

Reading List

1 Social Insurance: An Introduction

1. Martin Feldstein: Rethinking Social Insurance

2 Asymmetric Information: Theory and Tests

A. Theory

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B. Empirical Tests of Asymmetric Information

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C. Welfare Effects of Asymmetric Information

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15. Josh Lustig (2007). “The Welfare Effects of Adverse Selection in Privatized Medicare.” Job Market Paper, Yale University.

3 Issues with Health Care Systems: Theory and Evidence

A. Health as Human Capital and Its Measurement

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3. D. Cutler and E. Richardson (1997). “Measuring the Health of the United States Population”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Microeconomics, 217-271.

B. Dynamic Inefficiency Due to Reclassification Risk: Theory and Evidence

4. [*] J. Cochrane (1995). “Time Consistent Health Insurance”, *Journal of Political Economy*, 103 (3), 445-473.
5. Peter Diamond (1992). “Organizing the Health Insurance Market,” *Econometrica*, 60, 1233-1254.
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C. Dynamic Inefficiency Due to Investment Externalities

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D. Demand and Supply of Medical Care, Interacting with Health Insurance

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4 Unemployment Insurance: Theory and Evidence

A. Institutional Background

1. Katherine Baicker, Claudia Goldin, and Larry Katz, "A Distinctive System: Origins and Impacts of U.S. Unemployment Compensation," in *The Defining Moment: The Great Depression and the American Economy*, University of Chicago Press, 1998 (NBER Working Paper No. 5889).

B. Theory of Optimal Unemployment Insurance: Static Models

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D. Empirical Evidence of Unemployment Insurance on Worker Behavior

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E. Empirical Evidence of Unemployment Evidence on Firm Behavior
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5 Disability Insurance

A. Survey

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B. Theory of Optimal Disability Insurance

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C. Empirical Evidence of the Effect of Disability Insurance

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D. Workers' Compensation
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6 Social Security

A. Survey

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B. Theory

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C. Consumption and Saving Effects: Empirical Evidence

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