

Feature diagnosticity affects semantic representations of novel and common object categories

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INTRODUCTION

A central principle in feature-based theories of semantic memory is the differential weighting of some features over others [1-5].

Some of these features are **diagnostic** – they serve to distinguish or otherwise conspicuously differentiate one item from others [6,7].

In determining feature diagnosticity, we argue for a distinction between when a feature is available and needed, and when it is actually used.



Color is **necessary** in order to distinguish lemons and limes.



Color is **available** but not needed in order to distinguish stop signs and yield signs.

Using color as the diagnostic feature, we used a training paradigm to investigate how diagnostic features interact with semantic representations.


METHODS

Subjects learned one of two novel object sets over the course of four sessions:

COLOR + SHAPE:



SHAPE:



Color is **necessary**, shape is **not sufficient**.

$P(\text{object} | \text{shape}) = 0.33$

$P(\text{object} | \text{color}) = 0.50$

$P(\text{object} | \text{shape AND color}) = 1.00$


Color is **available**, shape is **sufficient**:

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$P(\text{object} | \text{color}) = 0.50$

$P(\text{object} | \text{shape AND color}) = 1.00$

Following training, subjects performed a number of behavioral tasks, including adjective generation and pairwise general similarity ratings:



Thirty-two of these subjects ($n = 16$ for each group) performed a shape retrieval task while undergoing fMRI, answering yes/no shape questions about the objects. This task was followed by a functional color localizer.

If you flipped a KLARVE over, would it stand up straight?


Shape retrieval task




Color perception task

For more on the color perception task, please see *Poster G101* (Persichetti).


RESULTS: BEHAVIORAL




When listing object adjectives, "color+shape" subjects ($n = 29$) listed color first 88% of the time, whereas "shape" subjects ($n = 34$) listed color first only 45% of the time ($p < 0.001$). Notably, the groups demonstrated comparable explicit object color knowledge.



RESULTS: FMRI




Left fusiform gyrus (involved in color perception): greater activation during a *shape* retrieval task for "color+shape" subjects. Independent color similarity ratings approached significance in predicting neural similarity for "color + shape" subjects ($r_s = 0.22$, $p = 0.08$), which differed significantly from "shape" subjects ($Z = 1.98$, $p < 0.05$).



Left inferior temporal gyrus (identified through exploratory analyses): showed an interaction of training condition and task. Prioritizing color positively correlated with brain activity.

RESULTS: GENERALIZATION

We examined the extent to which these results generalized to common object categories via fruits and vegetables (FV, color is diagnostic) and household items (HHI, color is *not* diagnostic) through parallel behavioral and fMRI tasks.



Like "color+shape" subjects, those subjects describing FV objects were more likely to list color first. When combining novel and common object categories, we found that prioritizing color positively correlated with left fusiform activation.

DISCUSSION

- Features can vary both in how well we *know* and *use* them, and this distinction taps into semantic representations.
- These results parallel previous work demonstrating differences in conceptual knowledge for blind versus sighted subjects [8].
- The neural instantiation of diagnostic features may vary along a posterior-anterior gradient in ventral temporal cortex.
- Preliminary results suggest a similar neural basis for the interaction of feature diagnosticity with representations of both novel and common object categories, supporting generalization of our findings.

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