

# Repeated Games

George J. Mailath\*

Winter School  
Delhi School of Economics  
December 10-13, 2018

The theory of repeated games provides a central underpinning for economists' understanding of social, political, and economic institutions, both formal and informal. These lectures will survey this theory, explaining what we have learned, as well as what we have not.

**Background:** An upper level introductory course in game theory, at the level of Gibbons (1992) or Osborne (2004) is assumed.

Mailath (2019, Chapter 7) contains lecture notes at about the level of the lectures covering some of the material, with the earlier material providing an introduction to noncooperative game theory at the appropriate level.

## References

GIBBONS, R. (1992): *Game Theory for Applied Economists*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.

MAILATH, G. J. (2019): *Modeling Strategic Behavior: A Graduate Introduction to Game Theory and Mechanism Design*. World Scientific Press, text available at <http://web.sas.upenn.edu/gmailath/books/modeling-strategic-behavior/>.

OSBORNE, M. J. (2004): *An Introduction to Game Theory*. Oxford University Press, New York.

---

\*University of Pennsylvania and Australian National University