The Impact of Resurgent Authoritarian Influence on Civic Space: New High-Frequency Evidence*

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1 Introduction

With the decline of the Soviet Union in the 1980s, the international influence of authoritarian governments fell sharply. Nevertheless, the last two decades have seen powerful non-democracies–China and Russia, in particular–become both more autocratic and more assertive in their foreign policies (Diamond, 2020). This resurgence of authoritarian influence (RAI) raises concerns that powerful authoritarian governments are undermining democratic processes and actors abroad.

Assessing the impact of RAI on democracy is difficult for several fundamental reasons. First, assembling data on RAI activities is difficult due to the sporadic nature of RAI efforts, the absence of publicly available administrative data, and the fact that some activities are not formally announced. To date, the most comprehensive data on RAI focuses on China's foreign aid, state financing, and more recently, on diplomatic events (Custer et al., 2021). Those measures miss a broad range of other RAI activities, and are they are reported at an annual level, which precludes precise measurement of the dates when RAI is deployed. Especially for policymakers and activists intent on responding to RAI, the lack of high-frequency data is a serious constraint. Second, the impact of RAI on democracy space is difficult to assess because most of our measures of regime type or civic space are also relatively blunt and annual.

We provide original monthly, systematic data on a wide range of RAI events and civic space for a sample of 34 countries over 111 months. By scraping more than 70 million news articles published by Chinese, Russian, international, and domestic online news sources and using the latest in Natural Language Processing (NLP) to identify reporting on 22 different activities reflective of foreign influence, our data capture a broader range of RAI events in unprecedented granularity.[1] We combine our RAI data with high frequency civic space event data on 19 dimensions of civic space. Together, these data allow us to assess the impact of RAI on civic space at a monthly level.

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[1]For further details on how we generate our RAI data and basic cross-country evidence on the incidence of different RAI activities, see our report "Resurgent Authoritarian Influence: New Machine-Coded, High-Frequency, Cross-National Data".

In this report, we assess the relationship between RAI and civic space activity. Consistent with the broad trend of democratic backsliding, efforts to restrict civic space have increased dramatically around the world in recent years (Youngs and Echagüe, 2017, p. 9). Anecdotally, evidence suggests that Russian and Chinese foreign influence have enabled the closing of civic space in some countries through methods ranging from the provision of repressive technologies or economic support to the use of soft power to promote an autocratic development model. However, data limitations have hindered our ability to rigorously investigate what role, if any, RAI has played in these processes.

This report assesses whether the deployment of common RAI tools is predictive of restrictions on civic space for target countries. In doing so, we provide one of the first tests of a claim driving high-level decision-making in foreign policy and international advocacy. In assessing RAI's impact on civic space, we focus on two classes of closures: first, those bearing on 'Coercion and Force', which includes arrests, raids, and other repressive activities; and second, those bearing on 'Restrictions on Civic Freedom', which encompass censorship, defamation cases and legal restraints on civic activity. We present evidence that for some countries, increases in RAI activity are associated with near-term changes in civic space. We find little evidence that the reverse is true; in other words, civic space events are not predictive of RAI events. Together, these findings suggest that Russia and China are not so much *responding* to civic space dynamics in target countries as they are trying *shape* it.

Our main findings are:

- Increases in RAI are more often associated with increasing restrictions on civic space, although increases in RAI are also predictive of decreasing restrictions in some cases.
- RAI activity more frequently predicts changes in the use of Coercion and Force by target governments than changes in Restrictions on Civic Freedoms.
- Across 5 types of RAI activity, 'Domestic Interference' is the least frequent predictor of changes in civic space. 'Diplomacy' is the most frequent predictor, and it is typically associated with increases in Coercion and Force but decreases in Restrictions of Freedom.
- Diplomacy is much more likely to predict increases (rather than decreases) in Coercion and Force in countries in North and Sub-Saharan Africa, and 'Hard Power' is more likely to predict increases (rather than decreases) in Restrictions on Freedom in countries in Sub-Saharan Africa than elsewhere.
- Some types of RAI are associated with *reductions* in civic space restrictions. In particular, in a majority of countries where exercises of 'Economic Power' and 'Domestic Interference' matter for governments' exercise of Coercion and Force, the association is negative. This might reflect the pacifying effect of RAI foreign investments and interventions on civil society.

Our results are necessarily correlational. In the conclusion, we call for further research that: a) distinguishes Russian and Chinese foreign activities; b) examines how exactly various RAI tactics correspond with the geopolitical interests of Russia and China around the globe; and c) evaluates the specific mechanisms through which RAI correlates with changes in civic space in target countries.

Table 1: RAI event theme and category.

Theme	Definition	Category
Soft Power	Attempts to change attitudes or beliefs of publics or influence policy through the mobilization of citizens.	Diaspora Activation Media Campaign Cultural Activity
Hard Power	Attempts to strengthen or weaken the military capacity of or military ties with incumbent regimes.	Security Transfer Security Exercise Security Engagement Security Presence
Economic Power	Attempts to strengthen or weaken the economic capacity of or economic ties with incumbent regimes.	Aid Operation Investment Action Trade Action Trade Agreement
Diplomacy	Attempts to strengthen or weaken the diplomatic standing of or ties with incumbent regimes.	Diplomatic Engagement Diplomatic Relations Diplomatic Action Diplomatic Statement Diplomatic Visit
Domestic Interference	Attempts to directly influence the policies or capacity of incumbent regimes through non-military actions.	Intelligence Operation Policy Intervention Cyber Operation Tech Transfer

2 Describing Russian and Chinese Influence and Civic Space Closures

To simplify analysis of how Russia and China deploy different types of influence, we group RAI event categories according to several 'themes' that capture related foreign activities. Table 1 presents this thematic organization. These themes are designed to capture five distinct groups of tools used by Russia and China to exert foreign influence. To summarize the variation across these themes, we calculate the share of articles reporting on all of the event categories associated with each. Table 2 presents a similar grouping of civic space events.

In our previous report, we find evidence for distinct regional patterns in RAI activity. This is especially true for countries that are in close geographic proximity to Russia and China. Following these findings, Figures 1–3 plot our measures of reporting on civic space events for each country in solid lines, with our measures of RAI in dashed lines. To ease comparison, the range of each variable is standardized between 0 and 1.

Figure 1 shows data for countries that are geographically proximate to Russia or China. We see some visual evidence for a relationships between RAI and Civic Space events in these countries. In Ukraine, high points of Coercion and Force (CaF) appear to correspond with elevated levels of RAI events. In Georgia, increases in Restrictions on Freedom (RoF) appear to occur shortly after spikes in Soft Power or Hard Power. In Serbia, Soft Power and RoF are elevated in nearby months, and in Belarus, we see Soft Power becoming noticeably less prominent among RAI activities as RoF and CaF increase steeply in 2021 and 2022.

In Philippines, we also see a pronounced spike in CaF after a sustained period of higher

Table 2: Civic Space event categories by theme.

Theme	Definition	Category
Coersion and Force	Domestic deployment of force or coercion.	Arrests State of Emergency Troop Mobilization Raid Lethal Violence Non-lethal Violence
Restriction of Civic Freedoms	Infringement on fundamental civic freedoms or democratic institutions.	Censorship Election Irregularities Defamation Cases Legal Actions Legal Changes

than usual Economic Power and Hard Power activity in 2016 and 2017. In Cambodia, RAI activity has been increasing steadily since the country's autocratic turn in 2017 (when civic space activity was peaking). Earlier in the time series, levels of soft power were high and dominated RAI activity, but after 2017, we see higher levels of Economic Power. In Bangladesh, Domestic Interference becomes more prominent over time, while the highest points of civic space activity show little RAI activity.

Figure 2 presents data for countries in Latin America, the Caribbean, and the Middle East, and Figure 3 presents data for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Again, we see some evidence for a relationship. In five countries (Colombia, Kenya, DR Congo, Nigeria, Ethiopia), there appears to be a positive relationship between levels of RAI and civic space activity, with periods of more/less RAI activity corresponding with more/less civic space activity. In Colombia, we see higher levels of both CaF and RoF surrounding spikes in RAI activity in 2018 and 2019, and again in 2021. In El Salvador a dramatic increase in RAI activity in 2018–2020 is followed by an unprecedented increase in civic space activity, particularly RoF. We see similar (though less apparent) patterns in DR Congo and Turkey (though with CoF rather than RoF).

In summary, we observe a number of cases where increases in RAI activity appear to be associated with increases in our measures of restrictions on civic space. However, there is little evidence of consistent patterns that hold within regions or shared associations between RAI activities and civic space restrictions. While these trends suggest that there may be an association between RAI events and restrictions on civic space in some countries, visual inspection is not sufficient to identify consistent patterns or estimate their strength. To assess this relationship systematically, we investigate whether RAI activity is predictive of civic space activity in the next section.



Figure 1: Geographically Proximate Countries: Share of articles reporting on RAI events and civic space events relative to the total number of scraped articles for each country over time. The range of each variable is standardized between 0 and 1.



Figure 2: LAC and ME Countries: Share of articles reporting on RAI events and civic space events relative to the total number of scraped articles for each country over time. The range of each variable is standardized between 0 and 1.



Figure 3: Sub-Saharan Africa Countries: Share of articles reporting on RAI events and civic space events relative to the total number of scraped articles for each country over time. The range of each variable is standardized between 0 and 1.

3 Predicting Russian and Chinese Influence and Civic Space Closures

To estimate the relationship formally, we use a regularized linear regression model, known as elastic net (EN), with leave-one-out cross validation. These models can detect patterns between a target variable (in our case, civic space closures) and predictor variables (in our case, RAI events) that are robust across different subsets of the data, including when making predictions about subsets of our data that were not used to train the model.[2] Due to the large differences in the volume of news for each country and the radically different national contexts contained in our sample, we estimate these relationships separately for each country.

We begin by taking Coercion and Force (CaF) and Restrictions of Freedom (RoF) as target variables. The predictor variable of interest are the 1–6 month lagged values of our RAI theme index variables. These predictors estimate whether RAI activity over each of the previous six months are associated with future changes in CaF or RaF; we do so with the expectation that the effect of some RAI activities might take months to manifest in civic space. We also include RAI theme index variable with no lags, estimating whether changes in RAI are associated with simultaneous changes in civic space in the same month. Each model also includes 1–6 month lagged values of our 18 civic space event categories, the 1–6 month lagged values of a battery of high-frequency economic variables, a linear time trend, covariates to absorb the introduction of new news sources into our data, and a covariate capturing the total volume of news in each month as predictors.[3]

Figures 7 and 6 present the average value across the 7 coefficients capturing 0–6 month lags of the RAI themes. Missing points indicate no relationship. The size of each point captures the absolute value of the coefficient, with larger sizes indicating a stronger relationship between the RAI theme predictor and the civic space target. The color of each point captures the direction of this relationship, with green points showing a negative relationship and red points showing a positive relationship between the value of the RAI theme and the civic space target. Because EN does not calculate standard errors, we visualize the predictive power of each RAI theme using the size of the coefficient. It is important to note that the absolute size of these coefficients represents a minimum size due to EN's penalization. For this reason, the absolute size of coefficients is not informative, and our analysis focuses instead on the size of each coefficient relative to others.

Looking at Figure 4, we can see that RAI variables provide little or no predictive power over CaF events in some countries, including Colombia, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Turkey, Nigeria, Uganda, and Zambia. However, we do see several interesting patterns elsewhere. Among the countries with the strongest relationship between RAI and CaF, several are characterized by a more consistently positive relationship between RAI themes and CaF, including Kenya, El Salvador, and Senegal. Alternatively, RAI themes are more consistency predictive

[2]EN is designed to guard against overfitting when using a large number of predictor variables by identifying the subset of variables that are most consistently predictive across different subsets of the data and selecting only those variables to use in a predictive model. To ensure stability and optimize lambda selection, we utilize leave-one-out cross validation.

[3]See Appendix 5.2 for tables that present the number of available covariates for each country (differences are driven by variation in the number of economic variables), the number of variables retained by the model, and the R2 for each model.



Figure 4: Each point represents the mean value across 7 coefficients capturing 0–6 month lags of the RAI theme. Missing points indicate a coefficient of zero. Point size captures the absolute value of the coefficient and point color captures the direction of this relationship.

of decreases in CaF in Ethiopia and Tanzania.

Each of the 5 RAI themes are predictive of CaF in more than half of the countries in our sample. Domestic Interference and Soft Power are predictive of CaF in the fewest countries (18 countries, each). Economic Power and Diplomacy are predictive of CaF in the most countries (25 and 24, respectively). In addition to countries showing more or less consistency in the direction of RAI's relationship with CaF across RAI themes, certain RAI themes also show more and less consistency across countries. Diplomacy is the most consistent category, with increases in Diplomacy predicting *increases* in CaF in most countries (17, compared to 7 where it is associated with *decreases* in CaF). Alternatively, Economic Power is less consistent, with increases predicting *decreases* in CaF in 13 countries, but increases in 11 countries.

Turning to Figure 5, we can see that RAI activities provide little or no predictive power over RoF events in Bangladesh, Ecuador, Honduras, Jamaica, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Ethiopia, and Rwanda. Among the countries with the strongest relationship between RAI and RoF, Serbia, Zambia, DR Congo, and Benin exhibit a more consistently positive relationship between RAI themes and government uses of Coercion and Force, while Tunisia sees a consistency negative relationship between increases in RAI and RoF.

Only 3 of the 5 RAI themes are predictive of RoF in more than half of the countries in our sample, suggesting a weaker overall relationship between RAI and CaF than between



Figure 5: Each point represents the mean value across 7 coefficients capturing 0–6 month lags of the RAI theme. Missing points indicate a coefficient of zero. Point size captures the absolute value of the coefficient and point color captures the direction of this relationship.

RAI and RoF. Domestic Interference is again among the themes that are predictive of of civic space in the fewest countries (17), this time joined by Economic Power (16). Similarly, Diplomacy is again among the themes that are predictive in the most countries (21), this time joined by Soft Power (23) and Hard Power (20).

However, we see less consistency in the direction of the relationship between RAI themes and Restrictions on Freedom than between RAI and Coercion an Force. Increases in Diplomacy predict *increases* in RoF in 9 countries, compared to 12 where they predict *decreases*. Hard and Soft Power, are similarly split, with increases predicting *increases* in RoF in 13 and 14 countries and *decreases* in 10 and 6 countries, respectively. To see coefficients presented separately for each month, see Figures 6– 7 in the appendix.

To further probe the validity of these results, we conduct a similar analysis in Appendix 5.3, this time asking whether our Civic Space themes can predict RAI activity. This analysis serves an important purpose. Policymakers and activists often assert that Russian and Chinese influence are actively undermining civic space abroad. Our visual inspection of the relationship between RAI activity and changes in civic space in Section 2 lends some credibility to these claims, at least in some countries. However, the reverse could also be true. Russia and China could target their influence at countries where civic space has already been eroded, or countries that have already embarked on an autocratic turn could be more welcoming to influence from these countries. This might suggest that many existing policy

responses to RAI are misguided.

However, we see much less evidence for this reverse explanation. Coefficients estimating whether CaF or RoF predict changes in RAI activity are consistently much smaller and are much more likely to be estimated at zero. Furthermore, these models have much less explanatory power than those estimating whether RAI predicts changes in civic space. This provides additional evidence that RAI influence typically occurs before shifts in civic space.

It is important to note that this analysis does not provide evidence that increases in RAI *cause* target governments to implement (or remove) restrictions on civic space. Russia and China may target RAI at countries that are already more likely to restrict civic space in the near future. For example, they may target countries that are experiencing changes in the structure of domestic political power that are likely to cause democratic backsliding (or advancement). However, this does provide the first systematic evidence that for some countries, increases in RAI activity are associated with near-term changes in civic space.

4 Conclusion

This report provides the first evidence for a near-term statistical relationship between Russian and Chinese influence and changes in civic space. As expected, increases in RAI are more often associated with increasing restrictions on civic space, although increases in RAI are also predictive of decreasing restrictions in some cases. We see that for both CaF and RoF, Domestic Interference is the least frequent predictor of restrictions on civic space among our 5 RAI themes. Diplomacy is the most common predictor, although it is typically associated with increases in CaF but decreases in RoF. Overall, we see little evidence for consistency in these relationships within regions. However, Diplomacy is much more likely to predict increases (rather than decreases) in government exercises of Coercion and Force in countries in North and Sub-Saharan Africa, and Hard Power is more likely to predict increases (rather than decreases) in Restrictions on Freedom in countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.

We find more evidence for a relationship between RAI activity and the use of Coercion and Force by target governments than between RAI and increasing Restrictions on Freedoms. Given that many components of RoF are slower and more administratively challenging to implement, such as legal changes and formal legal proceedings, and the relatively short time periods under consideration (0–6 months betweeen RAI activity and shifts in civic space), this makes sense. Future analyses with considering the longer-term impact of RAI could provide additional evidence for these claims. Likewise, further research should disentangle Russian and Chinese influence, which are here combined in order to investigate RAI writ large, and further examine the logic whereby Russia and China use different policy tools to pursue different policy aims in diverse target countries around the world. Our new, high frequency data on RAI activities provides a unique opportunity to pursue such research.

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5 Appendix

5.1 LASSO Model Performance

Table 3: Restrictions on Civic Freedoms Predictors and Performance

Country	Available	Retained	R2
Belarus	286	27	0.77
Georgia	223	23	0.60
Kosovo	230	23	0.70
Serbia	342	32	0.75
Ukraine	573	56	0.94
Bangladesh	356	6	0.74
Cambodia	188	16	0.33
Philippines	573	98	0.99
Colombia	258	58	0.92
Ecuador	524	2	0.26
El Salvador	412	28	0.64
Guatemala	237	48	0.92
Honduras	272	11	0.35
Jamaica	202	17	0.48
Nicaragua	279	40	0.73
Paraguay	426	29	0.62
Mali	209	9	0.48
Mauritania	188	24	0.51
Morocco	244	27	0.65
Niger	188	15	0.34
Tunisia	209	45	0.84
Turkey	797	81	0.97
Benin	209	60	0.90
Congo	167	36	0.78
Ethiopia	167	1	0.00
Ghana	265	34	0.66
Kenya	377	16	0.56
Nigeria	265	61	0.95
Rwanda	370	5	0.15
Senegal	300	27	0.54
South Africa	405	80	0.96
Tanzania	300	55	0.87
Uganda	202	26	0.62
Zambia	223	18	0.46

Table 4: Coercion and Force Predictors and Performance

Country	Available	Retained	R2
Belarus	286	46	0.92
Georgia	223	17	0.59
Kosovo	230	23	0.77
Serbia	342	58	0.86
Ukraine	573	56	0.95
Bangladesh	356	41	0.84
Cambodia	188	30	0.88
Philippines	573	90	0.99
Colombia	258	14	0.89
Ecuador	524	46	0.96
El Salvador	412	91	0.99
Guatemala	237	14	0.45
Honduras	272	37	0.94
Jamaica	202	46	0.83
Nicaragua	279	21	0.73
Paraguay	426	13	0.54
Mali	209	62	0.97
Mauritania	188	27	0.95
Morocco	244	15	0.60
Niger	188	17	0.71
Tunisia	209	31	0.66
Turkey	797	32	0.90
Benin	209	49	0.84
Congo	167	56	0.79
Ethiopia	167	72	0.93
Ghana	265	46	0.82
Kenya	377	63	0.92
Nigeria	265	11	0.83
Rwanda	370	30	0.89
Senegal	300	44	0.76
South Africa	405	20	0.92
Tanzania	300	25	0.73
Uganda	202	10	0.59
Zambia	223	9	0.29

Table 5: Protest Predictors and Performance

Country	Available	Retained	R2
Belarus	286	53	0.91
Georgia	223	2	0.07
Kosovo	230	20	0.71
Serbia	342	11	0.52
Ukraine	573	31	0.79
Bangladesh	356	49	0.93
Cambodia	188	49	0.88
Philippines	573	15	0.58
Colombia	258	6	0.34
Ecuador	524	1	0.00
El Salvador	412	53	0.77
Guatemala	237	32	0.69
Honduras	272	15	0.57
Jamaica	202	28	0.54
Nicaragua	279	6	0.64
Paraguay	426	15	0.59
Mali	209	22	0.54
Mauritania	188	1	0.00
Morocco	244	16	0.52
Niger	188	1	0.00
Tunisia	209	33	0.79
Turkey	797	11	0.52
Benin	209	16	0.41
Congo	167	14	0.65
Ethiopia	167	18	0.42
Ghana	265	7	0.27
Kenya	377	87	0.99
Nigeria	265	7	0.34
Rwanda	370	16	0.23
Senegal	300	4	0.16
South Africa	405	16	0.44
Tanzania	300	15	0.70
Uganda	202	2	0.02
Zambia	223	35	0.77

5.2 LASSO Model Lag Coefficients

For our 5 RAI event themes, non-zero and consistently signed coefficients for multiple lagged values or especially large coefficients for a single lagged value provide the strongest evidence for a predictive relationship to the target variable. Alternatively, smaller coefficients that are only present for a single lagged value are more likely to capture spurious correlations rather than a robust relationship. Due to EN's tendency to reduce the number of highly correlated variables by selecting a single variable from a highly correlated set, we consider this a conservative approach to interpreting our results.



Figure 6: Each point represents the coefficient for each lagged value of the RAI theme.



Figure 7: Each point represents the coefficient for each lagged value of the RAI theme.



Figure 8: Each point represents the coefficient for each lagged value of the RAI theme.

5.3 Do Civic Space Events Predict RAI?



Figure 9: Each point represents the mean value across 7 coefficients capturing 0–6 month lags of the civic space theme. Missing points indicate a coefficient of zero. Point size captures the absolute value of the coefficient and point color captures the direction of this relationship.



Figure 10: Each point represents the mean value across 7 coefficients capturing 0–6 month lags of the civic space theme. Missing points indicate a coefficient of zero. Point size captures the absolute value of the coefficient and point color captures the direction of this relationship.



Figure 11: Each point represents the mean value across 7 coefficients capturing 0–6 month lags of the civic space theme. Missing points indicate a coefficient of zero. Point size captures the absolute value of the coefficient and point color captures the direction of this relationship.



Figure 12: Each point represents the mean value across 7 coefficients capturing 0–6 month lags of the civic space theme. Missing points indicate a coefficient of zero. Point size captures the absolute value of the coefficient and point color captures the direction of this relationship.



Figure 13: Each point represents the mean value across 7 coefficients capturing 0–6 month lags of the civic space theme. Missing points indicate a coefficient of zero. Point size captures the absolute value of the coefficient and point color captures the direction of this relationship.

Table 6: RAI Hard Power Predictors and Performance

Country	Available	Retained	R2
Belarus	286	21	0.54
Georgia	223	2	0.05
Kosovo	230	1	0.00
Serbia	342	4	0.14
Ukraine	573	82	0.99
Bangladesh	356	10	0.35
Cambodia	188	7	0.13
Philippines	573	31	0.72
Colombia	258	14	0.31
Ecuador	524	46	0.81
El Salvador	412	3	0.09
Honduras	272	1	0.00
Nicaragua	279	1	0.00
Paraguay	426	1	0.00
Mali	209	1	0.00
Mauritania	188	1	0.00
Morocco	244	2	0.03
Niger	188	1	0.00
Tunisia	209	1	0.00
Turkey	797	19	0.74
Congo	167	17	0.44
Ethiopia	167	13	0.42
Ghana	265	1	0.00
Kenya	377	1	0.00
Nigeria	265	41	0.88
Rwanda	370	1	0.00
Senegal	300	9	0.20
South Africa	405	39	0.67
Tanzania	300	2	0.03
Uganda	202	1	0.00
Zambia	223	1	0.00

Table 7: RAI Soft Power Predictors and Performance

Country	Available	Retained	R2
Belarus	286	34	0.70
Georgia	223	27	0.55
Kosovo	230	2	0.04
Serbia	342	18	0.38
Ukraine	573	8	0.18
Bangladesh	356	23	0.56
Cambodia	188	1	0.00
Philippines	573	53	0.75
Colombia	258	11	0.29
Ecuador	524	4	0.14
El Salvador	412	9	0.43
Guatemala	237	18	0.38
Honduras	272	68	0.91
Jamaica	202	6	0.27
Nicaragua	279	1	0.00
Paraguay	426	6	0.20
Mali	209	1	0.00
Mauritania	188	1	0.00
Morocco	244	1	0.00
Niger	188	1	0.00
Tunisia	209	10	0.28
Turkey	797	1	0.00
Benin	209	4	0.08
Congo	167	29	0.56
Ethiopia	167	2	0.16
Ghana	265	8	0.20
Kenya	377	4	0.15
Nigeria	265	1	0.00
Rwanda	370	17	0.32
Senegal	300	5	0.20
South Africa	405	12	0.33
Tanzania	300	10	0.27
Uganda	202	11	0.28
Zambia	223	12	0.28

Table 8: RAI Economic Power Predictors and Performance

Country	Available	Retained	R2
Belarus	286	60	0.87
Georgia	223	5	0.14
Serbia	342	10	0.28
Ukraine	573	87	0.98
Bangladesh	356	12	0.37
Cambodia	188	56	0.89
Philippines	573	66	0.92
Colombia	258	12	0.41
Ecuador	524	1	0.00
El Salvador	412	22	0.74
Guatemala	237	15	0.52
Honduras	272	2	0.05
Jamaica	202	13	0.34
Nicaragua	279	4	0.16
Paraguay	426	16	0.66
Mali	209	2	0.04
Mauritania	188	4	0.16
Morocco	244	5	0.09
Niger	188	6	0.13
Tunisia	209	47	0.77
Turkey	797	17	0.57
Benin	209	22	0.42
Congo	167	36	0.68
Ethiopia	167	59	0.86
Ghana	265	12	0.34
Kenya	377	6	0.48
Nigeria	265	29	0.89
Rwanda	370	20	0.56
Senegal	300	12	0.43
South Africa	405	8	0.55
Tanzania	300	9	0.23
Uganda	202	18	0.40
Zambia	223	6	0.16

Table 9: RAI Domestic Interference Predictors and Performance

Country	Available	Retained	R2
Belarus	286	46	0.82
Georgia	223	7	0.15
Kosovo	230	6	0.10
Serbia	342	9	0.23
Ukraine	573	34	0.62
Bangladesh	356	20	0.55
Cambodia	188	1	0.00
Philippines	573	31	0.61
Colombia	258	2	0.06
Ecuador	524	1	0.00
El Salvador	412	1	0.00
Guatemala	237	1	0.00
Honduras	272	1	0.00
Jamaica	202	1	0.00
Nicaragua	279	1	0.00
Paraguay	426	1	0.00
Mali	209	7	0.25
Morocco	244	17	0.32
Turkey	797	17	0.46
Congo	167	1	0.00
Ethiopia	167	32	0.56
Ghana	265	61	0.83
Kenya	377	32	0.69
Nigeria	265	8	0.26
Rwanda	370	5	0.24
Senegal	300	1	0.00
South Africa	405	1	0.00
Tanzania	300	2	0.11
Uganda	202	2	0.09

Table 10: Diplomatic Activity Predictors and Performance

Country	Available	Retained	R2
Belarus	286	15	0.54
Georgia	223	1	0.00
Kosovo	230	2	0.05
Serbia	342	8	0.28
Ukraine	573	18	0.75
Bangladesh	356	9	0.41
Cambodia	188	6	0.28
Philippines	573	22	0.55
Colombia	258	21	0.65
Ecuador	524	6	0.18
El Salvador	412	1	0.00
Guatemala	237	14	0.34
Honduras	272	2	0.15
Jamaica	202	2	0.05
Nicaragua	279	1	0.00
Paraguay	426	1	0.00
Mali	209	8	0.26
Morocco	244	1	0.00
Niger	188	1	0.00
Tunisia	209	1	0.00
Turkey	797	17	0.65
Benin	209	1	0.00
Congo	167	14	0.63
Ethiopia	167	1	0.00
Ghana	265	40	0.73
Kenya	377	4	0.08
Nigeria	265	60	0.94
Rwanda	370	1	0.00
Senegal	300	2	0.11
South Africa	405	12	0.51
Tanzania	300	5	0.22
Uganda	202	3	0.11
Zambia	223	3	0.11