; and I declare, Ischomachus, on my oath—'"

LS: You see, that is very strong. "By Zeus" and "I declare under oath." That may be unique in the work of Xenophon. Yes?

Reader:
"'that I believe you, that all men naturally love whatever they think will bring them profit.'" (20.29)

LS: This is not the proper translation. "I believe you, or I trust you, that all men by nature believe to love those things from which they believe to be benefited." Now let us discuss this. This is a very important passage. Now the joke of Socrates at the expense of Ischomachus or his father is of course this: that Ischomachus does not see that his father is prompted by love of gain and not by love of corn or love of agriculture. And the subtlety of this is that this ignorance, this deep ignorance, this lack of self-knowledge, makes him the perfect gentleman he is. But in order to see that, we must take a further step, and this is suggested by the end of this chapter. The fundamental question is: What does "loving" mean? Otherwise we cannot know what the perfect gentleman is because the perfect gentleman is defined by what he loves.

I read to you a passage from Xenophon's *Greek History*, one of the most beautiful, and simple, and revealing sentences which there are in Xenophon: book 7, chapter 3, paragraph 12. The fellow citizens of Euphron, a tyrant in some Greek town, "buried him in the market place and worshiped him as the leader of the *polis*. Thus, it seems, do most men define men as good their benefactors." Simply stated, the popular vulgar opinion is that to be a good man means to be a benefactor "to me." I think we all detect ourselves from time to time in this error. It is very human, but it is an error because someone may be very beneficial to me and he may be an abominable fellow. For example, he may be very nasty to other people; sometimes this happens. I have heard of people who get rich by great lack of scruples and then they benefited other people—of course not those whom they robbed. He is also a benefactor. But this is of course true also on a much higher level. So the first step, so to say, in understanding human things is to make clear that the good man is not the same as the benefactor, and surely as one's own benefactor. This is not genuine love, because it is always in the crudest way self-regarding. And that is of course true of Ischomachus's father. He doesn't love farms; he loves gain. Or if he does love farming, there is a very crude mixture between love of gain and love of farming. And that is probably the case with most of us, that we love two very different things and don't observe the subtle difference. True love means loving something for its own sake. But most men don't love—they don't love that from which they are benefited; they believe to love it. And more precisely even: Men believe to love that from which they believe to be benefited.[vii] —they may be hunchback without knowing it. I think it is a beautiful sentence. You have to think for one moment until you understand it. And that is a good enough reason for changing the text, for writers should write so that everyone can understand it at the first hearing. That is the principle underlying much of scholarship, as we see here too. Of course a good man or a good thing

[vii] The tape was changed at this point.

cannot be but beneficial, but that is not the essential character of the goodness. There is a simple empirical proof that the distinction is necessary, and that is the phenomenon known by the name of admiration. Because if we admire genuinely, then we are really not concerned with the relative beneficence: good to us. The simple example: an enemy general who defeated one's own country's army. One can still admire him as a great general. Admiration does not have this character, and therefore it played such a great role in classical moral orientation. Admiration is one form of looking up. The general phenomenon is looking up, and only by starting from looking up to something, and not how it looks to me, can one understand the moral phenomena. One can also express it, say, that man is by nature the deferential animal. The others are not deferential, and only apparently so in the case of dogs and horses and so on. And ultimately one would have to start from this sentence in order to understand the difference between Socrates and Ischomachus. Ischomachus does not make this distinction. He believes to love that from which he believes to be benefited, and this confusion is his essence. And of course this is possible on various levels, and he is a nice man in the ordinary sense of the word. Others who do the same are not as nice. But this is not the key distinction: the key distinction is that between those who know this delusion and those who don't. Mr. ___?

Student: Would a perfect gentleman strictly speaking be such a merchant as Ischomachus' father?

LS: This is a very good point. That is indeed quite true; he is indeed not a perfect gentleman. That is one of these nice tricks which Xenophon makes. Of all the classical writers, Xenophon is the one closest to modern things, as is proven by the fact that Machiavelli quotes him more than any other classical writer, with the exception of course of Livy, the Roman historian whom Machiavelli has to use for the material of Roman history. But of the political thinkers, Machiavelli quotes Xenophon more than other writer, because Xenophon experiments with marginal possibilities with which Aristotle and Plato do not experiment. This is one of them. The genuine thing is gentleman farmer. This is a synthesis of farming and commerce: that he trades in farms at least as much as he farms. That is a kind of Machiavellian[ism], just as we will see in his treatise on tyranny, where he experiments with the nice tyrants, which is also a marginal possibility not tolerated by Aristotle and hardly tolerated by Plato. Xenophon experiments with it, and therefore this is a very important book for the true history of the so-called capitalist spirit, just as we found at the very beginning that administering the household was replaced by increasing the property. That was the first step. Well, you can go on from here. Xenophon draws the line somewhere, obviously, but this concession he is willing to make. It is of course made jocularly, as you see from the way in which Socrates is so amazed that he sold these farms after having improved their value. So that is a very good point.

Student: Does that have any implication for whether Ischomachus is a genuine perfect gentleman?

LS: Sure. The question which you raise is absolutely necessary to raise, and one would have to look at other perfect gentleman in Xenophon to see whether they met this test stated at the end of chapter 20, whether they can distinguish that. On the basis of my knowledge of Xenophon and also of Plato, I would say in this respect there is no difference between Ischomachus and the perfect gentleman, from the Socratic point of view.

Now let us turn to the last chapter then, in the first two paragraphs. Here a distinction is made by Ischomachus between farming as such, and the element of ruling, ruling human beings in it. Let us read these two paragraphs.

Reader:
"'But I am pondering over the skill with which you have presented the whole argument in support of your proposition, Ischomachus. For you stated that husbandry is the easiest of all arts to learn, and after hearing all that you have said, I am quite convinced that this is so.'" (21.1)

LS: You see, this was Ischomachus's *hypothesis*, that is the word. "Hypothesis" means in this connection the thesis which he lays down in order to prove it. This is Ischomachus's thesis, and he has proved it to Socrates's satisfaction. Now?

Reader:
"'By Zeus,[viii] it is,' cried Ischomachus; 'but I grant you, Socrates, that in respect of aptitude for command, which is common to all forms of business alike—agriculture, politics, estate-management, warfare—in that respect the intelligence shown by different classes of men varies greatly.'" (21.2)

LS: No, "In this respect I agree with you" [*synomologō*]. The first was a thesis of Ischomachus. Now we are told of a Socratic thesis. How does Ischomachus know that, that according to Socrates men differ greatly in insight—meaning, in farming the difference in insight doesn't arise because everyone can understand it at a first look (according to Ischomachus especially), but in another element of householding, ruling human beings, there insight is of decisive importance, and in this respect men differ greatly. And this is Socrates's assertion, not Ischomachus's assertion. Ischomachus agrees with Socrates but it is Socrates's primary thesis. How did he know that? Well, not from this book, as far as I have seen, but perhaps from earlier conversations. After all, they knew each other, we saw that earlier—Ischomachus recognized him. Or perhaps also from Socrates's reputation. Socrates had a reputation, as we have seen in chapter 11.

Student: [. . .]

LS: There is a simple test. Did he know Socrates's name without Socrates having told him, "I am Socrates"?

Student: Yes, he knew of Socrates.

LS: But he knew that he was Socrates. Someone may know, say, of Secretary of Defense McNamara[ix] without knowing *him*. So if he would suddenly come in, he would not know this is McNamara.

[viii] In original: "Of course."
[ix] Robert S. MacNamara served as Secretary of Defense from 1961-68, under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.

Student: [. . .]

LS: Someone might have pointed him out to him on a former occasion. There is a third possibility: that he knew him without being introduced to him because someone told him, "This is that funny guy Socrates." That is possible. However, Ischomachus knows somehow that Socrates holds the view that there is an important natural inequality of understanding among men. Now since we have seen that the *Clouds* is used by Xenophon here in the eleventh chapter, when Socrates says how his way of life is described, measuring the air and this kind of thing: in the *Clouds* of course that is of very great importance. It is described there how Socrates picks his pupils with a view to their abilities, and the comedy of the *Clouds* is only that he is so very inept in applying the standards. He picks invariably the wrong boys or young men. But still, Socrates was known for that. So this is important.

Now what must the ruling men, the men apt to rule, know? They must possess also the power of speaking so that they can make their subjects do their work gladly. And they must be able to do it especially by praising. This is what Ischomachus says in paragraph 3. Let us turn to paragraph 5.

Reader:
"'Contrast the genius—'"

LS: "The genius" is in Greek "the divine man." But there is a connection, you know: genius is in Greek *daimon,* and *daimon* is a god also, or something like a god. To that extent, if genius is taken in its original meaning, it is not an impossible translation; but in the present usage of the term, it is not recognizable any more. You must have seen that from all kinds of contests of what they call geniuses. So now read paragraph 5.

Reader:
"'Contrast the divine[x], the brave and scientific leader: let him take over the command of these same troops, or of others if you like. What effect has he on them? They are ashamed to do a disgraceful act, think it better to obey, and take a pride in obedience, working cheerfully, every man and all together, when it is necessary to work. Just as a love of work may spring up in the mind of a private soldier here and there, so a whole army under the influence of a good leader is inspired with love of work and ambition to distinguish itself under the commander's eye.'" (21.5)

LS: This you see still, the concern with praise. Now this concern with praise is exactly this ambiguous thing. The perfect gentleman does not see the problem of praise, reputation. And Socrates sees it. Paragraph 8.

Reader:
"'Him you may justly call high-minded who has many followers of like mind; and with reason may he be said to march 'with a strong arm' whose will many an arm is ready to serve—'" (21.8)

[x] In original: "genius"

LS: In Greek that comes out better: "A great mind[11] and a great hand." So it is not enough that he has a great mind; he must also have a great hand, or let us say, great arm. You will see what the difference is.

Reader:
"'whose will—'"

LS: "Mind." "Many hands are willing to obey."

Reader:
"'whose mind many hands are willing to obey; and truly great is he who can do great deeds by his will rather than his strength.'" (21.8)

LS: This opposition of mind and strength, *gnōmē* and *dunamai*, occurs very emphatically also in Thucydides. So in other words, the intellectual superiority as distinguished from brachial superiority, which controls the arms. This is Ischomachus's speech, mind you; that is not what Socrates says, but [is] allegedly an elaboration of a Socratic thought. We must read a few more paragraphs. [Number] 10.

Reader:
"'But, Socrates, if the appearance of the master in the field, of the man who has the fullest power to punish the bad and reward the strenuous workmen, makes no striking impression on the men at work, I for one cannot envy him. But if at sight of him they bestir themselves—'" (21.10)

LS: Literally: "they get into motion." You remember the theme "rest and motion"; they are moved. Yes?

Reader:
"'and a spirit of determination and rivalry and eagerness to excel falls on every workman, then I should say: this man has a touch of the kingly nature in him.'" (21.10)

LS: "Of the kingly character," [*ēthous baskilkoū*], from which *ethos* is derived. Well, we are no longer surprised that the master—and the master is of course primarily master of slaves, and naturally he has not only the power of praising but also of punishing—that is the reason why the hand, the army, is needed. We are no longer surprised that the master of slaves is compared to a kingly man because we have seen even the bailiff, a slave, can be kingly. That is no longer surprising. Next paragraph.

Reader:
"'And this, in my judgment, is the greatest thing in every operation that makes any demand on the labour of men, and therefore in agriculture. Mind you, I do not go so far as to say that this can be learnt at sight or at a single hearing. On the contrary, to acquire these powers a man needs education; he must be possessed of great natural gifts—'"

LS: "Of a good nature."

Reader:
"'above all, he must be a genius.'" (21.11)

LS: No, "become," "become divine." Now what does this mean? You see here there is again a reference to the difference between the kingly art and the farming art, a difference brought out by their kinship. So[2] he is not by nature [divine]. He has a good nature, but he becomes divine. Why? How does he become divine? Let us read the first sentence of the next paragraph.

Reader:
"'For I reckon this gift is not altogether human, but divine—this power to win willing obedience: it is manifestly a gift of the gods to the true votaries of prudence.'" (21.12)

LS: "Of moderation." Moderation is acquired. So he must have education. He must have a good nature, and he must have acquired moderation. That moderation is distinguished from education will no longer surprise us from what we have seen in the *Memorabilia*. The expression here, "becoming divine," [is] in a similar context in Plato's *Laws* 818c. There, however, it is said "having become divine by learning." And now the last sentence.

Reader:
"'Despotic rule—'"

LS: Why does he not say "tyrannical rule"? Despotic rule is in Greek the rule of the master over the slaves and is perfectly legitimate. What is illegitimate is tyrannical rule, meaning the rule over a political society as if they were not citizens but slaves. That's tyranny. That is simply one of the many barbarisms of which he is justly condemned, not only accused.

Reader:
"'Tyrannical[xi] rule over unwilling subjects they give, I fancy, to those whom they judge worthy to live the life of Tantalus, of whom it is said that in hell he spends eternity, dreading a second death.'" (21.12)

LS: "In Hades," of course, he says. So the tyrant is the opposite of the king—we know this from the *Memorabilia*—and he leads a most unhappy life. And this is expressed in these terms: He lives in Hades; he is dead. The living tyrant is dead and yet fears constantly the greatest pain or anguish which only the living can feel. You know the story of Tantalus, who doesn't get food or drink and is in pain all the time. He lacks the only good which the dead possess, namely, that they can no longer die. And while having the greatest evil of the living, he is an absolutely miserable man. That is the conclusion of the *Oeconomicus*. It is a very strange conclusion, if you think of the *Oeconomicus*,[3] which ends with the opposition of the king and the tyrant. And this is a very natural transition to the *Hiero*, which we will discuss next time. And I ask whoever is reading the paper on the *Hiero* to consider again *Memorabilia* 4.6.12.

Now let us try to summarize the thing as well as we can. Socrates knows the art of farming. He knows the art of ruling. But he does not know the economic art, because he doesn't know the element of expenditure and income. Now is his ignorance of the economic art proper the reason

[xi] In original: "Despotic"

why he is a good man indeed but not a perfect gentleman—in Greek *agathos*, but not *kaloskagathos*? Note the silence on *kalokagathia*, perfect gentlemanship, in this last chapter. And I have not made a study. Since when did it disappear altogether? I believe he was silent about this for some time.

Another point which one should mention also is this: farming. Socrates knows the art of farming. Now farming was used as a synonym for another art for the possession of which Socrates was very famous. In which art do you do something like throw out seed? Some will sprout, others won't.

Student: Teaching.

LS: Teaching, yes. That is in the *Phaedrus*. One can say [it is] the highest form of rhetoric, because education[4] [is] of course speaking, speaking being a very subordinate thing in education even long before the time of progressive education. So teaching means speaking, and therefore the art of education is the art of speaking, the highest form of the art of speaking. And therefore in the *Phaedrus*, where this art is discussed, this comparison with farming or a special kind of farming is made.

Student: Is it ironical that the Greek word for young man and the word for fallow land is the same? *Neos*.

LS: I didn't think of that, but that might very well be. But I do not know whether they are etymologically the same, but perhaps they are. That is a very good question. Let's consult Liddell and Scott.[xii] Thank you. It may very well be. I had not thought of it.

Let me now briefly take up the question of the relation of this dialogue to the other Socratic writings. On the basis of such a comparison as I made at the beginning, it appears that the *Oeconomicus* is *the* Socratic *logos*, *the* Socratic discourse. The *Memorabilia* deals with Socrates's justice. The other three works, of which the *Oeconomicus* is one, do not deal with Socrates as a just man. The others deal—the *Symposium* with his deeds, and the *Apologia Socratis* with his silent deliberation. Now who is the chief character in the *Banquet*, Mr. __?

Student: Callias.

LS: Very pompous. Not to say a pompous ass, but surely very pompous. Very rich, old family. And who is the interlocutor of Socrates in the *Apology of Socrates*?

Student: Hermogenes.

LS: Who is Hermogenes?

Student: Callias's brother.

LS: Callias's brother. So they are kindred. What is the most obvious difference between them?

[xii] Editors of the authoritative work *The Greek-English Lexicon*, first published in 1843.

1

Student: Callias is very rich. Hermogenes is very poor.

LS: Callias, however, was not only very rich but also, as we can easily know, a fellow who wasted his property. So both were impossible as interlocutors in a conversation on economics. The one was rich but couldn't administer his wealth, and the other was poor. So Socrates had to seek a third man, and this man is Ischomachus. He is rich and a good economist, but were there not other Athenians who met these conditions? Perhaps there was no one, I don't know, who had this peculiar combination of farming and trading in farms. And Xenophon was anxious to have this conceit in his economic work.

But there is also some other point to which I would like to draw your attention. In a contemporary orator called Andocides, in his speech *On the Mysteries*—there was a mystery scandal and a big lawsuit—he says this: "Callias, the son of Hipponicus [this Callias—LS], marries the daughter of Ischomachus." Well, there are *n* Ischomachuses in Athens. It was a very common name. But here we are: there was a man called Ischomachus who happened to be the father-in-law of Callias. And since this is all running in one family, I would at least see whether we can make any sense of this ascription.

"After having lived with the daughter of Ischomachus not for a year, he took the mother of the daughter and lived with the mother of that daughter, this most impious man of all. He was impious because he was the priest of the mother and the daughter [the mother and the daughter being Demeter and Kore—LS] and he had both women in the house. And he was not ashamed at all and did not fear the twin goddesses. [Now the daughter of Ischomachus finds the situation unbearable and tries to hang herself and then runs away from Callias's house—LS] And thus the mother drove out the daughter. When Callias had enough of the mother he threw her out too." [xiii]

And she claimed—and this is of course the wife of Ischomachus—that she was pregnant from Callias. And Callias first denied that the child was from him but later on acknowledges the child. And later Andocides refers to Ischomachus's wife, our great friend, as—how does he say?—"this most daring hag." Now I regard this as most perfectly proper to mention here because it throws light on an interesting question. Ischomachus presents himself, as we have seen, as a perfect educator of human beings, of his slaves, and especially of his wife. But the net result of education is of course how the educatee, if one can say so, will look many years later. And this is the famous question, one simple example of the question of virtue and knowledge: the knowledge she acquired in the first week after they were married. But that doesn't mean that she will have acted upon it. I thought the great question, Can virtue be taught? is illustrated by this possibility which we have mentioned.

Now I said that the *Oeconomicus* does not deal with the justice of Socrates, not with his benefiting people, and in particular here of course with his benefiting Critobulus. He teaches Critobulus an art, the art of farming. But this is not necessarily benefiting a man to teach him art. Does this make sense? We have to consider the context. Now why does Socrates teach

[xiii] Andocides, *On the Mysteries*, 124-127. In *Minor Attic Orators*, vol. 1, trans. K. J. Maidment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1941), 433-35. Apparently Strauss's translation of selected portions of the passage.

Critobulus the art of farming? Because Critobulus[1] must earn his living at something; that we know. But what is the particular reason why Critobulus has to earn money on a large scale? Do you remember that?

Student: He has friends to supply.

LS: No, that is not the primary reason.

Student: Ostentation.

LS: Ostentation. So in other words, accepting this end of Critobulus as something pregiven, Socrates gives him the means for it, whereas in the *Memorabilia*, where Socrates's justice is presented, Socrates is shown to make people pious, continent, good friends, and so on. This is, I think, the explanation of this point.

I have a few more points to add. *The* Socratic *logos* deals with the economic art, which according to some passages in the *Memorabilia* would seem to be the highest. At least the *Oeconomicus* does not deal with the kingly art, according to its title. And since the kingly art is the highest—well, does not everyone see that to be a king is something much more splendid than to be the manager of a household? What does this mean? In fact, of course the *Oeconomicus* does deal with the kingly art. You only have to read the last chapter, an economic treatise ending with opposition of the king and tyrant—that is a fitting ending for a dialogue on the kingly art. What is behind that? The first point, something we have already discussed: there is no essential difference between the economic art and the kingly art, the same thesis which Plato also sets forth in the *Statesman*; and therefore it would seem it doesn't make any difference. But this is not quite sufficient, because there is some difference, if not an essential difference, between the political life and the economic life. This is indicated by the fact that we have two reported conversations. I am not speaking now of the reported conversation between Ischomachus and his wife, that is an entirely different story. There are two reported conversations: one is reported by Socrates, and the other is reported by Ischomachus.

Student: Ischomachus reports on the merchantman.

LS: The Phoenecian. Ischomachus and the Phoenecian merchant. And the other?

Student: Socrates, of course, about the horse.

LS: That is not a true parallel to that. Well, Lysander, the Spartan general, and who?

Student: Cyrus.

LS: Cyrus, the Persian prince. These are strictly speaking political men, a general being a political office, of course. And these are economic men: Ischomachus the householder; and the Phoenecian merchant is of course also. Now what do these two men have in common?

Student: Barbarians.

LS: Yes, barbarians. And the people talking to them are Greeks. Now I use an old trick of pedagogues in former times, where the question is so obvious that one shouldn't put it in the form of a question: Who does not talk to barbarians?

Student: Socrates.

LS: Socrates, sure. He reports only a conversation of others with barbarians. Now this has nothing to do with any inhumanity on the part of Socrates but this must be understood judiciously and symbolically, as it were. Socrates is so remote from barbarism, and if Greekness is understood as the opposite of barbarism, that he has no connection with. The political man and the economic man have something to do with barbarism. That is one symbolic way of putting it. And that will be the key, I think, to the *Education of Cyrus*, because this is a barbarian master of the art of ruling, who is superior in the art to any Greek. That is the contention of Xenophon. We must keep this in mind.

But still, why the emphasis in the title on economics? We have to consider the whole context of the Socratic writings. First is the *Memorabilia*, and the *Memorabilia* opens with a quotation of the charge brought against Socrates. Do you remember that charge? Socrates commits an unjust act by not worshiping the gods worshiped by the city and by corrupting the young. Two charges. Now what is the worst thing he did to the young, according to the accuser? He didn't make them spendthrifts or gamblers or so.

Student: He taught them to laugh at their elders.

LS: But that is not the gravest from the point of view of the *polis*.

Student: He taught them to make the worse appear the better cause.

LS: That is not stated in the accusation. And it is not stated in what is developed here.

Student: Is it idleness?

Student: He taught them to despise the democracy.

LS: That's one thing. But there is a stronger term.

Student: [. . .]

LS: Well, no. The two chief proofs that Socrates was corrupting the young were Alcibiades and Critias: Alcibiades, the terrible man under the democracy; and Critias, the terrible man under the oligarchy. But what is the defect which both these fellows had from the point of view of the accuser?

Student: He made them tyrants.

LS: Tyrants. He made them tyrannical. That is his corrupting the young. Now this being the case, the economic art is much less exposed to hostile criticism than the political art, because the political art of Socrates would surely not be democratic. Of this we can be sure. The word *demos,* the common people, to say nothing of democracy, never occurs in the *Oeconomicus*, and we have seen some definitely antidemocratic passages.

By the way, the last passage is perfectly clear. The master of slaves is as it were the model of the political ruler, the king. These are all monarchic rulers. Also the bailiff, of course, rules as a monarch over slaves. And if you have any doubt about it, you could read Cicero, *De Republica*, when Scipio in the first book speaks about why monarchy is the best of the simple regimes. The example: the household. The household is ruled monarchically, and therefore if the *polis* is akin to the household, the *polis* too will be ruled monarchically. And up to Filmer,[xiv] and perhaps beyond, this comparison played such a role. From the *Memorabilia* one could be led to expect that *the* Socratic *logos* would be entitled *Basilikos*, the kingly *logos*. Such a dialogue was never written by Xenophon. But *the* Socratic *logos* of Xenophon is called *Oeconomicus*. But he did something else to compensate for the lack of a *Basilikos*, and what would you expect that to be?[5] He wrote a *Tyrannikos*. But *Hiero* is only *Tyrannikos* in the subtitle. The title is *Hiero* or *Tyrannikos*. But now we have the interesting thing: Who is the teacher of the tyrant in the *Hiero*?

Student: Simonides.

LS: Not Socrates. So this is I think the overall context of these things. And I think we are now prepared for studying the *Hiero*. Well, we have a few more minutes, if there is any point which some of you would like to raise.

Student: [. . .]

LS: What do you mean to say? If I understood you correctly, Ischomachus says almost nothing about forcing—using force against slaves. Is that what you wanted to say?

Student: [. . .]

LS: No, we have to see. I believe not, because Xenophon as well as Plato was sure that without coercion men cannot live together.

Student: [. . .]

LS: Sure, there can be a perversion of coercion, but there can also be legitimate coercion.

Student: [. . .]

LS: I think you will not be able to prove that Xenophon or Socrates regarded slavery as an avoidable evil. That he regarded it as an evil there can be no doubt. There can be no doubt. But they did not regard it as an avoidable evil. Whether that is due to their limited horizon or to an

[xiv] Robert Filmer, author of *Patriarcha* (1680).

understanding of at least what was possible given[1] the whole style of life and conditions of their time in Greece, is another matter. Mr. ___?

Student: You suggested in commenting on the closing passages that there was some difference suggested between the economic man and kingly man. Or does the argument stand at the point that these are essentially similar?

LS: The first impression you get from Xenophon is that there is only a difference of size and not of essence between the household and the *polis*. But still, when one reads the passages more carefully, one sees that this is only true in a certain respect, namely, as far as there is always rule over men in both cases. But[6] their essential differences come out indirectly. And I think there are two words which occur, and they are related. The one is law. Strictly speaking, there is no law within the household. There are commands, but no laws. And the other thing related to that: there is no freedom because there is dependence—even the wife, and of course the children [are] still more subject, and the slaves altogether. So freedom and law, these are the two political or public phenomena which do not exist in the household. All freedom in the household is on sufferance, meaning a father can empower a child to do these and these things either expressly or by silence, and he can at any time retract it. In the city, that is impossible. In the city there has to be a law if any change in the status of anyone or anything is to be made. Do you see that point? But on the other hand, if you take absolute monarchy then of course the difference becomes negligible. Is that not true, because he is the father of his nation? Well, I don't know whether you have ever read Filmer and Locke's criticism of Filmer;[xv] there this point is brought out: the dubious character of the comparison of the political society with the household. Of course [this is in] Aristotle too, but Locke has developed it at greater length.

Student: Would this thesis that they are essentially similar occur in the common understanding? I have the feeling that when Aristotle takes it up right away, it is the current understanding in a way.

LS: No, not the current understanding, but the highest available understanding. Highest—I mean the most thoughtful man or men who had spoken on the subject had asserted that: Plato, Socrates. You mean because he speaks of it on the very first page of the *Politics*? Yes, but the reason is this. Aristotle tries to show that the political association is the highest association, and it is the highest association because the end which it serves is the highest end. In order to do that, he must make a distinction between the highest association and lower associations, between the end of the highest association and the ends of the lower associations. Therefore he is confronted immediately with this position: all associations are so to speak of the same kind, all interesting associations. For this reason, he has to face it immediately and then to show that the household is essentially different from the political association, and of course also the master-slave association, and so on. That's the reason. Surely Plato was in Aristotle's mind the most competent man who had spoken on such matters before him. This was surely not the popular view. That the *polis* had a splendor which the household could never have, that is clear.

[xv] For Locke's criticism of Filmer, see his *First Treatise of Government*.

Student: Regarding the connection of the economic art, the household art, and the kingly art, why is there such a long digression into the question of farming as well as the side issues of livestock?

LS: The perfect gentleman, that was the beginning; and the perfect gentleman must of course also have a source of his livelihood. Which activity is the only one becoming for the perfect gentleman? And here Ischomachus answers as every British gentleman up to the eighteenth century would have answered (and in some countries even beyond that), of course: farming. Naturally, he wouldn't do the dirty work himself, but he is a gentleman farmer; therefore you have to say something about farming. It doesn't take up too much space. These are altogether five chapters, 15 to 19, out of twenty-one. But it has this great question. Farming of course brings up all kinds of other questions, especially that it is the art closest to nature, the art where human art is least important compared with what nature does. In a passage about this very question, nature and art, in the tenth book of Plato's *Laws*, three arts are mentioned which depend much more on the working of nature than on human work, and these are medicine, farming, and gymnastics. Farming is in the middle. Now it is perfectly clear that medicine and gymnastics would not be fit for a gentleman. And from the point of view of economics—after all, if a physician is anxious to get rich, he is not regarded as the right kind of physician. In the case of a farmer it would be different. And gymnastics was not a very lucrative thing. Medicine was a much more respected profession than gymnastics. So I think the choice is natural.

Student: But then somehow this doesn't tie into the other missing element of the side issue of livestock also.

LS: This I tried to explain, because the key division here is between indoors and outdoors. *Polis* belongs to indoors. Well, replace doors by walls, and then we see. And outdoors, and outside of the walls—but the livestock is not simply outdoors; they also have to come into the stables. That I believe is the reason for that. And in addition, as I say, only farming and not cattleraising is the symbol of rhetoric, of education. I don't see how one would try to explain education; perhaps breaking in horses goes to some extent, but that is not the highest form of education. You could apply that more to the military part and this kind of thing.

Student: Isn't the fact that Ischomachus is not able to effectively teach his wife her duties brought out by Socrates's asking twice in chapter 9 whether his wife really does perform the duties that he has taught her, and he dodges the question both times? And then that passage about his wife bringing him into court.

LS: I see. Not quite. He presents it as a kind of trial he has at home. What? I thought—excuse me. Well, maybe you are right. It would be grist for my mill if you are right. Maybe you are right; I do not know. At any rate, even if there is no allusion in the *Oeconomicus* to the future of Mrs. Ischomachus, the title reminds us of this possibility. After all, there was no reference to any child of that marriage, so this must have been fairly early. And later on, this daughter and Callias is a piece of scandalous gossip. But they do that from time to time, even the greatest writers. Plato too. I will only mention one point. In Plato's *Protagoras*, the dialogue takes place in the house of Callias, this Callias, and there is a very obvious allusion to the fact that the house of Callias is Hades. When they come in there is a kind of Cerberus there—a slave—who doesn't

admit them.[xvi] And then there are verses of Homer[1] quoted regarding Hades which have an application to the situation.[xvii] Now according to what we have seen, the Athenian gossip seems to have called Callias Hades, because just as Hades lived together with his wife and daughter, therefore Callias was called Hades. And so Plato must have used this gossip as a slight joke as the surface, as it were, of the *Protagoras*. That is perfectly all right. After all, it is not at all indelicate; these men were all dead when these books were writen. This was at least one generation afterward.

Student: There is one other case too where it is brought out, where he says when they started—in chapter 8 he begins instructing his wife about how she should arrange things. And in chapter 9 after he has finished his instructions she tells him to put the things where he had told her.

LS: Well, maybe you are right that the snake was already visible. That is possible. Good.

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[1] Deleted "that."
[2] Moved "divine."
[3] Deleted "and."
[4] Deleted "being."
[5] Deleted "He wrote a. And what would you expect that to be?"
[6] Deleted "that."

[xvi] *Protagoras* 314d.
[xvii] *Protagoras* 315c.

1

Session 6: no date
Hiero

Leo Strauss: [In progress] —that is doubtless true, that in the second half of the dialogue the poet rules the tyrant. You have made a number of other remarks[i] which were very sensible, but I have also to make some criticism. It was very good that you considered Aristotle's *Politics* on tyranny, because Aristotle discusses explicitly in the *Politics* the question of how to improve tyranny. I mean, in other words, he does explicitly what Xenophon does here implicitly. The fundamental answer is the greatest approximation to kingship which is possible. That is the formula for the improvement of[1] tyranny. And you stated it very well, what the limits of the improvement are. A tyrant can become a ruler of willing subjects. He can never become a ruler under law. Law can never come into it. And kingship according to the definition given in the *Memorabilia* is rule over willing subjects under law. Law can never come into it. Now of course this raises a further question which cannot be answered sufficiently on the basis of the *Hiero*. And that is: Is truly rule under law the highest form of rule? And in the *Oeconomicus* we have seen the king compared to the householder, the manager of the household. Now the manager of a household does not rule under laws. This subject will come up in the *Education of Cyrus*, where we will see the transformation of what we may loosely call constitutional monarchy into an absolute monarchy, presented as a progress. We must keep this in mind.

This is connected with another point which you made. You consulted also the ninth Book of the *Republic*, Plato's description of the misery of the tyrant. And there are amazing agreements between the *Hiero* and the ninth book of the *Republic*. But what is the difference? I mean not any detail, very broadly.

Student: [. . .]

LS: Yes, sure. That is the point. In other words, the man who should know best, the tyrant himself, shows how miserable the tyrant's life is. That is of course a great joke, because I think a careful study of the *Hiero* would show that Hiero is not as unhappy as he claims to be. What is *the* source of his unhappiness? What is the locus of his unhappiness? This pederastic relation, that's all. In other words, it is not as bad as it seems. Sure, that is part of the irony of the whole work. You were quite right in saying that the thesis of *Hiero* is of course in agreement also with Xenophon's own *Oeconomicus*, namely, with what Ischomachus says there: the tyrant lives in hell. And what Hiero says about the tyrant's life is exactly: I live in hell. But unfortunately he doesn't live as much in hell as he claims to. You stated very well that his condemnation of tyranny is an action to prevent Simonides from being too eager to become himself a tyrant—you know, as if someone would say, "I would like to become President of the United States," and President Kennedy would say, "Don't do it." Sure, this could happen. I also found helpful your remark that in the *Memorabilia* the question of leisure is discussed immediately before the question of kingship. That is surely worth considering, and you were very wise by saying what that means is a long question. But that it means something I have no doubt. Your dig at Mr. Marchant was very well deserved. This man believes himself to be much wiser than Xenophon

[i] Strauss responds to a student's paper, read at the beginning of the session. The reading was not recorded.

simply because he lived in the twentieth century,[1] and that is not true. A man can live in the twentieth century and be infinitely more foolish than someone who lived two or three thousand years ago. Some people simply forget this obvious verity. Good. So I thank you. Did you find the passage in the meantime?

Student: 10.4, at the end.

LS: But what has this to do with the question raised by Mr. ___?

Student: He wanted to translate *tetagmenoi* [as] "centuries."

LS: It comes from the verb *tassō*, to appoint, to set up, and sometimes is a military term. But nevertheless, I don't see how . . .

Student: Well, it would be a matter that these men are those assigned.

LS: "If they were appointed to watch these, to watch over them, then they would know that they are benefited by the mercenaries in this respect too." Well, it is not important enough to dwell on. We may perhaps bring it up in a later occasion.

Now let us first take up the dialogue as a whole. It consists, as Mr. ___ has seen, obviously of two parts. The first part is the first seven chapters, and the last, chapters 8 to 11. First part: the badness of tyranny, the tyrant speaking; second, the improvement of tyranny, the poet Simonides speaking. Now the badness of tyranny is the first theme, and this is discussed, however—and this is crucial—from the point of view of the tyrant, not from the point of view of the *polis*. The tyrannical life is bad for the tyrant, and not for his virtue but for his simple convenience and pleasure. So in the first place, the primacy of the individual: he is not seen as a member of the *polis*, but as an a[political] or transpolitical individual. There is no identity of the particular good and the common good; in other words, the distinction between the citizen and the man—this point which goes through classical political thought as a whole is here the first premise. But the specific thing is that the tyrant's life is viewed from the point of view of pleasure and not from any other. We have seen the issue of pleasure in the *Memorabilia* in the section on the good, in 3.8, where Aristippus, the famous hedonist, plays a certain role.

Now let us consider the very beginning, the conversational situation. "The poet Simonides came once upon a time to Hiero the tyrant."[ii] "Once upon a time": that is of course a fairy tale aspect, naturally, but also he didn't live with Hiero, he visited him once. As he says later on, people don't like to stay long with tyrants. They get nice presents, but the tyrant might take them away; and therefore the sooner you get away with your booty the better. "After both had found leisure, Simonides said . . . " So both were busy before. Well, he arrived by airplane, and he had to refresh himself and shave, and whatever it may be, but it is also possible that they had business with each other. You know, there are later references to what tyrants buy from wise men; maybe a poem which Simonides had to write in his honor. "Simonides said": Simonides begins the

[ii] The class uses the Loeb translation. Xenophon, *Hiero*, trans. E. C. Marchant, in *Xenophon: Scripta Minora*, trans. E. C. Marchant (Loeb Classical Library) (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925). Strauss translates many passages freely throughout.

conversation, "Would you be willing, Hiero, to explain to me what you are likely to know better than I?" "And what kind of things are these," said Hiero, "which I could know better than you who are such a wise *hombre*?" *Man*, male man. So in other words, really what could a poor tyrant know what such a wise man wouldn't know? And then he gives him an example: "I know that you have been a private man and are now a tyrant." One can even say: "You were born a private man." Now of course no one is born a tyrant, that's clear. So for some time even the most perfect tyrant has to be a non-tyrant: "It is therefore to be expected having experienced both conditions that you know to a higher degree than I in which way the life of the tyrant and the life of the private man differ with regard to pleasures and pains of human beings"—not merely of *hombres*, just plain human beings. You see, he answers the question well: I was never a tyrant; how can I know how a tyrannical life looks like with regard to pleasure and pain? Only experience can tell us. This is of course a swindle,[2] [that] the wise man cannot know the life of a tyrant without ever having been a tyrant.

Now, says Hiero: "Why do you too not, since you are still a private man [no one can tell whether such a wise man will not become a tyrant later on—LS], do you not remind me of the things [namely, the pleasures and pains—LS] in private life. In this way I think I would be best able to make manifest to you the difference in both ways of life." So that's important. Simonides could become a tyrant, naturally, because he is a wise man, a man able to do all kinds of things which non-wise men cannot do. More simply stated: he is a tyrant who has the knowledge required for tyranny, not the actual exercise of tyrannical rule; that is secondary. The famous thesis of the *Memorabilia*: Kingship is primarily the knowledge, not the actual exercise. "And thereupon Simonides said, 'I seem to have observed regarding private men,'" you know, *he* is not a private man. He sees those worms crawling there, looking down, brought out in the Greek by [*idiōtēs*]. "I seem to observe these private men being pleased and annoyed through the eyes by sights, through the ears by sounds, through the nose by smells, and through the mouth by food and drink, and the sexual things through what we all know." You see how delicate he is. "As for hots and colds, and hard and soft, and light and heavy we seem to distinguish them by the whole body, and on the basis of such distinction, to be pleased or pained by them. But of good and bad things we seem to enjoy." You see now he makes gradually a transition from these private men, these worms which he has observed from his heights, to "we." So he himself is a private man. He admits it after all that he is just a private man. "The good and bad things we seem to enjoy through the soul itself, but also sometimes in common through the soul and through the body. And as for sleep, I seem to observe we enjoy it, but in what manner and through what and when, this I believe I rather ignore somehow, and this after all is not surprising if the things in waking supply us with more evident, clear, perceptions than the things in sleep."[iii]

Now let us look at that for one moment. The key point I repeat: He who possesses the tyrannical art is a tyrant. That is the key point. You see here he recounts all pleasures and pains, and he makes a distinction simply by looking at the very organs of sensing, and hence feeling, eyes, ears and so on. But there is one distinction here. You see he uses the terms "the good and bad things." The good and bad things are also pleasant. But they are a subdivision of the pleasant. Is this clear? You remember the question of good we had in *Memorabilia* 3.8? These are all pleasures and pains, and one subdivision is good and bad. Yes? One subdivision. The other things are not as such good and bad, to see the sights, and sounds, and smells. But the good and bad things are

[iii] The passages in quotations are either translations or paraphrases made by Strauss from *Hiero* 1.

fundamentally different. And we will see the division of the argument is roughly this: Book 1, the pleasures unqualified, i.e., which are not good or bad as such; chapters 2 to 6, the good or bad things. And then chapter 7 is something else which is not mentioned here at all, and that is honor. And honor is that which we would have to call the beautiful or noble in contradistinction to the good. So we have a perfectly clear distinction: the pleasant things, the good things, and the noble things, but[3] with the understanding that the good things and noble things are modifications of the pleasant. The pleasant character is somewhat complicated there. There is no mention or even allusion to honor here at all.

Hiero is perfectly satisfied with this enumeration, as you see from the sequel. There is no difference regarding the kinds of pleasure between the tyrant and the private man. In other words, there is not, say, a sixth sense which the tyrant has and therefore special pleasures and pains which an ordinary man with his five senses cannot have. So there is perfect agreement. But Simonides stirs up trouble and says: But there is a difference regarding quantity; you have much more pleasures and much less pain from these sights, sounds, smells and so on. Hiero, however, denies this.

Student: [. . .]

LS: But he cannot possibly assert that there is a sixth sense which only tyrants have.

Student: [. . .]

LS: Because he is not a complete fool. I can also give you a more specific reason. If honor is really the key question, which he doesn't wish to bring up for some reason, then he is of course perfectly satisfied, because Simonides hasn't said a word about honor. That is a low reason for being satisfied. The more simple and obvious reason is because the enumeration is complete. What else can you have? He has given all sensible pleasures, and the nonsensible pleasures are all covered by the term "good," the good.

Student: [. . .]

LS: But we have to discuss here only what kinds of pleasure.

Student: What I have in mind is, doesn't Hiero have some reason for asserting superiority to ordinary human beings which is so strong—

LS: But apparently not. Apparently that isn't clear; and the reason, which can only be inferred, is because he has not the slightest intention to show off[4] in a private conversation with Simonides. His interest, rather, is different: to keep Simonides satisfied with his private station. You know, Simonides is such a clever fellow [and] can do all kinds of things. He may not wish to become a tyrant himself, but he may wish to get one of his special friends to take care of Hiero—to take him for a ride, as they say—and then he will become the tyrant of Syracuse, and Simonides would be in a wonderful position, his best friend and admirer tyrant. What better fate could you

wish? It is much better than to be a favorite of the Rockefeller Foundation,[iv] because they change. You know that. One must think in practical terms about the matters, otherwise one does not understand. Good.

So Hiero denies tyrants have more pleasures and less pains, but this is not credible to Simonides because everyone knows tyrants have of course a much more pleasant life than private men have. And then Hiero gives an explanation why even men like Simonides are mistaken about it. Will you read that? Paragraph 10.

Reader:
"For this reason by the gods,"[v] said Hiero, "that they speculate on the subject without experience of both estates. But I will try to show you that I am speaking the truth, beginning with the sense of sight. That was your first point, if I am not mistaken." (1.10)

LS: Let us stop here. So in other words, it is clear Simonides must be mistaken about tyrannical life and its pleasures because he has never been a tyrant, which is of course a fallacious argument. But at first glance it makes sense: How can you judge of a life you have never experienced? That you can have dug deep enough to the roots of the matter so that you can say something about all kinds of life, this is a thing of which Hiero is apparently not aware, or at least not sufficiently aware. Good. Only the actual tyrant can know how the tyrannical life is. Now the actual tyrant tells you how the tyrannical life is: It is terrible. You get it straight from the horse's mouth. That is the most convincing condemnation of tyranny imaginable—that is the idea behind this book, much more convincing according to this view than what you get in the ninth book of the *Republic* or in Aristotle's *Politics*, because there someone else who never was a tyrant talks about the tyrannical life. But that is a fallacy, that is a fallacy of simple, not empiricism, but of an absolutization of *emperika*: that you must have experienced something in order to know it. That is not simply true, because you can perhaps have an experience of the rudiments of it and by thinking about these rudiments you know also the full-blown thing.

Now then they discuss the various sensual pleasures: sights, sounds, food and drink, smells, and sex. The central subject is food and drink in this discussion, and this is the only part where we have a genuine dialogue between Simonides and Hiero. Simonides is genuinely interested in the food question. He seems to like the pleasures of the table. He could always have these magnificent steaks and whatever it may be which a tyrant can eat. Well, it was not easy to have steaks every day as it is now, of course. He seems to be interested in these pleasures of the table more than any other. And this is the part where Hiero truly goes out of his way to show to Simonides: You are mistaken if you think that we eat better than you private men. He goes out of his way, and the proof of it is that after they have already finished it—let us read paragraph 24.

Reader:
"Well, I certainly think that those costly unguents with which you anoint your bodies afford more satisfaction to those who are near you than to yourselves, just as the man who has eaten rank food is less conscious of the disagreeable smell than those who come near him." (1.24)

[iv] The Rockefeller Foundation was established 1913 by John D. Rockefeller, Sr. and his son, John D. Rockefeller, Jr. Its mission is to promote "the well-being of humanity throughout the world."
[v] In original: "of course" (rather than "by the god")

LS: You see here the subject is smells, where Simonides admits without any difficulty that there is no superiority of tyrants regarding smells because if they perfume themselves, the others are as pleased by the smell as the tyrant. It is obvious. Good. But then what does Hiero say?

Reader:
"Quite so, and we may add that he who has all sorts of food at all times has no stomach for any sort. Offer a man a dish that he seldom tastes, and he eats a bellyful with gusto." (1.25)

LS: You see, Hiero returns to the question of food, which had been settled before. So much is he concerned with that, not because he is such an eager eater, but because he has the impression that Simonides is so envious of tyrants because of their tables. And now the last subject is sex, paragraph 26 to the end of the chapter. And let us read the first paragraph.

Reader:
"It seems," remarked Simonides, "as if the satisfaction of the carnal appetites were the only motive that produces in you the craving for despotism."

LS: "For tyranny."

Reader:
"For in this matter you are free to enjoy the fairest that meets your eye." (1.26)

LS: You see the point. Everything has been said regarding all other sensual pleasures: the tyrants are not better off than private men, so we can forget that. There is agreement there. But one subject remains: sex. Here tyrants seem manifestly to be superior. And how important that is appears from the fact that in this connection, paragraph 31, Simonides mentions a personal name, the name of Dailochus, the favorite of Hiero. It goes without saying that this is a homosexual relation, which was not viewed by the Greeks as it is viewed by us. But here is where Hiero's interests lie as far as sensual pleasures are concerned—not that he is not interested in eating well, but this is trivial. The serious thing is homosexual relations, and that comes out later on as the chief, the only thing where Hiero is genuinely dissatisfied with tyranny is his love life, because he never knows: Do they love him, or do they "quote love unquote" the tyrant? In other words, they do not love him genuinely but they are simply impressed by his status. Good. Yes?

Student: There is a fallacy in Hiero's argument about pleasures of the table. Hiero's argument rests on the fact that he can't control himself at the table. If he would simply put off roast swan for two weeks, he would surely be able to enjoy it. And he does have the opportunity for it when he wishes.

LS: Good. But the deeper reason is because Hiero is after all a man of some intelligence, and therefore this is not his major preoccupation in life. I mean, if you look at the general estimation of these things, I think one would say that a man whose chief concern is love would be somehow more respectable than a man whose chief concern is eating.

Student: Simonides accepts this. He does not pounce on the fallacy.

1.

LS: Surely not. Why does he not do that?

Student: He is holding his game in reserve.

LS: Yes, sure, because he is after bigger game because he knows that is not the question, that he can never convince Hiero that the difference between tyrants and private men regarding table is a key issue. That's clear. A reasonably wealthy private man can also have very fantastic dinners; you don't have to be a tyrant for that. But here that's another point: he can lay his hands on every boy or girl. That is the point which seems to be more interesting. Yes? Good. And we have to know of course what does he understand by love, and this is developed in paragraph 34 to 36. Let us read that. But first, Mr.___, you had a question.

Student: Regarding the question of honor. The question of praise is introduced by Simonides.[vi]

LS: Yes, Simonides grants without any difficulty the sounds—well, we would think of music and such things, but he means a much more practical kind of sound: praise. In this respect, Simonides says, spontaneously: You are worse off because you can never trust anyone who praises you that he doesn't merely flatter you. So that is disposed of. Well, that confirms only what I said before: he was silent about honor in the enumeration of the pleasures because he keeps that back for a better occasion. Simonides creates the impression here in the first part that his chief concern is with pleasures of the senses. Look at his enumeration: say, nine points, of which at least six are bodily pleasures. And so this reassures Hiero, in a way. A man concerned chiefly with the pleasures of the senses will never be interested passionately in becoming a tyrant. Look at all tyrants throughout history: even if they indulged these pleasures very much, this was not their peculiarity. What makes a man go after tyranny are not the pleasures of the senses but other things. And so Hiero is pleased: no danger to apprehend from Simonides.

Student: Simonides mentions—I don't know how much stress he puts on it—praise from free men. I don't know how important it is.

LS: Very important, but in the context of the whole chapter it is very unimportant. It is passed by. Food and sex are much more important. And what distinguishes the poet from the tyrant is that the poet is concerned with eating and the tyrant is concerned with sex. This has many deep implications, because there is one obvious difference between these two pleasures: food is a strictly private affair; sex is never private, it is always social. The wise man is concerned with the pleasure which is fundamentally private[5] [*idiōtēs*]; the tyrant is concerned with the pleasure which is fundamentally social. This is the deepest level of the issue, but I do not wish to go into it because we must now go on. Let us read paragraph 35 following about his love pleasures.

Reader:
"For to take from an enemy against his will is, I think, the greatest of all pleasures—" (1.34)

LS: Now listen to that. The most pleasant thing in life is to take something from an enemy against his will. That is a true tyrant. Triumph. Yes?

[vi] As noted by the transcriber.

Reader:
"but favours from a loved one are very pleasant, I fancy, only when he consents."

LS: In other words, there is no fight.[6] There is harmony and that is not quite the right thing. Let us see how he corrects that.

Reader:
"For instance, if he is in sympathy with you—"

LS: No. "[If] he loves you in return."

Reader:
"how pleasant are his looks, how pleasant his questions and his answers, how very pleasant and ravishing are the struggles and bickerings." (1.34-35)

LS: You see, again? "The most pleasant are the fights and conflicts." The lovers fight, but they are lovers fighting. But there are still fights. Without that pepper, no real pleasure for Hiero. Yes. Go on.

Reader:
"But to take advantage of a favorite against his will seems to me more like brigandage than love."

LS: That is very beautiful. "To enjoy boys against their will seems to me to resemble robbery, he said." Now the "he said" of course draws our attention to the immediately preceding word, robbery. Hiero of all people disapproves of robbery. Do you see? A tyrant who is a kind of robber on the grandest scale. He doesn't want to be a robber here. Yes. How does he go on?

Reader:
"Nay, your brigand finds some pleasure in his gain and in hurting his foe—"

LS: Just as he himself had said before. Only he of course is not a robber in his own view.

Reader:
"but to feel pleasure in hurting one whom you love, to be hated for your affection, to disgust him by your touch, surely that is a mortifying experience and pitiful!" (1.36)

LS: Yes. The key point is the element of victory and battle must enter love in order to be truly pleasant. That is Hiero's view of love. So this much about the pleasure section. In chapter 2 we come to the good and bad things. At the very beginning, Simonides makes it perfectly clear that this whole issue hitherto discussed, namely, bodily pleasures, is irrelevant among serious people. Read the beginning of chapter 2.

Reader:
To this Simonides replied: "Well, the points that you raise seem to me mere trifles."

LS: Not the points you raise. "These *things* discussed are trivial."

Reader:
"For I notice that many respected men willingly go short in the matter of meat and drink and delicacies, and deliberately abstain from sexual indulgence." (2.1)

LS: You see, so men,[7] real *hombres* are not interested in this kind of thing. Yes?

Reader:
"But I will show you where you have a great advantage over private citizens. Your objects are vast, your attainment swift: you have luxuries in abundance: you own horses unequalled in excellence, arms unmatched in beauty, superb jewelry for women, stately houses full of costly furniture: moreover you have servants many in number and excellent in accomplishments and you are rich in power to harm enemies and reward friends." (2.2)

LS: "And to help friends." Yes. This is the issue. Now these are of course the good or bad things as distinguished from the merely pleasant and painful things. Now what is the common formula for that? What are the good things? If we try to find the most comprehensive formula for what he mentions.

Student: External goods.

Another Student: Luxuries.

LS: Not quite. That he has vast objects, as he translates it, that is not external. I believe we can say actions as distinguished [into] pleasures, passion, and possessions—possessions, of course, but possession, splendid possessions, but still possessions. These are the key points. Now it becomes graver: no one can deny that a tyrant is superior to a private man regarding the capacity to act on a grand scale and the possessions, so if Simonides should be attracted by that rather than by the bodily pleasures he would be really a serious enemy to Hiero. So the situation becomes grave.

Now Hiero answers here much longer than before. And he does no longer say: You are mistaken, Simonides because you have never been a tyrant, you have never had the experience of tyranny. He [8]no longer say[s] that. Read the answer.

Reader:
To this Hiero answered: "Well, Simonides, that the multitude should be deceived by tyranny surprises me not at all, since the mob seems to guess wholly by appearances that one man is happy, another miserable. Tyranny[vii] flaunts its seeming precious treasures outspread before the gaze of the world: but its troubles it keeps concealed in the heart of the tyrant—" (2.3-4)

LS: "Souls of the tyrants."

[vii] Throughout the translation, "despotism," "despot," and "despotic" are used instead of "tyranny," "tyrant," and "tyrannical."

Reader:
“in the place where human happiness and unhappiness are stored away. That this escapes the observation of the multitude I say, I am not surprised. But what does seem surprising to me is that men like you, whose intelligence is supposed to give you a clearer view of most things than your eyes, should be equally blind to it.” (2.4-5)

LS: You see, he is surprised that a wise man who was never a tyrant should not know how deceptive these splendors of tyranny are, because as wise men they are supposed to have a better view than the view through the eyes. The multitude sees only the external glamour and splendor, and these fools are deceived by it. But you are supposed to look at things with the eyes of the mind, and you should see through that. So, you know, experience is not important; the presence or absence of the eyes of the mind is. Good.

And then he argues on this basis. He does not follow the enumeration of Simonides at the beginning of chapter 2, so that he would say houses, ornaments for women, and what the other items are. He doesn’t do it, because that would be absurd because it would be the same argument in all these cases he brings in. He gives a different order, and above all, he introduces subjects to which Simonides had not spoken at all, and in the following order: the first subject is peace and war, and this is discussed while leaving it open whether peace is good or war is bad. That’s very interesting. Of course that corresponds to the tyrannical mind, who naturally regards war as good, contrary to the ordinary view that peace is good. And then he shows that the tyrant, especially if war is something good, the tyrant has much less fun from war than the private citizen. That’s the key argument, paragraph 15.

Reader:
“For, you know, when states—”

LS: “Cities.”

Reader:
“cities defeat their foes in a battle, words fail one to describe the joy they feel in the rout of the enemy—” (2.15)

LS: Let us count: “in the rout of the enemy.”

Reader:
“in the pursuit, in the slaughter of the enemy. What transports of triumphant pride! What a halo of glory about them! What comfort to think that they have exalted their city! Everyone is crying—” (2.15-16)

LS: Look, the central thing is how they enjoy killing the enemy and how they are proud of the deed, meaning the killing. This is the true pleasure of war: killing. And a man in a citizen army can enjoy that fully. But can the tyrant enjoy it, he says? Answer: No, because in his war, namely, his war with his subjects, he must conceal his pleasure. He must say: I am so sorry that I had to shoot these fellows. You know? This is very beautifully developed, how they go around,

the citizens, and say they killed more than they had in fact killed, so grand does this great victory seem to them. Very beautiful. Of course there is something which he disregards, and that is that a tyrant might wage war against a foreign enemy, and then of course he could enjoy the deed as well as anybody else. This he does not bring in because it would qualify his condemnation of tyranny.

Now the next subject is friendship, chapter 3. Now of friendship it is explicitly said that is a good thing. It is a good thing, and the tyrant is deprived of it. That is the famous story of the solitude in which these hated individuals find themselves. Unfortunately we cannot read the whole chapter. Let us only read paragraph 3.

Reader:
"Even cities[viii] are not blind—" (3.3)

LS: Even cities, who should not be concerned at all with a private relation [such] as friendship among individuals.

Reader:
"to the fact that friendship is a very great blessing, and very delightful to men. At any rate, many cities have a law that adulterers only may be put to death with impunity, obviously for this reason, because they believe them to be destroyers of the wife's friendship with her husband—" (3.3)

LS: Do you understand that? I mean, the proof that he gives that the cities see that friendship is a great good; and because they regard it as a great good they regard the killing of an adulterer, I suppose caught red-handed, as not a punishable action. It comes out clearly in the Greek because the same word is used: "they hold that one may kill the adulterers with impunity because they hold that adulterers are the destroyers of friendship between husband and wife." It is a legal presumption, because it is theoretically possible that the destroyer of the friendship may in a given case the bad woman, bad wife, obviously. But the legislator starts from the premise that the fault is with the adulterer, not with the wife. This is a brief indication of the whole problem of law: the problem of legal presumption. Is this point clear? Because it is of great importance regarding the question of law that law must [always] make[9] legal presumptions[10] which are of very dubious theoretical validity. Think of the presumption that one is presumed to be innocent until he is proven guilty. The guilt may be absolutely obvious. Think of what is happening to the Syndicate,[ix] and yet no one can act on that.

Student: [. . .]

LS: But that is not the point. The law presumes that the wives are absolutely defenseless. That has very great practical importance, you know, regarding the status of the children, the inheritance and all this kind of thing. Very grave. This is alluded to here only in passing. The main point which he makes in the sequel however is that friendship is good for the man who is

[viii] In original: "states"
[ix] A loosely-connected group of criminal organizations in America, dubbed the National Crime Syndicate by the press in the 1930s and 1940s, and the subject of television programs in the 1950s.

beloved, not for the lover. In Greek it is the same word, loving, friendship,[11] *philia*. In other words, Hiero looks at it from a very practical point of view. It is very practical to be beloved. It helps you, it is conducive to your benefit. He does not speak of the friendship as an act toward others. We come to the subject of law again in paragraph 9 of the same chapter.

Reader:
"Seeing, then, that they are so hated by those who are bound by natural ties and constrained by law to love them most, how are we to suppose that they are loved by any other being?" (3.9)

LS: Literally: "those who are born to love one another by nature and in addition compelled by the law to love one another." There is a harmony between nature and law, but this harmony is brought about by compulsion. Children love their parents by nature, for example. And in addition, the law compels them to love their parents. This is a parallel to the passage in the *Oeconomicus*, chapter 7, paragraphs 29 to 30, where Ischomachus speaks of nature doing something, and the law praises in addition what nature prompts men to do. Praising and compelling. A much harsher view of law here, much harsher. In other words, there is a kind of analysis of the law transmitted through the *Hiero* only in small bits.

Now the next subject is confidence, trust. What does he say about trust? We had peace and war, friendship, and now trust. Well, in a word, trust is a condition of everything else, including friendship. It is not a good in itself, something pleasant in itself, as friendship is. And now the atrocious next step, the fatherland or the city. Let us read that, chapter 4, paragraph 3.

Reader:
"Again, to all other men their fatherland is very precious."

LS: Literally: "is of very great worth," which can also mean almost monetary worth. Go on.

Reader:
"For citizens ward one another without pay from their slaves and from evildoers, to the end that none of the citizens may perish by a violent death." (4.3)

LS: How Hobbean. Yes?

Reader:
"They have gone so far in measures of precaution that many have made a law whereby even the companion of the blood-guilty is deemed impure; and so—thanks to the fatherland—every citizen lives in security. But for tyrants—" (4.4-5)

LS: And so on. Of course, they lack that. No one protects them against violent death. But the key point is that the fatherland, as distinguished from friendship, is also regarded as a means, just as trust.

And then in turn in the same chapter, paragraph 6 following to the end of the chapter, to the possessions, that subject which Simonides had mentioned. And this is also the central passage of

the whole central part of the *Hiero*, chapters 2 to 6. Well, we cannot read this whole thing. Let us read only paragraph 8 in this chapter.

Reader:
"And, moreover, you will find that even poverty is rarer among private citizens than among tyrants. For much and little are to be measured not by number, but in relation to the owner's needs; so that what is more than enough is much, and what is less than enough is little. Therefore, the tyrant with his abundance of wealth has less to meet his necessary expenses than the private citizen. For while private citizens can cut down the daily expenditure as they please, tyrants cannot, since the largest items in their expenses and the most essential are the sums they spend on the life-guards, and to curtail any of these means ruin." (4.8-9)

LS: The principles of economics, briefly restated. Poverty and wealth cannot be measured in absolute terms of dollars[12] or what have you, but in relation to the need, which we have seen from the *Oeconomicus*. Now we come then to subject number 6, the virtues in the next chapter. Yes?

Student: When you say the central part of the *Hiero* . . .

LS: The center of this part. The center of the whole dialogue is the section on the virtues to which we come now.

Student: Is this Xenophon's breakdown into chapters?

LS: No, we have no right to assume that. We know nothing. You see, for example, in chapter 4 there are three items: trust, fatherland, and possessions. I mean, whether the division into chapters is due to Xenophon or not is unknowable. I would not be surprised if it would go back to Xenophon; I mean, it makes so much sense in many cases: for example, that twenty-one chapters in the *Oeconomicus*, and the central chapter, 11, dealing with Socrates's way of life confronted with Ischomachus's way of life. But we cannot know that. That is very difficult. Even the division into books, for example in the *Republic* or in Thucydides—one doesn't know who made it. It is very plausible that the *Republic* consists of ten books; the division into ten books makes so much sense in all the details, but we have no evidence for that.

Student: But on the other hand, you don't have evidence for its not being so divided.

LS: No. But some people have some kind of pipeline according to which they are sure it cannot be from Plato or from Thucydides. No, I would never build on it. Now this section on the virtues is the true center of the dialogue, and extremely interesting. And I will briefly describe it. He mentions three types of virtue. Let us call this orderliness, and wisdom, which are closely linked together here, and justice. That is the first enumeration. And the second one is courage, wisdom, and justice again. Very strange. Now we must see what that means. Now orderliness, in Greek [*alkimous*] from [*alkimos*], that can switch easily into moderation. In the *Gorgias*, Plato's *Gorgias*, that is very clear. And moderation can switch very easily into continence, continence regarding the sensual pleasures, food, drink, and so on. Now what does he mean by that? It

appears from the sequel that the tyrant cannot possibly use the just, continent, and free-minded people, *eleutheroi,* liberal in the original sense of the term. He cannot use them because he can only use the unjust, the incontinent, and the slavish. That I believe does not need any proof. But if we look at the list now and allow that orderliness switches over in the way described into moderation and then into continence, and he cannot use the just, what about these two types, the courageous and the wise? Can he use them? Now let us assume he was surrounded by the greatest cowards and the greatest fools in the community. What would happen to him? Very simple: he couldn't last for more than one day. So he must use wise and courageous men. Surely these toughs, his bodyguards, can't be cowards, and he must also have advisors who are shrewd. That's important. The distinction between shrewdness, shrewd cleverness in the low sense, and true wisdom is of course not made here. Why does he fear the wise? Lest they devise something, lest they develop a clever trick of one kind or another. And such people he fears. But on the other hand, he needs such people, obviously; otherwise he couldn't survive. Also this is important. In a sense he can use orderly people, and even must use them, on various levels: he must have some order in his finances, but he can also use very elegant well-mannered courtiers, of course. That can also fall into that. You see, there is a certain realistic understanding of the court of a tyrant underlying the seemingly unqualified criticism.

Then there is a point which is most important here, another point. He is afraid of the courageous lest they dare something for the sake of freedom. He is afraid of the wise lest they invent some clever device, and he is afraid of the just lest the multitude desire to be ruled by them. These are three different dangers. For example, the multitude does not wish to be ruled by the courageous. Not every general of notorious bravery is attractive as a ruler to the electorate, as you probably know. General Eisenhower was a special case, but he had never heard a shot fired in anger, as someone said about him.[x] He is not General Patton. But you see the point: the courageous man may be concerned with freedom. The just are desired as rulers. Of the wise he doesn't say anything of this kind: that the wise should be wished as rulers or that the wise should take risks for the sake of freedom. Special case. The wise are somehow in a dubious position and therefore they can conceivably be useful to him. As it is said in the *Memorabilia,* they may be allies of the tyrant. You remember that passage in 3.8 and 9? The wise may be collaborators of the tyrant. Good.

Now the next item, the next point after the virtues, is at the end of this chapter. Patriotism, love of the *polis*. The tyrant must be a bad citizen or bad patriot. Now and what is the next one? And then we come to chapter 6, to pleasures, the subject of the first part, chapter 1. The tyrant has no pleasures. Pleasures are replaced by fear. Now in this connection something very strange takes place. When you go over the whole discussion in the second part, i.e., chapter 2 following, you will see that Hiero addresses Simonides by name very rarely, only when he discusses friendship, when he discusses possessions, when he discusses virtues, and then when he discusses pleasures as here. He does not address Simonides by name when he discusses peace and war, trust, fatherland, and patriotism. Here in the section on pleasures he repeatedly addresses Simonides by name in paragraph 7 to 10, and let us read the context. Hiero wishes to bring home to Simonides how terribly fear-ridden the life of the tyrant is, and Hiero must appeal to Simonides's experience of fear. And that he does here in paragraphs 7 to 8.

[x] This saying about Eisenhower is proverbial and was likely true of his career before December 1942 when he was on the front lines in Tunisia.

Reader:
"If, like me, you are acquainted with war—"

LS: No, "experienced in warlike things."

Reader:
"Simonides, and ever had the enemy battle-line close in front of you, recall what kind of meal you made at the time[xi] and what sort of sleep you slept. I tell you the pains that tyrants suffer are such that you suffered then. Nay, they are still more terrible; for tyrants believe they see enemies not only in front of them but all around them." (6.7-8)

LS: That is clear. In other words, what the citizen experiences only immediately before and in battle, this is the state of mind of the tyrant throughout his life. And so how terrible it is, your own experience proves it. What the experience proves to Simonides, however?

Reader:
To this Simonides made answer: "Excellent words in part, I grant! War is indeed a fearsome thing: nevertheless, Hiero, our way, when we are on active service, is this: we post sentries to guard us, and sup and sleep with a good courage." (6.9)

LS: In other words, war is not as bad as you say. The pleasures of the table with which I, Simonides, am identified are by no means absent from military campaigns. We ate excellently with good appetite in spite of the fear. So what is wrong with the tyrannical life? That is the point. And what does then Hiero say?

Reader:
Then Hiero answered: "No doubt you do, Simonides!"

LS: "By Zeus." He swears.

Reader:
"By Zeus, you do, Simonides! For your sentries have sentries in front of them—the laws,—and so they fear for their own skins and relieve you of fear." (6.10)

LS: You see, in other words, it is in this connection where the question of law becomes the theme. That is the difference. No laws under a tyranny, but laws in nontyrannical governments. And the laws give security, and therefore especially security against fear to the citizens.

Student: Hiero says he gives pay to guards to guard him, like laborers in the harvest. Do you know what laborers in the harvest were like?

LS: No. I suppose they didn't stay on—only for a season. That was not a permanent association like the association of the citizens is.

[xi] In original: "call to mind what sort of food you ate at that time"

Student: Very often today, to avoid paying them they get rid of them, like poisoning them or something.

LS: This I believe wouldn't work in the long run, would it? No, after all, gradually the news spreads. It is not healthy to be a mercenary of Hiero, because men have been seen coming into Syracuse but not leaving it. There are many stories in Thucydides: the fellow connected with king Pausanias of Sparta who sent men to the Persian king in a traitorous connection; and then one fellow who was supposed to be sent made the observation that they all went to Persia but no one came back. And then he opened the letter, and the letter was a clear statement of Pausanias: Of course you kill that guy, as you killed his predecessors. And he naturally did not go but showed this to the authorities in Sparta, and Pausanias was killed, not this poor fellow. I don't believe that this is so important. I think the nonpermanence—that, I would say, is the point. They are there for a season, whereas your fellow citizens are your protectors not merely for a season. Mr. ____?

Student: It seems that in Plato and Aristotle the notion of fear as the motivating force in the regime, of tyranny, is emphasized mainly with respect to the subjects of a tyrant, not so much to the tyrant himself.

LS: It is in the *Republic* very clearly drawn. It is not true, when he describes a tyrant like a private man as being isolated on an island somewhere with his many slaves, full of course of fears.

Student: They thought the difference here was [. . .]

LS: Yes, sure, the emphasis is I think only because he speaks from the inside, whereas in the *Republic* this is said by an observer. That is the only difference. Yes, Mr. ____?

Student: In Rousseau's *Social Contract*, when he refers to the difference between tyrants and despots, he mentions the *Hiero*. It comes up in the context of laws. He made it contingent on whether the tyrant usurps the power regardless of how he rules, whereas the despot simply rules with . . .

LS: But that is not the original distinction. The original distinction is that the tyrant is the illegitimate ruler of a commonwealth, and the despot is the perfectly legitimate ruler of slaves. It is something entirely different. *Despotēs* means "master." Then there came in the Middle Ages a distinction between the tyrant from defective title, a *defectu titulu*, and the tyrant from exercise, *ab exercitu*, meaning this: the latter tyrant, the tyrant from exercise, is a legitimate prince who rules unjustly, and the other one is not even a legitimate ruler, who lacks the title. The general view, if I remember well, is that the man who lacks a title can of course be killed by anyone, because it is just; he is simply a criminal. The other is a complicated question because his title is good, he only misused it; and the question is how to proceed. Probably the magistrates of the realm must assemble and condemn him for his injustice. I suppose in the eighteenth century the term despotism came to be applied to any form of absolute monarchy, whereas it was traditionally understood that absolute monarchy may be perfectly legitimate. In the eighteenth century the view came to the fore that no absolute monarchy can ever be legitimate; and I think

Locke played a very great role in that, but Locke did not yet use that terminology. But it became so for example in Montesquieu: despotism is absolute monarchy, where he claims somewhat sophistically that the ancient monarchy of France is not a despotism but a kingship, because it is limited. To some extent of course it is true, because the feudal principle of honor is characteristic of kingship, whereas the principle of despotism is fear. And fear: he meant there of course fear alone of the subjects; he was not interested in the fear of the despot. The disgraceful thing is only that classical scholars, who should know a bit more, translate *tyrannos* by despot, especially Marchant, and that is very bad.

Student: The other thing I was curious about is this. You mention the Middle Ages distinction, but is there a distinction as early as Xenophon between tyrant and despot?

LS: I told you. Despotism is something perfectly legitimate, because slavery was taken to be legitimate.

Student: But you wouldn't have a *polis* of one man over slaves, would you?

LS: Of course not. Despot means master of slaves and is, so to say, the economic rule, part of economic rule, but there cannot be strictly speaking a despot of a political community. If he rules his community as a master rules slaves, then he is a tyrant and not a despot. While this is surely an interesting question in itself, and why this enlargement of this term despotism so that it acquires this political meaning, namely, a kind of political rule, absolute monarchy, that is a question to which I do not have a ready answer but I think it could be found. I would probably start with Montesquieu, where it is clearly in the front, and see. I think it is in no way there in Locke. So I suppose it is somewhere in between where is must have taken place. This formula used today, oriental despotism, that is Montesquieu.

Student: Would you say Rousseau just didn't know what he was talking about when he says he learned this from Xenophon?

LS: No. What precisely? It is in a footnote somewhere?

Student: It is as the end of his tenth chapter of book 3 of the [*Social*] *Contract.*

LS: What does he precisely say?

Student: He says: "I learned in Xenophon the Greeks make a distinction, whereas Aristotle blurred it, between tyrant and despot. The tyrant usurps the authority and it didn't matter how he ruled—"

LS: I would say Rousseau was much too intelligent a man and thoughtful [a] man that one can easily accuse him of a blunder. Perhaps it has something to do with what I am going to say.

Now in the last section here of this part, chapter 6, paragraph 12 to 16, he takes up the subject helping friends and hurting enemies, a subject which Simonides had mentioned among the great benefits of tyrants. And of course he tries to show that the tyrant cannot help his friends and

cannot hurt his enemies. That is clear. Now we must consider somewhat more quickly, unfortunately.

In chapter 7, the third part begins, and that is the part dealing with honor. Very briefly it is this. Well, Simonides says, what we have discussed hitherto is all chicken feed. That is not why people are becoming interested in tyranny, possessions and this kind of thing. But *the* thing is honor, superiority, and recognized superiority by everybody else. And Hiero's reply is also clear. That is not a good reason for becoming a tyrant because we know that these honors are inspired by fear and therefore not genuine honors. Let us read only a few points. Let us read paragraph 3.

Reader:
"For indeed it seems to me, Hiero, that in this man differs from other animals—" (7.3)

LS: But "man" here in the sense of a male man—let us say *hombre*. An *hombre* differs from the other animals in the following way.

Student: I mean this craving for honor.

LS: Obviously no dog, horse, chicken strives for honor, although Xenophon in his writing on horses asserts that a stallion shows off. Dog owners also say the dogs are very sensitive to honor, praise, flattery. Xenophon doesn't believe that, apparently. Yes?

Reader:
"In meat and drink and sleep and love[xii] all creatures alike seem to take pleasure; but love of honour is rooted neither in the brute beasts nor in every human being." (7.3)

LS: "Not in all human beings."

Reader:
"But they in whom is implanted a passion for honor and praise—"

LS: *Eros*, in Greek.

Reader:
"these are they who differ most from the beasts of the field, these are accounted men and not mere human beings." (7.3)

LS: "No longer human beings." For human beings, that is nothing. Everyone is a human being. But an *hombre*, that is something special. And the specific difference is concern with honor. Yes? Next paragraph.

Reader:
"And so, in my opinion, you have good reason for bearing all those burdens that tyranny lays on you, in that you are honoured above all other men. For no human joy seems to be more nearly akin to that of heaven—'"

[xii] In original: "sex"

LS: That is not correct. “Seems to be closer to the divine.” Not to the pleasures which the gods have. Simply “to the divine.”

Reader:
“than the gladness which attends upon honours.” (7.4)

LS: Yes. Hiero’s reply is, well—that seems also to be the concern of Simonides, of course. Now if a man loves honor to that extent, he doesn’t mind these toils and troubles of tyrannical life. Honor is something much greater. And needless to say, he is not deterred by the fact that you can become a tyrant only through crime, and must commit one crime after the other. That is nothing. The real thing is honor.

Student: “Seems to be,” he says.

LS: That’s true. But “seems”—this is marvelous needlework, because “seems” means also “is thought to be,” and can of course also be true. Now what is the conclusion then if the tyrants don’t have genuine honor? What is the conclusion? Let us read paragraph 11.

Reader:
When Simonides had listened to all this—

LS: Yes, that is important. “After Simonides had listened to all of this.” This is the conclusion from the whole previous discussion. What does he say?

Reader:
“Pray, how comes it, Hiero, if tyranny is a thing so vile, and this is your verdict, that you do not rid yourself of so great an evil, and that none other, for that matter, who has once acquired it, ever yet surrendered tyrannical power?” (7.11)

LS: That is a good question, isn’t it? And it is so easy to get rid of it, because he had indicated before when [he] makes a trip into another city, he can just stay in that other city and that’s it. Good. So it’s easy to get rid of a tyranny. But what does Hiero reply?

Reader:
“Simonides,” said he, “this is the crowning misery of tyrannical power, that it cannot even be got rid of. For how could any tyrant ever find means to repay in full all whom he has robbed, or himself serve all the terms of imprisonment that he has inflicted? Or how could he forfeit a life for every man whom he has put to death? Ah, Simonides,” he cried, “if it profits any man to hang himself, know what my finding is: a tyrant has most to gain by it, since he alone can neither keep or lay down his troubles with profit.” (7.12-13)

LS: Now what do you say about this argument? He cannot abandon his tyranny because he cannot compensate for the innumerable crimes he has committed. What does he do instead? He adds to them. That is really a tough argument, a very political argument. Good.

Student: What does "with profit" mean here? 1:

LS: Not profitable to him. It is not profitable to him to live, to be a tyrant and to abandon his tyranny. Now in other words, both ways of life are impossible, and since there is no third way of life, only death—and for practical purposes, that means suicide. And he chooses one particular brand of suicide: hanging himself, probably. That is a long question, because he thought that is the easiest way. People have many theories about what is the best way of suicide. Xenophon discusses it somewhere[xiii] and says those who worry about these matters say that the way in which Socrates died, namely, by hemlock, was the easiest. In other words, the implication is a reasonable man would not worry about that, but I suppose Hiero had given it some passing thought. But the main point, to repeat, is this: that his reason for not abandoning tyranny is obviously not a true reason.

Student: Doesn't that argument makes sense to people in these positions, that once they have this past they can really never let up the tightness of their rule without endangering themselves? The process of transition—

LS: But he said before that he can make a trip to another city and simply disappear. There are quite a few tyrants who survived. He presents it as if all tyrants were killed, which isn't true. Perhaps most tyrants who stayed in power were killed, but surely not those tyrants who were deposed in their absence. That could be done. Especially this reason is of course preposterous. If he had said what you said, that it is not safe for him, we could consider it, but he says he could not compensate for the unjust actions—that is, he could not become a just man in a way. This is, I think, clearly hypocritical. Now the question we come across here is this. Well, Simonides could have said, "Yes, why not?" and then taken up the question with him: "Well, I would advise against hanging, but I have here a nice poison which kills painlessly," or something of this kind. The most extraordinary thing, however, is this. He advises him now in the sequel how to become happy as a tyrant. And this is the extraordinary thing, namely, you have committed innumerable murders and other things, [and] in spite of that you can become a perfectly happy man, admired, justly, by everyone. Now if you consider also the question of how he came to power—a man can come to power by murder and everything else, and yet be regarded as a blessing by his subjects—that is the fantastic teaching of this dialogue. [It is] of course ironical, and this also explains why Machiavelli quotes it more than any other classical treatise. That is the implication, because this is absolutely forgotten in the sequel, but we shouldn't forget it. Mr. Marchant may forget it, but we have no right to do so.

In the sequel he gives a diagnosis. As a sensible physician, he says: "What is wrong with you? what is the root of your troubles?" Very simple: You want to be loved by human beings. When the word "human beings" occurs you must remember the distinction between human beings and *hombres*. You want to be loved by these worms, so to speak; that's all you want. That's easy, especially for a ruler. People appreciate any kindness by a man in high position much more than the same kindness done to them by a man of their own status. That is as true today as it was thousands of years ago. Read any of these passages here. How does he say it? "Seeing someone he should address him in a friendly manner, of a ruler and a private man, whose address will be more appreciated?" If you take a humble example, if the president of the University of Chicago

[xiii] See Xenophon, *Apology*, 7, 32; *Anab.* 2.6.29.

would greet you on the street, and on the other hand some janitor, which is more respected by the ordinary people? Of course the president. Is it not clear? Now let us take the extreme: a tyrant and a non-tyrant. Obvious. So let us read paragraph 5.

Reader:
"Nay, to my way of thinking, even the gods cause a peculiar honour and favour to dance attendance on a great ruler. For not only does rule add dignity of presence to a man, but we find more pleasure in the sight of that man when he is a ruler than when he is a mere citizen—" (7.5)

LS: Each of us must examine himself how he is in this respect. And that is crucial. I know quite a few people who really feel that way, but there are also human beings who do not feel that way. But this is an important question. Now next paragraph.

Reader:
"And favourites—"

LS: "Favorites." You know what that means here. Yes?

Reader:
"mark you, who were the subject of your bitterest complaint against tyranny—"

LS: His bitterest complaint was not the criminality of the tyrant and the other disgraceful features, but this very limited and trivial subject, admittedly trivial subject: his love affairs. So in other words, Hiero's illness is not so great that he must take poison. This can be handled judiciously by a wise man like Simonides with ease. Yes?

Reader:
"are not offended by old age in a ruler, and take no account of ugliness in the patron with whom they happen to be associated." (8.6)

LS: Surely, we know that. But here in passage 8, then Hiero—the only time in the dialogue where he interrupts immediately. Why? Because now he is satisfied. Simonides doesn't wish him ill. Simonides is a friendly physician and therefore he can speak frankly, and the frank answer is: "But you forget, Simonides, that while we tyrants have to do lots of things by which men become beloved—handouts of various kinds—we also have to do many things by virtue of which men become hated. We have to impose taxes and what not." That is a serious question, and Simonides has a very good answer to that in the next chapter, an answer readily adopted by Machiavelli. Now what is that? Simple: You yourself do the things which make you beloved. You give the handouts, and as for the unpleasant things, let them be done by underlings, and in a pinch you can say: Well, I didn't know he did that. As simple as that. And in other things, prizes: make a contest for everything and you hand out the prizes—how much will you be loved.

Student: It reminds of Haille Selassie,[xiv] who never demotes anyone but promotes everyone no matter where he goes.

[xiv] The Emperor of Ethiopia from 1930-1974.

LS: But what happens to those who are to be demoted?

Student: They are promoted.

LS: But still that leads to inefficiency, I would say. There must be some demoted. I thought they would be killed by someone else, and the chief mourner will be Haille Selassie. That is what Machiavelli would recommend.

Student: [An anecdote concerning Mussolini is volunteered, unclear in the details.][xv]

LS: He claimed to be very sorry about that. Yes, sure. The most beautiful story about this subject you find in Machiavelli's *Prince*. Borgia wanted to have order in the Romagna, where everything was in the worst disorder, and then he found a kind of Himmler—I forget his name[xvi]—and sent him there. And he established order within a week. He hanged, drew, and quartered, and so; everyone was frightened. And then Cesare thought: He has gone too far. And so one day when the citizens of the city woke up in the morning they found in the marketplace that Himmler cut into four parts. And so everyone was pleased, naturally, by this benevolent government. Some of them also got a still greater fear. This is the most beautiful story I have read on this subject. Yes, prizes are especially important. Now let us see paragraph 5 in chapter 9.

Reader:
"Why, then, should not all other public affairs be managed on this principle? For all communities are divided into parts—'tribes,' 'wards,' 'unions,' as the case may be—and every one of these parts is subject to its appointed ruler. If, then, the analogy of the choruses were followed and prizes were offered to these parts for excellence of equipment, good discipline, horsemanship, courage in the field and justice in business, the natural outcome would be competition, and consequently an earnest endeavor to improve in all these respects too." (9.5-6)

LS: Yes. Now this is important because it shows for what are the most interesting prizes given. What are the most interesting objects of prizes? Weapons, discipline, horsemanship, courage in *war*—of course civic courage is highly undesirable—and also justice in contractual relations, because genuine justice would be impossible naturally. In other words, you need a kind of diluted virtue. These are the virtues which subjects of tyrants may have, but more than that would already be a danger to the tyrant. Now this then is applied also, this great force, to farming. Prizes, prizes all around. This is developed in paragraphs 7 and 8. And then in paragraph 9, which we read, it is also applied to the humbler economic pursuits.

Reader:
"If commerce also brings gain to a city—"

LS: You see, "if." That is still a reminder of the gentleman's point of view.

Reader:

[xv] As noted by the original transcriber.
[xvi] Remirro de Orco, in chapter 7 of *The Prince*.

"the award of honours for diligence in business would attract a larger number to a commercial career. And were it made clear that the discovery of some way of raising revenue without hurting anyone will also be rewarded, this field of research too would not be unoccupied." (9.9)

LS: This invention of some revenue—and this enlarged later on in paragraph 10 to other inventions—this is one of the very rare cases in classical political philosophy where invention is regarded as something which should be encouraged. Generally speaking, of course they did not wish to encourage invention, innovation, because innovation on the technical or technological plane can very well have political effects, can lead to political instability—a theme discussed at length by Aristotle in the second book of the *Politics* in the section on Hippodamus. Hippodamus, a very great fool, had recommended inventions: one must give prizes and rewards to inventors. And Aristotle says: What a dangerous proposal, because that is bound to have political effects. Technological change leads to social change, [which] leads to political change, and what wise legislator wishes to have political change, the destruction of his work? Great theme. But Hiero is perfectly satisfied, and Hiero has only one question. That is the last question, chapter 10.

Reader:
"Well, Simonides," said Hiero, "I think you are right in saying that. But what about the mercenaries? Can you tell me how to employ them without incurring unpopularity? Or do you say that a ruler, once he becomes popular, will have no further need of a bodyguard?" (10.1)

LS: "By Zeus, he will need them, of course." Don't be such a fool to think that you will ever become so popular that you will not need protection. Still, the question of Hiero was a relatively sensible question. What about these mercenaries who cost so much money and make me so unpopular? Simonides, meaning well to him, says: No, you must not do that; that would be the end of your rule. And then he goes on to say how he can use them, and then he gives a glowing description of how beloved mercenaries can become angels of mercy whom everyone will love—and especially, of course, if they do the real fighting in war so that the citizens are not so much endangered, that will make them relatively popular. The point—we read only one more thing in the first paragraph of chapter 11.

Reader:
"Nor should you hesitate to draw on your private property Hiero for the common good."

LS: That is advice he gives entirely without being solicited by Hiero. You must not sit on your wealth, you must also use it for public purposes.

Reader:
"For in my opinion the sums that a great tyrant spends on the city are more truly necessary expenses than the money he spends on himself." (11.1)

He must be a truly public-spirited man. And one little example: He must not send his own horses, his own private horses to Olympia or to the other races, which was the practice of this particular Hiero, as we happen to know from Pindar. That is foolish of you, he says; you must encourage your citizens to vie for these honors. A tyrant must vie only with other tyrants, with

rulers of other cities. And what is the contest there? He who makes his city the happiest and the grandest, he will be the winner. In other words, you must change your way of life completely. You must become a benefactor of your city, and then you will be perfectly happy. How does he put it? Paragraph 14: Regard the fatherland as your household. That means both ways, of course. That's your private property, the fatherland, but you must also take care of it as you would take care of your own. You must regard the citizens as your companions, meaning you must love them, you must like them. "And you must regard your friends as your children, and your children as your own life or soul. And you must defeat all these by doing well, by benefiting [you must be the supreme benefactor—LS]. For when you overcome your friends by benefiting, then your enemies will not be able to resist you. And when you do all these things, know well then you will have acquired of all the goods among human beings the most resplendent and blessed possession for while being happy you will not be envied."[xvii] Because no one will envy a man who has such an infinite toil as that poor man who gets up at four in the morning and goes to bed at twelve, and works hard the whole day for benefiting other people. By leading the most toilsome life you will stop envy. This is a highly ironical statement, and of course this whole section in the eleventh chapter is all in the Greek form, the optative with *an*, the potential optative, "you would." This is part of a long story: the good tyrant is the object of a wish ("would do"); the unhappy tyrant is an object of experience. Hiero, a man who should know, tells you from his own experience how miserable he is, that life is. Yes, Mr. ___?

Student: Why wouldn't a good tyrant be a king? If Hiero is wise enough to do all these things, why wouldn't he become a king?

LS: If he would be wise enough to do these things—but he never thought of them before, did he?

Student: No. I was thinking of your comment. You said Aristotle says the tyrant can become only half good.

LS: Yes, because of the—

Student: Law.

LS: No, because of the record. If you have committed all kinds of crimes, this is bound to affect you for the rest of your life. That is what Aristotle meant. He can at best be half-wicked, he says; one cannot say that he is half good. Aristotle is very strict.

Student: Theoretically, the conversion could be made.

LS: Yes, sure.

Student: If he followed the advice, he would become no longer tyrant but a king.

LS: You see how well we prepare ourselves for the *Education of Cyrus*? There we get a man who became ruler, and not only of a tiny *polis*, but of the whole world, so to speak—an empire—and without crime, number one; and number two, he did not need a wise man to advise him. He

[xvii] 11.14-15. Strauss's translation.

had the root of the matter in himself. The mere fact that Hiero didn't think of these things by himself is a sign that he does not belong to the top drawer. Mr. ___?

Student: In chapter 5 you spoke of the neutrality of the tyrant to the wise man, so to speak. He opposed the just, because they would want to dispose him, and the free man. You said the wise man was in an ambiguous position: "the wise lest they hatch a plot."

LS: That is too narrow because it only refers to one special kind of thing. It is a tolerable translation because that is what Hiero specifically means, but he uses a broader term: that they might devise something. And he means of course to devise something undesirable, and that is hatching a plot. All right, let us not quarrel about that.

Student: I'm just not sure where the ambiguity comes in.

LS: Simonides devises something in this conversation, doesn't he? This bright idea: the prizes. The unpleasant things: Let them be done by your underlings. And keep your bodyguard. Devising—but he devises something desirable, and this is a great experience for Hiero, that he sees that a wise man like Simonides does not necessarily devise something undesirable even to him, but he is friendly. Now this is of course a special point here. The wise man here is not Socrates, obviously not, but Simonides, a man who lived about one or two generations before Socrates. Well, Xenophon could of course have made a dialogue between Socrates and some actual or potential tyrant; there were plenty of them around. Alcibiades: a conversation with Alcibiades about how to conduct a tyrannical government, it would have been the easiest thing in the world. Or with some actual tyrant: there was one in Macedonia, Archelaos, who was a legitimate monarch legally, but he had the reputation that he was a terrible tyrant. And Xenophon could easily have made such a dialogue. No? Of course Socrates cannot be presented in any way as even abetting tyranny, as Simonides obviously does. The man who acts in this way, as the collaborator of a tyrant, must be a slightly unsavory character, and Simonides was exactly that. He is regarded or was regarded as a kind of sophist before the sophists proper emerged, taking money, eager to get money. In the eighteenth century, someone called him the Greek Voltaire.[xviii] You know, Voltaire was also very good at speculation and slightly unsavory business transactions. He is wise, but as they say, slightly on the unsavory side. And since it was known that he had visited Hiero, he was the natural character. This combination: Simonides, Hiero. Yes?

Student: On the relation of Xenophon and Machiavelli, it seems to me that the decisive break of Machiavelli has to do with the conquest of chance as well as taking one's bearings by how men actually behave, rather than how they ought to be. Now if this is so your point in summary of this dialogue, that the good tyrant is an object of wish and the bad tyrant an object of experience would have a great deal to do with the difference between Xenophon and Machiavelli.

LS: That is a long question. This statement with which I concluded, this is of course part of the surface of this dialogue. The unhappy bad tyrant, the tyrant is a matter of experience, and the good tyrant [is] the matter of a wish. But we have seen that this unhappy tyrant is not in fact as unhappy as he claims: the experience to which he refers is not the true experience which he has,

[xviii] Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, in *Lacoon* (1766).

you know, and therefore the possibility of—I would say the misery of the tyrant is not necessarily as great as Hiero says, and the possibility of a good tyrant is not as small, as is indicated by the external form of the dialogue. And all these questions will come up on the largest scale in the *Cyropaedia*, because in the *Cyropaedia* you have a king who starts out, in modern language, as a constitutional king, i.e., under law, willing subjects. And he becomes a ruler over many—millions—of willing subjects: the whole of Asia, so to speak, and without laws: absolute monarchy. So he is, in other words, on the largest scale what Hiero is advised by Simonides to become. And this is the true experiment. Is this a solution? Xenophon of course was for practical purposes in favor of constitutional government, as every sensible man was. But a greater theoretical problem remains, and this is the problem that the laws by which the king is limited are not necessarily good laws. And the question is, for example: Is it not under certain conditions wiser for the constitutionally limited king to act unconstitutionally for the good of the people? A great, always recurring question. Think of Lincoln. This grave question, this was of course always present to them: that the rule of laws is a crude rule. Ruling wisely, not hampered by any laws, comes up everywhere in Plato, in Aristotle, and of course also in Xenophon. Yes.

What supports your point is that for Aristotle, and likewise for Thomas Aquinas, the decisive distinction between tyrant and king has not so much to do with willingness of subjects and laws as it does with the fact that the king acts on behalf of the people, for the good of the whole, and the tyrant for the good of himself. This is the primary distinction. The others are technical points, very important, but still subordinate. That is I think the point. In other words, the question is, the key question, is the *nomos*, the law. And the practical meaning of the assertion that Socrates corrupts the young was that he made questionable the *nomos* of Athens, not by advising them to rob, to steal, and so on, but by showing the great difficulty and even absurdity that they should obey the will of the majority. Because that is what it amounts to; that's the law in a democracy, the will of the majority, which in quite a few cases was a very unwise will. There is a certain incongruity in that. And no fervor for democracy should go so far as to make us blind to this real difficulty, because the only way in which democracy can be good is to be aware of its specific dangers. And that is its danger: that the will of the majority is regarded, must be for practical purposes regarded, as wise. That is the meaning of that. No obedience to a manifestly foolish thing is evidently reasonable; it can become reasonable only by a long chain of reasoning. Think of any unreasonable law. But this is a very complicated story, and especially if you take into consideration the other fact, the cases in which unconstitutional action (speaking in present-day legal language) is really almost inevitable, as at least Lincoln felt in certain situations in the Civil War. This kind of thing can occur everywhere, the temptation I think everyone must feel from time to time, that notorious murderers and other crooks cannot be punished for legal technicalities. These legal technicalities have very sound reasons, because they are meant to protect innocent people who can appear from a concatenation of circumstances as criminal, but it has also the other bad effect that unscrupulous criminals plus their lawyers cannot be touched by the law. That is the problem. One must face that, and this is of course the thing.

Let me try to state it again. Here we have tyranny. That is a bad regime, and how it can be improved. Then we have another bad regime from Xenophon's point of view: that is democracy. And how it can be improved, that is the theme of the next discussion, namely, *On Revenues*. So there is another bad regime according to Xenophon: that is oligarchy. For some reason he has not written a special treatise on that, unless we say the treatise on the *Spartan Constitution* is that.

Now the good regimes are here kingship and aristocracy. One can perhaps say that the Spartan polity is somehow indicated here in aristocracy. Now there is no dialogue on kingship, but there is a dialogue on the household. The dialogue on the household, the *Oeconomicus*, deals with kingship, but in such a way that the teacher of this subject is really not Socrates but Ischomachus, especially the last chapter, and Ischomachus is surely not so close to Xenophon as Socrates is. But we want to hear the reason, of course, what Xenophon thinks about that; and this, I believe, we find only in the *Education of Cyrus*, because in the *Education of Cyrus* Xenophon speaks in his own name. Not even Socrates comes into it. It is a narrative, not a dramatic dialogue.

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[1] Deleted "the."
[2] Deleted "if."
[3] Deleted 'which."
[4] "up," replaced with "off."
[5] Deleted "_____."
[6] Deleted "there is no fight."
[7] Deleted "are."
[8] Deleted "does"
[9] Moved "always."
[10] Deleted "always and."
[11] Deleted "_____."
[12] Deleted "or a cres."

Session 7: no date
Ways and Means; Athenian Constitution

Leo Strauss: You said this was a book dealing with the improvement of Athenian democracy.[i] That is undoubtedly the case. But then you said through moderation, and taking the definition of moderation given in the fourth book of the *Memorabilia*, according to which it consists of justice and piety. And these two items surely play a very great role, but when you came to the chapter on peace, I saw that you had some basis, although we will have to restate it somewhat. Is there an economist in this class, by any chance? Because we might need his help when we read this highly economic treatise. No? In another way that is quite good, because what Mr. ____ said about economists and about the vulgarity of economic calculation might arouse some antagonism in them. But I must repeat to you what Socrates said: Do not despise the economic men. When you referred to the disease, that sounded like a reference to the plague, to the famous plague, but I believe the passage to which you refer doesn't say that—chapter 4, paragraph 9. Let us dispose of that: "When the cities fall into disease by defective harvest or war." There is no reference to a bodily disease, but the disease of the city due—

Student: I took [it] as a metaphor.

LS: I see. That is all right, then. Here it was meant metaphorically; I mean, not metaphorically as far as applied to the disease of the city, but not a disease due to bodily disease. The problem at the beginning you stated very well. We will take that up. Now let us turn to this writing.

First, I remind of the context of Xenophon's writings as a whole to the extent to which it is important to remember it here. We have read two writings, the *Oeconomicus* and the *Hiero*. Now the *Oeconomicus* deals with kingship, and this teaching regarding kingship is given directly by Ischomachus but it is transmitted by Socrates. So to that extent, Socrates identifies himself with it; otherwise he wouldn't transmit it. The teaching regarding tyranny is wholly outside the Socratic world: Simonides and Hiero [were] dead long before Socrates was born. So that is wholly unSocratic; because that is so evil, Socrates doesn't want to have anything to do even with its improvement.

Now we come to a democracy, also a bad regime from Socrates's point of view, but in this case Xenophon himself—I mean, even more than if he would make Socrates speak—takes the responsibility for teaching how democracy can be improved, and that means also how democracy can be stabilized. If someone would have written a book on the improvement of the Nazi regime, that would have been fundamentally a Nazi book, because it would have shown how it can be stabilized. So he identifies himself with it just as Simonides, by teaching Hiero how he can become a good tyrant, becomes a collaborator of Hiero. In the same way, Xenophon here becomes the collaborator with Athenian democracy. This much we must know in advance.

Now when we begin at the beginning—which of course doesn't come out in the translation—the first word of this work is *egō*, "I." Emphatic. In Greek, as in Latin, you don't need the personal

[i] Strauss responds to a student's paper, read at the beginning of the session. The reading was not recorded.

pronoun, the verbal form will do; but when you add the personal pronoun, "*I* hold," you emphasize the "I." [This is] the only work of Xenophon which begins with the word *egō*, and the *Hiero* is the only work of Xenophon in which "I" never occurs—he doesn't want to have anything to do with that. Here he emphatically is present. The last word of this treatise is the word *polis*. So "I"—"*polis*": that is a complicated relation, because Xenophon was exiled by his *polis*; we must never forget that. This shows at any rate that our work is at the opposite pole of the *Hiero*—the least presence [of] Xenophon and the maximum presence [of] Xenophon. And the connection is also shown by the fact that the *Hiero* and the *Revenues* are the only writings of Xenophon with an alternative title: *Hiero* or *Tyrannicus*; and here, how shall I say, *Affluences* or *About Revenues*. Now let us read the first paragraph.

Reader:
For my part I have always held that the constitution of a state reflects the character of the leading politicians.[ii]

LS: Now let us stop here first. More literally: "However the rulers are, such like are also the regimes." That is a rather loose statement, as Mr. ___ has pointed out, but that is a key principle of classical thought. A regime is characterized by the character of the leading men, meaning not only these fellows who are now occupying the offices (this is incidental), but the kind of men who are preferred. Now in an oligarchy the rulers are of course the wealthy people, naturally. Only wealthy people can be rulers, and not because they have some other qualities, but the decisive quality is that they are wealthy. And that means also that the society as a whole, as ruled by the wealthy, is dedicated to wealth. Or take the example with which we are more familiar, democracy: in democracy the principle is freedom, and that means, first, any man who is a free man, i.e., not a slave, is eligible for the highest offices. No other qualifications are required. He doesn't have to be wealthy, he doesn't have to be a college graduate—although by accident that may be required, but there is no constitutional provision to that effect. And it is dedicated to freedom: free men rule for the sake of freedom, just as in an oligarchy wealthy men rule for the sake of wealth. This correspondence is essential. But Xenophon means it now in a slightly more specific way, because what he is concerned with is not a defect of this particular polity or regime, namely, democracy.

By the way, is this point clear? Because this has been lost sight of a bit in the last generations, this concept of the *politeia* or the regime. The ordinary translation is "constitution," which is very misleading, because you think of a legal document. In this respect they are closer to what they now call political sociology, only what they do in political sociology has very little to do with these questions, but what the term would indicate, namely, the translegal phenomena. Well, you know what that means. The famous complaint that you had, political theory of democracy without a word about the party system. That is a just complaint, because modern democracy is unintelligible without the party system, and the [U.S.] Constitution, as you know, is silent about the parties, so the Constitution is misleading about political systems. This is a perfectly sound criticism. But that is not applicable to what such men like Xenophon or Aristotle meant, because they meant of course the actual order and not merely the legal provisions which have to be

[ii] Xenophon, *Ways and Means*, trans. E. C. Marchant and G. W. Bowersock (St. Edmundsbury Press, Ltd, 1925), 1.1.

interpreted in the light of the actual order. Now in every regime, this was the assertion, a specific human type is in control. Now this is very clear in the case, if you have, say, a warlike feudal nobility, where it is perfectly clear that this type of man rules and gives the society as a whole its character in every respect, because those who do not belong to it are nevertheless molded by being subservient to it, by being somehow or other influenced by it. In a democracy that seems to be the rule of all and not of a part, but the classics said that democracy is nevertheless the rule of a part, because in a democracy as they understood it every free man has a vote, rich or poor, noble or villain; it doesn't make any difference. But there is a stable majority; the poor are the majority. Aristotle says "it so happens" that in every society the majority are the poor. That has very mysterious reasons, but the fact is undeniable. "Poor" means here men who have to work for their living. Democracy is therefore in fact the rule of the poor, and therefore the poor are in control. Of course they may elect rich men to high offices, especially to those which require some technical skill, like generalship and treasury, only they wouldn't ordinarily elect a poor man to the Treasury because he might in a pinch avail himself of this good opportunity. But still, decent men like Pericles have to become traitors to their class in order to become rulers of the *demos,* so this would still hold true. But let us now see what the difficulty is, the sequel of the first paragraph.

Reader:
But some of the leading men at Athens have stated that they recognize justice—

LS: "That they know the just," know what justice is.

Reader:
as clearly as other men; "but," they have said, "owing to the poverty of the masses—"

LS: "Masses" is a word stemming from the eighteenth century, French Revolution, and this kind of thing. Newtonian physics. "Multitude."

Reader:
"we are forced to be somewhat unjust in our treatment of the cities." (1.1)

LS: Namely, of the cities subject to Athens. Yes. Let us stop here. The Athenians say: "Well, we know what justice is as well as anybody else, but we are compelled to be somewhat unjust because of the poverty of the multitude. They need money, and we milk the allied cities in an unjust manner." Yes?

Student: I would like to go back to the last phrase of your exposition a minute ago, when you said that this still holds true, this classical concept of democracy.

LS: Did I say that?

Student: You did say it.

LS: Well, then I said a mouthful.

Student: I didn't want to let it slip by.

LS: No, no. You wouldn't do me that favor, would you?

Student: If you meant by that that the conception was adequate for that age, but if you mean to say more than that, that this conception is accurate when you look at the real world today.

LS: Well, my hesitation was due to the fact that modern democracy is not identical with classical democracy—that goes without saying, but nevertheless there is something in common; and rule of all modern democracy surely is not. Look at such institutions as progressive income tax: absolutely impossible to get that except in a democracy. Or inheritance taxes: people of old wealth, or even of new wealth, of course have the natural advantage which wealth brings, but still they are fundamentally in a defensive position. Politically speaking, is this not true?

Student: I wouldn't accept that myself, from the point of view—

LS: I am also a poor man, but we are speaking now objectively.

Student: Okay. Objectively one might question whether the advantages[1] are such that in fact they have the net advantage in the society.

LS: Well, the majority of the people in this country surely wish to preserve private property. That is perfectly clear. And to that extent all private property, of the rich as well as the poor, is as such safe. But there is no question that—well, look at the taxes. A system favoring wealth would have an entirely different tax system, obviously. There would be no question of inheritance taxes—think what [has] happened to the British nobility, the landowning nobility and their castles and all this sort of thing since 1911. That is so. In a nondemocratic regime, the importance of popular speech is infinitely less than in a democracy. You see that now a presidential candidate is compelled to be a success over the TV, something which in itself has nothing whatever to do with any political ability. That is one of the many symptoms. This is fortunately a thing which is controversial, but that it is possible to make such statements—I read one by President Hanna of Michigan University, according to which Michigan University should have forty thousand students by 1970, and this can be achieved only if the faculty ceases to be—ceases to demand—that only geniuses be admitted as students to Michigan University. I haven't heard that [the] Michigan University student body consists only of geniuses. But then you see this can be said by a man of considerable power. That shows something. The point is this: modern democracy is a qualified democracy according to this idea; and the simple sign is that it is representative democracy, the idea being that the people elect an elite from among themselves as their representatives. Whether they are in fact an elite is of course a complicated question but that was the underlying idea of the institution as you can see from the *Federalist Papers*.

Student: The alternative conception which could be put forth is that the wealthy in fact rule subject to certain concessions they must make to the multitude from time to time to perpetuate that rule.

LS: If you go one step further you have the Marxist interpretation of liberal democracy. But is it true?

Student: We could argue it for about two hours.

LS: Surely it is not so simple. All right, I get out of all difficulties into which I came by simply saying that modern democracy according to its original idea was not meant to be an unqualified democracy. That is surely true. And you see [it] very clearly in the institution of the Senate, but you see it also very clearly in the institution of representative government as such, which was meant to be rule by an elite—subject to popular control, of course, but still primarily not a direct democracy. So the question here is then improvement of democracy as distinguished from tyranny. And we see here also in passing [that] knowledge of justice is not enough. You remember the famous theme: Is virtue knowledge? These men know justice, but they are prevented from acting justly because of the poverty of the multitude. In addition to knowledge, you need also what Aristotle calls equipment, and if the equipment isn't there the virtue will be defective. Yes, and now let us read the end of the sentence.

Reader:
This set me thinking whether by any means the citizens might obtain food entirely from their own soil, which would certainly be the fairest way. (1.1)

LS: "The justest way." You see, the justest way is that you get it from your own land and not from these poor subject cities which you exploit. Yes?

Reader:
I felt that, were this so, they would be relieved of their poverty, and also of the suspicion with which they are regarded by the Greek world. (1.1)

LS: "By the Greeks." So in other words, this is the basic idea of this statement: The Athenians act rather unjustly at the present, and Xenophon will teach them how they can cease to act unjustly, how they can cease to be unjust by some changes which he proposes in the sequel. Is this clear? The root of the actual injustice is the poverty, therefore he must see how this poverty can be overcome—well, a subject most familiar to modern democracy, a kind of social security but only in a Greek form. Then they will act justly. You must admit the soundness of this conceit, Mr. ___. Yes? Good.

Now the first subject he takes up is the land, Attica, the nature of Attica. That is the subject of the first chapter. Now this is described as absolutely wonderful: Athens has everything. But of course, when you look a bit more closely and see the space he devotes to the various subjects, you see the land proper and the agricultural produce is nothing to boast of. They have much more of stone and silver mines than of food supply. It is considerably exaggerated, this statement. At the beginning of Thucydides's *History*, chapter 2, paragraphs 4 to 5, Thucydides says that because of her poor soil Attica was rather safe in old times. No one wanted to have that poor soil; they were much more interested in the plains of the Peloponnesus and other places. So this is slightly overdone, and you see it. Let us read only the last paragraph of this chapter.

Reader:
Further, on the borders of most states dwell barbarians who trouble them: but the neighboring states of Athens are themselves remote from the barbarians. (1.8)

LS: "In the highest degree." How Sparta, for example, should be so close to barbarians is hard to see. He surely puts a great[er] emphasis on stone and silver and on the location than on the agricultural basis. The implication of course is crucial: improvement of agriculture, the great theme of the *Oeconomicus*, and of the *Hiero* even, would be of no help to Attica. Now in this chapter he deals with the good things which are produced by [the] nature of the place. In the next chapter he turns to what comes in, literally: to the income, *prosodos.* And what does he say, paragraph 1 of chapter 2? The metics, resident aliens. The first item of the imports are the metics, because they have to pay some form of tax, and in addition they work. That is the first great item. And what does this imply? Let us read paragraph 3.

Reader:
The state itself too would gain if the citizens served in the ranks together, and no longer found themselves in the same company with Lydians, Phrygians, Syrians, and barbarians of all sorts, of whom a large part of our alien population consists. (2.3)

LS: "Of the metics consists." You see, these metics are not only Greeks, they are even barbarians, but nothing of their barbaric origin is said when he makes this overall proposal regarding perfectly free immigration to Athens. And in the sequel he even makes this remark which shocked Mr. Marchant: the most elegant part of the army was of course the cavalry, and that these metics, who shouldn't serve in the infantry, the hoplites, should serve in the cavalry, to attract them. This is highly paradoxical. We will interpret that later. Paragraph 7.

Reader:
And if we appointed a board of Guardians of Aliens analogous to the Guardians of Orphans, and some kind of distinction were earmarked for guardians whose list of resident aliens was longest, that too would add to the loyalty of the aliens, and probably all without a city would covet the right of settling in Athens, and would increase our revenues. (2.7)

LS: "All the stateless people" would be a better translation. All people who are stateless would come to Attica where they are so entirely welcome. A very strange proposal for such a Colonel Blimp reactionary as Xenophon is supposed to be. How would you explain that? Now of course, needless to say, the author of this writing was stateless for many decades. We must not forget that.

Now what does this mean, this proposal? Well, we come to that perhaps later when he speaks of the slaves, because this is similarly treated. So the first thing is an extremely liberal immigration policy: no limitations whatever. Absolutely counter to the views of the Old Athenians, naturally. Now the Athenian democracy was of course relatively favorable to metics and slaves, as appears from many things; for example, from the eighth book of the *Republic* when Plato describes the situation of slaves in Athens, they were treated much better there than elsewhere. But Xenophon goes much beyond everything else in this respect. In other words, the improvement of a democracy, but democracy in general and this Athenian democracy in particular was particularly

liberal to metics and slaves. Therefore this proposal. Xenophon is ten times more liberal, but this is along the lines of the democracy, therefore politically proper.

The next chapter deals with other forms of income, and this is the central economic subject: trade and shipping. You remember again the *Oeconomicus*: the only gentlemanly source of income is farming, and the utmost which can be dared is trade in farms, as we have seen. You know Ischomachus's father's wonderful conceit? He bought the run-down farms, improved them, and didn't keep them, but to Socrates's surprise sold them again at a profit. So this is still barely possible, but plain trade and shipping is of course beyond gentlemanship. This is the next great proposal of Xenophon, and this is the central economic subject of the book. In other words, we must not merely consider the number of lines devoted to a subject, we must also consider its position. And then the last one, in chapter 4, the silver mines, and this is the longest chapter of the book. Now this we have to consider for a moment. Let us begin with paragraph 3.

Reader:
And it is continually being found that, so far from shrinking, the silver-yielding area extends further and further. (4.3)

LS: Well, so long as the maximum number of workmen was employed in them, no one ever wanted a job; in fact, there were always more jobs than the laborers could deal with. Read also the end of paragraph 4, same chapter.

Reader:
Hence, of all the industries with which I am acquainted this is the only one in which expansion of business excites no jealousy. (4.4)

LS: Yes, and the end of paragraph 5.

Reader:
In mining undertakings—

LS: "Mining" meaning silver mining here.

Reader:
everyone tells you that he is short of labour. (4.5)

LS: Paragraph 7.

Reader:
Neither is silver like furniture, of which a man never buys more when once he has got enough for his house. (4.7)

LS: In other words, no one would buy, say, twenty bathrooms when there is only room for one. Yes?

Reader:

No one ever yet possessed so much silver as to want no more; if a man finds himself with a huge amount of it, he takes as much pleasure in burying the surplus as in using it. (4.7)

LS: So in other words, silver is in infinite demand and in infinite supply, so you can have an eternal boom by exploiting the silver mines of Attica. What a wonderful thing. But there is perhaps a little difficulty. Paragraph 10.

Reader:
If anyone says that gold is quite as useful as silver, I am not going to contradict him; but I know this, that when gold is plentiful, silver rises and gold falls in value. (4.10)

LS: Yes. Is there a difficulty visible? What difficulty?

Student: What if silver is plentiful?

LS: Then there can be an inflation. I see. And this is of course a thing which Xenophon alludes to only in this passage. This is a highly fanciful proposal, to save Attica, [to] make Athens just by ruthless production of silver. Well, we know a bit more about what happened in Europe, you know, after the discovery of the silver in South America in the sixteenth century.[iii] Yes?

Student: I notice in chapter 1, also 3 and 4, references to peace and war. It seems this has importance for these chapters.

LS: You mean what is going to happen to the silver mines in war?

Student: Xenophon's economic proposals seem to have the effect of changing Athens from a warlike community to a peaceful one.

LS: But that comes in chapter 5. There it is the theme.

Student: But I thought I saw it already in the earlier chapters.

LS: Well, perhaps you wait until we discuss the peace problem and then we return to these passages. Let us read paragraphs 11 to 12 now.

Reader:
With these facts before us, we need not hesitate to bring as much labour as we can get into the mines—

LS: As "much human beings," to translate it a bit more literally.

Reader:

[iii] The Spanish discovered rich silver deposits in the mid-sixteenth century at Potosí, now in modern Bolivia.

and carry on the work in them, feeling confident that the ore will never give out and that silver will never lose its value. I think, indeed, that the state has anticipated me in this discovery; at any rate she throws open the mining industry to foreigners on the same terms as are granted to citizens. (4.11-12)

LS: So in other words, Xenophon's proposal has already been anticipated to some extent, only he wants to do on a very large scale what the practical politicians have done hitherto. Certain implications are striking. Paragraph 17.

Reader:
Were my proposals adopted, the only innovation would be, that just as private individuals have built up a permanent income by becoming slave owners, so the state would become possessed of public slaves, until there were three for every citizen. (4.17)

LS: You see, so another implication of this gimmick is an immense increase in the slave population of Athens. Innumerable foreigners, free men, and innumerable slaves will come to Athens and of course will change the character of the community completely. Let us read the last two paragraphs of this chapter. Perhaps this is the point which Mr. _____ had in mind. No, paragraphs 41 to 42. I am sorry.

Reader:
Or again, if any fear that this scheme would prove worthless in the event of war breaking out, they should observe that, with this system at work, war becomes far more formidable to the aggressors than to the city. For what instrument is more serviceable for war than men? We should have enough of them to supply crews to many ships of the state; and many men available for service in the ranks as infantry could press the enemy hard, if they were treated with consideration. (4.41-42)

LS: So in other words, this enormous increase of population contributes to the greater military power of Athens.

Student: I thought it was just the opposite when I saw the first chapter of the book, where he says because of the poverty of the multitude we are forced to be somewhat unjust in our treatment of other cities. The implication is that his proposals would make them less unjust in their treatment of other cities, namely, less warlike.

LS: The unjust treatment of the cities is in the first place, of course, the taxes which the cities have to pay; and secondly, that many of the lawsuits of the subject cities were handled by the Athenian lawcourts, and they paid the jurors and the jurors lived from that income. That is I think the main point, not the wars.

Student: I just wanted to point out that he also says at 22 that there is an abundance of labor, whereas before he said there was a shortage of labor.

LS: That is slightly different, I believe. He meant they could always use more labor than they had; and he says: Well, we will do that on the biggest scale, and we can use all kinds of slaves.

Student: At the end of 5, he says everyone tells you he is short of labor.

LS: This is in the present scheme. Still there were not so many that there were three slaves for every Athenian. He makes of course no distinction between men, women and children. So you have a population of, say, *x* Athenians, there are 3*x* slaves. And this is not counting even the metics. Xenophon goes much beyond that.

Student: 22 is about finding managers.

LS: You think so?

Student: Yes, the subject of 22 is how he will find enough people to manage the slaves, and he says lots of citizens who don't want to work with their hands will be happy to manage the mines.

LS: Yes, that is correct. Sure, because they don't have to do the dirty work in the mines. Yes, Mr. ____?

Student: In 22 there seems to be some sort of logical fallacy here. What sort of soldiers or sailors do you make of slaves?

LS: Rowers. They are very much needed. That was the most important part. The number of fighters on a trireme was very small. The chief point was rowing, and then the tactical maneuvers, one man commanding the ship to ram an enemy ship. They used the low population of the city, the poorest, for rowers. That was common. And why not use slaves in the same way? Don't forget the time of galley slaves, who were not the most respectable part of society.

Student: Except that there is one other aspect; he does speak about them serving as infantry also.

LS: Light-armed soldiers.

Student: It just seems to me that you would have more trouble controlling your soldiers.

LS: That is what Xenophon doesn't take up here, the question [of] what you will do when you have an alien population and a slave population much larger than the citizenry. This he doesn't take up, as little as he takes up the question of inflation.

Student: Rome actually tried using slaves on land.

LS: But even the Romans had the famous slave wars. Now let us see paragraph 50 of the same chapter.

Reader:
For a densely populated city would grow up there, if it were organised on this plan— (4.50)

LS: Namely, there close to the silver mines.

Reader:
yes, and building sites would become as valuable there as they are in our suburbs.
If the plans that I have put forward are carried out, I agree that, apart from the improvement in our financial position, we shall become a people more obedient, better disciplined, and more efficient in war. (4.50-51)

LS: So in other words, from every political point of view that would be an enormous improvement. This large-scale, unheard of exploitation of the silver mine**s.** These are the three economic proposals: (1) a new, most liberal, immigration policy; (2) promotion of trade and shipping; and (3) the exploitation of the silver mines. Good. Now we are through with the proposals which alone would suffice to make the Athenians more just. But one condition has to be fulfilled, a political condition, to which he turns in chapter 5. Mr. ____, you wanted to say something?

Student: After that last sentence: Is it just the tone of all political pamphlets, or am I right in recognizing the tone of Swift's *Modest Proposal*?

LS: There is something to that; it is only not so obvious. I once heard a political historian when we spoke about Swift's *Modest Proposal*, and I told him: You know, this was ironical—you know, this famous conceit how to solve the Irish problem. They had too many children and too little food: Let them eat the children; they have food and they have fewer children. And I insulted him by saying: Well, Swift didn't mean it literally. But in the case of Swift, it is obvious that it is a joke. Here it is not so obvious. We must come to that later. Let us first go on to the beginning of the next chapter.

Reader:
If it seems clear that the state cannot obtain a full revenue from all sources unless she has peace, is it not worth while to set up a board of guardians of peace? (5.1)

LS: In other words, we have already a guardian for orphans, now we establish a guardian for metics. And then we do more, we establish a guardian of peace. Now this of course is slightly more difficult because it depends not entirely on Athens whether she can keep peace or not. Yes?

Reader:
Were such a board constituted, it would help to increase the popularity of the city and to make it more attractive and more densely thronged with visitors from all parts. (5.1)

LS: So peace is the political condition. And then he describes the benefits of peace especially for Athens in the sequel. We cannot read the whole thing, we cannot read the whole. Paragraphs 3 and 4.

Reader:
For if the state is tranquil, what class of men will not need her? Shipowners and merchants will head the list. Then there will be those rich in corn and wine and oil and cattle—
(5.3)

LS: They omit something. "Not those rich in corn, not those rich in wine, not those of sweet wine ["who enjoy wine," it can be translated—LS] and not those with many olives, and not those rich in sheep." You see this they omit because they take it too literally as an economic pamphlet. Yes, and which other people?

Reader:
men possessed of brains and money to invest; craftsmen and professors—

LS: Sophists.

Reader:
sophists, and philosophers— (5.3-4)

LS: That a professor could translate sophist by professor is really incredible, isn't it? Yes?

Reader:
poets and the people who make use of their works; those to whom anything sacred or secular appeals that is worth seeing or hearing. Besides, where will those who want to buy or sell many things quickly meet with better success in their efforts than at Athens? (5.4)

LS: So Athens will be the center of the Greek world, at any rate. But at this, one could raise the question (and now we come to a key political issue): But could we Athenians not have this much better if we were to control the Greek world politically, and not by the attractions of Athens? Next paragraph.

Reader:
No one, I dare say, contests this; but there are some who wish the state to recover her ascendancy, and they may think that it is more likely to be won by war than by peace. Let such, in the first place, call to mind the Persian Wars. Was it by coercing the Greeks or by rendering services to them that we became leaders of the fleet and treasurers of the league funds? (5.5)

LS: And so on. In other words, the political control of an Athenian empire is not as desirable as making Athens attractive for everyone in a peaceful manner. The Athenian leadership, say, since the Persian War, came from peace and justice rather than from war. This he develops in the sequel. Let us turn to paragraph 11.

Reader:
If, on the other hand, any one supposes that financially war is more profitable to the state than peace—

LS: You remember the statement in the *Oeconomicus* that one way of getting rich is war and tyranny.

Reader:

I really do not know how the truth of this can be tested better than by considering once more what has been the experience of our state in the past. He will find that in old days a very great amount of money was paid into the treasury in time of peace, and that the whole of it was spent in time of war; he will conclude on consideration that in our own time the effect of the late war on our revenues was that many of them ceased, while those that came in were exhausted by the multitude of expenses; whereas the cessation of war by sea has been followed by a rise in the revenues, and has allowed the citizens to devote them to any purpose they choose. (5.11-12)

LS: The question is: What times does he mean by that? Does he mean here the time of the Peloponnesian War, or of the wars in the beginning or middle of the fourth century? He limits the statement by speaking of peace on the sea, because without peace on the sea, of course Athens was lost. More precisely, if Athens controls the sea, if she has by far the strongest navy, the war on land was not a serious danger. At any rate, this statement that peace, from the point of view of sheer gain, peace is more desirable than war, is not entirely in agreement with the *Oeconomicus*. This much we must say. Good. Peace policy is indispensable, that is the overall thesis. Naturally, in the last paragraph the city must wage war if someone wrongs the city, that goes without saying. No Munichs.[iv] Good. So this is the political chapter and now we come to the conclusion in the short chapter 6. Then we will try to consider the whole thing. Yes?

Reader:
Well now, surely, if none of these proposals is impossible or even difficult, if by carrying them into effect we shall be regarded with more affection by the Greeks, shall live in greater security, and be more glorious; if the people— (6.1)

LS: "The *demos* will be well off regarding its food."

Reader:
and the rich no more burdened with the expenses of war; if with a large surplus in hand we shall celebrate our festivals with even more splendor than at present, shall restore the temples, and repair the walls and docks, and shall give back to the priests, councillors, magistrates, and knights their ancient privileges; surely, I say, our proper course is to proceed with this scheme forthwith, that already in our generation we may come to see our city secure and prosperous. (6.1)

LS: To summarize this point: The proposals made by Xenophon are sufficient for making the city happy, prosperous, while living securely—the same goal which Simonides tried to achieve regarding tyranny in the *Hiero*. Good. But is this a solution? Is happiness as defined here, plus security, the goal of political life? Next paragraph.

Reader:
Furthermore, if you decide to go forward with the plan, I should advise you to send to Dodona and Delphi, and inquire of the gods whether such a design is fraught with weal for the state both now and in days to come. (6.2)

[iv] The Munich Agreement of 1938.

LS: Good. What does this mean? What should the gods tell? Xenophon cannot answer this question, therefore the gods Zeus and Apollo must be asked. What shall they answer? What information are they supposed to give? What is the precise question which is to be addressed to them? Whether these arrangements are good for the city now and in the future. But does it not also have a broader bearing: whether this goal in this way described, happiness as defined here, is good? He cannot guarantee that and needs the gods view about that.

Student: [. . .]

LS: But the question is, what question Xenophon asked the Athenians to address to the gods: "whether it would be better and preferable for the city thus constituted at once and for the future." Because assuming this all is done, would this guarantee happiness, if all these things are done which Xenophon advises them to do? And let us assume that there is no problem: Would this be better? At the beginning of the *Memorabilia* (has anyone the *Memorabilia* here?), in the first chapter in the first book:

"Those who wish to live in houses and cities need the art of soothsaying; for to become a housebuilder, or a smith, or a farmer, or a ruler of men, or an examiner of this kind of thing, or an economic man or a strategic man, all these pieces of learning can be acquired by human insight. But the greatest things in these matters, he said, were reserved by the gods for themselves, and nothing was known of these greatest things to human beings. For he who has planted a field rightly [meaning according to all prescriptions of the art of farming—LS] does not know who will get the harvest. Nor he who has built a house properly [meaning according to all the prescriptions of housebuilding—LS] will know who will live in that house; nor is it manifest to the man possessing the strategic art whether it profits to exercise the art; nor is it clear to the politician whether it profits to be a politician [to rule the city—LS] nor him who has married a beautiful woman whether he will enjoy her, whether [how does he translate it?—LS] she will bring you sorrow; nor is it clear that he who has great friends in the city whether he will not be deprived of them by the very city."[v]

Now let us apply it to our case. If all these things are done by the city, if the city will become very rich, will it be good for the city to be rich? She will be envied also, and so on. So for this reason at least we must ask the gods. Now the next point, the last paragraph.

Reader:
And should they consent to it, then I would say that we ought to ask them further, which of the gods we must propitiate in order that we may prosper in our handiwork. Then, when we have offered an acceptable sacrifice to the gods named in their reply, it behooves us to begin the work. For with heaven to help us in what we do, it is likely that our undertakings will go forward continually to the greater weal of the state. (6.3)

[v] *Memorabilia* 1.1.7-8. Strauss's translation.

LS: "Likely" one could also translate by "of course." You see, the gods are asked twice: (a) What shall we do, shall we accept this policy? and (b)[vi] To which god shall we sacrifice in order that they will be propitious? Does this remind you of a parallel?

Student: The *Anabasis*.

LS: Tell the story.

Student: Xenophon was invited by his friend Proxenus to go with Cyrus and he went to Socrates to ask his advice; and Socrates told him to ask the god whether he should go.

LS: Xenophon went to Delphi and asked which god should he sacrifice to in order to prosper. And then he came and told Socrates the story, and he said: You rascal, *you* decided to go and you didn't ask the god whether you should go; and then having made your decision you asked the god to whom you should sacrifice in order to have a good journey. Here the old Xenophon is not as frivolous as we see the young Xenophon was. Good.

But what is the overall notion of this piece? Of course we see that needs a much closer discussion, and I believe one would have to know infinitely more about the political economy of Athens than I do. And if I were ever to write on that I would take the trouble of learning it, but at the present time I do not know it.

Student: [. . .]

LS: Mr. ___, you contradict Socrates. Socrates said to Xenophon: You did wrong in not asking the god, and not addressing to the god two questions but a single question. You could perhaps say that Xenophon's success on the campaign in the *Anabasis* proves that he acted wisely. That you might say, but that leads to a very long question, the whole question of soothsaying in Socrates and Xenophon. But if we look at the proposals regarding the improvement of Athenian democracy, what does it amount to? The city is now admittedly not quite just. How will it be made just?

Student: That is based on the presupposition that only one problem exists.

LS: Sure, because they say we are too poor to be rich. And then the answer is: I will show you how you can become rich, and then you will be just. Now if we state it in general terms, to make a man or a city juster by making them richer—or still more generally, to make men just by making them rich, that is the problem. Is this discussed? Mr. ___, you have heard of that. Good. Does Xenophon discuss this issue anywhere, this interesting proposal with which we are too familiar, that it is possible to make men just by making them rich? Well, in the *Banquet* there is a very nice discussion of that. In Xenophon's *Banquet*, everyone is asked to tell what is the thing of which he is most proud. Callias, of whom we have heard before, the rich fool, pompous ass, Callias, says: I make people just, that is the thing of which I am proud. And how? By giving them money. Then they don't have to steal anymore, to rob, and to bribe or what have you. In a

[vi] The enumeration in this sentence was "2" and then "b." It has been changed for consistency.

brief discussion between Callias and Antisthenes—the famous founder of the cynical school, and who is a very low man in Xenophon's estimate, but who is good enough to refute that—one question which Antisthenes raises to Callias is this: "Now if you help them out of their fixes with your money, are they all grateful to you?" And Callias says: "No, as a rule they are not grateful." And Antisthenes says: "That is marvelous; you can make them just in every other respect except just to yourself"—gratitude being a part of justice. So this is not a wise proposal, although there are cases in which of course there is such a great need that help with money is indicated. But as an overall proposal of policy I do not believe that it is along the lines of Socrates or Xenophon.

Student: In the first sentence they say they do know what justice is. For this to be apropos, wouldn't [it] have to be that they didn't know what justice was at all?

LS: Yes, that you can very well say. That is absolutely true, that is correct, because this kind of justice which men acquire by getting money is not genuine justice. But in a loose way of course it is justice, because I think there are many people who are dishonest or slightly dishonest only because they are very poor, and if they were reasonably well off would not steal. People who have reasonable incomes and do shoplifting for the thrill of it or because they are ripe for the psychiatrist are, I think, a minority; whereas people who are starving or near-starving, that is probably much more frequently the case.

But there is another side to that: the question of justice. There are various levels of the understanding of justice, and on a very simple level the answer is given somewhere in Xenophon's *Greek History*. Some Asiatic petty tyrant had conquered a number of neighboring cities and taxed them heavily, and then a reasonable Spartan general takes these cities and takes him prisoner. But he doesn't kill him, and says: "You can no longer live in any of these cities." And the tyrant said: "What shall I do?" And he says: "Go to the city which you come from, where you belong, and that is justice for you. So go to your father's house, live from what belongs to you." This is a crude way, you know. This presupposes of course a general belief in the justice of the social order, naturally. If you take the view of a Marxist, he would question the whole social order, and he would say this is in a very primitive and crude sense just, but not in a deeper sense. Now Xenophon would also say that is not the deepest understanding of justice, but for practical purposes good enough. And in this way, if the Athenians, if this were feasible, would work their silver mines and become wealthy by that, and the Athenian economy would be in a state of constant boom so that they would no longer need to tax the cities, it would of course be better. Yes?

Student: Could you push this another step by saying this watered-down version of justice is one reason why the first question proposed to the gods is such a special question. He doesn't ask whether this constitutes *the* good.

LS: But if Apollo would say that it is not good, this of course could be based theoretically on a deeper understanding of justice, could it not?

Student: Yes.

LS: It could perhaps be based on a better understanding of economic problems by his awareness of the inflation difficulty.

Student: But he could say it is good on a very shallow level, too.

LS: But this is left open. I mean, how high the wisdom of Apollo is, that is in no way decided. It is surely something which on the basis of this argument as given here cannot be decided. Yes?

Student: [. . .]

LS: But in Hiero's case, Hiero is not dissatisfied with his wealth. Hiero is only dissatisfied because people don't like him. And Simonides tells him: I am going to show you how you will become highly popular. Well, a simple proposal: All nice things you do yourself, and the unpleasant things will be done by your officials. And then you say, "I am sorry, I can't do anything about it." This is one of the simple tricks by which you can become popular.

Student: Would these men remain satisfied?

LS: You mean they might gradually see that this doesn't—but you know the words of Lincoln, the three classes of men according to Lincoln: There are some you can fool all of the time. [vii] And therefore it can be of some practical importance.

Now let us consider another, broader aspect of this little piece. The first word is "I" and the last word is "city." This piece has something to do with Xenophon and Athens, and we can perhaps say this is the treatise which deals with this very question, Xenophon and Athens. Why did he give this question of great importance to him this particular form? Xenophon was exiled. The exact reason is not known. The fact is stated by him. The least we can say [is that] it is because of political heterodoxy. He belonged to the class of knights, and they had a very bad reputation at the end of the Peloponnesian War because of the oligarchic revolutions which had taken place. And it is of course possible that it had already something to do with Socrates, although Xenophon was exiled before Socrates's condemnation. Now if we look at the fact of his exile on account of political heterodoxy, he shows here in this writing that he is not politically heterodox. There is no criticism of democracy as such, but only improvements of democracy on the basis of democracy and along the lines of democracy. The easygoing policy regarding foreigners and slaves is even radicalized considerably. In no way does he suggest here anything smelling of Sparta or Spartanism—always the opposite suggestion—but rather much more democratic than the Athenian democracy was, especially in the case of metics, barbarians, and slaves.

There is also this point to be considered. Socrates reveals himself in his peculiarity, in his peculiar way of life, as not being a perfect gentleman, *kaloskagathos*, in the *Oeconomicus* by the contrast between Ischomachus, the *kaloskagathos*, and Socrates, who is only an *agathos*, a good

[vii] Though some present at Lincoln's address at Clinton, IL in 1858 recalled Lincoln making that statement, there is no definitive evidence that he did. See Thomas F. Schwartz, "'You Can Fool All of the People' Lincoln Never Said That," *For the People: A Newsletter of the Abraham Lincoln Association* 5 (2003): 1, 3, 6.

man, not with this additional thing of ostentation. And I think there is some propriety that Xenophon would reveal himself in a work which is also an economic work, although a work of political economy. I think we can call that political economy although the term did not yet exist. The term "political economy" was coined, I believe, in the sixteenth century for the first time, but it didn't come into general usage for a long time. When the plan of such a science was developed in the late seventeenth century it was called political arithmetic, which is something like statistics, statistics also being derived from "state."[viii] This much about this treatise I would like to turn—yes, that sounds strange today, doesn't it? Maybe I am wrong. I haven't looked [it] up [in] any dictionary. Someone should look up the Murray, the Oxford Dictionary, and see where statistics come from, because the term "status," which I know is derived from state, is prior to statistic. That is the thought in my mind. But someone should look that up, what the original meaning of statistics was.[ix] It is always interesting what skeletons we find in our closets.

Is there any point you would like to bring up regarding this writing?

Student: Would you discuss the paradox of metics thrown out of the infantry, but allowed in the high class cavalry?

LS: That is extremely liberal. The difference between citizen and aliens is completely disregarded on a very important level, not a political level, of course, because they will not hold offices. But, you know, what is socially chic is not entirely irrelevant politically.

Student: But why put them out of the infantry?

LS: That is not safe. I think cavalry was regarded as safer than hoplites, the real tough thing. When Hiero gives the example, when he asked:[2] "[Have] you ever been in real danger of your life in war," what does he speak of? Hoplites. It is the queen of battles, not cavalry. In other words, the cavalry attack where only one percent survive—these famous cases, Churchill at Omdurman,[x] the last case. That was of course different, because there were firearms. There were no firearms in antiquity. And I think the reason is that the really tough thing was hoplites.

Student: Wasn't the cavalry the traditional aristocratic, oligarchic thing—those who could afford it.?

[viii] Sir William Petty (1623-1687), who served under Cromwell, Charles II and James II, was author of important works on economic history and statistics, including *Treatise on Taxes and Contributions* (1662), and *Political Arithmetik* (published posthumously, 1690).

[ix] According to the *OED*: "The semantic development, in either post-classical Latin or German, was apparently from 'of or relating to the state, statists, or statecraft' to use designating or denoting the study of data relating to the state or to government, and hence the analysis of such data (especially in numerical form, and by mathematical methods); association with the meanings of classical Latin *status* may have played a part in this development."

[x] The Battle of Omdurman took place on September 2, 1898, when British and Egyptian troops, led by Sir Henry Kitchener, defeated the army of Khalifa Abdullahi, leader of the Sudanese, in an effort to re-establish domination of the Sudan. Winston Churchill fought with the 21st Lancers and wrote about his experience in *The River War: An Historical Account of the Reconquest of the Soudan* (1899).

LS: It was the prerogative of the wealthy, because a man had to furnish his own horse, naturally.

Student: [. . .]

LS: Well, the cavalry was never sufficient except in certain territories—in Asia, for example. There were famous cavalry battles, when cavalry decided it. When was the defeat of Crassus? In the 60's first century B.C.,[xi] that was won by the cavalry, and there were other such cases. But in the Greek wars the cavalry was not decisive. The hoplites were decisive except in very mountainous territory where the light-armed soldiers had a great advantage.

Student: What about the question of slaves? It seems as if there is almost a Spartanizing. The Spartans were more just because they stayed home.

LS: To that extent it is true. In other words, the immense slave population which the Spartans had made them more peaceful, because they were afraid of domestic troubles with the helots. And Athens would become more peaceful by increasing the slave problem. That is possible. But since the slaves are to be treated in a very humane manner, almost like citizens, I do not know.

Student: He indicates in war they run away. It isn't voluntary in any sense of the word.

LS: Sure. Well, this euphemism is something which you find in Xenophon everywhere.

I have to turn now to the other writing, which many of you will not have been able to read, the *Athenian Constitution*, or as you called it, the *Old Oligarch*.[xii] Well, since about a hundred years (I don't know the exact year), this writing is regarded as spurious and not the work of Xenophon but of an anonymous author whom they call the Old Oligarch. This would be a good enough excuse for us not to study it, but we cannot entirely disregard it for the following reason. The fundamental argument is, I think, this. This *Athenian Constitution* was written around 430, either shortly before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War or in the first year. Now at that time Xenophon was about eight years old, or maybe ten, and it is practically impossible that Xenophon could have written it. This is a very powerful argument. It is in itself a very powerful argument. But one then has to account for the fact how come that it has come down to us as a Xenophontic writing, and no one in antiquity ever doubted its Xenophontic origin. An explanation which I have read somewhere is this: that perhaps this was found among the papers of Xenophon when he died, and his executor ([3]whoever that was) thought, as a matter of course: That is by Xenophon; and so it came into the writings of Xenophon and came down this way. There was some doubt in classical antiquity whether it was genuine—good or bad, but we don't know the reasons, but there was some doubt. Regarding this there was no doubt. At any rate, we have to raise this question.

[xi] The Battle of Carrhae, 53 B.C.E.

[xii]The edition of *The Athenian Constitution* used in the course is from *The Whole Works of Xenophon*, trans. Maurice Ashley Cooper et al. (London: Jones and Company, 1832). In this edition, the title of the work is translated as *The Athenian Republic*. The translation read aloud in class seems to have been modified throughout and ahead of time in the direction of greater literalness.

I would say the defect of this argument is this. It is, as all these arguments are in the interesting cases, based on an overall estimate of what is possible for this particular author. You know, let us see. There are some cases—for example, you find in a writing—say, if you find a writing in which a reference is made to the theory of relativity, then you could be absolutely sure it was not written prior to 1911, the earliest possible date which was the publication of that. Or similar things. A telescope: that could not have been written before Galileo, that's perfectly clear. But even in this case there is always this question: Maybe this particular line or sentence is a later insertion—a gloss, as they say—and the writing as a whole is old. So that is not quite so simple. But in the interesting cases it is based on an estimate of what the author could have written. Now there is one Platonic dialogue which is offensive to a certain kind of Plato enthusiast, and that is the *Menexenus*. And I am absolutely sure that they would have denied the authenticity of the *Menexenus* in the nineteenth century, in the heyday of this kind of thing, if Aristotle didn't protect it. A beautiful expression, "protect it." So Aristotle quotes or refers to the *Menexenus*, and therefore one cannot question that it was written by Plato. But the reasoning is: Plato wouldn't do this kind of thing.

Now here in this case there is a tacit argument to this effect: Xenophon wouldn't do that kind of thing, namely, write a treatise on the *Athenian Constitution* which he places, as it were, sixty years before the actual time of writing. After all, a reasonably good writer could write a political pamphlet in the year 1963 which claims to be a political pamphlet of the year 1863, imitating the style and all other characteristics of this period; there is no intrinsic impossibility. But since they assume that Xenophon was a very simple-minded man, this idea does not occur, and I know of no discussion where this possibility that Xenophon would have written something about the *Athenian Constitution* which was dramatically located, say, in 431, at which time Xenophon himself couldn't have written because he was a child, [is refuted]. But why should it be impossible? However, this may be; and if the style differs from Xenophon's ordinary style, which I think it does, then this of course would fit very well, this possibility, if one has understood Xenophon's really great literary capacities. This possibility, as I say, is not considered because people are so eager to get material for the political history of Greece, especially of Athens, and here they have, as they say, the oldest document of Attic prose, older even than Thucydides, that is too good not to accept. So I would not assert that it is a Xenophontic writing, but I also would not deny that it is a Xenophontic writing. I think the whole question must be discussed from scratch on the basis of a much more adequate understanding of Xenophon's greatness as a writer.

Student: [. . .]

LS: But that would be exactly the question. Could not Xenophon delegate the authorship of this to a man who would defend the Athenian democracy on this ground? Could he not imitate the style of such a shrewd [man]? Why not? If someone would write a parody of a social scientist, then of course he would naturally read ten volumes of the *Journal of Sociology* and similar things. And after some time, I think everyone of us, with the necessary effort (like, take a whole year) could master that marvelous style and write an article which might be accepted by such a journal. I see no intrinsic impossibility in that. Perhaps, after having mastered that style, he has to do some research on some subject, about juvenile delinquency on the campus of the University

of Chicago or somewhere else, and then—I see no intrinsic impossibility of that. Good. But however this may be—yes?

Student: [. . .]

LS: That's very good. In other words, there is a lot of disorder in the admittedly genuine writings. But in addition, there is one thing which you will never find quoted in any literature, and that is a statement in the treatise *On Hunting* which we must forego discussing here. There a statement occurs which they don't dare to translate, just as they do not dare to translate the passage in the *Oeconomicus* where he says: "I believe that all men believe to love what they believe to be benefited by." They don't dare to translate it, because they don't understand that sentence. Now there the sentence occurs: "What is beautifully and orderly written is not beautifully and orderly written." Just as I once heard an Old Testament scholar who, when he came to the Psalm verse "In thy light do we see light," said: It doesn't make sense, so we must change the text. Many people have found it makes very much sense. Now here perhaps it takes a bit more reflection to see how something which is not beautifully and methodically written is for this reason beautifully and orderly written. But here of course this is a special case, because Xenophon seems to identify himself here with some capitalist, with some Athenian capitalist, which he surely was not. Good.

Now let us see what is the conceit underlying this writing? That is stated in the first paragraph very simply: "Now regarding the Athenian regime that they have chosen this manner of regime I do not praise for the following reason, because having chosen it they chose that the rabble prospers more than the nice people." I exaggerate a bit; for this reason I do not praise it. You see he really is, in a somewhat inept way, repetitious. That Xenophon wouldn't do. "But after they had made the decision that they preserve well the regime and do well everything else connected with that, in which things they are supposed to make mistakes according to the other Greeks, this I am going to prove."[xiii] Now to restate it simply: they made the wrong choice of a regime, because this regime favors the rabble versus the nice better people. But on the other hand, after having made this preposterous choice, they are no fools: they go well about promoting the interests of the rabble. This is the thesis of the book.

Now let us see. He goes even beyond that. He says in the next paragraph: Given the fact that the *demos* is the source of Athens's power, it is not unjust that they do it. You see, from an extremely antidemocratic beginning he gradually goes over to a position mildly in favor of the democracy. And the *demos* is not completely stupid: they leave such magistracies as generalship and commanders of the cavalry, etc., to men from the upper classes, but the most lucrative ones they keep of course for themselves. That is not a sign of complete stupidity. After all, they don't want to be defeated in war. And it is reasonable for them to give more to the rabble than to the gentlemen, because the well-being of the rabble is of course conducive to democracy. Naturally, if they promote their interests—how did Harry Hopkins call it, this principle? We tax, we tax, we

[xiii] *Athenian Constitution,* 1.1. Strauss's translation.

tax; we spend, we spend, we spend; we elect, we elect, we elect. [xiv] Good. The fundamental defect of democracy, in paragraph 5, chapter 1. Does anyone have it?

Reader:
In every country indeed the best are hostile to a democratic government. For among the best the least licentiousness and injustice exists, and the most scrupulous insistence on good principle. But among the plebeians the greatest ignorance and insubordination and wickedness are to be found. For their poverty leads them more to base principle, and so do lack of education and ignorance in some cases due in some cases to want of money. (1.5)[xv]

LS: Well, "principle" is of course not in the text. It is really very simple language, not philosophic in any way. But this you all recognize when you read Aristotle or Plato: the simple view of the upper class, the uneducated and the disorderly who do not make strict demands on themselves. This is the democracy. This view he adopts. Now he develops this further: the right to speak in the Assembly is of course given to this rabble, naturally. But it is very strange: that is good for them. And now the great question of Plato and Aristotle and also other wise men, but also the other country club members: But how can such a poor fish know what is good for him? And now we get a beautiful answer in paragraph 7.

Reader:
The question may be asked, "what proposal could such a man make likely to be good either for himself or for the people."[xvi]

LS: You see, "to the *demos*." In other words, that it would not be absolutely good, that's clear. It will be something abominable. But how can it even be good for him, or how can it be good for the *demos*, given the fact that he is such a lousy fellow? Now what is the answer?

Reader:
But they know that his ignorance and wickedness coupled with good will towards them are more likely to be beneficial to them than the virtue and wisdom of the good man conjoined with malice.

LS: So in other words, they say this gentleman may have all the virtue and wisdom in the world, but he is opposed to us. And I prefer a man without wisdom and without virtue if he is favorably disposed toward the *demos*. You may recognize here the Hobbean argument, the fundamental Hobbean argument that the fool has a greater interest in his self-preservation than the wisest and most virtuous man; therefore let the fool be the judge. Good. It is very interesting. He is a shrewd fellow, there is no question. [The] next paragraph is also very beautiful.

[xiv] Harry Hopkins was advisor to President Franklin D. Roosevelt and a federal administrator. There is some controversy about whether or not this principle can rightly be attributed to Hopkins.
[xv] In original: "money to some men."
[xvi] In the original edition, the paragraphs are not numbered. Following a numerical path through the paragraphs, the reader finds that the numbers do not always coincide with those read out by Strauss. As noted above, there are some (minor) changes made in the translation.

Reader:
Such institutions will not produce the best city, but they are admirably calculated to preserve democracy. The people by no means desire to be slaves in a well-constituted city. They prefer to be free and to govern. Bad political conditions give them little uneasiness.

LS: No. The Greek word is [*eunomeisthai*] and [*kakonomia*]. [*Eunomeisthai*] is to be ruled by good laws, and [*kakonomia*] [to be] ruled by bad laws. Now what they want is to be free and to rule, whether their laws are bad, demoralizing, that is to their interest. They prefer to have bad laws, and to be free, than to be under good laws and be enslaved.

Reader:
From what you consider to be the absence of good laws enlarges their power and preserves their freedom.

LS: "From this very thing the *demos* is strong and free." So a folksy shrewdness without any question. He develops that in the sequel. And now in the next few paragraphs, from 10 on, he deals with the position of slaves and metics. You remember that was also the theme of the *Revenues* piece. In Athens[4] [the] metics enjoy an unbearable license from the point of view of traditional morality, and the reason is because in Athens you can't distinguish the slaves and metics from the ordinary citizens, they are so well off. The Spartans coming to Athens [were] accustomed to whip slaves, and he doesn't know whether he doesn't whip a free Athenian. The only thing to do for him if he doesn't want to go to jail is not to whip anyone. Good. And what is the reason for that? There is another point. The Athenians have to be nice to these slaves because they have a navy, and they need the many rowers and the freemen are not enough for that. In paragraph 12, now.

Reader:
For this reason we have granted equality to slaves with freemen—

LS: Literally, the "equal right of speaking."

Reader:
because the state needs metics on account of the many crafts and of the navy. For good reasons therefore have we admitted the metics to equality.

LS: "We," the first time I believe that he identifies himself with Athens, that he speaks as an Athenian citizen. There is here a certain difficulty, obviously, because in the last case he speaks only of the metics, not of the slaves. All kinds of changes have been proposed by editors. And then he goes on with other things. The democracy opposes the teachers in gymnastics and music. Let us read this paragraph.

Reader:
The people here have abolished the professional exercise of gymnastics and music, convinced that such a thing is not right, because they know that they are not able to practice it. But when it comes to the functions of the Choregae, the Gymnasiarchs, the Trierarchs they know very well

that the burden of these offices falls upon the rich, while the advantages are enjoyed by the masses.

LS: "The masses," of course, [is] always "the many."

Reader:
The people therefore think it proper to receive money for singing, running, dancing and serving on shipboard in order that they may gain and the rich become poorer.

LS: And so on. That is a new subject. So in other words, these abominable fellows, rascals, are very clever about their own profit. It is quite a surprise to him, it seems. Then he describes the policy toward the allied cities, and this is of course perfectly intelligible if you consider for one moment that the *demos* rules in Athens, and they think of their own benefit and everything falls into shape. Of course they impoverish them for the benefit of the individual Athenians and especially of the individual poor, and the trials of the allied cities in Athens and so on follows all the same purpose.

Now let us turn to chapter 2. Now the military policy. He speaks of the fact that hoplites, the heavy infantry, is the poorest part of the Athenian armament, but this has also a good reason, because Athenian power is a naval empire, and therefore the emphasis is altogether on that. And he develops then the advantage of sea power in the next paragraphs at some length. Let us read paragraph 7.

Reader:
And even if it is necessary to enumerate small advantages as well, by the command of the sea they associate with others and discover their different kinds of good cheer, and whatever is pleasant in Sicily or in Italy or in Cyprus or in Egypt or in Lydia or in Pontus or in Peloponnesus or anywhere else, all this has been collected into one spot thanks to the control of the sea. And besides, becoming acquainted with many languages they choose something from the one and something else from the other. The Greeks prefer each their own language, mode of living, and dress, but the Athenians have adopted a compound from all the Greeks and barbarians.

LS: In other words, Athens is the most cosmopolitan city. But somehow it fits. And then in the sequel—by the way, these themes are all brought up on the most lofty level in Pericles's Funeral Speech. You have here only a tough version of the important parts of the Funeral Speech, but here given by a man who is opposed to democracy as such.

Student: [. . .]

LS: Yes, but the point of view is here is definitely—let us first complete it. Then he speaks of the Athenian temples and the other beauties of the city. That is all a democratic affair. The rich can have all kinds of beauties in their houses; the poor can't have it. The poor can have it only via public edifices, public things. The wealth of Athens, the next subject, is also due to the democracy. Let us read paragraph 11.

Reader:
The Athenians alone are able to enjoy the wealth of all the Greeks or barbarians. For if any state is rich in timber for ship building, where will they dispose of it unless they secure the permission of the lords of the sea? Or if any state is rich in steel, copper, or flax where can they dispose of it unless they procure the permission of the lords of the sea. And from these very materials my ships are made. From one nation timber, from another steel, from another copper, from another flax, from another wax.

LS: What does the "I," the singular, mean here?

Student: He does this again, too.

LS: I know.

Student: Doesn't this just mean "I" as a common citizen?

LS: This is one [possible] interpretation[5]. It occurs also in the next paragraph. But let us read the next paragraph.

Reader:
In addition they will not allow them to be exported to the lands of our enemies . . . and without labor I enjoy all these benefits from the land by means of the sea. No other city has even two of them.

LS: And so on. Here in the second case it could clearly be any Athenian. But since he speaks however of "they" and "I," and since in the first case he speaks of "my ships," could he not be a shipowner? I do not know. Could be.

Student: Could this apply to Xenophon?

LS: I come to that later. No, Xenophon is not a shipowner. In paragraph 14 he speaks of the intra-Athenian political problem.

Reader:
They lack one thing. For if the Athenians while lords of the sea inhabited an island, they would have it in their power when they pleased to injure others and to suffer no injury in return, as long as they commanded the sea, and their land could not be devastated or invaded by the enemy. But now the farmers and rich men of Athens are rather afraid of the enemy, but the people, knowing well that the enemy cannot burn or devastate their property live in safety and do not fear them.

LS: So this is the famous situation in the Peloponnesian War described very well in Thucydides; also in Aristophanes. The rich, the landowning part of the population altogether suffered much more from the war than the urban population, naturally. The city was protected by walls, by very powerful walls. He puts together the rich and the farmers—there are of course many poor farmers—and he opposes to the rich and to the farmers the *demos*. He obviously understands by the *demos* the urban *demos* alone. This is the peculiarity of Athenian democracy, that an urban

demos is in control, what Aristotle called the worst kind of *demos* in his list of democracies. That is the lowest. He does not belong somehow to the *demos* nor to these other classes, it seems. I say this very tentatively; I have the feeling that this man does not belong to either the *demos*, nor to the farmers, nor to the rich who are here meant. He may really be a capitalist in the narrower sense of the word. There is also an interesting remark about comedy in paragraph 18 which is very nice. There is a law against comedy: strictly speaking, one cannot poke fun at the *demos*, but private citizens may, because who is sufficiently famous to become an object of comedy? The rich. Only occasionally a demagogue can be the subject of that. Let us read paragraphs 19 and 20 because that deals again with a fundamental problem.

Reader:
I assert then that the people of Athens know who are good among the citizens and who are bad.

LS: "Good" and "bad," that [is] really in the moral sense. "Decent" and "indecent."

Reader:
And as they know this, they love those who are their friends and supporters, however bad they may be, and entertain quite a hatred for the good—

LS: "For the decent."

Reader:
because they do not think these men will use their excellence to the people's advantage, but rather to harm them. Some however on the contrary who actually are on the side of the people are not plebeians by birth.

LS: This is hard to translate, this passage. It is ambiguous. "There are some who are truly of the *demos* who are not democratic." Now the position [of] the word "nature" is absolutely ambiguous. It can apply to both "those who are of the *demos* by birth are not democratic"or, as it may as well mean, "there are those who are truly of *demos* are not by nature democratic." This is a strange intermediate position, which he mentions briefly. Next paragraph.

Reader:
I could easily excuse the people for choosing a democracy, for everyone must be excused for wishing to benefit himself.

LS: So you see, he is a very broadminded man. Good.

Reader:
Whoever is not one of the people and prefers living under a state subject to democratic rule rather than one subject to oligarchic rule is out for some crime and knows that a scoundrel has much greater facility in escaping notice in a democratic state than in an oligarchic one.

LS: Because of its permissiveness. It is perfectly natural that a man of the *demos* should favor the *demos* but not people who are not of the *demos*, say, Pericles. This shows a bad character. But of course the question is: Did not the author choose to live in a democratic city? What is his

motive? I repeat only what appeared from paragraph 19. There are also people who stem from the *demos* and are not democratic. This of course would fit such a man like Socrates. Now let us read the first paragraph of the next chapter, 3.

Reader:
I do not commend the kind of constitution the Athenians have but since they prefer to have a democracy they seem to me to be preserving the democracy well by adopting the kind of regime which I have described.

LS: This is a restatement of the thesis, and in a way the conclusion, agreeing with the beginning of the work, and I think the thesis is perfectly clear. He disapproves of democracy but must admit, given the hypothesis, as Aristotle would say, given the assumption on which the whole thing is based, namely, rule of the *demos*: they do it well. So now the remainder is devoted to the refutation of some special criticisms of Athenian democracy: the cumbersome judicial procedure which is caused, however, as he shows, by perfectly legitimate reasons. With the best will the Athenians couldn't have a more simple judicial system, but must have this complicated one. One reason of course is the many festivals for which Athens was famous; therefore many days at which the courts couldn't meet, and this is also something you can't do anything about. Paragraph 5.

Reader:
At intervals also they must decide on the mistakes of generals and if any unexpected crime should happen, if any unusual atrocity should be committed or any offense against the gods. I pass over many things. What is of most consequence has been mentioned except the settlement of the tribute.

LS: Let us stop here for one moment. Impiety is a crime. Impiety is a crime which also takes up some of their attention. Now let us read the immediate sequel.

Reader:
This happens generally every four years. Do you not think they should pass judgment in all these cases?

LS: Yes, that is the question in all these cases. What about the impiety trials which played such a role, and of which Socrates is of course the most famous victim? This of course is in no way developed. At the end of paragraph 8.

Reader:
They have doubled the number of holidays which any other state has. I count only as many as that state has which celebrates the smallest.

LS: The sequel.

Reader:
Since this is so I insist that it is impossible that business in Athens can be otherwise conducted than at present except that a little alteration may be made by taking away or adding something. A

great change cannot be made without weakening the democratic character of the constitution. It is possible to devise many plans for improving the constitution, but it is not easy to propose a plan which will procure a better system of government without endangering the democracy except, as I have already stated, by taking away a little or adding a little.

LS: So in other words, practically everything in Athens is as it could be given the democratic premise. And that is the justification. At the end he takes up the question of those grave objections. The persecution by democracy of the best men. Paragraph 12 to 13.

Reader:
Here somebody might remark "is there nobody wrongly deprived of his political rights at Athens?" I answer there are some who are wrongly deprived of their political rights, only a few however.

LS: In other words, that is not such a grave thing.

Reader:
But not a few are needed who would attack democracy at Athens since anyway not those create a stir who are disfranchised for good reasons, but only those who are wrongly disfranchised.

LS: In other words, the Athenians can afford[6] to treat some of their best men [unjustly] because they are so few. Their small number makes them harmless.

Reader:
How then can anybody assume that the majority are wrongly disfranchised at Athens when the offices are administered by the *demos*—

LS: In other words, the majority will not disfranchise the majority.

Reader:
and for not administering their offices according to the law and for violating the law in word and deed, for such reasons people are disfranchised at Athens. If one considers this, one cannot believe that there is any danger from the disfranchised at Athens.

LS: In other words, the regime is perfectly secure. There are some injustices, but they do not affect the whole thing. Now if we look at this whole work and try for one moment to see how it would fit into Xenophon's plan: It is a justification of democracy in spite of the badness of democracy, from which point of view? From which point of view is this written? Now let us look for one moment at Ischomachus, the man who presented the teaching regarding kingship. He is of course a citizen of the democracy. Now his teaching regarding kingship is theoretically incompatible with democracy, it goes without saying. But how does he live? As a normal Athenian citizen. There is not the slightest suggestion that he is involved in any conspiracies against democracy. Or let us take Crito in the *Memorabilia*. He is a rich man [and] gets into all kinds of trouble because of his wealth. The sycophants are always after him, and yet when he goes to Socrates and complains, Socrates says, "Well, why don't you find a sycophant who sycophants the sycophants?" In other words, no revolution is needed; you can take care of your

property here. There were quite a few men in Athens who would not have chosen democracy but who accepted it, who disliked democracy but were not in any sense disaffected. This was apparently such a man.

But what is the difference between this man and Ischomachus? I believe it is connected with the fact that he does not even trade in farms. This is my hypothesis; I do not know whether it would stand up under closer scrutiny. If he is what I call a capitalist, say, some big ship owner or trader or whatever he may be, who accepts the official view of the upper class—democracy is bad, rule of the rabble—but somehow makes his peace with it; now if we take such a man in contradistinction to Ischomachus, such a man would not converse with Socrates, and Socrates would not converse with him. The only approximation that you find is Cephalus in the *Republic*, also a capitalist. By the way, he is not even an Athenian citizen, he is a metic. But this conversation, as you know, is entirely unintended. Socrates meets Polemarchus, Cephalus's son in the Piraeus, and they take Socrates home. And he had seen Cephalus before, and so a very short conversation with Cephalus takes place. That is pure accident. Socrates never sought it, nor did Cephalus seek it. It was brought about by the accident that he had a son, Polemarchus, whom Socrates knew rather well. So this man then is very far from Socrates and the Socratic circle and of course also from Xenophon, yet he has one quality which Ischomachus doesn't have, and which Cephalus doesn't have, and which is shown by this treatise: he can write. I believe that Xenophon could have played with such a notion, to take someone who is not a democrat, strictly speaking—enthusiastic for democracy, but who is surely not disaffected to the regime and defends it quite ably.[7] That is a tacit criticism; he is not a highly literate man. He is rather clumsy, but with a great native shrewdness which shows, I think, in every point. More generally stated, a man like Xenophon, who could play with tyranny in the *Hiero*, could also play with democracy.

Student: Could this also be a reason for dating it back? At the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, a rich ship owner might have a little less to complain about than at the time Xenophon wrote it.

LS: I simply do not know enough about the social history of Athens, say, around 370 or so, in order to answer that question. My reason for making this kind of remark is simply this. In the tremendous literature on this short writing, [there is] this possibility: that Xenophon could have written it—of course not at the dramatic date, which I regard as perfectly possible. And in addition, this would also explain the presence of this writing among the Xenophontic writings, which has to be explained somehow.

Student: If you were going to do the analogous thing today from the point of view of Tory democracy, such a thing would have to be dated between Disraeli and Lord Randolph Churchill' there would be too many other considerations and qualifications that would be put into the mouth of [Harold] Macmillan.

LS: Oh, yes. But I must say that, reading it not very thoroughly, the impression that this is placed before 430 and not much before, shortly before the outbreak of Peloponnesian War, this is a sound point. This is a sound point. But it doesn't affect the question of authorship, because the author can be sufficiently versatile. But as I say, these people want to have documents,

absolutely reliable documents for every point of Athenian history. That was a godsend when someone saw that this belongs to a time, a critical time at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, and surely earlier than Thucydides. Thucydides began [writing his history] at that time, but it was not composed.

Student: Might it be intended as a reply to Pericles's oration?

LS: No, there is I believe only one passage where Xenophon discusses Pericles, and that is in the conversation between Socrates and the younger Pericles, Pericles's illegitimate son.

Student: The first book of the *Memorabilia*: Alcibiades and Pericles.

LS: And there I would say, though there are only a very few remarks about Pericles, they are very critical, very critical of Pericles, and absolutely in agreement with what Plato's Socrates does in the *Gorgias* when he speaks of Pericles there. And I would venture to say, although this is a real venture, that it is in perfect agreement . . .[xvii]

[1] Deleted "of."
[2] Deleted "did."
[3] Deleted "of."
[4] Deleted "and."
[5] Moved "possible."
[6] Moved "unjustly."
[7] Deleted ", of course not—and."

[xvii] The tape ended at this point.

Session 8: no date
Lacedaemonian Constitution

Leo Strauss: [In progress] —Rousseau's *Social Contract*, book 3, chapter 10, paragraph 3. That has to do with the fact that they translate *tyrannos* by despot. They make a distinction between tyranny and despotism. Perhaps the most important statement on this subject in modern times is by Rousseau.

"In the vulgar sense a tyrant is a king who rules with violence and without regard to justice and law. In the precise sense [and this vulgar view is of course the traditional view—LS] the tyrant is a private citizen who asserts royal power without having the right to it. It is in this way that the Greeks understood this word tyrant. They gave it indifferently to good and bad princes whose authority was not legitimate. Hence tyrants and usurpers are two perfectly synonymous terms. In order to give different names to different things I call tyrant a usurper of royal authority and despot the usurper of the sovereign power."[i]

Now for Rousseau there can be only one sovereign power: the people. But the sovereign is something different from the government; all power of the government is derived from delegation by the people. And this can be called the royal power in so far as one form of government is monarchy, so that given the premise of popular sovereignty, anyone usurping, anyone claiming to possess the sovereign power is of course an usurper, but a usurper of a different kind from one who usurps only the governmental power as distinguished from the sovereign, i.e., legislative power. And in a footnote he refers to the *Hiero* as confirming his view. Well, this is a somewhat complicated matter, but a better consideration would be supplied by Thucydides's analysis of the Athenian tyranny in the sixth book of the *Histories*, where he makes clear that the Athenian tyrant left the law intact and took on only the government: the laws, the sovereign, the legislative power, the sovereign. I think this is probably the clearest statement about this novel application of the term despot to what was traditionally called a tyrant, and should be kept in mind. This is all.[ii]

Now we have today a paper on the *Lacedaemonian Constitution*.[iii] That was a very good paper, and I think the fundamental question has been brought out very well. Now you raised a number of points which I would like to restate. First, regarding the title. You are of course absolutely right, the title is not "constitution" in the narrow sense. The best thing is to remember Aristotle's statement that a regime, a *politeia*, is some way of life, and that Xenophon presents of course the Spartan way of life here, and the way of life which is inseparable from the social order, social hierarchy. And the social hierarchy, if it is clear, coincides with the political hierarchy. You know? That is a complicated situation, if the people socially at the top are not politically at the

[i] Presumably Strauss's translation.
[ii] The audiofile for this session is extant. From this point the transcript of this session is based on the remastered audiofile. Inaudible words are indicated with ellipses.
[iii] The student's paper was then read. The reading was not recorded, and the recording resumes with Strauss's comments on the paper.

top. That can happen. For example, if you think of the great importance which Hollywood actors and actresses play in moral orientation now—obviously very great—and they are clearly not the political rulers. This is a complicated situation. You know? And to take another example, when some parts of society, represented for example by Henry Adams,[iv] who regarded themselves as the true top of society, and no connection with government anymore, or hardly any connection. So this is clear. It is the Spartan way of life.

Then you raised the very pertinent question: Why a narrative or quasi-narrative, and not a dialogue? But I would suggest a more simple answer: the dialogic writings of Xenophon are the Socratic writings plus the *Hiero*, no other. Now what is the peculiarity of these five writings compared with the other writings? Let's say in these five writings a wise man occurs: Socrates in the four; and in the *Hiero,* Simonides. And apparently Xenophon thought that the only way of presenting a wise man is in action, i.e., in speaking, in dialogue, and not descriptive[ly]. This has very broad consequences. For example, if you take Thucydides's *History*, which is admired, of course rightly, but people always say: Why[1] doesn't [he] say a word about the glory of Athens, Phidias, and Sophocles, and the other things? Whereas when a man writes today a political history—I remember the history of the Civil War period, the most recent by two Columbia professors,[v] I believe. Pardon?

Student: . . .

LS: . . . Merits? Yes, and there is of course a chapter on the intellectual life of the '50's and '60's. Today that's simply proper, to adorn a political history with some chapters about the intellectual life of the times; also in other countries in other periods. But these people assume that you can describe intellectual life. You can describe battles; you cannot describe thoughts. Thoughts can only be thought, and the way of presenting the thought of Athens is to think. And this is what Thucydides did. And similarly, Xenophon: when he presents wise men he presents them in the act of thinking or at least of expressing their thoughts. This I believe would be the answer to that.

Now you also stated correctly that Xenophon's treatment of Sparta is in principle the same as that of Plato and Aristotle: admiration, but also a critique. That is true. Now there was one more point. You wisely considered the *Education of Cyrus* together with the *Spartan Constitution,* and especially you considered the beginnings. I suppose Mr. Boyan will also think about this subject. Then you raise this incisive question.[2] In the *Cyropaideia* a regime is presented which looks wonderful, and which has however the seeds of its own destruction in itself, and the same is true of Lycurgus's Sparta: looks wonderful, but has the seeds of destruction within itself. But then you spoke later on of the decay of the more recent Spartans. That is what Xenophon also explicitly says in the fourteenth chapter, but what were the seeds of destruction already in the original scheme? And then you gave the answer: Because it is rule of law, just as the *Cyropaedia*, the *Education of Cyrus*, shows the defect, the inevitable defect, of the rule of the wise man, because he may not be succeeded by a wise man.

[iv] American intellectual and historian (1838-1918) most famously remembered for his posthumously published autobiographical work, *The Education of Henry Adams*.

[v] Strauss might be referring to the work of David Herbert Donald and Richard N. Current.

There is another thing: the rule of law, which has also essential limitations which however do not show immediately, but after some time. That was your answer, which is very good as far as it goes, but I believe you neglected in your final answer a point which you seem to have meant in your previous statement on the subject, namely, that it is not *merely* the fact that it is rule of law, but that these particular laws of Lycurgus account for the decay. This is the point I think we have to try to clear up. So I had here another point which I cannot remember what I meant: advice of tyrants. Did you say anything about advice of tyrants? Or I do not remember what I meant . . . Good. That is my fault.

Now let us turn then right away to the text, because we have lots of things to do. Unfortunately, from now on we will have still less time because the assignments are longer. Well, I cannot help that. And if I had been as wise as I am now at the beginning, I would have said we read only the *Cyropaedeia*, but I think since Xenophon is so very unknown today, I thought some general familiarity with him should be acquired before we turn to that. Now let us look at the beginning. Will you read that? At the beginning of the *Memorabilia*, he says: "I have often wondered" more than once. Here, as well as the beginning of the *Cyropaideia*: once. That indicates the relative weight which the two themes have for Xenophon. Yes?

Student: It's the plural in the *Cyropaideia*.

LS: Pardon?

Same Student: The plural, "us."

LS: Yes, that is also true. He doesn't speak from the beginning of "I," that's perfectly true. This is more direct, more homely—"I," not "we," which is a plural of modesty and at the same time of majesty. If people say: We have shown in our previous publications—you know?—more frequently in Europe, I believe, than in this country, yes: "Our famous theory," and so on. [Laughter] Good, so now begin again.

Mr. Reinken:
It occurred to me one day that Sparta, though among the most thinly populated of states, was evidently the most powerful and most celebrated city in Greece; and I fell to wondering how this could have happened. But when I considered the institutions of the Spartans, I wondered no longer.
Lycurgus, who gave them the laws that they obey, and to which they owe their prosperity, I do regard with wonder; and I think that he reached the utmost limit of wisdom.[vi] (1.1-2)

LS: So he wondered. He translates well. He doesn't say, "I admire Lycurgus"; he wonders at this point. He wonders all the time and he wonders also about Lycurgus. Yes?

[vi] Xenophon, *Constitution of the Lacedaemonians*, trans. E. C. Marchant and G. W. Bowersock (St. Edmunsbury Press, 1925). It is clear from the audiofile that the reader is Donald Reinken, who served as reader in many of Strauss's courses.

Student: Is that in the Greek? Doesn't that mean to admire also?

LS: Yes, sure, but it does not unambiguously mean admire. That's another word, *agasthe*. But *thaumazein* means wonder and can also mean admire, because it is obvious that there is a connection between wonder and admiration. You wonder about his wisdom.

Student: . . .

LS: Yes, but since he uses it three times in the compass of a single sentence or two sentences, one has of course to consider the one meaning, and the one meaning is clearly, first, "I wondered at," "I am amazed," and "in such a way that I try to explain." That is what Aristotle means in the famous sentence that wonder is the beginning of philosophy: "wondering," meaning to be nonplussed, and trying to find out why, and he is trying to find out why. Yes. Now the next sentence.

Mr. Reinken:
For it was not by imitating other states, but by devising a system utterly different than that of most others, that he made his country pre-eminently prosperous. (1.2)

LS: Ya. "Different" is too weak. "Opposed to the most cities," "opposed." Now Sparta did not imitate the other cities. Does this ring a bell in some of you? A city which did not imitate other cities?

Student: Athens.

LS: Very good. Where?

Student: Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War*.

LS: In the *Funeral Speech*. Absolutely, sure, and Xenophon knew Thucydides. According to the tradition, he edited the work of Thucydides, which may be an exaggeration, but he surely knew it. So Sparta is the true Athens, meaning[3] a city which is absolutely original. But he goes beyond Pericles and says, "*opposed* to the other cities," which Pericles doesn't say. Pericles says only we alone do that; in other words, we are different, but not opposed. Yes. Still, once[4] Pericles says, in chapter 40, paragraph 4, that Athens is opposed to the others. Once, it occurs. Good.

Now, and he begins of course at the beginning in the next paragraph, namely, birth—i.e., the generation of children. And since here the mother is somehow more important than the father, he begins with the education of women, just as in the *Oeconomicus*, you will remember, he began with the women question. Now what does he say here? Let us read only the first two paragraphs to get an idea what he is driving at.

Mr. Reinken:
First, to begin at the beginning, I will take the begetting of children. In other states the girls who are destined to become mothers and are brought up in the approved fashion, live on the very plainest fare, with the most meager allowance of delicacies. Wine is either withheld altogether,

or, if allowed them, is diluted with water. The rest of the Greeks expect their girls to imitate the sedentary life that is typical of handicraftsmen—to keep quiet and do wool-work." (I.3)

LS: In other words, they are brought up not as gentlewomen but as craftswomen, weavers. Yes?

Mr. Reinken:
How, then, is it to be expected that women so brought up will bear fine children?
But Lycurgus thought the labor of slave women sufficient to supply clothing. He believed motherhood to be the most important function of freeborn woman. Therefore, in the first place, he insisted on physical training for the female no less than for the male sex— (1.3-4)

LS: Yes, let us stop here for one moment. Now what do we learn here about Spartan girls and what they eat? They are not given merely the minimum of food as the Athenian girls and the Theban girls, but what do they get?

Student: Wine and meat.

LS: I spoke only of food, but since you brought up the subject of wine [laughter]**,** what kind of wine did they drink?

Student: Undiluted.

LS: Undiluted wine, which was in Greece regarded as dissolute, to drink undiluted wine. So the Spartan girls get plenty of meat and wine. Well, he develops this further; we cannot follow that, but[5] the reasoning is clear: they are overfed and drink much too much wine. And what is the consequence? They lead also in other respects a dissolute life. Never forget that the most famous Spartan woman was Helen, whose reputation is known. Sure, she was a Spartan girl. And then they had also these gymnastics, you know, where women exercised without proper dress. And Aristotle and Plato say a lot about this particular defect: the Spartan women were the weakest side of Sparta. But what is interesting here is this, that Xenophon doesn't say it explicitly. He doesn't say the Spartan girls drink too much undiluted wine, he only says the girls in the other cities do not get any wine or at most watered down wine, and we have to figure it out what happens to the Spartan girls. This is his way of—but this is one of the defects of Lycurgus's regime. Yes?

Student: Doesn't Aristotle say that Lycurgus had a problem with trying to impose a stable order on men and women?

LS: We don't know—well, Lycurgus is now regarded as a more or less mythical figure, but however this may be, if we talk in these terms, what would happen? He wanted to have also strict discipline for the girls, and then there was a kind of riot. And then the final legislation made the concession to the fair sex.

Student: So with Lycurgus, it really wasn't a problem of his wisdom so much as the way of life.

LS: But still, a legislator is ultimately judged on the basis of the code which he produced; I mean, just as the plans of the American Constitution are not the American Constitution but the Constitution [that] was eventually adopted. What is good for us is also good for Lycurgus. That Lycurgus was compelled to make the concession is an excuse for Lycurgus, but it doesn't make his final code better. Is that clear? Let us never forget that, this little thing. If something is excusable, that means it is bad: of something good, you don't say it must be excused, ya? That is somewhat forgotten in certain branches of present-day social analysis, [6][where] if you can give the cause, that's all there is to it; but the cause may be a good cause and may be a cause which has only the character of an excuse. Yes? Mr. Butterworth?

Mr. Butterworth: How much does the sentence in paragraph 3 take away from the fact that Xenophon may be pointing to a dissolute life . . . referring to the other Greeks? How then is it to be expected that women so brought up will bear fine children?

LS: "Will bear something on a grand scale": *megaleion*, derivative from *mega***.** Now you see of course you must not forget this point. If you look at the matter from a strictly eugenic point of view, you want to have the best offspring, physical offspring. But this is not the only consideration. I mean, this is good if you are concerned with horses and cows, but not with human beings. Let us read paragraph 7.

Mr. Reinken:
It might happen, however, that an old man had a young wife; and he observed—

LS: First he speaks about the marriage relations, and now we come to certain marginal cases. Ya?

Mr. Reinken:
and he observed that old men keep a very jealous watch over their young wives. To meet these cases he instituted an entirely different system by requiring the elderly husband to introduce into his house some man whose physical and moral qualities he admired, in order to beget children. (1.7)

LS: Yes. And the next paragraph?

Mr. Reinken:
On the other hand, in case a man did not want to cohabit with his wife and nevertheless desired children of whom he could be proud, he made it lawful for him to choose a woman who was the mother of a fine family and of high birth, and if he obtained her husband's consent, to make her the mother of his children. (1.8)

LS: And [the] next sentence.

Mr. Reinken:
He gave his sanction to many similar arrangements—

LS: So in other words, you see that was a big institute—how do you call this? "Eugenics" is not the right word. How do you call this thing for horses? Pardon?

Mr. Reinken: Stud farm.

LS: Yes, a farm, a big stud farm. [Laughter] Sure, that's it. Very good. And now we see the consequence pointed out by Aristotle in the second book of the *Politics*. Next paragraph. I mean, why this was not only required for eugenic reasons, but there were also other motives. Yes? "For the women wish."

Mr. Reinken:
For the women wish[vii] to take charge of two households, and the husbands want to get brothers for their sons, brothers who are members of the family and share in its influence, but claim no part of the money. (1.9)

LS: So you see. So in other words, the root of the Spartan decay described by Aristotle in the second Book of the *Politics* is already there. You get an aristocracy, an impoverished aristocracy. The famous problem of the younger sons, which brought such a ruin to France and to other continental countries, and which the English prevented by permitting the younger sons to go into business, you know, they didn't inherit the title and could go into business. On the Continent, if a noble family had ten sons, they all inherited the title and couldn't go into any business, and you created a kind of problem which could be taken care of to some extent by army and administration, but nevertheless which was not so easy. Yes, last sentence of the paragraph.

Mr. Reinken:
Whether he succeeded in populating Sparta with a race of men remarkable for their size and strength anyone who chooses may judge for himself. (1.10)

LS: In other words, what does Xenophon assert in this? Was Lycurgus successful from the point of view of mere eugenics? No, he doesn't say so. Everyone must look. He doesn't say.

Student: . . . the most thinly populated . . .

LS: That was at that time true, in the late fifth and fourth century. And there is a lot of speculation why this was so, one reason being there was an earthquake which depopulated Sparta tremendously, and other kinds of things. But Sparta had a very, very small body of full citizens, unusually small relative to her power. Now the beginning of the next paragraph.

Mr. Reinken:
Having dealt with the subject of birth, I wish next to explain the educational system of Lycurgus, and how it differs from other systems. (2.1)

LS: He doesn't speak of course of "systems," just the education simply. Why it is necessary to add "systems," except if this is meant to be read in education departments, I do not know. Yes?

[vii] In original (Marchant): "For the wives want"

Mr. Reinken:
In the other Greek states parents who profess to give their sons the best education place their boys under the care of—

LS: "Their children." Now that is interesting because he speaks first of the boys and then goes over to children in general. But of course that reminds us of the question: How were the Spartan girls educated? Because after all, after they were so pampered with food and wine, the education in continence would seem to be of utmost importance. Let us go on where you left off.

Mr. Reinken:
under the care and control of a—Marchant translates "moral tutor."

LS: That is an Oxford term, as he explains in a note.

Mr. Reinken: It was a slave who took the children.

LS: Yes. Perhaps he looked down at these Oxford moral tutors; I do not know. Maybe he was a very big shot there. I do not know. Yes, good. Now let's go on.

Mr. Reinken:
as soon as they can understand what is said to them, and send them to a school to learn letters, music and the exercises of the wrestling-ground. (2.1)

LS: Let us stop here for one moment. Then, of course, what did Sparta do? And then there is a great praise of Spartan severe ascetic education: no shoes, and all that kind of thing. He doesn't say a word about what the Spartans did regarding letters and music. This corresponds to the silence before. The amusical or insufficiently musical character of Spartan education is also emphasized in the first book of Plato's *Laws*.[7] They have then of course not a slave, but a highly respected older citizen who is in care of the young. What is his major activity? He punishes severely. He punishes severely. So they are whipped into shape, literally. Beginning of paragraph 5.

Mr. Reinken:
As to the food, he required the prefect to bring with him such a moderate amount of it that the boys would never suffer from repletion, and would know what it was to go with their hunger unsatisfied— (2.5)

LS: Yes. "The boys." Now let me see, there is here a difficulty regarding the text. What is that regarding *eirēn*? He doesn't translate it literally enough. The manuscripts read "the male one." "The male one." That is strictly what happened to the boys. All these ascetic severities apply only to the males. And now there comes a special Spartan institution which also—from the very beginning, that's all still Lycurgus, that's not decayed Sparta. Paragraph 6. Because they don't get much to eat, these boys have hunger all the time, and this also has its side effects. Now let us read what he did about that.

Mr. Reinken:
He also thought that a diet which made their bodies slim would do more to increase their height than one that consisted of flesh-forming food.
On the other hand, lest they should feel too much the pinch of hunger, while not giving them the opportunity of taking what they wanted without trouble he allowed them to alleviate their hunger by stealing something. (2.6)

LS: By stealing. So, yes. Good.

Mr. Reinken:
and lie in ambush by day, and moreover, if he means to make a capture, he must have spies ready— (2.7)[viii]

Nor yet is there any reason for amassing money in order to spend it on one's messmates; for he made it more respectable to help one's fellows by toiling with the body than by spending money, pointing out that toil is an employment of the soul, spending an employment of wealth. (7.4)

LS: The use of the distinction between body and soul is here slightly mixed up. Let us read the sequel.

Mr. Reinken:
By other enactments he rendered it impossible to make money in unfair ways. (7.5)

LS: Hitherto we had the impression there is no making of money, fair or unfair.

Mr. Reinken: He seems to be having his difficulties with the Spartans. "In the first place—"

LS: Yes, but we have not rightly translated it. "He prevented making money in unjust ways or from unjust sources also in the subject population." That is to say, not only did he forbid any moneymaking to the full citizens, even the subject population was not permitted to make money in unjust ways. And how did he do that?

Mr. Reinken:
In the first place the system of coinage that he established was of such a kind that even a sum of ten minae could not be brought into a house without the master and the servants being aware of it: the money would fill a large space and need a wagon to draw it. (7.5)

LS: Right. The iron coinage. Ihe iron coinage, and of course it requires lots of wagons if you want to be even moderately wealthy, whereas if you have as much silver as you would get in Xenophon's Athens, to say nothing of gold, the situation would be different. Yes?

Mr. Reinken:

[viii] There is a break in the tape at this point. When the recording resumes, Mr. Reinken is reading from 7.4.

Moreover, there is a right of search for gold and silver, and, in the event of discovery, the possessor is fined. Why, then, should money-making be a preoccupation in a state where the pains of its possession are more than the pleasures of its enjoyment? (7.6)

LS: Is it not true? So he solves this problem completely. The acquisition of wealth is prevented by the heavy weight of money. Now of course: What about gold and silver (one can rightly ask the question), which can easily be hidden? Well, there are searches for gold and silver, so it is impossible to own gold and silver. Later on, in the fourteenth chapter when he describes the present Spartans in contrast to the early Spartans, he says of the early Spartans, they were afraid of being seen in the possession of gold. In other words, the desire for gold was not eradicated. The same thing happened which happened in this country during the Prohibition:[ix] there were searches possible, as we know, and yet people who were very eager to possess liquor found a way to it. That was from the very beginning a defect. Yes?

Student: But that was just the subjects who somehow might have a desire for gold and silver. Is that true? The citizens, why they were so educated that there was nothing—

LS: All right, that's a good question. We come to that later. So in other words, if the citizens were men who had not even a desire for gold and silver, then not even searches would be necessary. Therefore we have to wait. How far were the Lycurgan Spartans educated so that they are free from greed in every form? Yes?

Mr. Reinken: May I call another thread to mind? We've been going on the Spartans' wealth. But going over chapter 4, we do not pick up the thread that it was Lycurgus who instituted the rivalry, but he had the three captains pick it up. And in the end, Sparta in its decline is described as not only greedy but factious.

LS: That is true. But I did not bring this in because of the brevity of time. Sure, this spirit of rivalry is of course also something questionable, you are quite right. Beginning of chapter 8.

Mr. Reinken:
To continue: we all know that obedience to the magistrates and the laws is found in the highest degree in Sparta. (8.1)

LS: That we all know. This is not merely something where he says "look around," as in the case of other things, whether it is true what I say or whether Lycurgus achieved his goal. That we all know. Good. Next paragraph.

Mr. Reinken:
I base my inference on the following facts. In other states the most powerful citizens do not even wish it to be thought that they fear the magistrates: they believe such fear to be a badge of slavery. (8.2)

[ix] "Prohibition" refers to the prohibition of the production, transport and sale of all alcoholic beverages. Prohibition in the United States began with measures taken by individual states and became national policy with the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment in 1920. The ban was lifted in 1933.

LS: Literally, "unfree." Unfree. Illiberal. Yes?

Mr. Reinken:
But at Sparta the most important men show the utmost deference to the magistrates: they pride themselves on their humility, on running instead of walking to answer any call, in the belief that, if they lead, the rest will follow along the path of eager obedience. (8.2)

LS: "Humility" is a correct translation here. It is one of the very few cases in classical literature where humility is used as a term of praise, and characteristically in a Spartan context. The same happens also in Plato's *Laws*, where it occurs also in a Spartan context. In other words, in Sparta humility is regarded as a virtue, which is not true in the other Greek cities. Now how do they bring that about? That is stated in the sequel; there was a special Spartan institution which guaranteed this kind of humility. Yes?

Student: Just one question. Is this the kind of humility where you have a mean opinion of yourself? Is this what he means by this? Where—

LS: Well, you could also say—well, you cannot bring in the most sophisticated analysis given by Aristotle in the *Ethics*, necessarily. But here it amounts very much to something like obsequiousness. Obsequiousness: "Yes, sir, yes sir, by all means, sir."

Student: But it's not the kind of thing where Cyrus is speaking of this very beautiful woman in his camp and afraid to go near her because I don't trust myself when it comes to— [Laughter]

LS: That I don't know. I mean, I don't know whether the word, the Greek equivalent of humility, occurs at all in the *Education of Cyrus*. I do not know.

Same Student: He says, "I have a mean opinion of myself," or low opinion of myself, and I wondered—

LS: That is not quite the same. Yes?

Student: . . .

LS: Of course in an army it is almost inevitable, but that occurs also in civilian life. Let us read the sequel, then it will become perfectly clear. Yes?

Mr. Reinken:
It is probable also that these same citizens helped to set up the office of Ephor, having come to the conclusion that obedience is a— (8.3)

LS: So in other words, Lycurgus was not entirely alone, you will hear that. He was not *the* wise man who established that. He had some helpers. Yes?

Mr. Reinken:

having come to the conclusion that obedience is a very great blessing whether in a state or an army or a household. For they thought that the greater the power of these magistrates the more they would impress the minds of the citizens to obedience.[x] (8.3)

LS: And *kataplexein*. What is that? To bring it down. To bring it *down*. I don't know—

Student: To strike down.

LS: Strike down, to strike it down. Yes. And now he comes to this key institution of Sparta.

Mr. Reinken:
Accordingly, the Ephors are competent to fine whom they choose, and have authority to enact immediate payment: they have authority also to deprive the magistrates of office, and even to imprison and prefer a capital charge against them. Possessing such wide power they do not, like other states, leave persons elected to office to rule as the like throughout the year, but in common with tyrants[xi]—

LS: "But like tyrants."

Mr. Reinken:
and the presidents of athletic games,[xii] they no sooner see anyone breaking the law than they punish the offender. (8.4)

LS: Ya. So in other words, the power of the Ephors is a tyrannical power, and this explains the extreme obedience of the Spartans, to which is added the next step, the final step of Lycurgus for guaranteeing obedience. The next paragraph.

Mr. Reinken:
Among many excellent plans contrived—

LS: "Devices."

Mr. Reinken:
devices contrived by Lycurgus for encouraging willing obedience to the laws among the citizens, I think one of the most excellent was this: before delivering his laws to the people— (8.5)

LS: "The multitude." Before giving the laws to the multitude—

Mr. Reinken:
he paid a visit to Delphi, accompanied by the most important citizens—

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[x] In original (Marchant): "impress the minds of the citizens."
[xi] In original: "despots"
[xii] In original: "the games"

LS: Yes, "the most outstanding citizens," which is not necessarily morally excellent. Good. It is also not simply identical with the most powerful, but could be just the most powerful. These men who helped him in establishing the order. Yes?

Mr. Reinken:
and inquired of the god whether it was desirable and better for Sparta that she should obey the laws that he himself had framed. Only when the god answered that it was better in every way did he deliver them, after enacting that to refuse obedience to laws given by the Pythian god was not only unlawful, but wicked. (8.5)

LS: So in other words, it is made clear: the religious sanction is a sanction for laws of human origin which Lycurgus had given. That's clear. This is in a way the key chapter.
Then in the next chapter he speaks of what Lycurgus did in order to make the Spartans courageous or manly. Cowardice leads to absolute disgrace in Sparta, so that even the greatest natural coward is bound to behave, because life becomes absolutely impossible if he doesn't live up to the highest standards of military virtue. In chapter 10 he turns to another Spartan magistracy, to the *gerousia*, the Council of Elders. Yes, now let us read that.

Mr. Reinken:
The law by which Lycurgus encouraged the practice of virtue up to old age is another excellent measure in my opinion. By requiring men to face the ordeal of election to the Council of Elders near the end of life, he prevented neglect of high principles even in old age. (10.1)

LS: What he calls "high principle" is "perfect gentlemanship," *kalokagathian*. That is the special Spartan claim. Surely, because what you want to become when you are old is a member of this Council of the Elders and then you must have a perfectly good reputation. Yes?

Mr. Reinken:
Worthy of admiration also is the protection that he afforded to the old age of good men. For the enactment by which he made the Elders judges in trials on the capital charge— (10.2)

LS: Now let us translate a bit more literally: "By making the old men sovereign regarding the contest about the soul." That is absolutely literal. It means of course soul is also life in capital charges, but the word "soul" is important. Now let us see what follows from that. "He thus made old age more honored than the strength of men in their prime." Yes, go on.

Mr. Reinken:
And surely it is natural that of all contests in the world this should excite the greatest zeal—

LS: Now this is taken most seriously, *this* contest. Which contest? The contest where your life is at stake, or the contest for a seat in the Council of the Elders? That is a nice ambiguity here. That is in Greek absolutely ambiguous. Of course one will think—but one must think of both. Now go on.

Mr. Reinken:

For noble as are the contests in the Games, they are merely tests of bodily things.[xiii] But the contest for the Council judges souls whether they be good. (10.3)

LS: You see? So it is really also a contest of the souls: criminal charge; and a seat on the Council is also a contest regarding the souls, whether they have a good soul. This joke must not be overlooked. Yes, now go on.

Mr. Reinken:
As much then, as the soul surpasses the body, so much more worthy are the contests of the soul to kindle zeal than those of the body. (10.3)

LS: Yes. Good. This much about this *gerousia*. And now comes the key sentence about Spartan virtue. Yes?

Mr. Reinken:
Again, the following surely entitles the work of Lycurgus to high admiration. He observed that where the cult of virtue is left to voluntary effort, the virtuous are not strong enough to increase the fame of their fatherland. (10.4)

LS: Literally "the fatherlands"; "to increase their fatherlands." Not only in fame, also in other respects. Also the territory, maybe; also the wealth, maybe. That's undecided.

Mr. Reinken:
So he compelled all men at Sparta to practice all the virtues in public life.

LS: "As a matter of public concern." This was the famous claim of Sparta mentioned by Aristotle, and Plato too. In Sparta every citizen was compelled to practice all the virtues as a matter of public concern, whereas in liberal Athens the practice of virtues was left largely to the individual. Yes. So Lycurgus has a higher aim. How did he go about it? Yes?

Mr. Reinken:
And therefore, just as private individuals differ from one another in virtue according as they practice or neglect it, so Sparta, as a matter of course, surpasses all other states—

LS: Literally "differs." The word "differ" can easily take on the meaning of surpassing, because surpassing is one way of differing. But literally translated it means "differs." Sparta differs naturally from all cities in regard to virtue. Yes.

Mr. Reinken:
because she alone makes a public duty of gentlemanly conduct. (10.4)

LS: Well, literally: "Exercising as a matter of public concern perfect gentlemanship." Now what do the other cities do? In the sequel.

[xiii] In original: "bodily powers"

Mr. Reinken:
For was not this too a noble rule of his, that whereas other states punish only for wrong done to one's neighbor, he inflicted penalties no less severe on any who openly neglected to live as good a life as possible? For he believed, it seems, that enslavement, fraud, robbery, are crimes that injure only the victims of them; but the wicked man and the coward are traitors to the whole body politic. And so he had a?good reason, I think, for visiting their offenses with the heaviest penalties. (10.4-6)

LS: Yes. No, this is the key question, the key question up to the present day, because in a modified form this is exactly the modern principle which is represented by the non-Spartan cities: You punish people only if they *hurt* other people—theft, murder, and so on. He doesn't mention the key case which is still admitted and was always admitted: that is, high treason, where your fellow citizen is not necessarily hurt as an individual but indirectly, of course, as a member of the *polis*. If we disregard the case of the most famous public crime, namely, high treason, then this is different. Is it the duty of the *polis* only to establish peace among the individuals, or to be concerned with the virtue of every citizen? And now the classics of course take the latter view, as you know. Aristotle makes this very clear that this is a very low view of the *polis*, to say it should only guarantee peace—the Hobbes-Lockean view. It should be concerned with every citizen becoming a doer of noble deeds, that is the official Spartan view. Yes?

Student: It's interesting, the difference in the principle here and the principle of the *Oeconomicus*. In the *Oeconomicus* the principle is "reward those who do the good." Here the principle is "punish those who don't do the good."

LS: Yes.

Same Student: Both are going beyond the normal notion of justice, I mean our notion of maintaining peace in society. But they are going higher—

LS: The emphasis on punishment and whipping is of course very powerful in Sparta, as we have seen and as we will see in some other places. But I think the fundamental principle is, in the language now used: Is the function of civil society very limited—protection of life, liberty and property, the non-Spartan view—or does it concern the best, the virtue of every citizen? And here Lycurgus goes in for the highest goal, but perhaps he was not quite successful. It is also interesting—that's one of these little things of which I gave a schema here—that he doesn't say anything about what Lycurgus did to ordinary crimes. That he does not say. Maybe he was so much concerned with making them patriotic citizens that he didn't take too seriously merely private crimes. Well, is there any evidence for this interpretation?

Student: Stealing.

LS: Sure. Naturally, when he taught them to steal, and also what he says about the common use of property, to say nothing of other things. All private things were more or less publicly used. Where can you draw the line then between a crime and something which is permitted as a matter of course? Yes. Now the next paragraph, please.

Mr. Reinken:
And he laid on the people the duty of practicing the whole virtue of a citizen— (10.7)

LS: "The whole *political* virtue." This is to be taken very seriously. Political virtue is not true virtue. Lycurgus believed, and intended to train all the citizens in *true* virtue. In fact, he trained them only in that virtue which can be produced by punishment and perhaps also by some honors, but chiefly by punishment, in this presentation. Yes?

Mr. Reinken:
as an irresistible necessity.[xiv] (10.7)

LS: In addition, the irresistible necessity cuts both ways, you know, because if a man has no *choice,* then you don't get the genuine stuff. Yes?

Mr. Reinken:
For to all who satisfied the requirements of his code he gave equal rights of citizenship, without regard to bodily infirmity or want of money. (10.7)

LS: Okay. Now this word which he uses here, *toi men gar ta nomina ektelousin*, "those who finish, who comply fully with the laws," this is not the same expression used in *Memorabilia* book 4, chapter 6, paragraph 12, where he defines aristocracy. In aristocracy those rule who *epitelousi ta nomina*, who "complete the laws," namely, by equitable interpretation. That is something different. Sparta is not an aristocracy, in other words. Yes?

Mr. Reinken:
But the coward who shrank from the task of observing the rules of his code he caused to be no more reckoned among the peers.
Now that these laws are of high antiquity there can be no doubt: for Lycurgus is said to have lived in the days of the Heracleidae. (10.7-8)

LS: Who were they?

Student: Sons of Heracles.

LS: Yes, the sons or descendants of Heracles. Now, but who lived in Xenophon's time? The Spartan kings. They were still the sons of Heracles. So that is a very ambiguous statement about the lifetime of Lycurgus. That is somehow obscure, when he lived. Yes?

Mr. Reinken:
Nevertheless, in spite of their antiquity, they are wholly strange to others even at this day. Indeed, it is most astonishing that all men praise such institutions, but no state chooses to imitate them. (10.8)

[xiv] In original: "necessity irresistible"

LS: Ya. So in other words, in a way they say that is admirable that everyone in Sparta is a good citizen in the highest sense, but somehow they are not attracted by the methods used. So this is the end of the core of the treatise beginning in chapter 5, of the Spartan constitution.

Now he turns to the army in the next three chapters. And let us read only the beginning of chapter 11.

Mr. Reinken:
The blessings that I have enumerated so far were shared by all alike in peace and in war. But if anyone wishes to discover in what respect Lycurgus' organization of the army on active service was better than other systems, here is the information that he seeks. (11.1)

LS: Yes, you see the "if." This is not as obligatory, so to speak, as the political proper. Xenophon, the alleged mere colonel, regards the military things as less important, less high in rank than the things applying equally to war and to peace. Now he develops that[8] in the eleventh chapter, [where] he deals with tactics especially. I am completely incompetent regarding that subject, and it would be a task for a thorough student of Xenophon[9] to study the tactics of Cyrus developed at great length in the *Education of Cyrus* and to compare it with the Spartan tactics. Only on that basis could one pass judgment on what Xenophon really thought of Spartan tactics.

The next chapter, 12, deals with the camp. And there are some—from paragraph 2 it appears that the Spartans have to watch their friends. What does this mean? That they don't come too close to the arms. They are disarmed except when in combat. What does this mean?

Student: Would that refer to the practice of hiring mercenaries or non-citizens to serve in the army?

LS: The Helots, the subject population which they had to use in war. But they didn't trust them, because if they got the arms in their hands, they might easily slit the Spartans' throats, and this was not what they were for in the camp. You know? At the end of paragraph 12—at the end of chapter 12.

Mr. Reinken:
Let not the length to which I run occasion surprise, for it is almost impossible to find any detail in military matters requiring attention that is overlooked by the Lacedaemonians. (12.7)

LS: Literally, "One will find the Spartans have omitted least what it necessary in military things." So in other words, the organization of the camp is probably the best thing you find in Sparta. Chapter 13 deals still with military matters, namely, with the position of the king on campaigns, and the most important thing which he does is sacrificing. Paragraph 5.

Mr. Reinken:
There are also present two of the Ephors, who interfere in nothing except by the King's request—

LS: So in other words, the tyrannical power of the Ephors is dormant when they are on a campaign, where the king is in control. Yes?

Mr. Reinken:
but keep an eye on the proceedings, and see that all behave with a decorum suitable to the occasion. When the sacrifices are ended, the King summons all and delivers the orders of the day. And so, could you watch the scene, you would think all other men were mere improvisors in soldiering and the Lacedaemonians the only artists in warfare. (13.5)

LS: Now that's when he speaks of the sacrificing done by the king. This sacrificing is part of the military art. Paragraph 8.

Mr. Reinken:
The following arrangements made by Lycurgus with a view to the actual fighting are also, in my opinion, very useful. When a goat is sacrificed, the enemy being near enough to see, custom ordains that all the fluteplayers present are to play and every Lacedaemonian is to wear a wreath. An order is also given to polish arms. It is also the privilege of the young warrior to comb his hair before entering battle, to look cheerful and earn a good report. (13.8)

LS: Well, that is a noble thing, I would say. But it has, of course, as all Spartan things have—at least from the point of view of the Athenians—it always verges on the ridiculous, even if nobly intended. I think that comes out very well in Thucydides's *History*, too. Yes. He then goes over at the end of the chapter to the function of the king not only in war but also in peace. We might read the last paragraphs. Read paragraph 10.

Mr. Reinken:
When the time for encamping seems to have arrived, the decision rests with the King, who also indicates the proper place. On the other hand the dispatch of embassies whether to friends or enemies is not the King's affair. All who have any business to transact deal in the first instance with the King. Suitors for justice are remitted by the King to the Court of Hellanodicae, applications for money to the treasurers; and if anyone brings booty, he is sent to the auctioneers. With this routine the only duties left to the King on active service are to act as priest in matters of religion and as general in his dealings with the men. (13.10-11)

LS: Ya, literally: "as a priest with a view to the god, and as a general with a view to human beings." So in other words, the king's function is strictly limited to the hierarchic and military. All functions of a political, diplomatic nature, to say nothing of the merely domestic ones, belong to other magistrates. This much is the military section.

And now there comes this chapter 14, which has been regarded as at least misplaced, if not spurious, by some editors because the fifteenth chapter goes on, as the whole work, [in] apparent praise of Sparta and Lycurgus's wonderful, wonderful institutions, and then in fourteen there comes a criticism of present-day Sparta. Now let's read the beginning.

Mr. Reinken:

Should anyone ask me whether I think that the laws of Lycurgus still remain unchanged at this day, I certainly could not say that with any confidence whatever. (14.1)

LS: No. "This by Zeus I could no longer say boldly." The former things he has said boldly—boldly—but this he cannot say because the facts are too obvious. And this is the only time where he swears, to make absolutely sure that this is the pure truth. [LS chuckles] Yes.[10] Then he describes the Spartans as they are now, because all Greeks have come to know them after the Peloponnesian War when they occupied the Greek cities and behaved like absolutely abominable tyrants, sending there their governors called "harmosts," and so on. And of course they are extremely greedy—extremely greedy. That was a matter of public knowledge, where no one could have the boldness to say they are fine men. The difficulty is only: Why does it come in here, and why do we have another chapter still? Present-day Sparta, in a word, has declined completely in every respect except one, and that one which is maintained comes in the fifteenth chapter. Now what is that? The beginning of chapter 15.

Mr. Reinken:
I wish also to give an account of the compact made by Lycurgus between— (15.1)[xv]

LS: —This is the only magistracy which remains as it has been separated from the very beginning. When you say "government" you mean the Spartan government is the only one which remains. But he speaks of this particular part of the government, this particular magistracy, kingship, as the only Spartan institution which remains. The iron money, ore, and all the other famous things, have gone. That is the reason why he gives this in the last chapter. And now let us then see what he says. Go on, the next paragraph.

Mr. Reinken:
that survives exactly as it was originally established, whereas other constitutions—

LS: Yes, all right, "the other regimes."

Mr. Reinken:
will be found to have undergone— (15.1)[xvi]

LS: Yes, sure. That is also true, that, say, the old Athenian constitution has been changed *n* times and in many other places. And in Sparta, at least—the Spartan constitution goes back for centuries. The old story. But what does remain of the Spartan constitution? And the only thing which remains unaltered is the institution of kingship. Yes. Now, next paragraph.

Mr. Reinken:

[xv] The tape was changed at this point.
[xvi] The passage, interrupted by the changing of the tape, reads: "I wish also to give an account of the compact made by Lycurgus between King and state. For this is the only government that continues exactly as it was originally established, whereas other constitutions will be found to have undergone and still to be undergoing modifications."

He ordained that the King shall offer all the public sacrifices on behalf of the state, in virtue of his divine descent, and that, whatever may be the destination to which the state sends out an army, he shall be its leader. (15.2)

LS: "The *polis* sends out the army," not the king. The king is strictly general and priest, nothing else. Yes?

Mr. Reinken:
He also gave him the right to receive certain parts of the beasts sacrificed, and assigned to him enough choice land in many of the outlanders' cities—

LS: I.e., the conquered. Of course the country around Sparta conquered by the Spartans, the land of the *perioikoi*. Yes, go on.

Mr. Reinken:
to ensure him a reasonable competence without excessive riches. (15.3)

LS: So in other words, the emoluments of the king are also unchanged, we are happy to learn. Yes. And now, next paragraph.

Mr. Reinken:
In order that even the kings should mess—

LS: Now look, stop. Why "kings" instead of "king?" We have heard only of the king. Yes?

Student: Weren't there supposed to be two kings in Sparta?

LS: Sure. But that is one of the other things which Xenophon lets out of the bag only here, the dual kingship, and naturally that creates some difficulty—jealousies, if not of the kings, at least via the queens. [Laughter] And therefore, when Xenophon presents his so-called ideal Sparta in the form of a Persian monarchy in the beginning of the *Education of Cyrus*, there is of course only one king. This is another indication of a fatal defect of the Spartan polity from the very beginning: the dual kingship. Yes, begin that sentence again, Mr. Reinken.

Mr. Reinken:
In order that even the kings should mess in public, he assigned to them a public mess tent; he also honored them with a double portion at the meal, not that they might eat enough for two—[Laughter] (15.4)

LS: You see? So in other words, he did not wish to encourage incontinence of the kings. Yes?

Mr. Reinken:
but that they might have the wherewithal to honour anyone whom they chose. (15.4)

LS: In other words, they could always bring a guest with them to this very exclusive club. Yes. Paragraph 6.

Mr. Reinken:
A lake near the house supplies abundance of water; and how useful that is for many purposes none know so well as those who are without it. (15.6)

LS: Isn't that charming? [Laughter] I mean, and there are people who don't see the irony here. I don't know how I could explain it, but I hope everyone has seen it. [LS chuckles] It is also a very fine emolument for the king. Go on.

Mr. Reinken:
Further, all rise from their seats when the King appears; only the Ephors do not rise from their official chairs. (15.6)

LS: See?[11] The Ephors were highly admired by a number of political thinkers later on; for example, Althusius and a German philosopher, Fichte,[xvii] wanted to have an institution of the Ephorate as a kind of guardian of the constitution. The notion is not of course foolish, that if you have a king, you need also an institution which watches the king. So that is the idea. *Ephoros* means the "overseer," the "overseer." So the Ephors are a very important factor in Spartan life. By the way, this is also beautifully brought out by Thucydides [in] the deliberations about the war before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. The Spartan king, a very nice gentleman [is] against the war, and the fellow who pushes through the war is the Ephor. You know, popular—popular and therefore more open to popular emotions than the dignified family stemming from Zeus ultimately would be. Yes, Mr. Dry?

Mr. Dry: Could the dual kingship be such a failure . . .

LS: Yes, well, there is a famous distinction between authority and influence, of which you doubtless have heard. Why the king with this severely limited constitutional function was still the first man in the land, and it seems that the record of the kings is not very great. There is the famous example of Leonidas, of course: you know the shining example, Thermopylae. But when you read about the Spartan kings, say, in the time of the Peloponnesian War, this was not impressive; [there is] constant suspicion that they are being bribed by the enemy. For example, Archidanas invades Attica and returns very soon without having done serious damage to the country. Immediate suspicion. And other things of this kind abound.[12] Aristotle also discusses dual kingship, I believe, in the second book of the *Politics* and regarded it also as a defect. In other words, you have only the disadvantages of monarchy, not the true advantage.

Student: I think Herodotus talks of the defects of the dual kingship in Sparta concerning bribery . . . selling the army . . .

[xvii] Althusius, *The Politics of Johannes Althusius*, trans. Frederick S. Carney (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1964), chap. 18. On the resistance of the ephors to a tyrant, see 187-88. For Fichte, see his *Foundations of Natural Right*, trans. Michael Bauer (Cambridge, 2000), 156.

LS: The public morality of the kings was apparently nothing to boast of . . . But this of course could have happened in the case of a single king, but the rivalry must have created quite a bit of troubles. Yes. Now let us go on. The oaths of the—

Mr. Reinken:
And they exchange oaths monthly, the Ephors on behalf of the state, the King for himself. And this is the King's oath: "I will reign according to the established laws of the state." And this the oath of the state: "While you abide by your oath, we will keep the kingship unshaken." (15.7)

LS: That of course is a classic example of a kind of contract between the city and the king. You know? The original contract, as it came to be called, which, in case it was broken, gave the other side the right—especially the people, the city, the right—to do something against the king. Yes?

Mr. Reinken:
These then are the honors that are bestowed on the King at home during his lifetime; and they do not greatly exceed those of private persons. (15.8)

LS: In other words, he is almost a republican magistrate, and not more. And you can imagine what these passages meant to many generations in opposition to absolute monarchy from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. You know, *the* model. This is what a king should be, and not like a Henry VIII or Louis XIV. Yes?

Mr. Reinken:
For it was not the wish of Lycurgus to put into the King's hearts tyrannical[xviii] pride, nor to implant in the mind of the citizens envy of their power. As for the honours assigned to the King at his death, the intention of the laws of Lycurgus herein is to show that they have preferred the Kings of the Lacedaemonians in honour not as mere men, but as heroes.[xix] (15.8-9)

LS: "As demigods." So only when they are dead do they get superhuman honor: when they are alive, no. This is also a very nice joke. Here again you find the plural, but one could rightly say this refers not to the two kings living simultaneously, but to the successive kings. So one can see a clear reference to dual kingships only once . . . The structure of the whole is very clear from the end. He begins, as he says, from the beginning, from birth; and he ends with the end, the death—not of everyone, but of the highest men in Sparta, of the kings. Now someone raised his hand, and I don't remember—

Student: Is the use of the words like the "intention" of the laws of Lycurgus—would this suggest that perhaps the intention was not carried out?

LS: That is clear; that he says in chapter 14 explicitly. There is no question about that. But the question is whether the original scheme of Lycurgus was sound, and these are the more interesting things. And the points which emerge I think beyond a shadow of a doubt is the laxity

[xviii] In original: "despotic"
[xix] In original: "demigods" (not "heroes")

of the women legislation, and also the dubious institution of permitted stealing—which will be taken up in the first book of the *Education of Cyrus*, but there it is more limited. Mr. Dry?

Mr. Dry: I somehow am not convinced that the women were somehow incontinent, and that there was dual kingship. That doesn't seem to be enough to me to explain that the defect was in the laws rather than, oh, that the men following did not carry them out.

LS: I am sorry. Whether it is a defect must be investigated, but that the institution regarding the women goes back to Lycurgus is made clear beyond a shadow of a doubt; and the same for the dual kingship. Now the reasoning is simply this: the women are fifty percent of the population, and if they are in a state of extreme disorder, that is much more than juvenile delinquency. Sure. Now think if all the men, when they come to the Assembly, go there with their heads full of troubles caused by their wives and daughters—you know, infinite difficulties arise, and they cannot bring them under control as the Athenians brought them under control.

Student: I was thinking that they would be treated somewhat like Cyrus treated his slaves. They get the food first, and they're well taken care of—

LS: But that was not so. You see, there was the other point—read the chapters on Sparta in the second book of the *Politics*, because the Spartans had many wars. You know, the citizen body was not extraordinarily large, and therefore they had many losses. And so it happened that in quite a few cases—in the first place, who controlled the slaves and everybody else when the men were at war? And the second point: many men [were] killed in battle, and the heir—the girls inherited. The Spartan heiresses created a famous problem. They could write their own tickets. Ya? If the son of an impoverished full citizen married a very rich heiress, whatever the laws may say, this woman, if she is in any way energetic, had a terrific power. You have studied Rousseau about this subject—about marriage, you remember—oh, you were not there. Last quarter we did that. There is a long discussion about how the fortunes of husband and wife must be ordered.

Student: Plutarch in his *Life of Lycurgus* mentions that he was never able to keep the women in their proper place, particularly when the men were at war—

LS: Yes, but Aristotle was closer to the critical time than Plutarch. This is the key point. Yes?

Student: In a way, this description of a compact between the king and the city implies the laws have remained unchanged, because if the kingship had remained unshaken, that means that the kings must have abided by their oaths, just formally.

LS: Yes.

Student: If they abide by their oaths, they reigned according to the established laws of the city.

LS: Yes, sure, but as you indicated, the laws may very well have remained on the statute books, if I may say so, without being enforced. If these people who go out as commanders or governors of Greek cities amass gold and silver—and perhaps there was a kind of what Switzerland is in our century, you know, where people can deposit money they can't have at home. You know?

Man is a very inventive animal, especially if such an incentive is there. They may well have left their money in Byzantium, perhaps (how do you put it?) investing it in some private business, a thriving shipping enterprise, you know. Even that doesn't contradict it; that formally the laws were the same doesn't mean that they were enforced. But still, this impressive sentence about these oaths on the part of the kings and on the part of the city, one can understand how this was regarded as a model of a well-ordered and free republican society, you know, in all these centuries when *the* problem was how to limit absolute monarchy.

Mr. Reinken: Wasn't the job of the kings to . . . and to enforce the laws? They were very strictly limited. It should have been the Ephors who would have seen to it that people—

LS: Yes, sure, but the Ephors were a democratic institution.

Mr. Reinken: They didn't make the laws.

LS: Perhaps for the very good reason that the laws were made by people who had, to quote Xenophon, virtue and wisdom but ill will to the demos, and the Ephors and their party had no virtue and no wisdom but good will to the demos. It might have—ya?

Student: What would you call this regime that Xenophon is describing, absolute monarchy?

LS: Oh *no*. How could you? *No*. How was it called? For example, we know this from Aristotle. But even without the help of Aristotle we might figure it out.

Student: Oligarchy.

LS: No.

Student: Limited constitutional monarchy.

LS: No. Constitutional monarchy doesn't exist.

Student: Mixed.

LS: Mixed regime. There is a king, there are the elders. The king is monarchical, quasi-monarchical. The Elders is an aristocratic thing because virtue is the condition for being elected to the Council of the Elder, and the Ephorate is a democratic institution. That was the orthodox view. Mr. Mueller?

Mr. Mueller: Doesn't Plato group Sparta and Persia together by their wealth?

LS: Sparta and what?

Same Student: And Persia.

LS: In a way, but of course the wealth of the Spartan kings added didn't come within hailing distance of the wealth of the Persian king.

Same Student: . . .

LS: Yes sure, the corruption of an aristocracy is oligarchy, i.e., concern with wealth, from this point of view. Sure.

Student: . . . privately held . . .

LS: No. But this had very much to do with—the beautification of Athens had very much to do with the democracy. We read it in Xenophon himself, didn't we, that these buildings are made for the demos? They don't have these fine houses. They don't have these fine houses—the only fine houses they can enter and enjoy are the public buildings, temples, and so on. That had to do with it. Yes?

Student: Isn't it true that in many passages throughout the book the other virtues are reduced to, as instruments to military virtue?

LS: In a way. Yes, sure.

Same Student: . . .

LS: That is the criticism of Plato in the first book of the *Laws*. It is not so emphatic in Xenophon. Here the emphasis is rather that the virtue which they cultivate is a reduced virtue, political virtue, that virtue which you can produce by punishments and this kind of thing. This is never genuine virtue. It surely has nothing to do with knowledge, as Socratic virtue. First, Mr. Butterworth.

Mr. Butterworth: Returning to chapter 10—

LS: Yes, I wanted to return to that chapter myself.

Mr. Butterworth: The reference is to citizen virtue, the polity.

LS: Yes.

Mr. Butterworth: What would be the position of somebody perhaps a little bit more philosophical than Xenophon but nonetheless . . . in Sparta?

LS: Like Xenophon?

Mr. Butterworth: People who wanted to think about these things and cared about them.

LS: One knows a bit about that from Xenophon. The Spartan whom he genuinely liked was not Agesilaus, of whom he wrote this praise, but when you read that praise you can easily see

through it. Xenophon uses a very simple device in these matters. He has a list of virtues. [LS writes on the blackboard] One, two, three, four, five six, seven. Now if he praises someone and says he was a man of outstanding continence—good. And then you look to see what he says about the six other virtues. And when he is silent, you can make your own guess about it. But in the case of Agesilaus, he ascribes to him all virtues, but in what manner? The man whom he admired most of the Spartans of his lifetime was a man called Derkylidas. Derkylidas. That occurs in the *Greek History*. [LS writes on the blackboard] He is really a wonderful fellow, but he is an irregular fellow. When he was fairly young he was punished for lack of discipline, *ataxia*. He didn't comply with all the rules when he was stationed in Byzantium. And then he had one quality which is hard to translate: *philapodemos*.[xx] He liked to be away from the *demos*, meaning from home. [Laughter] He liked this . . . Now he was by far superior to Agesilaus and anyone else as a military commander, and what Agesilaus didn't achieve in a year he achieved in six weeks, I believe, or less, because of his nice conduct, and he didn't repel the people by Spartan harshness and so on. And so Derkylidas is such a man[13]. With such Spartans, of whom there must have been some, naturally, Xenophon had a good relation. And after all, they saved him, so to speak, when he was demobilized, as it were—you know, when they had come back from Cyrus's campaign after their defeat, and the only thing they could do was to become Spartan mercenaries[14]. The Spartans were at that time omnipotent in Greece. They were very nice to Xenophon: they gave him an estate in Spartan territory and there he lived for a few decades and apparently had no troubles. I suppose he didn't state these things which he alludes to here in public; that they wouldn't have liked. But they were rather decent to him, and a certain gratitude he surely had, but he was not blinded by gratitude so that he simply said the Spartans were just wonderful.

Now I think one can say that this treatise as a whole is a parody, surely, of actual Sparta. In the first place, very simply, the Spartans are not what they claim to be. [That is] very questionable. But the more important thing of course is not that the Spartans didn't live up to what they claimed to be. Which nation can be said to do that? But the more interesting criticism of course is the criticism of the Spartan "quote ideal unquote," the criticism of what Sparta stands for, and this indeed comes out most clearly in the tenth chapter, in the passage we have discussed: that Lycurgus compelled the Spartans, all Spartans, *askein*—what is it, to exercise, to train themselves in all virtues as a matter of public concern. This proves to be a very questionable part, not unimportant, but surely a low part, of virtue. We must also look back at the writings on the Athenian constitution, and the *Revenues* as well as the *Athenian Constitution* so-called.

Now Xenophon was not fooled for one moment by the simplistic admiration for Sparta which was so fashionable in fine circles in Athens. You know, the Laconists, they were called. They wore their hair like Spartans, and so on and so on. This was a kind of thing which is always ridiculed in Plato when they are mentioned, but from a popular point of view, Socrates of course looked like one of these people, not because he wore his hair in a Spartan fashion but because he had a certain sympathy with Sparta. We will explain what this sympathy means.

Now, democracy. How did it appear to these people? Frankly, indifferent to virtue except to the extent that it is absolutely necessary for winning wars and for living together. You remember the

[xx] *Hellenica* 4.3.2.

passages from the *Athenian Constitution*, when this man frankly says: Wisdom and virtue be damned, I want people who are benevolent to the demos. So compared with that, the Spartan principle, [that] virtue is most important, is sounder. But if you look however at how Lycurgus, "in quotes interpreted" that principle, you might very well say there is not much to choose between these two—between the one which denies the importance of virtue altogether, and the other which makes so much fuss about a spurious conception of virtue. And one could even go beyond that and, say, compare the writing called the *Athenian Constitution* with the writing called the *Spartan Constitution*. I believe [when] the two writings [are] taken together, the one on Athens is more favorable than the one on Sparta. After all, the *Athenian Constitution* is a defense of the Athenian constitution, on the face of it. They couldn't do it better than they did it. What they want to do is not gentlemanly, but they do it well. Here they do it ill, whatever they are. Yes?

Student: What is the significance of the wants which forced Athens to be what it was? . . . Certain revenues, and—

LS: Poor land, meaning imports, a large population of citizens, and foreigners, and slaves. And therefore they were dependent on shipping, and shipping must be protected because otherwise, in wartime they would be starved very soon. So you need a navy.

Student: But Athens is not in a situation . . .

LS: The Spartans had fertile land. And the Spartans had done something else which the Athenians forgot. As Churchill once put it, when he spoke of Mussolini's onslaught on Ethiopia (Mussolini also wanted to have an empire), Churchill said that was a very unhealthy thing in the twentieth century.[xxi] He meant if he had done it in the nineteenth, he would have gotten away with it. Now the Spartans, at the time that it was healthy, the eighth century or before, conquered the most fertile part of the Peloponnesus, disinheriting their blood brothers the Messenians and lived, not happily perhaps, but wealthily ever after and were not dependent on a navy, surely, for their food supply. The Athenians, latecomers—only after the Persian War did Athens become a world power—depended on that, depended on imports and depended therefore on a navy, and one thing given another, and the navy depends on rowers. You don't need hoplites so much. That can be done by anybody, provided he has the bodily strength. Democracy. This is very roughly and with some overstatements what he said in the *Athenian Constitution*.

Student: . . . beautiful Athens, the desire for so many things . . .

LS: Yes, but if you look from a purely political point of view, who wanted that? Who wanted that?

Student: Pericles.

[xxi] "Mussolini's designs upon Abyssinia were unsuited to the ethics of the twentieth century. They belonged to those dark ages when white men felt themselves entitled to conquer yellow, brown, black, or red men, and subjugate them by their superior strength and weapons." Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: The Gathering Storm* (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948), 166.

LS: Sure. But still, Pericles alone would have been rather helpless if there had not been some popular demand for that.[15] I mean, these ruddy squires to whom Xenophon refers, in Sparta, who liked hunting much more—some hunting lodges perhaps, but why should they need such a terrific expense for fine buildings in Sparta? And I suppose there were also these ruddy squires in Athens, only they were not as powerful there. There was a people, [a] demos, in control—of course not poor, but still not capable of having elegant houses.

Student: There is the Athenian *erōs* for Syracuse at one point.

LS: Ya, ya, sure. That is a question which one cannot help raising: Were not the Athenians simply a much more gifted people than the Spartans? You know, in Sparta nothing of any importance came up, and in Athens this galaxy of great men. But that is very hard to say. In Plato's *Laws* it is said that the Athenians are distinguished by their *physis*, by their nature, by their race.[xxii] But that is said by a Spartan, not by an Athenian; that would of course be self-praise and therefore improper. But it seems that no one of course knows anything about it, because why do these gifts show in these two or three generations, not before and not after? If it is merely racial it should show at all times. This is an absolute mystery, how this happens that there are these galaxies of great men at certain moments in different countries. You have the same in France; you have the same in England. This density of great gifts at a given time is amazing. In Germany too. And then it stops. Surely a Marxist explanation in terms of the social-economic situation also will not do. I don't believe believe the—[xxiii]

LS: —Now is there any other point? Mr. Lyons?

Student: . . .

LS: Well, they surely lived on farms. The valley of the Eurotas was a very fertile one. But the question is: Did the Spartan full citizen take care of his farm? Did he supervise the farming to the degree to which other farming populations in Greece did? The impression you get from Xenophon is that what they did was political activity and hunting, and also these common messes, much more than farming. One cannot base an economic history of Sparta on this treatise alone because it is much too general. I suppose the men specializing in this kind of thing probably know much more than this. I don't know, but it would be easy to look up some book on, say, the social-economic history of antiquity and see what they say about Sparta. I must say I have neglected to do so. Yes?

Student: . . . Would the decline of Sparta have anything to do with the neglect of farming?

LS: I believe one can state it on the basis of the *Oeconomicus* that Xenophon regarded it as very good if the ruling class—the people who complete the laws, the men who have the decisive influence in the society—do take care of their property and are concerned with it. I would at least suggest it as a serious possibility. I couldn't say this very emphatically. It is surely striking that

[xxii] Plato, *Laws* 642d
[xxiii] There is a break in the tape at this point.

in the *Oeconomicus* he thinks it worth his while to have a Spartan, a leading Spartan, Lysander, as it were converted to farming by a Persian prince—I mean, a man least likely ever to soil his hands with soil.

I think we must leave it at that.

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[1] Moved "he."
[2] Deleted "Why did the, I mean."
[3] Deleted "that."
[4] Deleted "he says—I have here—once."
[5] Deleted "he's perfectly—."
[6] Deleted “that.”
[7] Deleted "So these are more or less well—."
[8] Deleted "then."
[9] Deleted "would be."
[10] Deleted "Which, as you know, is not a—."
[11] Deleted "This can of course also—."
[12] Deleted "But at any rate, the notion was—."
[13] Deleted "who comes."
[14] Deleted “you know.”
[15] Deleted "And it has something to do—."

Session 9: no date
***Cyropaedia* 1**

Leo Strauss: [i]That was a very spirited and clear delivery,[ii] and you made many points which we must consider. You started rightly with the question of the title. That surely is a strange title, the *Education of Cyrus*. Cyrus's education is over at the end of the first book. In order to put this question on the proper basis, we must consider other titles. This is not the only title where Xenophon does this. In the *Anabasis*, the ascent of Cyrus is described in the first book, perhaps part of the second book. The rest is the descent of the Greeks led by Xenophon. The *Memorabilia* doesn't tell you[1] that they are recollections of Socrates. They are Xenophon's recollections. Now of course in the latter case we can easily understand it. *The* recollections of Xenophon are those regarding Socrates and not regarding his expedition with Cyrus. This title can also be meaningful in a way—as you put it, the education of Cyrus goes on and on. Continuing education. And in addition one can also say the genitive is perhaps also the objective genitive not only the subjective genitive: the education inflicted by Cyrus, not merely that received by him. That you also saw. You noted certain parallels with the *Spartan Constitution*. You observed his silence about women, whereas the *Spartan Constitution* begins with women. And let us never forget the *Oeconomicus*, where the first subject is a woman. But do we not find a parallel to that in the first book of the *Education of Cyrus*? There are two conversations of Cyrus with his parents, one with his mother, and one with his father. Which comes first?

Student: His mother.

LS: So you have something which reminds you of that. Good. You reminded us also of a problem we discussed last time, namely: What is the purpose of legislation, law? And there are two views: [first], the narrow view, the modern view, preventing murder, theft, and so on, also housebreaking; and the other one where the purpose of education is to make men good. And the Persians take, just as the Spartans, the broad view. This leads indeed to the consequence that freedom of speech, as you seem to understand it, is not unimpaired. If you want to educate men to virtue you cannot allow every kind of speech. That would be called license, what you call freedom of speech. Even today I believe there is not an unlimited freedom of speech in the sense in which certain American organizations seem to understand it. There is a difficulty in the ancient position of which Xenophon is very well aware, and he indicates it by one example. There is one thing which the Persian laws enforce which is by its nature unenforceable. You mentioned this thing, but you did not elaborate it.

Student: Gratitude.

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[i] The transcript of this session is based upon the original transcript.
[ii] Strauss responds to a student's paper, read at the beginning of the session. The reading was not recorded.

LS: How can you enforce gratitude? The minute you enforce it, it ceases to be gratitude. Very simple. That is the one thing which cannot be enforced. You can compel a man by law to do certain things if someone else has a claim on him: these are legal debts; that is no longer gratitude. Gratitude can never be enforced. Also what you said about the military art is correct of course that it is much more than mere tactics. This is stated also in a much simpler way in the *Memorabilia* 3.1, where Socrates explains to a young man that he has gone to a teacher of the military art and has learned only tactics. This is only one part of the military art. By the way, the reputation of the *Education of Cyrus* as a classic of the military art is very high. I know this only from quotations, but the greatest captains of antiquity and of modern times regarded it as *the* text: Scipio in antiquity; [and] Gustavus Adolphus,[iii] who is said to be the father of the modern military art, in the seventeenth century.

The last point which I had not mentioned last time: the question of penal law. Now this is a particular joke of Xenophon's regarding which I don't remember the exact passage, but somewhere it occurs. The problem of law[2] shows very well in the penal law. Now what does the penal law say? He who does this and this will be punished in such and such a way. Yes? Will be punished in this and this way. Well, is this prediction necessarily true? In order to make it true you must add the clause, if he is caught. But in the moment you do that, you face the truth, you ridicule the penal law. And you show people how they can avoid the penalty. Xenophon refers to this. Somewhere he says this.

Now then let us turn to the text. Let us remind ourselves first of the place of this book within the body of Xenophon's writings. We have seen from the writings on the Athenian and Spartan Constitutions that *the* two Greek cities, Sparta and Athens, have defective polities. Now the two Greek cities—that could be an accident. Perhaps there was another Greek city which had a nondefective polity. But perhaps there is also something essential, some essential necessity at work. Perhaps barbarians are superior to the Greeks in this respect. Well, we must be open minded. Although Aristotle says the Greeks are superior to the barbarians regarding politics, maybe Xenophon did not entirely agree with him. Now what would be the defect of the Greeks? Why [cannot] they[3] establish a good polity, whereas the barbarians can? What do Athens and Sparta have in common which you do not find among the Persians? Something very dear to you in particular, Mr. ____: freedom. These were republican governments of course, however different they may be, and the principle is freedom. But then one can rightly say: Well, what should be wrong with freedom, that this should be a defect? Now in the first place, a *polis* has not only the end of freedom. I am speaking now of empirical cities, and not of any best city which might or might not exist. The city also wants to be powerful and great, not only free. What is the relation between freedom and greatness? Or to state it more harshly, between freedom and bigness? A theme familiar to every student of the American constitution. Yes?

Student: [. . .]

LS: So the *Federalist Papers* still have to argue it out, that it is possible to have a big republic. Small free states, yes. Big free states was a difficulty. Now if bigness is a political value the

[iii] An early seventeenth-century Swedish general.

barbarians are better off, because they lack freedom, because freedom and bigness seem to be in a certain conflict. But there is another, more Socratic reason. What is the highest title to rule according to Xenophon or Socrates? The only title really, strictly speaking: knowledge or wisdom. Now of course if wisdom is the only title to rule, that is clearly the end of freedom, because freedom means the freedom of unwise people—let us never forget that—because the freedom of the wise people is of no practical importance because of their rarity. Freedom means freedom of the unwise. Now, but there is something else regarding Cyrus. He was not only a barbarian king (there were many barbarian kings), he was an unusual barbarian king. He ruled, so to speak, all men. That was an almost universal empire. That is at least the way in which it appeared, the Persian Empire being the largest empire up to this time. That was a unique thing, at least for the Greeks, because the other empires, Assyria and so, that was so far away. This was at their doorstep, and [they] even tried to conquer Greece itself, as you know. Alexander the Great came much later, after Xenophon, and Xenophon in a way can be said to have prepared it by presenting Cyrus's big achievement, and in addition by showing in his *Anabasis* how easy it is for the Greeks to lick the Persians, i.e., to have a Greek Cyrus. And that was Alexander the Great. So this is I think the broader context.

Now let us also remind ourselves of what Father Buckley said last time about the fundamental issue for Xenophon, the *Spartan Constitution*, and by implication also the *Athenian Constitution*: rule of law. And here we have absolute rule at the end, at least, but the rule of a man who knows how to rule, the rule of wisdom. Now in the first case, in the case of rule of law, it took a very long time until this decayed. In the case of the absolute ruler here described, the death of the wise man sufficed for bringing on the decay. So in other words, this is the indirect argument in favor of republican government. This much as a preparation.

Now when we turn to the first chapter, the first and second paragraph, Xenophon distinguishes there three kinds of rule: political rule, despotic rule, and rule over irrational animals. And which is the easiest and most elegant form of ruling? The rule over irrational animals. There are no revolutions, no conspiracies, no elections, nothing of this kind. Sure. Now as for the political rule, you will see he omits aristocracy and kingship. He speaks only of monarchy, avoiding the term kingship, and of democracies, oligarchies, and tyrannies. And tyrannies are particularly short-lived, as he indicates. Now despotic rule is rule of the master over the members of his household, especially over the servants. This is also not quite easy; there are masters who have trouble. But[4] the other rule, the rule of shepherds over their sheep and cowherds over the cows, is infinitely easier. And as a matter of fact, in the case of herds, as he emphasizes, the herds are harsher on members of other herds of the same species—a sheep of this herd and a sheep of the other herd—than on their rulers who belong to a different species, namely, human beings. This is the secret; that is the reason why rule over herds, over animal herds, is such an easy thing according to this very provisional analysis. This subject—rule where the rulers belong to the same species as the ruled, or to a different species—plays also a great role in Plato's analysis, especially in the *Statesman*.

Cyrus then is this miracle who succeeded not only in performing that feat of ruling over human beings but ruling over so many of different tribes or nations, and they all obey him willingly. Therefore we turn to Cyrus in order to see what the conditions of rule of human beings are. We see however in the sequel, in paragraphs 4 and 5, that Cyrus's subjects were not all voluntarily

obedient. Quite a few of them had been subjected by force. You note the emphasis on the difference of tribes, what one would call ethnic systems, and difference of tongue. So this implies if people have the same ethnic origin and all have the same tongue (which is of course not the same thing), they are easier to rule than if they are heterogeneous, racially or linguistically. But this very beginning here: [that] Cyrus ruled over voluntary subjects, Persians, Medes and so on, and others subjected, indicates from the very beginning that Cyrus's rule is in between the rule of a king as defined in the *Memorabilia* and that of a tyrant. From the very beginning.

In the last paragraph he states the theme of the *Cyropaedia*. This we should read.

Reader:
Believing this man to be deserving of all admiration, we have therefore investigated who he was in his origin, what natural endowments he possessed, and what sort of education he had enjoyed, that he so greatly excelled in governing men.[iv]

LS: "That he differed so greatly"—you know, we spoke about that last time. "Differed so greatly" can have the meaning of "he excelled," excelling, but doesn't necessarily.

Reader:
Accordingly, what we have found out or think we know concerning him we shall now endeavour to present. (1.1.6)

LS: Here the theme is clearly indicated. You see here that Xenophon speaks of himself in the first person plural. Now he speaks then in the beginning of the next chapter, first of Cyrus's origin, his parents, and his *physis*, his nature. His overriding concern: he was a wonderful boy, an absolutely wonderful boy—and especially when you read Dakyns, the English translator, who must have been principal or headmaster of a public school, I believe. He is absolutely at home in this world and he has no inkling of the treacherous character of the ground on which he is walking, which was good for him. But the overriding concern of Cyrus is to be praised. We must keep this in mind. What he says about Cyrus's origin and nature is very brief: one paragraph. In paragraph 2 already the education begins. And the education was in the Persian laws, and therefore Xenophon speaks of the difference of the Persian laws and those of most cities. He doesn't say all other cities. Why?

Student: Athens?

LS: Not Athens. Sparta especially. Sparta has something in common. The Persian laws are concerned with citizens being good, and not merely with their abstaining from certain external actions like murder, theft, etc. only. But then there is this institution which shows the radical difference between Sparta and Persia, namely, this peculiar institution which the Persians have: schools of justice. You go to school in other countries in order to learn reading and writing. There you go to school in order to learn justice, which of course also has the implication that

[iv] Xenophon, *Cyropaedia I*, trans. Walter Miller (Loeb Classical Library) (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1914).

they are not very strong in reading and writing, or arithmetic for that matter, but justice. There is a passage where Herodotus speaks of the Persians. He says: What do they learn? To obey, to throw with a javelin, and to say the truth. This has the great difficulty that to say the truth, you must know it. This is a great difficulty frequently pointed out by Plato. Good. But these schools of justice, this is the unique Persian institution. And of course moderation, followed by obedience to rulers. Moderation goes easily into obedience to rulers as you would see from discussions in Plato's *Republic*, book 4, where obedience to rulers is subsumed simply under moderation. And then we have continence. Continence is something in Xenophon, surely also in Plato, something different from moderation. Continence refers strictly to self-control regarding food, drink. And of course they learn also to shoot with the bow and to hurl the javelin.

Now a point which we must consider is the Persian polity. What is the character of the Persian polity? We have heard quite a bit about this freedom. Now what is it? Let us read paragraph 15.

Reader:
Now, that the whole constitutional policy of the Persians—

LS: Well, "the whole regime," "the whole Persian regime."

Reader:
the whole Persian regime may be more clearly set forth, I will go back a little—

LS: I believe this is the first time he uses the first person singular, because hitherto the character of the polity is, as a matter of fact, wholly unclear. And now to make something clear and to stick out one's neck is inseparable, and to stick out one's neck means of course to speak as "I" not as "we," unless in this famous plural of majesty used by scholars of which we spoke last time. "As we have shown in our previous essays." Go on.

Reader:
for now, in the light of what has already been said, it can be given in a very few words. It is said that the Persians number about one hundred and twenty thousand men; and no one of these is by law excluded from holding offices and positions of honour, but all the Persians may send their children to the common schools of justice. (1.2.15)

LS: How would you call such a polity? Everyone, every free man, has full access to rule and office? What is that?

Student: Democracy.

LS: Democracy. Persia is a democracy. He doesn't mention the king at all when speaking of the Persian polity. So the king has a very limited function as the hereditary general and high priest. Now go on.

Reader:
Still, only those do send them who are in a position to maintain their children without work; and those who are not so situated do not.

LS: You see how he spells it out, because the negative is already implied in the positive: that those who can bring up their children while they do not work send them to these schools. It is already implied that those who are not able to bring up their children in idleness do not send them. Xenophon wants to leave nothing to chance; he spells it out: they do not send them. What follows from that? Let us first read it.

Reader:
And only to such as are educated by the public teachers is it permitted to pass their young manhood in the class of the youths, while to those who have not completed this course of training it is not so permitted. (1.2.15)

LS: You see, he is very precise: he states the negative although it is perfectly implied in the positive. He doesn't wish to leave the slightest doubt in the meanest capacity. Yes?

Reader:
And only to such among the youths as complete the course required by law is it permitted to join the class of mature men and to fill offices and places of distinction, while those who do not finish their course among the young men are not promoted to the class of the mature men.

LS: Yes. Go on.

Reader:
And again, those who finish their course among the mature men without blame become members of the class of elders. So, we see, the elders are made up to those who have enjoyed all honour and distinction. This is the policy by the observance of which they think that their citizens may become the best. (1.2.15)

LS: What is then the net result of this little qualification? Every citizen can have any office provided he has had the official state education. What is the implication of this little proviso? The exclusion of the mass of the population from political office. That is a very easy way to say everyone has the right to any office, and under conditions specified universally. There is no discrimination against the poor, the law says nothing that the poor have no access, but it provides for that. In other words, in name a democracy; in fact an oligarchy or aristocracy.

Student: Would he so emphatically spell it out this way because later on[5] Cyrus will have the common men join the ranks of the peers?

LS: Very good. That's it. But spell it out, the first measure of Cyrus.

Student: [. . .]

LS: In other words, in simple English: he democratizes the army as *the* step toward despotism. How interesting. You know when the armies became democratized in modern time[s]? The French Revolution. You don't have to live in the twentieth century to understand these things—Xenophon saw it—because they who do the fighting get political rights. They knew it in Athens.

The navy, a mass of rowers who had only to be strong-bodied, nothing else. Democracy, as simple as that. But we must also read the next paragraph. From a gentleman's point of view this was not an objection but a recommendation. Since everyone has a legal right, no one can complain. That he doesn't have the right in fact, well, that is not the fault of the law. Why don't they try to get rich by thrift and industry, so they can also do it? Equality of opportunity of course; the whole problem as we know it in the nineteenth and twentieth century. We must first read the next paragraph.

Reader:
There remains even unto this day evidence of their moderate fare and of their working off by exercise what they eat— (1.2.16)

LS: In other words, now he speaks of the sole relic of this wonderful Persian polity after Cyrus had gone over it with his bulldozer. Yes?

Reader:
for even to the present time it is a breach of decorum for a Persian to spit or to blow his nose or to appear afflicted with flatulence; it is a breach of decorum also to be seen going apart either to make water or for anything else of that kind. (1.2.16)

LS: Charming. These are the great remains of this noble polity. Most scholars who have written on the book, to my knowledge, have read that without feeling what everyone of you felt, how absolutely funny that is. They see only Xenophon still admiring and looking with an open mouth at these marvelous Persians who never spit. Yes. Yes?

Reader:
And this would not be possible for them, if they did not lead an abstemious life and throw off the moisture by hard work, so that it passes off in some other way. (1.2.16)

LS: This I think is all we need. Now Mr. ___, I interrupted you.

Student: I didn't understand your point about democratization as a step to despotism.

LS: Next time—because I only anticipate it because I thought it might be of help to Mr. ____. Let us read then the next paragraph, which is crucial for the understanding of the whole work.

Reader:
Such was the education that Cyrus received until he was twelve years old or a little more; and he showed himself superior to all the other boys of his age both in mastering his tasks quickly and in doing everything in a thorough and manly fashion. It was at this period of his life that Astyages sent for his daughter and her son; for he was eager to see him, as he had heard from time to time that the child was a handsome boy of rare promise. (1.3.1)

LS: The same word which we translate by "perfect gentleman."

Reader:

Accordingly, Mandane herself went to her father and took her son Cyrus with her. (1.3.1)

LS: Now Cyrus's wonderful Persian education is interrupted when he was twelve years old, and then he goes to Media to his grandfather on his mother's side, Astyages, and there he gets another education. And that is one of the secrets of the first book: Cyrus has not received a pure Persian education, republican education, but also the Median education; and out of this mixture Cyrus comes out. So if he had been in Persia all his life, he would never have become that world-famous Cyrus. On the other hand, if he had been only in Media, he would never have become that man. The meeting of these two cultures, as they would say today, produces Cyrus. Mr. __?

Student: What else does he gain from this except his horsemanship? Is this clear? He comes there at twelve years old and starts teaching everyone else.

LS: Mr. ____, you are young and you do not yet know sufficiently the importance of what they might call informal education. Now the informal education he gets of course at the court of this king of the Medes. And what kind of a king was he, in hard political terms?

Student: An absolute monarch.

LS: To say the least. A tyrant. So you see, this is a synthesis of republicanism and tyranny. Out of this synthesis emerges this master of the royal art, Cyrus, who is neither a tyrant nor a republican ruler. You can see how pertinent this title is. You must understand the education of Cyrus if you want to understand the book.

We cannot read everything. Cyrus is highly pleased with the fine clothes, highly pleased. He never had such fine clothes in Persia. That he likes, but in other respects he remains a stern Persian. He is not interested in that fine food—he keeps the sober Persian principle that your thirst and hunger are perfectly well taken care of by simple fare and water and he sticks to that—but fine clothes he likes. Now but even fine clothes, which is a rather trivial thing, can be the sign of a radical change. *Principiis obsta*, the Romans said: Resist the beginnings, the tiny things which have the germ of infinite consequences in them.

You will have seen we find there a strange individual who is very high in the political order but doesn't play such a particularly great role—that is one of these differences in which Herbert Simon[v] is interested, that the legal position doesn't correspond to the factual position—the uncle. It takes a very long time until his name is mentioned. Later on we will see (that was a point which was of interest to you) what the son Cyaxares means for the future of Cyrus. If Cyaxares had been a different fellow, Cyrus would not have succeeded. Inconspicuousness is in this case a sign of nullity, and this nullity of Cyaxares—his own father despises him and is happy to have such a wonderful grandson from the old stem, a man who would have become a wonderful tyrant in Media, if he had been born in Media. But by virtue of this fate, that he is a Persian with Median connections, [he] rises much higher than even his grandfather. The thing is made perfectly clear in chapter 3, paragraph 16, when his mother returns, and Cyrus, at the request of

[v] Herbert Simon, American political scientist, won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1978 for "pioneering research into the decision-making process in economic organizations."

his grandfather, remains. This point which you mention, Mr. ___, is of course true, this little thing, but we cannot discuss everything. How he learns to flatter, sure, but the point is this: there must always be two men for flattery. There is not only the flatterer but also the flatteree, if I may say so, who likes it, and this is of course the tyrant. But this changes. You know Cyrus had the capacity to flatter, obviously; otherwise he couldn't have done it. But that it was developed he owed to Media, to his grandfather—that is to say, ultimately to the regime. Yes, now let us turn to paragraph 16.

Reader:
"But, my boy," said his mother, "how will you learn justice here, while your teachers are over there?" (1.3.16)

LS: In the original it is more emphatic because the first word is justice: "But justice, my boy, where will you learn it here when the teachers in it are over there?" Namely, in Persia.

Reader:
"Why, mother," Cyrus answered, "that is one thing that I understand thoroughly."

LS: I have it at my fingertips. What I don't know about justice goes on the back of a stamp. Yes?

Rewader:
"How so?" said Mandane.
"Because," said he, "my teacher appointed me, on the ground that I was already thoroughly versed in justice, to decide cases for others also. And so, in one case," said he, "I once got a flogging for not deciding correctly. The case was like this: a big boy with a little tunic, finding a little boy with a big tunic on, took it off him and put his own tunic on him, while he himself put on the other's. So, when I tried their case, I decided that it was better for them both that each should keep the tunic that fitted him. And thereupon the master flogged me, saying that when I was a judge of a good fit, I should do as I had done; but when it was my duty to decide whose tunic it was, I had this question, he said, to consider—whose title was the rightful one; whether it was right that he who took it away by force should keep it, or that he who had had it made for himself or had bought it should own it. And since, he said, what is lawful is right and what is unlawful is wrong, he bade the judge always render his verdict on the side of the law. It is in this way, mother, you see, that I already have a thorough understanding of justice in all its bearings; and," he added, "if I do require anything more, my grandfather here will teach me that." (1.3.16-17)

LS: But you see, of course, this is a great problem and indicates the great problem of the rule of law, of republican government. For instance, the problem is this: that what is just, i.e., according to law, is not necessarily good. And one couldn't find a more beautiful exemplification than the big boy with the small coat and the small boy with the big coat. Nothing is more absurd than this arrangement, and it would be much better if the big boys would get big coats and the small boys would get small coats—and that is what Cyrus, on the basis of his uncorrupted sense, wishes to do, and then he gets a beating. One cannot state the problem of justice more beautifully in a

nutshell than it is stated here. All the problems of socialism, what have you, are of course implied in that. The clear consequence is: no private property. One should own something only if it is good for him and as long as it is good for him; but that means no private property, and each gets from the state stores, just as in the army, the outfit fitting him and as long as it fits him and is good for him. Now the consequence is a wise man assigning to each what is good for him. Better. Plato's argument—it was not invented by Plato; that, I think, is a part of the Socratic heritage. Yes?

Student: Does Xenophon mean the truly just is truly good or is the justice which Cyrus learns only a partial justice?

LS: That is in one way or the other in every decent form of government. This is the situation that the just is not simply identical with the good. And that is a very long argument by virtue of which we see that this kind of defective justice, if the small boy has the big coat, is preferable to a situation in which everyone gets what is fitting for him, [6]for the very simple reason [that] then you have to give this fellow such a tremendous power who does the assigning. Well, if he is perfectly wise and virtuous, it might be all right, but what guarantee do you have that he will do it? And therefore it is better to leave it at this imperfect justice. That can be developed—it must be developed at much greater length, but that is implied. But we must also not forget that because the rule of laws is always the rule of imperfect laws, but the laws can be more or less imperfect, and that is the problem of legislation: to make the laws less imperfect. But how can you do it if you do not know what perfect is? And therefore you must elaborate the difference between the good and lawful to have full clarity about it theoretically, otherwise you will be blind in practice. Mr. ____?

Student: Could it be that Cyrus's judgment was right, but that he was not yet the judge of a good fit?

LS: He learned it only by beating. In other words, there is a kind of irrationality which is indicated by the beating. It must be beaten into people that they do certain things which are not simply rational. Well, it doesn't necessarily have to be done by whipping; it can also be done by shouting, and perhaps sometimes even by just [saying]: No, that's not being done, and don't ask any questions which you would not yet understand. That is also a kind of whipping.

Student: But he will get big enough so that no one can whip him, and he will decide what is fit, and he will decide that he should rule even though—

LS: That comes later. That is part of the story. Later on we will see that Cyrus is a living law, as it is put later on, meaning he decides each case on its merits and no universal law is binding. Now let us see in the sequel where we left off. So he says: I know everything about justice. The principle is extremely simple: Obey the law and don't give a damn for what is good. That is easy. But still I may not know everything, the twelve-year-old Cyrus admits, but here I have our wonderful grandad. He is a charming boy.

Reader:

"Yes, my son," said she; "but at your grandfather's court they do not recognize the same principles of justice as they do in Persia." (1.3.18)

LS: Well, this is much too heavy a translation: "the just things with your grandfather and the Persians do not agree," they are not the same.

Reader:
"For he has made himself master—"

LS: Master, *despotēs*, ruler of slaves.

Reader:
"but in Persia equality of rights is considered justice." (1.3.18)

LS: Well, we have seen that. To some extent it is true, everyone can get any office. Not quite true, however, we have seen, because of the little unwritten qualification: if he has passed all the examinations, gone through college and graduate school and so on. Yes?

Reader:
"And your father is the first one to do what is ordered by the State and to accept what is decreed, and his standard is not his will but the law."

LS: "Not the soul," literally translated. You can say it amounts to will in the end. So in other words, not what he desires, what he likes, but the law.

Reader:
"Mind, therefore, that you be not flogged within an inch of your life, when you come home, if you return with a knowledge acquired from your grandfather here of the principles not of kingship but of tyranny, one principle of which is that it is right for one to have more than all." (1.3.18)

LS: So the issue is made perfectly clear: the rule of law; the king meaning a man ruling under law; and in Media tyrannical rule, perhaps benevolent tyrannical rule, but still tyrannical. Yes, go on.

Reader:
"But your father, at least," said Cyrus, "is more shrewd at teaching people to have less than to have more, mother. Why, do you not see," he went on, "that he has taught all the Medes to have less than himself? So never fear that your father, at any rate, will turn either me or anybody else out trained under him to have too much." (1.3.18)

LS: So you see he is not inarticulate, but what is the defect of his reasoning? He says, "Your father doesn't want anyone to have more, because he wants to have all subject," but there is one little—

Student: [. . .]

LS: That's one thing, but I think there is something much more specific. The grandfather loves Cyrus, and the grandfather knows he will not live always, and such a wonderful fellow like this Cyrus will be spoiled because he likes him so much. Yes?

Student: Can we go back to 3.10 about this freedom of speech?

LS: That is simple. That is straight, good old-fashioned republican morality. These loose proceedings at a court, where they are drunk and use all kinds of improper language, and the severe noble manners of Persia. As I told you, that is license, not freedom of speech. Even today there is a question whether you can use any word and any language on any occasion in spite of freedom of speech. I believe it is not protected by the First Amendment, as I learned from Mr. Anastaplo.[vi] There is such a thing as verbal injury, slander, and obscenity, which are still punishable actions. He doesn't mean more. There was no question of political freedom. When they were completely drunk the tyrant permitted surely some of his subjects to tease him a bit and perhaps to make fun with his beard, that is true, but you must admit that these are not political rights. Yes.

Student: I recall how Plutarch tells how the Spartans brought the Helots in drunk to show them how ludicrous drunk men were.

LS: There was surely more freedom of speech in—he says it ironically, I think we can dispose of that as easy as that. Now let us turn to paragraph 6 of the next chapter, because this is one of the clearest chapters of what is happening to young Cyrus in Media, the education he undergoes there. Yes?

Reader:
But though he was exceedingly eager to go out hunting, he could no longer coax for it as he used to do when he was a boy, but he became more diffident in his approaches.

LS: In other words, with his becoming an adult, losing his childlike naïveté, he becomes more self-conscious. Yes?

Reader:

[vi] George Anastaplo (d. 2014) defended "his First Amendment rights before the McCarthy-era Illinois Bar and eventually the U.S. Supreme Court . . . Anastaplo was denied admission to the Illinois Bar in 1950 after refusing on principle to answer whether he was a member of the Communist Party—calling questions about political affiliation and religion irrelevant. The Committee on Character and Fitness, which routinely interviewed Bar applicants, also asked if Communist Party members should be allowed to practice law in Illinois. 'I should think so,' replied Anastaplo, who then went on . . . to defend the right of revolution, if justified, as established in the Declaration of Independence. Anastaplo argued his own case before the Illinois and U.S. Supreme Court. He lost the federal case in 1961 by a 5-4 decision." http:news/uchicago/edu/article/2014/03/07. Anastaplo was a professor of law at Loyola University in Chicago.

And in the very matter for which he found fault with Sacas before, namely that he would not admit him to his grandfather—he himself now became a Sacas unto himself— (1.4.6)

LS: That is the point. Sacas is a man who protects the tyrant against intruders, and Cyrus, the boy Cyrus, didn't like it that there was someone who could keep him from granddad. And later on he becomes his own Sacas. He becomes autonomous. The law is in him. But which law? The law regulating access and egress from the tyrant. It is a tyrannical order which takes place in Cyrus's soul.

And now there is a description of the hunt; and Cyrus is completely drunk, not from wine, but from hunting—the term *enthousia*, enthusiasm in the original sense of that term, a religious term in the original sense—completely thrilled from hunting.

Student: Doesn't it have a negative connotation? Fanatic?

LS: Yes, but for sober men like Aristotle in the seventh book of the *Politics*, but not necessarily. *Theos*, god, is a part of the word. Cyrus is already in a way the king at this early age. He had bewitched the old tyrant, which is quite a feat, and the old tyrant spoils him completely. That is of course also education in a sense. When we speak of education we mean of course good education. When you say of a man he is educated, you mean he has a good education. You wouldn't call a man with a bad education an educated man. That is one of those relics of value terms which still survive. But when the behaviorists are through with education, everyone will be educated because everyone has surely either a good or bad education. And if we must not use value terms, every man is an educated man, and just as now every man has culture. That you know. That is axiomatic, because there are cultures of suburbia, of juvenile delinquents—well, everyone. So the same is going to happen very soon to education. But speaking now less crudely, this is also education in a way which Cyrus undergoes in Media. And this education on the top of the interrupted Persian education lays the foundation for his later feats.

At the end of paragraph 11 there shows something which is quite interesting. When he goes for the first time hunting real animals, wild animals, and not those in the zoo, what does he say?

Reader:
"To me at least, it seems just like hunting animals that were tied up. For, in the first place, they were in a small space; besides, they were lean and mangy; and one of them was lame and another maimed. But the animals out on the mountains and the plains—how fine they looked, and large and sleek! And the deer leaped up skyward as if on wings, and the boars came charging at one, as they say brave men do in battle. And by reason of their bulk it was quite impossible to miss them. And to me at least," said he, "these seem really more beautiful, when dead, than those pent up creatures, when alive." (1.4.11)

LS: Let us keep this in mind. And Dakyns simply falls for that, comparing Cyrus to a puppy. Now puppies surely are nice creatures; and human beings who are like puppies are also very nice people, but there is a certain difficulty here which will come out later. But the mere expression puppy, dog, reminds of course of Plato's *Republic*. The guardians have to be like dogs. That goes through the whole thing.

Then there comes a battle for the first time. Just by accident there comes a battle. No one wanted to fight and Cyrus talked everyone into it. And it is a terrific thing: they are successful. It is a marvelous achievement. Yes?

Student: Could you tell us the passage where you saw this word puppy.

LS: Paragraph 15, paragraph 21. [*Chuōn*] in Greek. Now paragraph 24.

Reader:
Then Astyages marched back, greatly rejoicing over the victory of his cavalry but not knowing what to say of Cyrus; for though he realized that his grandson was responsible for the outcome, yet he recognized also that he was frenzied with daring. (1.4.24)

LS: "Mad." In other words, he loves that grandson and doesn't[7] wish him to be killed. But here is this young man of sixteen years [who] dared something which all the officers of the Median army didn't dream of, and got away with it. Marvelous fellow.

Reader:
And of this there was further evidence; for, as the rest made their way homeward, he did nothing but ride around alone and gloat upon the slain— (1.4.24)

LS: Literally translated, "his looking at them." His *theoria*, we could call it. Cyrus loves to look at the corpses. That is very important. And surely that was in him by nature. That would have developed in one way or the other also in Persia, but it is such an extraordinary thing that even that old tyrant is shocked by this frankness in showing it. That is one of the most interesting passages for the character of Cyrus, and much more than that. You remember the passage in the *Hiero* when Hiero describes the pleasures of war, the fun of killing [being] the central thing? And here of course he goes even beyond that. He still relives the joy by looking at them again. This is part of the character of Cyrus and the type of man he represents. That I think is very important. Xenophon had some experience with fighting as you know, and he came to this conclusion. Perhaps Xenophon himself had it in him, only in Cyrus it probably was a bit stronger than in Xenophon, Xenophon's name being the "slayer of strangers."

Student: [. . .]

LS: Not necessarily. Perhaps every education where education to war plays a role—that means practically every education anywhere in the world.

Student: [. . .]

LS: Sure. In other words, this element of cruelty, to state it very simply, is essential. Now the wonderful thing in Xenophon—in Plato it is less pronounced—it is an amazingly frank book, the *Cyropaedia*. This is what Nietzsche brought out in this atrocious statement, you know when he opposed the sentimental compassion doctrines of Rousseau and others[8] [who] simply said: No cruelty. [This] is stated here in an infinitely more subdued and an infinitely truer way. If this element were wholly absent from men, how would you get the soldiers and officers? I saw once

a beautiful British film, a war film, in which Niven[vii] played the role of a very humane officer, and the soldiers complained about the absolute beastliness of a sergeant who was really incredibly beastly. And he listened to these soldiers, and he said: I will talk to him. He really didn't like him, but he never spoke with the sergeant, and the reason was clear: what the Germans and Japanese were going to do to these boys was infinitely more terrible than what this cursed sergeant did. That's one of the facts of life. Of course it can be overdone; that is a matter of good leadership and rhetoric. But since there are so many people who are not tough and must be tough, you probably need the other extreme to get the right mean. That is probably the way in which it works. I don't believe the commentators are aware of how important that is. Yes, Mr. ____?

Student: Is how Odysseus received his name a parallel?

LS: No, I don't see that. The key point is this: the strain of cruelty. I believe one of the most humane men now living is Winston Churchill, but when you read the description of his youthful exploits, for example in Omdurman, you know, the last cavalry attack, and he tells what fun he had seeing the man he is going to shoot, seeing the white of his eye. And when he describes himself as a young officer on the northwestern frontier,[viii] and he had all kinds of savages in his platoon and he knew only two words of their language: "go" and "kill." And Churchill is surely not a cruel man, but he has no shyness regarding the shedding of blood.[ix]

Student: [. . .]

LS: As a counterpoison to certain sentimentalities of course it is absolutely necessary.

In the next two paragraphs (I mention this only in passing, but it is of some importance), he speaks all the time of what people said about Cyrus. Now for a thorough study one would have to make a clear distinction between the things which are ascribed to Cyrus without qualification: Cyrus did this or was this; and [what] Cyrus was said to be. And the overall impression you get of this charming public school boy is of course created by lack of discrimination between those things ascribed to him with the phrase "he was said" to have done this or that. So many of these touching scenes, this outgoing warm character [of] Cyrus, are all what was said about him. Yes?

Student: [. . .]

LS: It is perfectly sufficient if you want to say something nasty about a man you will say it only once. And given[9] human malice that will be more remembered than the other thing.

Student: Is there not a parallel to looking at corpses in the *Republic*?

[vii] David Niven, British actor, in *The Guns of Navarone* (1961).
[viii] The North-West Frontier of British India.
[ix] Churchill was with the 21st Lancers for their famous cavalry charge on September 2, 1898 that involved fierce hand-to-hand combat. For an account, see William Manchester, *The Last Lion: Winston Spencer Churchill, Visions of Glory, 1874-1932* (Boston: Little, Bornw & Co., 1983), 277-85.

LS: That is true. That is quite right, where he speaks of *thymos*, and he loves to look at corpses and hates himself for it.[x] But his desire—when he speaks of *thymos*, that must be the fourth book. That is very true. And also in the *Republic*, by the way, the children become spectators of battles, the young children on very swift and tame horses, so that nothing can happen to them but they should see the sight.[xi] It is a warlike society.

Then he returns to Persia, where he continues his interrupted Persian education. In other words, the injection of the Median element cannot be disposed of, naturally. Then he makes his first speech which is of the utmost importance. Unfortunately, it is too long to read. The key point is this. He demands a radical change in moral orientation, a radical change. Hitherto the Persians had exercised themselves in virtue for its own sake, and now they must do it for the sake of the rewards, the external rewards of virtue. This is the decisive step. This is addressed to the Persian nobility alone, the perfect gentlemen, and he tells them: Don't be fools, get something out of your perfect gentlemanship. Now of course they got something for it before. We have seen they are actually the rulers of the land, and they owe to their qualities their freedom from foreign subjugation, and so on. But this is not enough. He instills in them the seeds of the desire for having more—what was said to be the characteristic of the Median tyrant, having more than they had. He corrupts their moderation. This is an absolutely decisive step. This same problem is discussed by Aristotle toward the end of his *Eudemian Ethics*.[xii] Toward the end he makes a distinction between the good man and the man who is fine and good, the perfect gentleman. And in their external actions they are more or less the same, but the good man does it for an external end and the perfect gentleman does it for the sake of the noble things alone. I suggest that you read this, at least occasionally. But still one thing remains clear even here in paragraph 12: the most beautiful or noble possession is praise, not wealth.

Let us read only paragraph 13.

Reader:
"Now if I say this concerning you while I believe the contrary to be true, I deceive myself utterly. For if any of these qualities shall fail to be forthcoming in you, the loss will fall on me. But I feel confident, you see, both from my own experience and from your good-will toward me and from the ignorance of the enemy that these sanguine hopes will not deceive me. So let us set out with good heart, since we are free from the suspicion of even seeming to aim unjustly at other men's possessions. For, as it is, the enemy are coming, aggressors in wrong, and our friends are calling us to their assistance. What, then, is more justifiable—"

LS: "More just."

Reader:
"than to defend oneself, or what more noble than to assist one's friends?" (1.5.13)

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[x] *Republic* 439d-440a.
[xi] *Republic* 467c-e.
[xii] *Eudemian Ethics* 1248b17-1249a17.

LS: So that is an important [point]. The old morality is preserved to some extent: One must not wage unjust wars. Nothing is juster than to repel force by force to defend yourself. That is one thing. And in addition, this is just; everyone is entitled to it. But to do the just thing is of course not the highest thing. The noble is higher than the just, because the noble implies here something which you are not obliged to do. When your friends are attacked, to come to their assistance, that is a noble deed; whereas when you defend yourself, your own country, that is only just. This is clear. This distinction you must always keep in mind if we want to understand a Greek text dealing with moral questions. Now of course this you must keep in mind: Cyrus defends his allies, his friends, and he goes on defending allies, and at the end he is the ruler of the universe, something like the Romans, who later did this on a big scale. Now what we have to watch is whether he is doing anything later when he has to deviate from these fine principles. It can be expected that something must have happened, some deviations must have taken place, otherwise he would not have become the ruler of the universe. After all, the simple thing: if you defend your ally, after you have liberated him you go home, as America did after the Second World War. That is one thing. But if you stay there and say you still have to defend them, then it becomes questionable. Mr. ___?

Student: In the battle, isn't it significant that Cyrus had to ask who the enemy were? Is this not education in justice?

LS: I don't know. It didn't strike me, the passage. We have so much to do so we cannot consider every point. I would say he didn't know it.

Second Student: He came late on the scene.

LS: After all, he sees there a concourse of people and two groups of armed men watching each other; naturally he wouldn't know it. But I believe it is said by Xenophon in order to bring out that though he knew so to speak nothing of the prehistory, he saw immediately the tactical problem after the situation was explained to him, and no one had thought of it. And this sixteen year old boy tells them what to do, and he gets away with it. This is I believe the context. But we must now turn because the time is going on. Partly my fault.

Now the sixth chapter is the action shortly before Cyrus leaves. He is naturally now a grown-up man—young, but grown-up, and[10] [he goes] then as the commander of the Persian Expeditionary Force to Media to help the friends and allies. In this context he has a conversation with his father. With his mother, that was when he was a little child, so to speak; with his father, that is when he is a grown-up man. And the principle for understanding that is that we must see what Cyrus knew already—the cases where he says: I know that, and the cases where he does not yet know it, the things which he still has to learn. This is, so to speak, the peak of his education. If I am not mistaken, there are seven items, the highest items which he has to learn. Now the first subject is the need of caring for supplies. This belongs to *oikonomia,* economics, paragraph 12.

Student: Is that the first subject he has yet to know? The first subject of the chapter is divine omens.

LS: That he knows. I will limit myself entirely to these new things. So in other words, he knew quite well how to do the fighting. But the corollary to fighting, the administrative tail, this he has not yet understood. That he learns now. Yes?

Student: [. . .]

LS: No, no. That would not help. There is also theory of tactics and the practice of tactics. There is a theory of how to go about supplying and doing it. That won't do. It is the subject matter which is important. In this connection he mentions what he knows already: the crucial importance of rhetoric for the military art, paragraphs 13 to 14. But this he knew. We have seen he was able to make a very successful speech to the nobility before. The second point which Cyrus does not yet know, paragraph 16 following, is that gymnastics is more important than medicine. That you must have medics around to take care of the wounded, that is elementary, but that you have to take care that they don't get sick in the first place by the proper hygiene and other things, that he still has to learn. The next, number three, paragraph 19, the arousing of uncertain hopes, which we might read.

Reader:
"In the next place," said Cyrus, "for putting enthusiasm into the soldiers nothing seems to be more effectual than the power of inspiring men with hopes."

LS: The Greek word would be more literally translated by eagerness or zeal, not enthusiasm. *Prothumia.* Yes?

Reader:
"Yes, my son," said he; "but that is just as if any one on a hunt should always call up his dogs with the call that he uses when he sees the quarry. For at first, to be sure, he will find them obeying him eagerly; but if he deceives them often, in the end they will not obey him when he calls, even though he really does see a wild beast. So it stands with respect to those hopes also. If anyone too often raises false expectations of good things to come, eventually he can gain no credence, even when he holds forth well-grounded hopes. But, my son, you should refrain from saying what you are not perfectly sure of; by making certain others your mouthpiece, however, the desired end may be accomplished; but faith in your own words of encouragement you must keep sacred to the utmost to serve you in the greatest crises." (1.6.19)

LS: Cyrus was still too young to know that. He knew that you must make your soldiers what they now[11] [call] optimistic: morale building. And that can sometimes be done by arousing false hopes; in a tough situation you say, "Relief is coming, I have it straight from headquarters." And headquarters told him they don't have a single company to send. But if they fight and win, they don't need the relief after all. Now the father says: Well, that can be done once, perhaps, but if it is done from habit, no one believes you any more. But on the other hand, you do need these false hopes from time to time: Let others do it. You remember? Because then they can say his reputation for veracity remains unimpaired. The others lie at his command. We have seen this already in the *Hiero* in a general way.

Now item number four, paragraph 21 to 23, how to get voluntary obedience. Answer: by becoming known to be a reasonable, sensible man, a knower, and this means the mere appearance: the mere reputation for being sensible won't do. Somewhere sooner or later they must see that you are really intelligent. So there is no way for maintaining the reputation for reasonableness except [by] being reasonable. One of the hardest things to tell a man: be intelligent. Nevertheless, the advice is here proper because Cyrus is surely a very able man.

Items number five, paragraph 24 to 25, the difficulty of becoming beloved. Now let us read perhaps the end of paragraph 25. Let us read the whole of paragraph 25.

Reader:
"And in his campaigns also, if they fall in the summer time, the general must show that he can endure the heat of the sun better than his soldiers can—" (1.6.25)

LS: The context is simply how can the general become beloved and not merely by handing out candy. But he must really be superior as a soldier to anyone. And that means that he must have all these qualities. Now?

Reader:
"and that he can endure cold better than they if it be in winter; if the way lead through difficulties, that he can endure hardships better. All this contributes to his being loved by his men."
"You mean to say, father," said he, "that in everything the general must show more endurance than his men."
"Yes," said he, "that is just what I mean; however, never fear for that, my son; for bear in mind that the same toils do not affect the general and the private in the same way, though they have the same sort of bodies; but the honour of the general's position and the very consciousness that nothing he does escapes notice lighten the burdens for him." (1.6.25)

LS: If he is a weak and soft fellow that is cold comfort, but this of course Cyrus is surely not. But if you are equal, though, with the toughest sergeant you have an advantage which this[12] sergeant doesn't have: everyone looks to you and you have this great honor. So the father is surely a wiser man still than Cyrus, otherwise he wouldn't have to tell him.

And now we come to this key passage, item number 6, paragraph 26 following, and that is an absolute revelation to Cyrus to see how naïve he still is, and his virtuous republican father must in a way corrupt him in order to teach him. And now comes the second great problem of justice. The first, we recall, was that the just and the good are not identical: small boy, big coat—simple formula. And now we learn something else, and that is the double morality essential to civil society, namely, he must learn the principle of war, [which] is to have more than the enemy. And this desire to have more is the root of all evil. And here it is a duty. Now let us read paragraph 27.

Reader:
"But, father, what would be the best way to gain an advantage over the enemy?" (1.6.27)

LS: "To have more," literally. All right, you can say "gain the advantage" if you keep in mind this connotation. It is something ordinarily disapproved.

Reader:
"By Zeus," said he, "this is no easy or simple question—"

LS: "This is no longer a simple thing." This is a big thing, the biggest thing he mentions.

Reader:
"that you ask now—"

LS: Well, he says, "this is neither a small thing, nor a simple thing." It is a great thing, and it is not simple, but double—not triple and so on, double. We will see that.

Reader:
"but, let me tell you, the man who proposes to do that must be designing and cunning, wily and deceitful, a thief and a robber, overreaching the enemy at every point."
"O Heracles, father," said Cyrus with a laugh— (1.6.27)

LS: That is important. He laughed. That is very interesting, because men are so wicked that when they are told about certain loopholes of morality, they laugh at them. You must have observed this more than once. And this is what he says. It was amusing to him because it is a burden, the moral duties. When you get rid of that burden it is a relief, and you laugh and you are relieved.

Reader:
"what a man you say I must become!"
"Such, my son," he said, "that you would be at the same time the most righteous and law-abiding man in the world." (1.6.27)

LS: That is justice. Justice requires stealing and the other things. That is of course extraordinary. And now Cyrus is absolutely surprised. We were told from childhood on never to do these things: now you say we must do it. And then the father makes a simple distinction: What you were told as a child is how you behave toward friends, meaning fellow citizens and so on, but with enemies it is an entirely different story. Helping friends, hurting enemies.[xiii] Does this ring a bell, this formula?

Student: The *Republic*.

LS: Where? Who says that?

Student: Polemarchus.

[xiii] *Republic* 334b ff.

LS: "The warlord" is his name. Sure. And also, by the way, the short dialogue *Cleitophon*, the introduction to the *Republic*, in which this view is ascribed to Socrates, helping friends and hurting enemies. This is quite a thing because naturally this creates a certain difficulty. Many people have been very honorable men who were tough against enemies in war and unscrupulous, and absolutely stupid in their relations with their fellow citizens. That is of course possible, but still there is a difficulty here. There is a difficulty which has—the pacifists thrive on this difficulty. They don't solve it, but that is the starting point. Pacifism is only pointing out the grave difficulty of civil society. By the way, I believe that the verse in the New Testament: "It has been said unto the old ones, love thy neighbor and hate thine enemy, but I say unto you, love thine enemy"[xiv]—and the ordinary Jewish answer is: That's unfair, because there is not a single statement in the Old Testament saying, "Hate thine enemy." This is perfectly correct. But I think the meaning of Jesus is deeper. The overall Old Testament morality is a citizen morality: this nation. That is a question. That is a question because every nation has enemies actual or potential: fighting, and then no holds barred. Of course it is easy to prevent the killing of women and children and other bestialities; that is not the point. But in war, that's the enemy. And I think the most subtle thing is not killing, it is lying. When we say of a man he is a liar, he can't look you in the face. Or if he can lie while looking you straight in the face, then he is a worse liar, of course, a more corrupt man than a man who lies ineptly. Is this not true? The diplomat, the negotiator, must of course lie with an absolutely innocent face. The corruption must go very deep if he has mastered lying to that extent. That is a question. The question cannot induce one to say one should abolish diplomacy, espionage and so forth, which would be wholly unrealistic, but still one must see there is a great human difficulty. One can understand [how] sophisticated men like Xenophon felt that this is a sign of the essential limitations of all political life. The interesting point is paragraph 30. Let us read that.

Reader:
"Well then, father," said he, "if indeed it is useful to understand both how to do good and how to do evil to men, we ought to have been taught both these branches in the case of men, too." (1.6.30)

LS: And then he gives a long story, that there was once a man—he doesn't say a Greek, but he was surely a Greek—who did try to teach that to children, and the consequence was devastating. And then they made it a law. Children are told: Be good, be good to everyone, because this sophisticated distinction, good to friends, bad to enemies, they learn early enough when they grow up. And he compares it to education in matters of sex: just the stork. In other words, the children get a kind of stork version regarding justice. You know? And when they are grown up they get the true version. We must discuss two more passages. Paragraph 38.

Reader:
"However, my son," he continued, "since you are desirous of learning all these matters, you must not only utilize what you may learn from others, but you must yourself also be an inventor of stratagems against the enemy—" (1.6.38)

[xiv] Matthew 5:43-44.

LS: The Greek word is *poiētēs*, which means "maker," but in ordinary language a poet. You must become a poet of ingenious, clever devices. Yes?

Reader:
"just as musicians—"

LS: You see he mentions musicians even explicitly.

Reader:
"render not only those compositions which they have learned but try to compose others also that are new. Now if in music that which is new and fresh wins applause—"

LS: As such, you know, because you get tired hearing always the same very beautiful music. You want to hear also something new.

Reader:
"new stratagems in warfare also win far greater applause, for such can deceive the enemy even more successfully." (1.6.38)

LS: Naturally, because they are not in the textbooks. You see, that is one of the rare passages where a classical philosopher encourages invention, novelty. Here that is absolutely necessary. In war it is absolutely necessary. Aristotle too says so.

Student: Doesn't Aristotle, when he speaks of invention, mention also music?

LS: Sure, that is the difficulty. The praisers of the old things, as the classics in a way were, always had to admit that in music, which means also poetry, the new has a peculiar attraction. Even such an extreme reactionary (as some people believe) as Aristophanes—the good old Athens—he also praises in the same mouth the novelty of his comical conceits. Man cannot altogether live on the old. He also needs the new. And the proper proportion of the new and the old, that would be the question. But the fundamental question is this: that[13] Aristotle especially [is] very distrustful of change and therefore of invention, but in one respect the city is not the master of which inventions she wants and which she does not want, and that is in a war. In war, the wicked and base enemy imposes to some extent his standard on the virtuous and good city. I would say that is the only theoretical loophole in classical political philosophy—theoretical. And this of course is the entering wedge for Machiavelli, where the war side, both foreign and domestic conflict, becomes the engine for his new kind of political philosophy. This cannot be overestimated in its importance. The *polis* is to so speak autonomous; [it] can write its own law in its domestic affairs, but in foreign affairs it must reckon with the character of the enemy, and that requires some adaptation. That is inevitable. That is the key point. Plato and Aristotle knew that, but in a way they disregarded it because it doesn't depend on the polity itself. The last point we read is the end, paragraph 44 to 46.

Reader:
"Learn this lesson, too, from me, my son," said he; "it is the most important thing of all—"

LS: This we must watch carefully. That is even more important than the double morality. Yes?

Reader:
"never go into any danger either to yourself or to your army contrary to the omens or the auspices, and bear in mind that men choose lines of action by conjecture and do not know in the least from which of them success will come." (1.6.44)

LS: You see the general way, you have to use soothsaying. That is an old story; that is not the most important point. Now the reasoning which comes now.

Reader:
"But you may derive this lesson from the facts of history—"

LS: That doesn't exist in Greek. "From the very things which happen," "which take place."

Reader:
"for many, and men, too, who seemed most wise, have ere now persuaded states to take up arms against others, and the states thus persuaded to attack have been destroyed. And many have made many others great, both individuals and states; and when they have exalted them, they have suffered the most grievous wrongs at their hands. And many who might have treated people as friends and done them favours and received favours from them, have received their just deserts from these very people because they preferred to treat them like slaves rather than as friends. Many, too, not satisfied to live contentedly in the enjoyment of their own proper share, have lost even that which they had, because they have desired to be lords of everything; and many, when they have gained the much coveted wealth, have been ruined by it. So we see that mere human wisdom does not know how to choose what is best any more than if any one were to cast lots and do as the lot fell. But the gods, my son, the eternal gods, know all things, both what has been and what is and what shall come to pass as a result of each present or past event; and if men consult them, they reveal to those to whom they are propitious what they ought to do and what they ought not to do. But if they are not willing to give counsel to everybody, that is not surprising; for they are under no compulsion to care for any one unless they will." (1.6.44-46)

LS: I am very doubtful whether Xenophon means the religious conclusion literally, but the premise he surely means very seriously. You remember when we read the short writing *On Revenues*, and after Xenophon has prescribed this beautiful policy—you know, the big silver inflation and the other things he says there—in the end he says this: If you think this is a wise proposal, go to Delphi and Dodona and ask the gods, and ask the gods whether these proposals will be truly beneficial.[xv] Now enlarge that: not only these proposals, any proposals. You never can tell, because that is the essential limitation of all human prudence. Something may be the absolutely the right thing to do and no sensible man can have any doubt about it, and yet no one can say whether it will not be the consequence of this wise thing that something perhaps worse will come out of this wise action. Examples abound. There was no doubt for anyone who knew

[xv] *Ways and Means*, 6.2.

the situation around in the ’30’s that this country will have to fight Hitler and crush him. There was no question that it was wise, and yet the almost inevitable, but at that time not foreseeable, consequence was Soviet Russia, a military giant by far superior to Hitler’s Germany. That happens all the time. And to that extent Xenophon puts it in this pious way, but even without the piety the problem is there. Surely it contains in particular also a warning against Cyrus’s expansionism. These are very alluring goals, to rule over all men, and what will come out of it you don’t know. But even reasonable and virtuous goals and sensible actions on their behalf—no one knows the outcome, therefore one rightly does not make statesmen responsible for the unforeseeable consequences. But whether the consequences are unforeseeable or not, they are still the consequences, and therefore one must be very modest in one’s expectations. Even if a policy seems to be the only sound one and no serious opposition is possible, one has to do it, yet the end will be different. Shakespeare presented it very beautifully at the end—which is the play preceding Richard III? The last part of Henry VI.[xvi] Now everything is fine: the War of the Roses is over, so to speak, but at any rate this particular mixture was over. Everything is fine. As it were, the war to end all wars is finished. That is the way not only in the twentieth century; this happened also in former times: this last step, and then everything will be fine. And everything is fine, only one of the fellows present happens to be Richard III, the snake in the grass. There is always a snake in the grass.

Student: Is this the seventh thing that Cyrus didn’t know?

LS: Sure. Cyrus is an extremely clever man, but he is still very young. And perhaps he learned it never. Yes?

Student: What disturbs me about this paragraph is the examples he gives of human wisdom not succeeding do not seem very wise—

LS: In other words, somehow he seems to sense that Cyrus is bemused by these Median and not Persian goals, that is clear. But not all. The principle is stated universally. Not even the wisest, most sensible, most virtuous policy has a guarantee that it will not contribute to something equally bad, perhaps worse, than that against which the policy is directed. In simpler terms, in terms of the individual, as it is stated in the *Memorabilia*: Someone may plant a tree, a garden, and do it according to all the rules of the art of farming or tree-farming, and yet if he wants to enjoy the fruits, he doesn’t know that he will enjoy that. That is the simplest case. In other words, prediction is possible only regarding those things which are not the most important. Because a man fills his garden for his enjoyment—also [that of] his family—but let us assume in the first place he wants to enjoy these peaches or whatever it is, and no one, not the most competent physician or political physician, can tell him what will happen. That is so. Again, I believe from the Socratic point of view this is another sign of [the] essential limitation of the sphere of action. If he were concerned to the extent to which a man is concerned with contemplation, with what is always, he cannot know whether he will continue his contemplative activity and how long. That

[xvi] Richard: “And, that I love the tree from whence thou sprang’st,/ Witness the loving kiss I give the fruit./ (*Aside*) To say the truth, so Judas kissed his master/ and cried ‘All hail!’ when as he meant all harm.” (Shakespeare, *Henry VI, part 3*, 5.7.32-33)

is clear. But what he is concerned with, the objects of it, are not subject to chance. That is the point. Mr. __?

Student: You could almost say from the example that it is an eighth point that you shouldn't desire too much.

LS: That is sound, surely. But the terrible thing is, while in a general way it is of course true that being moderate and sensible is safer than being immoral and foolish, it is not universally so. I mean, some people have been very moderate and very sensible and acted on that, and yet the outcome of the action was not what any sensible man seeing the action would have wished. That is so.

But to come back to this more general point. That one must do because there are *n* subjects taken up, but not all are new. Many of these things—the father mentions the point, Cyrus says yes, and he develops the point fully. His father doesn't have anything additional to say which he doesn't know. But in these seven cases, if I count correctly, Cyrus still has to learn. So this is the cream of Cyrus's education. Now whether he still has to learn in the future remains to be seen. Mr. ___?

Student: About the point of invention, you made a statement about Machiavelli. Could you restate that?

LS: To what extent a city can be virtuous depends to some extent on the enemies. Very simply, for example: if the enemy is so powerful and so warlike that you have to have a strong army all the time, the energy going into that cannot go into peaceful activities. For example, the French complained prior to the First World War[14] [that] because they had only forty million and the Germans had sixty-five [million], they had to have three-year military service for the educated people as well as the others. And the educated Frenchmen said: That is unbearable, let us have the war and get it over with. That contributed to the militaristic policy of pre-First World War France. But the main point is this: How you can organize your domestic affairs depends to a considerable extent on the character and the quality of the enemy. There is no question. And this affects also ultimately moral matters, because these things have all kinds of side effects. So when Aristotle speaks in his *Politics* about the best regime, the perfect case is an island where no one else can come. The fact that utopias, the famous utopias written [about], are in most cases islands has to do with that. Here foreign politics is completely out; that doesn't exist. Perhaps some South Sea islanders—but then they don't have the other thing, because if you are so protected then you don't make any effort, and then you just lie in the sun and eat bananas, and you do not develop the human faculties. In other words, that is not so good. And therefore Machiavelli—and not only Machiavelli, because Thucydides, for example, saw this very clearly, but Machiavelli did it so to speak officially, so to speak, as a member of the theory profession; Thucydides belongs to the history profession—he did it and simply said therefore something is fundamentally wrong with the classical polities. And he expressed it by certain overstatements of which he knew they were overstatements, when he says, for example, you must have good arms and good laws. But if you have good arms, you have already good laws; the only thing which counts is good laws—which is not quite true. But in order to bring out this fundamental antagonism to the classics, you have to start from these tough, rock-bottom facts, and that means

defense, the enemy; whereas for classical politics the consideration of foreign policy is absolutely subordinate, as it should be, to domestic policy. Just as in private life we think a man who takes his bearings by his competitor is not a very good man—a foolish man, we would even say. Today they call him other-directed. I can state it in this slogan: The *polis* has to be other-directed. That's the trouble. The individual can be inner-directed; the *polis* can also be to some extent, but the *polis* is much more compelled by its functions to be other-directed than the individual. It is a limitation of the *polis*. Pardon?

Student: It can be tradition-directed too.

LS: This wouldn't help us. Even if you are tradition-directed, still the enemy has to be considered. Well, the case of de Gaulle would be very interesting in this connection, but we don't have time.[15]

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[1] Deleted "anything."
[2] Deleted "occurs."
[3] Mobed "cannot."
[4] Deleted "in."
[5] Deleted "when."
[6] Deleted "because."
[7] Deleted "think."
[8] Deleted "and."
[9] Deleted "the."
[10] Deleted "is."
[11] Deleted "say."
[12] Deleted "thought."
[13] Deleted "in."
[14] Deleted "I."
[15] Deleted "

Session 10: no date
***Cyropaedia* 2**

Leo Strauss: That was a very good paper.[i] I do not know whether you were aware before you read this section of the *Cyropaedia* how comical politics, and even political theory, can be if you look at it from a sufficiently high plane. You showed Cyrus very well as a master manipulator and calculator. That you did very well. Perhaps you overstated a few minor points; that is not important, the main point you got very well. You made one remark of which I do not know whether you are correct: that justice is absent. You mean the word justice does not occur? I didn't observe that, but you may be right. Perhaps I'll observe it while we go over the text today. In fact, justice is surely present. You used the word "merit" more than once. What is the relation of justice and merit?

Student: [. . .]

LS: In other words, unequal things to unequal people. That is a principle of justice. So justice is surely there in fact. You made one involuntary joke, I believe, among the many voluntary jokes which you reproduced. You spoke of an individual named Cyaxares. How did you pronounce that?

Student: Siahares.

LS: Why do you pronounce the x as h? There is a language in which this happens. What about Spanish?

Student: I never took Spanish.

LS: Nor did I. Well, at any rate Cyaxares. The Greeks have an x too, but that is surely trivial. Now let us begin at the beginning, right at the beginning, where we don't need for our purposes the first two sentences. The third: "After they had done this," namely, prayed, "they embraced each other. "

Reader:

they prayed again to the tutelary gods of the Median land to receive them with grace and favour; and when they had finished their devotions, they embraced one another, as was natural— (2.1.1)

LS: Let us stop here. So in two cases immediately following, he says, as he translates, "as is natural." That is too strong. "As is plausible" would be better. The meaning approaches natural,

[i] Strauss responds to a student's paper, read at the beginning of the session. The reading was not recorded.

but it is not the same: "as is to be expected." Why does he use that so emphatically? Once would have been sufficient. Why does he emphasize this here?

Student: [. . .]

LS: Not necessarily. I think it has something to do with the character of the whole book. This book presents itself when you read it as a good child, as an account of things that happened, i.e., as a historical book. Now no one would say that it is a history, and they have a word for that: they call it historical romance. Is this the term which is used by Miller?[ii] But this is of course one of these pigeonholes which kill the problem. Historical romance is not a term like tragedy, where one can speak of tragedies in contradistinction to comedies and perhaps other forms of dramatic poetry, because there is a clear meaning not only regarding the externals but also regarding the meaning of the whole thing. Remember Aristotle's definition of tragedy, with reference to what is to be done to fear and compassion: that is the core of tragedy. But there is no such core of historical romance. If you take this as a historical romance and say what Walter Scott is doing to you and wishes to do to you is something entirely different, radically different, from what Xenophon does to you and wishes to do to you—it is merely a superficial and external category, historical romance, in contradistinction to such a thing as tragedy. We have to think about that. This presents itself as a history and we have to take it as such. And of course Xenophon makes a distinction: in many cases he says this and this "is said" to have been said. This means he knows it, not directly, but only by rumor. But even a historian can say that. Xenophon, in his historical books, in the *Anabasis* and the *Greek History*, also uses the expression "it was said" to have happened; that is not the point. But in a true history, of course, strictly private things which happened between the two men who discussed something cannot be known unless one of them leaked it. But surely Xenophon wasn't present when this farewell took place, nor has he had any report about it. But since he knows men, he can say they did it "as is to be expected," because that is what people do. When father and son say goodbye to each other, and the son goes on a campaign, they are very likely to have embraced one another. It is an indication of this problem of what we can know. And we are so spoiled in this respect because of our habit, centuries old, of reading novels, where someone tells us the most intimate things about two people which they never mention to anybody else and we are let into the secret. How does he know it? How does Flaubert know what Madame Bovary said to one of her many lovers? How does he know? And ultimately because it can be expected. So one should not entirely neglect this point. Did you want to say something?

Student: [. . .]

LS: Oh, no. It is a book on political philosophy, if we use a term he does not use, insofar as it claims to give an answer to *the* question of political philosophy: How can man rule men? Yes, but on the other hand the answer is given by a story, by an account of what happened in the most famous case of this kind, the case of Cyrus. For example, Tolstoy's *War and Peace* is also an account of what happened but surely is meant explicitly to show the universal truth about war and peace, or more particularly about historical movements: that the great men are nothing. You

[ii] Miller is the translator of the edition used in class.

know this kind of thing. Formally it is of course a history, an account of things which have happened once. Mr. ____?

Student: [. . .]

LS: It is slightly derogatory, the way in which you put it, because one can omit the absurd part. It is not absolutely necessary. Sure, but one doesn't have to go into any particular analysis of history. It suffices to say that history is the record of memorable events—of course events of the past, the past may be last year, it may be a thousand years ago. To that extent it is history. But you see the question is very important in the *Memorabilia*, because in the *Memorabilia* Xenophon claims to present the truth about Socrates. Therefore all these stories of Socrates's conversations must be true accounts. Now he vouches for them in many cases by saying, "I was present when he had this conversation"; in other cases, he says, "I have heard this," meaning from a trustworthy man who was present. Plato never raises such claims, as you know, because the word "I" never occurs, as Plato, in any dialogue. And this is not merely play; it has to do with the whole question of truth. I mean, a Platonic dialogue is surely meant to be true if properly understood in one sense to present, say, the truth about justice or moderation or whatever it may be, but in another sense of course it is not true. I mean, that Socrates should have talked with Laches and Nicias about courage on this occasion with this and this incident is of course a mere fiction. It is worth thinking about how you can teach the truth by means of fiction. We are so spoiled by a millennia-old tradition that we can do it [so] that we do not give it any thought anymore. But the claim even in Homer is raised: How does Homer know these things which happened between Achilles and Agamemnon, and so on? He has a pipeline, because he surely wasn't there: the Muse. The Muse told him and she vouches for the truth. When he had this particularly hard nut to crack, namely, the precise number of ships which went to Troy, there he invokes the Muse in particular, because while the other things he might conceivably have figured out because it could be expected, this he couldn't have figured out—so he needs especially the Muse. In earlier ages people took this seemingly trivial question much more seriously, and I think it is not a trivial question.

At any rate, when Cyrus arrives at his uncle's, Cyaxares (this poor fish, as we shall see soon), the first question is the number of fighters on each side. The allies have fourteen thousand horse and one hundred thousand others; and the enemy has sixty thousand horse and two hundred thousand others. At the end of paragraph 6, do you have that?

Reader:
"That is to say," said Cyrus, "we have less than one-fourth as many horsemen as the enemy and about half as many foot-soldiers." (2.1.6)

LS: A little thing: in the text it is "less than a third." And since they[iii] believe they are better mathematicians than Xenophon, and fourteen is obviously also less than a fourth of sixty, they say "less than a fourth," but clearly fourteen is also less than a third of sixty. How do they know what the principles of military arithmetic of Xenophon are? Good. Of course one has to interpret that, but one has no right to make this change. This is one thing. Number is important, but it is

[iii] I.e., the translators.

also important, of course, what kind of troops. Now these are horseman and light infantry—no hoplites, or not a sufficient number of hoplites. Since the kind of troops is more or less the same on both sides, number is decisive. Our side is hopelessly outnumbered; now we have to do something about it. We cannot increase the number, but we can increase the quality. And what he will do is increase the number of heavy infantry—real infantry, hoplites. The Persian commoners are to be made hoplites. That is a purely military measure, an emergency measure, but an emergency measure with consequences. Let us read paragraph 11.

Reader:
Thereupon Cyrus is said to have called the peers together and said—

LS: This is his second address to the Persian nobility. Do you remember the burden of the first?

Student: Virtue is not to be practiced for its own reward.

LS: There [is] the principle. Now we come to one application of that. By the way, you see also here "he is said to have said," he doesn't claim that he has a verbatim report of this speech. Yes?

Reader:
"When I saw you thus equipped and ready in heart to grapple with the enemy in a hand-to-hand encounter, and when I observed that those Persians who follow you are so armed as to do their fighting standing as far off as possible, I was afraid lest, few in number and unaccompanied by others to support you, you might fall in with a large division of the enemy and come to some harm. Now then," said he, "you have brought with you men blameless in bodily strength; and they are to have arms like ours; but to steel their hearts is our task; for it is not the whole duty of an officer to show himself valiant, but he must also take care that his men be as valiant as possible." (2.1.11)

LS: That is the proposal. Now what is the reaction of the nobility?

Reader:
Thus he spoke. And they were all delighted, for they thought they were going into battle with more to support them. And one of them also spoke as follows: "Now," he began, "it will perhaps sound strange if I advise Cyrus to say something on our behalf, when those who are to fight along with us receive their arms. But I venture the suggestion, for I know that when men have most power to do both good and ill, then their words also are the most likely to sink deep into the hearts of the hearers. And if such persons give presents, even though the gifts be of less worth than those given by equals, still the recipients value them more highly. And now," said he, "our Persian comrades will be more highly pleased to be exhorted by Cyrus than by us; and when they have taken their place among the peers they will feel that they hold this honour with more security because conferred by their prince and their general than if the same honour were bestowed by us." (2.1.12-13)

LS: Let us stop here. So he even improves on Cyrus. And he may very well be, as Mr. ___, I believe, indicated, what is called a plant. Is this not what you said, that he was induced by Cyrus to make this very remark? So this works very well. Now clearly this implies everything. By

establishing this direct relation between the king or the king's son, the general, and the commoners, the nobility ceases to be the intermediary power, to use Montesquieu's term. The power was actually in the hands of the nobility up to this time, and the king was only the hereditary general, nothing more. All relations hitherto went from the kings through the nobility, through the commanders of regiments or whatever it might be. From now on in the decisive respect the relation is from the top to the bottom, and the proportionate importance of the nobility is diminished: a constitutional change of the utmost importance, which comes in as a minor temporary measure for increasing the efficiency of the army. Mr. ___?

Student: [. . .]

LS: Here this claims to be a literal verbatim report. Read the beginning of the next paragraph, paragraph 14.

Reader:
Accordingly, Cyrus had the arms brought in and arranged to view, and calling all the Persian soldiers together he spoke as follows— (2.1.14)

LS: No, that is not properly translated: "he spoke in about the following manner." So this does not claim to be a literal speech. I cannot answer this question why in this particular case the brief speech to the nobility is said to be verbatim, and this speech to the soldiery, to the plebeians, is said to be "about this way," not literal. That is one of the many questions which we can here only raise and which would have to be answered by an adequate interpretation of Xenophon.

In Thucydides, it is very simple. In Thucydides all the great speeches, all speeches, are "in about this manner"; and at the end "he had spoken in about that manner." And there is only one very brief speech which is said to be literal, a very brief speech. In the case of an author like Thucydides, I would say here you have to assume that Thucydides got a verbatim report—after all, a short speech, say, of fifteen lines, can be memorized especially by the man who made it, and might have [been] told [to] Thucydides later. The difficulty in Thucydides is rather that he has a number of letters which are verbatim quoted, and these are correspondence between two famous Greek traitors, Themistocles and Pausanias, and the Persian king. And there the question arises: How could Thucydides have had access to these originals in some archives in Susa or wherever they might have been? Here I do not know how to handle it, but one could acquire it by first making complete statistics and then seeing whether a pattern emerges.

Student: I see another strange thing about this. I wonder if it is related to another problem, namely, he seems to articulate one of the main principles of the *Hiero*, which Simonides puts up to the tyrant.

LS: Yes?

Student: Which leads to the improvement of his rule.

LS: Namely?

Student: That if a monarch does certain things it carries more grace than if another man does it.

LS: Nice things by the ruler, the punishments by subordinates. Sure, I have here a reference to some passage in the *Hiero*. I think that is correct. Mr. ___?

Student: What is the relative weight of a speech preceded by "is said to have" and then followed by "as follows," whereas the speech to the commoners is "in about this way."

LS: That is a very good point. It may establish the equality in truth of the two speeches, because the first one, "he is said to have said," and in the second case he spoke to them: "he spoke to them in about the same manner." That seems to come to the same, that's quite true. But still the difference would have to be explained, and I cannot explain it. I have to raise many questions in this seminar which I cannot answer. Now let us continue.

Now then there comes the speech to the Persian soldiery, which is fairly long. I will therefore only give a brief summary. The main point: you have all become fully equal. I think we should read it. Paragraph 15 following. "Men of Persia."

Reader:
"Fellow-citizens of Persia, you were born and bred upon the same soil as we; the bodies you have are no whit inferior to ours, and it is not likely that you have hearts in the least less brave than our own." (2.1.15)

LS: "Souls." So in other words, by nature you are perfectly equal, have always been.

Reader:
"In spite of this, in our own country you did not enjoy equal privileges with us, not because you were excluded from them by us, but because you were obliged to earn your own livelihood."

LS: You remember that constitutional provision. Yes?

Reader:
"Now, however, with the help of the gods, I shall see to it that you are provided with the necessaries of life; and you are permitted, if you wish, to receive arms like ours, to face the same danger as we, and, if any fair success crowns our enterprise, to be counted worthy of an equal share with us.
"Now, up to this time you have been bowmen and lancers—" (2.1.15-16)

LS: In other words, light infantry, and not the real stuff.

Reader:
"and so have we; and if you were not quite our equals in the use of these arms, there is nothing surprising about that; for you had not the leisure to practice with them that we had."

LS: You see the typical difference between nobility and plebs: no leisure, no education. Now you are provided with the education—a bit later, but still it will do. Yes?

Reader:
"But with this equipment we shall have no advantage over you. In any case, every man will have a corselet fitted to his breast, upon his left arm a shield, such as we have all been accustomed to carry, and in his right hand a sabre or scimitar with which, you see, we must strike those opposed to us at such close range that we need not fear to miss our aim when we strike." (2.1.16)

LS: As it would be with weapons when shooting from a distance. You can't miss when you are so close. Yes?

Reader:
"In this armor, then, how could any one of us have the advantage over another except in courage? And this it is proper for you to cherish in your hearts no less than we." (2.1.17)

LS: In other words, he doesn't say "courage," but "daring."

Reader:
"For why is it more proper for us than for you to desire victory, which gains and keeps safe all things beautiful and all things good? And what reason is there that we, any more than you, should desire that superiority in arms which gives to the victors all the belongings of the vanquished?" (2.1.17)

LS: So equality is now fully established. This minor difference of education—that they did not go to the schools of justice to which the nobility went—is unimportant. The main reason is that the good things are acquired by arms, and by the best arms of course. Now you get the best arms too; no longer any significant difference. The demoralization increases at a tremendous pace. The difference of moral level which was supposed to have existed in the nobility is now completely discounted. And now the end.

Reader:
"You have heard all," he said in conclusion. "You see your arms; whosoever will, let him take them and have his name enrolled with the captain in the same companies with us. But whosoever is satisfied to be in the position of a mercenary, let him remain in the armour of the hired soldiery." Thus he spoke. (2.1.18)

LS: So they are of course in favor of it, and now we have a professional army, no longer a citizens' army. And this is stated very clearly in paragraph 21: [*ergon*], a single work, a single activity. Just as in Plato's *Republic*, the key formula: one work. The only thing to do is to fight and to win, and forget about everything else; and then you get all the good things because naturally the good things which the other part of the population produce—carpenters, farmers, or whoever it may be—belong to him who wins. I believe this axiom does not have to be, does not need special proof. Those who need a proof will find it later on in the third book of the *Cyropaedia*. Good.

This is also developed in the sequel, paragraph 25. The soldiers have to lead a life in common. No private bedrooms: barracks, and in the open. Again, *Republic*: that's all there, only here in the

special application. Now he develops at great length the great advantages which this common life in the open has. Let us read paragraph 28 as a specimen.

Reader:
And finally, he thought that comradeship would be encouraged by their messing together and that they would be less likely to desert one another; for he had often observed that even animals that were fed together had a marvellous yearning for one another, if any one separated them. (2.1.28)

LS: This comparison with animals, which was brought out by Mr. ___, goes through. You remember in the *Oeconomicus* when he developed how to train a bailiff and this kind of thing—and workers, carrot and stick, which is fundamentally an education for donkeys, sheep, as well as for human beings, up to a point. Good. In paragraph 31.

Reader:
The quartermasters—

LS: Well, this is not merely the quartermasters, this is also everyone who has to do with the lowly functions: kitchen police, those who don't fight. How would they be called today? The tail. They of course don't have the status of the soldiers from one of point of view, but they have to be well treated because if they are not good the whole thing must be ruined. Read the paragraph, please.

Reader:
The quartermasters in the army he always allowed an equal share of everything; for he thought that it was fair to show no less regard for the purveyors of the army stores than for heralds or ambassadors. And that was reasonable, for he held that they must be trustworthy, familiar with military affairs, and intelligent, and, in addition to that, energetic, quick, resolute, steady. And still further, Cyrus knew that the quartermasters also must have the qualities which those have who are considered most efficient and that they must train themselves not to refuse any service but to consider that it is their duty to perform whatever the general might require of them. (2.1.31)

LS: In other words, the democracy goes in a way still further. All ranks and all parts of the army must be properly treated.

Now let us turn to the next chapter. The great question which we must raise is: How does the nobility react to the new situation? Because that the commoners will [not] like [them] would follow from some simple principles of human nature, namely: How does the nobility react after the change has been enacted? Because sometimes people don't know what a change means when it has not yet been put into effect. You know that, surely. After all, there is an enormous difference between gentlemen and commoners regarding education or breeding. The question was raised in the first paragraph: How are the commoners as fighters—that they can't know yet, because there has been no fighting, but how are they as companions outside of fighting? This is a question which is raised at the beginning, and Hystaspas says they are rather ill-tempered

fellows; they don't have the suavity and ease of gentlemen. This is the beginning of it. Now this is the point.

In the next paragraphs, 2 to 5, the first thing which is mentioned is the ridiculous fear that they do not get their share, and a story is told to this effect. It is all very nice but we don't have enough time for every little story, and I hope that you have read it. The key point is this: that there is one very eager to get his share and he is last, and so he doesn't get a good share. And then the commander says: Sit at my side so that you can be sure. But next time they start at the other end of the table, he doesn't get anything. And then when he sits in the middle something happens again which deprives him of his share. Let us read paragraph 5.

Reader:
Thereupon he took his mishap so to heart that he lost not only the meat he had taken but also what was still left of his sauce; for this last he upset somehow or other in the confusion of his vexation and anger over his hard luck. (2.2.5)

LS: Yes. Luck, *tuchē,* chance. So this is the point. You see that while now he has legal equality, so to speak, chance still treats him unequally. And this cannot be avoided, done away with, by any legal arrangements. Yes?

Student: Is there any connection between this passage and that in the *Memorabilia* where Socrates admonishes a man for taking too much sauce with his bread?

LS: Not directly. It is not a question of continence or incontinence here. But it is a question of feeling that he is still underprivileged from the olden times. He is in fact underprivileged, but now no longer by law, but only by chance. There are people who are by nature exposed to nasty chance. They break their leg and come too late, and miss the desirable thing, whatever it may be. There are such people. And if such a man is by nature unlucky, that cannot be remedied by any egalitarian legislation.

Now the next story, in chapter 6, paragraph 6 to the beginning of paragraph 10: their ridiculous stupidity. You must see these are gentlemen who are accustomed to look down on these incredible persons who are not gentlemen. And of course now they have to admit them to comradeship, but it still shows. Look how inept they are, how stupid they are. Extremely funny people. Cyrus, however, when he hears these stories, is highly pleased. Let us read paragraph 10.

Reader:
The rest, of course, laughed over the military escort of the letter, and Cyrus said: "O Zeus and all the gods! What sort of men we have then as our comrades; they are so easily won by kindness that we can make many of them our firm friends with even a little piece of meat; and they are so obedient that they obey even before the orders are given. I, for my part, do not know what sort of soldiers one could ask to have in preference to these!"
Thus Cyrus praised his soldiers, laughing at the same time. (2.2.10-11)

LS: That's interesting. He finds it also—it is a serious thing to have soldiers whom you would wish, but at the same time he laughs. Now what does this laughing of Cyrus mean? I think we have to keep this in mind. Let us read the following two paragraphs.

Reader:
But one of his captains, Aglaitadas by name, one of the most austere of men, happened to be in Cyrus' tent at the same time and he spoke somewhat as follows—

LS: "Somewhat as follows," you see, it is not quite literal. Yes?

Reader:
"You don't mean to say, Cyrus, that you think what these fellows have been telling is true?"

"Well," said Cyrus, "what object could they have, pray, in telling a lie?"

"What object, indeed," said the other, "except that they wanted to raise a laugh; and so they tell these stories and try to humbug us." (2.2.11)

LS: "They boast," more literally translated.

Reader:
"Hush!" said Cyrus. "Don't call these men humbugs. For to me, the name 'humbug' seems to apply to those who pretend that they are richer than they are or braver than they are, and to those who promise to do what they cannot do, and that, too, when it is evident that they do this only for the sake of getting something or making some gain." (2.2.12)

LS: The purpose of the boaster is to gain by his boasting. That is Cyrus's view of a boaster. Yes?

Reader:
"But those who invent stories to amuse their companions and not for their own gain nor at the expense of their hearers nor to the injury of any one, why should these men not be called 'witty' and 'entertaining' rather than 'boasters'?"[iv] (2.2.12)

LS: By the way, here the word justice occurs in the Greek original: "Why are they not more justly called witty rather than boasters." Now here we have an ill-tempered gentleman; hitherto we have seen an ill-tempered commoner. And he dislikes laughter, and protests against that; he is a serious man. And Cyrus takes the side of the laughers, defends laughter. Why is Cyrus such a friend of laughter? Remember, to understand this question fully one would have to read the Socratic writings and see whether Socrates laughed. He laughed only once in his whole life. Cyrus laughed often, which is a sign of lack of seriousness; and in addition, Cyrus does more: He encourages laughter. That is very strange. Why then does he like laughter? That would be a question, would it not? And also why Socrates does not like laughing.

[iv] In original: "humbugs" (not "boasters")

Student: [. . .]

LS: Could one express what you mean by saying laughing is good for the sake of seriousness? Just as we need relaxation for the sake of work, so let these boys have their fun while there is time for it. Soon the time will come when they won't have any fun anymore.

Student: When you say only Socrates laughed once, do you refer to a Platonic dialogue?

LS: To Xenophon, who is more relevant here. A similar situation as in Plato.

Student: Paragraph 12, [which] we just read, strongly reminded me of Rousseau's fourth reverie of a solitary walker,[v] and I think it is not wholly unlike the arguments adduced in the end—both are meant to be applied to the art of reading.

LS: That is exactly it. But I wouldn't go to the art of reading, but something much more immediately relevant. Laughing first of all for the sake of letting them have fun as long as they can is good, because it will really contribute to their good qualities in a serious situation. The other is an entirely different consideration: laughing as a means of fooling people. In fact, Cyrus fooled them all, what Mr. ___ called the manipulation. You remember in this conversation with his father when his father said to him: You have to be a thief and a robber and not only honest, and Cyrus's first reaction is to laugh. This release from the bonds of civilian peace morality is a relaxation, a relief. But more specifically, what does Cyrus say about a man who used laughter as a means for fooling people?

Student: He praises him.

LS: Oh, no. He has used a more specific word for that.

Student: At the end of paragraph 12?

LS: Sure, how does he call them?

Student: Those who invent stories to amuse their companions.

LS: No. Cyrus is not merely an entertainer. Cyrus is calculating; he uses laughter as a means of fooling these people. How does he call these people before in paragraph 12? He calls them boasters. Whether this corresponds to the range of the term boasting in present-day English is of no concern to us. The main point is that. What follows then, regarding Cyrus? A specific word which he would never grant of himself: he is a boaster. He is a boaster, which doesn't mean that he is not a terrifically clever man—this will be shown—but from the highest point of view and, according to his own definition of boasting in addition, he is a boaster. Now why that is the case, that is the problem of the whole book. Socrates is not a boaster; Cyrus is a boaster. And the meaning of boaster must be enlarged. A boaster is not necessarily a mere swindler, someone who

[v] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Reveries of a Solitary Walker* (1782).

claims he is an MD and never got a diploma, and operates on people. We have heard such stories and other things of this kind. “Boaster” can have a deeper meaning. Now what is the precise meaning of a boaster in Socrates’s view? A man who claims to know what he does not know. Perhaps Cyrus claims to know, in a particularly impressive manner, things which he doesn’t know. Could this be?

Student: [. . .]

LS: Not necessarily, but simply that he knows what is good. For example, that it is good to rule over millions, the principle on which he acts.

Student: [. . .]

LS: He transforms the whole regime in his favor without anyone being aware of it. It will come out later. Once they are completely caught it will dawn on one or two of them. But for the time being they are perfectly happy. And that is I think a very good deception—I mean, if you can speak of a good deception.

Student: [. . .]

LS: But that is a question. Is the interest to be measured in terms of badges and booty, or is freedom also of some importance?

Student: I was referring to the specific fact that they are outnumbered.

LS: A first-rate politician will never do anything to his own benefit which is not also to the common good. That is the point. That is the reason why people have constitutions, that is not merely a consideration of the common good in the narrow sense. It is always to the common good that a man, very intelligent, finding the easiest way to solve a question, just dictates what is to be done. Also other people. That can be an example. I think he surely deceived them.

Now in the sequel there follows another defense of laughter, no longer by Cyrus but by Hystaspas. Let us read that. Paragraph 15.

Reader:
Hereupon Hystaspas answered somewhat as follows: “If you will heed me, Aglaitadas, you will freely expend this very valuable commodity upon your enemies and will try to set them to weeping; but upon us and your friends here you will please to lavish this cheap article, laughter. And you can, for I know you must have a great quantity of it stored up; for you have never spent it upon yourself nor do you ever afford any laughter for your friends or for your enemies if you can help it. So you have no excuse for begrudging us a laugh.”

“What!” said Aglaitadas; “do you really think, Hystaspas, to get a laugh out of me?”

"Well, by Zeus," said the other captain, "he is a very foolish fellow, let me tell you, if he does; for I believe one might rub fire out of you more easily than provoke a laugh from you."

At this, of course, the rest laughed; for they knew his character, and Aglaitadas himself smiled at the sally. And Cyrus seeing him brighten up said: "It is not right, captain, for you to corrupt our most serious man by persuading him to laugh, and that, too," said he, "when he is such a foe to laughter."

With that, the subject was dropt. (2.2.15-17)

LS: What is Hystaspas's argument? Both Cyrus and Hystaspas defend laughter, and for the understanding of Cyrus it is very important to see how his defense of laughter differs from Hystaspas's. It is a very simple means to make clear the peculiarity without Xenophon having to tell us anything; we just have to think about it. Hystaspas says laughter is in itself better than crying. That is the point. This is of course not Cyrus's view. How could it be Cyrus's view, who derived such great enjoyment from looking at corpses, you remember, which is not exactly a laughing matter from any point of view. Good. Now we come up to a very grave question of constitutional law, and more than that. Yes.

Student: I wonder if there isn't a very important principle stated by this man, namely, that our enemies are somehow our best friends.

LS: No. I think the principle is very simple, very crude: One should make one's friends laugh, and one's enemies weep.

Student: Nevertheless, our enemies teach us a very important truth about ourselves.

LS: Yes. But one cannot raise all the grave questions at the same time. The *prima facie* case is this, that laughing is better than weeping. This is what Hystaspas says. Good. Just as a friend as such is better than an enemy as such. Is that not true? That enemies can be extremely valuable because they keep you on your toes is also true, but that is a derivative thing. You know you [don't] have to add a reason why it is good to have friends. In the case of a friend, you don't have to give a reason why it is good to have friends—or [that] the reasons are so obvious that they don't have to be stated would be better.

Now let us turn to this grave constitutional question. Paragraph 18.

Reader:
"Cyrus," said he, "and all you here present, I observe, for my part, that some have come out with us who are of superior merit, others who are less deserving than we."

LS: You know this delicate language. Hitherto this was a clear inegalitarian society: nobility here, commoners there. Yes?

Reader:
"Now, if we meet with success, these will all expect to have share and share alike. And yet I do not believe that anything in the world is more unfair than for the bad and good to be awarded equal shares." (2.2.18)

LS: Literally: "is more unequal than that the good and the bad should be regarded as worthy of equal status." So in other words, the aristocratic principle is stated against the democracy: not equal shares to all, but unequal shares to the good in contradistinction to the bad. The issue is drawn. What does Cyrus answer?

Reader:
"Well, then, in the name of the gods, my men," Cyrus replied to this, "will it not be a very good thing for us to suggest to the army a debate on this question: shall we, in case God gives us any success to reward our toils, give to all an equal share or shall we take into consideration each man's services and bestow increased rewards upon him commensurate with them?" (2.2.18)

LS: In other words, Cyrus, constitutional general, is very far from deciding this great issue on the ground of reason alone. Let us have a popular vote on the aristocratic principle, that [is what] he suggests. Later on he is no longer in need of these cumbersome procedures, but for the time being he still does it. We can also say what is proposed in democratic terms is equality of opportunity, not equality of achievement. Equality of achievement doesn't exist, but there could be an equality of shares. No equality of shares, but equality of opportunity. Everyone can distinguish himself as much as he is capable of and he is awarded according to the degree of his distinction, which is also a principle of modern democracy. Now it appears from the sequel, paragraph 19 and the beginning of 20, that it must be established democratically. We must read that.

Reader:
"And what is the use," said Chrysantas, "of starting a discussion concerning this matter? Why not rather announce that you propose to do thus and so? Pray, did you not announce the games and offer the prizes that way?"

LS: You see, there is precedent for the dictatorial procedure. Why not do it in this other case?

Reader:
"Yes, by Zeus," said Cyrus; "but this is not a parallel case. For what the men obtain by fighting, that, I suppose, they will consider their own common property; but the command of the army they still consider fairly to be mine, so that when I appoint the judges, I am sure they think I am within my rights." (2.2.19)

LS: You see? Do you not think this is an interesting discussion?

Reader:
"And do you really believe," said Chrysantas, "that the mass meeting would adopt a resolution that each one should not have an equal share, but that the best should have the preference both in honours and gifts?"

"Yes," said Cyrus, "I do—"

LS: Cyrus is a better democrat than the man of the nobility.

Reader:
"partly because we recommend it, and partly because it is mean to oppose a proposition that the one who suffers the most and does the most for the state should also receive the highest rewards. And I think," said he, "that even to the worst it will seem proper that the good should have the larger share." (2.2.20)

LS: "Will seem to be useful." In other words, they will calculate that they are better off if those who toil more for them should be encouraged to toil more by getting more. So Cyrus is sure, in other words, that the principle of distributive justice, inequality of shares, is democratically defensible and evident. At least everyone will be ashamed to oppose that. You know they may not like it, but not everything of which we disapprove are we willing to disapprove [of] in public. You know, to contradict something and be opposed to something is a great difference; and this is the great problem of the ballot, secret ballot, and polls, where people do not have to stand up for what they think in public. So conceivably the indefensible motions can express themselves which could not express themselves if they had to stand up in the marketplace and say: "I am in favor of that." You see how deep these things lead us. The proposal of distributive justice is intrinsically reasonable, says Cyrus, and it is evident to the meanest capacity so we don't run any risk in proposing it to a democratic assembly.

From the sequel it appears from now on the nobility will no longer be legally privileged. If there is something to the presumption that the nobility are the better people by nature, and that this goodness is inherited from father to son and grandson, then this will show in the exercise of the right. But if this is not so, because noble men are known to have produced inferior offspring, well, too bad for them. But hitherto whether an offspring was good or bad was of no importance because there was a legal privilege. That no longer exists.

Student: Does not nobility depend on habituation?

LS: We come to that later. The problem, only to state it now simply: there is always a social hierarchy in the most democratic society, even in the Soviet Union. But the social hierarchy is credible to the lower ranks if they feel they deserve to be at the top, i.e., if the social hierarchy coincides with the natural hierarchy. It never is identical, but if there is even a close approximation, then the hierarchy is acceptable; and if there is no earthly reason why these people should be at the top except legal privilege, then people don't stand for it any more. This we come to later.

In paragraph 22 to 23, one company commander tells a story of loafers which he finds very amusing. Now let us see how Cyrus reacts to that. Let us read that.

Reader:

But one of the captains said with a laugh: "Well, I know a man of the commoners, too, who will support the proposition not to have share and share alike in that indiscriminate fashion."

Another asked him whom he meant; and he answered: "By Zeus, he is a messmate of ours, who in everything does his best to get the largest share."

"What! the largest share of hard work, too?" asked another.

"No, by Zeus," said he; "not by any means; but here I have been caught in a falsehood. For my observation is that he very good-naturedly consents to have a smaller share of hard work and other things of that sort than anybody else." (2.2.22)

LS: Funny story, isn't it? And how does Cyrus react to this funny story?

Reader:
"Well, men," said Cyrus, "I am convinced that such fellows as this one of whom our friend has just been telling us must be weeded out of the ranks, if we are to keep our army industrious and obedient." (2.2.23)

LS: In other words, here is the end of Cyrus's laughing. This is a serious matter. Good. [1]I think one has also to consider that Cyrus is not simply a friend to laughter, because loafers can be of course very amusing. I suppose some of you have read the nice stories about what is going on in the forest preserves—you know, where these people work one hour a day, and only when someone is around. That is really funny, there is no question, and yet someone might say in the City Council: That is not a mere laughing matter, taxpayers' money. Paragraph 26.

Reader:
"Do not, however, endeavour to fill up their places in the ranks with your own countrymen only; but, just as in selecting a team you seek out not horses that are home-bred but those which are best, so also in the case of men, take them from all sources—whoever you think will be most likely to contribute to your strength and to your honour." (2.2.26)

LS: You see? The revolution goes much further. Not only do we have now an intra-Persian democracy, but it is no longer even necessary to be a Persian citizen. Anyone who is promising to be a good soldier is to be accepted. The formula in Greek is very strong: "horses which are best, not those which are born in the fatherland." In principle, complete universalism. I mean, the whole thing is already tailored from the very beginning to a universal empire where the best men, whatever their national origin may be, will have the position which belongs to them according to merit: a homogenous universal state, as M. Kojève calls it.[vi] Homogeneous: no difference of status in any manner or form. And universal: in principle it embraces the whole human race. You see how topical Xenophon is. The practical conditions for that kind of thing

[vi] See Alexandre Kojève, "Tyranny and Wisdom," and Leo Strauss, "Restatement on Xenophon's *Hiero*," in Leo Strauss, *On Tyranny* (Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), esp. 181-84, 221-26.

didn't exist of course at that undeveloped stage of technology, but the principle was clearly known to Xenophon. People who say: Well, these are all forebodings of Alexander's empire, which came a generation or two later are very short-sighted, because that goes much beyond what Alexander achieved and even dreamt of. People knew, Xenophon knew, that the future empire of Alexander the Great would not embrace all men. India did not become a part of Alexander's empire, although he marched into northwestern India; and the Indians come up here, as Mr. ____ has shown by his report. So that is quite a tremendous step which he takes.

Now let us read paragraph 28.

Reader:
After that Cyrus began again to jest with them—

LS: You see we have been very serious, and now he begins again with the jests. Yes?

Reader:
for he had observed that one of the lieutenants had brought along as a guest and companion at table an exceedingly hairy and exceedingly ill-favored man; and addressing the lieutenant by name he spoke as follows: "Well, Sambaulas," said he, "so you also have adopted the Greek fashion, have you, and take about with you everywhere this youngster who is now beside you, because he is so handsome?" (2.2.28)

LS: May I ask to which Greek fashion he refers?

Student: Pederasty.

LS: Yes. You must know that, otherwise you won't understand it.

Reader:
"Yes, by Zeus," said Sambaulas; "at all events I enjoy both his company and his looks."

When his messmates heard this, they looked at the man; and when they saw that his countenance was exceedingly ugly, they all laughed. And one of them said: "In the name of the gods, Sambaulas, what has this fellow done to make such a hit with you?"

"By Zeus, fellows," he answered, "I will tell you. Every time that I have called him, whether by day or by night, he has never made any excuse saying that 'he had not time,' nor has he answered my call slowly, but always on a run. And as often as I have bidden him do anything, I have never seen him perform it without sweat; and besides, by showing them not by precept but by example what sort of men they ought to be, he has made his whole squad of ten just like himself."

"And yet," said one of the men, "although he is such an excellent fellow, you don't kiss him as you do your relatives?"

And the homely man answered this and said: "No, by Zeus, for he is not fond of hard work; for if he wished to kiss me, that would be an ample substitute for all his drill-work." (2.2.28-31)

LS: Now what is this story about? This is a funny story, mildly funny story, but it has of course a great message. This Sambaulas draws the ultimate conclusion from a certain very respectable principle: that goodness is only a quality of the soul, and the only thing loveable is goodness of the soul. Now this man has a perfect soul as far as the soldier is concerned, therefore he is absolutely loveable. But why do we laugh about it? Why do Cyrus and the others laugh about it? What does this laughter mean? It has a very grave message.

Student: Isn't that a rejection of the principle?

LS: Sure. Will you please restate the principle then, as corrected?

Student: Goodness is not only a quality of the soul, but also of the body.

LS: Or at least this: that to be loveable and to be good of soul are not identical. So in other words, love is something special. We come to that subject later. Love is something special. Now is there a connection between love and laughter, that great subject of chapter 2?

Student: We laugh among friends.

LS: That we do, but in a much more general way.

Student: I know we find out later in book 6 that love is very laughable. [. . .] Somehow love is looked down on.

LS: From Cyrus's point of view, not from Xenophon's or Socrates's point of view. So we must keep this in mind as a grave question, because that goes through the whole book. The conflict between Cyrus and Socrates is primarily the conflict between politics and philosophy. On a more common level, it is a conflict between politics and love, philosophy being love of truth—you see, that is a special form of *eros* that is reflected in that. *Eros* is not in itself a political passion, as can easily be proven. If we take the normal form of love, it happens that people belonging to different political societies fall in love with one another, which wouldn't be possible if *eros* were essentially political. Then people would only love people of their own political society. I have been told that this is so true that even other forms of political association, [such as] parties—that people belonging to different political parties may fall in love with each other. Even communists fall in love with noncommunists, which is something to be considered. You know? There is a tension between the two things, because they do not have identically the same end. Yes?

Student: How about the question of utility?

LS: Which utility? Well, here it is a virtue. This man is a virtuous man. Now here virtue is understood on the lowest level as something approaching what we mean by efficiency. He is an

efficient soldier, and the greatest interest of his commander is of course to have efficient soldiers—I mean, in obedience in handling of weapons and whatever else may come, and he is the best man in his company. And if this axiom is true, the most virtuous man is the most lovable man, he must be in love with this super-ugly fellow. It is obvious that his ugliness has nothing whatever to do with his military efficiency. Must I prove that? Can a man not be a first-rate soldier, and even a first-rate statesman, while being very ugly? That has nothing to do with that, whereas love has something to do with beauty, although there is a great variety of views [about] what constitutes beauty. But love is as such concerned with beauty, and concern with efficiency is something radically different.

Student: I was trying to get back to the question of goodness being for a definite purpose, and then when we were studying the *Memorabilia* it finally got down to where goodness and beautiful became intertwined.

LS: That is a question, whether one can leave it at that. This attempt of Socrates simply to identify good and beauty: a good umbrella is a beautiful umbrella. What Socrates means up to a point is clear, that the merely ornamental—if you have an umbrella which has a most glowing colors and perhaps even jewelry on it, and you can't open it, that is not a beautiful umbrella. Starting from such humble things, we can reach provisionally the conclusion that the good is identical with the beautiful. That is just like virtue is knowledge: ultimately, properly understood it is true; penultimately it is not true, as everyday experience shows. That is one of these paradoxes; [a] paradoxical assertion, not a simple assertion.

Student: I understand this with respect to love of a human being, but it is difficult to see a lack of identity between love of wisdom and goodness of soul, in other words, *eros* for wisdom.

LS: That is a long question, a very long question. In other words, you would say the ultimate coincidence of love of goodness of the soul, admiration for goodness of the soul, and love is identical. Perhaps this can be made to stick in the last analysis. But short of that last analysis it is manifestly untrue, would you not admit that? It would mean that only wise men can love wise women, and vice versa. And I believe a simple poll at the University of Chicago would show you that this must be considerably qualified. A certain percentage, but not universally.

Student: This disjunction between love and politics, this is not such a clear disjunction in the sense that the truly political man in the strict sense is a man, say, a lover of eternal glory, lover of honor, and this sort of *eros* is clearly political.

LS: Sure, but the point is this: Cyrus doesn't suffer from any deficiency of that *eros*, and yet he is called a frigid man, explicitly. We come to that later. It seems that love of glory or praise is somehow excluded, and Xenophon, following his general practice [of] treating these things on a very commonsensical level and only indicating the higher level, starts from the ordinary phenomena. And then from that level it makes absolute sense doesn't it, that someone can be super-ugly and yet super-efficient? We have to think that through, what this implies. Good.

We turn now to chapter 3, which is perhaps the most important of the chapters of this book. Now at the beginning of chapter 3 Cyrus speaks to all, nobility and commoners assembled. How does he address them?

Student: Friends.

LS: "Friends." Previously he had addressed the nobility "friends" and the commoners "Persians." Now this little change in address shows the change which has taken place: they are now as much friends as the nobility were hitherto. Now this assembly is meant to determine on the issue equality of opportunity or distributive justice, however you would like to call it. The speaker is a man, a commoner, called—no, first Cyrus speaks. I am sorry, first Cyrus speaks. Let us read paragraphs 3 and 4.

Reader:
"Accordingly," said he, "you must realize that when men who are united as comrades in war are fully persuaded that nothing will come out as it should unless each individual man exerts himself, then many splendid achievements are speedily accomplished; for nothing that needs to be done is neglected. But when each one assumes that there will be some one else to do and to fight, even if he proves a weakling, let me assure you," said he, "that to such men, all alike, all that is grievous comes in a flood." (2.3.3)

LS: The principle is clear. Everyone must know that on him depends everything. Yes?

Reader:
"And God has ordained it in some such way as this: in the case of those who will not compel themselves to work out their own good, he assigns others to be their commanders. Now, therefore, let any one stand up and speak to this question before us, whether he thinks that valour would be more cultivated among us, if the one who will do and dare most is also to receive the greatest rewards, or if we know that it makes no difference whether a man be a coward or not, as we shall all share and share alike." (2.3.4)

LS: The word which he uses, which he translated as "valour," is the common Greek word for virtue. So shall the virtues be rewarded, or shall everyone get the same share? And Cyrus states here a kind of natural law, that those who are not virtuous will be punished by natural means. They will be licked, and they will serve. Yes?

Student: Is equality of opportunity and distributive justice identical?

LS: Sure. I deliberately used them synonymously, and I think it is perfectly all right. Of course equality of opportunity is not quite the same, because distributive justice means that there is a distributor who awards the honors to the good and the punishments to the bad. When you speak of equality of opportunity, you think that there is an anonymous distributor called the invisible hand[vii]—have you ever heard of that?—and therefore it is not quite the same. I mean, if say, for

[vii] Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations* (1776), book 4, chapter 2.

example, Mr. Rockefeller, the old Rockefeller,[viii] used his opportunity so well, and some others used it so ill, there was no authority in the United States who gave Rockefeller his millions and the others the relief money, if any, but this was done by a kind of mechanism of the market or however you might call it. Distributive justice refers to some man or body of men who distribute the honors. To that extent there is a difference, but on this crude level on which we discuss it now the difference is negligible. Yes?

Student: But doesn't that one concept imply justice whereas the other doesn't?

LS: Which?

Student: Distributive justice implies justice whereas the other doesn't.

LS: That is very good, but that is implied in what I said. Still, when we speak of equality of opportunity we imply that the result of that—justice requires that everyone has the same starting point, so in that sense equality; but if they become unequal in the process, one working hard and the other being lazy, this serves them right. Right for each: right, just, yes? I don't deny the difference here, but I only say that for our present purpose we can neglect it. Now Cyrus has then made the proposal and told them what severe sanctions [are] applicable to all of them if each doesn't make the greatest effort; and therefore that even the defective ones will be benefited by the effort of the best ones, because they too will remain free men.

Now what is the reaction of the nobility? Chrysantas. Next two paragraphs.

Reader:
Hereupon Chrysantas, one of the peers, a man neither large nor powerful to look upon, but preeminent in understanding, stood up and spoke.

LS: Yes. We would have [to] keep this in mind, because that is one of the rare cases where characters are described—why Chrysantas is, in other words, not a man of impressive presence as they call that now, but outstanding in practical wisdom, [and] what this means. What does he say?

Student: We had him before.

LS: Yes, sure. But there he was not characterized. Yes?

Reader:
"Well, Cyrus," said he, "I think that you are introducing this discussion not because you think that the bad ought to have an equal share with the good, but because you wish to prove whether a single man will really be found who will care to let it be known that he thinks that, even if he himself does nothing good and noble, he should have an equal share of that which others win by their valour. Now I," he went on, "am neither fleet of

[viii] John D. Rockefeller (1839-1937). The enormous donations he made to the University of Chicago between 1889 and 1910 were key to the University's establishment and success.

foot nor strong of arm, and I know that in view of what I shall accomplish by my bodily strength I should not be judged either the first or the second, or even, I suppose, the thousandth, and perhaps not even the ten thousandth. But on this point I am perfectly clear, that if those who are powerful men take matters vigorously in hand, I shall have as large a share of any good fortune that may come as I deserve. But if the bad do nothing and the good and strong lose heart, I am afraid," said he, "that I shall have a larger share than I wish of something other than good." (2.3.5-6)

LS: In other words, he emphasizes his defects in order to make clear that he can speak of those who are in any sense of the word defective, that they are benefited by the efforts of those who are not defective. And now comes the main speech, that of Pheraulus, paragraph 7.

Reader:
Thus spoke Chrysantas. And after him Pheraulas stood up, one of the Persian commoners, but a man who for some reason or other had from the beginning won Cyrus's confidence and affection; besides he was well-favored in body and a gentleman at heart. His speech was as follows—

LS: "About as follows." Yes. This is a very long speech and we cannot read it whole, but we must read at least part of it. Begin, and I will tell you when we stop.

Reader:
"I think, Cyrus," said he, "and all you Persians here assembled, that we are all now starting on an equal footing in a contest of merit—"

LS: "We are starting from an equal start line." Equality of opportunity. Yes?

Reader:
"for I observe that we are all taking the same bodily exercise, that we all have the same rations, that we are all considered worthy to move in the same society, and that the prizes are offered alike to all. For obedience to the officers has been enjoined equally upon us all, and whoever shows himself prompt to comply, I observe that he receives honour from Cyrus. Again, to be brave in the face of the enemy is not a thing to be expected of one and not of another, but it is considered far the noblest thing for all alike.
And now," he continued, "we have been initiated into a method of fighting, which, I observe, all men naturally understand, just as in the case of other creatures each understands some method of fighting which it has not learned from any other source than from instinct—" (2.2.8-9)

LS: "From nature." Yes?

Reader:
"for instance, the bull knows how to fight with his horns, the horse with his hoofs, the dog with his teeth, the boar with his tusks. And all know how to protect themselves, too, against that from

which they most need protection, and that, too, though they have never gone to school to any teacher." (2.2.9)

LS: So only by nature, not from any other source.

Reader:
"As for myself, I have understood from my very childhood how to protect the spot where I thought I was likely to receive a blow; and if I had nothing else I put out my hands to hinder as well as I could the one who was trying to hit me. And this I did not from having been taught to do so, but even though I was beaten for that very act of putting out my hands." (2.3.10)

LS: In other words, even if there was a punishment on that natural action, he did it. So strong is nature. That is the whole theme here. Yes?

Reader:
"Furthermore, even when I was a little fellow I used to seize a sword wherever I saw one, although, I declare, I had never learned, except from instinct, even how to take hold of a sword."

LS: He has only one teacher, nature; that is the thing which comes back. Yes?

Reader:
"At any rate, I used to do this, even though they tried to keep me from it—and certainly they did not teach me so to do—just as I was impelled by nature to do certain other things which my father and mother tried to keep me away from. And, by Zeus, I used to hack with a sword everything that I could without being caught at it. For this was not only instinctive, like walking and running, but I thought it was fun in addition to its being natural." (2.3.10)

LS: Yes, "it was pleasant in addition to being natural." Yes?

Reader:
"Be that as it may," he went on, "since this method of fighting awaits us, which demands courage more than skill—"

LS: Literally, "zeal more than art." Yes?

Reader:
"why should we not gladly compete with the peers here? For the prizes proposed for excellence are equal, but we shall go into the trial not having at stake interests equal with theirs; for they have at stake a life of honour, which is the most happy of all, while we risk only a life of toil unhonoured, which I think is most burdensome." (2.3.11)

LS: We must stop it here. Perhaps we read later on another section of that. Now what is the key point of Pheraulus's speech? He is the only one in any speech hitherto read who speaks of nature, who appeals to nature in contradistinction to teaching by human beings, to art, and last but not least, this is not mentioned: *nomos*. And of course part of that *nomos* is also the education which the nobility received. They have no education; they are taught only by nature and that is of

course not education. Now what does this mean, that Pheraulas is the one, the *demos* man who appeals to nature? You see, some people who have never read anything except Tom Paine believe this all started in the eighteenth century, but this starts way back already here. Why does the democrat appeal to nature whereas the aristocrats do not? This side is not sufficiently considered when one speaks of classical political philosophy.

According to the official teaching of Plato and Aristotle, the rule according to nature is the rule of the best, and that is aristocracy. But this of course means literally the rule of those who are by nature best and also by training, but in any actual aristocracy this is not quite so. Why is this nobility—why are they ruling the commoners? On the basis of what?

Student: Birth.

LS: Birth. You can say birth is nature. There is a close connection between birth and nature. But it means of course, more specifically, on the basis of *nomos*. There is a rule established by men that these and these people, these and these families rule. Now there are various ways in which this can be expressed: so and so many quarters on a coat of arms is one way of putting it. You can also say, for example, the first settlers. It doesn't have to be a feudal nobility. The descendants from the Mayflower, they alone should rule: it is a defensible principle, because first come first served, meaning first come to clear the land to make it livable against wild beasts and wild men, and so on and so on. That can be done; it has been done frequently. Difficulties come, because if settlers come in to a large extent, then the Mayflower descendants will be swamped, and they are not sufficient to defend themselves and they have to enlarge the basis; therefore limitations on immigration [and] all this kind of thing. It is a long story. But at any rate, the key point is this: that by *nomos* a certain part of the population is singled out for privileges. They claim that they are by nature privileged, but this is a complicated question. Maybe and maybe not. To that extent distributive justice strictly understood or, if you please, equality of opportunity, is the natural principle: every man according to his worth, which ultimately depends on his nature. That is the point.

This thought has been used in a very interesting way by Machiavelli, to whom Mr. ___ referred, and we will hear a lot of Machiavelli as we go on. But on this for now: In the *Florentine History*, when he speaks of the rebellion in Florence of the year 1378—you can easily find it, because it proceeds in chronological manner—he describes a rebellion of the plebes against the patricians. And the leader of the plebes makes a most extraordinary speech occurring in the *Florentine History*, and it is very close to that speech of Pheraulas, only somewhat more savage, as you would expect because it is a revolution, a bloody revolution against the ruling class. And there is an appeal also to nature. And then the modern democratic theory: when it emerged in the seventeenth-eighteenth century, that this was the age in which nature played such a great role in all "quote ideologies unquote," this had a long, long prehistory—a long prehistory. And of course the emphasis is different. The emphasis is here not so much on equality in the sense of one man–one vote as in the sense of equality of opportunity. By nature, meaning as far as the starting point is concerned, all men are equal, but only in this respect. If they differ by virtue of their achievements, they should differ. That is according to nature. Yes?

Student: Hasn't Cyrus used democracy as a transition from an aristocracy based on birth to one based on merit?

LS: Absolutely. Yes, because, you see, the aristocracy based on birth, this does not require an arbiter who belongs and who does not belong, because every child, every son, of the nobility born in wedlock is a future patrician. You know? There is no man needed who says you belong to the upper class. But if you do not have such a legal arrangement, whether you do or do not belong to the nobility depends on individual selection, then there must be a selector. And this selector of course is meant to act not according to any law, but according to his judgment in each individual case. Therefore this is naturally an absolute rule. Do you see that? Every rule of law, every rule of law in one sense [has] an element of the arbitrary in it. Yes? You see that?

Student: This is an improvement of Plato's *Republic* politically, because strength is in alliance with wisdom here, if you equate wisdom with Cyrus.

LS: Yes.

Student: There is no problem of their accepting that; there is no problem of having to dilute his rule.

LS: I see. That is very good. Would you be surprised if Xenophon would be more practical than the Plato of the *Republic*? After all, Xenophon argues always on a somewhat lower, more practical level than Plato. But on the other hand, you do not get so easily away with it. Xenophon made it in a way easy for himself by radically separating Socrates from Cyrus, whereas Plato brings them together. And therefore the problem is as it were between the covers of the *Memorabilia* on the one hand and of the *Education of Cyrus* on the other, whereas in the *Republic* you have it within the covers of a single book. Both things are feasible, but one must always think of the alternative in order not to miss the problem. Yes?

Student: It's a bit strange, isn't it, that he says nothing about dissatisfaction of the aristocracy? I mean, we saw in the second chapter a lot of promotions made which of course implies there were many demotions also.

LS: Yes, sure. What is the principle coming in at this point?

Student: I think we mentioned them.

LS: I mean, what is the principle which comes in when you reflect on the fact you just mentioned?

Student: To elevate the best man.

LS: Sure, but nothing is said about demotions.

Student: There must have been demotion.

LS: Sure, although there can also be a considerable expansion, you know. For example, now no one has to be demoted in a college or university because a tremendous need exists. But Mr. ____, state your point.

Student: That if you have somebody else do it. But the inflationary approach is a way of doing it without having anyone visible do it. You just raise everybody's title and some people—

LS: That is not the point. The most important point, I believe, is this: Cyrus promotes and demotes; and according to the rule stated before, he will be present and will fix the other, whatever it may be. Then when someone is demoted, someone else will do it; and the other fellow will be cursed, and Cyrus will be universally praised. You see, when Xenophon is silent about demotions, he acts like Cyrus, doesn't he? He speaks of the things that Cyrus did and does not mention the things which Cyrus had done by others. Xenophon's manner of writing corresponds to Cyrus's manner of doing. The nice things are Xenophon's, and the not-nice things are yours who discover that. In other words, Xenophon is a politic writer. That is true.

Let me see. Democracy and nature. We have two more passages which we must consider, in the next chapter, paragraph 20. We cannot read these very interesting things. Because Pheraulas also gives a long description of what an excellent education the poor people got in Persia. They didn't go to schools of justice, but they went to the school of necessity, which for practical purposes is as good—you know, they learn to work very hard and are exposed to all inclemencies of the weather: and that was not sport; they had to do it in order to live. So the whole praise of education with which the whole thing began evaporates more and more. That is the price we pay for this much more efficient form of government which Cyrus is establishing. Yes?

Student: The whole argument up to now in the second chapter is really concerning the argument about nature, and the speeches up to now are about one virtue, and that would be courage.

LS: Not only that, discipline.

Student: And it is all in a contrived setting, in the sense the Persians are not speaking in Persia, but they are in a weak army and everyone is concerned very much with his own self-preservation.

LS: Well, this has to do with another question which we will discuss next time: whether insight, understanding alone is sufficient for making people good. To see in general that this kind of order, equality of opportunity or however you call it, is good is not yet sufficient for accepting it; there may be other pressures needed. Now the pressure is partly supplied by the situation. Sure, it's war, that's clear. But the general question is: Is virtue identical with knowledge, as it is according to Socrates's official assertion, or is it not? This question will be taken up next time. Let us turn to paragraph 20 of the fourth chapter.

Reader:
When they arrived at the frontier, he at once proceeded to hunt, as he used to do; and the most of his men, on foot and on horseback, were marching in a straight line before him, in order to start up the game as they approached. But the best of his foot and horse stood at intervals and lay in

wait for what was started up, and pursued it in relays. And they took many boars, deer, antelope, and wild asses; for many wild asses breed in those regions even unto this day. (2.4.20)

LS: You see this is another way in which Xenophon maintains the historical character of his account. This he can know, what the flora and fauna is, because that is unchanged and he was there. Next time you will see why this personal character, that he was there in these places, is of fundamental importance for the whole book. But I do not wish to take away all reasonable tensions or expectations. Let us read paragraph 26.

Reader:
"However," he added, "do not in this case do as you sometimes do, Chrysantas, in your fondness for hunting: you often keep yourself busy all night without sleeping; but now you should let your men rest long enough, so that they may be able to resist drowsiness. Again, do not, because you personally are accustomed to wander up and down the mountains without following human guides but running after the game wherever it leads you—do not now go into such dangerous and difficult places, but order your guides to lead you by the easiest road, unless it is much too long; for the easiest road is the shortest for an army. And do not lead your men at a run because you are used to running up mountains, but lead with moderate haste, that your army may be able to follow you easily. And it is a good thing for some of the strongest and most zealous to fall back sometimes and encourage the rest; and when the column has passed by them, it is an incentive to all to hasten when these are seen running past them as they walk." (2.4.26-29)

LS: You see, these very reasonable tactical lessons are given to Chrysantas in particular, for the reason that he is liable not to think of these matters. That is a kind of characterization of Chrysantas. You see in this book what at first glance repels many present-day readers is the lack of dramatic art. The art is there, it is only subdued. One has to observe these little things and then see. What we learn here about Chrysantas's specific defect, how does this help us in understanding his other actions? You remember perhaps that Chrysantas was the speaker for the nobility in the famous constitutional convention where the structure of the Persian state was radically changed, you know? This again is one of the questions which are raised to which I do not have an answer.

Student: In chapter 3, paragraph 5.

LS: That's it.

Student: The translation says that Chrysantas was preeminent in understanding, and one would think that a man preeminent in understanding would not have these defects regarding tactics. Even if he was not brave and strong, he would still have the understanding.

LS: Yes, but apparently—I can defend Xenophon by simply translating literally "a man neither tall nor strong to look at, but different—differing—through practical wisdom." So now, that the word "differing" switches insensibly into excellence is true, but originally and literally it does not mean excellent, only different. There was a peculiar bent of his practical wisdom. Yes? This

is one point. Now the praises of Xenophon, just as also of Thucydides, are always incomplete. Always incomplete. And this is one of his major charms, that he speaks very little of vices or defects. He is a nice man. And he wouldn't say—when recommending a student, for example, he would not say he is very bright but terribly lazy; he would simply be silent about his industry and only speak about his intelligence. If the recipient is a man who can read between the lines, the message will come across; otherwise it will not. This simple method of being silent—and it is more amiable if you speak always of good things and do not mention bad things, and Xenophon has this to an astonishing degree, this quality. So this explains it. But one has to make a study and has to follow the fate of each individual. There are not many here, through the whole book. And this would bring out the third dimension which is not visible in the two dimensional picture which we find when simply reading it. Mr. ____?

Student: I was very impressed with the elaborate procedures for crossing the boundaries because this seemed to me to be a kind of piety.

LS: Sure.

Student: But I notice when they go into Armenia [. . .]

LS: Yes, sure. Well, you see the procedure reminds, although it is not identical, of the Spartan procedure. Whenever they cross their frontiers on a campaign, sacrificing is done. And Persia is a barbaric Sparta and in many respects superior to Sparta, that we know. We have to see whether we can identify the other Asiatic nations mentioned here.

Student: Would Xenophon agree with Thucydides on this point?

LS: With whom?

Student: With Thucydides.

LS: No, it is very simple. Thucydides has simply Sparta and Athens, the actual cities. And he does not falsify the images but he only deepens them, whereas Xenophon is of course free—that is the meaning of a so-called historical romance: he can change them. That Persia is the Sparta of Asia, as they called Japan the Prussia of the Far East, as you may remember, many decades ago, this is in Xenophon somewhat different. By the way, Xenophon wrote a true book, if one can say that, about these matters, in the *Anabasis*, his expedition with Cyrus into Asia Minor; and there some of these nations, especially the Armenians, play a great role. It is very helpful to read these parallels, to read the *Anabasis*. The Armenians are a particularly nice people, Mr. ___, I don't know, that was his view at any rate: a particularly nice people and gay people, and he apparently liked them best. But he does certain things with these merely factual observations which goes much beyond any facts.

Student: In chapter 3, paragraph 1, there is a mention about a third libation and a footnote about Xenophon's understanding of the Persians.

LS: Where?

Student: Book 2, chapter 3, paragraph 1. The editor points out here, Xenophon introduced a Greek custom; the Persians poured no libation.

LS: How would you explain that?

Student: It seems almost too simplistic. I would suggest that this might be a hint by Xenophon that the Persians are not Persians.

LS: In other words, an indication that it is a historical romance, that these are not the true Persians, the true Cyrus, but something which Xenophon made out of them. And he lets us see the Greeks in these barbarians, and this means also of course the other way around: he lets us see the barbarism of the Greeks. That is the point. His *Greek History* is called *Hellenica*, "things Greek"—if you call it *Greek History*, then you miss the point—"things Greek," meaning nonbarbaric. And when you read it, just follow it, you see that this was quite barbaric, what was done. There were certain differences; there were so many republics in Greece and hardly any outside of Greece, that is of some importance. But what they do to each other, the killings and plunderings and so on, that is quite barbaric.

Student: But it is such an easy solution.

LS: Well, must all[2] [solutions be difficult]?

Student: From the other things we see in Xenophon, yes.

LS: In other words, you think it must make a sort of deeper background. But if you look at the hypothesis of the book as stated in the first chapter of the first book: he is going to show us the perfect ruler. The perfect ruler. And this is something of the greatest interest to everyone. In making this statement he takes for granted the ordinary view of the ultimacy of the political. He does not explicitly criticize it in this book because the last chapter, in which he shows the ultimate failure of Cyrus—which is also very simple, a clear contradiction—could mean on the surface only, well, [that] there is something wrong even with the perfect form of rule, absolute monarchy, because it depends on the successor, and the successors are most likely not [going] to live up to the standards of the founding. But the thing goes deeper and implies an insight into the limitations of all politics, not only absolute monarchy. This is helped by the fact that one sees the barbaric character of all politics. That is one way of putting it. Or the Greek character of barbaric politics, that is only the other way around.

Student: And this would only be helping the things along.

LS: But let us remind ourselves again and again of this question, that these things seem to be so simple. I mean, I have never studied the *Education of Cyrus* as thoroughly as one must study it, which means statistics also, and comparative statistics; for example, say, the number of oaths and what kind of oaths here and in the Socratic writings and elsewhere, that one would also have to do. In many cases when I gave seminars I had such statistics, but here I don't have them. And also the individuals, Chrysantas, Hystaspas, and so on, are not sufficiently clear to me, you

know, because I have not done this kind of homework. But I think if every professor is supposed to have done all the possible homework on every text he reads, then he would have to close shop. Therefore it is sufficient when I have read—I don't say I am just one reading ahead of you; that happens—I have heard it especially of younger college professors, who are very glad if they are one meeting ahead. But I know Xenophon reasonably well, but I don't know especially the *Education of Cyrus* as well as would be desirable. But I am addressing young people, and one can't know whether there will not be one of you, or maybe more than one, who is willing to devote five years or perhaps more to the study of this book. It would surely pay, there is no question, but I think we learn some things about the fundamental theoretical issues even at a cursory reading. But remind us from time to time, keep us on our toes. Good.[3]

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[1] Deleted "this."
[2] Deleted "situations be different."
[3] Deleted "

Session 11: no date
***Cyropaedia* 3**[i]

Leo Strauss: I like particularly your remark about the use of the term "barbarian."[ii] And the meaning of this is that the Persians are not barbarians, that they are in fact not the true Persians. You saw that very well. As for your remark about the term "discretion," which you say means also continence and prudence—ya, but what is the Greek term?

Student: *Sōphrosynē*.

LS: *Sōphrosynē*. But I translate it always thematically by "moderation," even if it does not sound right in English in a given case. We are then always reminded that it is the same term. This term has a very wide range, from continence regarding food and drink on one pole, to the opposite of madness and *hybris* on the other. But we have to accept that, this wide range. The same is, by the way, true in Plato. And so moderation can be on the hand something very low and very limited, as simply a kind of low sobriety and modesty, and then it can also be something very high.[1] There are relations between these meanings, which one can present in dialectical form, but we must somehow preserve the range by always translating it in the same manner. Mr. ____?

Student: Which term in your judgment is usually the broader term, continence or moderation?

LS: I will write the name *sōphrosynē*. [LS writes on the blackboard] And this is *enkrateia*. Now *sōphrosynē* has a much wider range. And *enkrateia* is in Xenophon's usage nothing but self-control and is, as he puts it, the pillar of virtue, i.e., it is not virtue proper but a condition of it. This *enkrateia* is required of course also by any conqueror, like Cyrus, or Alexander the Great, or even by a far-seeing gangster. He must exercise a considerable amount of self-control regarding sleep, drink, and so on and so on. So it is only the pillar, it is not virtue itself. In Aristotle's usage *sōphrosynē* means, in the *Ethics*,[2] self-control regarding the sensual pleasures, true inner freedom from them, whereas *enkrateia* is *mere* self-control. [3]He discusses the difference in the seventh book of the *Ethics*. Now what would be a good example? If someone has in each case, as it were, to pull himself together, not to succumb, that would be *enkrateia*. But if it has become a habit—

Student: Would an example be Cyrus himself, who could not look at—

LS: But we are not yet at this point. Xenophon's usage is not the same as the Aristotelian usage, but we come to that later. There is one more point. You described very nicely how everyone is better off after he has been treated by Cyrus: the Armenians, the Chaldeans, and of course the

[i] The transcript of this session is based on the remastered audiofile. Ellipses indicate inaudible words unless otherwise noted.
[ii] Strauss responds to a student's paper, read at the beginning of the session. The reading was not recorded.

Persians and Medes, too. Everyone is better off, including Cyrus. Now therefore the book reads like a fairy tale. Everything is just wonderful; and of course [there are] the many people who have to be killed in the process, and others who are not exactly killed but demoted, this is not so strongly emphasized.

Let us remind ourselves only of the situation for one moment, because the many foreign names may otherwise be bewildering. We start from Persia, Cyrus's land. And the Persians are kin, are neighbors of the Medes, and the two royal houses are related by marriage. We know that. And now there is a relation between Media and Armenia. And the Armenians were subjugated by the Medeans before, and were subject to them, rebelled, and Cyrus has to do something about it. At the same time there is a big war between Media and Assyria, Assyria being the great power, imperial power prior to Persia at least according to Xenophon's scheme. In fact, Babylonia came[4] after Assyria: Assyria, Babylonia, and then the Persian Empire. But we are only concerned with Xenophon's geography and history and not with true geography and history. So the big war is with the Assyrians. The Chaldeans have only a short scene; they are also a small tribe, just as the Armenians, and this is taken care of in passing by Cyrus. The big affair is the conquest of Assyria, the beginning of which has been told at the end of book 3 and which will be continued in the sequel.

But it is more important to consider the substantive context of the *Education of Cyrus*, and I will remind you briefly of the main points, because we have proceeded perhaps at too great a pace hitherto. Book 1 presented to us the problem of justice in the two conversations between Cyrus and his mother on the one hand, and his father on the other. In the first case, the question is that the just and the fitting or good are not identical: big boy, small coat. You remember that. Now from this it follows, if you want to have a good solution, the just must be identical with the fitting, i.e., that each possesses or gets what is fitting, what is good for him. This means of course communism, if thought through, and absolute rule of the wise, who assigns to each what is good for him. Now the difficulty in the conversation with the father is the double morality: that you should not steal in peace, but that you should steal in war. This can be resolved only if there is no war, if there are no longer separate political societies. In other words, we need not merely absolute rule and communism, but we need also a universal empire. You know, just as the Armenians and Chaldeans don't need any armies any more because they are part of an empire, but of course an empire which has limits, as Cyrus's empire has frontiers. The difficulty is not resolved there; it could only be resolved only by a universal empire. Now this can of course only be established by conquest, and therefore the whole book, and the activity of Cyrus, has a military character. It is the conquest, in its intention, of all men. What we would arrive at at the end is a universal and homogenous state, meaning [that] all differences which are recognized in any way and which are important in any way are only the natural differences. No differences based on law, on *nomos*, or even on education, play any role. Now this whole presentation of the problem of justice reminds us of another more famous presentation of the problem of justice. May I ask you which that is? [LS chuckles]

Student: The *Republic*.

LS: The *Republic*. What are the differences between Xenophon's presentation and Plato's in the *Republic*. Yes?

Student: . . .

LS: That is very important, yes.

Student: The rulers are of different natures. That is, Cyrus is not the same as the philosopher kings.

LS: Yes, that is true. But still, the philosopher kings come into the *Republic* very late, you know, at the end of the sixth[iii] book. [5]Let us disregard the philosophers for one moment. What you said is true, but I would start from a somewhat different point of view. Yes?

Student: . . . the *Republic* is one city-state.

LS: Yes. That is surely true. In other words,[6] Plato's concern is always the *polis*, and therefore always the element of injustice coming in via war cannot be abolished according to Plato, [whereas] according to Xenophon's scheme it seems to be. I would start from another thing, namely, Cyrus abolishes the difference between the commoners and the nobility, a difference allegedly based on difference of education, [7]which is absolutely crucial in Plato's *Republic*, the class difference based on difference of education. Now this is abolished, but one could say this, and then I come gradually to what Mr. Dry suggested: there is no such difference perhaps within the army. You see, you know in Plato the guardian class, the silver [ones], they are called, they are of course all ranks from the private up to the five-star general. And they all have the same education. Perhaps the difference in this respect with Plato is only due to the fact that in the *Republic* we do not find a description of the best regime in *war*, in motion, but only in peace and at rest. That this description is correct is proven by the beginning of the *Timaeus*, where Socrates demands to see this best regime described in the *Republic* in motion, i.e., in war, and therefore the *Timaeus* and *Critias* follow. And this is only another way of saying that Plato or Socrates have then to give something like a history where there is no longer the nameless best city, but a named best city at war with another named city. That is a kind of history which is given in the *Critias*, just as we have a kind of history here in the *Cyropaedia*. That was the point I wanted to make. Yes.

Student: . . .

LS: . . . No. War is included in the *Republic* . . .

Student: . . .

Second Student: . . . war creates bureaucracy . . .

LS: . . . But there is one Platonic institution which is wholly absent from Xenophon . . .

Student: Equality of the sexes.

[iii] The philosopher king is introduced in book 5, at 474d-e.

LS: Equality of the sexes, yes. That is very important. Now why does, I mean, what is the basis of Plato's demand for the equality of the sexes in the *Republic*? Yes?

Student: . . .

LS: In other words, an abstraction of the fundamental natural difference between the two sexes. Since this natural difference is the basis for *eros* in the ordinary common sense of the term, there is no abstraction from *eros* here, no simple subordination of *eros* to the *polis*[iv] as is the basic notion of the *Republic*. Therefore the question of love between the two sexes is very important in Xenophon's *Education of Cyrus*, as will appear still more in the sequel. We had however already an indication of it at the end of chapter 2 of book 2, when this story was told of the super-ugly love of a Persian officer, and where[8] the simple equation of the good with the beautiful [is denied]. You remember that. Now what does this mean, stated in general terms? We have the scheme of a perfectly just society, a universal, homogenous society. This is of course inegalitarian because of the inequality of natural gifts and the inequality of achievement, but where no inequality is merely conventional; all inequality corresponds to nature. So even such a society is however not fully satisfactory because man cannot find his complete satisfaction in and through society, however just.

Now you don't have to go very far. Look at present-day social science. There are two heroes who determine—really three heroes, but two heroes who determine: the one is Marx, the other is Freud. Marx, the apostle of the solution of the human problem through human society, and then on other hand, Freud denied the possibility[9] [that] a political solution could be found in the human individual. Therefore the present-day social scientists combine Marx and Freud: these two things together would make men perfectly happy. I mean, I know there is something else in present-day social science, associated with the name of Max Weber, but I do not want to go into that now.

At any rate, the question with which we are ultimately concerned, and which is reflected in the present-day controversy, is the tension between the common, the public, and the private. There is a tension between the two and it cannot be disposed of by any political or social means. But then the question arises: Can these two things not be reconciled? This question is discussed in a way in the third book of the *Cyropaedia*, to which we turn now. We cannot read everything. Let us begin at paragraph 9 of the first chapter. The situation is clear. The rebelling Armenian king is caught, and Cyrus can do with him what he likes, can punish him. Yes?

Student: [Unclear question concerning public and private] [v]

LS: But Plato presents the problem in very different terms. Plato presents it in the form of a perfect reconciliation of the two in a society in the best regime where philosophers are kings. There is perfect harmony, and there is of course the price. The price is the ruthless subordination

[iv] There is a break in the tape here for several minutes. Until the recording resumes, the transcript is based upon the original transcript.
[v] As noted by the original transcriber.

of *eros* to the *polis*. That people love one another is irrelevant, immaterial and impertinent. The only question is whether the ruler says boy A and girl alpha are best from the point of view of procreation. That is the only thing. Good. Now let us read paragraph 9, following.

Mr. Reinken:
When everything was in order, he began his examination.

LS: "He began with his speech," literally.

Mr. Reinken:
"King of Armenia—"

LS: He says always "Armenian," simply.

Mr. Reinken:
"Armenian,"[vi] said he, "I advise you in the first place in this trial to tell the truth, that you may be guiltless of that offence which is hated more cordially than any other. For let me assure you that being caught in a barefaced lie stands most seriously in the way of a man's receiving any mercy. In the next place," said he, "your children and your wives here and also the Armenians present are cognizant of everything that you have done; and if they hear you telling anything else than the facts, they will think that you are actually condemning your own self to suffer the extreme penalty, if ever I discover the truth." (3.1.9)

LS: Why that? Why that?

Student: . . .

LS: No, no. Why does he deny it? Answer: Because he thinks he will be punished for admitting it, and therefore lying is a confession. He has committed a punishable offense. That is the point. Yes?

Mr. Reinken:
"Well, Cyrus," said he, "ask what you will, and be assured that I will tell the truth, let happen what will as a result of it."

"Tell me then," said the other, "did you ever have a war with Astyages, my mother's father, and with the rest of the Medes?"

"Yes," he answered, "I did."

"And when you were conquered by him, did you agree to pay tribute and to join his army, wherever he should command you to go, and to own no forts?"

[vi] In original: "King of Armenia"

"Those are the facts." (3.1.9-10)

LS: Now this is a kind of examination of the king of Armenia by Cyrus. Does this remind you of similar happenings elsewhere? That someone says "Tell me," and then he answers; and then something else follows, and he goes on and leads to a situation not altogether different from the Armenian, because the Armenian is absolutely helpless, and in the parallel scene the fellow is also completely helpless. Where does this happen? Yes?

Student: With Cephalus?

LS: Not only in the *Republic*; in Xenophon, Socrates too. This is what Socrates does all the time. Now the name for that in Greek is *elenchus*, and this means—this is an old term, the verb from which it derives means to disgrace someone, put him to shame, but also to question someone, to convict, to test, to prove, to refute, to confute, expose. So there is a Cyrus-kind of elenchus and a Socratic-kind of elenchus, and that we have to consider. Now there is an obvious difference. The man examined and exposed by Cyrus cannot lie. He cannot lie because Cyrus knows all the facts, and everyone present knows all the facts and it would be absolutely absurd, whereas it seems in a Socratic conversation the examinee can lie. He can say—if he asks what is courage, he can give him an answer he himself doesn't believe. You find a beautiful example of that in the *Republic* in the first book, 346a3 to 4, and on the other hand 349a6 to b1. That is with Thrasymachus. In the first case Socrates says: You must say the truth, what you really think about that, Thrasymachus, otherwise we can't make any headway. In the second case, however, Socrates says: It doesn't make any difference whether you say what you think; we challenge the *logos* you assert. It is quite a difficult passage in itself.

Let us then reconsider this simple distinction that in the elenchus by Cyrus the examinee cannot lie, and in the Socratic elenchus one can lie. Now in the case of a Socratic elenchus, the examined man is in fact as unable to lie as is the poor Armenian king. Socrates presents himself contrary to Cyrus. Cyrus says: I know everything. I know everything, and I want to see whether you will admit everything. Socrates says: I know nothing. I only can raise questions; I am ignorant, you are the wise man. In fact, of course Socrates, far from being ignorant and asking a wise man for something, is the knower, and for this reason the situation is not so grotesquely comical as here, but it is fundamentally not so different. There is no escape from Socrates, just as there is no escape from Cyrus. Socrates is as much the judge as Cyrus. But the crime is different: the crime is not transgressing the treaty as it is in the case of the Armenian. What is the crime in the case of Socrates, for which people are exposed?

Student: Ignorance.

LS: Yes. But there is a simple phrase for that. We had it last time.

Student: Boasting.

LS: Boasting. The crime is boasting. The poor fellow didn't boast, the Armenian king. And what is the punishment inflicted by Socrates? To be exposed—but still that would only be nasty: to become better. And of course this has a certain parallel also here in this case, as Mr. ___ pointed

out. The Armenian king does become better, but the method is different. We have now answered the question: What is the difference between Cyrus's elenchus and Socrates's elenchus? This will come in the sequel. Paragraph 13. Everything is worth reading, but we have not the time.

Mr. Reinken:
Then his son—

LS: In other words, the father has admitted that in such cases capital punishment is the only thing that can be due. And then the son, what does he say?

Mr. Reinken:
when he heard this, stripped off his turban and rent his garments, and the women cried aloud and tore their cheeks, as if it were all over with their father and they were already lost. But Cyrus bade them be silent and said: "Very well, king of Armenia; so that is your idea of justice; in accordance with it, then, what do you advise us to do?"

Then the Armenian was silent, for he was in a quandary whether to advise Cyrus to put him to death or to propose to him a course opposite to that which he admitted he himself always took. But his son Tigranes put a question to Cyrus, saying: "Tell me, Cyrus, since my father seems to be in doubt, may I advise you in regard to him what I think the best course for you?"

Now Cyrus had observed when Tigranes used to go hunting with him that there was a certain philosopher—

LS: "Sophist." We must change the text.

Mr. Reinken:
sophist with him who was an object of admiration to Tigranes; consequently he was very eager to hear what he would say. So he bade him express his opinion with confidence.

"Well," said Tigranes, "if you approve either of my father's theory or his practice, then I advise you by all means to imitate him. But if you think he has done wrong throughout, I advise you not to imitate him."

"Well then," said Cyrus, "if I should do what is right, I should surely not be imitating the one who does wrong."

"That is true," said he.

"Then, according to your reasoning, your father must be punished, if indeed it is right that the one who does wrong should be punished." (3.1.13-15)

LS: More literally, "if indeed it is just to punish him who acts unjustly." That would come out more clearly. Yes?

Mr. Reinken:
"Which do you think is better for you, Cyrus, to mete out your punishments to your benefit or to your own injury?"

"In the latter case, at least," said he, "I should be punishing myself." (3.1.15)

LS: That is very interesting. Tigranes introduces another principle: What is good, as distinguished from what is justice. You remember that. One can state it in simple political terms as follows, [terms] that would be too narrow, although it is implied: It is not the task of a statesman to be absolutely just, and not political in the sense of what is good for the community. What happened at the end of every war in our country shows that. Now your question.

Student: [. . .]

LS: But the first question is simply—but the whole issue of justice is what? Now we go over to the question of making men better. First of all, what is better for Cyrus, and in this connection also what is better for the Armenian comes in. Let us read the next paragraph.

Mr. Reinken:
"Aye, but you would be doing yourself a great injury," said Tigranes, "if you should put your friends to death just at the time when it was of the greatest advantage to you to have them." (3.1.16)

LS: He doesn't say "friends." He only says "your own people," *tous seautou*.

Mr. Reinken:
"How," said Cyrus, "could men be of the greatest advantage to me just at the time when they were caught doing wrong?"

"They would be, I think, if at that time they should become discreet." (3.1.16)

LS: "Moderate." So the key term is now moderation, not justice. One can say this is the message from Thucydides's point of view. In Thucydides, the people who insist on justice are either people who have no other possibility to defend themselves, like the Melians, or very nasty people, like Kleon. The nice people don't speak so much of justice but speak of what is good for the city of Athens. Is it for Athens to kill the inhabitants of Mytilene? And one could say "moderation" is a good word for that, moderation rather than justice. Go on.

Mr. Reinken:

"For it seems to me to be true, Cyrus," said he, "that without discretion there is no advantage at all in any other virtue; for what," he continued, "could one do with a strong man or a brave man, or what with a rich man or a man of power in the state if he lacked moderation?"[vii] (3.1.16)

LS: He adds after "brave man" the man who is master of the art of riding on horseback. The "hippic"[viii] man. All right. Yes?

Student: But every friend is useful and every servant good, if he be endowed with moderation.

LS: Now we have to raise the question: What is moderation?

Student: [. . .]

LS: In order to solve that question, one would have to wait until all occurrences of the word in Xenophon are known and then see how they are related to one another. But here the problem of moderation seems to be identical with the whole problem of virtue. And this of course is characteristic of Socrates altogether, as you see for example in Plato's *Laches*, where the question is, "What is courage?" And it turns out that courage proves to be identical with wisdom as a whole. The lines which we draw ordinarily on this ground are however very crude lines. Ultimately there is only one virtue. Now the question, "What is moderation?" means here something very different. We will be reminded of an old friend, though not of Socrates. We will be reminded of another philosopher. Let us read what moderation is here.

Mr. Reinken:
"Do you mean to say then," Cyrus answered, "that in one day's time your father has become moderate when he was immoderate[ix] before?" (3.1.17)

LS: "When he was senseless," *aphronos*. Can he become moderate in a single day, after he has been such a fool? This is a funny virtue, which you can acquire so fast.

Mr. Reinken:
"By that you mean to say that moderation is an affection of the soul, as sorrow is, and not an acquisition." (3.1.17)

LS: This is not knowledge; he does not say virtue is knowledge. A passion, not a piece of learning. The *sōphrosynē* of which he speaks is not knowledge, but a passion. So—

Mr. Reinken:
"For I do not suppose that a man could instantly pass from being immoderate to being moderate, if indeed the one who is to be moderate must first become wise."[x] (3.1.17)

[vii] Here and throughout, the text has "discretion" in place of "moderation."
[viii] From the Greek for horse, *hippos*.
[ix] In original: "discretion"
[x]" In original: "discreet" and "indiscreet" (instead of "immoderate" and "moderate")

LS: So in other words, it is clear that here moderation is not the same as the equivalent of practically wise. That is clear. It is only a part.

Mr. Reinken:
"What, have you never observed, Cyrus," said he, "that when a man indiscreetly ventures to fight a stronger man than himself and has been worsted, he is instantly cured of his indiscretion toward that particular man? And again," he continued, "have you never seen how when one state is in arms against another it is at once willing, when defeated, to submit to the victor instead of continuing the fight?" (3.1.18)

LS: In other words, there are situations of instant conversion. But there is a certain difficulty. This does not go to the root of the matter. Let us continue.

Student: . . .

LS: We do not have all the evidence. Paragraph 20.

Mr. Reinken:
"Well," said Cyrus, "do you really think that such a defeat is adequate to make men discreet—I mean, when they find out that others are their superiors?"

"Yes," said Tigranes, "much more than when they are defeated in combat. For the one who is overcome by strength sometimes conceives the idea that, if he trains his body, he may renew the combat. Even cities too, when captured, think that by taking on new allies they might renew the fight. But if people are convinced that others are superior to themselves, they are often ready even without compulsion to submit to them." (3.1.20)

LS: You see the qualification "often." Not always. Go on.

Mr. Reinken:
"You seem to think," said the other, "that the insolent—"

LS: *Hybristas*, derivative from *hybris*, which is the opposite to *sōphrosynē*.

Mr. Reinken:
"do not recognize those more discreet than they, that thieves do not recognize honest men, that liars do not recognize the truthful, and wrong-doers those who do right."

LS: That there is no recognition is proven by the usage. The crooks call the non-crooks, I hear, "squares," to which Xenophon refers here. The crooks know they are no squares. So it is not a lack of knowledge here, it is only a question: Is being square good?

Mr. Reinken:

"Do you not know," he continued, "that even now your father has played false and has not kept his agreement with us, although he knew that we have not been violating any of the agreements made by Astyages?"

"Yes; but neither do I mean that simply recognizing their superiors—" (3.1.21-22)

LS: "Simply knowing." Or if you think of the cognitive element in recognizing, knowing does not make men moderate. Knowledge is not sufficient for acquiring this kind of virtue. Yes?

Mr. Reinken:
"makes people discreet, unless they are punished by those superiors, as my father now is."

"But," said Cyrus, "your father has not yet suffered the least harm; but he is afraid, to be sure, that he will suffer the worst."

"Do you think, then," said Tigranes, "that anything breaks a man's spirit sooner than abject fear?" (3.1.22-23)

LS: "Strong fear."

Mr. Reinken:
"Do you not know that those who are beaten with the sword, which is considered the most potent instrument of correction, are nevertheless ready to fight the same enemy again; but when people really fear anyone very much, then they cannot look him in the face, even when he tries to cheer them?"

"You mean to say," said he, "that fear is a heavier punishment to men than real correction." (3.1.23)

LS: "Than suffer evil."

Mr. Reinken:
"And you," said he, "know that what I say is true; for you are aware that, on the one hand, those who are afraid that they are to be exiled from their native land, and those who on the eve of battle are afraid that they shall be defeated, and those who fear slavery or bondage, all such can neither eat nor sleep for fear; whereas those who are already in exile or already defeated or already in slavery can sometimes eat and sleep better than those enjoying a happier lot. And from the following considerations it is still clearer what a burden fear is: some, for fear that they will be caught and put to death, in terror take their own lives before their time—some by hurling themselves over a precipice, others by hanging themselves, others by cutting their own throats; so does fear crush down the soul more than all other terrors." (3.1.24-25)

LS: We may leave it at this. So in other words, the great recipe is fear. And by fear people can become good in a sense, can acquire this particular virtue of moderation as here understood. This theme has been alluded to already in the discussion in book 2, chapter 2, when this fellow, this hater of laughter, spoke and said weeping is so much more educative than laughing. Do you remember that? But here it is[10] stated in a much more radical form. The root of goodness is fear—the root of this particular kind of goodness, of moderation. Does that remind you of other political thinkers?

Student: Hobbes.

LS: And Machiavelli. But Hobbes is more obvious; Machiavelli is slightly more subtle. Sure. This is then one thing. So if Socrates teaches [that] virtue is knowledge, he also teaches that there is a virtue of a passionate origin rooted in the passion of fear. And this particular virtue is here called moderation. Now the verb[11] [*sōphronizein*] "to make moderate," is a polite euphemism for punishment: to make them more sensible, just as in the old-fashioned education of children where certain spankings, which are obviously a form of frightening, is thought to be a very healthy and wholesome way of improving children. Yes, you wanted to say something?[12]

Student: [. . .]

LS: Sure, that has something to do with it. And Xenophon would not make a distinction between servile fear and simple fear. Yes?

Student: [. . .]

LS: That is very hard to say, but one can only say this. Since the Socratic view [that] virtue is knowledge obviously is not simply true [and] does not cover all cases where we speak of virtue, there must be another kind of virtue, and here he is speaking of such another kind. Whether that other kind is sufficiently described as moderation arising from fear, that is an open question. We still don't have the full evidence.

Student: [. . .]

LS: Well, may I suggest that we complete the discussion of this chapter and then you bring up your point. Good. I grant you that Tigranes does not make this argument merely in order to enlighten Cyrus. He wants to get his father out of trouble; that is perfectly true. And in paragraph 29 to 30 he makes it clear that his father is in this salutary state. He got the shock and the fright of his life, and you can be assured that this will last. Now we know of other cases both in private and public life where these shocks do not last, if you mean that. Did you mean that? In other words, fear is not necessarily lasting, but it may be lasting. Someone may have learned his lesson, as we say, and as a later story proves, this particular king has learned his lesson. No later rebellion, as far as I remember, of Armenia against Cyrus. What is the reason? Perhaps, to anticipate, maybe Socrates's view that virtue is knowledge is something very special, which we can disregard for most practical purposes. Maybe fear is not the only passion inspiring virtue. Yes? And then other passions might lead to other ways of action. Does this suggest something to

you, Mr. ____? What other passion could it be? One was even mentioned as Mr. ___'s paper showed. There was another desire. What prompted the Armenian king to act unjustly?

Student: Freedom.

LS: Love of freedom. Love of freedom. Now this love of freedom may reassert itself after the fear has done its work and has receded. That is clear. But this wouldn't do away with the fact that for many men—and perhaps for almost all men, in certain situations—this fear might do exactly that work which Tigranes has in mind, and which is very attractive to Cyrus, naturally, because it is obviously an instrument of government. Or would you deny that?

Student: [. . .]

LS: The kid glove. But the kid glove means of course the *ultima ratio*, you know, that they wrote on cannon in Europe. *Ultima ratio Regis*, the last reason of the king, on which he can fall back if all other methods of persuasion fail.

Student: No, I thought you meant the fact that he was very much concerned with the well being of the women folk and children.

LS: Yes, but he fears for them. Xenophon doesn't take the narrowest view, which Hobbes takes, that fear of my own violent death is the fundamental sphere of fear—whether for yourself or for someone without whom you couldn't live, that wouldn't make any difference. Mr. _____?

Student: [. . .]

LS: Disarming is of course very helpful for keeping people down, sure. That is quite true, in other words, but this is only part of the story. He can frighten people more when they are disarmed. Is this not clear? Because if they can shoot back, you yourself might hesitate to use force. That is only a corollary of what has been stated here. Now let me first continue. Let us read paragraph 29, the application to the father.

Mr. Reinken:
"But, Cyrus," said he, "as things now are, could you find any one to whom you could do as great favours as you can to my father? For example, if you grant any one of those who have done you no wrong his life, what gratitude do you think he will feel toward you for that? And again, who will love you for not depriving him of his wife and children more than he who thinks that it would serve him right to lose them? And do you know of any one who would be more grieved than we, not to have the throne of Armenia? Well, then," he added, "it is evident that he who would be most grieved not to be king, would also be most grateful for receiving the throne. And it you care at all to leave matters here in as little confusion as possible when you go away, consider whether you think the country would be more tranquil under the beginning of a new administration than if the one we are used to should continue." (3.1.29-30)

LS: Let us stop here. You see, these are the points Mr. ___ has in mind. He does not merely frighten him, but after he has frightened him as much as possible, then to pet him and say: If you are a good doggy, nothing will happen to you any more, but don't do it ever again. But you must admit that fear is an element of his condition. He couldn't build up to the other things except on the foundation of fear. This is of course what he means. Pardon?

Student: [. . .]

LS: Well, if someone has nothing to hope for, then of course if it is hopeless and he is desperate, he will do anything. There will be an example of that later. In the fourth book we will find an example chosen from war. The enemy will be harmless if they have hope of escape, but if they have no hope of escape then they will become unbeatable. Now let us turn to paragraph 38 and then we will summarize this point—38 to the end of the chapter.

Mr. Reinken:
And after dinner, as the party was breaking up, Cyrus asked: "Tell me, Tigranes, where is the man who used to hunt with us? You seemed to admire him very much."

"Ah," he replied, "did not my father here have him put to death?"

"What wrong did he find him doing?"

"He said that he was corrupting me. And yet, Cyrus," said he, "he was so noble and so good—" (3.1.38)

LS: "Such a perfect gentleman."

Mr. Reinken:
"that when he was about to be put to death, he called me to him and said: 'Be not angry with your father, Tigranes, for putting me to death; for he does it, not from any spirit of malice, but from ignorance, and when men do wrong from ignorance, I believe they do it quite against their will.'"

LS: "Involuntarily."

Mr. Reinken:
"Poor man!" Cyrus exclaimed on hearing this.
Here the Armenian king interrupted—

LS: That's Tigranes's father.

Mr. Reinken:
"Do not men who discover strangers in intercourse with their wives kill them, not on the ground that they make their wives more inclined to folly, but in the belief that they alienate from them their wives' affections—for this reason they treat them as enemies. So

I was jealous of him because I thought that he made my son regard him more highly than he did me."

"Well, by the gods, king of Armenia," said Cyrus, "your sin seems human; and you, Tigranes, must forgive your father." (3.1.39-40)

LS: That is all we need. Now this brief story is of course of some importance, and Mr. ____ recognized without difficulty the story of Socrates in Armenian garb, i.e., it is not the *demos* of Athens, who could kill only in a democracy, but the corresponding opposite number in a monarchy, and that would of course be the king. And otherwise the thing makes perfect sense: the king, corresponding to the fathers, the many fathers in Athens, kills the sophist, who is at the same time a perfect gentleman, because he corrupts the son. And the motive is envy. The fathers envy Socrates. Translating into Athenian again, the fathers envy Socrates because Socrates made the sons admire him, Socrates, more than the fathers. The fathers want to be the bigshots in the family, and then they come home and the sons are no longer so impressed by the wisdom of the fathers. And that is an unbearable situation. This is the most open statement about what happened to Socrates which occurs anywhere in Xenophon—I mean, a simple psychological explanation.

Now this, I say, is the barbaric equivalent of Socrates: the sophist killed by the king of Armenia for corrupting the king's son. Pardon? Well, all right, where does Socrates appear in the writings? We don't have Mr. Kendrick here, so I must explain it. Now in the first place, of course, in the Socratic writings, of which there are four. But where else?

Student: In the *Anabasis*.

LS: And in the *Hellenica*. And where does it appear in the *Anabasis* and the *Hellenica*? At the beginning of book 3. This is one reason why I believe the division into books is perhaps Xenophontic and not due merely to the librarians at Alexandria. But Xenophon wished to remind the reader in his strictly nonphilosophical writings at first glance of Socrates. Socrates is always somehow present even here, and precisely here where the name of course could not be mentioned. It would be absolutely shocking, an Armenian named Socrates. But if you read Xenophon's *Anabasis*, his genuine trip to Asia, in the description of Armenia you see that Armenia is a very special country, reminding very much of Athens.[xi] So by the way, this makes it a bit doubtful whether the *Anabasis* is so historical as it seems to be. The description of Xenophon's exploits—after all, there is a parallel report of what happened in Asia Minor which goes back to a historian called Ephorus and is available in Diodorus Siculus.[xii] When you read the history of Diodorus Siculus, Xenophon doesn't play any role. Now of course Ephorus may have been a nasty man, but theoretically of course it is possible that a man who didn't do anything in particular writes a wonderful story where he plays the key role, and the book is as enjoyable as if he had done this. And Xenophon had even a special reason, because he wanted to show what a pupil of Socrates can do. And that is absolutely terrific: He saves the Greek army; he almost founded a *polis* in Asia. Founder—and he could have become what he calls a monarch,

[xi] *Anabasis* 4.
[xii] Diodorus Siculus, *Bibliotecae Historicae*.

but he declined; he didn't wish to. Of course this goes probably much too far, but we have no external evidence by which to check. Yes, Mr. ____?[xiii]

Student: What is the significance of the difference between the sophist and the philosopher?

LS: Because in the primary meaning of the word there is no difference. This difference came about—the making of the distinction is due more to men like Plato and Xenophon, and of course also Aristotle, than to anybody else. For the ordinary men, Athenians, that is the same thing: Socrates would of course be a sophist. Well, if you think—I mean, I believe that has completely changed in our blessed age, where even men who advertise cleansing powders speak of "identify with," and use other words—you know: "I identify with this particular cleansing powder." [Laughter] Today everyone is an intellectual . . . but there were times when intellectuals were really objects of suspicion. Really. I mean by "sensible people" [those] who earned their livelihood in an honest way and do other things, and then there are these people who live, who enjoy themselves at the expense of hardworking men. I was told by Alvin Johnson[xiv] (whose name some of you may have heard), who had however a practical reason for saying so, that when he was young, say, about sixty years ago in this country, scholars were looked upon—at least apart from Harvard Yard, I suppose—as a kind of fraud. Now this kind of thing exists in various forms and exists everywhere. There are of course certain forms of "quote intellectuals" which are recognized. For example, obviously you have to have lawyers and physicians and so on, but they are then not really intellectuals. But those people who have no very definite profession, the usefulness appears everywhere, they are naturally looked upon as strange people—and still more so in olden times, when there had never yet been in the world a university, because the first inkling of a university was Plato's Academy, which came long after Socrates's death—and therefore they were suspect. They raised all kinds of questions which a sensible man wouldn't raise, because they are confusing, disturbing. And from this, Socrates was surely condemned as a sophist. I mean, the distinction was made. Then they tried to make a distinction, especially on the basis of Socrates, taking very crude things; for example, [that] a sophist is a man who does these strange things for money, like Protagoras. Socrates did not take money. Now up to the present day there are people who still stand up and say: What an unfair criterion, Socrates also had to live. Plato charged high fees in his Academy, so Plato too was a sophist, and what's wrong with earning money for teaching? Surely no professor would deny that. [Laugher] And of course, it was also a professor who made this excellent argument. [Laughter]

The deeper thing is, of course—the question is: What is the difference between Socrates and these sophists? Now these sophists, the men so-called, people like Protagoras and Hippias, are of course much lower intellectually than Socrates is. But we would have to say who are the philosophers behind Protagoras, Gorgias and so on, and these other great men like Heraclitus and Parmenides? And this is then the question: What is the peculiarity of Socrates's teaching contrasted with the pre-Socratic teaching? And to what extent is the Socratic teaching closer to the requirements of the *polis*? That forms the practical issue[13] [of] the teaching of the pre-Socratics. That's an infinite, long question.

[xiii] From this point, the transcript is based on on remastered audiofiles.

[xiv] Alvin Johnson (1874-1971), economist and co-founder of the New School in New York. He wrote the forward for the first edition of Strauss's *On Tyranny*.

Now [14]the mere allusion to the Socrates question here brings out, of course—it reminds us of the difference between Socrates and Cyrus. We couldn't help observing that difference when we looked at the different way in which they refute: you know, at the beginning when Cyrus knows all [the] misdeeds of the Armenian king, and only once they have an admission of this; whereas Socratic elenchus obviously has a different point. Now there is something else. Since Tigranes is a pupil of this sophist, i.e., of Socrates, Cyrus is here presented as learning something indirectly from Socrates. The ruler learning something from Socrates, that we must also keep in mind.

A last point which leads into quite a series of questions to which I do not have the answers—it all starts from the very beginning: Persia, a superior Sparta, a glorified Sparta. Now we find here another acquaintance in the depths of Asia. Armenia is what, then?

Student: Athens.

LS: Athens, ya. Now if you look [at] what the Armenian king did wrong, one thing was he should not re-erect the fortifications. Does this ring a bell?

Student: The walls.

LS: Yes, the long walls destroyed by the Spartans after the Peloponnesian War, and which Athens was forbidden to reconstruct, and always trying of course to reconstruct them. Yes?

Mr. Reinken: Tigranes seems to be an orator who was in exile, and comes back with the Spartan power.

LS: Yes. And what would that be?

Student: The orator, Xenophon.

LS: Yes, sure. I mean, I do not know how far one can go. One simply has to go over the whole ground. One has to watch the characters, especially those close to Cyrus, like Chrysantas and Hystaspas, and see whether the whole symbolism stops there or goes further. It is surely not uninteresting to see. For some time I've thought, and this is perhaps not entirely wrong, that Xenophon presents here, in Cyrus and his circle, the barbaric equivalent of Socrates and his circle. Now if Socrates and his circle were barbarians, they would of course have become conquerors of the world, with Socrates in command. [Laughter] Yes?

Mr. Reinken: Later on, when he's describing the Chaldeans, it sounds very much like the Spartans. They are fond of wars . . .

LS: Ya, but then you get into troubles, because the Persians were already Spartans.

Mr. Reinken: And the Medians were already . . .

LS: No. They were not Athenians, were they?

Mr. Reinken: The relation keeps cropping up again. Athens is to Sparta as Media is to Persia , as Armenia is to Chaldea.

LS: Oh, I see. Maybe. But let us keep an open mind for all kinds of things. But for the time being I think there is no question that the Armenian business reminds very much of the most famous Athenian business: the walls, and the sophist killed for corrupting the king's son.

Let me say a word more about the key question here in this chapter. The question of virtue has been discussed all the time of course, first in Cyrus's speech to the Persian nobility in book 1, chapter 5. Virtue is not to be practiced for its own sake, but for the sake of extraneous rewards, I mean, to get rich and so on. Now if this is so, virtue is of course lower than these rewards, virtue being only in the service of getting them, only a means to these ends. The means are always lower than the ends because they are dependent on the ends and justified by them. Now in this particular case, what is then the root of virtue according to this view suggested by Cyrus? What makes men virtuous?

Student: Love of gain.

LS: Exactly, love of gain. You can also say greed. That is another theory of virtue: love of gain, intelligently practiced, comes very close to virtue. I think we all know that honesty is the best policy, as they say. This is one view of virtue. Now here we get another view, presented not by Cyrus, but learned by Cyrus from Tigranes: virtue derivative from fear, that is something very different. The virtue derivative from fear leads to much greater modesty in demands that the virtue derivative from love of gain.

Student: There is an indication of softness also which is absent in the case of fear . . .

LS: Yes, but it is surely a different virtue which has its root in fear from that which has its root in greed. Now it is interesting that the virtue derivative from fear and not the other one is called, is identified with, moderation. With moderation. And there are quite a few parallels with that also in Plato. So in other words, moderation as here understood would not be derivative from greed. It would not be derivative from greed. Yes?

Student: If Persia is an idealized Sparta and Cyrus's view is that love of gain makes men virtuous, whereas Armenia is somehow similar to Athens, is this in a way Sparta versus Athens?

LS: Not quite. You see, originally Persia—originally Persia, not corrupted by Cyrus, is a glorified Sparta. And here virtue is practiced for its own sake. And also Armenia prior to the instruction given by Tigranes is not Tigranes's. It is different. Yes.

But let us consider one more point, coming back to Sparta for one moment. We have read the *Spartan Constitution* and have seen the Spartans claim indeed to practice the whole [of] gentlemanship, you know, a legal code laid down by Lycurgus so that every Spartan should be a perfect gentleman. And then Xenophon[15] replaces the term "perfect gentlemanship" by "political virtue." Now political virtue is a certain kind of virtue. It is not virtue pure and simple, [it is]

qualified. And the question is then: What is the inspiration of political virtue as distinguished from genuine virtue? This usage, political virtue or vulgar virtue as distinguished from genuine virtue, is also in Plato, this is not a peculiarity of Xenophon. Now for this rooting in fear, this had of course a terrific history later on through Machiavelli and through Hobbes, and it would be quite interesting to compare that, because in Hobbes that is the only thing which remains. The other motivations of virtue are banished in Hobbes.

One point, then I am through with this exposition. Now there is of course something else apart from love of gain or greed, and fear which is a motive of virtue. Let us look at Cyrus himself. What motivates him? Honor, glory, praise. Again, something very different also from these two. This is of course in a way the most important form because it prompts Cyrus and the other rulers. Ya?

Student: I thought you said virtue is knowledge comes out in the *Cyropaedia*.

LS: Where does it come out in the discussion with the Armenian?

Student: Because the man says: Don't blame your father because he acts involuntarily. He doesn't know what he is doing. This implies that virtue is knowledge, for had he known what he was doing, he would have acted justly.

LS: Yes, that is true. So in other words, Tigranes knows very well that there is another kind of virtue. But this is not the one which he expects his father to acquire, or Cyrus to acquire. That he uses only as a part of his argument subordinately. But his father is not supposed to become a knower in any sense.

Same Student: . . . when I read this, because I thought there was some truth in the fears which the father was facing here. In other words, I wasn't so sure that this moderation he got was wholly the action of a passion. It might be interpreted immediately as a kind of acquisition of knowledge . . . I would approach it in this discussion here, it is seen clearer I think in the case of Socrates. Socrates is constantly benefiting young men by making them realize that some of their hopes are groundless. In other words, he makes them more cautious, he . . . fear and in this way it is a kind of knowledge which they gain.

LS: Yes, but you say "kind" of knowledge.

Student: A passion or something—

LS: Yes, but the key point, the great question, would of course be this. You would admit that there is a difference between the virtue of the Armenian king after his conversion by Cyrus, and the virtue of Socrates. Would you admit that? Or the virtue of Cyrus, for that matter.

Student: It seems to me. Let me see. One I thought was a cruder example of the other. I thought they had a great deal in common. Precisely the difference, I can't see that.

LS: By saying "cruder," you admit that there is some difference?

Same Student: Yes.

LS: And you would only say maybe it is only a difference of degree not in kind.

Same Student: The Armenian king definitely saw that he was by himself in a situation from which he could not escape, anymore than a man on the sea, that he was really in dire straights.

LS: But let us take then the highest case: Cyrus, who never gets into this kinds of trouble ever, and he fulfills himself according to his peculiar kind of virtue, and he is still radically different from Socrates, not only in degree but in kind. I think you cannot avoid the question of the two kinds of virtue, perhaps even more kinds.

Same Student: But then the crucial point was Cyrus, no more than Socrates, decides to destroy this man. In this respect again there is a kind of reflection that there is humanity or something like that on Cyrus's part, that he stops and he listens to, you know—

LS: He is not a bully. Yes, sure. He is an intelligent man. But I can only say this, let us leave open this question whether there is or is not an essential difference between the virtues, because next time, in book 4 we will come across a passage where the difference in kind is made absolutely clear, whereas here the theme is only: Can there be a virtue whose foundation, whose ultimate foundation, is fear? This is developed by Tigranes, and this has a very long history later on. It is amazing in Xenophon in general that one comes closer to certain fundamental thoughts of modern political philosophy than in either Aristotle or in Plato. This I mentioned before in connection with the *Oeconomicus*, where it was particularly clear, also in the writings on Athens, you know. Mr. Butterworth?

Mr. Butterworth: Are you going to go back to the question of the difference between Socrates and Cyrus regarding elenchus?

LS: That is again the question of virtue. In which sense does Cyrus wish to make the king of Armenia better? And in which sense does Socrates wish to make men better? Cyrus is perfectly satisfied if the Armenian king obeys him.

Student: I had a more pedestrian question about elenchus, though. Couldn't you distinguish Socrates from Cyrus about this question of lying? Socrates lies when he is in conversation with people, when he says I don't know anything, whereas Cyrus doesn't lie.

LS: Yes, but this is not quite true. We have seen that Cyrus lies a lot, perhaps not in explicit statements but in being silent about what he is really after. No, I think we have to leave it at the question: Is there an essential difference between Socrates's virtue and Cyrus's virtue, and see whether we come across something where the question is answered with full clarity. And I believe this happens in the next book, and we will come to that. But we have still a lot to consider.

In the next chapter I will limit myself to the main point where Cyrus acts as a pacifier between the Armenians and Chaldeans, and that is very kind of him. These people who have been always at each other's throat will now live amiably and peacefully together. But one thing is understood: the pacifier rules the pacified, and Cyrus is very much interested in ruling the pacified. Now here again we are reminded of a Hobbean principle, that protection and obedience are correlative. Cyrus protects them; he is very kind. But of course they have to obey him. And this is what he desires. Now what is the motive of the pacifier? I believe the clearest passage is paragraph 31 of the second chapter.

Mr. Reinken:
Thus Cyrus spoke; and he believed that those of the Armenians and Chaldaeans who were to go would say such things of him as he desired all men to say and to hear of him. (3.2.31)

LS: Yes. Here you see the motive comes out. He wishes to be admired and praised by *all* men. That he cannot achieve this in fact, given the deplorable state of communications in that benighted age, does not do away with the fact that his motive—he knows no limits. No, there are no limits to his expansion.

In the next, last chapter of this book, we see at the beginning [that] the Armenian who was so envious of Socrates—of the sophist, rather—is in no way envious of Cyrus, although everyone admires Cyrus much more than him. This requires a very profound psychology to answer the question: How come? But I think you all can answer this question. In paragraph 4 we find a remark which is partly an answer to Mr. Megati's question. What do they say about him when they see him, the people of Armenia? "Calling him the benefactor, the good man": comma, the good man. They are identified. The benefactor is identified with the good man. And according to Xenophon or Socrates they are radically different. Radically different. They may coincide, but the point of view is radically different. In the case of the benefactor, the point of view is merely advantage of the most ordinary kind. A man who gives me warm soup or whatever I might have needed, or a roof over my head, is a benefactor. But anybody can do it and can be very low in other respects.

Student: . . . What does it say again? They call him benefactor, then what?

LS: Comma, "the benefactor"; comma, "the good man." Paragraph 10 is of great interest.

Mr. Reinken:
And he further observed that, because they were so eager to excel in those exercises in which they vied with one another, many of the soldiers were even jealous of one another— (3.3.10)

LS: "Envious." Why not call it a spade a spade? Yes?

Mr. Reinken:
for this reason also he wished to lead them into the enemy's country as soon as possible. For he knew that common dangers make comrades kindly disposed toward one another, and that in the midst of such dangers there is no envy of those who wear decorations on their armour or of those

who are striving for glory; on the contrary, soldiers praise and love their fellows even more, because they recognize in them co-workers for the common good." (3.3.10)

LS: We have seen the question of equality or inequality coming in. Now we have put inequality on the soundest basis: no inequality of status, only inequality of merit. But terrible as it may sound, people are perhaps more envious of the people unequal in merit than of the unequal in hereditary status, because then in the case of hereditary status, they can rightly say: We didn't have a chance to begin with. But if it is *only* merit, then it is of course rather shocking to say we are inferior to them, we ought to be inferior to them, and that causes a much deeper envy than the other. Now how can we cure this inevitable bad consequence of equality of opportunity, as we have also called it? Answer: to remind them every moment how much these other people have to toil, and which dangers they have to run in battle and elsewhere. Then they will say: Well, they are so much punished for their superiority that their overall situation is not enviable. Yes?

Student: There was a cartoon in *The New Yorker* a few months ago, where the psychiatrist said to his patient: You haven't got an inferiority complex, you *are* inferior. [Laughter]

LS: Now regarding this question of envy. This comes out very clearly at the end of the *Hiero*, the last word of the *Hiero*, when Simonides tells him what would happen to him if he is a good ruler. You will be happy, blessed, prosperous or however you might translate it, and will not be envied. So important is that because people, if they are envious, they tend to be very nasty. If you don't know it, read the literature. There is by the way a very beautiful novel on envy and its horrors, Balzac's Cousin Bette, *Cousine Bette*.[xv] I don't know the English translation—"Cousin Betty," probably? Terrible ravages wrought by envy. Paragraph 43. There is here, shortly before, the speech of the Assyrian king.

Mr. Reinken:
Thus Cyrus and his men were occupied; and the Assyrians, when they had lunched, came out boldly and bravely drew up in line. And the king in person rode along in his chariot and marshalled the lines and exhorted them as follows—

LS: Let's read only the beginning

Mr. Reinken:
"Men of Assyria, now is the time for you to be brave men; for the struggle now—" (3.3.43)

LS: "Now" again. This is of course done by Xenophon advisedly: "Now." He hasn't thought of it before, they haven't thought of it before. Now the Assyrian king addresses all his men by the same speech, whereas Cyrus addresses the different parts differently, which is obviously the wiser form of speaking. The Assyrian speaks of what is at stake: freedom or slavery. And Cyrus tells the soldiers what they have to do. They know what is at stake, and it is much more important also taking their attention away from the dangers and so on, and the fears, telling them you have to do that. You have to do that. So Cyrus proves here to be in a simple way superior to

[xv] Honoré Balzac, *Cousine Bette* (1846). In English editions it is translated either as *Cousin Bette* or as *Cousin Betty*.

his opponent. Then later on in paragraph 48, Cyrus makes clear in a conversation with Chrysantas the rationale of his procedure, because what you can say on the eve of a battle, a single speech, can't make men brave. The effective thing is to be prepared by long training and not a speech. It can only have this function, which is to tell them what the action in this battle has to be, or if something unforeseen has happened and this must be made clear to the soldiers. Mr. Dry?

Mr. Dry: At the same time, this is the only place in the whole book we get a speech by an enemy leader.

LS: This is the only time?

Mr. Dry: And this is also the only time that the enemy in any way has a victory. It can be considered a victory in the sense that Cyrus is forced to retreat.

LS: You mean at the camp. No, I wouldn't call this a victory of the enemy; at most, a tactical withdrawal which Cyrus makes because he cannot get the camp in one assault. I didn't know that is the only speech by an enemy. That makes it all the more important to show how miserable Cyrus's chief enemy was, indicated by this speech and the comment in Cyrus's conversation with Chrysantas. You checked it? That is the only speech? Well, let us keep this in mind. Paragraph 54, we might still read, 54 to 55.

Mr. Reinken:
"But if, when soldiers are about to go armed into battle, when many forget even the lessons oft learned of old, if then any one by an oratorical flourish can then and there make men warlike, it would be the easiest thing under heaven both to learn and to teach the greatest virtue in the world." (3.3.54)

LS: "Among human beings." In other words, you see Cyrus's notion of the greatest virtue among human beings: the virtue of the soldier in the battlefield. That is also—we must keep this in mind. Yes?

Mr. Reinken:
"For even in the case of those whom we have kept and trained among ourselves, I, for my part, should not trust even them to be steadfast, if I did not see you also before me, who will be an example to them of what they ought to be and who will be able to prompt them if they forget anything. But I should be surprised, Chrysantas, if a word well spoken would help those wholly untrained in excellence—" (3.3.55)

LS: "Wholly uneducated in virtue." So in other words, education in virtue means now a first-rate military training. And it meant something more in Persia, where they went to the schools of justice. They don't go to these schools any more, yes? This I think shows how far we have travelled. I have here a note; I hope I can explain it. I can read it all right. Oh yes, the relation to Machiavelli: I think one must keep this in mind. In Xenophon we have these two—if we disregard the Socratic writings entirely in Xenophon and limit ourselves to the political writings in the narrower sense apart from the *Education of Cyrus*, we have the *Spartan Constitution*—the

Spartan Constitution, which deals with a republican government, allegedly the best. And here absolute monarchy, allegedly the best. Does this remind you of something in Machiavelli?

Student: The *Discourses* versus the *Prince*.

LS: Yes, yes. In Machiavelli the *Prince*, absolute government, absolute monarchy; and in the *Discourses* the primary theme, at any rate, is republican government. But one thing strikes one immediately, the most external thing you can say about any book.

Student: The lengths are reversed.

LS: Yes, the lengths are reversed. The *Prince* is a rather short book, one hundred pages, and the *Discourses* more than four hundred pages. This is quite true. But there is something also, there is another difference, because the relation of the *Discourses* to the *Prince* is not simply republican and monarchic, absolute monarchic government, it is also that the *Prince* deals ultimately with a certain kind of prince, what he calls the wholly new prince in a wholly new state: the founder. The founder. And the *Discourses* deal rather with the found*ed* society, or the people.

But who is the founder? When one thinks through Machiavelli's thought, that is indeed not quite visible. I mean, one could say, of course, Romulus in the case of Rome, or Lycurgus in the case of Sparta, Moses in the case of the Jews. But this doesn't go to the root of the matter. Ultimately *the* founder of the perfect commonwealth is Machiavelli himself. This comes out only when one reads it somewhat more carefully. Machiavelli is the philosopher-founder. Only then can one see the relation to Socrates. Socrates is not a founder in any sense of a political society. You can say Plato in the *Republic* is in a way the founder, but it becomes clear when studying the *Republic* that this is not a possible solution in Plato's own view. So this, I believe—Xenophon has a certain distance from the political. There is no political solution which can satisfy him. Machiavelli comes close to that, to the notion of a political solution of the human problem, as does Hobbes too, and a quite a few later thinkers.

Student: Isn't there another parallel? This is something I am just guessing at; just a feeling. Isn't there a certain parallel between Machiavelli and Xenophon based on the way they wrote? . . . in a way because of his bashfulness, in other words, the suppression of many very nasty, very evil things, he makes things which are in fact very nasty and very evil appear better than they are. Machiavelli, by lowering the standards and by—

LS: Yes, but you must compare comparable things. Xenophon is, as I would be prepared to say in private conversation, something like the Jane Austen of the political philosophers. You know? He is so nice. And when you read the book you can easily get the impression which Dakyns retained until the end of his days. Dakyns I have mentioned before. He sees just the playing grounds of Eaton on a great, grand scale; on the playing grounds of Eaton, these nice British public school boys. Sometimes he has to admit that Cyrus is a bit too sly, but the English were never known, at least those who came to the Foreign Office, for being quite innocent—this of course is what Dakyns doesn't really consider. But Machiavelli is notorious for the terrible things he says. Xenophon doesn't do it. So from this point of view they are just opposite numbers. In substance, I think it is true. We saw this in the *Oeconomicus* with his severe

gentlemanly standards: farming, farming, farming, and nothing of these vulgar pursuits, and then we see that this supergentleman Ischomachus actually is a trader in farms, which is the closest concession to Adam Smith which Xenophon could make. Machiavelli didn't have any such inhibitions. Yes?

Same Student: Can I mention something else, or have we exhausted this?

LS: No, we have not exhausted anything.

Same Student: Machiavelli makes no distinction between the tyrant and the king, and he drops the distinction.

LS: But that loses its meaning, I mean, when you—Machiavelli starts from the simple distinction as traditionally known, at least from Aristotle, and then when you go deeper and deeper it disappears. I mean, in other words, a tyrant who becomes the savior of his country is no longer meaningfully distinguishable from a king. That is Machiavelli's point. In other words, that certain things have to happen which a constitutional or legitimate king would not do, is true, but then he would raise the question: What did the ancestors of the legitimate king do until they became kings? The beginnings of commonwealths, as Burke said, are better covered with a veil,[xvi] because their legitimacy and illegitimacy in that mist are not so easily distinguishable as they are in an American election in the year 1962 [LS chuckles], although some people say even there they are not so easily distinguishable.Yes?

Student: Going back to the question we were discussing, book 1, chapter . . . about the love of gain . . . you were referring to the difference between Socrates's virtue and Cyrus's virtue, I recall that when we were discussing the *Oeconomicus*, book 14, you were talking about the love of gain and you referred to some dialogue that showed that somebody, some interlocutor of Socrates, they figured the love of gain was good—

LS: *Hipparchus*. Plato's *Hipparchus*, now mostly regarded as spurious. Hipparchus [LS writes on the blackboard] was the name of an Athenian tyrant. This is the point, you see. In this enormous literature on Socrates you find always—then again, which is perfectly true, that there is something in the Socratic argument of a very low utilitarianism, of which we found traces in what we read in the *Memorabilia*. What is it useful for? And at the same time, and as one of the best classical scholars of his generation put it, he always preaches usefulness, usefulness, usefulnes for practical things, low practical things. And yet he himself never uses these advantages; he is not concerned with them. But Socrates means ultimately this: there is a simple sobriety—you know, in our ordinary commonsensical dealings, we can easily distinguish between a man who is prudent and an imprudent man. And in another way, we have it in the arts: a shoemaker is perfectly able to give you an account of every move he makes, and why he chose this leather in preference to [the] other, [16]and everything. Now these lowly things, ordinary prudence in the ordinary arts, give us a hint toward the higher. They should be as clear and as prudent on the highest level as they are on the lowest level.

[xvi] *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790).

Now you can see the difficulty very easily when you come from simple practical matters to political matters, where the passions come in and where you find rarely people who are as sober in their political actions as the simple craftsman, and the simple farmer, or whoever you take, would be either in his art or in his daily life. This is the point. From this point of view, Socrates says, love of gain, which is so maligned ordinarily, is not quite truly maligned. Of course you have to consider true gain. And that is the question: What is true gain? Is it the largest bank account? This leads to manifest absurdities. Manifest absurdities, you know, demonstrable absurdities. So no sensible man can seek his end in wealth, or in power, or all the other things which are mostly desired by most people, and you have to think of something better. You know, today you see it in the discussions in social science. I have discussed it in my lecture course, when someone said: Well, [why should] wisdom or something of this kind[17] be such a high thing? Why not power? That is easily said. You can also say: Why not stamp collecting? Why not skating? Why should this not be the highest good? You can easily say it, but you cannot think it. Apply your mind to a man: look at him, whose highest and greatest satisfaction is found in stamp collecting or in power as power. I mean, not the purpose for which power is used, that is another matter, but a man who is concerned with power as power is simply an absolutely abominable busybody whom no one can respect and who cannot respect himself, because he respects himself only to the extent to which he is successful in his power, and he cannot always be successful. This is the kind of thing which Socrates has in mind: sobriety. Someone has said it very nicely, one of my former students: What Socrates stands for is sublime sobriety.[xvii] But the noun as distinguished from the adjective is sobriety; you have to start from that. Dispassionate.

Student: Do you think this then could be the solution to our problem of what is the difference between Socrates's virtue and Cyrus's virtue? Cyrus, for example, preaches self-denial and moderation, but for what?

LS: Exactly.

Student: For gain of power, wealth.

LS: Yes. It looks wonderful in the process. Well, I will anticipate what we will see next time. In the process it looks wonderful: this marvelous, and intelligent, and efficient conqueror on a white steed, you know? And himself not fearing danger of any sort, always in the thick, in the midst of things, and that is wonderful. But what is its end? What can it lead to? In the end he will die, that we know. But what is the purpose of that? Let us assume he has conquered the whole globe. Let us give him the whole rope to hang himself. What will be? He will live exactly like that despicable uncle of his, you know? He will have everything which the heart desires and he will enjoy that because he doesn't know anything better. So while the action and the way of life is of course much more impressive, and rightly so, than that of his despicable uncle, it is nevertheless a thoughtless life because he has not considered the *finis*, the end. Yes?

Student: I was just wondering about the very last paragraph of book 3 . . . the word is translated . . .

[xvii] Strauss used the phrase himself to describe "the spirit which animates" classical political philosophy. Leo Strauss, *What is Political Philosophy?* (Chicago, 1959), 28.

LS: Not necessarily, no. I think what he means is this. Here the case of discipline is much more striking than in other cases. For example, if they are keeping discipline in retreat where they all are apprehensive and would like to run for their lives, that is something trivial, so to say. But in victory, where they believe they are about to conquer the whole camp, that they even there obey . . . is a greater feat of discipline than the other. This I think is correct. We must not underestimate the amount of simple military wisdom which Xenophon of course possesses. Since we are not in a military school [LS chuckles], we do not put the emphasis on it. And I think also from Xenophon's point of view it is subordinate to the moral-political issue. But it is of course there.

Student: It sounds like moderation.

LS: Of course, a kind: self-control. Sure.

Mr. Reinken: I am troubled by paragraph[18] 56. In contrast to the thing you had me read, "Cyrus was eager to get his soldiers into the war, but again Cyaxares said to Cyrus saying he was making a serious mistake in delaying instead of leading as soon as possible against the enemy. And Cyrus twice replied, I don't want to attack, I want them all out." Now what is going on that Cyrus first is trying to get his army into the field but again he is hesitant about joining battle and refuses to attack the enemy when he's half in and half out, and presumably in the greatest disorder?

LS: Yes, that I do not see. Mr. Dry?

Mr. Dry: The explanation is, if he only defeats half of the enemy, the enemy will feel they are not defeated.

LS: Yes, let them stick their neck out, so that he can cut it off.

Student: He might have to fight twice. He doesn't want to fight twice.

Mr. Reinken: Isn't it easier to fight the enemy in two halves?

LS: What did you say?

Student: . . .

LS: This subject comes up later, I believe, again. Next time, who will read the paper next time? Oh, Mr. ____.[19]

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[1] Deleted "And this is—."
[2] Deleted "it means."
[3] Deleted "in other words"
[4] Deleted ," was prior to, was."
[5] Deleted "but up to a point"

[6] Deleted "The universal—."
[7] Deleted “you know.”
[8] Deleted "it" and moved "is denied."
[9] Deleted "of."
[10] Deleted "not."
[11] Deleted "_____."
[12] Deleted: “Student: …. /LS: I can’t hear you.”
[13] Deleted "than."
[14] Deleted “so by.”
[15] Deleted "uses,."
[16] Deleted “and why he”
[17] Moved "should."
[18] Deleted “Article,” replaced with “paragraph.”
[19] Deleted "

Session 12: no date
***Cyropaedia* 4**

Leo Strauss: That was a good paper: intelligent and thorough.[i] I am especially grateful to you, because I have a feeling book 4 was less rewarding to the reader than the three other books, and also the fifth book, are. You brought out very well a number of important points, and I think you were enabled to do so because you approached it with the right question: What does book 4 contribute to answering *the* question of the book, "How is rule of men over men possible?"[ii]— the fundamental question of political philosophy. Or, as you also stated it: Is Cyrus a wise man? This you articulated very nicely.

Now there are a few points which I would like to repeat. You brought out that wisdom requires knowledge, but the knowledge which Cyrus possesses to an amazing degree is not *the* knowledge. It is a limited and in a way subordinate part. And you discussed at some length his moderation, his possessing moderation. At a certain point you stated this very clearly, that he does not possess moderation in the full sense, but he has some kind of moderation which is perfectly sufficient for his purposes. Now when you spoke of it in the beginning of the exposition of this point, you proved it by the fact that he was able to make his soldiers moderate. Now does it prove moderation if someone can make his subordinates moderate?

Student: Not in itself, no, and that's why I have the second part.

LS: Well, the most beautiful example I know is Alcibiades, in Thucydides, in the eighth book, when he teaches the Persian satrap who employs Greek soldiers that it is absolutely necessary to give them small monetary compensation because they are going to spend that like drunken sailors in the next port. And so Alcibiades teaches moderation. Alcibiades, of all people. So this is not—you did not leave it at this argument, very happily. Good.

And of course we have spoken about this question of Cyrus's wisdom before, not necessarily under this heading, but for example in the third book when the sophist friend of Tigranes, the son of the Armenian king came in, then Socrates somehow. Then we have the standard, as it were, present in *the Education of Cyrus* itself, and the mere fact that Tigranes has to teach something to Cyrus which Cyrus did not know sufficiently proves his superiority over Cyrus in this respect.

There were two minor points. One, you said wealth is better than food and drink, and this made you shake your head in distrust, in disbelief.

Student: I forget the statement.

LS: Yes. You said wealth is better than food and drink. I remember that.

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[i] Strauss responds to a student's paper, read at the beginning of the session. The reading was not recorded.
[ii] Starting at this point, the transcript of this session is based upon the remastered audiofile.

Same Student: . . . My disagreement was not with the belief that Cyrus's aim was wealth. That the aim is great wealth is stated by one of the peers, not by Cyrus.

LS: In other words, you would agree with Mr. Glenn that wealth is better than food and drink?

Same Student: Yes.

LS: One could question that.

Different Student: I certainly would. [Laughter]

LS: You would deny it? Mr. Glenn, defend your proposition.

Mr. Glenn: This was an interpretation.

LS: Yes, but what would you say?

Mr. Glenn: I was looking at this problem here and I was trying to solve the problem. And the problem is this: Why preach abstinence from food and drink for the purpose of wealth?

LS: Yes.

Mr. Glenn: Obviously it must be so that wealth is higher. Obviously it must be so that wealth is higher, at least in the sense of more desirable than food and drink.

LS: You asserted it, but you didn't prove it in any way.

Mr. Glenn: No, I admit I can't prove it.

LS: But you gave some rudiment of an argument, I remember. What was it?

Mr. Glenn: The reason was the wealth was shared by all, whereas food and drink was a pleasure . . . purely subjective, purely selfish.

LS: Still, but you could of course also—what is wealth? All useful things, all good things, all values. Now these values can of course include steers, grain, eggs, and other things—and brandy even, or whiskey. You can share food and drink as well as wealth.

Mr. Glenn: . . . Aristotle for some reason placed the virtues which are shared above those which are selfish . . .

LS: That is spoken of in the *Politics*, yes.

Mr. Glenn: And that was just a plausible interpretation . . .

LS: But that you have a point is proven at least historically by the fact that Plato in the *Republic* gives a higher rank to oligarchy, the rule of wealth, than to democracy, the rule of the bodily desires. Now this is fundamentally the same as what you say. From what point of view could wealth and the desire for wealth be put higher than the desire for food and drink?

Student: Is there a distinction between long-range self-interest and short-term self-interest?

LS: It has something to do with it, but we need a word with which you are all nauseated, in order to make it quite clear.

Student: . . .

LS: No. Look around. You all know sufficiently some animals, like birds, or cats, or lions. Do they have desire for food and drink?

Student: Yes.

LS: Do they have desire for wealth?

Student: Too stupid.

LS: So in other words, there is an element of rationality, a very low class, but there is some calculation, some long-range calculation. That is supposed to be the long range. To that extent, desire for wealth, good or bad, is specifically human; desire for food and drink is not specifically human. To that extent it is higher.

Student: . . . [Laughter]

LS: Yes—but, sure. Would you assume that they—what is the simple formula people use for explaining these things?

Student: Simple instinct.

LS: Instinct. Therefore all animals of that species do it, whereas in the case of men some do it and others don't, which means in the case of man it has really to do not with instinct but [with] thinking of the future and not thinking of the future. I think one can safely say that. In addition, to store up enough for the next winter is not the same as the desire for wealth. The man who is concerned with becoming wealthy thinks much beyond the next winter. He thinks even of what he will leave his children.

Student: Wealth as you are defining it, though, assumes a certain kind of rationality, that it's wealth for things useful; but then one could talk of wealth which is not useful.

LS: [1]Ultimately. Ultimately, even if you take a wholly valueless piece of paper and make a certain imprint on it which tells you it is a thousand dollars or so, still you must admit that its value depends ultimately that you can get something for it, as is easily proven in a runaway

inflation, when you can get nothing for it and therefore it is no longer valuable. So all wealth is ultimately for the sake of useable things. And even if you invest money in enormous factories, ultimately that is supposed to produce the things to be used and to give monetary reward to the owners and workers, who will again use this reward for useable things. I mean, they may use it for bad things, they may buy heroin with it; that is another matter. But from their perverted point of view, that is a good thing. In other words, I think Mr. _____ is right.

Now then you said something which also created some shaking of heads in some quarters in the class. Is belligerence required for the military art? You seem to question that, and that struck me as a paradox. What do you mean by that? Perhaps I do not understand what you mean by belligerence.

Student: Well, I meant—when I was trying to describe, in the preceding paragraph when Cyrus had taken off with Cyaxares's permission and just ignored this man who was supposed to be his military equal, the king of the Medes. And this was—

LS: Can you call this belligerence? I mean, what you suggested was a first-rate general of an extremely mild and gentle disposition. This is what was meant, and I would say in principle that it is possible. I think Alanbrooke,[iii] you know, the British Commander, was such a man. At least that was the impression I got from his diary. And there are such people, of course. But this I wouldn't call in itself belligerence, if you mean a man who likes to fight.

Same Student: No . . . But what I meant was there was certainly a man in a position—

LS: That you cannot properly call belligerence, you can only say that is injustice, a certain kind of injustice. And this is of course a question which we will keep in mind: that Cyrus, this master of the political art and therefore master also of justice, of being just, is in a sense not just. And you gave us some examples of the way in which he pushes out his uncle, Cyaxares, and which will be the action for quite some time. I believe this question is bothering you greatly. I haven't looked at your statement, but you said it to me orally.

Student: That was just relavent to the point I brought up last time.

LS: Oh, I see. Now if we have time at the end of our discussion of book 4, we may take it up.

Let us now then begin with the beginning of book 4. We see in the second paragraph in Cyrus's address to the Persians that he is unable to give everyone his proper reward on the basis of his own knowledge. He can reward properly Chrysantas, the Persian commander, because he has observed him. And this raises a very interesting question. Let us assume we have the perfectly just and wise man at the top, and we lose our freedom in the ordinary sense, but on the other hand we get full justice. There is a certain complication here, because this supremely wise and just man cannot possibly have sufficient knowledge of all cases. He has to depend on reports by others; that means on the judgment of others. And the others: you have to go down from the

[iii] Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff from 1941-1946 and Winston Churchill's principal military advisor.

generals to the noncommissioned officers, and whether the same degree of wise judgment will be available in the lower echelons is not to be expected. This I mention only in passing. The great question which appears at the beginning of the first chapter is that they don't have a Persian cavalry. We have read at the beginning that Persia itself, Persia proper, being a mountainous country, doesn't have a cavalry. And now Cyrus feels very strongly the need for such a cavalry. What shall they do? Let us read paragraph 11.

Mr. Reinken:
"Why not pursue them as swiftly as possible," said one of the men; "now that the good things we have let slip are so manifest to us?"
"Because," he replied, "we have not horses enough; for the best of the enemy, those whom it were most desirable either to capture or to kill, are riding off on horseback. With the help of the gods we were able to put them to flight, but we are not able to pursue and overtake them."
"Then why do you not go and tell Cyaxares this?" said they. "Come with me, then, all of you," he answered, "so that he may know that we are all agreed upon this point." (4.1.11-12)

LS: In other words, Cyrus doesn't dare to make the demand in his own name yet. It must be a demand of the whole army, which is bound to make some impression even on that tyrant or absolute monarch, let us never forget that, Cyaxares. Yes. And then they go. Now how does Cyaxares react to this request for cavalry? Paragraph 13.

Mr. Reinken:
Now Cyaxares seemed to feel some little jealousy because the proposal came from them; at the same time, perhaps, he did not care to risk another engagement; then, too, he rather wished to stay where he was, for it happened that he was busily engaged in making merry himself, and he saw that many of the other Medes were doing the same. (4.1.13)

LS: In other words, his motivation is complicated: (a) he is envious, and (b) he likes the situation as it is. Of course both reasons are unsayable. That is always in such a speech—you know, what the speaker says is not identical with what motivates him. And this simple fact is not a discovery of present-day social science analysis of propaganda. [Laughter] Good. Now what does he say?

Mr. Reinken:
"Well, Cyrus, I know from what I see and hear that you Persians are more careful than other people not to incline to the least intemperance in any kind of pleasure. But it seems to me that it is much better to be moderate in the greatest pleasure than to be moderate in lesser pleasures; and what brings to man greater pleasure than success, such as has now been granted us?" (4.1.14)

LS: More literally, "good luck." Yes?

Mr. Reinken:
"If, therefore when we are lucky, we follow up our success with moderation, we might, perhaps, be able to grow old in happiness unalloyed with danger. But if we enjoy it intemperately and try to pursue first one success and then another, see to it that we do not share the same fate that they

say many have suffered upon the sea, that is, because of their good luck[iv] they have not been willing to give up seafaring, and so they have been lost; and many others, when they have gained a victory, have aimed at another and so have lost even what they gained by the first.'" (4.1.15)

LS: Then he gives—we cannot read the whole thing. There follows a second argument in the next three paragraphs: Do not drive the beaten enemy to despair. Now they are glad to get rid of the danger, but if you pursue them into their own land, their last retreat, then they will behave like a sow defending her litter (if "litter" is the proper term). Good. That is argument number three. And then at the end of paragraph 18: The Medes, my own people, deserve some rest. These are the three ostensible reasons. Now Cyrus replies to that in the next—let us read that.

Mr. Reinken:
"Nay," said Cyrus in reply; "please do not place anybody under compulsion; but allow those who will volunteer to follow me, and perhaps we may come back bringing to you and each of your friends here something for you all to make merry with. For the main body of the enemy we certainly shall not even pursue; for how could we ever overtake them? But if we find any detachment of their army straggling or left behind, we shall bring them to you." (4.1.19)

LS: And so on. So Cyrus's suggestion is: Of course the Medes should not be compelled to engage in that unpleasant business, but only if someone is eager to volunteer, do not forbid that. This is the substance of Cyrus's reply. He does not meet the issue stated in the first argument, namely, that one must be moderate or continent in any pleasure, even regarding the pleasure of victory. This means—what light does this throw on Cyrus, if we knew nothing else but this exchange?

Student: Cyrus always goes after more. He is never really satisfied with enough.

LS: Let us use now the almost technical terms used by Cyaxares.

Student: . . . the seafarers?

LS: No, no. The technical term for this peculiar defect of character which Cyrus shows. He is immoderate, incontinent. Yes?

Student: But if he thinks the argument is spurious, is it not possible he just ignores it because of the fact that it is flagrant and takes away from the case in point?

LS: After all, it is a serious question: Should not one sometimes stop conquering? You know, the historical Cyrus didn't stop conquering; he was stopped by being killed in battle. And of course Xenophon, who is so nice, permits him to die in bed surrounded by his whole family. And everything is fine, and the misfortune happens only immediately after his death. This is Xenophon's improvement on the situation. The question is this: A man might not answer to an objection because he thinks it is silly, that is perfectly true, but is it silly?

[iv] In original: "success"

Student: From the point of view of a general who has routed an army, to say let's stop when we have them on the run—

LS: Surely, the main point was to defend Media against this barbaric host. They have succeeded in that. That is enough, you know? There is no total war in the twentieth-century sense. It is proven, one can say that. Now the question of course we have to say is, was Cyaxares entitled to make that argument? Mr. Rotella?

Mr. Rotella: It seems that Xenophon gives us a key to that when he says Cyaxares was jealous, and this would be a nice way for Cyrus to get around that. We don't know if the advice is really . . .

LS: But Cyrus doesn't meet the argument in any point. He only says, as it were: You are quite right, but we don't want to do any big thing but just a little mopping up. And some of your own officers and men are eager to do the same, don't spoil their pleasure. That is the rest which they seek, not to sit here and get drunk. And Cyaxares, who is after all a rather mild and ineffective ruler, says: All right, I don't want to be a spoilsport, and that's it. I mean, Cyrus is very clever and he is infinitely superior regarding slyness to this uncle, but the question nevertheless is that the uncle might have a point. You must make a distinction. The uncle might not have a point because his motivation consists of envy and also of sheer satisfaction with getting drunk and similar things. Ya? In my opinion. But nevertheless, it has happened before and will happen again, that people who have no right to bring forth an argument bring forth a very good argument. I mean, you find examples every day. I read in a column yesterday a remark against Senator Keating,[v] that he is a very amiable and public-spirited man but eager for publicity. Now one could say the friends, the political friends of this columnist are also perhaps not averse to publicity. Therefore to be eager for publicity may be a vice, but it is irrelevant here, or rather, he had no right to use it. But this happens all the time.

Now the real point why Cyaxares's point is well taken, although he had no right to take it, is: What happens at the end? As Mr. Glenn has pointed out, what Cyrus wants is success, military success, one after the other, and getting ever more rich and ever more famous. At some time they must stop, if only after having conquered the whole globe—which at that time was not possible because of poor communications, as we have observed on other occasions. So at some point they must stop, even at the end of the earth, or Venus and moon, whatever the limits at the time may be. What will they do then? Exactly what Cyaxares is doing now: to sit, to celebrate, get drunk. [LS taps on the table] And this is the lesson of the whole book. That happens. So from this point of view, Cyaxares, this despicable fellow,[2] was wiser than Cyrus. He did it now, he did not postpone it. [3]First, because there, in this relatively small country of Media, it did not make such a

[v] It was widely assumed that Senator Kenneth Keating, Republican Senator from New York, "learned about the Soviet emplacement of missiles in Cuba in 1962 before the Kennedy administration did, or before Kennedy officials were willing to release the information. By relentlessly hammering on the issue of the Soviet military buildup on the Caribbean island, Keating embarrassed the Democratic administration during the campaigns for the November congressional elections." Thomas G. Paterson, "The Historian as Detective: Senator Kenneth Keating, the Missiles in Cuba, and His Mysterious Sources," *Diplomatic History* 11 (1987): 67-70, 67. Paterson, however, argues that "Keating and government officials learned about the presence" of the missiles "at just about the same time."

great difference whether they had such a ruler or that. But after Cyrus had conquered the whole world, so to speak, and enslaved all these nations, this could not be undone so easily as the bad effect of an inferior ruler in a single country. So I think Cyaxares has a point, although he in a way has no right to say so. But in a way he has the right to say so, because the end which Cyrus and his friends aspire to is not different from the end which he enjoys now. There is a fable of the hare and the which other slow—

Student: The tortoise.

LS: Tortoise, ya, and the race. He doesn't move, and the hare runs and runs, and the tortoise arrives first. Cyaxares has already arrived while this very quick hare, Cyrus, is still running. Ya?

Student: Do you think it would be unfair to impute Cyaxares a prediction of his future, if—

LS: No, he was too dumb for that. But someone may say something which is quite sensible as far as it goes, and be more sensible than one knows. That happens.

Student: From the mouths of babes.

LS: Yes, in a much more general way. We always mean more than we know. What we say is always more than what we mean. And these implications may be foolish; they may also be right. And therefore Hegel said very well occasionally that it is a very unfair criticism of a man to say he does not know what he says. We all do not know what we say. That would require a degree of awakeness which cannot be expected. The key point which is implied here, it seems to me, is this: that all the grandeur and nobility of Cyrus's way of life, as contrasted with the ignoble way of life of Cyaxares, that all this nobility is ultimately in the service of the bodily pleasures. [LS taps on the table] And that is the absurdity of it, and this has very grave implications. Now let us turn to the next chapter. Still—yes?

Student: . . . in order for men to be noble, you say they always have to have something to struggle against . . .

LS: If the end is achieved. Is this not so? I mean, if the end is the overcoming of others, if it could be achieved, and the hypothesis of this work is it can. In fact, it was never achieved, as you know. Napoleon didn't achieve it in Russia, Alexander the Great didn't achieve it—he died very young. In a way, even Caesar didn't achieve it; he was assassinated. No one really achieves universal rule, ever.

Student: . . .

LS: What did he achieve? He had to commit suicide. No, there was a prospect for one or two fleeting moments, and that was quite a bit, given the circumstances . . . Now let us read the first paragraph of the next chapter.

Mr. Reinken:
While Cyrus was thus occupied, messengers came as if providentially from the Hyrcanians.

LS: "In a divine way somehow." Yes?

Mr. Reinken:
Now the Hyrcanians are neighbors of the Assyrians; they are not a large nation; and for that reason they also were subjects of the Assyrians. Even then they had a reputation for being good horsemen, and they have that reputation still. (4.2.1)

LS: You know, this reference again that Xenophon knows these things somehow by direct knowledge, by present knowledge. So the fiction of historical truth is preserved.

Mr. Reinken:
For this reason the Assyrians used to employ them as the Spartans do the Sciritae, sparing them neither in hardships nor in dangers. And on that particular occasion they were ordered to bring up the rear (they were cavalrymen about a thousand strong), in order that, if any danger should threaten from behind, they might have to bear the brunt of it instead of the Assyrians. (4.2.1)

LS: Ya, so this gives of course the Hyrcanians an easy opportunity to switch sides. This remark about "this has happened in some divine manner" we find also repeated in paragraph 15 in a different way. Let us read that first—while they are marching.

Mr. Reinken:
As they proceeded, night came on, and it is said that a light from heaven shone forth upon Cyrus and his army, so that they were all filled with awe at the miracle but with courage— (4.2.15)

LS: "With awe, with a shudder toward the divine," and so on. You see Cyrus's new attempt, going over from the defensive to the offensive, acquires divine approval. Ya? So the gods are not concerned with man's moderation; they give their blessing to the lack of moderation. Let's keep this in mind. In the second case, you see Xenophon says, "It is said." He doesn't claim that this actually happened, whereas in the first case he simply asserts that the arrival of the Hyrcanians was of divine origin. At any rate, we can say what Xenophon suggests, not so much through Cyaxares as through the gods: Cyrus gets his cavalry, and of course this means also he is less dependent on Cyaxares. Paragraph 10.

Mr. Reinken:
while of the Medes some came out because as boys they had been friends of Cyrus when he was a boy, others because they liked his ways when they had been with him on the chase, others because they were grateful to him for freeing them, as they thought, from great impending danger— (4.2.10)

LS: "Great fear."

Mr. Reinken:
and still others because they cherished the hope that as he seemed to be a man of ability he would one day be exceedingly fortunate and exceedingly great besides; others wished to requite him for some service he had done for them while he was growing up in Media— (4.2.10)

LS: Ya. These are five reasons, and all introduced in identically the same way: *hoi men, hoi dē*; those and those. The central one is that they were grateful to him that he had liberated them from a great fear. You remember the theme of fear in the conversation with Tigranes. Their king could not have saved them from the Assyrian danger, Cyrus had done it. Yes, and let us read the next paragraph. So in other words, the Medes all gladly went with Cyrus, because Cyrus had saved their country. Yes?

Student: It shows that Cyaxares didn't know his men well enough. If he had, he would not have assented so easily to allow Cyrus to use them.

LS: Sure. Well, he was in every respect an inept king, wasn't he?

Same student: And also, I think this points to what I consider the real part of the education that Cyrus received—well, it wouldn't be an education—the most important factor of his being in Media when he was young, these connections.

LS: Yes, sure. That is true. In addition to the lessons he learned in flattering and being flattered, you remember? And in tyrannical rule, he also surely established connections, naturally. If someone goes to graduate school, he has two benefits: a) he gets certain instruction, and b) he meets other students who may become later on in life VIPs and can be very helpful. Sure. Good. This is however not an ostensible reason why people go to universities. Paragraph 11.

Mr. Reinken:
The result was that almost all came out—even the Medes, except those who happened to be feasting in the same tent with Cyaxares; these and their subordinates remained behind. But all the rest hastened out cheerily and enthusiastically, for they came not from compulsion but of their own free will and out of gratitude. (4.2.11)

LS: Ya. Not "compelled," but from *charis*. The Greek word *charis* means something more than gratitude; it includes that: grace, gracefully, and of which gratitude is as it were a part. And this opposition between compulsion and grace, by the way, is crucial for the *Hiero*, because one can show that in the part in which the badness of tyranny is presented, the first seven chapters, the word "compulsion" is much more frequent than the word "grace." And in the second part, where the good tyranny is described, the number of references to compulsion is equal to the number of references to grace. In other words, the secret of government is to rule fifty percent by compulsion and fifty percent by grace. And here Cyrus does even more: he wins these Medes without any compulsion. There is no possibility to compel them. This is his *charisma*, a word derived from *charis* which is now so common in social science.

Student: Are you implying a Machiavellianism? The activity on Cyrus's part here, by which he . . .

LS: That is clear. That he would do as a matter of course. There was even a reference to that. Was there not a reference to that?

Student: Book 1.

LS: Ya, that is true. Naturally. You see, you must not lose sight of the obvious. When you look at Cyrus as he appears at a simple reading, without any thinking, just surrendering to the impressions, then you see Cyrus is in a way a very amiable man. You know, a mere calculator, of whom everyone sees he is playing them close to his chest, and all this kind of thing. He is loathed by everyone. He has no friend. He cannot have a friend. I mean, Cyrus is the outgoing type, slapping the backs all the time. This can go well with calculation, very well. And the point is that these people are not always calculating. They have a kind of natural capacity to be amiable when it is particularly useful to be amiable. They are in a way really gifted men. And Cyrus is such a man, you know; he has an urge to be kind. And of course he has to kill people all the time, but that just can't be helped. [Laughter] He doesn't do it—you know, how many people can he possibly kill—he doesn't have to kill a single man with his own hand by now, I believe, so that is exactly the secret of his success: he appears to be amiable to everyone, with a few exceptions which we will observe. Yes?

Student: I'd like to go back for a moment, if I may—

LS: Only one point. The next paragraph, then I give it away. Paragraph 12. "When they were out."

Mr. Reinken:
And when they were out of the camp, he went first to the Medes and praised them and prayed the gods above all things graciously to lead them and his own men, and he prayed also that he himself might be enabled to reward them for this zeal of theirs. (4.2.12)

LS: "That he might be able to give *charis*," grace, gratitude. So in other words, gratitude on both sides: the Medes are grateful to Cyrus, and Cyrus is grateful to the Medes. That is a most desirable relation, as you know from the ordinary absence of that in foreign relations. Ya? Everybody understands? I read in a book about the Second World War, the difference between the French and the Belgians after the liberation: the Belgians were much more genuinely grateful than the French were, because the French were somehow ashamed that they had to be liberated by others because of their famous military past; whereas the Belgians, a small nation, never aspired to military greatness, at least not since time immemorial, and they could be simply grateful. So gratitude is extremely rare. Here we have it. And this impression which goes through the whole book of a man who wins by his smile, as it were he conquered the whole . . . you know, a fairy tale. But something very hard and harsh is easily discernable beneath this pleasant surface. Now Mr. Seltzer.

Mr. Seltzer: I would like to go back for a minute to your point about the contrast between Cyrus and Cyaxares, and that in the end Cyrus will sit back and indulge in eating and drinking, just as Cyaxares does now. But it seems to me, at the end Cyrus will have a much greater end in view than bodily pleasures, namely, glory and praise.

LS: That is true. But the question is still this: Is glory such an unproblematic thing that we can simply leave it at that, an end no longer in need of an analysis? Because granted that Cyrus is

concerned, so to speak, only with glory, what happens to his subjects? No subject of Cyrus can possibly have the glory of Cyrus himself. And in proportion as this is the case, the other rewards of victory may become more important. There is a certain delusion about glory—I mean these people who are concerned with it, and they are more open in classical antiquity than in modern times, of eternal glory, glory for ever and ever. Is there such a glory for ever and ever? I mean, think of Pericles, he was surely such a man, and he said it quite openly. To whom does Pericles owe his everlasting glory, up to the present day? Pardon?

Student: . . .

LS: No, to a single man: to Thucydides. If we did not have Thucydides he would be spoken about, in a way, but he would not be present as an individual. Similar things apply also to Caesar. And of course in the case of Caesar it is different because he founded the Roman Empire, which lasted for many centuries and even the physical remains of it are still visible.[4] And in addition, to say nothing of the victors, eternal glory is of course also very much dependent on what future generations will think. You know, there may be changes of interpretation. There is no presence. For example, Aristotle: Well, you always have Aristotle himself here. He may be wrong and he may be right, but we are confronted with him directly. In the case of these great conquerors, it is impossible, there is no such presence possible. What can we know of their deliberations, and counsels, and to what extent each of them was the originator of his plans? Very hard to say.

Mr. Seltzer: It was mostly with respect to your summary of your point that I raised the question, namely, that Cyrus's way of life, his nobility and grandeur, was in the service of bodily pleasures—

LS: No, no. You are quite right. But we must add some intermediate points. You are quite right. But when we read the last chapter of the eighth book, we will see how the whole thing ends, how this terrific edifice, according to Xenophon's description—I am not concerned now with historical truth—collapsed from one day to the other. Well, there is nothing eternal. I mean, the glory which survives, the work surely was not forever and ever. The glory can last beyond the work, that is clear. But the question is, again, if we didn't know of Cyrus through the Old Testament, and through Herodotus, and Xenophon—again, a mere name, [that] some fellow in Persia conquered the world—and all modern diggings and so on and so on would not fundamentally do away with that . . .

Student: The modern example . . .

LS: Yes, but we can read him, for the time being at least. To that extent we have more direct knowledge.

Student: Also, Caesar passed letters to the Roman Senate, and so forth.

LS: Especially his *Gallic Wars* and *Civil Wars*. Ya, but men like Pericles and so on never wrote. They made speeches, and nothing has remained except two or three quotations in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* or so. Yes?

Student: Would you say that Cyrus's success depends on the historical monument after him, and that this would be . . .

LS: Yes. There is one more point regarding this subject of the end toward which the effort of Cyrus is directed, at the beginning of paragraph 22. A speech of Cyrus. Yes?

Mr. Reinken:
"If, therefore, we wish from this time forth to eat well, to sleep soundly, and to live comfortably, let us not give them time either to—" (4.2.22)

LS: And so on. You see? Here, at least as far as his following is concerned, he only says: Let us not eat *now* and sleep *now* so that we can eat and sleep forever in perfect safety. There are other remarks to this effect in paragraphs 25 to 26. In paragraphs 29 and 30 there is a minor point which I mention as a question. Here he speaks of the allies of the Assyrian king, what they did. Could you read that? Paragraph 29.

Mr. Reinken:
As it was summer, Croesus, the king of Lydia, had had his women sent on by night in carriages, that they might proceed more comfortably in the cool of the night, and he himself was following after with his cavalry. And the Phrygian king, the ruler of Phrygia on the Hellespont, they say, did the same. (4.2.29-30)

LS: "They say." Why does he make this qualification, "they say," in the case of the Phrygian king and not in the case of Croesus? I do not know. But I only bring them up as the kind of question which a real interpreter of this book would have to solve.

Student: It's the same thing with his reference to the divine. In the one case it was a—

LS: Yes . . . That is one of the many defects of our present discussion that we cannot solve a single of these questions. The only one which I can solve is a simple one, when he says his mother was Mandane and his father is said to be Cambyses, which is easy to solve. But in the other cases, I do not find my way. Now he is of course—

In the address to the Persian nobility which follows somewhat later, we see how much he is concerned with being *reputed* to be concerned with the well-being of the allies. Without the reputation, the concern would be politically valueless, ya? In other words, this element of reputation, and therefore also of sham, enters into that glory. You know? Glory is what the others think. What the others think. There is something in principle spurious about that, although human life is unthinkable without it. Yes?

Student: This whole thing comes up again in the passage that Mr. Reinken read, 22. If they want to do this in the future, in safety, then they have to follow the battle now. This is why I have this question as to whether or not Cyrus is being immoderate in pushing it to a sure victory. They could regroup and gain—

LS: Cyrus didn't give a single prudential military reason why they must go beyond that. He simply avoids the issue . . . There is no proof given that Cyrus, for prudential reasons of a higher order, say, organizing Asia, embarked on this. Not the slightest suggestion to that effect anywhere.

Student: Well, it seems that here there is . . . where he says if we want to sleep and eat in the future then we have to push on now.

LS: That is of course true of every defensive war, surely, and also the line between offensive and defensive cannot always be easily drawn. But that is exactly the point which Cyaxares has in mind. They could sleep now because the Assyrians have a bloody nose, and they are glad to be left alone. There is no danger from the Assyrians now.

Same Student: This is the thing that I question. Maybe it is possible now, but maybe tomorrow they won't have it.

LS: Yes, but there will always be such a tomorrow. You know, in former times people believed that there is a war in every generation, or at least in every two generations. And consult the annals of the world, whether you find a period longer than seventy years without a war. I mean, you can have peace organizations and peace marches and everything else, but hitherto it hasn't helped. And [in] our century, which was thought to bring war [to an end]—you remember the Hague, the International Court, and all the things they tried—we have had more, and bigger, wars than any earlier century. Perhaps the increase in the political noise by pacifists is in a sense in exact proportion to the increase in war. [Laughter] At any rate, it is not a thesis which can easily be refuted by empirical means, and the fact that the wars have now reached this enormous character through thermonuclear war, that doesn't of course mean that there will be no further wars. There may be no thermonuclear wars, perhaps, but people can do that, you know. The simple example, often adduced in this connection, is poison gas. Poison gas was valueless to both sides equally in the First World War, and hence they didn't use it in the Second World War. But they used other things. So that is not a safe consideration. The war to end all wars is a peculiarity of the twentieth century. [LS taps on the table] In former times, that attitude was: We fight our war; what there will be in thirty or forty years we don't know. And the Greeks went very far in that. They didn't make eternal peace; they made peace for a limited period, for thirty years, for example, because god knows what will be the situation in thirty years. There will be a young generation, people who have not known war and who are eager for fighting. That was the typical thing, described beautifully also by Thucydides at the beginning of the *Peloponnesian War*. There hadn't been a big war since the Persian Wars, 479, and when was that? 431. Forty-eight years. So imagine: up to forty-eight [years], the whole group of people of arms-bearing age had never seen a war. [5]It is not true that men simply detest war. That is not simply true. I think it was discernable even during the Blitz in England. I wasn't there, but I got this impression that however terrible it was in many respects, it was also an enormously thrilling interruption of a humdrum life. One must face that.

Mr. Reinken: Their finest hour.

LS: One must not forget that. It is not merely a sense of duty which enables people to begin wars and to stand them.

Student: Would it be possible to draw a generalization that Cyrus would be aware of the fact that he couldn't avoid a war on the morrow, and that this—

LS: That means world conquest. If you want to have the war to end all wars, you must do to all men what Cyrus did to the Armenians, and how are they called, the natives?

Student: The Chaldeans.

LS: The Chaldeans. Namely, disarm them, and you have a big army to defend them against all comers. And maybe if there were a world state, you would only need a police force. But this police force of course must have all the earmarks of an army.[6] Let us assume there is starvation in India, and if this were controlled from Moscow or Peking and they would necessarily send foodstuffs there to stop the rebellion, that might be very inconvenient and impractical because they need it elsewhere. A few bombs take care of the problem. I mean, that is—this police force of a world state is nothing but an army. Indeed, there is no longer foreign policy in the technical sense, but its equivalent in the interior. So this I believe is not an argument against what I said. Now in this paragraph 38 to 39, let us read that.

Mr. Reinken:
When they heard this, they proceeded with great alacrity to carry out his directions, while he called together his captains and spoke as follows: "I realize, friends, that it is possible for us now to take luncheon first, while our comrades are away, and to enjoy the choicest food and drink. But I do not think that it would be of more advantage to us to eat this luncheon than it would to show ourselves thoughtful for our comrades—" (4.2.38-39)

LS: "To come to sight." Ya, "to come to sight." They must see it, otherwise it is of no use. Go on.

Mr. Reinken:
"neither do I think that this feasting would add as much to our strength as we should gain if we could make our allies devoted to us. But if we show ourselves to be so neglectful of them that we are found to have broken our fast even before we know—"

LS: Again, "show," "if we seem to be." And so on. Now let us read paragraph 40.

Mr. Reinken:
"And remember," said he, "that even if we were under no obligation to show them every consideration—" (4.2.40)

LS: Literally, "even if it were not necessary for us to be ashamed of them." So to omit this out of sheer shame because they will despise us that we fed ourselves while they were doing the fighting. Yes?

Mr. Reinken:
"even so it is not proper for us as yet to sate ourselves with food or drink; for not yet have we accomplished what we wish, but, on the contrary, everything is now at a crisis and requires care. For we have enemies in camp many times our own number—" (4.2.40)

LS: In other words, that is the main point here: this continence regarding food and drink is necessary also independently of its becoming known or not, because only if we are continent will we be able to take care of the enemy. Continence is a virtue not dependent on becoming known to others, whereas this care for reputation depends absolutely on becoming known. Is that not true? Good. And again, in paragraph 42.

Mr. Reinken:
"Besides, there is also a vast amount of treasure in the camp, and I am not ignorant of the fact that it is possible for us to appropriate to ourselves as much of it as we please, though it belongs just as much to those who helped us to get it. But I do not think it would bring us greater gain to take it than it would to show that we mean to be fair and square—" (4.2.42)

LS: Ya. "To appear to be just is more gainful than to get these things." Again, in the case of justice it is important that you are known to be just. In the case of continence, it is not so. The simple proof: If you have overeaten, you are punished for it regardless of whether it is publicly known or not. Or drunk too much. But if you are dishonest, you can get away with it if it never becomes known. Therefore justice has more to do with reputation than these virtues which concern only the individual man himself. Yes?

Student: . . . continence is good in itself, but justice is good only for—

LS: Ya, that is an extreme version taken by the so-called sophists, and [for] such people, justice is not a virtue at all, because it is not a genuine virtue. But a part of the sophistic argument is of course true on a low level. Now in the sequel he refers to the Persian education. Paragraph 44.

Mr. Reinken:
"For to secure a present advantage would give us but short-lived riches. But to sacrifice this and obtain the source from which real wealth flows, that, as I see it, could put us and all of ours in possession of a perennial fountain of wealth.
And if I am not mistaken, we used to train ourselves at home, too, to control our appetites and to abstain from unseasonable gain—" (4.2.44-45)

LS: "Unseasonable gain." All right?

Mr. Reinken:
"with this in view, that, if occasion should ever demand it, we might be able to employ our powers of self-control to our advantage. And I fail to see where we could give proof of our training on a more important occasion than the present." (4.2.45)

LS: What he says "training" is in Greek the "education." He is now restating the purport or goal of Persian education—you remember, in the first book?[7] The corruption which he had effected in

his first speech to the Persian nobility, virtue for the sake of its material rewards, is now imputed to the original Persian education itself. Yes. So we have traveled a long way from this aristocracy to the present state.

Now in the sequel Cyrus proves to be displeased with their dependence on foreign cavalry, Hyrcanians and Medians, and they have no Persian [cavalry of their own]. And he makes therefore a speech to the Persian nobility in the next chapter. We read only a part of it, at the end of paragraph 8.

Mr. Reinken:
"Well then, supposing that we wished to organize a division of cavalry, had we not better consider our resources and our deficiencies? Here, then, in camp are numbers of horses which we have taken and reins which they obey, and everything else that horses must have before you can use them. Yes, and more, all that a horseman must use we have—breastplates as defensive armor for the body and spears which we may use either to hurl or to thrust. What then remains? Obviously we must have men. Now these above all other things we have; for nothing is so fully ours as we ourselves are our own.
"But perhaps some one will say that we do not know how to ride. No, by Zeus; and no one of these who now know how to ride did know before he learned. But, some one may say, they learned when they were boys. And are boys more clever in learning what is explained to them and what is shown them than are men? And which are better able with bodily strength to put into practice what they have learned, boys or men? Again, we have more time for learning than either boys or other men; for we have not, like boys, to learn to shoot, for we know how already; or to throw the spear, for we understand that, too. No; nor yet again are we so situated as other men, some of whom are kept busy with their farming, some with their trades, and some with other domestic labours—" (4.3.8-12)

LS: With their "arts," where he says "training." Yes?

Mr. Reinken:
"while we not only have time for military operations, but they are forced upon us." (4.3.12)

LS: "But also necessity." They are—this has never come out so clearly before. The Persian nobility is compelled to wage war. One can say it was all implied in the description of the Persian regime, but in this clear way I think it has never been stated before.

Now, so Cyrus proposes to the Persians that they should have a cavalry of their own. And he asks the Persian nobility, hitherto hoplites, heavy infantry, to become cavalrymen. And the speaker supporting the motion is Chrysantas. We have met him before. He is the most loyal follower of Cyrus, and he gives a long speech; paragraph 15, following. We cannot read the whole. Let me only remind you a bit of Chrysantas. He was in favor of the democratization of the army, you know, the distributive justice [by] which everyone gets the position which he deserves; and he was in favor of the establishment of this change by Cyrus's fiat, as distinguished from democratic vote in the Assembly. He is a man not outstanding by size and strength, but by prudence or reason. Yet, however, he was given to unreasonable and untimely overexertion, as we have seen. And also he showed a certain overestimation of the power of

speech or *logos*. This is roughly the character of Chrysantas. Now what are his reasons for having a Persian cavalry? His reasons are not political and not utilitarian properly speaking. We cannot read the whole. Let us read paragraph 17, for example.

Mr. Reinken:
"Now the creature that I have envied most is, I think, the Centaur (if any such being ever existed), able to reason with a man's intelligence and to manufacture with his hands what he needed, while he possessed the fleetness and strength of a horse so as to overtake whatever ran before him and to knock down whatever stood in his way. Well, all his advantages I combine in myself by becoming a horseman. At any rate, I shall be able to take forethought for everything with my human mind, I shall carry my weapons with my hands, I shall pursue with my horse and overthrow my opponent by the rush of my steed, but I shall not be bound fast to him in one growth, like the Centaurs. Indeed, my state will be better than being grown together in one piece; for, in my opinion at least, the Centaurs must have had difficulty in making use of many of the good things invented for man; and how could they have enjoyed many of the comforts natural to the horse? But if I learn to ride, I shall, when I am on horseback, do everything as the Centaur does, of course; but when I dismount, I shall dine and dress myself and sleep like other human beings; and so what else shall I be than a Centaur that can be taken apart and put together again? And then," he added, "I shall have the advantage of the Centaur in this, too, that he used to see with but two eyes and hear with but two ears, while I shall gather evidence with four eyes and learn through four ears; for they say that a horse actually sees many things with his eyes before his rider does and makes them known to him, and that he hears many things with his ears before his rider does and gives him intimation of them. Put me down, therefore," said he, "as one of those who are more than eager to become cavalrymen." (4.3.17-21)

LS: So this is Chrysantas's reason for becoming a horseman. Now how can you describe his desire? Yes?

Student: He becomes a more perfect physical specimen, a mighty warrior . . .

LS: Yes, that is true, absolutely. But could one not state it more simply? And this would also give us an inkling of what it stands for.

Student: Pride?

LS: No, no.

Mr. Reinken: Strength for self-defense.

LS: No, more. He can see better, he can hear better. Yes?

Student: . . . a reversal of the modernization process, where you're sending out a group of men to ride horses . . .

LS: No, I don't think so . . . Mr. Mueller?

Mr. Mueller: He becomes more independent.

LS: Yes, that is one attribute of this new status, but how would one describe it?

Student: Is it too far-fetched to say, he is closest to Cyrus . . .

LS: That I do not see. Ya?

Student: Could it just mean that he wants to increase his capability?

LS: Ya, sure, but I would like to link that up with what—

Student: He retreated in the beginning of the book . . .

LS: Yes, that showed how obedient he was.

Same student: He was faster on a horse.

LS: Oh, I see. That's good. In other words, he wants—that is also something I believe. Yes?

Student: Are not centaurs demigods?

LS: Sure. In other words, he wants to become super-human. He wants to be more than a man and yet to have all the advantages of men, and have more. Well, I would say this is the limit of Chrysantas's notion of a man surpassing man. This enlarges the question, ya? In other words, a beast-man is more than a man. Yes?

Student: Should we contrast this to Cyrus's desire actually to be a god?

LS: Yes, sure. One must do that. This is his notion. But Chrysantas's notion of his aspiration is the synthetic centaur. I mean, he uses the expression "synthetic" because every evening he can take away that belt and he is again a human being.

Student: Is this an additional indication of his prudence? He knows it is limited, therefore he doesn't have the aspiration to become a god, but a demigod.

LS: Yes, but still, you see, that is a very complicated thing. I do not claim that I can interpret it, but I think as a model for interpretation I would take the fact which we observed when reading the *Oeconomicus*, where, when Ischomachus taught Socrates the art of planting and Socrates knew everything—and then the reflection: "knowledge is recollection." Because Socrates remembered having passed certain fields, how the people had done the planting: knowledge is recollection. Now this is of course a reminder of the doctrine that knowledge is recollection on a philosophic level, the Platonic level. Now Xenophon is capable of doing that; and this is his particular manner, to present the higher issues on a low level, just as comedy does this. I mean, when you read Aristophanes's *Clouds*, for example, the presentation of the issues of astronomy, and geography, or whatever it is, is on the level of an Athenian peasant. Socrates is making

investigations beneath the earth—well, that means, of course, he wants to find the right place for planting onions. I forgot the other jokes. Now Xenophon does something similar, only from a pro-Socratic point of view, not an anti-Socratic point of view. So I would say something of this kind may be behind it.

Now let us look: What is such a centaur, as Chrysantas describes it? It is a being composed of a rational being, man, and an irrational being. Now man is of course himself composed of reason and subreason, subrational things, desires and [other] things. Now in man the *logos*, reason, is supposed to rule the irrational. That is one thing. But another thing which we must also not forget: that reason in man is helped by the irrational, just as in the hippocentaur, in the centaur, the human is helped by the better ear of the horse. You remember? [8]Man, in other words, is in a way a centaur. Man is in a way a centaur, a centaur being a being mixed of rational and irrational. I believe this leads even up to Swift's *Gulliver*, the fourth part, the Houyhnhnms. In Plato's *Phaedrus* man is described as a man, two horses, and a chariot.[vi] The two horses are the desires, man is reason, and the chariot is the body. [9]I mean, in other words, Chrysantas in his barbaric way divines something, but since he divines it in a barbaric way, he also ruins the thing.

Student: Why does he make centaur so emphatic? Why does he say horse-centaur?

LS: Because in Greek, centaur would be perfectly sufficient? That I do not know. In the *Cynegeticus* he speaks of *hippocentaurus*?

Student: No, *centaurus.*

LS: No, of *centaurus*. Very good question.

Student: Does it have something to do with the army?

LS: Yes, he obviously wants to underline the fact that a part of the centaur is a horse, ya, otherwise the mere name centaur would not supply the connection with cavalry, the verbal connection. That I would suggest, which is probably not good enough, but it is worth considering. I do not claim that I can interpret it fully, I said only what occurred to me. So we turn now to the next chapter. Yes?

Student: . . . passage at the end of this chapter . . . As for example the . . . retreat from democracy setting off a certain group of men as cavalry men . . .

LS: In other words, the reintroduction of the hierarchical society.

Student: That was in paragraph 22.

LS: Of chapter 3? And secondly, this is a strictly military organization. They have to obey. They are not the peers of the realm, who have as much to say as the ruler. That is important. I am grateful to you.

[vi] *Phaedrus* 246a.

Now in the next chapter, paragraphs 4 to 8 (we unfortunately cannot read it), we see Cyrus again as benefactor, how he takes care of the civilian population. These people will not be harmed in any way. Of course they must be disarmed, that goes without saying; and they have to deliver foodstuffs and so on for the army, that is also clear. But then they are treated very well. Now of course part of it is meant very literally. There are certain very elementary rules of conduct where ordinary decency and low prudence absolutely coincide, and rules which are very frequently neglected by thoughtless men, soldiers or generals. The most impressive example I remember is from Thucydides again: a Spartan commander, Alcidas, who kills all prisoners of war from the Greek islands whether they are pro-[10]Spartan or anti-Spartan. And then someone has to tell him: You are a fool, you will create an anti-Spartan feeling everywhere by your indiscriminate killing. And then he immediately stops it. But he didn't have the wits to think of it himself. Now such people exist in all countries and in all conditions, and to that extent of course Cyrus is the model of the way to do these things: not create unnecessary antagonism. He is much better off by being nice to these people than he would be if he were not nice to them. Everyone who fights is killed, without any mercy. There is no monkey business about that. But those who do not fight and can work for the army, they must of course be treated well. They are benefactors of the army, and so they will be benefited by the army in turn. Mr. Johnson?

Mr. Johnson: . . . He was originally going to put the Armenian king to death, and he supposedly learned that it would be much more profitable—

LS: Well, he really never thought of that. Because the main point—I mean, the practical lesson of Tigranes, that he would be better off if the Armenian king and the administration would remain as it was and they would send the armies, he knew very well. [11]To that extent, Cyrus did not have to learn from Tigranes; what he learned from Tigranes were the theoretical reasonings connected with that. Now, and also the other point which goes through Xenophon everywhere, the point which is one of the main points of Machiavelli: that in a large sphere it does not make a great difference whether a man is decent, truly decent, or merely calculating. In a large sphere it doesn't make any difference. In other words, if Cyrus were guided only by self-interest or if he were guided by genuine beneficence does in a large measure make no difference provided he is intelligently selfish. Ya? And there is some truth in that. To Machiavelli one can say that is almost the whole truth. For Xenophon it is not the whole truth, but within limits it is of course true.

In paragraph 9, when the prisoners of war come, ya, the prisoners of war come, these civilians—at the end of that, paragraph 13, what is the last sentence? Cyrus addresses them in a very humane manner, not because he is a very humane man, but because he is not a fool. These poor fish, they are no danger to him. If he treats them well, they can be very helpful to him so he will be nice to them, that's all. The last sentence of paragraph 13.

Mr. Reinken:
Thus he spoke and they did obeisance and promised to do what he directed. (4.4.13)

LS: This obeisance—in Greek, *proskuneō*; that is derivative from the Greek word for dog: to come on towards the ruler like a dog, crawling, as it were. This is a term which they use for

greeting the Persian king. This happens for the first time here. Cyrus gradually becomes the oriental despot. He originally was something like a Spartan king, at most a *primus inter pares*. And this is the first sign. Ya?

Student: Does this mean "prostrate yourself"? Because Xenophon says in book 8, when Cyrus goes out in great splendor, and the people prostrate themselves—

LS: These were the so-called free men, free citizens. Yes?

Same student: So that is the distinction.

LS: Ya. Now we turn to the next chapter. And in paragraph 4 and paragraph 7, let us read these.

Mr. Reinken:
Then the Medes and Tigranes and his men bathed, changed their clothes (for they were provided with a change), and went to dinner. Their horses also were provided for.
Of the bread, half was sent to the Persians; but neither meat for relish nor wine was sent, for they thought that Cyrus and his men had those articles left in abundance. But what Cyrus meant was that hunger was their relish and that they could drink from the river that flowed by. (4.5.4)

LS: And paragraph 7.

Mr. Reinken:
Thus, then, the Persians employed their time; but the Medes drank and revelled and listened to the music of the flute and indulged themselves to the full with all sorts of merry-making. For many things that contribute to pleasure had been captured, so that those who stayed awake were at no loss for something to do. (4.5.7)

LS: This is again a reminder of the original situation: Persian continence and Median incontinence. Ya. Now in the sequel he describes the Median king Cyaxares: a lack of continence and envy. I mean, he is really a despicable character; he cannot control himself and then he doesn't get honor, and then he is envious of those who do control themselves and get honor for that. And he sends a messenger to Cyrus, but the messenger cannot see him before the next day. In other words, by some accident, dilatory tactics prove to be very helpful, as they frequently do. Paragraph 15, where Cyrus again addresses the Persian nobility.

Mr. Reinken:
"Friends, God holds out before us many blessings. But we Persians are, under the present circumstances, too few to avail ourselves of them. For if we fail to guard what we win—" (4.5.15)

LS: There is a certain joke in Greek. What he translates "to avail ourselves of them," *enkratēs*, is the same as the word for continent, "to become masters of them." And self-control means of course being master of oneself. This cannot well be brought out in translation.

Mr. Reinken:

"For if we fail to guard what we win, it will again become the property of others; and if we leave some of our own men to guard what falls into our possession, it will very soon be found out that we have no strength. Accordingly, I have decided that one of you should go with all speed to Persia, present my message and ask them to send reinforcements with the utmost dispatch, if the Persians desire to have control of Asia and the revenues accruing therefrom. Do you, therefore, go, for you are the senior officer, and when you arrive tell them this; and say also that for whatever soldiers they send I will provide maintenance after they come. Conceal from them nothing in regard to what we have, and you see for yourself what there is. And what portion of these spoils honour and the law require that I should send to Persia—in regard to what is due the gods, ask my father; in regard to what is due to the State, ask the authorities." (4.5.15-17)

LS: "Magistracies." You see, Cyrus is still a republican magistrate at that time, and he behaves in an absolutely constitutional manner regarding the home authorities. But he builds up already an empire of his own in the conquered countries, which is not yet formally an empire, but this will happen in short order. Yes?

Student: . . . his father is Cambyses, the king of Persia.

LS: Yes, but a very constitutional king; he is chief priest and the commander in chief, nothing else. All civilian authority, i.e., all political authority, is in the hands of republican elected magistrates.

Same Student: I see.

LS: Oh, *yes*. Oh, yes. Yes. That is important. Now how does he handle Cyaxares? Paragraph 21.

Mr. Reinken:
"But further, how do we deserve any blame, since we have been doing him good service and have not been doing even that on our own motion? But I, for my part, first got his consent to march out and take you with me; while you did not ask whether you might join the expedition and you are not here now because you desired to make such an expedition, but because you were ordered by him to make it—whoever of you was not averse to it." (4.5.21)

LS: Is it not amazing? He changes it. The permission is transformed into a command. Well, to some extent it is of course right. Permission is surely not a prohibition, but it is also not a command. But he prepares himself for the worst in case Cyaxares doesn't come to his senses. This is developed in the sequel where we have also a letter from Cyrus to Cyaxares which was very well explained by Mr. Glenn. Yes?

Student: I read in [paragraph] 21 to mean that when he had actually gone to get the Medes to go out with him this is what he told them, he told them originally that they were ordered to go out, that they were ordered by—

LS: But still—maybe you are right in that, but Cyaxares knew or might know that he had not given a command but only permission. And Cyaxares is a great fool, but he is not foolish enough

not to see that Cyrus is wooing away his subjects from him toward Cyrus. That is part of the theme of the next book also. Let us read only paragraph 32, the end of that letter.

Mr. Reinken:
"Furthermore, although I am a younger man than you, let me advise you not to take back what you have once given, lest ill-will be your due instead of gratitude, nor to summon with threats those whom you would have come to you quickly; and again let me advise you not to employ threats against large numbers, while at the same time you assert that you are deserted, for fear you teach them to pay no attention to you." (4.5.32)

LS: Ya. So we have heard that in the paper, but this is where we are. Now then in the sequel, there is an address of Cyrus to the rulers of the horsemen, the commanders of the horsemen, and of course the Hyrcanians. Could we have paragraph—it's too long. Paragraph 48 to 54 seem to be especially important. There is this point how they should reward Cyaxares. Let us read paragraph 51.

Mr. Reinken:
"Well," said he, "I accept them; may good fortune attend our turning into horsemen and your dividing the common spoils. In the first place, set apart for the gods whatever the magi direct, as they interpret the will of the gods. Next select for Cyaxares also whatever you think would be most acceptable to him."
They laughed and said that they would have to choose women for him. "Choose women then," said he, "and whatever else you please. And when you have made your choice for him, then do you Hyrcanians do all you can to see that all those who volunteered to follow me have no cause to complain.
"And do you Medes, in your turn, show honour to those who first became our allies, that they may think that they have been well advised in becoming our friends. And allot his proper share of everything to the envoy who came from Cyaxares and to those who attended him; and invite him also to stay on with us (and give him to understand that this is my pleasure also), so that he may know better the true state of things and report the facts to Cyaxares concerning each particular. As for the Persians with me," he said, "what is left after you are amply provided for will suffice for us; for we have not been reared in any sort of luxury, but altogether in rustic fashion, so that you would perhaps laugh at us, if anything gorgeous were to be put upon us, even as we shall, I know, furnish you no little cause for laughter when we are seated upon our horses, and, I presume," he added, "when we fall off upon the ground." (4.5.51-54)

LS: So of course they laugh about this marvelous joke. And this is one of these sly jokes, you know, because this makes the Persians fully self-sufficient as an army. And this has great consequences.

In the next chapter, in paragraph 2, there comes a former subject of the enemy, of the Assyrian king, whose name is Gobryas, and he addresses Cyrus in paragraph 2 for the first time "*ō despota*." "O Master"—how a slave addresses a master. This is also a further step. Now this Gobryas had been absolutely badly treated in a terrible manner by the present Assyrian king. You know, the old Assyrian king had died in battle when they took the camp, and now the crown prince has become king; and this crown prince has behaved as crown princes have behaved on

other occasions and has committed a terrible crime, an inexcusable crime, killing the only son of Gobryas. And Gobryas is of course now perfectly willing to betray this kind of master, and this is one of the many benefits which Cyrus derives from the stupidities of other people. Yes?

Student: This crime was committed long ago.

LS: Ya, but still he was loyal to the old king because the old king had nothing to do with that. But after the old king died and now this murderer is on the throne, he does this. Let us read paragraph 11. We cannot read the story although it is quite touching. And we will see another man of this kind—

Mr. Reinken: If you are going to commit treachery, it would be foolish not to come in with a story at least that good.

LS: Very well. What you say is very good. In other words, when you read the whole book, everything seems to be above board. I mean, Cyrus becomes the ruler of the world without committing any unjust act, only by his virtues and justice. And the people who help him are all nice people, and the people who resist him are people who really deserve to be crushed. It is a fairy tale. One couldn't wish for a better one . . . but if we look a bit deeper these things are not as simple. Now paragraph 11 to 12.

Mr. Reinken:
With these words he was gone—

LS: Namely, Gobryas.

Mr. Reinken:
leaving a guide behind. And then the Medes came in, after they had delivered to the magi what the magi had directed them to set apart for the gods. (4.6.11)

LS: Who are the magi, by the way? This is perhaps not immediately clear.

Student: Persian priests.

LS: Persian priests. Now the Persian priests will of course also think above all of which country?

Student: Persia.

LS: Persia. So you see, his piety comes in very handy for the national interest. Ya?

Mr. Reinken:
And they had selected for Cyrus the most splendid tent and the lady of Susa, who was said to be the most beautiful woman in Asia, and two of the most accomplished music-girls; and afterward they had selected for Cyaxares the next best. They had also supplied themselves with such other things as they needed, so that they might continue the campaign in want of nothing— (4.6.11)

LS: But what about this distribution? Does this correspond to Cyrus's command?

Mr. Reinken: There's been a bonus, probably.

LS: Pardon?

Student: The change that has been made is to recognize that Cyaxares is the next best person—

LS: Yes, you only have to compare chapter 5, paragraph 51. Cyrus didn't say that he should get a better share than Cyaxares, Cyaxares should get it. But then why do they change, why are they so disobedient that they give Cyrus the best and Cyaxares only the second best?

Student: One might say the distribution between rulers is now according to merit . . .

LS: But still should they not obey a clearly formulated command? What motivates them? The admiration for Cyrus, let us assume. Let us leave it at that. But should not Cyrus be very much concerned with strict obedience to his orders? We have heard, you know, how strict he was usually, but in this case of course not because it is a recognition on the part of the Medes that Cyrus is at the top and not Cyaxares. So in other words, disobedience conducive to Cyrus's authority is not disobedience. It is a simple but not unimportant question. Ya. And then follows the rest of the distribution. Yes, this is the substance at least of what I found of special importance. Mr. Warren?

Student: I would appreciate a summary of the book.[vii]

LS: Perhaps Mr. Reinken can.

Mr. Reinken: Before we went to general question, I looked back at 51, and Cyrus managed to give the instructions in a such way that does not wholly forbid the thing. He says: Choose for Cyaxares as you please.

LS: Ya, but still—

Mr. Reinken: He was very pleasantly surprised.

LS: All right, if you want; perhaps this is true. But this question, this gift to Cyrus provides a link with the sequel, because this beautiful woman will become the heroine in the sequel. Especially Cyrus's relation to her, which was absolutely unblameable, throws however a somewhat doubtful light on Cyrus. Now as for Mr. Boyan's question, how could one say that? Well, the big action of this book, I would say, is the creation of a cavalry force with all that entails, with the increasing power and independence of Persia and therewith of Cyrus himself, and we see the first inklings of a despotic regime. But [12]formally he is still the son of the king of Persia, the constitutional king. Well, and we see somewhat more clearly, and in other detail than we have seen before, the amazing coincidence of what philanthropy would dictate and what

[vii] Presumably book 4.

Cyrus's interest itself dictates. This is the maximum I could say in the way of a general summary.

Mr. Reinken: You might analyze the book as the acquisition of armies. If you were doing another literary analysis, it might be entertaining and instructive to compare the different ways and modes in which he acquires armies. We have one unsuccessful attempt by Cyaxares to reacquire his own army and the thoroughly different way Cyrus goes about getting an army. That army will probably be . . . Persia. Blandishments.

LS: But is it not true that it is a much more rewarding thing to be a subject of Cyrus than to be a subject of Cyaxares, from every point of view: military honors, booty? And you are treated like a human being, whereas this terrible tyrant is very nasty to his subjects. I mean, of course, [that] when we say this, we forget one thing, and that is law. Are they not legally obliged to prefer their king to Cyrus? That is a question of how far can legal obligation extend. I mean, a man can be legally obliged to be loyal to his king, [but] he cannot be obliged by any law to respect him. That is impossible. He can by law be prevented from saying in public what he thinks of him, or otherwise he will commit the crime of *lèse majesté*. But that can be done, but there is still a conflict, a possible conflict, between law and what is intrinsically sensible, between *nomos* and *physis*. That will come out in the sequel. So what we can look forward to now is this: How will the relation between Cyrus and Cyaxares develop? Because it must come to a head sooner or later. At one point it will become a matter of life and death for Cyaxares to assert his royal authority, however sunk in low pleasures he may be, in a very limited way. And then the other thing of course: How will the campaign against Assyria develop? This is a very large point, because Babylon is a terrific city, and Cyrus must prepare that properly and get a much larger number of desertions from the Assyrian king than he already has. And last but not least, Cyrus has special booty: that beautiful woman whose story will be told in the sequel. Yes, Mr. . . .

Student: . . . the other characters besides Cyrus and Cyaxares, namely, Cyrus's friends and fellow and subordinates, and we should watch out . . . of Chrysantas and everything he has done, do you see this as a development into the small circle that finally exists in the end, that could be compared to another famous man and his small circle of friends?

LS: Ya, but I believe—the question is only how far will this go into any details. The only thing I would say is this, that Tigranes, the crown prince of Armenia, who was a pupil of the Armenian Socrates, would seem to call for, from this point of view, a special . . . If we tried to translate that into intelligible language: Tigranes is an Armenian and then follows the king of Persia. Now what is Armenia and what is Persia? We must first translate this into intelligible language.

Student: Armenia is a fief of Media, which is—

LS: Ya, but I meant the walls. The people who were forbidden to rebuild the walls: Who were they?

Student: The Athenians.

LS: So in other words, he is the son of the king of Athens. Of course there is no king, the son of the *polis*, and who follows the king of Persia. And what is Persia?

Student: Sparta.

LS: And do you know of any Athenian, son of Athens, who followed Sparta?

Student: Xenophon.

LS: Xenophon. He was also a pupil of that sophist in Armenia. So in a way, Tigranes—this I believe one can say: Xenophon describes here in the story what would have happened if Agesilaus or the other Spartan leaders, Lysander and so forth, had not been low fools and antagonized the whole world, the whole Greek world, by their folly, and had had the wisdom of his Cyrus, they could have easily built up a Panhellenic empire even embracing Asia Minor, and this Greek conqueror could have had a fine advisor trained in the best school. But instead it never went beyond the Spartans giving him some nice estate with good hunting facilities in the western part of the Peloponnesus. Yes?

Student: I wanted to ask a question about the character of this young man, namely, that his father was first condemned by Cyrus to die . . .

LS: Sure, just as Sparta at the end of the Peloponnesian War was urged by the allies—especially the Thebans, if I remember well—to destroy Athens. Then the Spartans said: No, you never know how we may need these fellows, because there is still the Persian king around. And there was also a certain somewhat more noble feeling: gratitude at what Athens had done in the Persian War. I don't believe this was out of gratitude for Sophocles and Phidias. These things didn't play that role in politics in former times, you know, where cultural relations were such an important thing as they are in 1963. So to come back to our fairy tale: first the king of Persia saved the king of Armenia, and in a way Tigranes, i.e., Xenophon, had something to do with it. In a way. This is of course buried in complete mystery. What has happened is that Xenophon acquired a claim on Spartan gratitude, which took place later, in 401, and the Peloponnesian War ended in 404—you know, in 401 when he went with the younger Cyrus and brought the Greeks back. And this Greek army, mercenaries, were incorporated as it were into the Spartan army, and then Xenophon acquired some value to the Spartans for this reason. And he went so far as to fight on the wrong side, i.e., on the Spartan side, in the battle of Coronea about eight years later—or at least he was present in the enemy camp. But what he had done before, that is hard to say. You see, that must probably be understood in this way. There was in Athens a certain group of men, one could call it a party, and they had to do with the knights. The knights is of course cavalry, but that meant also the wealthy people, the most wealthy people. And Xenophon was such a knight. They were somehow opposed to the radical democracy, and probably also to any democracy. I wouldn't be surprised if Xenophon in his youth had something to do with that. And this party was on the whole favorable to Sparta—on the whole. They were surely opposed to the war against Sparta; and since the democracy went together with the navy, the whole naval power, commercial power of Athens, and this was connected with the anti-Spartan policy, this was very roughly the division of opinion. And Xenophon probably belonged to these people, just as Plato. You must not forget, the young Plato, when he was twenty, had great hopes on these

terrible fellows, Critias, Charmides and so on, who destroyed the democracy after the Peloponnesian War and with the help of the Spartans, the so-called Thirty Tyrants. But after a short while Plato turned away from them and gave it up. But these simple things were surely also in Xenophon.

And there is another man, a famous politician at that time, Theramenes,[viii] who was called a turncoat, because when the Whigs were in control he was a Tory and when the Tories were in control he was a Whig, you know, because he was a middle-of-the-roader, and when life is very tough then these people are in the worst position. He was killed by the Thirty Tyrants. Now Theramenes also was connected with Socrates. In brief, there were some connections. It is not so simple as some people who look at everything from the point of view of political history see it, but there were some sympathies between the Socratic circle and the antidemocratic circle. And this may very well have be the reason, there may have been an underlying reason for Socrates's condemnation. It was of course not the crime specified in the charge: the crime was simply impiety. But he may have been very unpopular, especially with the vocal democrats like Anytus and such people, and so this is somehow in the background. And they never spoke about it, because it was not easy to speak about these matters. This, I believe, is a delusion to believe it was—there was not a First Amendment in Athens, never forget that. Isocrates, who was also connected with Socrates, says somewhere that in 399, when Socrates was condemned to death, at this time philosophy lay absolutely low in Athens. In other words, no one dared to speak. And we have the report[13], a very detailed report of Thucydides, about what happened in 415 when these Hermae were mutilated and the other crimes committed, allegedly inspired by Alcibiades. There was a popular terror—a real terror, not what people say about Senator McCarthy.[ix] People were really killed in large numbers on mere suspicion of having had anything to do with that. So that is I think the reason why we know so relatively little about these things. What we hear, modern scholars have tried to fill these gaps by saying that these political cleavages did have something to do with that, but there may be more involved. And perhaps the *Education of Cyrus* gives us not specific facts which could be used in any court of law, but an indication: Xenophon, I mean a pupil of Socrates, who in fact helps his city, Athens, with the Spartans. That is a kind of symbolic presentation which is surely exaggerated, that as it were the Socratic circle should be responsible that the Spartans behave tolerably decently to the Athenians at the conclusion of the Peloponnesian War. But who can know—who can possibly know what went on in conversations between private individuals, some of whom might have been under the influence of Socrates, for all we know? At any rate, it is a thought which is, how shall I say, pleasing; to some people displeasing, but surely interesting to consider. Xenophon mentions only the fact that he was banished, exiled, legally. He does not give the reasons. So we don't know.

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[1] Deleted "What could—."
[2] Deleted "from this point of view Cyaxares this despicable fellow,."

[viii] *Hellenica*, books 1 and 2. See especially 2.3.23-56.
[ix] Senator Joseph McCarthy (R-WI) was chair of the Senate's Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations that in 1953 led a series of investigations into communist infiltration of the U. S. Government, particularly the State Department.

[3] Deleted “up to and then”
[4] Deleted "But even there—."
[5] Deleted “and people have”
[6] Deleted "Because do you believe—."
[7] Deleted "Now it is strictly—I mean."
[8] Deleted “so in other words, it is a kind”
[9] Deleted “something”
[10] Deleted “Athenian”
[11] Deleted “but this”
[12] Deleted “it is still”
[13] Deleted "about what happened."

Session 13: no date
***Cyropaedia* 5**

Leo Strauss: [In progress] —[i]In other words, this obnoxious term, "manipulating men," is avoided. That was a very good paper,[ii] and I have very little to add so far as the paper is concerned. But there was one point of which I was reminded by your paper, I had not thought of that before. You started from the very beginning from the overall question that here we learn how to become a ruler, the art of ruling men, and Xenophon's statement that three things were required: the origin, the nature, and the education. Now the education is of course in a way not Cyrus's peculiar education. After all, all Persians got the Persian part of the education, and all Medes got the Median part of the education, but perhaps the mixture of the two is something rare. That would be a partial explanation.

Now as for the nature of Cyrus, this is taken for granted, that he surpassed by nature everyone. But still would this natural superiority have been sufficient? You must admit that however much we may admire Cyrus's natural gifts, he had a head start, being the son of the king of Persia and the grandson of the king of Media. You know? He had more than equality of opportunity. Now the interesting form of the question, if one wants to present this issue: the man who has no start whatever. An underdog becoming the ruler would be a much more interesting case. I know only of one great work in which issue is discussed, and this Aristophanes's *Knights*, where someone coming from the gutter—well, the problem has a certain similarity with that of Hitler in our century. The upper class people are threatened by the *demos*, by a terrible demagogue, and then they try to pick the worst demagogue of the demagogues to set him on Cleon. And this is the sausage-monger whom they discover. And he proves to be superior to Cleon in all [the] low demagogic arts. He is as good or better at calumniation, at calumny, than Cleon. And in addition, he can also fist fight. He beats Cleon. And now a very strange thing happens, and this is the apparent absurdity of the play. This fellow becomes the demagogue, the successor to Cleon, and he proves to be a most excellent man. He cannot be used by the upper class people who had found him. They are out. And the secret of the thing is he is a natural ruler, lacking all graces of breeding. He is by nature a ruler not only in that he is intelligent but he doesn't wish to rule. He is forced, somehow persuaded, to do that, and he is a good-natured fellow. He is not interested in ruling but this also is, as you know, according to Plato one of the proofs of the true ruler. This is a quite remarkable comedy which I think one should consider in this connection. However, to come back to Cyrus, we must not forget that in a fair judgment on Cyrus. But still his nature is quite remarkable. And there was a point in your paper—I don't remember where I made the note. You may have said Cyrus is not jealous of others, as this Assyrian is, the Assyrian king. Yes, but what is the answer to that?

Student: Cyrus doesn't have to be jealous.

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[i] The transcript of this session is based on the original transcript.
[ii] Strauss responds to a student's paper, read at the beginning of the session. The reading was not recorded.

LS: Yes, that's it. In other words, the natural ruler, surely, if he is a single man would not have to be jealous of anyone; but in addition, [there is] the head start which Cyrus has. So in the language which Xenophon has employed, Cyrus is favored by the gods. The head start belongs to that, something he doesn't owe to his own exertion and which cannot be understood in terms of his own nature. I was frequently reminded, of course, in what you said, as also in earlier papers, of the famous saying of Talleyrand, when Napoleon committed perhaps his greatest crime, having taken the duc d'Orleans from foreign territory and having him shot on French soil. And everyone was shocked by this breach of international law and everything else, and Talleyrand, who was not given to moral indignation, to say the least, said: "This is worse than a crime, it is a mistake."[iii] And this happens here all the time, that these people commit mistakes by their criminal action. Now you[1] rightly stressed the fact that Cyrus preserves the appearance of legality all the time and that this is part of the secret of his success, because hitherto the Medes are attracted to him only by voluntary submission. There is no question of a legal obligation of any kind. The legal obligation exists very indirectly only via their own king. So it is of some importance for him to preserve it.

Now this is important for the question which we must never forget, namely the difference between Cyrus and the tyrant. This great question is somehow concealed by the Jane Austenian character of Xenophon's presentation, namely, this wonderful Cyrus who smiles all the time, and everyone smiles and so on. But there are of course very hard facts behind it. But if we analyze it, then one would see the tyrant is an illegal ruler. There is no appearance of legality. This however is not mere cleverness, it is also good. Whatever Cyrus intends, it is simply good, because some bonds, very important bonds for the society as a whole, are not severed brutally, with infinite consequences. You have it in English history, I think, very clearly, when you come to compare Cromwell with William of Orange.[iv] Cromwell's rule was usurpation; William of Orange, that was at least formally legal. That meant there was a possibility of a settlement under William, there was no possibility of a settlement under Cromwell. But there are many other historical parallels which come to mind, for instance, in the relation between Cyrus and his uncle, the relation between Bismarck and the then Prussian king William I.[v] It is amazing. William I was not a man who was eager to have women who were not his right, and all the time he was a very stern, ascetic, austere Prussian. But this problem of knowing that all his greatness was due to Bismarck and not to him, and he got the big honors—he became emperor. That was some difficulty for this very honorable man, but he faced it really honorably. He knew what Bismarck was, but he had to fight something down, there is no question, especially since there was also an Empress around. Good. Now let us then . . . Mr. ___?

Student: I was reminded of a broader sense of this question of legality, would be the modern problem, when social change comes about if it comes about in a revolutionary context, very

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[iii] Frequently misattributed to Talleyrand, this quote comes either from Antoine Boulay de la Meurthe, legislative deputy from Meurthe (according to the Oxford Dictionary of Quotations) or Joseph Fouché, Napoleon's chief of police (according to John Bartlett, *Familiar Quotations*, 10th ed. [1919]).

[iv] Thomas Cromwell (1599-1658), Protestant civil war commander and Lord Protector of the commonwealth of England, Scotland, and Ireland, 1653-58. William of Orange (1650-1702), Dutch-born King of England, Ireland, and Scotland, 1689-1702.

[v] Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898), Prussian statesman. William I (1797-1888), King of Prussia and then first German emperor, 1861-1888.

often thereafter[2] problems do not seem really to have been solved. There are still fundamental differences involved in the postrevolutionary society. Think of France.

LS: In other words, what you call social change: I didn't know what that word means. You mean revolution?

Student: Yes.

LS: I see.

Student: When they all come to a head and try to establish a new legality. By then society takes up one problem at a time, content to solve them along the way.

LS: Well, these are those words which are so much in use, and one doesn't know what they mean. But is not in every revolution the question that there is a kind, a new principle of legality, or perhaps one should say of legitimacy? But the old principle is also there and doesn't die with the moment of the revolution. And the classic example is in this, as in many other cases, France, where the conflict of the two legitimacies I think has not been resolved (if it has been resolved) before de Gaulle. You know, the fight [that] was going on almost undermined the Third Republic more than once, and reasserted itself in a way under Pétain. You know, the ideological leader[3] [Charles Maurras],[vi] a royalist, made a complete peace with Hitler, going much beyond Pétain himself. And then de Gaulle having the double legitimacy: *la France Libre* in the Second World War, and an officer and surely linked up with the French monarchy. So he seems to have been the first who in a way brings about a reconciliation of the two legitimacies which had been at loggerheads since 1789. In Russia it doesn't exist, apparently, because they were much more successful—obviously much more successful; there is no question that the old principle of legitimacy may very well survive and create great difficulties. In Germany it was quite obvious that the old regime was much stronger, the monarchic than the democratic one.

Student: My only point related to this is the desirability of preserving the continuity of the legality.

LS: I see. Yes, sure. That is absolutely clear, and it was done classically in 1688 in England. And one should still read this most beautiful commentary written by Macaulay.[vii] He shows very well that this was of course not simply preserved, the continuity, but to some extent. And what he said about it should be a part of every sensible introduction to political science, which exists because it is really a wonderful analysis. He describes it roughly in these terms. It consists of a syllogism: the major did not jibe with the minor, and the conclusion didn't follow from the two premises, and yet the major got two hundred votes, the minor two hundred other votes, and the conclusion two hundred other votes. And that is a political settlement as distinguished from a logical settlement. But still somehow the British preserved that, but it lasted nonetheless until 1745 in

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[vi]The original transcriber left the name blank. Strauss might be referring to Charles Maurras of "Action Française."

[vii] Thomas Babington Macaulay, *The History of England: From the Accession of James II* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1856), vol. 2, chap. 10.

England, the second Pretender. Only at that time did the British achieve what we call so nicely the "consensus," fundamental agreement. But if one means by consensus this consensus regarding the fundamental legitimacy, then of course it is very important, not consensus regarding particular measures. I mean, for example, as in this country I believe there is consensus regarding the Constitution plus the Amendments, although not necessarily regarding every interpretation by the Supreme Court for the time being. That is only in the long run a matter of consensus.

Let us then turn to the fifth book. At the beginning of the fifth book we see that Cyrus's friend, a friend who is a lover of the Muses, asks for one of these singing girls, and Cyrus is very happy to oblige him because Cyrus has no use for such girls. Because—what is the reasoning, why does he have no use for them? He is not a friend of the Muses. Surely that is not explicitly said, but perhaps the sequel will prove it. The sequel is a discussion of *eros*. And here Cyrus's view about *eros* may imply this negative view about the Muses, if we assume that there is a certain harmony between *eros* and the Muses, which makes sense even today if you remember that that form of writing which has taken the place of much of the poetry of former times, the novel, *roman*, was primarily love stories. We sometimes still say: "This was a romantic affair," so that is so. This young Mede, Araspas, has a certain difficulty which is stated in paragraph 2 to 3. Let us read that. "Cyrus calls to him Araspas."

Reader:
Then Cyrus called to him Araspas, a Mede, who had been his friend from boyhood—the same one to whom he had given his Median robe when he laid it off as he was returning from Astyages's court to Persia—and bade him keep for him both the lady and the tent. Now this woman was the wife of Abradatas of Susa; and when the Assyrian camp was taken, her husband happened not to be there, having gone on an embassy to the king of Bactria; for the Assyrian king had sent him thither to negotiate an alliance, because he chanced to be a guest-friend of the Bactrian king. (5.1.2-3)

LS: Now does this remind you of something, this particular story about the woman of Susa's husband? She was caught, taken prisoner, in her husband's absence. Who was taken prisoner in her husband's absence, here in the book? Whose wife was captured in the absence of her husband? Tigranes's wife. Tigranes-Xenophon.[viii] She was taken. So this may be of some importance, that there is a certain parallel. So this young man, because of his youth, is supposed to be particularly exposed to the attractions of beauty, is to be her guardian and he is absolutely impressed by her, not because of her beauty, but also because of her virtue, grace, and everything else. And this leads to a difficulty. Let us read paragraph 7 to 8.

Reader:
"And then we had vision of most of her face—"

LS: Well, in other words, she was veiled, and they could only see her size and her figure, but now they see her face.

[viii] In original transcript: "Tigranes-dash-Xenophon."

Reader:
"and vision of her neck and arms. And let me tell you, Cyrus," said he, "it seemed to me, as it did to all the rest who saw her, that there never was so beautiful a woman of mortal birth in Asia. But," he added, "you must by all means see her for yourself."

"No, by Zeus," said Cyrus; "and all the less, if she is as beautiful as you say."

"Why so?" asked the young man.

"Because," said he, "if now I have heard from you that she is beautiful and am inclined just by your account of her to go and gaze on her, when I have no time to spare, I am afraid that she will herself much more readily persuade me to come again to gaze on her. And in consequence of that I might sit there, in neglect of my duties, idly gazing upon her." (5.1.7-8)

LS: There is a parallel to that, which Mr. ____ surely knows and will tell us.

Student: Socrates goes to see Theodote.

LS: Yes, there was a beautiful woman in Athens one day of unspeakable beauty, they say, beauty beyond description. And then Socrates says: Well, if it cannot be described, we must go to have a look at that, if she is beyond description. And so they went, and Socrates had a long conversation with her and even gave her advice of a very strange kind, namely, how she could catch men. And she proved to be very inexpert in what one would think would have been—I suspect because she was a woman of loose manners, not like Panthea here. So that is crucial.

Cyrus, in contradistinction to Socrates, has no time for looking at beautiful things, and he is even afraid of looking at beautiful things. This is the connection with his lack of interest in the Muses. Cyrus is unerotic, just as he is amusic. On the other hand, however, he has a characteristic which is not necessarily incompatible with that but which is surely different from it. There is an object at which Cyrus likes to look: corpses. You see how good it is if things are properly translated, the same terms always used? He likes to look at corpses. Now what in man—I mean, if it is *eros* which inclines men to look at the beautiful things, what power of the soul induces men to look at corpses? On the basis of an old-fashioned psychology which is—

Student: Cruelty?

LS: Cruelty is only one particular form of it. It has a broader range, as *eros* has a broader range.

Student: The beastly-like part of the soul?

LS: But *eros* has also its bestial depths.

Student: *Thymos*. Spiritedness.

LS: *Thymos*, in Plato's psychology. Spiritedness: love for superiority, victory, killing. Yes, that is indeed the case. In Cyrus *eros* is sacrificed to *thymos*. He is a conqueror. We have seen other parallels with Plato's *Republic*, and we should also keep this in mind. But we cannot of course leave it at this fact merely, that Xenophon makes such a suggestion. We must raise the question why must this be so: Why must the perfect ruler, as Cyrus is presented here, be unerotic? This assertion that the perfect ruler must be unerotic is confirmed by an apparent refutation. You remember the Hiero, the tyrant. He is concerned above everything else with *eros*, and he is an imperfect ruler, so that confirms it. But what is the peculiarity of *eros* which makes it in principle incompatible with statesmanship? Of course that must be judiciously understood. There have been very great statesmen who have been very good husbands and so on, but here the problem is understood very radically. What is the fundamental thing? What is the characteristic of *eros* which is really in tension with the statesman's function? Yes?

Student: [. . .]

LS: In other words, you confirm what Xenophon says. Augustus could not be bewitched by Cleopatra, and the battle at Actium, the naval battle, was the payoff for this adventure. But to come back to the central point: Why is that so? What is the characteristic of *eros*?

Student: *Eros* concentrates on one individual.

LS: Yes. So the individual, the particular, is distinguished from and opposed to the common, the whole. I think that is true. And I think the following discussion turns exactly around this subject. Let us read paragraph 9 to 11.

Reader:
"Why Cyrus," said the young man breaking into a laugh—

LS: We should have complete statistics of all the laughings explicitly mentioned here, and contrasting with the other works of Xenophon.

Reader:
"you do not think, do you, that human beauty is able to compel a man against his will to act contrary to his own best interests? Why," said he, "if that were a law of nature—" (5.1.9)

LS: "If this were so by nature, it would compel all alike."

Reader:
"Do you observe," said he, "how fire burns all alike? That is its nature."

LS: "For this is natural." In other words, what is natural affects all equally.

Reader:
"But of beautiful things we love some and some we do not; and one loves one, another another; for it is a matter of free will, and each one loves what he pleases. For example, a brother does not fall in love with his sister, but somebody else falls in love with her; neither does a father fall in

love with his daughter, but somebody else does; for fear of God and the law of the land are sufficient to prevent such love." (5.1.10)

LS: "Of the land" is his addition. He tries to improve on Xenophon. We don't know which law. Maybe it is the divine law which he means.

Reader:
"But," he went on, "if a law should be passed forbidding those who did not eat to be hungry, those who did not drink to be thirsty, forbidding people to be cold in winter or hot in summer, no such law could ever bring men to obey its provisions, for they are so constituted by nature as to be subject to the control of such circumstances." (5.1.11)

LS: Not "such circumstances," "such things," heat, cold, and so on.

Reader:
"But love is a matter of free will; at any rate, every one loves what suits his taste, as he does his clothes or shoes." (5.1.11)

LS: Those things which belong to him somehow,[4] [*heautou*], as clothes and shoes. Araspas is not afraid of that beauty because love, falling in love, is strictly a matter of will: you may or may not fall. He is a good man, and therefore he will not fall in love. It is not a matter of natural necessity, for in the first place, not all men love the same, and if love were natural all men would love the same. And second, loving can be forbidden by law, whereas being hungry cannot be forbidden by law. So it is not strictly speaking natural, but voluntary. Even more than that, *eros* can be completely according to law. Everyone loves what belongs to him, or at least he tends to that, his lawful property. One can avoid falling in love with another man's wife or with one's own sister as simply as one can avoid stealing. *Eros* is no danger at all. This is the view of this sanguine and amiable young man. But of course the argument is not exhausted, is it? I mean, there are certain difficulties which he overlooks probably only through lack of experience. He hasn't read the right literature, literature being the chief source of information, as you know. What are the differences? Let us take the example of hunger and thirst. What is the difference, taking a very broad view of the matter? Well, I think we all know that man cannot live without eating and drinking. Even Gandhi could do this only within certain narrow limits. But man can live without sexual activity, as has been proven more than once. To that extent, *eros* differs from the other things and can be said to be voluntary. A man can take a vow not to have any sexual activity and can do it. This is a matter of experience.

That is one point. The other point to which he refers, which has nothing to do with that, is that *eros* is, as they say, *ad hanc*, toward this woman; or in the case of certain vagrant people, to this, and this, and this, but surely not to all, whereas desire for food and drink does not have this character. The man may be very choosy, but if he is very hungry he stops being choosy. Now there is one distinction which must be made, of course, and that is *eros* on the one hand, and the passions; and on the other hand the actions following from that. It may be true that no one is compelled by erotic desire to commit actions in accordance with it. But the falling in love itself can hardly be said to be voluntary. Even incestuous love occurs on the part of very lawabiding

people who did not act on this. And if this is not believed, then you know in our age of Sigmund Freud, that this is grade school knowledge.

Now how does Cyrus then reply to this remark in the next paragraph?

Reader:
"How then, pray," said Cyrus, "if falling in love is a matter of free will, is it not possible for any one to stop whenever he pleases? But I have seen people in tears of sorrow because of love and in slavery to the objects of their love, even though they believed before they fell in love that slavery is a great evil; I have seen them give those objects of their love many things that they could ill afford to part with; and I have seen people praying to be delivered from love just as from any other disease, and, for all that, unable to be delivered from it, but fettered by a stronger necessity than if they had been fettered with shackles of iron. At any rate, they surrender themselves to those they love to perform for them many services blindly. And yet, in spite of all their misery, they do not attempt to run away, but even watch their darlings to keep them from running away." (5.1.12)

LS: Yes. What then does Cyrus say, in a nutshell? *Eros* is much more powerful than you, young man, think. Good. He doesn't enter into the details, he only says this is a fact. Even granting you are right, that it depends on one's will whether one falls in love or not, to stop it afterwards is surely not such an easy thing, as is proven by experience. But he makes a point which is characteristic of Cyrus. Why is he averse to falling in love?

Student: He doesn't want to give his things away uncalculatingly.

LS: Yes, but more specifically, he doesn't want to be subject to anyone. He wants to rule. And if he wishes to rule and never be subject to anyone, then he must never fall victim to this curse.

Araspas continues his argument in the sequel. He restates his formula, but he only brings out what he meant from the very beginning: *eros* has this dangerous power over low-class people; it cannot happen to a perfect gentleman, and since he is a perfect gentleman everything is fine. Let us only read paragraph 17.

Student: May I ask about one sentence?

LS: Sure. Where?

Student: Paragraph 13. "And this same sort attempt also to steal and do not keep their hands off other people's property." This describes Cyrus.

LS: Well, you mean that if you take it in a deeper sense, even Cyrus—

Student: He hasn't kept his hands off other peoples' property.

LS: But you see, that is always a question. I agree with your point. But this is the famous subject of the Sermon on the Mount,[ix] as you know. In one sense it is very easy not to do, very easy. In another sense it is almost impossible. So this is a problem. As a practical man, Cyrus of course takes a practical view, the crude view. He doesn't steal; he doesn't go into another man's tent and take some gold home—but to take from the enemy in war, that is an entirely different thing. We have seen this in chapter 6 of the first book. The dark case is the case of his uncle (we come to that later), where he in a way takes away what belongs to the uncle and yet leaves the feeling he is a perfectly just man. Let us read only paragraph 17.

Reader:
"Never fear, Cyrus," said he, "even if I never cease to look upon her, I shall never be so overcome as to do anything that I ought not. Your professions," said he, "are most excellent. Keep her then, as I bid you, and take good care of her; for this lady may perhaps be of very great service to us when the time comes." (5.1.17)

LS: In other words, for Cyrus she is merely an object on the chessboard. He knows that she is well-connected, and that can come in handy in the future. Now in the sequel he describes in paragraph 19 to 23 Cyrus's wooing away the Medians from Cyaxares, and that he does with unblameable correctitude. Well, we are already familiar with the subject, although there is something in it which we have not observed. Yes?

Student: It turned out Araspas falls in love.

LS: That is true, but on the other hand, we could almost have promised that this would happen if a man is so cocksure. But you are quite right. We should mention it. But the whole story of Panthea will come up in the sixth book, and then we will go into this in more detail. In paragraph 24, let us read that. So what was his precise proposal to the Medes in this speech? Do you remember, Mr. ____, whether they should go on with the war, or what was this?

Student: [. . .]

LS: Let us read paragraph 24. We will find out.

Reader:
Thus he spoke. And the first one to reply was the man who had once upon a time claimed to be a kinsman of Cyrus.

LS: Do you remember who that was? He was in love with Cyrus's youthful beauty. Yes?

Reader:
"For my part, O my king—"

LS: He calls him *king*. Cyrus was of course not king at that time in any way. This has not happened before. Yes?

[ix] Matthew 5-7.

Reader:
"For to me you seem to be a born king—"

LS: "A king by nature." Let us be quite literal.

Reader:
"no less than is the sovereign of the bees in a hive." (5.1.24)

LS: Why does he say "sovereign?" All right, go on.

Reader:
"For as the bees always willingly obey the queen-bee and not one of them deserts the place where she stays; and as not one fails to follow her if she goes anywhere else—so marvellous a yearning to be ruled by her is innate to them; so also do men seem to me to be drawn by something like the same sort of instinct toward you." (5.1.24-25)

LS: Not "instinct"; *eros*, such a mighty *eros*. Cyrus is a king by nature, and this means of course here very clearly in the circumstances not by law, not by convention. The translation doesn't bring it out because regarding the ruler in a beehive, he speaks of the "leader," and that is in Greek a masculine word, *hēgemōn*, and he uses therefore always the masculine. He obscures the fact that the beehive is ruled by a queen, as we know from the *Oeconomicus* if we have no apiary knowledge of our own. What is the characteristic of a beehive? What is the meaning of this somewhat inept comparison, as we see here? Yes?

Student: The drones are all equal.

LS: But there are other worker bees apart from the drones. But the main point is this, I believe: he transforms the queen bee into a kind of king bee, and by this transformation he suggests that the subjects of the king are women. Now this makes sense, doesn't it, that the subjects of an absolute king, of a despot or tyrant, are not really men? That has been said more than once. There is a reference to that somewhere in the *Hiero*, when the virtues of the tyrant's subjects are described. The quality of courage or manliness is limited merely to war. Civic courage is of course impossible under a tyrant. Yes?

Student: [. . .]

LS: This comparison is of course very common, but here of course it comes in very beautifully: like women, the subjects of the king are filled with *eros* for him. He is an *hombre par excellence*. The subjects at any rate are prompted by *eros*, and this is again important in view of the preceding discussion. There is no *eros* of Cyrus[5] [for] the subjects; it is a one-way street. In paragraph 26, in the same speech, the Mede also says, points out that they are afraid to go back to Media without Cyrus, because in Media they will be subject to Cyaxares, the legal ruler, and they would be punished for their disloyalty to him by having been so much enamored of Cyrus. Now let us first read paragraph 28 now. You had a question?

Student: At the end of that Median speech,[6] "But as for me, Cyrus, I, with the men whom I command, will remain with you and endure the sight of you and tolerate your goodness to us."

LS: Sure. "Will show endurance in being benefited by you." In other words, this is somewhat jocular. It is easy to show endurance in getting all kinds of candies. That's the joke. It is just wonderful to be with Cyrus. Good. Now let us turn to paragraph 28.

Reader:
"Well, Medes," said the Hyrcanian king, "if you should go away now, I should say that it was the plot of the evil one—"

LS: "Evil one" of course that would be in a Christian context. "Of some demon."

Reader:
"of some demon to prevent your becoming exceedingly blest. For, in all common sense, who would turn away from the enemy when they are in flight, or refuse to take their arms when they surrender them, or their persons and property when they offer them—especially under such a leader as we have? For, I swear to you by all the gods, he seems to me happier in doing us kindnesses than in enriching himself." (5.1.28)

LS: So he is just wonderful. So this was the Median view and the Hyrcanian view. The Persians of course are in favor of it, because they are the favorites of Cyrus anyway. Now in the middle there is a very brief statement of a man of special importance, Tigranes. Let us read paragraph 27 now.

Reader:
Following him, Tigranes spoke as follows: "Cyrus," said he, "you need never be surprised when I fail to speak."

LS: "When I am silent." Why not be simply literal?

Reader:
"For my mind has been disciplined not to offer counsel but to do what you command." (5.1.27)

LS: "My soul is prepared not as going to counsel, but as going to do whatever you command." So this is Tigranes. You must never forget how important a man that is. You remember the link between Cyrus and Socrates? Now what does he say? He is silent, so we don't know what he thinks. He obeys Cyrus. But you can obey on any number of grounds, so the fact of obedience doesn't tell you anything about the grounds of obedience. *He* does not say that Cyrus is the natural ruler or that he is filled with *eros* for Cyrus. No. We don't know why. Well, we know to some extent: he knows that if he would not follow Cyrus, his poor father and nation would terribly suffer from it, which is a good enough reason. That is I think the point. Now that his love for Cyrus doesn't exist I think is clearly shown, if we turn back for one moment to 3.1.41. "When they have come home." Do you have that? Read it.

Reader:

And when they got home they talked, one of[1] Cyrus's wisdom, another of his strength, another of his gentleness, and still another of his beauty and his commanding presence. Then Tigranes asked his wife: "Tell me, my Armenian princess," said he, "did you, too, think Cyrus handsome?"
"'Why, by Zeus," said she, "I did not look at him."
"At whom, then?" asked Tigranes.
"At him, by Zeus, who said that he would give his life to keep me from servitude." (3.1.41)

LS: I.e., at Tigranes. In other words, if any inference is possible from Tigranes's wife to Tigranes, they were not so full of admiration for Cyrus. They were concerned with other things. And I think this applies to our Tigranes here too. Yes?

Student: [. . .]

LS: But that is exactly the point. Is Cyrus such a perfect ruler? That is the same question. Is Cyrus wise? That is a question for Tigranes, to put it mildly, and therefore he is silent. He does everything and there is no alternative for him, but not on the grounds of these other people who are so fully convinced that it is right. Now in paragraph 30 we get a notion, a general notion of where we stand now.

Reader:
Thereupon he commanded the rest to station guards and after that to do for themselves whatever they pleased; and the Persians he bade divide the tents among themselves—to the cavalry the ones appropriate to their use and to the infantry such as sufficed for their needs—

LS: That is very neatly distinguished. "To the knights the tents becoming to them, and to the foot soldiers the tents sufficient for them." That is the new hierarchy, as we know; we saw that last time.

Reader:
and to arrange matters so that the commissaries in the tents should do all that was required of them, prepare everything necessary, and carry it to the quarters of the Persians, and have their horses groomed and fed, and that the Persians should have no duty other than to practise the arts of war. (5.1.30)

LS: So in other words, a hierarchically ordered empire: Cyrus absolutely at the top, and then come the Persians. And the Persians are distinguished into two parts, cavalry and infantry. The cavalry is higher. And then the subject nations, who, however, believe they are not subject. This is the situation.

Now in chapter 2, to which we turn now, Cyrus is marching or walking with Gobryas, the man who had defected from the Assyrian king to Cyrus. And we see Cyrus behaves sensibly: he is very cautious. He doesn't know whether he can trust that traitor. That is always a great question when you commit treason. But it comes out that he can trust him very well. Yes?

Student: Just one question before we leave the speech by the Mede who pretended once to be Cyrus's kinsman. The very fact that Xenophon reminds us of that again, wouldn't [that] put his speech in a certain light? This man who would lie about kinship which is a very obvious thing, about [a] blood relationship in order to get a kiss from Cyrus, couldn't this be considered questionable here?

LS: No. He simply was in love with Cyrus. Well, if you develop that fully—but I do not know whether we have a right to do that here. After all, such erotic relations are not supposed to take place between near kin. Would you go so far as to say this is a kind of incipient incest, normally speaking?

Student: It is very hard to understand.

LS: I have nothing against that. I have not watched or have not collected all the materials about this man, because sometimes he is mentioned by name and sometimes he is mentioned in this indirect circumlocutory manner. What does that mean? I do not know, and that is the reason why I am hesitant. The question which you raise is absolutely necessary to raise, one must do that. I am sure Xenophon was careful and did not do these things merely to vary expressions. Mr. ____, you wanted to say something?

Student: I just wondered, is it absolutely certain there was no kin? It is not clear Cyrus did not see through him.

LS: Cyrus was absolutely untouched by it. Only a man one can easily control. That is clear. But one thing is clear: I think it illustrates again the unerotic character of Cyrus which goes through the book.

Student: He was slightly touched, was he not?

LS: We find Cyrus touched many more times. We will even see him crying. But the question is whether these are not all beautifully timed. Yes?

Student: [. . .]

LS: I don't remember this passage, but I know the emphasis in book 1 on the fact that Cyrus has, as he put it, "loving affection" [*philostrogia*]. That of course has a double meaning: love to give affection, and loving to receive affection. This is the ambiguity. But we know now more about Cyrus's character than we knew at the beginning, when we saw this wonderfully charming boy who charmed especially his grandfather. We are beyond that stage. We must take that into consideration.

Student: Would you say then that it is an open question as to whether Cyrus—whether *eros* is completely absent or love of beauty completely absent from Cyrus, or on the other hand there is just self-restraint?

LS: Well, his most intimate and dedicated follower, Chrysantas, says of him in the eighth book: "You are cold." Cool. Cyrus's life and passion is ambition.

Student: [. . .]

LS: What does beauty mean? You see, when Pericles says in the famous Funeral Speech, "We Athenians love beauty," what does he mean by that? Most present-day readers think of Phidias the sculptor, and tragedy and comedy, and all the other beauties of Athens. But it is at least as possible that he means "we Athenians are lovers of honor and glory." That is in Greek the same,[7] *to kalon,* the beautiful, fine, noble, resplendent. That doesn't necessarily mean love of art. That is very narrow.

Let us now turn then to his chapter 2, paragraph 9.

Reader:
And Gobryas, wondering what he meant and suspecting that he meant his daughter, asked—

LS: We must not forget Gobryas, an eminently wealthy man who has an eminently beautiful daughter. That is what is so nice about that book, everything is wonderful. There are no flaws. Or they are very wicked, like the Assyrian king. That is very deceptive, this simplicity of Xenophon. But we Persians are of course not impressed. We are sturdy mountain people, we are not impressed by this display. And now paragraph 9.

Reader:
"And what might that gift be, Cyrus?"
"'Gobryas," he replied, "it is this: I believe that there are many men who would not consent to be wicked or unjust or false—" (5.2.9)

LS: "False voluntarily." That is very easy to avoid the difficulties by omission.

Reader:
"voluntarily, but they die before it is ever discovered what sort of men they are, simply because no one has ever seen fit to entrust them with great wealth or kingly power—"

LS: "Tyranny." Whatever may be true of Greek poets, Xenophon surely makes a distinction between kingship and tyranny, and so we have to keep it.

Reader:
"or tyranny or mighty fortresses or lovely children; but you have now placed in my hands your fortress and all sorts of wealth, your forces—"

LS: "Your power." It is necessary here to be literal.

Reader:
"your power and your precious child—"

LS: "Daughter." That's beautiful, because first he had spoken of children worthy to be loved, and now he speaks of a daughter worthy to be acquired. That is nice. Good.

Reader:
"and have thus given me an opportunity of showing to all the world that I would not do an act of wickedness against a friend or do a wrong for the sake of gain or willingly prove false—" (5.2.9-10)

LS: "Voluntarily," yes. "Voluntarily lie regarding covenants," i.e., voluntarily break a covenant. Yes. Now true virtue comes to sight only when there are temptations, the first point which he makes, and with which I believe we can agree. True virtue includes not voluntarily to lie. In other words, true virtue is compatible with lying, but involuntary lying. Now what are involuntary lies?

Student: Lies made under necessity.

LS: Compulsory lies, in the first place. All right, but there are two kinds of compulsory lies. You must break it down.

Student: If you don't know the truth.

LS: Yes. That is the most compulsory lie. In other words, if you don't know the truth, then you are compelled to say the untruth. That is the same word in Greek, to say the untruth and to lie. The Greek word *pseudesthai* has both the objective and the subjective meaning, which "to lie" in English does not have. The objective meaning, to say the untruth; subjective meaning, you voluntarily say the untruth (middle). Now this is the most compulsory compulsion to lie. It is surely ignorance.

But there is another one, too. Think of the situation of the Armenian king. If Cyrus had [not] known all the facts, what would he have said to Cyrus? "I didn't do these things." In other words, a lie made in order to save one's life, for example, would also be another kind of compulsory lie. This we must consider. Now in the repetition, he changes that somewhat and says to lie regarding covenants, i.e., to break covenants. This is much more limited because a man may lie in many other ways without breaking covenants, but even here the qualification is made [that] under compulsion, he will of course break a covenant. And in the latter case it is not likely to be due to ignorance of the terms of the covenant but to a compulsion of another kind.

Student: Is there a third form of compulsion?

LS: Perhaps.

Student: Not to inform.

LS: Is this a lie? That is a somewhat moot question. If you refuse to answer, take the Fifth Amendment, that is not strictly speaking a lie. In certain circumstances it can be morally the same as a lie. For example, if someone treats you as if you were already a Ph.D, and he says

"Dr." all the time, and even makes you perhaps an offer of a very attractive job on this basis. And if you would not say: "I am not a Ph.D," in one sense you cannot be said to have lied: you never told him you were a Ph.D. But you must admit no court of law would recognize that. But I think for our main purposes we can leave it at these two kinds of compulsion.

Now we see here two enumerations which he makes. I will make this here [LS writes on the blackboard]: wealth, tyranny, fortresses, and children. The second is fortresses, wealth, power, daughter. This is of course a specification for the present case, children–daughter. Wealth is the same in both cases, fortresses is the same in both cases, and so we have left tyranny and power. And there is obviously a connection between tyranny and power, tyranny being the biggest power. Now the interesting thing Cyrus asserts here, as it were: You can't know what a man is before he has been exposed to the temptation of a tyranny in particular. Now he was not here in the relation with Gobryas exposed to the temptation of tyranny. The poor man couldn't make him a tyrant. So we don't know at all what Cyrus would do if he were exposed to this temptation. This is left to everybody's guess informed by the Xenophontic reports. What Cyrus would have done if he had not been the son of a king and had so many other head starts, and there would have been an opportunity to make himself a tyrant of his city—a man like Cyrus—is anybody's guess. It will depend on how we judge of his action towards his uncle. Now Cyrus of course is always a very practical man, and he uses the opportunity to question Gobryas and the Hyrcanian, former subjects of the Assyrian king, about the lay of the land with a view to the war against Assyria. Paragraph 23 and 24 are of some interest.

Reader:
So he called Gobryas and the Hyrcanian king to him, for he supposed that they must know best what he thought he needed to learn, and said: "My dear friends, I think that I should be making no mistake to consult with you in regard to this war and to rely upon your trustworthiness. For I observe that you have greater need than I to see to it that the Assyrian shall not get the upper hand of us—"

LS: He lays it thick.

Reader:
"if I am unsuccessful in this, I shall, perhaps, find some other place of refuge; whereas in your case, I see that if he gains the upper hand, all that you have passes into other hands." (5.2.23)

LS: I mean, he does not have to rely entirely on the others' honesty. They are compelled to be honest to Cyrus. Yes?

Reader:
"For, as for me, he is my enemy, not because he hates me, but because he imagines that it would be inimical to his interests for our nation to become great, and for that reason he is making war upon us; but you he actually hates, for he thinks that you have done him wrong." (5.2.24)

LS: Well, "done him wrong," "you have acted unjustly against him." That is all we need for our purpose. The Assyrian king thinks that these subjects of his have acted unjustly, have broken a kind of covenant. Were they compelled to do so? Long question. At any rate, Cyrus does not go

into that question, because it is not in his interest to go into that. He is benefited by these other people's injustice, if it is injustice. But we can bet that if there were a clear case of unprovoked treason in the enemy camp, Cyrus would of course make the fullest use of it. Or do you have any doubt, Mr. ____?

Student: No.

LS: No. You see, that is also a very interesting question. Is it just for a ruler to profit from the injustice, for example, of his enemy's subjects? It is an interesting question. But these delicate questions do not arise for a man like Cyrus and he would not for one moment be deterred by them. Now Cyrus proposes immediate advance on Babylon to exploit the terror of the Assyrians. And here in paragraph 32 to 34, which we cannot read, there is a very clear statement about "mass psychology," so that numbers, which are so important an element of military strength, can also become an element of great military weakness if panic arises. This is very beautifully and forcefully stated. We do not have the time to read it.

In the next chapter there is also one of these little questions which we cannot answer. Cyrus makes a brief speech to the commanders, and in paragraph 3 one of them said the following things. We would have to consider in a thorough discussion why just "someone," why he is not identified. I mention this only in passing. No, this speech is really interesting. Let us read that. Paragraph 3.

Reader:
When they heard this they all signified their approval and applauded the proposition; and one of them also spoke as follows: "By all means, Cyrus," said he, "let us do that. And it would be a good stroke of policy, too; for it seems to me that Gobryas regards us as no better than a lot of beggars because we have not come here with our pockets full of darics and because we do not drink from golden goblets. And if we do this, then he would realize that it is possible for men to be gentlemen, even without gold." (5.3.3)

LS: Literally, "free men," "liberal men without gold." Does this ring a bell?

Student: Socrates and the horse.

LS: In the *Oeconomicus*. A horse can be good without possessing money, from which Socrates draws the conclusion that maybe a man can be good without possessing money. So that is the reason why I observe this little point. Perhaps this is what Tigranes says.

Student: I believe there is an anachronism in the speech. It was the successor of Cyrus the elder who first started coining darics, Darius, wasn't it?

LS: Who cares for historical truth in this book?

Student: It might be a deliberate anachronism.

LS: I don't know that yet. But I think the anachronism is much more fundamental because, as they say, it is a historical romance. I would not worry about that, if I were you. By the way, I regard it as possible for reasons which I am not yet free to disclose that it may not be Tigranes, the link between Cyrus and Socrates, but Chrysantas. You know, the top man. His name consists partly of the word "gold." *Chrysantos*—[*chrusos*]. But I have more serious reasons than the name. But let us resume. Paragraph 31 in the same chapter, from a speech of Cyrus.

Reader:
"So now, my men, it seems to me that we should be doing what is fair, if we gave Gadatas, our benefactor, our heartiest assistance; and at the same time we should be doing only what is right in paying a debt of gratitude. But apart from that, it seems to me that we should be gaining an advantage for ourselves." (5.3.31)

LS: Let us stop here. Here a distinction is made which is very well known, but one cannot be reminded of it often enough. The noble: "it would be something noble if we helped Gadatas, a man who is our benefactor, and at the same time we would do the just thing—as distinguished from the noble—by paying back a debt of gratitude. But it would also be expedient for we would act for ourselves."[x] These are three different considerations—the distinction between the expedient and the moral we all know, but the thing with which we are not so familiar because it does not have a clear linguistic expression in the modern languages is the distinction between the noble and the just. What we call the moral is called by the Greeks the noble and the just, the just being what you are obliged to do, and the noble is what is beyond the call of duty. The simplest example: to pay debts is just, not a noble action. Good. And to be sent to live for ten years in jail: it is a just action not to try to break out. No one would call it a noble action. Good. In the sequel these three points will be repeated in inverse order. We cannot go into that now.

In the sequel, paragraph 38 following, the order of the march is described. There are eleven commanders mentioned by name. I have not been able to find anything which is revealing, which doesn't mean that it is not in it. In paragraph 46 following, there comes a passage which Mr. ____ has discussed. I think we should nevertheless read it. Paragraphs 46 to 50.

Reader:
Hereupon they went to their tents, and, as they went, they remarked to one another what a good memory Cyrus had and how he called every one by name as he assigned them their places and gave them their instructions. Now Cyrus made a study of this; for he thought it passing strange that, while every mechanic knows the names of the tools of his trade and the physician knows the names of all the instruments and medicines he uses, the general should be so foolish as not to know the names of the officers under him; and yet he must employ them as his instruments not only whenever he wishes to capture a place or defend one, but also whenever he wishes to inspire courage or fear. And whenever Cyrus wished to honour any one, it seemed to him proper to address him by name. Furthermore, it seemed to him that those who were conscious of being personally known to their general exerted themselves more to be seen doing something good and were more ready to abstain from doing anything bad. And when he wanted a thing done, he thought it foolish

[x] Strauss's translation or paraphrase.

to give orders as do some masters in their homes: “Some one go get water!” “Some one split wood!” For when orders are given in that way, all, he thought, looked at one another and no one carried out the order— (5.3.46-50)

LS: Everyone thinks, “Let George do it.” I think that is a great practical truth, isn’t it? If you command a troop, then you can say “Company B,” or so. That will do. But if someone is sent out on some special job, he should very well be mentioned by name. Now what is the main point? The comparison between the general and the artisan: the artisan knows the names of his tools, and so the general should know the name of his tools. But what is the difference here? Does the artisan call the scissors “Philip?” Sure, you have to think it through. I don’t think he would, except if he was a bit crazy. In other words, the names which the artisan knows are not proper names, not names of individuals. If his scissors are lost and he gets another pair, he still calls it “scissors.” But if he gets another soldier into his platoon, his name will not be the same as the one who fell out.

Student: How about the fact that the scissors will not go off by themselves?

LS: But on the other hand, in a way they must be not more like—that is a very good, what you say. They are not animate. Did you ever hear the word “animate tool”? Mr. ____?

Student: A slave.

LS: Who said that?

Student: Aristotle.

LS: But someone might have had that bright idea before him, but we don’t know that. So, but at any rate, surely this is here meant: they are just animate tools which have great advantages, they can walk by themselves; but on the other hand, they are nevertheless still instruments and nothing else. Yes. Everything comes out very clearly. And the fact that they are animate is indicated by the fact that they have proper names—you know that when we are particularly interested in animals we call them different proper names. That changes very much. When I was in Israel I was very surprised they didn’t give proper names to their donkeys. I thought this was barbaric. But this depends really on what they call now the culture; I suppose in this country too every cow would have a name. Would it?

Student: Controversy.

LS: But if I think of these big herds coming up from Texas to Kansas City, they are unlikely to have proper names. Or sheep. I don’t know what the Greek habits were, but this I know regarding dogs, because we have it straight from Xenophon’s mouth: he gives a long list of dog names in his book on dogs, how they should be called. Well, what proper names does one give to dogs?

Student: Are they generic names?

LS: They are generic names, fundamentally.

Student: Lance, Ambush—all kinds of things.

LS: Yes. Very warlike names: Thymos, Spirit, and Anger, and other names of this kind. There is not a single proper name in it. Well, at any rate we must find out something about whether the Greeks called their domestic animals, unless they were in big herds, by proper names as cattle raisers and peasants in Western Europe surely do. That I know. And horses also. What about horses? Are they given proper names?

Student: Racehorses.

LS: This I should know, but I don't. Good. Fine. Yes?

Student: Are you going to stay the discussion of Gadatas until later?

LS: What discussion?

Student: Are you going to comment on his nature? Somehow the question of *eros* arises.

LS: I think we come to that. Now let us see in chapter 4, paragraphs 5 and 6; there are again some examples. Read the beginning of paragraph 5 only.

Reader:
And when Gadatas and his men saw this, they began to flee, as was natural— (5.4.5)

LS: "As was to be expected." And the others pursued "as was to be expected." Now there are some more cases of the same kind in paragraph 6: "obviously—naturally," one must assume they were happy. This is all this question which I mentioned before, that Xenophon indicates from time to time the fictitious character of the book by saying, "Of course I wasn't there, but I bet that they did such and such." You know, I bet that when some fled, the others went in pursuit of them. So you don't have to have evidence for that in particular. This is only in passing. Paragraph 12.

Reader:
"By the gods, Cyrus, if I were such a man as once I was and had children, I doubt if I could have had a child as kind to me as you have been; for I know that this present king of Assyria, like many another son that I have known, has caused his own father much more trouble than he can now cause you." (5.4.12)

LS: Now the situation. Gadatas, the other deserter from the Assyrian king: the present Assyrian king had castrated him, and this was the misfortune of his life, and he hates him for that. And now he makes this observation here which we just read. That is a great paradox. This is *the* unhappiness, and yet this unhappiness leads to a much greater happiness. He finds a man who is much better to him than any son is likely to have been. That is a paradox. There were some references before to that point. Let us read chapter 3, paragraph 19.

Reader:
"Let me assure you that by this deed you have made of us friends who will try, if we can, to stand by you and aid you no less efficiently than if we were your own children." (5.3.19)

LS: Cyrus says this. So that is Cyrus's promise. And then Cyrus's promise is fulfilled in the opinion of the eunuch himself. He has come to see that the loss inflicted on him by the Assyrian king is not as great as he had thought hitherto. Yet in spite of that, he continues to have a deadly hatred to the Assyrian king, who had inflicted on him the misery of which he knows now that it was, in an unforeseen way, the way toward a greater happiness. It is an enigma, perhaps. I think we should keep this in mind. Was this the point you mean, Mr. _____?

Student: I was thinking of something else. The sentence before paragraph 19 of chapter 3, where Cyrus tells him the Assyrian took away his power to have children but did not deprive him of the ability of acquiring friends. And somehow the contrast between *eros* and acquisition of friends there is what struck me.

LS: The word is I think somewhat different. Let me see. He took away from him the power to *make* children, and he has not taken away from him the power to *acquire* friends. This is surely a reference to the difference between children and friends. Friends are not his own blood.

Student: And I think more broadly the question of *eros* seems to come in here because in Gadatas is personified the absence of *eros*, plus still he's a ruler of a sort. *Eros* is also absent from Cyrus, but not in this same physical way. He is a greater ruler, while having certainly the capacity to make children.

LS: But the question is this. We have not given any thought—and this applies in particular to myself—to this question. Cyrus is surrounded in the first place by Chrysantas and Hystaspas. We have given some thought to that. But these are Persians. Then there is Tigranes, the Armenian, whose importance is now obvious. And then there are the two deserters from the Assyrian king. They are Gobryas, whose son had been killed by the Assyrian king out of sheer jealousy (that was Gobryas), and then we have Gadatas, the eunuch. The question is this: In what way do these five men reveal to us the character of Cyrus? According to a schema which is very natural for Plato and which can also be presumed to be existent in Xenophon, that the truly superior man—compared with him all other men are fragments. And in a way, one does not understand the great man if one does not see the others, and see how all these things go together to make him up. We see easily however, on the basis of what you just said, how Gadatas also would be an element of Cyrus. Is that what you mean?

Student: Yes.

LS: That is worth considering. But there is a more superficial question. Why did Xenophon, who made up these examples, just pick out two such crimes, the killing of the son and castration? After all, there were *n* other possibilities. He could have taken away the man's wife, and this

kind of thing. You only have to read the long list of Aristotle, in the fifth book,[xi] of the reasons why people have slain tyrants—you know, the private crimes, a long list. And Xenophon takes just these two cases. They have of course a certain kinship here: killing of the son; killing of the possibility of having a son. Yes?

Student: One interesting element I think we might add, although I can't draw it all together, is that the Median king seemingly wanted very much Cyrus for his son. And yet one of the great themes of the book turns about the fact that Cyaxares is there and yet Cyrus is so superior, so much so that even Cyaxares's father could recognize this.

LS: The potentiality of the grandson.

Student: Yes.

LS: This brings up another point, namely, this: Old Astyages would not have been fooled out of his kingdom as easily as his inept son Cyaxares, so the difference between grandfather and grandson is sufficiently great. Well, the old story on the most popular level [is] that at least in former times this was true, that the grandparents were nicer, or thought to be nicer and more permissive to their grandchildren than parents were of their children. All these things we have simply neglected. This is deplorable. In two years I will have to give another seminar when we can build more or less on what we have found this time. This I think is absolutely necessary.

Student: There is one other crime he mentions, and that is he tried to separate Panthea from her husband, and therefore the husband doesn't have the same loyalty to this king.

LS: We don't have the evidence here yet. But he cannot belong to Cyrus because he dies in battle later on. Mr. ___?

Student: I didn't understand the point you made regarding the lingering hatred of Gadatas, even though he has acquired someone better than his son . . .

LS: Well, is it not an interesting "quote psychological unquote" problem, that if someone by some great misfortune[8] [has] an experience which he in all probability would never have had except through that misfortune, [9]he still hates; he is as incensed as he was before. Should it not somehow affect it? Sure, in this case the problem is very simple, because this great fortune he has is that he has found an avenger, and therefore the two things are inseparable. But if we generalize the problem, as we must, I believe, then we arrive at this question which is of some interest. But we have to go on.

In the sequel he describes a mistake committed by some new allies, the Cadusians, who are very rash and are punished for that. They are defeated, and Cyrus has to comfort them. Let us read paragraph 17 to 18.

Reader:

[xi] of the *Politics*.

When Cyrus found out what had happened, he went out to meet them, and if he saw any one that was wounded he received him kindly and sent him on to Gadatas, that he might receive attention; the rest he helped into their tents and saw to it that they should have provisions, taking some of the Persian peers along to help him in looking after them. For under such circumstances, the good are ready to undertake extra labour. Still Cyrus was evidently very much distressed, so that, when the rest went to dinner at the usual hour, he with his aides and the surgeons did not go; for he would not wittingly leave any uncared for, but either looked after them in person, or, if he did not succeed in doing that, he showed his personal interest by sending some one to attend to them. (5.4.17-18)

LS: That is an example of Cyrus's kindness, how he takes care of the wounded soldiers. But there is of course also, as comes out more clearly immediately, he himself looked. Whether this still has some reference to his looking at corpses, we cannot know.

Student: [. . .]

LS: Very good. So he does not look at beauty. That is a good point. That is demonstrable. Good. In paragraph 22 we see that the Cadusians are still a republican community. In the sequel a great principle of international law is established, of course only on the basis of a specific contract: war only between the fighters. The workers are to be left alone. You know the great principle especially in modern international law: civilians are not combatants. It is however slightly different from modern international law as you see from paragraph 28, which we should read.

Reader:
This concession Cyrus obtained for the farming classes. But as for the herds out grazing, he ordered his friends, if they wished, to drive them in and keep them in the territory under their own control; but the enemy's cattle they brought in as their legitimate prey from whatever quarter they could, so that the allies might be better pleased with the expedition. For the dangers were the same, even if they did not go foraging for provisions, while the burdens of war seemed lighter, if the army was to be fed at the enemy's cost. (5.4.28)

LS: In other words, some civilians are not part of the soil. Paragraph 31, Gadatas speaking.

Reader:
"And by the gods, who see all things and hear all things, I swear to you, Cyrus, that it is not for anything wrong or base that I have said or done that I have suffered this affliction."
As he uttered these words he burst into tears over his lot and could say no more.
And Cyrus, as he listened, pitied him for his misfortune and answered him thus—"
(5.4.31)

LS: It is a bit better in Greek: "he pitied him indeed for his suffering, but he spoke in the following manner"[10] [*men pathous ōkteiren auton, elexe de hōde*], because in the speech there is nothing of this compassion. The speech is perfectly businesslike and has to do with the situation. Now this passage is very interesting, because Gadatas presents to us the problem of Job. Wholly innocently he has suffered the greatest misfortune of which he can think. And the gods know it.

He only mentions the gods as it were in passing; he swears by the gods, who see everything. They know that. Now Cyrus of course doesn't take up this question of theodicy in the sequel at all. And not, for example, for the consideration which was indicated in paragraph 12, namely, that Gadatas through his misfortune has become aware of something of which he would not have become aware without it. That is absolutely beyond the sphere of interest of Cyrus. The difficulty is a very practical one, because if Cyrus is going to leave now Gadatas is in terrible danger. The Assyrian king might come and get hold of him, and that would be very unfortunate. Paragraph 35, Gadatas speaking.

Reader:
"Perhaps, then, someone might say: 'And why, pray, did you not think of that before you revolted?'" (5.4.35)

LS: In other words, why did you hasten your treason before it was safe to commit it?

Reader:
"Because, Cyrus, on account of the outrage I had suffered and my consequent resentment, my soul was not looking out consistently for the safest course but was pregnant with this thought, whether it would ever be in my power to get revenge upon that enemy of gods and men, who cherishes an implacable hatred not so much toward the man who does him wrong as toward the one whom he suspects of being better than himself." (5.4.35)

LS: Let us stop here for a moment. Now Gadatas has been wronged in a terrible manner. He has never done anything wrong. But afterwards, out of anger he has made a great mistake. And he calls the Assyrian king "hated by the gods." But could not one, on the basis of his statement in paragraph 12, say: Is he himself not hated by the gods? That is at least a question. Let us read the next paragraph.

Reader:
"Therefore, since he is such a scoundrel himself, he will find no supporters but those who are worse scoundrels than himself. But if some one of them by any chance be found better than he, never fear, Cyrus, that you will have to fight that good man; but he will take care of him, scheming unceasingly until he has got rid of that man who is better than himself. But as for me, he will, I think, even with worthless fellows easily be strong enough to harass me." (5.4.36)

LS: What does this precisely mean? In other words, Gadatas himself is a better man, is that what he means? Does Gadatas mean that?

Student: Well, he was.

LS: He still is in his own view, surely. He would even say he is now still superior to the Assyrian king.

We must say something about the next chapter. Now this is of course very crucial. Cyrus's uncle Cyaxares is naturally mortified, because he is at best now a figurehead and all true power has not gone to his nephew Cyrus. He complains to Cyrus and is truly annoyed. Cyrus has done him

greater harm than an enemy could have done, for an enemy might have defeated him and might have killed him and his whole entourage, but the enemy would never have gained the affection of his entourage. So what Cyrus did to him is worse than what the Assyrian could have done to him. Cyrus replies to that. We cannot read the whole. Let us read paragraph 11.

Reader:
"but that you are angered and threaten them gives me no surprise. However, whether your anger against them is just or unjust, I will not stop to inquire; for I know that you would be offended to hear me speak in their defence. To me, however, it seems a serious error for a ruler to be angry with all his subjects at the same time; for, as a matter of course, threatening many makes many enemies, and being angry with all at the same time inspires them all with a common sense of guilt[xii]." (5.5.11)

LS: "Makes them united." "If one is angry or annoyed with all of them, it gives unanimity to all of them." That is a very polite way of saying: You are a fool; they are much stronger than you are. That is what he means. And the beginning of the next paragraph.

Reader:
"It was for this reason, let me assure you, that I did not let them come back without me, for I was afraid that in consequence of your anger something might happen for which we should all be sorry." (5.5.12)

LS: Sure. So in other words, he couldn't be more explicit, could he? He leaves it open here, as we have seen, whether Cyaxares has just reason for complaining about his subjects. Now the subjects are one thing, and Cyrus is another. This much is certain, and Cyrus made it perfectly clear. Cyaxares can no longer afford any more to be angry with his subjects. Now let us go on where you left off.

Reader:
"With the help of the gods, therefore, you are secured against that by my presence." (5.5.12)

LS: Yes. So in other words, whatever may be true about the gods, Cyrus's presence is certainly a guarantee of his safety. Yes?

Reader:
"As to your supposition that you have been wronged by me—I am exceedingly sorry, if, while I have been striving to the utmost of my ability to do as much good as possible to my friends, I seem after all to be accomplishing just the opposite." (5.5.12)

LS: And then comes a long list of the many benefits which Cyrus has bestowed on his uncle. He has not the slightest reason to complain. Let us read paragraph 24, where the most important point is mentioned.

Reader:

[xii] In original: "wrong"

"But what is most important and best of all, you see your own territory increasing, that of the enemy diminishing; you see the enemy's fortresses in your possession, and your own, which had before all fallen under the Assyrian's power, now restored again to you. Now, I do not know that I can say that I should like to learn whether any one of these results is a bad thing or whether any one is not a good thing for you, but at any rate I have no objection to listening to what you have to say. So tell me what your judgment on the question is." (5.5.24)

LS: Now Cyaxares gives the complaints which were summarized very well by Mr. ____. Cyaxares is jealous, but he contends that his jealousy is legitimate. He accuses Cyrus of (what is the technical term?) alienation of affection—not only of his wife, but of everyone. And that is a more grievous thing than any other thing he could have done to him. But here we must also take a somewhat broader view. We have seen before a king who was jealous.

Student: The Armenian king.

LS: So there is this proportion: Cyaxares to Cyrus equal to the Armenian to Socrates. Now what did this jealous king do?

Student: He killed the man he was jealous of.

LS: Why does Cyaxares not kill Cyrus? Excuse me if I ask such a simple question.

Student: He didn't have the power.

LS: So in other words, that is one difference between Socrates and Cyrus: that Cyrus cannot easily be killed, because of Cyaxares's lack of power. And this is no accident. Cyrus can take care of himself; Socrates cannot take care of himself in this manner. The main point of the accusation stated later on in paragraph 32 following: Cyrus has not behaved like a friend and relative. And I think one can say this is a perfectly legitimate accusation, isn't it? He has practically dethroned his uncle. But on the other hand, is this really so simple? Yes?

Student: It depends ultimately on what we think of the justice of his rule, doesn't it?

LS: At what precise moment does the situation become critical as far as this question is concerned? Up to a certain point, Cyrus behaved in an absolutely unblameable way. The uncle calls for Persian support, Cyrus comes, defeats the enemy.

Student: It becomes crucial then.

LS: In other words, the key decision there is to start an offensive war against Assyria. This is the key problem, not only with regard to the uncle but generally, because this means in principle conquering the whole world: because when he has conquered the whole Assyrian empire, there will be people at the borders of that empire and there is some reason for conquering them, and so on. That in principle would require universal conquest. To that extent, Cyaxares's issue is the whole issue of Cyrus, but not necessarily as such. The situation is thinkable, although not yet

described where, say, the nephew, by his sheer superiority and the absolute ineptness of the present king, overshadows him. He can do what he wants. This fact, that he is nice to the king, is of course the greatest degradation for the king. Nothing can be done about that. I think in the end of paragraph 35 we find a statement of that. Let us simply read paragraph 34.

Reader:
"Do you think that these are deeds of kindness, Cyrus? Let me tell you that if you had any regard for me, there is nothing of which you would be so careful not to rob me as my reputation and my honour. For what do I gain, if I have my realm extended wide and lose my own honour? For I was not made king of the Medes because I was more powerful than they all, but rather because they themselves accounted us to be in all things better than themselves." (5.5.34)

LS: But the point I think is this. Here he brings out the basis of his rule. The basis of his rule is not, as he states here, simply positive law, but the presumption that the royal family are better than the subjects and therefore deserve to rule. This is the true title, the ultimate title, the natural title of hereditary monarchy. Now of course this presumption is refuted, and has been refuted time and again. And this in a way proves the relative right of Cyrus, of course, because Cyrus is surely a better man than he is.

The last point we find in paragraphs 46 to 47 at the end of the book, which we might read. This also is from a speech of Cyrus.

Reader:
"but just as, when we are called upon to fight, the one who conquers the greatest number has the glory of being considered the most valorous, so also when we are called upon to use persuasion, he that converts the greatest number to our opinion would justly be accounted at once the most eloquent and the most efficient." (5.5.46)

LS: "The best at speech and the best at action." The terms occur at *Memorabilia* 4, beginning of chapter 3, beginning of chapter 5, and the beginning of chapter 6. So they must be good at speech and at deed. But deed here does not mean fighting; deed means here to induce people to act. This kind of efficiency. Yes?

Reader:
"Do not, however, aim at displaying to us the arguments that you will address to each one of them, but set to work with the feeling that those who are persuaded by any one of you will show what they are by what they do." (5.5.47)

LS: So in other words, the commanders must be speakers. They cannot be deprived of this virtue of being orators. But of course no exhibition, epideictic—no display, no fireworks, but speak in such a way that they can be sure that they act. There is a parallel in *Memorabilia* 3, chapter 8, paragraph 1, which you might consider. There is a rather difficult sentence there.

[1] Deleted "are."
[2] Deleted "very often."
[3] Deleted "_____."
[4] Deleted "_____."
[5] Deleted "of."
[6] Deleted (26)."
[7] Deleted "_____."
[8] Deleted "makes."
[9] Deleted “that”
[10] Deleted "_____..._____."

Session 14: no date
***Cyropaedia* 6**[i]

Leo Strauss: This was a clear and good account.[ii] I think I have only one point where I believe you may be wrong, and that concerns the recall of Cyrus to Persia. You believe that this was a white lie, perhaps also a black lie.

Student: [. . .]

LS: There is no question, but this wouldn't prove it was a lie. And you would have to consider the possibility that Cyrus was recalled. You also have to consider what this would imply.

Student: It would imply he was in trouble.

LS: And with the Persian authorities, yes.

Student: To warn Cyrus against getting too conceited.

LS: For very obvious reasons: the army. This has to be done, because the pretension of the whole work is that Cyrus becomes an absolute ruler by perfectly legal means, and this is a complicated question already in the case of Cyaxares. It may also be true in the case of Persia. Therefore we have to watch that. Mr. ____?

Student: I just had a question I'd like explained. We have been using this Greek word, *eros*, in the original. Is there any connotations in the Greek work which is not in the English word?

LS: Yes. You see, there are at least three—in fact there are four words which occur immediately which can be translated by "love": there is *eros*, which means primarily something like desire, but limited in ordinary usage certainly to sexual desire (and of course everything which is implied in sexual desire in the highest interpretation); and then there is *philia*, which is friendship and which is something different, but they can easily switch into one another; and then there is *storgē*, affection (for example, it is even applied to irrational animals, the care and affection they have for their young); and then there is *agapē*, which came to the fore more in the New Testament; and is then charity. So that has to be watched. One has to see in each case. And I think when I said *eros*, I used it when the Greek word *eros* occurred in the text.

Student: Could there be a transfer of *eros* of Panthea to Cyrus?

LS: That is not quite so simple. Surely not. She is grateful to Cyrus. This is not *eros*. But we will take up this question which Mr. ____ had in mind.

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[i] The transcript of this session is based on the original transcript.
[ii] Strauss responds to a student's paper, read at the beginning of the session. The reading was not recorded.

Now I would like first to say a few words about Mr. ___'s paper. It was quite satisfactory. There were a few points which I would like to mention. On page 2: "Cyrus gives Panthea to the guardianship of Araspas. This makes the second beautiful thing which he gives to his boyhood friend from Media. We recall that we first learned of Cyrus's fondness for beauty when Astyages gave him a beautiful robe. The Mede to whom Cyrus gave that robe when he returned to Persia was Araspas." I thought this was a good remark. And on page 5, this is probably simply a printing error, he tells his father he would wish for an army "with which he could do good to his friends and get help from his enemies." This must have been a typing error. To "hurt" his enemies. And then there was one more point, where you quote a passage: Cyrus decided to go to his rescue to show everyone that he tried to surpass in doing harm [to] those who do us harm, and that we surpass in well-doing [to] those whom we do well by, and the consequence of such conduct would be that many would wish to become friends and not one would desire to become our enemy. And you draw the inference: not one enemy. One would have to figure that out. You did not indicate the passage here where you found that, so I couldn't check it against the original.

Now before we raise the more general question for which the time has come, let us first begin our coherent study of book 6. And we begin at the beginning. Well, since this was described well by Mr. ____: at the beginning we find the Persian Hystaspas and Gadatas, the Assyrian eunuch, together somehow. You remember the scheme I drew last time. There were two Persians, Chrysantas and Hystaspas; and there are the two Assyrian traitors, Gobryas and Gadatas. And then of course we have Tigranes, we must never forget the Armenian, the pupil of Socrates or Xenophon, and this would somehow have to be interpreted. Here we find these two men together; and you stated quite rightly Hystaspas is no longer simply a Persian, there is something cosmopolitan, as you call it. There is truth to that. Now they band together, we see. They wish Cyrus not to disband the army. Now let us read paragraph 2 to 3.

Reader:
Then Cyrus, though he realized that Gadatas had for some time been frightened almost to death for fear the army should be disbanded, laughing said: "It is clear, Gadatas, that Hystaspas here has been instigating you to the ideas that you have been expressing." And Gadatas lifting up his hands toward heaven declared on his oath that he had not been influenced by Hystaspas to entertain those feelings. "But I know," said he, "that if you and your men go away, it is all over with me. For this reason, I introduced the subject with him of my own accord, asking him if he knew what it was your intention to do with reference to disbanding the army." (5.1.2-3)

LS: Yes. And you see in this connection Cyrus laughed when he saw that this poor man Gadatas was almost dying from fright. This also throws some light on the character of Cyrus. In other words, he is not too humane, number one. But we must not forget the other side. This fear of Gadatas is very useful to Cyrus. You know, Cyrus's laughter is never free from utilitarian considerations—we have seen that on former occasions. Now let us go on here, the next two paragraphs.

Reader:
"I was wrong, then, as it seems," said Cyrus, "in accusing our friend Hystaspas."

"Aye, by Zeus, Cyrus, you were indeed," said Hystaspas. "For I was only remarking to our friend Gadatas that it was not possible for you to go on with the campaign; for I told him that your father was sending for you." (6.1.4)

LS: You see this simple irony: only this little point—only the little point that you will be executed tomorrow morning. Yes?

Reader:
"What do you mean?" said Cyrus. "Did you dare to let that get out, whether I would or no?"
"Yes, by Zeus," he answered; "for I observe that you are exceedingly anxious to go around in Persia the cynosure of all eyes, and to parade before your father the way you have managed everything here."

"And do not you wish to go home yourself?" asked Cyrus.

"No, by Zeus," said Hystaspas; "and I am not going either; but I shall stay here and be general, until I have made our friend Gadatas master of the Assyrian." (6.1.5)

LS: The Assyrian king he means, of course. Cyrus has been called home to Persia. And I would say [that] until we have a proof he was not recalled, we must believe it because after all Cyrus is still a subject. You must never forget that. There is a disproportion between his factual power and his legal position.

Student: [. . .]

LS: There is no question that it could have been a lie to make Gadatas still more loyal out of fear than he ever was. But it could also be that, you see, and then—

Student: [. . .]

LS: But what, exactly? There was a mixture; they joked with seriousness, surely. But then there is the question: What is serious and what is a joke? Now one part of the seriousness might be that Cyrus had been called home, and the other thing which is surely serious is the fright of Gadatas. And the fun is the contribution of that fright to Cyrus's policy. You see, it could also be the other way around. Cyrus was called home, and Hystaspas does not like to go home. He finds it much greater fun to stay here and to fight. Therefore he told Gadatas the story of Cyrus's recall so that Gadatas could beseech Cyrus to stay. And part of the joke might very well be that Cyrus sees through Hystaspas and he enjoys it because this is exactly what he wants. He too doesn't want to go home.

Student: Part of the serious joke is Hystaspas really means he would be general if Cyrus went home.

LS: I see, you take this very literally. That could be. If you take it very literally, "that I will be the leader of the army"—I will take your place. This of course could not be literal; Cyrus would never do that. So there is still another dimension.

So Cyrus begins a speech in paragraph 6. The question is, the key question which must now be settled: Shall we go on with the war? Shall we stop at our success in having repelled the enemy, driven him back, or shall we go on and crush him in his own country? Now there are five answers to this question. Let us read the central one. This is Cyaxares's first speech; he had never spoken in public, really, as we know—the uncle. But we see from the context that he is simply put up as a speaker by Cyrus. He is a mere figurehead and has absolutely nothing to say. Now the most interesting thing in the context is the speech of Cyaxares's own subject, in paragraph 9 to 10. Let us read that.

Reader:

After him Artabazus, the one who once claimed to be a kinsman of Cyrus, made the following speech: "In one point, Cyaxares, I beg to differ from the previous speakers: they say that we must stay here and carry on the war; but I say that it was when I was at home that I was carrying on wars. And I say truly; for I often had to go to the rescue when our property was being carried off; and when our fortresses were threatened, I often had trouble to defend them; I lived in constant fear and was kept continually on guard. And I fared thus at my own expense. But now we are in possession of their forts; I am in fear of them no longer; I revel in the good things of the enemy and drink what is theirs. Therefore, as life at home was warfare, while life here is a feast, I do not care to have this festal gathering break up." (6.1.9-10)

LS: In other words, he no longer behaves like the obedient subject of a tyrant or absolute ruler. He knows where his bread is buttered. Dakyns, that translator whom I mentioned to you more than once,[1] reads Xenophon from the point of view of a British public school boy, but he is enamored of Xenophon and that has this advantage that he reads him with some care. This love affair between Dakyns and Xenophon also blinds him to the subtleties of Xenophon, but it has this advantage. Now here at this point he makes the remark that this Persian, Artabazus, is here for the first time mentioned by name, and he raises the absolutely necessary question: Why? I do not have an answer, but I thought I should bring the question to your attention. It is very strange that he has been treated as anonymous up to this point and now, exactly here, he is mentioned by name.

Student: I am not sure that that is correct. In book 3, Cyaxares sends him, Artabazus, to Cyrus.

LS: Of course I didn't go over the whole text; I only went over the index. I looked up all passages mentioned in the index, and the index is not quite complete, that I know. But when he speaks a few times of the one who said that he was a relative of Cyrus and he had also spoken of Artabazus, but that the two are identical, that has never been explicitly said.

Student: He equates them in this one passage?

LS: Sure he does. Nothing like having another look, as Socrates used to say.

Student: He does so in book 7, following.

LS: Dakyns said the first time, he didn't say the only time.

Student: Why again?

LS: That also would be a question: Why this is necessary? That is true. But the primary question is: Why it is mentioned here first? Yes?

Student: The passage Mr. ___ referred to in the fifth book is supposed by the translator, and I think he is right, to be this Artabazus. The translator says Artabazus is a common Persian name at 5.3.38—a Persian Artabazus is mentioned as the head of the Persian infantry or cavalry.

LS: He says: "Artabazus should lead the Persian light infantry."

Student: The identification between the name and the event is made in book 4, chapter 1, paragraph 22: "Now it happened that the man who had once pretended to be a kinsman of his and had got a kiss from him was present there. Cyrus therefore said at once: 'This man will do.' 'Let him follow you, then,' said Cyaxares."

LS: And where does the name Artabazus occur?

Student: "'And do you,' he added to Artabazus."

LS: The word is not in the text.

Student: It is not in the text?

LS: No. No, I would say this: I would expect from Dakyns that he is likely to be right in such a merely simple factual question. No, translations do not suffice. Good. Now the beginning of paragraph 13.

Reader:
"Why then do you suppose I suggested to Cyaxares to bring up the question of disbanding the army?" (6.1.13)

LS: What he says, "suggest," here has in Greek also the meaning "commanded." "Ordering." So in other words, Cyaxares is absolutely put in his place by now. That is clear. Paragraph 14.

Reader:
"For winter is coming, you know; and even granting that we have shelter for ourselves, still, by Zeus, there will be none for our horses or for our attendants or for the rank and file of the army; and without them we could not carry on the war." (6.1.14)

LS: In Greek, "for the *demos* of the soldiers." This reminds us more forcibly of the hierarchic character: the rank and file as distinguished from the officers; the nobility of the army.

Reader:
"and without them we could not carry on the war."

LS: Surely not. That is the great difficulty. But "without which not" becomes a philosophic term; *conditio sine qua non* in Latin: the condition without which not, and that is distinguished from the true cause. That is the peculiarity of Plato or Socrates, that the true cause is to be distinguished from the condition without which not. And the condition without which not, that is the matter, so to speak, as distinguished from the form which is the true cause. So this is the Socratic view of the relation of the *demos* to the rulers. By the way, it must be at least mentioned that the other speeches made in reply to Cyaxares's question all say: By all means, let us go on. But the tough question, what to do, how to guarantee success of the further war, that of course Cyrus does. In other words, they must have fortresses, forts, so that they are safe in the enemy's country. Now let us read that.

Reader:
"But if we get fortresses, these will alienate the country from the enemy while everything will be smooth sailing for us. But perhaps some of you may fear that you will possibly have to do garrison duty far from your own country. You need have no hesitation on that score. For since we are far from home in any event, we will take it upon ourselves to do the garrison duty for you in the places nearest to the enemy; but those parts of Assyria which are on your own borders—do you take possession of them and cultivate them. For if we can safely guard what is near the enemy, you will enjoy a plenitude of peace in possession of the regions far away from them; for they, I trow, will not be able to neglect those who are close to them, while they lay schemes against those who are far away." (6.1.16-18)

LS: Now this whole statement implies two things, I believe. First, the Persian preponderance. The Persians will guard. We are away from home—that means of course the Persians, whereas the Medians will simply defend their borders and will therefore be in their own country. And we Persians will take the burden of the trouble, and that means of course also the burden of honor, glory and power. And the second point which I would still assert: that of Cyrus's refusal to obey his father and the home authorities. He will stay away from home. We must skip a number of passages. Let us turn to paragraph 26.

Reader:
So it became general talk among the rank and file of the soldiers— (6.1.26)

LS: No, here it is *ochlos*, which means "crowd." Well, it is not a formal term, crowd; think of Mr. Riesman's book title. What is it?

Student: *The Lonely Crowd.* [iii]

LS: That doesn't mean the lonely electorate, the *demos*. Then one would have to write a different book. The electorate cannot be lonely, can it? Because it is a whole, whereas a crowd can be lonely, naturally, because it is not a whole [but] a spurious form of a whole. Yes?

Reader:
that he was already conveying his treasures to a place of safety because he was afraid. But Cyrus, recognizing that he had gone for the purpose of forming, if he could, a coalition against him, made vigorous counter preparation in the expectation that he would have to fight again. And so he set about bringing to its full complement the Persian cavalry— (6.1.26)

LS: The *Persian* cavalry. Yes?

Reader:
for which he obtained horses, some requisitioned from the captives, and a certain number also presented to him by his friends—

LS: No. "Taking." Who are the friends?

Student: The allies.

LS: Sure. So he strengthens the Persian cavalry at the expense of the allies, which is good politics from this point of view. Go on.

Reader:
for he accepted such gifts from every one and never refused anything, whether any one offered him a fine weapon or a horse. (6.1.26)

LS: But the question is, you get so little this way; and in fact, that is taking. You hear such stories even from the municipal government of the city of Chicago. Now here there comes an intermezzo, and Mr. ____ rightly said that it is not entirely an intermezzo: it fits in a way, namely, the beautiful Panthea. You remember that Araspas was so absolutely sure that he could resist her beauty, but Araspas was mistaken. He had fallen in love with the beautiful woman, who behaves perfectly, as a perfect lady, and at the same time is a humane lady. But she denounces Araspas to Cyrus only because she is compelled to do so. Let us turn to paragraph 34.

Reader:
When Cyrus heard it he laughed outright—

LS: Cyrus is a big laugher, and the laughing I believe always has the same character. It has a certain element of nastiness, what the Germans called *schadenfreude*: pleasure derived from the damage which another has received. And also it is extremely useful, because this defeat of

[iii] David Reismen, with Nathan Glazer and Reuel Denney, wrote *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950).

Araspas and his disgrace makes him the ideal man for pretending to be a traitor and going over to the enemy and finding out all the secrets. Cyrus is a marvelous user of human failings. Now read this sentence again please.

Reader:
When Cyrus heard it he laughed outright at the man who had claimed to be superior to the passion of love; and he sent Artabazus back with the eunuch and bade him warn Araspas not to lay violent hands upon such a woman; but if he could win her consent, he himself would interpose no objection. (6.1.34)

LS: You see, strictly speaking, she is a prisoner of war. But still Cyrus again, I think, speculates well that Araspas will be so much ashamed; and the woman has shown her power of resistance, so there is no danger if he says: If you persuade her, try. But there is no ghost of a chance that he will succeed. Now next paragraph.

Student:
So, when Artabazus came to Araspas, he rebuked him severely, saying that the woman had been given to him in trust; and he dwelt upon his ungodliness, sinfulness, and sensuality, until Araspas shed bitter tears of contrition and was overwhelmed with shame and frightened to death lest Cyrus should punish him. (6.1.35)

LS: Cyrus always has people at his disposal who do the unpleasant things for him. That is one of the secrets of ruling.

Student: [. . .]

LS: You mean he has an erotic relation to Cyrus? Excuse me, that would make him immune, if true. It is as if you would send someone who is given to forging false checks to someone who has committed armed robbery, and this check forger would say: Such a terrible crime this armed robbery, because forging checks after all has no violence. There is a lot of so-called psychology in these matters, which you doubtless see. Now Araspas is deeply ashamed. That is nicely described here. And this is of some interest, because a point has been made in the literature about two kinds of positions toward human failings. You have probably read that. There is a book on that subject where a man makes a distinction between shame cultures and guilt cultures. Mr. Dodds?[iv] I never read it, I have heard of it. Briefly it is this: the culture of biblical origin is guilt culture, and of course that is the reason why Freud is so terribly important, to get rid of guilt; whereas Japan, I believe was the example, was a shame culture. You seem to know something about this.

Student: Oriental cultures are examples of shame cultures.

LS: Oriental, generally? You have read that book?

[iv] E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951). See also Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture* (1946).

Student: The author is Dodds.

LS: An Englishman, I believe.

Student: I can't remember.

LS: Things are a bit more complicated, probably. The Greeks surely, I believe, would belong according to this reckoning to the shame cultures, wouldn't they? Or is this complicated?

Student: I couldn't say right offhand now.

LS: There may be something to that. I know nothing about Japan, but of the Greeks one could hardly say what the difference is here between some biblical scenes. Yes.

Student: There is an interesting story about a Japanese who committed suicide when he was accused of murder.

LS: Could not one say that is an extreme, perhaps foolish, sense of honor?

Student: That isn't required by the culture.

LS: I see. But let us compare this with feudal morality, partly living on in our world—you see it in every Western movie. If you are called a liar, it is not sufficient or proper to deny that you lie or to shrug your shoulders, you must hit that fellow. Well, the idea behind this is of course that if you show you are physically superior to him, you show that you don't have to be afraid of anything, and hence you have no reason to lie. That I think is the reasoning. But in the older feudal morality, you know, this very strict point of honor—the point of honor could not go in Christian chivalry to the point that you must commit suicide, because suicide was regarded as a sin. But if you take away the biblical view that suicide is murder, it surely leads to the conclusion [that] when your honor is wounded severely, then you must extinguish yourself. The difference here regards the minor of the syllogism, not the major of the syllogism.

Student: [. . .]

LS: No, that was a special case. Artabazus was perfectly right, she was a sacred trust and it was understood. There is no question. This was not the plunder of a city given to the soldiery. That was not the case; it is perfectly clear. Yes?

Student: Even so, I think it is important to see that Artabazus does not deliver the message exactly the way Cyrus put it.

LS: You have not been in the army, I suppose. But you know that even in civilian life from time to time the director of a bank says to the second in command: Why don't you talk to this teller? And the second in command has a certain discretion. On the high level, the commands are given with a great degree of discretion and trust in the intelligence of the second in command that he will do the best in the circumstances.

Student: But Cyrus said he could have her if he could persuade her.

LS: That is true. But perhaps Artabazus makes, perhaps on the grounds Mr. ____ pointed out—it clear that he finds these things particularly obnoxious. But still the effect is perfectly along the lines Cyrus wished. Perhaps Cyrus sends Artabazus for this reason, that he is extremely clever.

Student: [. . .]

LS: Not quite. I believe that is not quite sufficient. But I believe the Japanese would be concerned also with things which no one would see. Don't you think so? I mean, according to the strict Japanese account, if some Japanese soldier acted wrongly and no one else has seen him? That would be true of the Greek, but not the notion of shame in general. Now I believe it is much more important to make this distinction: whether it is regarded as possible that the human being can be perfectly free from this failing, and the biblical assumption [that] no one can be free from that failing. Now this is also not so simple. But still, if you take Aristotle as in a way the peak of Greek moral reflection, Aristotle says explicitly that sense of shame belongs to the young, because they cannot possibly be perfect because they are young. But for grown-up men there is no place for [a] sense of shame, because if he is a gentleman, he will do everything well. He says that at the end of the fourth book.[v] That he says. I found this repeated somewhere by Churchill. Unfortunately I didn't make a note of it. Mr. ____ should know. When he speaks of this marvelous Englishman, Lord Birkenhead, do you remember? Does he not say of Lord Birkenhead that he was simply perfect?[vi]

Student: [. . .]

LS: Yes. He always did absolutely the right thing under all conditions. Churchill had read the *Ethics*. Birkenhead had given it to him, and he was perfectly satisfied with it. So that is not uninteresting. Now you see what Aristotle says here in this remark about sense of shame is exactly what Jesus meant when he spoke of Pharisees. That was a great moot question, whether the Pharisees were rightly described in the New Testament. That is a very long question. Surely Judaism as such is very much of a "guilt culture," as is easy to see. But still, what is meant by Pharisees in the New Testament is exactly what Aristotle meant: men who don't do anything wrong. And this you find of course when you read, for example, Pericles' speeches. He doesn't say that, but it is of course implied. He may have made political mistakes here and there but[vii]—there is no moral deficiency at any point. Yes?

Student: [. . .]

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[v] *Nicomachean Ethics* 4.9.3-7.

[vi] Churchill wrote of Lord Birkenhead (F. E. Smith) that "he had all the canine virtues in a remarkable degree—courage, fidelity, vigilance, love of the chase." Winston Churchill, *Great Contemporaries* (New York: Putnam, 1937).

[vii] The tape was changed at this point.

LS: In other words, that is a kind of punishment, then, like exile. Good. I only thought that one should see that the reaction of Araspas to the rebuke of Artabazus is not fundamentally different from certain biblical parallels.

Student: Is the parallel in Plato in the *Apology*?

LS: But that is of course very qualified. You mean at the end of the *Phaedo*?

Student: The *Phaedo*, I mean.

LS: Yes, he was the justest and so on man of his generation. This means, of course, he was not simply good. Plato, because of his understanding of virtue, says of course that no man is truly virtuous; [he] can only strive for virtue, because virtue is wisdom and there cannot be wisdom but only longing for wisdom.

Student: [. . .]

LS: I don't remember that. No. Now let us see then how Cyrus reacts to the repentance of Araspas. Paragraph 36.

Reader:
So, when Cyrus learned of this he sent for him and had a talk with him in private.

LS: Strictly private. *Monos mono*; he alone to him alone. You see, Cyrus is a man of delicacy.

Reader:
"I see, Araspas," said he, "that you are afraid of me and terribly overcome with shame. Do not feel that way, pray; for I have heard say that even gods are victims of love—" (6.1.36)

LS: *Eros*.

Reader:
"and as for mortals, I know—"

LS: You see. "I know." Of the gods he has heard it, and of men he knows it. Yes?

Reader:
"I know what even some who are considered very discreet—"

LS: "Very sensible."

Reader:
"have suffered from *eros*.[viii] And I had too poor an opinion of myself to suppose that I should have the strength of will to be thrown in contact with beauty and be indifferent to it. Besides, I

[viii] In original: "love"

am myself responsible for your condition, for it was I that shut you up with this irresistible creature." (6.1.36)

LS: "This irresistible thing," "affair"—he doesn't call the woman a thing, of course, but he means *eros*.

Student: [. . .]

LS: But you remember that he may have stated it differently now for reasons of humanity. Now in the sequel Cyrus turns this failing of Araspas to his advantage. Araspas should run away as being disgraced and become a traitor, and use this seeming treason for spying in the enemy camp—which is very practical, very credible because this thing will spread and the enemy will hear it. Now let us turn to paragraph 41.

Reader:
"And will you be able to give up the beautiful Panthea?" asked Cyrus.

"Yes, Cyrus," said he; "for I evidently have two souls. I have now worked out this doctrine of philosophy in the school of that crooked sophist, Eros." (6.1.41)

LS: Literally, "I have philosophized this out together with the unjust sophist eros." Yes, go on.

Reader:
"For if the soul is one, it is not both good and bad at the same time, neither can it at the same time desire the right and the wrong—"

LS: "The noble and the base deeds."

Reader:
"nor at the same time both will and not will to do the same things; but it is obvious that there are two souls, and when the good one prevails, what is right is done; but when the bad one gains the ascendancy, what is wrong is attempted. And now, since she has taken you to be her ally, it is the good soul that has gained the mastery, and that completely." (6.1.41)

LS: That is a remarkable passage. The doctrine of an evil soul. This is repeated by Plato in the *Laws* in the tenth book on a cosmic scale: a good world soul and a bad world soul. If you want to look it up: 896. Now there is a certain similarity of the argument here with the argument in Plato's *Republic*. When Plato proves that reason and desire and spiritedness are different from one another, of course in Plato it is much more elaborated, but the thesis is exactly the same. And also the tacit reasoning in Plato's *Phaedrus*: he speaks of two kinds of desire in an image of the noble and the base horse. Of course they are not called there souls but parts of the soul, but the reasoning is the same: there must be an evil part of the soul and a noble part of the soul. Here Araspas goes beyond this and speaks simply of two different souls—much more extreme. It is very interesting that this kind of dualism—what is the basis of the doctrine of a dualism, of a good part of man and a bad part of man here?

Student: It occurs later in Persian doctrine.

LS: No, never do this kind of thing. By the way, Xenophon might have heard something of the Persian doctrine, but since there is no reference to it I would not even bring this in. But here in this argument.

Student: His own experience with *eros*?

LS: But more specifically, what view about *eros*, what experience of *eros*? That it is bad, that *eros* as such is bad. This is the basis of this distinction. That is very interesting.

Student: [. . .]

LS: But here he has philosophized something, developed a theory, and we have to first understand the theory and what its alleged basis is. And if we think we can prove that the theory is wrong or the reasoning inadequate, then we can raise thematically the question: What is the source of the error? And then we might find something. But could one not do the same thing, as quite a few schools have thought, and simply say: "No, one is the soul, the other is the body," rather than say, "There is a good soul and a bad soul." What are the relative merits of these two doctrines? Which is sounder, Araspas's doctrine or a kind of gnostic doctrine? Yes?

Student: [. . .]

LS: The ordinary crude view, yes. In other words, it doesn't go deep enough to trace evil to body, to matter, because there is a certain spirituality of evil which cannot be understood in terms of matter. The depth of evil does not come out when you trace it to matter and body alone. And surely *eros* is not a bodily thing. And therefore it is a superior doctrine. But it is, to repeat, not Xenophon's view. We have no right to say that, because Xenophon doesn't say this is the right view. Araspas says it—and in a special situation, in addition. Now let us turn to paragraph 45.

Reader:
When Panthea learned that Araspas had gone away, she sent word to Cyrus, saying: "Do not be distressed, Cyrus, that Araspas has gone over to the enemy; for if you will allow me to send to my husband, I can guarantee you that a much more faithful friend will come to you than Araspas was. And what is more, I know that he will come to you with as many troops as he can bring. For while the father of the present king was his friend, this present king once even attempted to separate me from my husband. Inasmuch, therefore, as he considers the king an insolent scoundrel, I am sure that he would be glad to transfer his allegiance to such a man as you." (6.1.45)

LS: All Cyrus's affairs prosper. Everything works to his advantage. He hasn't lost Araspas, because Araspas is working for him in the Assyrian camp. In addition, he will get a leading Assyrian away from the Assyrian king. Just wonderful. Paragraph 47. Another thing, the husband comes over from the Assyrian camp into Cyrus's.

Reader:
And when Abradatas and his wife saw each other they embraced each other with joy, as was to be expected—[ix]

LS: You see, Xenophon wasn't present. He only guessed, and it is a good guess.

Reader:
considering they had not expected ever to meet again. Thereafter Panthea told of Cyrus's piety and self-restraint and of his compassion for her. (6.1.47)

LS: There are three different things. His piety—piety here in a more restricted sense of conduct among human beings in accordance with divine law; it is not worship of the gods. The Greek word which he uses here, *hosion*, is quite interesting and means something like holiness. It is the Greek word for profane, in contradistinction to the holy: the profane is a lower grade of the holy. There is nothing profane. This is what people mean who say that paganism was much more religious than biblical religion by not recognizing a sphere which is simply profane. This is one example of that. The distinction is important. This reference for a divinely-guaranteed justice—and moderation has here almost the same meaning as self-control, something very different, and compassion is again something different. Someone may have the other two qualities without having compassion, and vice-versa.

Now then there comes a distinction in the sequel which I am not able to judge of: Abradatas's invention. This is not exactly the tank. I thought this was Cyrus's invention, the improvement of the chariot. But what is the relation of what Abradatas does in terms of military unity (not to go into the military details) compared with Cyrus's improvement? What Abradatas does is not the same thing as what Cyrus does. Cyrus makes a certain invention or improvement, and Abradatas makes a certain invention or improvement. What is it in practical military terms, the result, without the technical side of it? That's why I asked. Perhaps we get it next time when we see it in action. Surely it leads to the consequence that Abradatas will be killed in the battle, and this is of great practical importance, especially to his wife.

Student: Are there not four pairs of horses?

LS: But how does it affect this battle if they attack a phalanx of infantry?

Student: It must be wonderfully clumsy. It can only go forward, and to turn the thing you have to be a good horseman.

LS: In other words, Cyrus's invention is better than Abradatas's.

Student: Abradatas hasn't thought about getting away.

LS: That I sensed.

[ix] In original: "natural."

Student: The four-poled chariot makes it very fast. If it couldn't be turned, it goes forward to the phalanx and you'll never hear of Abradatas again.

LS: That is what I sense. He is perfectly willing to sacrifice. He doesn't think of safety, and Cyrus thought of safety. This much I believe I saw. Good. At the end of paragraph 55, this is the last paragraph of the chapter.

Reader:
Inasmuch, therefore, as he found that the hauling of the towers was easy, he made ready to take them with the army, for he thought that seizing an advantage in time of war was at once safety and justice and happiness. (6.1.55)

LS: Literally translated, "believing that the desire to have more, or greed, in war is at the same time salvation as well as justice and happiness." So in other words, greed, love of gain, or however you call it, it is not simply bad. It is bad only in peace among fellow citizens. It is not only very helpful but it is just. You remember the conversation which he had with his father, when his father explained to him the difference between peace morality and war morality.

Now then the Indian embassy comes, which Cyrus of course uses. In other words, these Indians (not to be mistaken for present-day Hindus) are to go also to the enemy, and of course they should use the opportunity of finding out about the enemy's dispositions, which could not do any harm. Let us read the end of paragraph 2.

Reader:
"And if you perform this service acceptably, I shall be even more grateful to you for your bringing the money with which you have come. And this is service which you are eminently fitted to perform; for spies disguised as slaves can give information of nothing more in their reports than what every one knows; whereas men in your capacity often discover even what is being planned." (6.2.2)

LS: "What everyone knows": what is open to everyone's inspection, say, what you might see on the first of May in Moscow in a parade. And on the other hand this is not interesting, because we know this, but the thing which is interesting is what has been planned, what is still secret because it is planned and not put into action. This is of some help for the understanding of a passage in Xenophon's *Memorabilia,* 1.1.17, the discussion of Socrates's piety in defense against the charge of impiety: "Regarding those things where it was not manifest how Socrates thought, it is not surprising that regarding this matter he was misjudged by the judges, but what all knew is it not surprising that they didn't take into consideration these matters?"[x] So here we have the same certain distinction: what all knew, and the other thing is where it is not manifest what he knew. We must take into consideration other parallels: [at] the beginning of Xenophon's *Apology of Socrates,* Xenophon indicates that the subject of this will be what Socrates silently deliberated. And this is of course at the opposite end of what all knew, for what a man silently deliberates is not as such known to anyone. I mentioned this only because of this parallel.

[x] Presumably Strauss's translation.

Now things become hot, and the mood in the army is described. Let us read paragraph 12. The mood is simply fear, naturally. They hear what a terrific army the Assyrian is building up. Now let us read paragraph 12.

Reader:
When Cyrus's army heard this report, they were disturbed, as was to be expected—[xi]

LS: Yes. Also it can be figured out.

Reader:
they went about more subdued than had been their wont, they gathered in groups, and every corner was full of people discussing the situation and asking one another's opinion. (6.2.12)

LS: Yes. I think one can also say that was to be expected. And the next paragraph.

Reader:
When Cyrus perceived that a panic—

LS: "Fear," literally. Fear was running in the army.

Reader:
was spreading through his army, he called together the officers of the different divisions and all others whose despondency he thought might cause injury and whose enthusiasm would be a help. And he sent word to his aides-de-camp that if any one else of the armed soldiers wished to attend the meeting and listen to the speeches, they should not hinder him. And when they had come together, he addressed them as follows— (6.2.13)

LS: There is an interesting parallel to that in Thucydides, book 2, chapter 89, where an Athenian commander, Phormio, after having observed the fear of his troops—*after* having observed it, on the basis of it—called them together and addressed them. It might be worthwhile to look at it and the context. Now Cyrus's speech in the sequel, we cannot read that now, has one tenor: there is no ground for fear because we know we are superior to the enemy in every respect of any importance. Chrysantas, who got a very good press from Mr. ___, makes another speech in paragraph 21. And I think we should read that.

Reader:
When Cyrus had finished his speech, Chrysantas, the Persian, arose and spoke as follows—

LS: You remember Chrysantas is the other of the two leading Persians, the other one being Hystaspas. Yes?

Reader:
"Do not wonder, Cyrus, that some looked disconsolate when they heard the report; for it was not from fear that they felt this, but from vexation—just as, if it should be

[xi] In original: "as was natural"

announced, when people are ready and waiting to sit down to luncheon, that there is some work that they must do before they may eat, not one, I venture to say, would be pleased to hear it. So we also, thinking we were just on the point of getting rich, all put on a disconsolate look when we heard that there was some work left over which we must do; and it was not because we were frightened, but because we wished that this, too, were already accomplished.

"But our disappointment is past, seeing that we are to contend not for Syria only, where there is an abundance of grain and flocks and date-palms, but for Lydia as well; for in that land there is an abundance of wine and figs and olive oil, and its shores are washed by the sea; and over its waters more good things are brought than any one has ever seen—when we think of that," said he, "we are no longer vexed, but our courage rises to the highest point, with desire to come all the more quickly into the enjoyment of these good things in Lydia also."

Thus he spoke; and the allies were all pleased with his speech and applauded. (6.2.21-22)

LS: So you see the two speeches supplement each other very well. Cyrus faces the tough problem: fear. And Chrysantas says: Who's afraid? We are only annoyed; we still have to overcome this little hump and we have all the riches of the world, so that fear is appeased and hopes are aroused and then we can expect good actions. No one will be annoyed anymore if he thinks of the riches awaiting us.

Then there follows another speech of Cyrus, paragraph 25 following, which we cannot read. We read only one or two paragraphs. One of them has been mentioned by Mr. ____, paragraph 29. The main point is now they have to go through some deserts, or a deserted country at any rate, and there will be no longer any wine and they have to become water drinkers. And Cyrus, as a first-rate dietician, tells them how you get rid of the habit of wine-drinking. Paragraph 29.

Reader:
"But later on we must also gradually diminish the amount taken after dinner, until unconsciously we have become teetotalers. For gradual transition helps any nature to bear changes. Why, God teaches us that, by leading us gradually from winter to endure the burning heat of summer, and from the heat of summer to the rigours of winter; and we should imitate Him and reach the end we would attain by accustoming ourselves beforehand." (6.2.29)

LS: Now Mr. ____ rightly spoke of an imitation of nature. That is perfectly correct. The term nature is not used here, "the god," but we have seen from the *Oeconomicus* that this means fundamentally the same thing. Now what characteristic of nature do they imitate here? *Natura non facit saltus*: Nature doesn't make jumps. We have to do the same: a slow, steady transition from wine-drinking to non-wine-drinking. But the difficulty is indicated, not regarding this particular point, but regarding the broader principle, in paragraph 31.

Reader:
"For meats—"

LS: "Meat" is not quite correct: that which you eat in addition to the bread. Anything—it could also be cake and this kind of thing. Anything beyond the basic thing, bread, is the [*opson*]. Yes?

Reader:
"we must pack up and take along only such as are sharp, pungent, salty; for these not only stimulate the appetite but also afford the most lasting nourishment." (6.2.31)

LS: Now you see these kind of things, the pungent, sharp, and salty things. According to the Greek understanding—that can easily be documented, I did it somewhere in a note to my study of tyranny—these are things against nature. And I think there is some reason that he mentions these.[xii] Why are they against nature? The terms "according to nature" and "against nature" have very specific meanings. Why are these against nature, whereas sweet things, for example, are according to nature?

Student: First, they stimulate the appetite; second they have to be found. They have to be pickled or salted or made in some way.

LS: Salt can be found.

Student: It can be found, but it has to be added.

LS: Oh, no. I am sure there are quite a few fruits and herbs which have these qualities. That is not the point. Sour apples, I remember.

Student: Is it that they require an acquired taste.

LS: No. Very literally.

Student: They need preservatives; they don't keep.

LS: But why are they against nature?

Student: Is there a connection between the saltiness and the water? With the inducement of salt people will drink more water.

LS: It is more strict and more precise.

Student: If food is bad, these things somehow mask it.

LS: No. Well, let me try to give the answer as you find it for example in Aristotle, and also in other writers. It is very strict. These kind of things are taken in, as you surely know, by eating, i.e., via the tongue, and there are things which are in accordance with the tongue and things which go against the grain. Now the things which go against the grain of the tongue, these are

[xii] *Hiero* 1.22.

these things; and that they can have nevertheless good uses, that is not excluded. But in the strict sense—well, take an example from the other senses. There are sounds, shrill sounds, which go against the grain of the ear, and then there are pleasing sounds. Similarly, there are things which are agreeable to the taste and others which are not—just as shrill sounds can be very useful, for example, if there is a fire suddenly, you don't expect pleasing sounds but shrill sounds to awaken the sleepers. So this is I think what he means.

Student: Is agreement with the tongue the same as agreement with the sense of touch outside of the tongue?

LS: There is some difference. Is there not a difference between the sense of touch and the taste? I mean . . .

Student: There are cases of things which are pleasant to the tongue which you do not particularly care to touch.

LS: And vice versa. Yes?

Student: The reason I mention it is because earlier, when Cyrus was a young boy visiting his grandfather in Media, he made some comment (I can't recall the exact passage) about the types of food his grandfather was eating, and that he wouldn't particularly care to touch those. Someone has to pass them.

LS: Could you look it up for us, for next time?

Student: How does this pose a difficulty for what was said before?

LS: No difficulty, but simply—well, if one elaborated it, then I think one would have to go much beyond, and I don't know whether I can improvise that. But this, that soldiers on campaign must use that, has something to do with the fact that war is less according to nature than peace. That is I believe what he means—which doesn't mean that war is not necessary, that is another matter, but war is for the sake of peace and not vice versa.

Student: Do you know offhand where Aristotle gives his explanation of these things which go against the grain of tongue?

LS: I am sorry, I don't have this here.

Student: Is it in *On the Soul*?

LS: It may also be in one of the so-called biological writings, I do not remember now. Where can you look it up? For it is not only in Aristotle, there are also some Pre-Socratic texts which confirm that. If I had the book here I might find it, because in the *Hiero* there is a passage where he speaks about pungent and sour things, do you remember that? Could you look it up in *On Tyranny* and find the note and tell us next time? And Mr. ____ will take care of the other.

Student: This interpretation of things going against the grain of the tongue presupposes the standard that pleasure is according to nature.

LS: Not quite. There is something to that, but I would say the fundamental criticism of hedonism which is given and implied by Plato, Aristotle, and also by Xenophon, is rather this: that to speak of pleasure and pain in general is not sufficient. And that is the error of simple hedonism. As Heraclitus puts it, the pleasures of [a] donkey are not the same as the pleasures of a man.[xiii] There are quite a few things which we would never eat, and surely not eat with pleasure, which a dog enjoys eating. Try dog food. What does this mean? This means that the pleasures of a being depend on the constitution of the being, and therefore the fundamental phenomenon is not pleasure but the constitution, what they call the nature. In one way or another you must make a distinction between good and bad pleasures. Every hedonist admits that, of course, but the hedonist would then have to say: Well, good pleasures are lasting pleasures, pleasures which have no bad consequences—you know, this kind of thing. But from the Socratic point of view, the point is this: These are fundamentally the good pleasures which are in accordance with the human constitution and with the proportion of the parts of the human soul, so that there are higher and lower pleasures. You see, that is what was done. But it shows of course also the importance of pleasure. Pleasure as it were, if uncorrupted, is that which is by nature pleasant to the various parts of man. Of course you cannot isolate for your project of life the pleasures of the tongue; then you may become a glutton, and man is not meant to be just a glutton. There are people who in a way specialize in that, I know that, but there is something questionable about it. So pleasure is not bad in itself. This is the impression people get from, I dare say, Plato's *Gorgias*, read in oblivion of all other Platonic dialogues—you know that is the particular hypothesis of the *Gorgias*, that pleasure is simply opposed to the good or the noble. That is a certain abstraction which is made there for some reason. I hope to take this up in a lecture course on the *Gorgias* in the fall quarter, the meaning of the *Gorgias*. Good.

Then we come to strictly military matters in the next chapter. We read only a short passage, paragraph 22 following, and that has to do with the limited question of tactics, properly understood. Namely, "tactics" come from [*tassō*]. What is the simple translation of [*tassō*]?

Student: To order.

LS: To order, yes: arrange, draw up. How to draw up the troops for a battle.

Reader:
"And do you think, Cyrus," said one of the generals, "that drawn up with lines so shallow we shall be a match for so deep a phalanx?"

"When phalanxes are too deep to reach the enemy with weapons," answered Cyrus, "how do you think they can either hurt their enemy or help their friends? For my part, I would rather have these hoplites who are arranged in columns a hundred deep drawn up ten thousand deep; for in that case we should have very few to fight against." (6.3.22-23)

[xiii] Heraclitus, Fr. 9: "Donkeys prefer chaff to gold." See Kathleen Freeman, *Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Universit Press, 1948), 25.

LS: You see the principle. Of course it exists up to the present day, naturally in a different realm. I remember in the Second World War, the issue confronting the German High Command at the landing in '44 was this: What should they do? Should they cover the whole seacoast, at least that part of the seacoast where the allies could be at all expected to land, or should they have rather a mobile reserve and not cover every point? And the one was called putting everything into the shop window, and that was regarded as contradicting the most elementary principles of strategy. But in this discussion, which I found described in Wilmot's book on the *Struggle for Europe*,[xiv] the question is exactly in each case, of course. There are textbook rules which are quite sound as far as they go, but you have to decide which of the textbook rules applies here. And this is what they call judgment, and that is not something which you can find through textbooks or in textbooks—and this is one of those issues here. In other words, if everyone fights, it would seem to be much better than to have a terrific reserve which would come in only in the case of collapse of the front ranks.

Reader:
"According to the depth that I shall give my line of battle, I think I shall bring the entire line into action and make it everywhere mutually helpful. I shall bring up the spearmen immediately behind the heavy-armed troops, and the bowmen immediately behind the spearmen; for why should any one put in the front ranks those who themselves acknowledge that they could never withstand the shock of battle in a hand-to-hand encounter? But with the heavy-armed troops as a shield in front of them, they will stand their ground; and the one division with their spears, the other with their arrows will rain destruction upon the enemy, over the heads of all the lines in front. And whatever harm any one does to the enemy, in all this he obviously lightens the task of his comrades. Behind all the rest I shall station the so-called rear-guard of veteran reserves. For just as a house, without a strong foundation or without the things that make a roof, is good for nothing, so likewise a phalanx is good for nothing, unless both front and rear are composed of valiant men." (6.3.23-25)

LS: Good. The phalanx: that is to say, the heavy infantry, the queen of battle. And who is in the front and who is in the rear? Which kind of troops? Let us read paragraph 27, or 26 also.

Reader:
"Do you, therefore, take your positions as I direct, and you also, the officers of the light-armed troops, bring up your platoons immediately behind them, and you, the officers of the archery, fall in, in the same way, directly behind the light-armed troops.

"Now you, the commander of the rear-guard, as you are behind all the rest with your men, issue orders to your own division that each man watch those immediately in front of him, encourage those who are doing their duty, threaten violently those who lag behind, and punish with death any one who turns his back with traitorous intent. For it is the duty of the men in the front ranks with word and deed to encourage those who follow them,

[xiv] Chester Wilmot, *The Struggle for Europe* (1954).

while it is your business, who occupy the rear, to inspire the cowardly with greater fear than the enemy does." (6.3.26-27)

LS: But what is the situation? We have a front, and a rear, and a center. Who are the front troops? The heavy infantry, the hoplites. And who are the rear? Also hoplites. The cavalry is somewhere on the wings, like a bird. And who are in the center? Light infantry and also the baggage. Light troops. And how are the light troops described here? "Who themselves admit." Do you remember that passage?

Student: Cowards.

LS: Cowards. So let us call them "C." The cowards are in the center. These I think are the key tactical principles stated by Socrates in the *Memorabilia* in the third book. And this is a tactical principle also for a nonmilitary tactics, namely, how to build up a *logos*, a speech, not only an army. Now this is explicitly stated in books on forensic rhetoric. When you have to defend a defendant before the law court, you have to discuss what speaks in his favor in the front and in the rear, and the things which are not so defensible in the center—based on this principle of psychology; I don't know whether present-day psychologists have established it with the necessary charts. But you know from your own experience, every one of you, that attention is reasonably good at the beginning unless people have drunk or slept before coming to class. This may also happen, but ordinarily speaking, when people go to a lecture they listen in the first twenty minutes reasonably well, and then attention flags. And then in the moment the speaker says, "I come now to my conclusion"—which a wise speaker says twenty minutes before the end—then they are awake again. So those things which are therefore not so defensible come into the center. You find this in Cicero and in rhetorical writings elsewhere. Now this of course is also done in *logoi*, speeches which are not forensic, but [in] books like the *Memorabilia*, the *Cyropaedia*, or Plato's dialogues, and so on. This is the principle of which I know only by experience, that is, from deed. I have never found it explicitly stated in any author of this nature that what is in the center is the most important. Now the difficulty is only: Why should what is the center be the coward, or the least defensible? Well, I would say because these are the key issues which do not permit of an explicit public discussion. That is my hypothesis.

Student: You generally attribute this to ancient writing, and I know you attributed it to Rousseau last quarter. Where do you think this stops?

LS: More or less with Rousseau among the great writers, I would say. It stopped, you see, in the nineteenth century—in England and Holland it was earlier, but on the Continent, the European continent, and in America I suppose also, for America belongs in this respect to England, earlier America at least. No one should accuse me of trying to question the War of Independence. You cannot be too careful, not because of the FBI, but because of certain academic people, I am sorry to say. But in the European countries up to the French Revolution, and including the French Revolution and Napoleon, of course, there were definite limits to what could be said. All the works which are so famous today, with the exception of the writings of Rousseau, were all published anonymously. Think of such a book at Montesquieu's *Spirit of Laws*: the document of moderation, of political moderation, if there ever was one, had to be published anonymously in

Switzerland. And Montesquieu was a man very high in the French hierarchy. What was his precise function? He was a high judge in Bordeaux—I forgot the exact title—a high magistrate.[xv] That changed only in the nineteenth century, generally speaking, up to the emergence of communism. There was a degree of legally protected freedom of speech, especially in the academic speech, for which there is no precedent in the early ages. There was sometimes a very liberal *practice*, to some extent in Athens, to a larger extent in the Roman Empire. But an easy practice is not a legal guarantee. I mean, those fools who believe that laws are unimportant—you know, the practice alone doesn't count because the practice can be changed any time by any judge, any legislator. Law cannot be so easily changed. Whether these people who were prosecuted most ordinarily in earlier times deserved the persecution, that is another matter.

But we are now only concerned with the fundamental issue underlying what we call the First Amendment. There was no First Amendment in Greece, in Rome. It didn't exist, and therefore people who disagreed with the accepted views, with the views regarded as sacred by the *polis*—and this included also in each case the political establishment—it is amazing what it was possible to say in Athens regarding the established order, the democracy. It is amazing, but there was no legal guarantee for that. This was part of the charge against Socrates, that he corrupted the young. The first point which Xenophon mentions regarding this corruption charge is that Socrates said it is foolish to elect by lot—you know some very important magistrates were elected by lot in Athens—and that is a kind of high treason. Yes?

Student: It would be an interesting empirical thing to see if in the Soviet Union today those people making dissenting or somewhat off-color approaches to things might do the same thing.

LS: You see, the point is this. In the first place, when I came to observe this whole phenomenon, which was in the thirties, in the 1930s, and it became clear to me when the war had already started, and then I took it for granted that when the war is over, there will be some fellows, at least in Germany—because at that time I still had a very great faith in German scholarship in particular, which was due to my childhood prejudices—then there will be a number of historians of ideas, or however you will call them, who will have made the same observation which I have made, because they saw it every day, that they couldn't speak about the Hitler regime. Some books were written about this kind of thing. A German writer named Junger wrote a book.[xvi] I never read it but I heard about it. And this is the symbolic presentation of Hitler and his regime, which is, I have been told, quite easy to see through, and other things of this kind. And I have seen a single observation by a German scholar, who saw that this is, in a particularly vicious form but still in principle, the restoration of an older climate. People cannot speak about publicly relevant matters without observing certain limitations. He didn't draw any conclusion from that, but he had observed it. I think we simply have to relearn that this plays a very great role. Generally speaking, that is true of all heterodox writers—not the religious ones, because in the case of the religious ones, then there was a matter of duty to profess the true faith; and going to the stake for it, that was another matter. But men like Montesquieu would have no duty to go to the stake because he saw the defects of the absolute monarchy of Louis XIV. He thought he

[xv] Montesquieu was Président à Mortier in the Parlement of Bordeaux. He presided over the Tournelle, the Parlement's criminal division.
[xvi] Ernst Jünger, *Auf den Marmorklippen* [On the Marble Cliffs] (1939).

would do his best if he would indicate clearly enough that an order like the English order is preferable to the French order, and show that in France there was originally the elements of the English order—the parliament, and other institutions, only in France they were permitted to decay and [were] even deliberately destroyed from above—and other matters of course also concerning the religious problem. Now this one must keep in mind. And I think these tiny little things which we see all the time: an enumeration of five items, of trivial matters; even there, it always pays to consider why in this particular item in the middle, in the center. Yes?

Student: Who was the scholar you referred to?

LS: Georg Krüger. In one of his postwar publications he made the remark, but he didn't draw any conclusions. And some of you will know that I have made this assertion regarding various writers, one of them being John Locke, and I have been punished with great severity for that because people don't like it. But the question is simply not what one likes or what one does not like but what is true. And I believe in the case of Locke it is relatively easy to show when one considers *all* of his writings and not merely reading the *Second Treatise* by itself, which is a common practice, I believe, or perhaps even only snippets from the *Second Treatise* which however will not do. So, good.

Now let us turn to the last chapter. Here we have a touching farewell scene between the perfect wife and the perfect husband. Let us read only paragraphs 5 and 6.

Reader:
But at this moment Panthea bade all who stood near to retire and then she said: "Abradatas, if ever any woman loved her husband more than her own life—"

LS: One can translate it that way, but the word is of course "soul," and soul is here understood as that which gives life.

Reader:
"I think you know that I, too, am such a one. Why, then, should I tell of these things one by one? For I think that my conduct has given you better proof of it than any words I now might say. Still, with the affection that you know I have for you, I swear to you by my love for you and yours for me that, of a truth, I would far rather go down into the earth with you, if you approve yourself a gallant soldier, than live disgraced with one disgraced: so worthy of the noblest lot have I deemed both you and myself." (6.4.5-6)

LS: You see, she swears here by "friendship" or "love," [*philia*], not by the gods. I think this is the only case of this kind, that someone swears by something not the gods. Yes, next paragraph.

Reader:
"And to Cyrus I think we owe a very large debt of gratitude, because, when I was his prisoner and allotted to him, he did not choose to keep me either as his slave or as a freewoman under a dishonourable name, but took me and kept me for you as one would a brother's wife." (6.4.7)

LS: So that is clear. Now this highest love and perfect love between this perfect husband and perfect wife turns by itself in the circumstances into the service of Cyrus, and there is a strange paradox in that. I mean, on the one hand, it is perfectly legitimate: they owe Cyrus very much. And yet if we state it in general terms, a perfect love, a perfect couple, turns as such, in a way sacrifices itself, for Cyrus. There is also a certain incongruity. Why? What animates Cyrus, and what animates this couple, and which is the higher? That is the question. This is a kind of reflection, I believe, of the relation between philosophy and the *polis*. In other words, the tension between the *polis*—and here it is not only the *polis*, but this universal empire—and love of husband and wife. The tension between them reflects the higher. You can also say the tension between the family and the *polis*, between the home and the marketplace, points to something which is beyond that conflict. Well, according to the official doctrine we all know from Aristotle, the beginning of the *Politics*, the household is simply a part of the *polis*, a subordinate part, period. You know Sparta: the women breed the children so that they are soldiers later on, and if these boys die in battle, well, you can have some compassion with them if you want to, but that is irrelevant and immaterial: they have been bred for that purpose. This is not quite sufficient. The mothers, if they are not Spartans, will not agree with you, and this tension points to something beyond it. In other words, the superiority of the *polis* to the family is not so simply true. The superiority of the public to the private is not simply true. And the solution according to the classic philosophers is philosophy, insofar as in one sense the most private, what goes on in the mind of man, is concerned with the most public, with the whole, something much more public than the *polis*.

I would like to make one more remark about the general question. When she was captured, one of Cyrus's men entered the tent. Araspas tells the story. She was weeping. The man says: Don't weep any longer, because although your husband was gallant and noble, we will give you a husband even more gallant and noble. And she responds by weeping more, like Tigranes's wife. Everyone admired Cyrus because of his great virtues, and she did not even see him. To that extent there is a parallel between the Tigranes's wife's story and this story of Panthea. Now I think when we read the book and the more we go on, especially in book 6 and 7, we see that here the ruler, allegedly the most perfect ruler, shows himself as the most perfect ruler as conqueror, as the master of the military art, and this calls for some reflection. Why is this so? Why is the ruler decisively a warrior, a conqueror? Now according to a definition given in the *Memorabilia*, 3.2, end, the definition of a good leader is that he makes those whom he leads happy. Now the Greek word *eudaimonia* has the great range of meaning, going from something like "bliss" or "blessed" down to a mere "prosperity." This [wide][2] range of meaning must be considered. Cyrus is a good ruler because he makes all *Persians* happy, and therefore he is a perfect ruler. No ruler ever made his subjects as happy as Cyrus made the Persians. Yes, but how did he make the Persians happy? At the expense of others. Therefore the activity of the ruler is inseparable from and based upon conquest; and therefore it depends above all on his military capacities. In addition, he makes many others in need of the Persians, and thus he counteracts the envy of the others because, as was stated in a very telling paragraph which we have read, envy of people who are better off ceases in proportion as one needs these people and their superiority. If you see that other people get ten times your salary, then you may be envious of them, but when you see they have ten times as much trouble and danger as you have, and their troubles and dangers profit you, then your envy is likely to decrease.

And last but not least, he makes of course both the Persians and the others in need of himself, so they cannot be envious of Cyrus because he is so eminently useful to everyone. And he has the prudence not to spread it thick by saying, "Look at me"; he is always extremely condescending, and friendly, and philanthropic. We have found many examples of that. So the connection is—one can state it in greater generality as follows: Cyrus is a perfect ruler because he is establishing, as much as possible, a universal empire. And a universal empire means literally an empire embracing all mankind. In other words, the best ruler cannot be the ruler of an individual city, because the city is a part, and therefore there is always war or the possibility of war. But in a universal empire, at any rate, there wouldn't be any war anymore. We have seen some specimens of that. You remember the tribes who were fighting each other all the time: Cyrus pacified them, simply took away their arms, and they were protected. And if any one attacked the other, then Big Brother came in from above and takes care of the situation. Is this not a legitimate expression? I believe it was introduced into political science by Orwell.[xvii] Good.

But what is this universalism? The difficulty is that this kind of universalism is impossible, and that will be shown in the last chapter of the book. In the first place, it is not universal. It is only, say, even the whole of Asia, but he didn't conquer it, of course. He didn't conquer India, and he didn't conquer Europe, and he didn't conquer Africa—to say nothing of America, which they didn't know at the time, and Australia. So a universal empire was not achieved, and to the extent to which it was achieved it collapsed immediately after Cyrus's death, as we shall see. So this universalism is not possible. It is a false universalism. But one cannot see the falsity of that universalism if there is not a true universalism. This seems to be against all rules of logic, but it is the way which [3][Xenophon] likes to argue, and perhaps it is not against all rules of logic. Still, even in the ordinary sense one could not speak of a false universalism if there were not a true universalism, otherwise one would have to say universalism is simply bad. Now the true universalism according to this view is that of thought, of thinking, of philosophy, however you call it. And the false universalism is a reflection of the true universalism. One can say a perversion of the true universalism.

I jump now from the world of Greek thought, philosophy, to biblical thought. Then you have an amazing parallel. I think we should think of it in order to understand Xenophon better. He would not have used these terms, but the problem was there. How is this called, this perversion of the highest? What is the biblical symbol of that?

Student: Fallen angels?

LS: Fallen angels. There is something noble in it, the angelic but perverted, and that is called diabolical in biblical language. For Xenophon, or for Thucydides, or Plato and Aristotle, this is not diabolic in the biblical sense because that doesn't exist for them, but the perversion of nobility, to that extent it is I think meant by them. So the great attraction and splendor of this terrific thing Cyrus does is fully appreciated, not minimized, and that is even the thing which meets the eye immediately when one reads that book. I believe most readers see nothing but that splendor. And then the last chapter is declared to be spurious or written by Xenophon when he was out of his mind; I don't know what. But this belongs to the thing from the very beginning,

[xvii] George Orwell, *1984* (1949).

because the author of that book was the author of the *Memorabilia*, which is a fact, and one must put two and two together. In other words, when reading the *Cyropaedia* one must think of the *Memorabilia*, and vice versa. And this, I think, is the point. It has a splendor which nothing else perhaps has. Nothing else. As the noblest figure in Thucydides puts it: the greatest things, political freedom, freedom and empire—imitated by a German poet, Schiller, mankind's great objectives: empire and freedom.[xviii] That is so. And I believe that when one sees the great statesmen and captains, why do they attract many more people and many more, obviously? Every one of us, I believe, with the exception of people who are simply dogmatic—you know, pacifists and this kind of thing. That is so, and yet there is something fundamentally questionable behind it, and Xenophon makes it, I think, quite clear. This I think is ultimately the relation.

So Xenophon has brought this out very well by the structure of the whole book. This rule of men over men is, if it follows its own logic, conquest, universal conquest. And therefore this book is regarded as the classic of a work on the military art. I cannot say anything about this particular point, although I would be very much interested to read an analysis by someone who knows the military art and its history. It is of course theoretically very simple, what he says about the military art, these simple rules; and yet it seems that no one before Xenophon ever took the trouble of writing them down and elaborating them. One would have to do some work and compare it at least with Machiavelli's *Art of War*—but also there are ancient books on the art of war—and then one could see what the peculiarity of Xenophon's teaching on these matters is.

[1] Deleted "who."
[2] Deleted "long," replaced with "wide."
[3] Deleted "Plato"

[xviii] Friedrich Schiller, *Wallenstein Triology*, Prologue, ll. 61-69.

Session 15: February 20, 1963
***Cyropaedia* 7**

Leo Strauss: To come now to Mr. ____'s paper.[i] You understood very well the Croesus discussion. The point with Aristippus is really different. He did not need a defeat to understand this problem. The life of pleasure as he understands it, the nonpolitical life, is impossible. Because the key point of Socrates is [that] you wish to be free from the *polis* while being protected somehow by the *polis*; and Socrates says that's quite a job. So the situation is not identical, because Croesus of course gets the protection of Cyrus because Cyrus needs him very badly. But still, your reference was quite well taken. You also noticed Cyrus's interest in Abradatas's corpse. We have seen Cyrus's interest in corpses before.

The question of eunuchs is of course very important. That has a long history afterward in one very famous book of modern political philosophy. Eunuchs are the crucial symbol of oriental despotism in Montesquieu's *Persian Letters*, where a Persian living in France describes the fundamental political problems in terms of the problems he has at home with his harem and the eunuchs, and this stands for the problem of the absolute monarch and his ministers as well as his subjects. That might be worth your reading occasionally. A point which you made from a speech of Cyrus, that there are certain things which we share with all, with our slaves—heat, thirst, and so on—this of course plays a certain role in a certain egalitarian argument. The so-called sophist Antiphon, fragments of whose writings were recovered from papyri only fifty or sixty years ago; his thesis is that all men breathe, need bread, hence all men are equal, which is of course not a legitimate conclusion. If people are equal in some respects they don't have to be equal in all respects, nor does it mean that human beings are equal in the most important respects. The argument occurs also in Shakespeare's *Merchant of Venice*; Shylock makes this point,[ii] and Cyrus raises the same fundamental difficulty.

Today we proceed in a slightly different manner because of the special importance of the seventh book. Mr. ____?[iii]

LS: The point is this: every Aristophanean comedy has a manifest difficulty at the first reading. The *Lysistrata* has none, and therefore it is particularly popular. But the hitch is this. There is a problem here because the play is based on the assumption that sexual relations are possible only in marriage. Now if this is not so, then we see that the play is based on the premise that what is not legitimate, what is not according to *nomos*, is not possible for human nature. And once one sees that, the identification of *physis* and *nomos* is the hidden premise of the play; and once one sees that, one comes to a very deep stratum where also the question of *eros* and politics is of course raised. I must leave it at that now.

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[i] Strauss responds to a student's paper, read at the beginning of the session. The reading was not recorded.
[ii] *Merchant of Venice*, 3.1.58 ff, "Hath not a Jew eyes?"
[iii] The transcriber notes that there follows a mostly inaudible exchange between Strauss and the student concerning Aristophanes's *Lysistrata*.

Now I suggest we proceed somewhat differently today because there is one section of special importance for the understanding of the whole *Cyropaedia*, and therefore we begin with a short chapter, chapter 4. And we turn to the rest of the book later. Now let us read the first paragraph.

Reader:
Then the Carians fell into strife and civil war—

LS: Yes. Where is Caria, by the way? Very roughly.

Student: Southwest Asia Minor.

LS: Yes, near the coast, near Greek territory. Good.

Reader:
with one another; they were intrenched in strongholds, and both sides called upon Cyrus for assistance. So while Cyrus himself stayed in Sardis to make siege-engines and battering rams to demolish the walls of such as should refuse to submit, he entrusted an army to Adusius, a Persian who was not lacking in judgment generally and not unskilled in war, and who was besides a very courteous gentleman—

LS: "Witty" would be better; graceful, a man of grace. Charming, witty, not to say elegant—the same predicate Xenophon applied to hares in his book on hunting: a hare sitting on its haunches, that wonderful creature, charming, *eucharis*. Yes?

Reader:
and sent him into Caria; and the Cilicians and Cyprians also joined most heartily in this expedition. (7.4.1)

LS: Now here we see another man, Adusias he is called, and what is characteristic of him is that he has also a Greek name. There was another Persian high in Cyrus's graces who also had a Greek name. Do you remember him?

Student: Chrysantas.

LS: Chrysantas. Good. Let us read in paragraph 3 what Adusias does.

Reader:
Adusius now set out for Caria at the head of his army; and there came to him representatives from both parties of the Carians, ready to receive him into their walls to the injury of the rival faction. But Adusius treated both sides alike—

LS: "Did the same toward both." In other words, he is a fair man. He treats them equally. Yes, that's one point. Now?

Reader:
with whichever party he conferred, he said they were more in the right—

LS: You see?

Reader:
but they must not let their opponents know that he and they had become friends, alleging that he would thus be more likely to fall upon those opponents unprepared. Moreover, he demanded from the Carians pledges of good faith and made them swear to receive him without treachery within their walls to the advantage of Cyrus and the Persians, and he himself consented to give his oath— (7.4.3)

LS: "He was willing to swear." He doesn't say that he swore. There is no perjury committed. Yes?

Reader:
that he would without treachery enter their walls for the advantage of those who admitted him. And when he had done this, he made appointments with both parties for the same night—each party without the other's knowledge—and on that night he marched inside the walls and took possession of the strongholds of both. At day-break he took his stand with his army between the two and summoned the leaders of the two factions. And when they saw one another they were indignant, for they both thought they had been duped. (7.4.3-4)

LS: "Both deceived." How does Adusias get out of this fix?

Reader:
Adusius, however, addressed them as follows:
"Gentlemen, I gave you my oath that I would without treachery enter your walls for the advantage of those who admitted me. If, therefore, I destroy either party of you, I think that I have come in to the injury of the Carians; whereas, if I can secure peace for you and security for all to till the fields, I think I am here for your advantage. Now, therefore, from this day you must live together like friends, till your lands without fear of one another, and intermarry your children one party with the other; and if any one in defiance of these regulations attempts to make trouble, Cyrus, and we with him, will be that man's enemies." (7.4.5)

LS: I think that is all we need for our purposes now. What does Adusias do? He is not [one] hundred percent honest in the strict sense of the word, because there is some deception going on, an obvious deception. What is the result of that deception, of that action? He makes the two parts agree. Now this name which he has, Adusias, is not known in classical Greek and is known only in a very late dictionary by Hesychius.[iv] The verb occurs there, not the noun or adjective. It has a meaning something like "agreeing," so that I take the name to mean a man who makes people agree. They have found in the meantime in some inscription an earlier use of the word, fourth century, I believe, where it means not directly agree but "to become a member of" an association, which is of course something akin. However that may be, this is a man who makes people agree, agree so that they live in peace and harmony. We remember perhaps a figure from

[iv] Hesychius of Alexandria compiled in the fifth or sixth century a lexicon of surviving Greek words.

Memorabilia where the same problem is discussed. Answer: Socrates. Socrates does that all the time, but there is a more theoretical discussion of that.

Student: Third book?

LS: Yes. No, 4: [book] 4, [chapter] 6. You were not quite right. Book 4, chapter 6, where Xenophon presents Socrates's twofold dialectics: the scientific dialectics, we may say, and the popular dialectics. The popular dialectics has the purpose of making men agree, i.e., live in peace. And who is the authority to which Socrates refers, the model of this kind of dialectic?

Student: Odysseus.

LS: Odysseus. Wily Odysseus. So in other words, Adusias imitates Odysseus. Odysseus was known for his lack of veracity, but according to one school of thought he was nevertheless a noble man because he did not lie for his own benefit, but for public causes. But there was also a school of thought which said that Odysseus lied for his own benefit. There are two schools regarding this. But there is something else. I have referred to the fact that Adusias has a Greek name. Now there is a Greek in Xenophon's own *Greek History* who is a man of his time and who is also compared in a way to Odysseus, and that is a man called Derkyllidas. He was a Spartan general, an extremely nice man, perhaps the nicest man occurring in the *Hellenica*—surely in the first books. Now this Derkyllidas was a master diplomatist. I mean, not a cookie-pusher, but a man who succeeded in making peace without fighting it out all the time, by persuasion. And he was called by the Spartans or by the Athenians Sisyphus, Sisyphus being the grandfather of Odysseus. Well, of course the emphasis was not on the terrible fate of Sisyphus in hell, but they meant the super-cleverness which is indicated by the Greek word Sisyphus, which is derivate from *sophos*, wise. Sisyphus: super wise. So in other words, we are here reminded of Derkyllidas. Now let me make simply a guess. Here is Derkyllidas: What about Chrysantas? Can we identify him now? A Spartan of Xenophon's time engaged in war in Asia Minor. What other outstanding Spartan was there whom Xenophon collaborated with, to use a bad word. Pardon?

Student: Agesilaus.

LS: Agesilaus. And I was quite shocked when this occurred to me, but then I immediately recovered my composure, because what is the characteristic of Agesilaus? One characteristic.

Student: [. . .]

LS: But something much more obvious. Do you remember what he said in describing the looks of Chrysantas? He was not an imposing figure. Later on he will be called small. And Agesilaus also did not have a very imposing figure. He limped, and I think he was not a superior man from any point of view. And do you remember we had also Tigranes, the Armenian, not a Spartan, who corresponds to Xenophon? So this I believe is of some importance. If the greatest Spartans whom Xenophon knew, I mean the most outstanding ones, Agesilaus and Derkyllidas, appear here as lieutenants of Cyrus, that means in plain English there was no Spartan Cyrus. If we look at the Spartans of that day, we don't find a Cyrus-like figure. Surely Brasidas is an outstanding Spartan in Thucydides, but never occurs in Xenophon. Brasidas lived before his time, Brasidas

having died in 422 BC. So there is no Spartan Cyrus, and there is of course no Spartan Socrates. Two possible alternatives are not to be found in Sparta. By the way, this is also a continuation of the argument of Thucydides. There is no Spartan Themistocles, no Spartan Pericles. They are at best just nice gentlemen, of which there were plenty at Athens. But the outstanding figure, a man above the average, is only Brasidas, who is characterized by the fact that he is an Athenian in his nature who happened to be born in Sparta. So this I think is in perfect agreement with what I said.

Now I must finish. I tell you why I believe this is of some importance. For the time being I retract something which I have believed for two or three decades, and I would say now I have been barking up the wrong tree. Because the observation regarding Tigranes—Tigranes and Socrates, which is quite obvious, and Armenia and Athens—induced me to believe that the *Cyropaedia* presents the Socratic circle in a barbaric guise: that Cyrus is as it were, the barbaric Socrates, and then all these figures—Chrysantas, Hystaspas, Gobryas and Gadatas—are somehow members of the Socratic circle, if they would have been born in Persia or in Assyria. I still have some feeling that it was perhaps not entirely wrong, but for the time being I surely retract it. And I believe this new suggestion is absolutely defensible. Now the method which Xenophon uses: First we have Chrysantas and Hystaspas, you remember, two leading Persians; and then he has the two Assyrians, two famous traitors, Gobryas and Gadatas; Tigranes we know. Then a new point of view emerges, not so much the nationality, Persian-Assyrian, but the name. Chrysantas is clearly not a Persian name but a Greek name. But now if we link Chrysantas with Adusias, they, I believe, are identifiable as two heroes of Xenophon's *Greek History*—and as a matter of fact, of his own life, in the *Anabasis*. Is not Agesilaus mentioned toward the end of the *Anabasis*?

Student: Also the encomium.

LS: Yes. I found this amusing, and somewhat more than amusing. Now Mr. _____?

Student: [. . .]

LS: He is a Spartan. Derkyllidas is Xenophon's opposite number to Brasidas. But then he differs from Brasidas. Brasidas has been compared by Plato somewhere, in his *Banquet* if I remember well, to Achilles. And Derkyllidas is not an Achilles type, but an Odysseus type, but still a Spartan. I think he is the most charming man, a Spartan, occurring in Xenophon.

Student: [. . .]

LS: That is the point. This couple, Agesilaus-Derkyllidas, points to another couple, Chrysantas-Adusias, who, if understood, reveal to us the connection between the personnel of the *Cyropaedia* and the personnel of the true history. And the key point to remember is this. Figures who to the simple reader of the *Greek History* would appear to be at the top and, I think—I haven't read the recent literature on Xenophon, but I am absolutely sure that they believe Xenophon worshiped Agesilaus. I mean, that can be shown to be erroneous even if you read Xenophon's praise of Agesilaus, or at least the *Greek History*. But because he mentions a few virtues of Agesilaus and doesn't mention others, they think he was simply a worshiper of

Agesilaus. And Agesilaus was a kind of silly martinet, that becomes perfectly clear: he makes an enormous fuss with everything and doesn't achieve anything, whereas Derkyllidas, who makes no fuss, pacifies northwestern Asia Minor, the Greek part, in ten days, I believe, in a very short time. And then the Spartans in their great wisdom call him back. And then of course the mess starts again. But I think this only confirms this interpretation. Mr. ____, your point?

Student: [. . .]

LS: Well, I started from the fact that there are two poles: Cyrus and Socrates. And Socrates, that is altogether dialogic; and Cyrus, that is a narrative, which does not exclude, of course, that within the narrative also some conversations occur, although many more set speeches. But the dialogue is characteristic of Socrates and is not characteristic of Cyrus. Yes?

Student: [. . .]

LS: That I do not remember.

Student: You may be referring to two points: One, the fact that the *Memorabilia* climbs to a peak and you don't get Socrates talking to Plato; and the other suppression is that it is not Socrates who talks to a ruler about the art of ruling. In the *Hiero* you get Simonides the poet.

LS: Yes. Oh, I see, the contrast between the *Hiero* and—yes, I see now. Now if we put Socrates on one pole and Cyrus on the other, these two poles never meet. And that of course is of the utmost interest, to see these two peaks. But it is of course not feasible, because Cyrus was dead long before Socrates was born. But this has not prevented quite a few people from arranging this kind of thing: think what Plato does with Parmenides and Socrates meeting. But still it is a bit inconvenient, I admit that. But we have an equivalent however in the *Hiero*. There is a wise man, also beginning with an S, Simonides, [who] meets the ruler Hiero. But here the situation is not quite good, because Hiero is manifestly an imperfect ruler and the wise man is absolutely in the position of teacher, although he presents himself at the beginning as wanting to know things he can only hear from Hiero—so that the situation where Socrates would learn from Cyrus as he learned from Ischomachus, that is the point. The *Oeconomicus* is the particular place where Socrates is presented as learning from a ruler. But then one would have to reflect on why Xenophon could not easily present Socrates sitting at the feet of Cyrus and learning there the art of ruling. He did the second best, taking the most respectable Athenian, and not one of these famous names but just Ischomachus, and having Socrates sit at the feet of Ischomachus. The irony of course is that Socrates's posture towards Ischomachus is not so greatly different from what his posture would be if it had not been Ischomachus but even the older Cyrus. This is the point.

Student: [. . .]

LS: But the point is they are inferior, and I think I can prove that this distinction is relevant. In the brief reply of Tigranes, when he speaks just after Hystaspas—I think it was Hystaspas who had spoken of his *eros* for you, Cyrus, as the natural ruler. Do you remember? Or was it one of the others? Artabazus? Yes, but Hystaspas also makes a speech of similar intent. Tigranes replies

in one line, so to speak, and he simply says: I don't give you the reasons why I obey, but I obey. No, Tigranes does not admit the superiority of Cyrus because he remembers some fellow, yes, whom his father had killed. Do you remember? And this gives him a standard for seeing beyond Cyrus. Yes?

Student: [. . .]

LS: Well, if I may anticipate a point which will come up next time: you see we found some parallels to what this dirty Armenian king did to that sophist. What did the Assyrian king do to Gobryas and to Gadatas? He killed the son of the one, and he killed the possibility of Gadatas's having sons, also out of envy. Now if this reasoning is correct, that envy excuses even killing, then it would seem to apply to the Assyrian king as well. I think that is good logic, unless somebody would find that I commit—that I use a term with different meanings for different things; but in both cases, murder stemming from envy. Now what is good for the goose is good for the gander, that's one of the most sacred rules of logic. Then it would seem the Assyrian king also is excusable. But Gadatas and Gobryas do not behave as Socrates behaves, or this Armenian Socrates, surely a thinker. But this would lead to another matter which I suggest we postpone.

In this context, by the way, in paragraph 9, the Greek cities in Asia Minor are mentioned. And in paragraph 11 we find that Cyrus mixes Adousias with Hystaspas, brings them together, they command an army. I believe that mixing Adousias and Chrysantas would have been too obvious. Now since we are in this chapter let us read paragraph 12 to 13 for another example.

Reader:
Accordingly, they were thus engaged in executing these orders. But Cyrus, leaving behind a large garrison of foot-soldiers, started from Sardis in company with Croesus; and he took with him many wagons loaded with valuables of every sort. And Croesus also had come with an accurate inventory— (7.4.12)

LS: "Having written things," "writings." This would also be interesting to have a complete index of the references to writings in this barbaric book. Later on a marriage will be consummated, and part of the dowry, at least from the point of view of the groom, is a writing made by his father-in-law. Very strange. Good. Now go on.

Reader:
and as he handed the lists to Cyrus—[v]

LS: "The writings."

Reader:
the writings to Cyrus he said: "From this, Cyrus, you may know who renders to you in full that of which he has charge and who does not."

[v] In original: "and as he handed the lists to Cyrus—."

"Aye, Croesus," answered Cyrus; "you do well to take this precaution. As far as I am concerned, however, those shall have charge of the valuables who also deserve to own them; so that if they embezzle anything—" (7.4.12)

LS: You see, Cyrus is much better than Croesus. His foresight is by far superior. But nevertheless, what does he go on to say?

Reader:
"they will be embezzling from what is their own."
With these words, he gave the inventories to his friends and officers, that they might be able to tell who of the overseers delivered everything safe and who of them failed. (7.4.13)

LS: In other words, there might be some stealing going on in the lower echelons, but on the upper level Cyrus provides much better than they do.

Now since we are in chapter 4, we might as well pass on to chapter 5. In paragraph 5 the rule of tactics which we discussed last time is restated more powerfully: the best in the van and the rear, and in the middle the worst. So it is more emphatic than it was before. Let us read paragraph 32.

Reader:
While they were thus occupied, Gadatas and Gobryas came up; and first of all they did homage to the gods, seeing that they had avenged themselves upon the wicked king, and then they kissed Cyrus's hands and his feet with many tears of joy. (7.5.32)

LS: Literally translated, "weeping very much, together with joy and being pleased or elated." The last two words have been deleted by someone who found this redundant. Whenever they don't understand anything they delete, without—if they say it is a hard passage, all right, but if they say Xenophon cannot have written that? Where did Xenophon say, "I am going to write in such a way that Mr. Lincke,[vi] or whatever his name is, will understand this immediately?" He didn't write for him, perhaps. It is an apparent redundancy, but I believe it can be understood if we consider the fact that there are two participles: one is weeping, one is being pleased. What he wants to make clear—weeping would immediately suggest some sadness, grief, and it is made clear immediately that there was no atom of grief in the whole thing. Even their weeping was entirely joyful. That I think he brings out very well.

Now in the sequel, then, Cyrus makes himself king with the Persians in a privileged position. This was clearly not according to law. It may not have been technically illegal, that is a moot question. But surely this point has been reached now. And then there is this scene, to which Mr. ____ referred, in paragraphs 38 to 41, in which Cyrus demonstrates *ad oculos*, so that the meanest capacity can see it, that he must have seclusion. You see, he doesn't take on the style of a king and change his manner abruptly. Then they can say: This snobbish fellow was formerly so kind, so nice a fellow, and now he shuts himself up. No, he shows everyone that he must have some seclusion. And this is done very well. Let us read only paragraph 46.

[vi] Karl Linke, an editor of the Greek text who thought there had been an interpolation at 7.5.32.

Reader:
"Perhaps some one may ask why I did not adopt this arrangement in the beginning instead of making myself accessible to all. It was, I answer, because I realized that the demands of war made it necessary for a commander not to be behind others in finding out what he ought to know nor in doing what it is expedient that he should do. And I thought generals who were seldom to be seen often neglected much that needed to be done." (7.5.46)

LS: In other words, to make oneself scarce. Cyrus makes himself scarce, and that is part of his new position. And he makes clear why hitherto he did not make himself scarce: because a general cannot afford that, he must have discipline and must inspire and order. But as a king, the highest civilian authority superior in every way, he must make himself scarce. Now paragraph 56.

Reader:
"But now, seeing that you do not hold your power by this method alone but are in a position in still other ways to win the hearts of those whom it is of advantage for you to win, it is meet that you should now have a home." (7.5.56)

LS: That is what Chrysantas says. Yes?

Reader:
"Else what enjoyment would you have of your power—"

LS: "Rule." Yes?

Reader:
"if you alone were to have no hearth and home of your own? For there is no spot on earth more sacred, more sweet, or more dear than that." (7.5.56)

LS: You see? No more sacred—more holy—more pleasant, and more one's own than a house. And the next sentence. "And furthermore he said."

Reader:
"And finally," he said, "do you not think that we also should be ashamed to see you living in discomfort, out of doors, while we ourselves lived in houses and seemed to be better off than you?" (7.5.56)

LS: After all, Cyrus, the poor fellow, also needs a house, which even his humblest subject has—a house; privacy. But this has a somewhat different meaning for a king because a king needs seclusion for the sake of greater solemnity, *semnotes*, so that he appears to be grander. Familiarity breeds contempt. Once or twice a year, perhaps, so that the proper distance is preserved. Paragraph 58.

Reader:
This done, he began at once to organize the rest of his court. And as he considered his own situation, that he was undertaking to hold sway over many people, and preparing to dwell in the

greatest of all famous cities, and that that city was as hostile to him as a city could be to any man—as he reflected on this, he decided that he needed a body-guard. (7.5.58)

LS: You see, I think it is clear beyond a shadow of doubt that Cyrus is no longer simply a ruler over willing subjects. I mention this as well as other points at the same time because they all prepare this seemingly paradoxical last chapter. When this wonderful man who is filled with nothing but philanthropy, love of human beings, and everyone knows that he is just sweet, and then suddenly the whole thing collapses with his death. That is very well prepared by Xenophon if one reads with a bit of care. Now in the immediate sequel of course there comes the case for eunuchs which is developed. Let us read only paragraph 60.

Reader:
Those, therefore, who had children or congenial wives—

LS: Observe the qualification.

Reader:
or sweethearts, such he believed were by nature constrained to love them best. (7.5.60)

LS: "By nature constrained." Compare *Hiero*, chapter 3, paragraph 9. The eunuchs of course being under no such constraint[1] [give] free voluntary allegiance to a man like Cyrus. That is very interesting, we cannot—paragraph 66 to 68.

Reader:
But, as he deemed this guard insufficient in view of the multitude of those who bore him ill-will—

LS: You see? Again.

Reader:
he looked around to see whom he could find among the rest who would be the most trustworthy guards about the palace. Now he knew that the Persians on account of their poverty lived in the greatest privation at home and were accustomed to a life of the hardest toil, because their country was rugged and they had to work with their own hands; so he believed that they would especially welcome life with him. Accordingly, he took from among them ten thousand spearmen— (7.5.66-68)

LS: And so on. So the other big thing is the Persians. We get here some additional information about Persia. He hadn't said a word about it when describing Persia in the first book—you remember that—because Persia is a utopia. And here we get an inkling. And here is the seed of the corruption, naturally. They come suddenly from this very poor life into a very wealthy, affluent society, and this quick transition is bound to have effects.

Student: [. . .]

LS: But that does not exclude that they are heavily armed. This means simply they are an additional bodyguard. I do not know if this excludes heavy armed.

Student: But spearmen had not been serving as his heavy troops.

LS: No, no, they are not meant to be for fighting service. They are meant to protect him, and always be around, you know, just like the people who guard the president are not supposed to go to war. Now paragraph 69.

Reader:
And since he considered that all Babylon, too, stood in need of adequate protection, whether he himself happened to be at home or abroad, he stationed there also an adequate garrison, and he arranged that the Babylonians should furnish the money for their wages, for it was his aim that this people should be as destitute of resources as possible, so that they might be as submissive and as easily restrained as possible. (7.5.69)

LS: That's the tyrannical principle. *Hiero*, chapter 5, paragraph 4. Paragraph 72, 73.

Reader:
and when they had come together he addressed them as follows—

LS: Cyrus.

Reader:
"Friends and allies, thanks be above all to the gods that they have vouchsafed to us to obtain all that we thought we deserved. For now we are in possession of broad and fertile lands and of subjects to support us by tilling them; we have houses also and furniture in them."

LS: "Which feed us." More literally, "feed us by tilling the soil," so we do not have to do the dirty work any more. Yes?

Reader:
"And let not one of you think that in having these things he has what does not belong to him; for it is a law established for all time among all men—"

LS: "A sempiternal law among all human beings," the only reference to such a law occurring anywhere in Xenophon. Yes?

Reader:
"that when a city is taken in war, the persons and the property of the inhabitants thereof belong to the captors. It will, therefore, be no injustice for you to keep what you have, but if you let them keep anything, it will be only out of generosity that you do not take it away." (7.5.72-73)

LS: Nice generosity, because they need them. You see, they don't kill them because someone has to do the dirty work. This is of course important, that [this comes] after this tyrannical principle was stated in paragraph 69. Cyrus, as every captain before and after him, has to show

that this is justice. No ruler can afford to say: My basis is injustice, mere force. No one can say that. A commander, or however they call these fellows in a concentration camp, may say it, but not a ruler. He must always have some basis in law, in right. Now the right stated here is this: the victor is entitled to everything. We have won the war and we are even nice, we don't kill all of them, we don't put all of them in jail or concentration camps. And of course this generosity would be extremely rewarding.

Student: [. . .]

LS: Yes, that's the same question which you raise. It is not stated in this exact version, but the principle is the same.

Student: [. . .]

LS: "Eternal" is very hard to translate into Greek, but "sempiternal"—that word occurs here, from *aei*, always, *aidios nomos*. One couldn't express it more strongly. This is Cyrus's basis. Mr. _____?

Student: [. . .]

LS: Not yet. No, no. Ischomachus also doesn't go deeply into these things. And if you get the right kind of bailiff, and the bailiff can use a lash, you don't have to worry provided there are people around who, in case of any great revolt, would take the necessary steps. Cyrus could be relied upon to know how to do that. Let us read paragraph 75, then.

Reader:
"For, to have quitted yourselves once like valiant men does not, we know, assure the perpetuity of valour, unless you devote yourselves to it to the end—"

LS: The word which he translates here by "valour" is of course the Greek word for "good," which frequently means primarily martial valor, but not necessarily. Go on.

Reader:
"but, just as skill in other arts retrogrades if neglected, and as bodies, too, that were once in good condition change and deteriorate as soon as the owners relax into idleness, so also self-control and temperance and strength will take a backward turn to vice as soon as one ceases to cultivate them." (7.5.75)

LS: You see, here three virtues are required. I translate, according to my usual translation: moderation, continence, and martial strength. Moderation is distinguished here from continence, and it may include justice according to what we have seen in *Memorabilia*, book 4, but justice as such is no longer mentioned. And you see also the clear distinction between moderation and continence again. Now, next paragraph.

Reader:

"Therefore, we dare not become careless nor give ourselves up to the enjoyment of the present moment; for, while I think it is a great thing to have won an empire, it is a still greater thing to preserve it after it has been won." (7.5.76)

LS: This is Cyrus. Yes?

Reader:
"For to win falls often to the lot of one who has shown nothing but daring; but to win and hold—that is no longer a possibility without the exercise of self-control—" (7.5.76)

LS: "Without moderation, nor without continence, nor without much care." So these are the virtues required in peace. Moderation, continence, are the same, but martial valor and daring are no longer so important for peace as caring, which means: Supervise your bailiff and watch for any incipient slave uprising, and this kind of thing. Next paragraph.

Reader:
"Recognizing all this, we ought to practice virtue even more than we did before we secured these advantages, for we may be sure that the more a man has, the more people will envy him and plot against him and become his enemies, particularly if, as in our case, he draws his wealth and service from unwilling hands." (7.5.77)

LS: Yes, you see that is the problem of justice come back again: the rule over unwilling subjects, the sign of tyrannical rule as stated in the *Memorabilia*. Next paragraph.

Reader:
"We must, therefore, believe that the gods will be on our side; for we have not come unjustly into our possessions—"

LS: You see? "But."

Reader:
"through plotting against other, but plotted against we have avenged ourselves." (7.5.77)

LS: We have come into this position because we only defended ourselves, but by merely defending ourselves we came into the property of everything belonging to the enemy. This is a very difficult question, whether you can take more than compensation for the damage the enemy did to you. And suddenly the allies whom they defended are now in the position of subjects. So one can say Cyrus's proof of the justice of his rule is exactly what they now call an ideology. Paragraph 79.

Reader:
"but the science and practice of war we need not share at all with those whom we wish to put in the position of workmen or tributaries to us, but we must maintain our superiority in these accomplishments, as we recognize in these the means to liberty and happiness that the gods have given to men. And just as we have taken their arms away from them, so surely must we never be

without our own, for we know that the nearer to their arms men constantly are, the more completely at their command is their every wish." (7.5.79)

LS: One couldn't state it more beautifully than Xenophon puts it: We disarm them and don't let them practice or even see arms. By the way, some homely remarks about the importance of arms—there was a remark when he spoke of the eunuchs I forgot to mention. Paragraph 65, let us read that.

Reader:
And if it is thought with some justice that they are inferior in bodily strength, yet on the field of battle steel makes the weak equal to the strong. (7.5.65)

LS: You have heard this applied to another weapon in the nineteenth century in this country. A certain gun was called the great equalizer. In use a hundred years ago or so, something everyone can easily buy and easily learn to handle. You don't need armor or a horse, which makes all men equal regardless of any natural inequalities.

So let us now turn to the beginning of book 7, and we must consider a few points. At the beginning there is a big battle which in itself decides the whole war. Cyrus of course encourages the new troops, in chapter 1, paragraph 10 to 13. There are five speeches altogether which he makes. This is quite interesting: fundamentally the same address [is] given to all, but he varies them. Being an imaginative man, he doesn't have to repeat the formulation literally. And in the central speech alone are the gods mentioned. Paragraph 17, the reference to Cyrus's "talking big" occurs, which Mr. ____ noted. In the middle of paragraph 17, would you look at that?

Reader:
Cyrus indulged in such boastful speech only on the eve of battle; at other times he was never boastful at all— (7.1.17)

LS: Or "not very much." By the way, does Socrates boast? The same word, "talking big."

Student: In the *Apology*.

LS: In the *Apology* of Socrates by Xenophon, Socrates is said to have "talked big" in his defense at his trial.

Student: Does it have the same meaning?

LS: Sure. Sure, it has the same meaning, but since—when the translators and interpreters come, these famous people who are presented by Swift, you know, in *Gulliver*, in book 3, when they come down into the nether world and then they see two august figures, and then a multitude of shades running away; and Gulliver asks who they are and he is told: These are Homer and Aristotle, and these are the commentators.[vii] That Cyrus could talk big is bearable, but that Socrates could have been said to have talked big is impossible, and therefore—I don't have a

[vii] Jonathan Swift, *Gulliver's Travels*, part 3, chap. 8.

translation here, I am sure they would translate it differently. They would use a euphemism to satisfy their very delicate taste.

Student: I don't want to push it too far, but the phrase "talked big," if that's the real translation, has two different meanings, depending on the context.

LS: I see. That may be true of the Greek, but as far as I know the only evidence of a good meaning of the term is this passage in Xenophon. But you have to check on that, of course. Now the most interesting event in this battle is of course the Egyptians, the only ones who really fight and create a difficulty. And of course the Egyptians are also responsible for the death of Abradatas, the husband of the beautiful Panthea. Now they can't be moved from the place, and Cyrus attacks them from the rear, and so Cyrus himself is in danger on this occasion. Let us read only paragraph 40. Finally they are surrounded on all sides, but they don't move. They are slaughtered, but they don't give in. Yes?

Reader:
And when he had ascended the tower, he looked down upon the field full of horses and men and chariots, some fleeing, some pursuing, some victorious, other vanquished; but nowhere could he discover any division that was still standing its ground, except that of the Egyptians; and they, inasmuch as they found themselves in a desperate condition, formed in a complete circle and crouched behind their shields, so that only their weapons were visible; but they were no longer accomplishing anything, but were suffering very heavy loss. (7.1.40)

LS: "And they did nothing anymore, but they suffered many terrible things." This is the statement of it. Now this passage about the Egyptians is of course entirely fictitious, since Cyrus never defeated the Egyptians, so far as I know. He surely didn't conquer Egypt. That also is not said here. But later on, I believe Egypt is presented as conquered in the seventh book. But who conquered Egypt in fact? Cyrus's son Cambyses. This is of course told at great length by Herodotus. What kind of a fellow is Cambyses? We have to consider this for one moment because Xenophon surely knew Herodotus.

Now very briefly, the Herodotean scheme is this. There is first of all of course the Greeks, and the war with Persia, books 7 to 9 in Herodotus. But the Persians are one extreme and the Egyptians are the opposite extreme. And the Greeks, a moderate, sensible people, are in the middle. And what is the difference? The Persians are the impious people. They are the ones who destroyed the temples in the Persian War. The Egyptians are the opposite: they are excessively pious, as Herodotus puts it. They worship everything. Everything old is a god. Therefore also the oath "By the Dog," because any dog, any cat, anything, will do as a god. Socrates says explicitly, "By the Dog, the god of the Egyptians," to remind us of this connection. So when the Persian king Cambyses comes to Egypt, one of his most striking deeds is that he kills the sacred bull Apis. And this is a terrible crime, and that of course shows his absolute madness, according to Herodotus, and he ends badly. The Greeks are in the middle: they are pious; they are not excessively pious. This is roughly the scheme of Herodotus. It is restated more clearly—because in Herodotus you have to infer it—in a passage in Cicero's *Republic,* when he speaks of these three nations and describes them in these terms.

Now let us see here. To come back now to our passage, the Egyptians were conquered by Cyrus's son Cambyses, who killed the bull Apis, this madman. In Xenophon, Cyrus, who is surely pious and not tainted by any impiety as is Cambyses, defeats the Egyptians. Now if we look at it, the passage is of some difficulty, because Cyrus's arrangements are discussed in book 6, chapter 4, paragraph 17 to 18. And it is a question to which I don't have a ready answer, whether Cyrus underestimated the Egyptians—which can happen to the best general, of course—or whether this seeming underestimation was a pretense because he knew he couldn't break through. If Abradatas sacrificed his life and keeps them busy while he goes around is another matter. In other words, Cyrus may have thought from the very beginning he could only out-general them, and not defeat them by mere valor. But why did Xenophon invent this incident, which has no basis? In Lessing, a well-known German writer of the eighteenth century, I read this remark, which may go back to an earlier commentator, for all I know: "The Egyptians, who understand less of the military art than all other enemies, were nevertheless the only ones whom Cyrus could not beat."[viii] In other words, according to this interpretation, the Egyptians by their marvelous stand would show the limitations of the military art. Here it is said, in the passage which we read, the Egyptians could not do anything but were very good at suffering. Unbeatable in this respect. In other words, their fortitude was a passive one, not an active one. This surely reminds you—it certainly reminded me of some other passage where the active and passive fortitude are opposed to one another—in the same political science book, not necessarily twentieth century.

Student: Thucydides, where Athens failed against Egypt.

LS: Very good. In a way, that was a turning point. No expansion toward the east, therefore the Athenians turned toward the west, ultimately toward Sicily. That's very true, however in this connection nothing is said by Thucydides about the Egyptians' passive fortitude in opposition to the Athenian active fortitude. Well, no less a man than Machiavelli, in the *Discourses*, book 2, chapter 2, he speaks in a very famous passage (it's a fairly long chapter) where he contrasts the pagans with the Christians, where he says: "Since our religion has shown the truth and the true way, it makes us esteem less the honor of the world, whereas the gentiles estimating it rather high, and having put in the honor of the world the highest good, were in their actions more ferocious."[ix] And then he describes that, for example, the bloody sacrifices, that sounds almost like Cyrus:

" the multitude of animals was slaughtered, which sight being terrible, made men similar to it. The ancient religion besides did not gratify except men of worldly glory as the captains of armies and the rulers of republics. Our religion has glorified more the humble and contemplative men than the active ones. Furthermore, it has put the highest good in humility, abjection, and in the disparagement of human things. The other one put it in the greatness of mind, in strength of the

[viii] Gotthold Lessing, "Die Ägyptier, welche von der Kriegskunst weniger verstanden als andere Feinde des Cyrus, waren gleichwohl die einzigen, die er nicht schlagen konnte. Lib. VII. c. 1," in *Werke, Fünfter Band: Literaturkritik, Poetik und Philologie* (München, 1973), 768. I owe this citation to Hannes Kerber.
[ix] Machiavelli, *Discourses* 2.2. Strauss's translation.

body and in all other things fit for making men most praised. And if our religion demands that you have fortitude, it wishes that you be apt to suffer rather than to do a strong thing."[x]

This is exactly the same point which Xenophon makes here. And this has led to the present state of the world. Of course, Xenophon could not well have had Christianity in mind, but if you think of the symbolism which is supplied by Herodotus, i.e., the country of piety is Egypt. Of course none of the Greeks ever went inland in Asia Minor. They knew the Phoenician cities Tyre and Sidon, but they never went into this poor hinterland Judaea. Then they would have changed their minds about the Egyptians. But not knowing Judaea, for them Egypt was the country of piety, Egyptian priests and so on—that occurs in many places. And I regard it as possible that this passage is a classical, and more particularly a Xenophontic, parallel to what Machiavelli, who had greater knowledge of the situation—of course, [he] simply had greater empirical knowledge of [it]—made later on. Yes?

Student: [. . .]

LS: Yes, but you see all this comes down to this neat formula at the end of paragraph 40: they could not *do* anything but they suffered many things. I do not claim to exhaust this question, but I believe that this consideration is of some importance.

Now in chapter 2 we find the capture of Sardis and its king, Croesus. This of course is an old story and fundamentally true, also described by Herodotus. And apparently that was the topic of many inventions: the conversations between that defeated king Croesus, who through his defeat had come to his senses, and this nice, wise, conquering king: Cyrus.

Student: I'm sorry, but I don't understand what the explanation of Lessing has in common with Machiavelli.

LS: Lessing didn't give an explanation, he only stated a fact. An explanation to some extent, yes, insofar as he says the Egyptians lack the military art completely. This is not in the text, as far as I can see.

Student: Then you are extending from there to the issue of passive versus active.

LS: Yes, this is based on Xenophon; whereas I must say Lessing's statement, which I have not looked up again in the context, was made by him when he was very young, and I don't know on what it is based. I don't think he quotes anything; he mentions it casually. But as far as I [can] see, there is nothing said about the Egyptians lacking the military art. They were surely not up to Cyrus's standard, but others also who were not up to Cyrus's standard could not be said to have lacked the military art. What is said is that they did not do anything and they only suffered. Whether they have active or passive fortitude is borne out by the description: they don't surrender until Cyrus gives them honorable terms. Yes?

Student: Doesn't Nietzsche make this distinction?

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[x] Machiavelli, *Discourses* 2.2. Strauss's translation.

LS: Sure, but you must not forget that in this matter Nietzsche doesn't say anything which Machiavelli had not said before. Nietzsche elaborated it in various other ways, but this simple distinction is, I would say, stated by Machiavelli in more moderate terms than it is stated by Nietzsche.

Student: The same would apply to Nietzsche.

LS: But for good or for ill, Machiavelli is a terribly important writer. I mean, they all had read him. A contemporary of Hegel, a German philosopher named Fichte—whom Hegel knew by heart, because when Hegel was young Fichte was in his prime, and you know such young people as Hegel read these things with eagerness—had written an essay on Machiavelli, in particular.[xi] But Machiavelli was as well known at that time as Sigmund Freud is read today. And perhaps also, by the way, he must be read with greater care than Freud. Good.

Now the action which is most important in this connection is what Cyrus does about the rape of the city, of which we cannot read the report. Of course not. But not from the point of view of high moral principle, but it is a silly thing. Confiscation is much more practical. Everyone brings in his property and then it is divided up according to merit: that's much better than allowing each soldier to rob what he wants, naturally. That doesn't need a special justification. Unfortunately not all generals are able to prevent it as well as Cyrus could.

Paragraphs 15 to 17: this conversation we have to consider.

Reader:
"But pray tell me, Croesus," he resumed, "what has come of your responses from the oracle at Delphi? For it is said that Apollo has received much service from you and that everything that you do is done in obedience to him." (7.2.15)

LS: You see, this is a conversation just prompted by curiosity. Cyrus is finished with all the hard business, and then he has time for a leisurely conversation and this interests him, that's all.

Reader:
"I would it were so, Cyrus," he answered. "But as it is, I have from the very beginning behaved toward Apollo in a way contrary to all that he has advised."

"How so?" asked Cyrus; "please explain; for your statement sounds very strange."

"At first," he answered, "instead of asking the god for the particular favor I needed, I proceeded to put him to the test to see if he could tell the truth. And when even men, if they are gentlemen—to say nothing of a god—discover that they are mistrusted, they have no love for those who mistrust them." (7.2.16-17)

[xi] Johann Gottlieb Fichte, "Über Machiavelli als Schriftsteller, und Stellen aus seinen Schriften" (1807).

LS: Does this remind you of a parallel, where Apollo is tested and likes it as little as any Indian fighter in the West? If you suggest he might lie, he resents it. But who tried to test Apollo whether he would say the truth? Socrates, in Plato's *Apology*.[xii] He asks him. Socrates represents Apollo saying that Socrates was the wisest of all Greeks, and Socrates says that is utterly incredible and so he must test him. And this testing gets him into trouble, not primarily with Apollo as here, but with the Athenians, because he can test Apollo only by proving to all Athenians that they are less wise than he is. And they don't like it. But you could of course say in an indirect way this is also the effect of Apollo. That is hard to say. So that is the first point. Apollo behaves like a gentleman; he doesn't like that. Now the next point.

Reader:

"However, as he knew even about the gross absurdities I was engaged in, far as I was from Delphi, I then sent to him to inquire if I should have male issue. And at first he did not even answer me; but when I had at last propitiated him, as I thought, by sending many offerings of gold and many of silver and by sacrificing very many victims, then he did answer my question as to what I should do to have sons; and he said that I should have them." (VII 2.18-19)

LS: So you see, first Apollo behaved like a gentleman; now he does not behave like a gentleman because he is vehement. He first didn't answer until he gave him lots of gifts, so no wonder he is not in good graces with him. Go on.

Student:
"And I had; for not even in this did he speak falsely; but those that were born to me have been no joy to me. For the one has continued dumb until now, and the other, the better of the two, was killed in the flower of his youth. Then, overwhelmed by the afflictions I suffered in connection with my sons, I sent again and inquired of the god what I should do to pass the rest of my life most happily; and he answered me: 'Knowing thyself, O Croesus—thus shalt thou live and be happy.'" (7.2.20)

LS: And he was very pleased by that, that fool Croesus, because he thought nothing is easier than that. It is hard to know other men, because they conceal themselves; they present themselves as better than they are. But everyone can look into his mirror and find out. And this was of course the thing which brought him down. Especially the idiocy of Croesus is shown in paragraph 21 in the first place.

Reader:
"And when I heard this response, I was glad; for I thought that it was the easiest task in the world that he was laying upon me as the condition to happiness. For in the case of others, it is possible to know some; and some, one cannot know; but I thought that everybody knows who and what he himself is." (7.2.21)

[xii] *Apology* 21a.

LS: By the way, there is another point which must be brought out. If, of course, he means it as special advice to Croesus, he doesn't understand that the god, or the priestess, means this applies to all men. Of course it is meant[2] [for] all men: self-knowledge is the guarantee of happiness. Now if self-knowledge is so easy as Croesus believes, all men would be in fact happy, which is clearly contrary to fact. He is wholly thoughtless, and he imputes to the god or to the priestess a wholly thoughtless thing. Here is the point. I need only repeat what Mr. ____ said. Croesus's self-knowledge is this: he could not possibly win against a man stemming from gods and a long royal line and who had trained himself from his youth in virtue. Of course, that he should have known in advance. He knows nothing of Cyrus's particular nature. This is only implied in the divine descent of Cyrus. Paragraph 25.

Student:
"But, Cyrus," said he, "I know myself now. But do you think Apollo's declaration still holds true, that if I know myself I shall be happy?" (7.2.25)

LS: Literally: "Do you still think that Apollo states the truth?" In other words, he still offends the god. He still assumes that Apollo might not say the truth. This is implied.

Now the sequel. He still offends Apollo, and it so happens that he becomes happy. Croesus becomes happy only through Cyrus's intervention, because Cyrus thinks it expedient to save him, to spare him. Cyrus's conduct toward Croesus vindicates Apollo, which of course is in agreement with Cyrus's piety. But for Cyrus, Apollo would be a liar, because if there had been another conqueror he would have killed, or tortured, or whatnot, Croesus. So this is the story.

In the sequel Croesus is now perfectly happy when he is reduced to the life of a wealthy woman—not merely a woman, that wouldn't be good enough for him, Mr. ____, she must be a wealthy woman living in luxury. Cyrus is the man, *aner*, that we have seen before. Compared with him, all others are women. Paragraph 29.

Reader:
At hearing these words Cyrus wondered at his good spirits, and after that he always used to take Croesus with him wherever he went, whether, as may well have been, because he thought Croesus was of some service to him, or whether he considered that this was the safer course. (7.2.29)

LS: So Cyrus is amazed. He cannot understand how a man could be satisfied with such a reduced status, and at the same time of course is practical, as always. He never neglects that. Here we have seen in chapter 2 Croesus's and his wife's perfect happiness, and in the next chapter we see Panthea's and her husband's complete misery. If we may draw such a general conclusion from this simple incident, Cyrus makes fools like Croesus perfectly happy and he made the lovers perfectly unhappy. We will see whether that—you remember also the case of Tigranes and his bride, however, who were not rendered perfectly unhappy by Cyrus because they were more cautious than Panthea and her husband were. We see now that Panthea's husband has died, and she repents her folly. Paragraph 8 to 10.

Reader:
And when he saw the lady sitting upon the ground—

LS: Well, it is of course a woman. "Lady" is justified to that extent because it is meant in the same way as *aner*, man: real man, not a female.

Reader:
and the corpse lying there, he wept over his loss and said: "Alas, O brave and faithful soul, hast thou then gone and left us?" And with the words he clasped his hand, and the dead man's hand came away in his grasp; for the wrist had been severed by a sabre in the hands of an Egyptian. And Cyrus was still more deeply moved at seeing this— (7.3.8-9)

LS: This is of course very unphilosophic. He can't make the dead in any way worse. He is an ordinary human being; the feelings belong there.

Reader:
and the wife wept aloud; but taking the hand from Cyrus, she kissed it and fitted it on again as best she could—

LS: It is a bit macabre, isn't it? But we should perhaps not laugh as much as we do.

Reader:
and said: "The rest of his limbs also you will find in the same condition, Cyrus; but why should you see it?" (7.3.10)

LS: She does not know him.

Reader:
"And I am in no small degree to blame that he has suffered so, and you, Cyrus, perhaps not less than I. For it was I that, in my folly—"

LS: Yes, "I, the foolish woman."

Reader:
"urged him to do his best to show himself a worthy friend to you; and as for him, I know that he never had a thought of what might happen to him, but only of what he could do to please you. And so," she said, "he has indeed died a blameless death, while I who urged him to it sit here alive!" (7.3.10)

LS: She says a "blameless death." Now "blameless" is of course not the highest term of praise. When Socrates was offered a wonderful dinner in the richest house in Athens, he said what no one today would say when invited to a very wealthy house: "that was a blameless dinner."[xiii] That would be a shocking understatement, I believe, because Socrates would never say "a

[xiii] Xenophon, *Symposium* 2.2.

wonderful dinner," because that term he reserves for other things than a dinner. Now what happens next?

Reader:
For some time Cyrus wept in silence and then he said aloud: "Well, lady, he indeed has met the fairest of ends—"

LS: "The most beautiful end," not blameless; that could not—if people are going to think that death on the battlefield is only the least blameful death, then where would he get his soldiers? So he uses another word.

Reader:
"for he has died in the very hour of victory—" (7.3.11)

LS: "For he has finally found his end while being victorious": that is the most beautiful end.

Reader:
"but do you accept these gifts from me"—for Gobryas and Gadatas had come with many beautiful ornaments—"and deck him with them."

LS: Literally, "adorn him." Because the end was the most beautiful, the most noble, his corpse needs adornment. That corresponds to the beauty of the death.

Reader:
"And then, let me assure you that in other ways also he shall not want for honours, but many hands shall rear to him a monument worthy of us, and sacrifice shall be made over it, such as will befit a man so valiant. And you," he continued, "shall not be left friendless, but on account of your goodness and all your worth—" (7.3.11-12)

LS: "Your moderation," which here means of course female virtue. "And your whole virtue." Yes?

Reader:
"I shall show you all honour; and besides, I will commend to you some one to escort you to the place where you yourself desire to go. Only let me know to whom you wish to be conducted."

"Ah, Cyrus," Panthea answered, "do not fear; I shall never hide from you who it is to whom I wish to go." (7.3.12-13)

LS: You see, Cyrus thinks that this single death was so perfect that by honoring the dead and the widow, the death is no longer so terribly important. We have a parallel to that, a much more impressive parallel to that, in Pericles's Funeral Speech in Thucydides. You know; you all have read that. And I think the most characteristic thing of the Funeral Speech is that Pericles never mentions the words "dying," "death," or "corpses," except once he speaks of an "unfelt death."

That is also a kind of delicacy, compared with the Gettysburg Address where Lincoln does mention it. Lincoln did not have the slightest wish not to mention death and the dead, because it was even given in a cemetery. But Pericles's Funeral Speech is on a much higher plane, something like Cyrus's action here. Of course, for Cyrus the illusion of immortality through glory, just as in the case of Pericles, is the reason why death is minimized.

We must read one more paragraph. Paragraph 15. Panthea commits suicide. She doesn't wish to live any longer.

Reader:
When Cyrus heard what the woman had done, he was filled with dismay and hastened to the place to see if he could bring any help. And when the eunuchs, three in number, beheld what had occurred, they also, standing in the spot where she had ordered them to stand, drew their daggers and drove them into their own breasts.

[And now even to this day—[xiv] (7.3.15)

LS: I am very glad he translated it, because in this edition it is regarded by (who is that?) Mr. Dindorf.[xv] The nineteenth century, the heyday of *athetēsis*. Of course it belongs to the text. Read it.

Reader:
[And now even to this day, it is said, the monument of the eunuchs is still standing; and they say that the names of the husband and wife are inscribed in Assyrian letters upon the slab above; and below, it is said, are three slabs with the inscription the mace-bearers.][xvi] (7.3.15)

LS: I.e., the eunuchs. Now this monument is called the monument of the eunuchs, although of course it was primarily for the wife and the husband. The eunuchs have received greater fame, greater honor, greater glory, than Panthea and her husband, whatever Cyrus might wish to have ordered. They are remembered, the three faithful eunuchs are remembered more than the couple. This is what can happen to planned glory or honor after death. I think that is perfectly fitting that this is meant here, and not as Dindorf thought, who wanted to have it all on the same level of simple enjoyment for himself. Mr. ____?

Student: On the other hand, the eunuchs have more fame because of Xenophon than the others.

LS: All right, but this is of course a slightly different story because, as far as I know and I think as far as anyone knows, this is Xenophon's invention. That is a different story. But Pericles was that real statesman who brought Athens to the peak of her glory, and the deepest motive was for himself and for his Athens' everlasting glory. Invented greatness depends, of course, ultimately on the inventor. What would be a good example of a merely invented glory? What great ruler

[xiv] Brackets in original.
[xv] Karl Wilhelm Dindorf, a nineteenth-century German classicist.
[xvi] Brackets in original.

exists only by virtue of speech and not by virtue of deeds? I don't know of any at the moment. There must be.

Student: Good King Wenceslas?

LS: Well, I don't know that story. He never lived?

Student: He is remembered in a Christmas carol, and there seems to be no place to pin him down.

LS: Is there not a novel or a drama in the last century where some great chief is presented who is merely a figment of the imagination? I do not know. It would be quite interesting if there were no such novel or drama. I mean, it would throw some light on novel and drama in the last century, if this doesn't exist.

Student: You mean a wholly fictitious king?

LS: Yes.

Student: There were certain novels popular around the turn of the century.

LS: But if they are already forgotten now, then I suspect that they were not very good.

Student: They were very popular.

LS: Sure, I suppose quite a few of the Western heroes are of the same kind.

Student: King Lear.

LS: Yes, surely King Lear is, much more through Shakespeare than he would be through Holinshed[xvii] or whatever the source may be.

Student: I thought Cyrus himself may have given an order on the one hand for a monument, as it was for the mace-bearers alone.

LS: Sure, but how come it is now called the monument of the eunuchs and not of this marvelous couple? Perhaps there is something else to it, come to think of it: that because of Cyrus's lack of interest in a perfect married couple—that is proven by his own life—he gave rise to the emphasis on the eunuchs.

Student: From here on the eunuchs in a sense are more important.

[xvii] Raphael Holinshed (1529-1580), author of *Holinshed's Chronicles of England, Scotland, and Ireland* (1577), the primary source for a number of Shakespeare's plays.

LS: Yes, that is true. He is much more concerned with eunuchs than with happily married couples. Sure.

Student: And with faithful servants.

LS: Yes.

Student: And it is very appropriate for these two Gadatas and Gobryas to bring gifts.

LS: Yes. That[3] has a simple reason: because they were fellow subjects of the Assyrian king, his old friends.

Student: How about King Arthur?

LS: I thought of him. But he lived. I learned this from Churchill's *History of the English-speaking Peoples*.[xviii] He was a king, and one of the last British kings fighting against the Romans or the Saxons; that I forget.

Student: It's hotly disputed.

LS: Well, let us not—for after all, we cannot possibly settle this kind of thing. Yes, this has another stratum. It occurs to me, this passage, you know, that it has to do something with Cyrus [and] the shift of emphasis from the primary objects of honor, the married couple, to the secondary objects. Yes, that makes sense.

Student: Doesn't Herodotus have Cyrus put an inscription of himself on a wall or cliff?

LS: Yes, I remember, but my answer to this is very clear. We are now reading Xenophon, and what it means in Herodotus we will find out when and if we read Herodotus. Unfortunately there is no ghost of a chance that we read him in this seminar.

Student: [. . .]

LS: For a proper interpretation, one would of course have to study carefully Herodotus's account of Cyrus, which as you know is entirely different—which does not necessarily mean that everything Herodotus says is demonstrable truth, because he also had something up his sleeve, I believe, regarding these matters. Now is there any other point anyone would like to bring up? Mr. ___?

Student: Is it possible the first time it is mentioned, the name of Adusias was passed over—verbal noun or something like this?

[xviii] Winston Churchill, *A History of the English-Speaking Peoples*, 4 vols. (1952-1957), vol. 1, 58-61. The invaders against whom Arthur fought were Saxons. Churchill notes that Arthur was described by Collingwood as "the last of the Romans."

LS: Let me see. You are quite right. The best manuscripts. I have to retract a few things. It is of course still Greek, but the name is Kadousias in the best manuscripts.

Student: Does a capital set it off as a name?

LS: No. Kadousias; that I had not considered. I do not know however whether—this edition is not very good. I would have to take the best edition of the *Cyropaedia*. When Adusias is mentioned later on—let me see, line 9—there is no reference any more. Well, in other words, it might very well [be] that in all other cases he is called Adusias in all the best manuscripts and only here he is called Kadousias. That might be. And that would be then some justification for reading Adusias also here. I do not know that. We cannot solve these questions.

I remember I gave once a seminar on Machiavelli's *Discourses* (that must have been about 1952[xix]) and I read it at that time very simply on the basis of the assumption that the *Prince* deals with princely government, with monarchy, and the *Discourses* deal with republics, i.e., that in the *Discourses* the highest consideration deals with the notion of the common good in Machiavelli's sense, in the vulgar sense of the word, freedom, power, wealth, and virtue only as a means for producing the common good. What we did, my students and myself, in that seminar was probably atrocious, but at that time there was not yet this invention[xx] so there is no record of that. And I remember only that the last three meetings of that seminar I saw, on the basis of the last fourteen chapters of the book, that Machiavelli questions this concept of the common good in the last fifteen chapters. I had not seen that he had already been questioning it much earlier. And then my whole edifice, which wasn't too beautiful anyway, broke down; and I made the decision [that] at the earliest decent opportunity—that is, in two years—I am going to give another seminar on the *Discourses*, where we start from what I had seen there. And then many things took shape which at that time were wholly unintelligible. And then in that seminar, also much too late to be of great use for that particular seminar, I saw that the key to this book is what I should have seen from the very beginning: because the book is not called *De Republica*, *On the Republic*, but it is called *Discourses on the First Ten Books of Livy*—in other words, that the first ten books of Livy are the clue to this book. Nothing could be more obvious, more elementary, and more demanded by common sense. But that is the trouble: we never are simple enough. And so I made another decision that in two years from now I give another seminar, and then indeed the main difficulties which had prevented an understanding cleared up. Now to apply this to our case, if I were still alive in two years from now, physically or morally—[by] "morally," I mean there are certain time limits for academic activity—I would say let us have another seminar on the *Education of Cyrus*, where some things which have come up at a rather late stage in this seminar could be used as a starting point, and then we might be able to see many more things. How do they call it? Continuing education.

[xix] Strauss taught a seminar on Machiavelli's *Discourses* at the University of Chicago in the autumn quarter of 1950, and again in the autumn quarter of 1952. There are no extent audiofiles or transcripts of these courses.

[xx] Strauss presumably refers to the tape recorder.

[1] Deleted "are."
[2] Deleted "to."
[3] Deleted "has to do—that."

Session 16: No date
***Cyropaedia* 8**[i]

Leo Strauss: I believe I can say what you tried to do[ii] was to show that the eighth chapter, the final chapter, does not come as a surprise . . . There are indications of that before. From the beginning, the praise of Cyrus is qualified.

Student: . . .

LS: I mean, we learned something about the Armenians in the course of our study.

Student: . . .

LS: The question of the title you discussed very well—the absence of law proper, the emphasis on "I" and . . . in Xenophon. Also the difference between Cyrus the father and Cyrus the shepherd, that's all very sound. That was very good what you said about the end of the *Memorabilia*, where Xenophon bids us to read his other books, where he describes men other than Socrates, of course in the first place Cyrus, but also Agesilaus and the other men. That is perfectly true. Ya, and the concern with fame. Cyrus conquers the world and loses his soul . . . His empire is an impressive, empty shell, and it therefore collapses.

Now before we go on I have to make a few remarks.[1] Mr. Emmert—this is not directly relevant, but I . . . take the liberty—wrote a very good master's thesis on Winston Churchill . . .[iii] In his thesis he made the point that the most important theoretical statement of Churchill is *Amid These Storms: Thoughts and Adventures*. Now when I read it, I didn't see your point; and then I came to the end of the volume 3, which justified your statement. There is one passage which has only indirectly to do with this course, but something because the subject is laughter, that has come up more than once. Permit me to read that.

"The late Duke of Devonshire, the famous Lord Hartington, talked to me about public meetings on several occasions. He was once accused of yawning in the middle of an important speech of his own in the House of Commons. When asked if this was true he replied: 'Did you hear the speech?' [Laughter] On another occasion he went still further: 'I dreamt,' he said, 'that I was making a speech in the House. I woke up, and by Jove I was!'"[iv]

It is a wonderful story. Now Mr. Johnson . . . gave me a paper on laughing and . . . in the *Cyropaedia* which I think is a very good paper, but I couldn't check on it. But he tried to put

[i] The transcript of this session is based on the remastered audiofile.
[ii] Strauss responds to a student's paper, read at the beginning of the session. The reading was not recorded.
[iii] Kirk Emmert, *The Political Thought of Winston Churchill* (Master's thesis, The University of Chicago, 1963).
[iv] Winston Churchill, *Amid these Storms: Thoughts and Adventures* (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1932). The passage is met with great laughter by the class.

together all the references to laughter and to interpret it. Now how many copies of that do you have? Then I can keep it? Good. I will use it . . .

And now let us turn to the eighth book. Ya, it begins with a speech by Chrysantas to the nobles. He sees the good ruler as the good father. The one thing needful is obedience, like children . . . Everyone who is somebody is now a ruler, of course under Cyrus. What everyone expects from his inferiors, he himself must do to Cyrus. And this whole system is now called in paragraph 4 *monarchia*, the rule of a single man. The original version was of course a republic, and not the rule of a single man. The complete coincidence of the good of the ruler and the good of the ruled makes obedience an evident necessity, no question. Now Chrysantas's proposal is adopted unanimously by the leading men. This is the legal basis of Cyrus's rule. Let us read at the end of paragraph 8. Mr. Reinken?

Mr. Reinken:
Accordingly, the nobles came to Cyrus's court with their horses and their spears, for so it had been decreed by the best of those who with him had made the conquest of the kingdom. (8.1.8)

LS: Ya. A unanimous decision of the nobility lays the basis. Now in the sequel he describes the military order as a model for administration of the internal things, the things which are called here the economic things, which corresponds to what is meant now by administration. Economy has a larger meaning in Greek, a metaphorical meaning. For example, the expression "economy of the truth"; the things to say and not to say is called economy of the truth.

Now paragraph 16 to 20 develops a theme of very great importance and we might perhaps read that.

Mr. Reinken:
In this way, then, he secured leisure for himself and for his ministers; and then he began to take measures that his associates in power should be such as they ought to be. In the first place, if any of those who were able to live by the labours of others failed to attend at court, he made inquiry after them; for he thought that those who came would not be willing to do anything dishonourable or immoral, partly because they were in the presence of their sovereign and partly also because they knew that, whatever they did, they would be under the eyes of the best men there; whereas, in the case of those who did not come he believed that they absented themselves because they were guilty of some form of intemperance or injustice or neglect of duty. We will describe first, therefore, the manner in which he obliged all such to come— (8.1.16-17)

LS: "Compelled" would be better. Go on.

Mr. Reinken:
he would direct some one of the best friends he had at court to seize some of the property of the man who did not present himself and to declare that he was taking only what was his own. So, whenever this happened, those who lost their effects would come to him to complain that they had been wronged. (8.1.17)

LS: You see?

Mr. Reinken:
Cyrus, however, would not be at leisure for a long time to give such men a hearing, and when he did give them a hearing he would postpone the trial for a long time. By so doing he thought he would accustom them to pay their court and that he would thus excite less ill-feeling than he would if he compelled them to come by imposing penalties. That was one of his methods of training them to attend. (8.1.18-19)

LS: Yes?

Mr. Reinken:
Another was to give those who did attend the easiest and the most profitable employment; and another was never to distribute any favours among those who failed to attend. But the surest way of compulsion was this: if a man paid no attention to any of these three methods, he would take away all that he had and give it to some one else who he thought would present himself when he was wanted; and thus he would get a useful friend in exchange for a useless one. And the king to-day likewise makes inquiries if any one absents himself whose duty it is to be present. (8.1.19-20)

LS: So . . . no retired life is possible under Cyrus, that is clear. The abolition of privacy, which includes, as we shall see, also the practical abolition of private property. Mr. Boyan?

Student: . . . future kin.

LS: You must not forget Cyrus the conqueror, not to be confused with the younger Cyrus. The younger Cyrus, the younger brother of the Persian king, trying to depose his brother. That story in chapter . . . Xenophon tried to help this younger brother in his unjust deed. But he could say later: Well, that is not my business, that is a Persian affair. Persian legality is not binding on the Greeks. They were hired people, mercenary soldiers, and Xenophon was one of them. They . . . fortunately or unfortunately had to march back to the coast under the leadership of Xenophon, and this is Xenophon's *Anabasis*. So he knew Persia, and all these things are partly based on . . . also how easy it would be to conquer the Persians, which Alexander did later on. Mr. ____?

Student: The eighth chapter . . .

LS: Sure. That is a point which he—or at least they are of questionable goodness, like that they don't spit. They don't spit in public. This is in itself a good thing, not to spit in public, doubtless, but it is not the most fundamental base of good government. Paragraph 22 we have to read.

Mr. Reinken:
For he thought he perceived that men are made better through even the written law, while the good ruler he regarded as a law with eyes for men, because he is able not only to give commandments but also to see the transgressor and punish him. (8.1.22)

LS: Yes, this is a key point: the seeing law, and therefore superior to any non-seeing law, any original law. But it means in effect of course something more, because this seeing law is also the lawgiver, the man who can make and unmake the law, and is therefore surely above the law in every respect. The next paragraph, please.

Mr. Reinken:
In this conviction, he showed himself in the first place more devout in his worship of the gods, now that he was more fortunate; and then for the first time the college of magi was instituted . . . and he never failed to sing hymns to the gods at daybreak and to sacrifice daily to whatsoever deities the magi directed.[v] (8.1.23)

LS: Yes. You see, this is an apparent contradiction, because the magi have been mentioned quite a few times before. But one can resolve that contradiction very easily. The religious establishment, even to the extent to which it antedates Cyrus, now originates in Cyrus. The source of its legal validity is from now on Cyrus. Or to use later language: no dualism of powers. There is no independent power of the magi; there is only a secular ruler. Paragraph 25.

Mr. Reinken:
And Cyrus considered that the piety of his friends was a good thing for him, too; for he reasoned—

LS: In other words, not only for them, but also for him. Yes? Because if they didn't have the latter quality, it wouldn't be sufficient.

Mr. Reinken:
as they do who prefer, when embarking on a voyage, to set sail with pious companions rather than with those who are believed to have committed some impiety. And besides, he reasoned that if all his associates were god-fearing men, they would be less inclined to commit crime against one another or against himself, for he considered himself their benefactor— (8.1.25)

LS: In other words, their gratitude to the benefactor has a religious sanction and therefore religious men, pious men, are likely to have more. But this is strictly from the point of view of Cyrus's selfishness.

Now he enumerates here the virtues . . . piety, sense of shame, obedience, moderation, and continence. Nothing, as Mr. Butterworth pointed out, about justice. Paragraph 31 is bracketed in your edition, but I don't think it should be bracketed. Yes?

Mr. Reinken:
[Moreover, he distinguished between considerateness—

LS: No. "Sense of shame."

Mr. Reinken:
and self-control—

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[v] Ellipses in the original.

LS: And "moderation."

Mr. Reinken:
in this way: those who feel[vi] shame are those who avoid what is offensive when seen; the moderate[vii] avoid that which is offensive, even when unseen.][viii] (8.1.31)

LS: Yes, and 32.

Mr. Reinken:
And he thought that moderation—

LS: No, "continence."

Mr. Reinken:
could best be inculcated, if he showed that he himself was never carried away from the pursuit of the good by any pleasures of the moment, but that he was willing to labour first for the attainment of refined pleasures. (8.1.32)

LS: So the distinction between moderation and continence is here repeated, and the result? The next paragraph.

Mr. Reinken:
To sum up, then, by setting such an example Cyrus secured at court great correctness of conduct on the part of his subordinates, who gave precedence to their superiors; and thus he also secured from them a great degree of respect and politeness toward one another. (8.1.33)

LS: Yes. "Sense of shame." He doesn't say the other things. In other words, fine manners all around. Yes?

Mr. Reinken:
And among them you would never have detected any one raising his voice in anger or giving vent to his delight in boisterous laughter; but on seeing them you would have judged that they were in truth making a noble life their aim. (8.1.33)

LS: Ya. "Would believe" . . . would believe it . . . because perfect manners create an impression of perfect character. But the conclusion is not valid. Now someone had a question. Mr. ____?

Student: . . . in moderation . . .

LS: Ya, sure we discussed that when we considered the chapters of the fourth book of the *Memorabilia* dealing with moderation, moderation consisting of piety and justice. This is a problem . . . moderation understood. Therefore, when Xenophon speaks finally about the matter

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[vi] In original: "with sense"
[vii] In original: "self-controlled"
[viii] Brackets in original.

at the end of book 4, he speaks explicitly of piety and justice in contradistinction to moderation. And the reason is that justice is there not lawabidingness, but benefiting one's fellow man, because lawabidingness might very well be harming one's fellow man. Proof: the small boy with the big coat, and the big boy with the small coat.

Now in the sequel he discusses the virtues which Cyrus's subjects acquired through hunting. And the virtue is only one: continence. Surely you do not become moderate through hunting, but you do become continent—you have to endure hunger and thirst, and go without sleep for quite some time. Paragraph 40.

Mr. Reinken:
We think, furthermore, that we have observed in Cyrus that he held the opinion that a ruler ought to excel his subjects not only in point of being actually better than they, but that he ought also to cast a sort of spell upon them. (8.1.40)

LS: "To bewitch them."

Mr. Reinken:
At any rate, he chose to wear the Median dress himself and persuaded his associates also to adopt it; for he thought that if any one had any personal defect, that dress would help to conceal it, and that it made the wearer look very tall and very handsome. For they have shoes of such a form that without being detected the wearer can easily put something into the soles so as to make him look taller than he is. He encouraged also the fashion of pencilling the eyes, that they might seem more lustrous than they are, and of using cosmetics to make the complexion look better than nature made it.
He trained his associates also not to spit or to wipe the nose in public, and not to turn round to look at anything, as being men who wondered at nothing. All this he thought contributed, in some measure, to their appearing to their subjects men who could not lightly be despised. (8.1.40-42)

LS: In the light of previous remarks, this bewitching serves boasting, so that they appear to be better, taller than they are. So Cyrus is a boaster, all right, as we have suspected on another occasion. They must not turn to the look, to the contemplation, of anything—not to the contemplation of a beautiful woman, for example, or any other thing worth looking at. To "admire nothing," that's a famous word of Horace, but in Horace it has a somewhat nobler meaning[ix]. But here it is a kind of prudently instilled snobbishness. It is nothing which can impress us . . .

Mr. Reinken: Xenophon says himself he is a wonderer . . .

LS: No. Socrates turns to them, when he was told there was a woman—she was not particularly outstanding for virtue, but she was singularly beautiful and it was said no one can describe her. And Socrates said: Let us have a look at her, if she is beyond description. You see here the

[ix] "Nil admirari prope res est una, Numici, solaque quae possit facere et servare beatum," Horace, *Epistola* 6.

beginning of this, and there are many more examples, Xenophon uses here the second person plural, and he does this regularly, and then turns at a certain point to the first person singular.

The next two paragraphs. There is so much, and we have so little time. Let us read the next two paragraphs.

Mr. Reinken:
Those, therefore, who he thought ought to be in authority he thus prepared in his own school by careful training as well as by the respect which he commanded as their leader; those, on the other hand, whom he was training to be servants he did not encourage to practise any of the exercises of freemen; neither did he allow them to own weapons; but he took care that they should not suffer any deprivation in food or drink on account of the exercises in which they served the freemen. And he managed it in this way: whenever they were to drive the animals down into the plains for the horsemen, he allowed those of the lower classes, but none of the freemen, to take food with them on the hunt; and whenever there was an expedition to make, he would lead the serving men to water, just as he did the beasts of burden. And again, when it was time for luncheon, he would wait for them until they could get something to eat, so that they should not get so ravenously hungry. And so this class also called him "father," just as the nobles did, for he provided for them well [so that they might spend all their lives as slaves, without a protest].[x]
(8.1.43-44)

LS: Xenophon has only utter contempt for the welfare state as the chief good—I think that's fair to say. In the sequel Xenophon explains how Cyrus arranged for his own security, from those who might be "great-souled," who might be magnanimous. We have to read paragraph 46.

Mr. Reinken:
But there were some whom he considered very powerful and whom he saw well armed and well organized; and some of them, he knew, had cavalry under their command, others infantry; and he was aware that many of them had the assurance to think that they were competent to rule; and these not only came in very close touch with his guards but many of them came frequently in contact with Cyrus himself, and this was unavoidable if he was to make any use of them—this, then, was the quarter from which there was the greatest danger that something might happen to him in any one of many ways.
So, as he cast about in his mind how to remove any danger that might arise from them also, he rejected the thought of disarming them and making them incapable of war—
(8.1.46-47)

LS: . . .

Mr. Reinken:
for he decided that that would be unjust, and besides he thought that this would be destruction to his empire. On the other hand, he believed that to refuse to admit them to his presence or to show that he mistrusted them would lead at once to hostilities. But better than any of these ways, he recognized that there was one course that would be at once the most honourable and the most

[x] Brackets in original.

conducive to his own personal security, and that was, if possible, to make those powerful nobles better friends to himself than to one another. We shall, therefore attempt to explain the method that he seems to have taken to gain their friendship. (8.1.47-48)

LS: "*I* shall therefore attempt" . . . and he speaks in the first person singular.

Student: . . .

LS: Partly, yes, but which of course Xenophon couldn't have in mind, because . . . I must read to you a comment on this passage by Dakyns, the old translator, who is really a very charming man. "The archic man's"— "archic" is the Greek word *archos*, for ruling man—"dealings by those of his subjects who are apt to rule, the men of high thoughts and ambitions, with whom he must come into constant contact. With them the spiritual dominance alone will do. They shall be made to love him rather than themselves. (The only thing just here that jars is a sort of Machiavellian self-consciousness, resented in the archic man.)"[xi]

So in other words, it is not quite philanthropic. And here, regarding paragraph 46, he says: "A cumbrous disjointed sentence, but the thought of it is clear enough. Even Xenophon's style breaks down when he tries to say in a breath more than he naturally can. Is it a sign of senility, or half-thought-out ideas, or what?"[xii]

But that it could be connected with the slightly unsavory character of the thought, that Mr. Dakyns has not considered. Now in the next chapter—

Student: . . .

LS: Well . . . the people who regard themselves as worthy of great honors and are worthy. People who could say: Well, I could be as good a ruler as Cyrus. Or we too together could do this and therefore . . .

Student: . . .

LS: These people who have a high opinion of themselves, these poor fellows who are beat down, and have to work the whole day in the fields, they are not interested . . . They have plenty of grass around to make themselves . . . But these people, the generals, might be dangerous. You can see what is going on with what some French generals think of themselves. [Laughter] Good. In the next chapter he deals then with the question, how Cyrus makes friends. The principle is—well, how do you make a dog your friend? You give him good food, the same as Cyrus does here. We cannot read all that, let us read paragraphs 5 to 6, which are very relevant here. There is the question of Cyrus's superb kitchen.

Mr. Reinken:

[xi] Note to book 8, sections 46-48, *The Education of Cyrus*, trans. Henry Graham Dakyns (London: J. M. Dent & Sons; New York: E. P. Dutton, 1914).
[xii] Note to book 8, section 46.

That this, however, should be so is no marvel. For just as all other arts are developed to superior excellence in large cities, in that same way the food at the king's palace is also elaborately prepared with superior excellence. For in small towns the same workman makes chairs and doors and plows and tables, and often this same artisan builds houses, and even so he is thankful if he can only find employment enough to support him. And it is, of course, impossible for a man of many trades to be proficient in all of them. (8.2.5)

LS: You know this thought from another place . . . the *Republic*: one man, one art . . . Yes?

Mr. Reinken:
In large cities, on the other hand, inasmuch as many people have demands to make upon each branch of industry, one trade alone, and very often even less than a whole trade, is enough to support a man: one man, for instance, makes shoes for men, and another for women; and there are places even where one man earns a living by only stitching shoes, another by cutting them out, another by sewing the uppers together, while there is another who performs none of these operations but only assembles the parts. (8.2.5)

LS: You see, an amazing description of the division of labor . . . But you see this is not Adam Smith. It is much older than Adam Smith, he's only incorporating it into a modern context. Yes?

Mr. Reinken:
It follows, therefore, as a matter of course, that he who devotes himself to a very highly specialized line of work is bound to do it in the best possible manner.
Exactly the same thing holds true also in reference to the kitchen: in any establishment where one and the same man arranges the dining couches, lays the table, bakes the bread, prepares now one sort of dish and now another, he must necessarily have things go as they may— (8.2.5-6)

LS: He says, "necessarily I believe" here. Yes, he definitely does . . . Yes?

Mr. Reinken:
but where it is all one man can do to stew meats and another to roast them, for one man to boil fish and another to bake them, for another to make bread and not every sort at that, but where it suffices if he makes one kind that has a high reputation—everything that is prepared in such a kitchen will, I think, necessarily be worked out with superior excellence. (8.2.6)

LS: "I believe." He repeats that in this context, "I believe," because this means he has no certain knowledge of it, he has only figured it out. Xenophon says this about the kitchen for the same reason for which Socrates says, when he had a fine dinner at Callias's house, "it was a blameless dinner,"[xiii] which was an utterly tactless remark and had to be excused only by ignorance. Let us read the next paragraph.

Mr. Reinken:
Accordingly, Cyrus far surpassed all others in the art of making much of his friends by gifts of food. And how he far surpassed in every other way of courting favor, I will now explain. (8.2.7)

[xiii] Xenophon, *Symposium* 2.2

LS: "I" again. You see, we don't have statistics on the use of "I" and "we." For a full interpretation, we would have someone do the same job regarding "I" and "we" which Mr. Johnson did for "laughing" and "weeping." Yes?

Reader:
Though he far exceeded all other men in the amount of the revenues he received, yet he excelled still more in the quantity of presents he made. It was Cyrus, therefore, who began the practice of lavish giving, and among the kings it continues even to this day. For who has richer friends to show than the Persian king? Who is there that is known to adorn his friends with more beautiful robes than does the king? Whose gifts are so readily recognized as some of those which the king gives, such as bracelets, necklaces, and horses with gold-studded bridles? For, as everybody knows, no one over there is allowed to have such things except those to whom the king has given them. (8.2.7-8)

LS: Ya. You see, in other words a certain kind of property can only be due to royal gifts. But as a matter of fact, no property there is secure without the king approving it. Because . . . But then there is a point of the utmost importance. Paragraphs 10 to 12, which we must read, because that is very topical in the twentieth century, at least as much as it was then.

Mr. Reinken:
Moreover, we—

LS: "We."

Mr. Reinken:
Moreover, we have discovered that he acquired the so-called "king's eyes" and "king's ears" in no other way than by bestowing presents and honours; for by rewarding liberally those who reported to him whatever it was to his interest to hear, he prompted many men to make it their business to use their eyes and ears to spy out what they could report to the king to his advantage. As a natural result of this, many "eyes" and many "ears" were ascribed to the king. But if any one thinks that the king selected one man to be his "eye," he is wrong; for one only would see and one would hear but little; and it would have amounted to ordering all the rest to pay no attention, if one only had been appointed to see and hear. Besides, if people knew that a certain man was the "eye," they would know that they must beware of him. [Laughter] (8.2.10-11)

LS: Sure.

Mr. Reinken:
But such is not the case; for the king listens to anybody who may claim to have heard or seen anything worthy of attention. And thus the saying comes about, "The king has many ears and many eyes"; and people are everywhere afraid to say anything to the discredit of the king, just as if he himself were listening; or to do anything to harm him, just as if he were present. Not only, therefore, would no one have ventured to say anything derogatory of Cyrus to any one else, but every one conducted himself at all times just as if those who were within hearing were so many eyes and ears of the king. I do not know what better

reason any one could assign for this attitude toward him on the part of people generally than that it was his policy to do large favours in return for small ones. (8.2.11-12)

LS: Here he says, "I do not know"—which "I" is an extremely simple man, as you see from this remark. Touching simplicity.

Now in the sequel he states then the point that Cyrus is a good ruler in the sense of the good shepherd, no longer of the good father. That is[2] important, but the key point, Mr. Butterworth explained it very well, but there is one point which we must never forget. A shepherd is a ruler who belongs to a different species than the ruled. The father belongs to the same species. Therefore from this point of view the rule of the father is lower than the rule of the shepherd. That we must not forget. And of course the bewitching is needed in order to make people believe that he belongs to a different species. Mr. ———?

Student: . . .

LS: Surely, the shepherd takes care of the herd for the benefit of the owner. And here of course it is proper to say, here is a shepherd who is at the same time the owner. I mean, all the shearing and killing, slaughtering is done—pardon?

Mr. Reinken: He is not a vegetarian shepherd.

LS: Well, this is a possibility we can dismiss here because it is not discussed by Xenophon. I don't remember a single vegetarian statement. It existed in Greece; there were schools who were vegetarians, Pythagoras, Empedocles and so on, but not Xenophon. Paragraph 19.

Mr. Reinken:
And when this became apparent, Cyrus is said to have remarked: "Do you observe, Croesus, that I, too, have my treasures? But you are proposing to me to get them together and hoard them in my palace, to put hired watchmen in charge of everything and to trust to them, and on account of those hoards to be envied and hated. I, on the other hand, believe that if I make my friends rich I shall have treasures in them and at the same time more trusty watchers both of my person and of our common fortunes than any hired guards I could put in charge." (8.2.19)

LS: In other words, Cyrus's generosity pays well, and it amounts of course also to the denial of private property. People have all these slaves, but whenever Cyrus needs something he will kindly say: Would you . . . what can the other fellow do but to respond to so much kindness by kindness of his own? Mr. ___, you wanted to say something?

Student: Does Cyrus, in the *Cyropaedia*, develop the fathers rule and the shepherd's rule [so] that there must be a difference in kind? We have to consider why it is possible, why these capable men, say, Chrysantes, could not take up the role of the father-ruler. Of course no one would be the shepherd-ruler, it would be the same kind . . . I don't know why this thing comes apart so fast, because he had so many very capable men around him. Why couldn't this father-rule . . . shepherd-rule . . .

LS: If you had been a political science graduate student for many years, I would fear that you had been brought up with an underestimation of the importance of law. But since you entered the department only a short time ago, this diagnosis would be wrong. So what was the legal situation which permitted Cyrus to become such a ruler, and which prevented anyone after his death from becoming the ruler? Cyrus was just crown prince in a very limited monarchy, in fact a republic. No ghost of a chance. But the circumstance that he was then the general to the Medes and then he founded an empire in a perfectly legal way, because Cyaxares, the Median king, on whose service he really was, permitted it. And once you have founded an empire, say, like Hastings in India,[xiv] for example—well, he was not strong enough, but is there is an example of someone who founded an empire and then could defy the home government—an historical example . . . ?

Student: . . .

LS: No.

Mr. Reinken: Caesar!

LS: In a way, Caesar in Gaul. That's good. The conquest of Gaul which Caesar did in a perfectly official function—he was a proconsul—gave him a terrific nonlegal, not necessarily illegal but nonlegal power which permitted him in a complicated situation to transgress, to go over the famous Rubicon and become the master of Rome. That is true. That of course is only an approximation. In other words, people come to nonlegal power when the waters are disturbed, not when the situation is perfectly clear. For example, you have such a wonderful situation as the multiparty system, and then one party gets, say, two hundred forty-nine seats out of five hundred. Now they are clearly in the minority, and let us assume they don't have any allies. Government is impossible. Confusion. And it is confusion in which the cleverest taker takes the power. Now after Cyrus left, the situation was perfectly clear: Cyrus handed over the power in a formally legal manner to his oldest son, and a qualified power to his second son. These were only the props of legality. Now they began to fight. That's interesting. But the other fellows would not have a leg to stand upon, unless they could makes themselves the power behind the throne of one of them . . .

Now where were we now? Paragraph 19. Oh, we read that. Good. Paragraph 20 to 23, Cyrus's posture toward private property and wealth is discussed. It is clear: no limit to acquisition. No limit to acquisition. I mean, one should acquire it legally or justly—but not how much, no limit of this kind. And this is of course prepared in a way by the *Oeconomicus*, as we have seen there. And a poor man cannot be a happy man. That is understood, and this of course shows the difference from Socrates—you know, the remark about the horse shows that very clearly.

At the end of this chapter, he shows how Cyrus created mutual envy and ill will in this environment, so that they could not conspire against him. Let us only read the last paragraph 28. Yes?

[xiv] Warren Hastings was the first Governor General of India, from 1773-1785.

Mr. Reinken: Can I go back to 23 and ask a question? In the next to the last sentence which is bracketed—*kai ta chrēmata*—I was wondering whether I had it correctly pieced together . . . I regard him . . . I count him as the most happy . . . I also count him to be money.

LS: No, no. One could only translate it, "I regard this one as most happy also in regard to money" . . . How do you call that? The accusative of respect. Good. Now let us read paragraph 28, the conclusion of this point.

Mr. Reinken:
And those also who wished to hold the first place in the affections of Cyrus were jealous of one another, just like other people (even in republics), so that in most cases the one would have wished to get the other out of the way sooner than to join with him in any work to their mutual interest.
Thus it has been shown how he contrived that the most influential citizens should love him more than they did each other. (8.2.28)

LS: So this is the end of the subject. Now in the next chapter he shows first how the Persians became Medes in their way of life, and then the super-Persian, the representative of the Persian common people, Pheraulas, makes his re-entry. Cyrus puts him in a way above the Persian nobles here. I mean, he is in charge of the procession, the big procession, and then he can favor or disfavor whomever he might like. Let us read paragraph 14. We cannot read everything.

Mr. Reinken:
His hands he kept outside his sleeves.

LS: In the procession. Cyrus can—all others have to keep their hands inside so that they can't shoot, but Cyrus of course can keep them outside, because he wouldn't shoot. He is after all not Al Capone.

Mr. Reinken:
With him rode a charioteer, who was tall, but neither in reality nor in appearance so tall as he; at all events, Cyrus looked much taller. And when they saw him, they all prostrated themselves before him, either because some had been instructed to begin this act of homage, or because they were overcome by the splendor of his presence, or because Cyrus appeared so great and so goodly to look upon; at any rate, no one of the Persians had ever prostrated himself before Cyrus before. (8.3.14)

LS: You see the radical change. We have now an oriental despotism. Here Dakyns has also a note, which I think I can read to you.

"Xenophon delights somewhat in this sort of scene. It is a turning point, a veritable moral peripety, though the decisive step was taken long ago. What is Xenophon's intention with regard to it? Has he any *parti pris*, for or against? Does he wish us to draw conclusions? Or does it correspond to a moral meeting of the waters in his own mind? Here love of Spartan simplicity and there of splendor and regality and monarchism? He does not give a hint that the sapping of the system begins here, when the archic man ceases to depend

on his own spiritual archic qualities and begins to eke out his dignity by artificial means and external shows of reverence."[xv]

Well, some people don't understand unless you throw down a ton or two tons of brick. Then they would understand. But it is charming; that we must admit. It is really charming, and much nicer than certain remarks about the classics which you read in a certain kind of present-day literature, because at least he still pays homage to the wonderful character of Xenophon's writings although he doesn't quite understand them. But it is a nicer human posture, I would say. Good.

Now in the sequel we find also something which is illuminating. Gadatas, the eunuch, is in command of a contingent of *Persian* cavalry. Mind you, he was not even a Persian, you know, he was a foreigner. This is quite a change. Paragraph 25—let us begin with 24 so that we understand the context.

Mr. Reinken:
So, when they came to the sanctuaries, they performed the sacrifice to Zeus and made a holocaust of the bulls; then they gave the horses to the flames in honor of the Sun; next they did sacrifice to the Earth, as the magi directed, and lastly to the tutelary heroes of Syria. (8.3.24)

LS: By the way, I cannot interpret this reference to the particular god, which was made already before. That would have to be studied. I have some inklings, but they are not elaborated enough. Yes.

Mr. Reinken:
And after that, as the locality seemed adapted to the purpose, he pointed out a goal about five stadia distant and commanded the riders, nation by nation, to put their horses at full speed toward it. Accordingly, he himself rode with the Persians and came in far ahead of the rest, for he had given especial attention to horsemanship. (8.3.25)

LS: Well, I would even say this: even if he had not, who would have dared to ride ahead of Cyrus? Yes?

Mr. Reinken:
Among the Medes, Artabazus won the race, for the horse he had was a gift from Cyrus—

LS: . . . the quality of the horses.

Mr. Reinken:
among the Assyrians who had revolted to him, Gadatas secured the first place; among the Armenians, Tigranes; and among the Hyrcanians, the son of the master of the horse; but among the Sacians a certain private soldier with his horse actually outdistanced the rest by nearly half the course. (8.3.25)

LS: Yes. This is of some importance. He is the winner. You see that Tigranes is in the center of the men mentioned here, which doesn't surprise us. Let us now turn straight to paragraph 33.

[xv] Note to section 14, chapter 3, book 8.

Mr. Reinken:
The chariots also he allowed to race by divisions; to all the winners he gave cups and cattle, so that they might sacrifice and have a banquet. He himself, then, took the ox as his prize, but his share of the cups he gave to Pheraulas because he thought that that officer, as grand marshal, had managed the procession from the palace admirably. (8.3.33)

LS: Ya. Now this explains then the following scene, a conversation between Pheraulas, who is now very high in the court, originally a very poor fellow, and Sakas, the winner in that horse race. Pheraulas is now a very rich man after he had lived in very great poverty before, but he is not a bit happier. This is his problem. Paragraph 42 to paragraph 43.

Mr. Reinken:
"But still, by Zeus," said the Sacian, "when everything is going well, you must at the sight of so many blessings be many times as happy as I."

"The pleasure that the possession of wealth gives, my good Sacian," said Pheraulas, "is not nearly so great as the pain that is caused by its loss. And you shall be convinced that what I say is true: for not one of those who are rich is made sleepless for joy, but of those who lose anything you will not see one who is able to sleep for grief." (8.3.42)

LS: You understand this, yes? No rich man is kept sleepless because of joy over his wealth, but quite a few rich men are kept sleepless because of apprehension for the loss of their wealth. And what's the answer?

Mr. Reinken:
"Not so, by Zeus," said the Sacian; "but of those who get anything not one could you see who gets a wink of sleep for very joy." (8.3.43)

LS: But that is a question of *getting* wealth as distinguished from losing it. Now the problem of Pheraulas is like that of the tyrant Hiero, who also said: Well, it is not a pleasure to be a tyrant at all. And then Simonides says: Why don't you throw it away? . . . And Hiero says: I can't, because if I give it up, I will be killed and must pay the fines and whatnot—which is of course clearly hypocritical. Pheraulas is much more honest. The loss is a great pain, and Hiero does not have the honesty or the frankness to admit that while tyranny is very troublesome, the loss would be unbearable for him, of course. Hiero had said it is impossible to get rid of one's wealth, which is of course nonsense, anyone can get rid of one's wealth if he wants. We must read a few things more. [Paragraph] 46.

Mr. Reinken:
"In the name of the gods, then," said Pheraulas, "please make yourself happy at once and make me happy, too! Take all this and own it and use it as you wish. And as for me, you need do no more than keep me as a guest—aye, even more sparingly than a guest, for I shall be content to share whatever you have."

"You are joking," said the Sacian.

But Peraulas assured him with an oath that he was really in earnest in what he proposed. "And I will get you other favours besides from Cyrus, my Sacian—exemption from attending at court and from serving in the field; you may just stay at home with your wealth. I will attend to those other duties for you as well as for myself; and if I secure anything more of value either through my attendance upon Cyrus or from some campaign, I will bring it to you, so that you may have still more wealth at your command. Only deliver me from this care. For if you will relieve me of its burden, I think you will do a great service also to Cyrus as well as to myself."

When they had thus talked things over together, they came to an agreement according to this last suggestion and proceeded to act upon it. And the one thought that he had been made a happy man because he had command of great riches, while the other considered himself most blessed because he was to have a steward who would give him leisure to do only whatever was pleasant to him. (8.3.46-48)

LS: And the beginning of the next, please.

Mr. Reinken:
Now, Pheraulas was naturally a "good fellow"—

LS: Literally, "a lover of comradeship," comradeship, companionship. Yes?

Mr. Reinken:
and nothing seemed to him so pleasant or so useful as to serve other people. For he held man to be the best and most grateful of all creatures, since he saw that when people are praised by any one they are very glad to praise him in turn; and when any one does them a favour, they try to do him one in return; when they recognize that any one is kindly disposed toward them they return his good-will; and when they know that any one loves them they cannot dislike him; and he noticed especially that they strive more earnestly than any other creature to return the loving care of parents both during their parents' lifetime and after their death; whereas all other creatures, he knew, were both more thankless and more unfeeling than man. (8.3.49)

LS: So in other words, Pheraulas sees the essential difference between men and brutes, but his statement is somewhat sanguine. Ya? And this makes him of course such a nice fellow. He doesn't see the corruption of men's nature, hence he is fooled by Cyrus's love of human beings.

But this point which he makes regarding caring for parents alive and dead, that is of course true. That was frequently discussed in Greek writings, that in the case of brutes, parents take care of the children, also in the case of men. But the peculiarity of men is that the children are, or are supposed to take care of their parents. To some extent it actually takes place; and he alludes to this very famous subject. Now I prevented Mr. Butterworth from saying something.

Mr. Butterworth: You passed over the blow Pheraulas received in the face. Could you explain that in any way?

LS: There is no English word for that, *schadenfreude*[4] on the part of Cyrus.

Mr. Butterworth: Is that sufficient to explain it?

LS: I can't think of anything more. I can easily link up that unpleasant trait of Cyrus with something more profound. We have seen for example his joy deriving from looking at corpses. This *schadenfreude* is a milder form of looking at corpses.

Student: After this happens and Pheraulas keeps on riding, the Sacian asked: Why didn't he stop, and Cyrus said: I think he must be stupid. According to Cyrus it would be stupid . . .

LS: Yes, that is definitely true. Yes. Pheraulas has a certain natural generosity of course, but not on a very high level, but he likes more to acquire than to possess than the horseman and therefore he likes to be around Cyrus all the time and not be troubled by administering his property. Sakas is, by the way, the name of Astyages's . . . wine-pourer . . . Now let us turn to the next chapter

Student: Is it not the name of the race?

LS: Yes, but it is not wholly insignificant. Good. Cyrus calls together also the non-Persian leaders, and the special position of Gadatas appears from that. In paragraphs 7 to 8, where it becomes clear that the art of generalship and philanthropy, loving of human beings, are opposites. That is of some interest; and you know, the funny thing is that Cyrus is at the same time so philanthropic and a tough master of the art of generalship. I think the thesis in itself is not surprising, because a general is supposed to kill—if for good purposes, but still. And this is the reason why Socrates, although he had perfect command of the art of generalship, didn't teach it. *Memorabilia* 3.1: When you read that, you see that Socrates knew everything about that art, and yet when a young man wanted to learn it he sent him away to other teachers, whereas Socrates taught the economic art, as we have seen with our own eyes.

Then there is one of these nice mess meetings of the highest, the top brass. And Hystaspas asks Socrates—Cyrus, I beg your pardon—why does Cyrus prefer Chrysantas to him? You remember Chrysantas, who was always—and here we learn what we suspected[3] all along, namely, that Chrysantas was this wonderful tool. Whenever Cyrus wanted to bring up something in the assembly which he could not with propriety bring up, he planted it (is this correct?), he planted it in Chrysantas, and Chrysantas made the proposal and he got the credit for that. And Hystaspas never did that. Paragraph 12, beginning.

Mr. Reinken:
"By Hera," said Hystaspas in reply— (8.4.12)

LS: Let us stop here. Hystaspas, if I am not mistaken, is the only man ever in this book to swear by Hera—Juno, the wife and sister of Zeus. Who does it? Who is known for this in Xenophon especially, also in Plato?

Student: Socrates.

LS: Absolutely. Socrates. It was a women's oath.[4] This strange man, Socrates, swore a women's oath. Hystaspas has something in common with Socrates. Let us see whether we can fit this together with other things. In paragraph 14, Gobryas, that was one of the Assyrian defectors, makes a statement which we should read.

Mr. Reinken:
"Because, while at that time I saw them bear toils and dangers with cheerfulness, now I see them bear their good fortune with self-control."

LS: "Moderation."

Mr. Reinken:
"And to me, Cyrus, it seems harder to find a man who can bear good fortune well than one who can bear misfortune well; for it is the former that engenders arrogance in most men; it is the latter that inspires in all men moderation."[xvi] (8.4.14)

LS: So adversity makes all men moderate. Does this remind you of something?

Student: . . .

LS: It reminds of Tigranes definitely, his statement that fear makes men moderate. That is not quite the same. Yes?

Mr. Reinken:
"Hystaspas, did you hear that saying of Gobryas?" asked Cyrus.

"Yes, by Zeus," he answered; "and if he has many such things to say, he will find me a suitor for his daughter's hand much sooner than he would if he should exhibit to me a great number of goblets." (8.4.15)

LS: And what does Gobryas say?

Mr. Reinken:
"I promise you," said Gobryas, "that I have a great number of such saws written down, and I will not begrudge them to you, if you get my daughter to be your wife. But as to the goblets—" (8.4.16)

LS: We don't care about the goblets. So Gobryas is a writer of wise sayings, which reminds somehow of Tigranes, i.e., of Xenophon.[4] This is true. In paragraph 18 to 19 Cyrus explicitly calls himself a matchmaker. Does this ring a bell? Who is a matchmaker?

Student: Socrates.

[xvi] In original: "self-control" instead of "moderation."

LS: Yes, and also in Plato in the *Theaetetus*.[xvii] Cyrus is a matchmaker like Socrates. Hystaspas swears by Hera, like Socrates. Then in paragraph 20, Chrysantas comes up. In the meantime, I have looked—I have said Chrysantas stands for Agesilaus, and I looked up Xenophon's *Agesilaus,* and Xenophon doesn't say anything about the looks of Agesilaus. But Plutarch, in his *Agesilaus,* says that he was short, lame, and in every respect inconspicuous, and this corresponds exactly to the description of Chrysantas here. He was fined by the Ephors in Sparta for marrying a little woman. They said she will bear us not kings, but kinglets [laughter] because she also was short. This is the short Chrysantas. And in the sequel, these gay jokes—Dakyns notes that they are jokes and doesn't see why they are so jocular. Mr. Johnson understands this by now much better, I believe. Here in this connection, paragraph 23, one of the jokes is that Cyrus is frigid or cold, a wholly unerotic man. His marriage comes much later, and it is one of the soberest marriages ever contracted. Now in paragraphs 24 to 25 Hystaspas marries Gobryas's daughter. Paragraph 25, beginning. Let us read that.

Mr. Reinken:
"You will please present him with me, then, will you not,' said Hystaspas, 'so that I may get the collection of proverbs?" (8.4.25)

LS: "Get the writings," more literally. So Hystaspas marries Gobryas's daughter in order to get Gobryas's wise writings. He is a "an intellectual, unquote." [Laughter] Now again this reminds us of Socrates, because [in] *Memorabilia* 1.6, Socrates reads with his companions the writings of the wise men of old. Hystaspas, incidentally, is also the lover of laughter in book 2, chapter 2, and a lover of wise writings—in his way a lover of wisdom, a philosopher. Now as an explanation of these things, I suggest this. The circle of Cyrus consists of fragments of Socrates. Cyrus is the matchmaker, Hystaspas has other qualities, Chrysantas others, and Tigranes others. This I believe is the least one can safely say. My old conceit that this might be the Socratic circle in barbaric guise I still will withhold as unproven in any sense. Paragraph 30, let us read that.

Mr. Reinken:
And they apportioned all the rest, each officer examining into the merits of his subordinate officers; and what was left to the last, the corporals, inquiring into the merits of the private soldiers under their command, gave to each according to his deserts. And so all were in receipt of their fair share. (8.4.30)

LS: "Just share." Now this of course shows the great problem of distributive justice on such a large scale. Assuming that Cyrus is perfectly fair, for reasons of self-interest, and is of good judgment: The more you go down, will every noncommissioned officer have the moral and intellectual quality required? So it becomes then a matter of the bureaucratic machine, as they would say today. And so the great benefit we believe to get by establishing an absolute monarchy, namely, that we get a higher degree of justice than we have in a constitutional society where laws rule and not a living law, is perhaps lost, even in the best case, by virtue of the complicated machinery which must be set up. In the next chapter he speaks of the kingship between the order in the house and the order in the army. Paragraph 7, we might read that.

Mr. Reinken:

[xvii] *Theatetus* 150a.

For Cyrus considered orderliness to be a good thing to practice in the management of a household also; for whenever any one wants a thing, he then knows where he must go to find it; but he believed that orderliness in all the departments of an army was a much better thing, inasmuch as the chances of a successful stroke in war come and go more quickly and the losses occasioned by those who are behindhand in military matters are more serious. He also saw that the advantages gained in war by prompt attention to duty were most important. It was for this reason, therefore, that he took especial pains to secure this sort of orderliness. (8.5.7)

LS: So order in the army is of course much more important than order in the household. If you don't find some salt at the right moment for adding it as a condiment, no grave harm can be done, but if the tanks are not around in such a critical situation, the situation is much more different. Cyrus is not an economic man proper, as little as Pheraulas, whereas Sakas and Ischomachus of course in the *Oeconomicus* are such economic men.

In the sequel Cyrus becomes the son-in-law and lawful heir of the king of Media. It was a highly profitable establishment. And we find here also in the sequel, that is also partly based on Spartan precedent, a contract between the Persian people and Cyrus—you know, the famous contract between king and people which played such a great role especially in English history. And at the end of paragraph 28 Cyrus marries. Let us read this paragraph, which is very gratifying.

Mr. Reinken:
When, on his way back, he came to Media, Cyrus wedded the daughter of Cyaxares, for he had obtained the consent of his father and mother. (8.5.28)

LS: You see, everything is perfectly legitimate: he is not a juvenile delinquent who marries against the wish of the parents; and by marrying, he primarily becomes as a matter of course the heir to the Median throne. He is heir of Persia as a matter of course and to the others by right of conquest. So if this is not a just ruler, we don't know who is. Yes?

Mr. Reinken:
And to this day people still tell of her wonderful beauty.

LS: You see, naturally, who would say anything bad about the wife of such a powerful man?

Mr. Reinken:
[But some historians say that he married his mother's sister. But that maid must certainly have been a very old maid.][xviii] (8.5.28)

LS: Yes, so in other words—good. And therefore, it is impossible that he could have married her. Which impossibility of course doesn't exist in such cases. Yes? If the dowry is so big, age disappears as a consideration. Yes?

Mr. Reinken:

[xviii] Brackets in original.

And when he was married he at once departed with his bride for Babylon. (8.5.28)

LS: Good. So the procession of the king is described at great length and nothing is said about this surely very elegant and costly wedding, whereas the funeral[5] of Panthea and Abradatas was described at great length. Mr. Butterworth?

Mr. Butterworth: At the beginning of chapter 4, at the beginning of the banquet, Xenophon tells us who was going to be invited. Cyrus invited some of his friends, and then he invited also Tigranes and other people. In other words, it makes you wonder whether Tigranes and Gobryas are friends.

LS: No. I explained this. He calls together also the non-Persian leaders, of course also the Persian leaders. It is a bit strange.

Mr. Butterworth: Is it the translation?

LS: No, no. It is a bit strange. The first impression you get is only non-Persians, and this needs an explanation. At the moment I have no explanation.

Mr. Butterworth: The other thing I was trying to figure out [was] whether Tigranes was a friend,[6] [from] the fact that he said he invited "with them," with the friends, also these other people . . .

LS: I may have overlooked something.

Mr. Reinken: There was a descriptive clause in "friends."

LS: The beginning of the paragraph, chapter 4.

Mr. Reinken:
he invited in those of his friends who showed that they were most desirous of magnifying his rule— (8.4.1)

LS: Mr. Butterworth is right: "Artabazus and Tigranes, the Hyrcanians and Gobryas," are not those who would obviously [lean] most on aggrandizing Cyrus. That is absolutely right. And that is of some importance, because at least Tigranes, the most interesting person, does not belong to them. Why the others, it is hard to say. Gadatas surely belongs to these.

Student: . . .

LS: He belongs to the inner circle. [One] hundred percent good. And it is interesting that the Mede Artabazus is not so close. Tigranes is of course the most interesting. The Hyrcanian and Gobryas would need some thought. The point deserves much more careful consideration than I have given it. All right.

Student: Artabazus gave some reasons why he didn't like the fact that Cyrus was now so—

LS: Yes. Well, more generally stated you mean the fact that he tried to monopolize Cyrus for himself.

Student: That's right—

LS: In this sense, you are right. And Tigranes is not too impressed. And the case of the Hyrcanian and Gobryas would need some study. Perhaps it has to do in the case of Gobryas that he was in a way a wise man—in a slightly barbarian way, but he was in a way a wise man. This might have made him somewhat immune, whereas Gadatas is hundred percent with him, and of course also Chrysantas and Hystaspas. That's a good point you made.

Student: . . . Every once in a while, in his speeches Cyrus sometimes says friends and allies and sometimes he says allies . . . All these men here are allies.

LS: Naturally. These, yes. But later on it appears the Persians were also there. But this is not a good enough solution; I think the key point here in this first paragraph of chapter 4 is that these four people are in a way exempted from the circle a hundred percent dedicated to Cyrus, a hundred percent convinced of his transcendent greatness. Now—yes?

Student: That could be one way of putting it, but these men also may not be the ones who are most desirous of magnifying his rule or honoring him. In other words, they are not obsequious.

LS: Ya, sure, that's what we mean. That's what we mean, and we have to see what the reason is. In the case of Artabazus, he is absolutely in love with Cyrus but he wants to monopolize him, and that Cyrus cannot tolerate. In the case of Tigranes, it has to do with his relation with that sophist in Armenia. In the case of Gobryas, it has to do with his barbaric wisdom. The case which I cannot solve is the Hyrcanian, but regarding the Hyrcanian there was a question anyway. Or was he a Chaldean?

Student: . . .

LS: Dakyns somewhere makes the point: Why is the commander of the Hyrcanians never mentioned by name? That I remember. My opinion: He is not as hundred percent good a subject as some of the others are.

Mr. Reinken: He was a Hyrcanian first, and a follower second.

LS: Yes. Yes, may very well be, that may be the explanation. In other words, he is not an individual, he is simply a member of that nation, and that is decisive. That is a good point.

We must skip the next chapter and turn to chapter 7, where it is made clear to us, where he speaks especially to his two sons, but also to other friends. His wife is of course not present. She is wholly inconspicuous—somewhere sitting in a harem, probably.

Student: He doesn't even send her from the room.

LS: No, she isn't there . . . He sends her his greetings. But he doesn't . . . He leaves the kingship to the oldest son, of course not to the best. This is a change from the absolute rule to legal rule. And he is perfectly clear that he leaves a sting in the heart of his second son. Naturally, the second son might look at his father and say: My father didn't inherit this empire, why do I have to inherit it, I also won't inherit it, I will get it for myself. Paragraph 13, that we should read. Cambyses is the oldest son.

Mr. Reinken:
"As for you, Cambyses, you must also know that it is not this golden scepter that maintains your empire; but faithful friends are a monarch's truest and surest scepter. But do not think that man is naturally faithful; else all men would find the same persons faithful, just as—" (8.7.13)

LS: Yes, so loyalty, trustworthiness, doesn't come from nature. Otherwise, according to a simple argument, just as all men are two-legged and two-eyed by nature, all men would be loyal by nature. Yes?

Mr. Reinken:
"else all men would find the same persons faithful, just as all find the other properties of nature the same. But every one must create for himself faithfulness in his friends; and the winning of such friends comes in no wise by compulsion, but by kindness." (8.7.13)

LS: "Rather by kindness." Now the term which he uses here is not properly translated. "But the loyal ones, the faithful ones everyone must establish for himself," which is also not good enough as a translation, but it comes a bit closer. The Greek word is *tithēmi*, to put. Now the noun derivative from it is [LS writes on the blackboard] *thesis*, from which the thesis you are supposed to write from time to time is eventually derived. Now *thēsis* is used in opposition to *physis* very frequently, just as *nomos*. In that sense it is used synonymously with *nomos*. So in other words, people are trustworthy by virtue of an establishment, by some convention in the very wide ontological sense of the term, not by nature. But the next paragraph we must read.

Mr. Reinken:
"If, then, you shall endeavour to make others also fellow-guardians of your sovereignty, make a beginning nowhere sooner than with him who is of the same blood with yourself. Fellow-citizens, you know, stand nearer than foreigners do, and messmates nearer than those who eat elsewhere; but those who are sprung from the same seed, nursed by the same mother, reared in the same home, loved by the same parents, and who address the same persons as father and mother, how are they not the closest of all?" (8.7.14)

LS: In other words, here there is a natural basis for trustworthiness, trust among brothers insofar as they are by nature derived from the same parents. And this is a corrective.

Then in the sequel, in order to enforce his admonition to his sons, Cyrus tells them that he will still be present after death to watch what they do. And in order to prove that, he has to speak about the immortality of the soul, which he does in paragraphs 19 to 22. That we must read.

Mr. Reinken:
"I am sure I do not; nor yet, my sons, have I ever convinced myself of this—that only as long as it is contained in a mortal body is the soul alive, but when it has been freed from it, is dead; for I see that it is the soul that endues mortal bodies with life, as long as it is in them. Neither have I been able to convince myself of this—that the soul will want intelligence just when it is separated from this unintelligent body—" (8.7.19-20)

LS: This distinction is interesting. This played a great role in the discussion of the immortality of the soul until the eighteenth century. At that time they made a distinction between (how did they call it?) the permanence of the soul and immortality proper. The soul might last ever, but be as it were in a kind of sleep after death, and immortality means of course that the soul is awake, conscious. And something like this distinction is made here. Yes?

Mr. Reinken:
"but when the spirit is set free, pure and—"

LS: "The *nous*," the intelligence. So in other words, he makes here a distinction between soul and mind, or intelligence. It is a very common distinction, and what he asserts in fact is the immortality of the intellect as distinguished from the soul in general.

Mr. Reinken:
"untrammeled by matter, then it is likely to be most intelligent. And when man is resolved into his primal elements, it is clear that every part returns to kindred matter, except the soul; that alone cannot be seen, either when present or when departing.

"Consider again," he continued, "that there is nothing in the world more nearly akin to death than is sleep; and the soul of man at just such times is revealed in its most divine aspect and at such times, too, it looks forward into the future; for then, it seems, it is most untrammeled by the bonds of the flesh.

"Now if this is true, as I think it is, and if the soul does leave the body, then do what I request of you and show reverence for my soul. But if it is not so, and if the soul remains in the body and dies with it, then at least fear the gods, eternal, all-seeing, omnipotent, who keep this ordered universe together, unimpaired, ageless, unerring, indescribable in its beauty and its grandeur; and never allow yourselves to do or purpose anything wicked or unholy." (8.7.20-22)

LS: Read only the next sentence.

Mr. Reinken:
"Next to the gods, however, show respect also to all the race of men as they continue in perpetual succession—" (8.7.23)

LS: Now this last statement is made on the assumption of the denial of the immortality of the soul. After the gods, not the soul—his soul, rather—for it may not be mortal, but the whole

human race. Now what about the immortality of the soul in the Socratic writings? We must always consider that pole: Cyrus-Socrates.

Student: . . . Socrates.

LS: But where does it occur in Xenophon? I remember two places. First at a passage which we have read, and that is at the end of the *Oeconomicus* when the tyrant, when he speaks of the life after death of the tyrant. Or is this only a simile: "It is like"?

Student: . . .

LS: But in the *Agesilaus*—unfortunately I have no reference to it . . . there is a reference, too. But *Agesilaus* of course belongs together with the *Cyropaedia* rather than with the Socratic writings. And one point—by the way, the distinction between soul and mind may amount to an implicit rejection of the doctrine of the two souls which Araspas developed on earlier occasion.

But there is one thing in paragraph 26 which we must read because it is very funny in such a solemn setting. Yes.

Mr. Reinken:
"But I must conclude," he said; "for my soul seems to me to be slipping away from those parts of my body, from which, as it appears, it is wont to begin its departure. So if any one wishes to take my hand or desires to look into my face while I yet live, let him come near; but after I have covered myself over, I beg of you, my children, let no one look upon my body, not even yourselves." (8.7.26)

LS: You should see the point. What is it?

Student: His own eyes look on dead bodies.

LS: Yes. Very good. His own corpse should not be seen by anybody, but he wants to see everybody else's corpse. That is a somewhat unjust demand. Good.

Now we come to that final chapter, which we have anticipated many times before. Only a few points. Let us read the last sentence of paragraph 2.

Mr. Reinken:
"I know, for example—"

LS: No, no, before. Now let me see: "But that I say the truth."

Mr. Reinken:
And that what I say is the truth, I will prove, beginning with the Persians' attitude toward religion. (8.8.2)

LS: All right. "The divine things."

Mr. Reinken:
I know—

LS: "For I know." You see, first person singular. Good.

Mr. Reinken:
I know, for example, that in early times the kings and their officers, in their dealings with even the worst offenders, would abide by an oath that they might have given, and be true to any pledge they might have made. For had they not had such a character for honour, and had they not been true to their reputation, not a man would have trusted them, just as not a single person any longer trusts them, now that their lack of character is notorious—

LS: Did he omit that, what he says here about the generals?

Mr. Reinken:

and the generals of the Greeks who joined the expedition of Cyrus the Younger would not have had such confidence in them even on that occasion. But, as it was, trusting in the previous reputation of the Persian kings, they placed themselves in the king's power, were led into his presence, and had their heads cut off. And many also of the barbarians who joined that expedition went to their doom, some deluded by one promise, others by another. (8.8.2-3)

LS: You see, here he refers almost expressly to his own experience with Persia as described in the *Anabasis*. One more point before I try to give a very brief summary. The last paragraph.

Mr. Reinken:
I think now that I have accomplished the task that I set before myself. For I maintain that I have proved that the Persians of the present day and those living in their dependencies are less reverent toward the gods, less dutiful to their relatives, less upright in their dealings with all men—

LS: "Less just."

Mr. Reinken:
and less brave in war than they were of old. But if anyone should entertain an opinion contrary to my own, let him examine their deeds and he will find that these testify to the truth of my statements. (8.8.27)

LS: Yes. Now these virtues which are mentioned here—or vices, rather—[are lack of] piety, justice, and courage. I think if we go over the chapter we will see the bulk of the chapter is devoted to their lack of courage . . . the bulk. The others are mentioned, but the impiety and injustice are dealt with roughly each in a paragraph, and the bulk is devoted to the military polity of the Persians.

4'

Well, we have of course considered more than once what the whole book is about, and I would like to make now only this point. At first glance the book is obviously devoted to the praise of Cyrus's rule. That this praise is very qualified when we read it carefully is true, but the first impression can never be gainsaid. Now this praise of Cyrus's rule has its Platonic correspondence in the praise of the best regime in the *Republic*, and there are quite a few kinships in it—resemblances between the works as we have seen. Now both Cyrus's rule and the best regime of the *Republic* are impossible, they could never have happened as they are. But Cyrus's has some basis in fact. I mean, there was once a man called Cyrus, who conquered. That is true. Now what is the meaning of these impossibilities which both Plato and Xenophon pursue, these experiments? One can say they are attempts to think through the logic of the *polis*. Men cannot live except in political society. Political society has certain essential limitations and as limitations they point beyond themselves. For example, the big boy-small coat is the simple example; the double morality in peace and war. These are the two massive starting points. And they lead, thought through, to some perfect *politeia*, but this perfection proves to be an impossibility. So you have to admit the essential limitations of the *polis*.

The other point: the *polis* points beyond itself towards something higher which is no longer politically possible: and that is, in the language of Plato, philosophy; in the language of Xenophon, Socrates. This is not possible without the *polis*, but in itself it transcends the *polis*. One can also state it differently.[7] Aristotle holds fundamentally the same view, that the *polis* and everything going with the *polis* is inferior to what he calls the contemplative life. But in Aristotle that questioning of the *polis* and everything belonging to it is less visible. It becomes visible in such a conspicuous place as the end of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, but not when you read the *Ethics* as a whole. It will barely become visible there, whereas in Plato and Xenophon it becomes visible all the time, provided one doesn't read Xenophon for example as the late Dakyns read him: full of enthusiasm, and then finding some little things which jar with that enthusiasm, but he may have dreamt, slept. Homer himself sleeps sometimes, why not Xenophon? Good.

But one can formulate this difference between Plato and Xenophon or Socrates on the one hand, and Aristotle on the other, most simply as follows. In a simple manner which is formally correct, for which we can find much evidence, Socrates identified virtue and knowledge. And Aristotle said: No, virtue is not simply knowledge. There is an important virtue, the practically most important virtue, which is not knowledge, where knowledge plays only a subordinate part: and that is what he called moral virtue, which is acquired not by learning but by habituation. Now what is characteristic of Socrates, Plato, Xenophon is that there is no moral virtue strictly speaking. This fact—which is so obvious, which is proven by a single glance at any Greek dictionary—that Aristotle coined the term moral virtue is of tremendous importance for the understanding of our tradition. The ordinary understanding of justice, decency, in terms of moral virtue is very sensible, and therefore we can say man as man knows of moral virtue. That is perfectly true. But he doesn't know it *as* moral virtue. [LS taps on the table] This is a theoretical understanding of a well-known and universal phenomenon of the theoretical understanding which as such transcends the ordinary understanding.

Now that Aristotle comes closer to the phenomena as they are understood in pretheoretical life, I have no hesitation to assert. But that is of course the reason why he had the world enthralled for a longer time than any other philosopher, the rule of Aristotle, in modified ways of course up to

the present day, but still for many centuries openly *the* authority, the master of those who know. But, as I say, in Plato, Socrates, Xenophon this doesn't exist, and that means that what we ordinarily understand by virtue, or decency or however you call it, is something fundamentally unsolid. Of course it makes a difference whether someone is decent or indecent in the ordinary sense—it makes an enormous difference for all practical purposes. But in itself it is something unsolid, because it is not based on understanding or knowledge. And the most accessible proof of that is, first, the usage of Plato: Genuine virtue, and that is identical with philosophy, is distinguished from vulgar virtue, *dēmotes aretē*, and he has another term which I do not remember at the moment. There is another one which has the same meaning, vulgar virtue. No, political virtue, citizen virtue. But the passage in Plato where this comes out most clearly is at the end of the *Republic*, when he describes how the souls choose their lives after death for a future life; and then there is one among them who picks the most tyrannical life, attracted by the power, wealth and the other attributes of tyranny. And what kind of a man is he? He was a relatively decent man in his previous life, brought up in a tolerably decent society but possessing virtue only by custom or habituation—what Aristotle understands by moral virtue.

Xenophon, in other words, shows us here on a very large scale what the *polis* and the virtue which belongs absolutely to the *polis* is, when it is given the fullest freedom to reveal itself as what it is. In an ordinary limited government of course quite a few things cannot happen. There can be perfect gentlemen who are satisfied with their lot and all this kind of thing, but it lacks the solidity which in their view only the philosophers can have—not because the philosophers are a special profession or are intellectuals; no thought was further from them than that. What we call intellectuals, they called sophists. It was not an impressive thing. They compared them to prostitutes; I mean, they were very intransigent in this way. But philosophy they did take very seriously, and not merely because all social science questions lead to methodological questions which can no longer be treated competently by the social scientist himself, but because philosophy they understood as a way of life. That is inseparable for them, for Aristotle too. Good.

I cannot now remember a number of individual resemblances between the *Education of Cyrus* and the *Republic*, but you will find them among your notes, if any, so we don't have to repeat. You know, the question of property, the absolute rule of the wise man and so on, but also the differences: no equality of the sexes as we have in the *Republic*, and so on.

We have a few more minutes, and if there is any point you would like to bring up, I would be glad. The general feeling which I have, and which is probably shared by some of you, if not all of you, that as I said last time that we are now more or less prepared to begin a serious study of the *Cyropaedia*. That cannot be done in a single seminar. You would have to have long statistics—I mean, wisely chosen statistics are not to be despised. What is so questionable is only if you make statistics for the sake of statistics, that is not a wise procedure. But if we know, for example, the use or nonuse of the first person singular and first person plural, that is of some importance, then indeed only an absolutely reliable statistics of the usage can lead us to progress. Mr. _____?

Student: How did you interpret Cyrus's description of the universe and soul . . .

LS: I did not interpret it. It reminded me—you see, you must not overestimate, how should I say, my physical power. I cannot study this with the care which it requires. I read it, and if there is something which strikes me as a point then I note it. I read it and it is surely important. It reminded me of a parallel in the *Memorabilia* somewhere. I couldn't tell you—but it is likely to be either of the two theological chapters, 1.4 and 4.3. It would be very interesting of course to compare them very thoroughly, whether there are not some differences between the Socratic statements and Cyrus's statements. This I would say is a rule of which I venture to assert that it is universally valid: that when one reads this book on Cyrus, one must always think of Socrates at the pole, and vice versa. And when one reads the *Memorabilia*, one must also think of someone who seems to do what Socrates always tells people to do, and then see what the difference is. Mr. Megati?

Mr. Megati: I was struck by the superficial resemblance between the death of Cyrus and the death of Socrates as reported in the *Phaedo* and other places.

LS: Xenophon barely, but barely.

Mr. Megati: For example . . . Cyrus's wife, here he sends away his wife, and he covers his face.

LS: And[8] forbid[s] anyone to look at him. You are perfectly right.

Mr. Megati: Does that shed any light on Cyrus?

LS: Yes. For example, this little fact, this prohibition, Socrates—

Mr. Megati: Doesn't it imply what Socrates did? He didn't want people to see him suffering the effects of the poison. He might show fear or something like that.

LS: Ya, that is the question: Why did Socrates utterly wrap himself so that no one could see him? I believe he didn't wish to exhibit the agony. These people were worried and shocked enough of death—you know, Simmias and Cebes and the others. Socrates didn't wish to add to that. Socrates, you know what he said: Do with my corpse whatever you like, because it no longer has anything to do with me. But I think the most revealing thing as far as I can see is the prohibition to look at his corpse, just as Agesilaus, who had these bodily defects which I mentioned. Xenophon never mentions it; he only says Cyrus was so modest that he forbade that any statues of him be made. But in the light of what Plutarch says, one can imagine that it was not mere modesty. Now how does it lead up . . . Cyrus wants to be seen only in his magnificence, that is clear. And that is a motive which Socrates doesn't have.

Student: There is one question I have . . . In 25, before he forbids anyone to look at him he gives explicit instructions . . . whereas when Socrates died, he didn't care how he was buried or whether he was buried. He left it open as to whether they wanted to cremate him or—

LS: Sure, Cyrus follows what was the Persian custom, the burial. I do not know. I would assume there is a long—not a long [one], but a discussion in Herodotus somewhere, where he speaks of

this difference: some people bury the dead; others burn them, and each regards the other as absolutely shocking. And Socrates, it was a matter of indifference to him.

Student: It seemed to me it followed exactly from what Socrates was saying: My soul is leaving my body; don't worry about it. And Cyrus starts to say this, but you pointed out in class there is some hesitation in saying that there is immortality of the soul.

LS: Yes, sure. I see. That's good. So then we will call it a quarter.

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[1] Deleted a largely unintelligible remark to a student about coming to Strauss's office.
[2] Deleted "an."
[3] Deleted "expected," replaced with "suspected."
[4] Deleted "Socrates," replaced with "Xenophon."
[5] Deleted "marriage," replaced with "funeral."
[6] Deleted "was."
[7] Deleted "According to Aristotle—."
[8] Deleted "didn't."