

# Online Appendix for: “The Majoritarian Threat to Liberal Democracy”

November 18, 2020

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## A Survey Instrument

Q1. Consent form on a separate page

To begin, we'd like to ask you a few demographic questions for background purposes.

Q2. What is the highest level of education you have completed?

1. Did not complete high school
2. High school graduate
3. Some college, no degree
4. Associate's degree
5. Bachelor's degree
6. Post-graduate degree

Q3. In what year were you born?

[Drop down menu showing years provided to respondents]

Q4. I consider myself to be:

1. Male
2. Female

Q5. I consider myself to be:

1. Caucasian (white)
2. African-American
3. Hispanic/Latino
4. Asian American
5. Other

Q6. Which of the following is more important to you?

1. Having my state's governor come from the political party I prefer
2. Having the U.S. president come from the political party I prefer

Q7. Thinking about elected officials at different levels of American government, which decisions do you think have the most impact on your day-to-day life?

1. Decisions made by the President of the United States
2. Decisions made by the governor of your state
3. Decisions made by the Mayor or executive of your city, town, or county

Q8a. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?

1. Republican
2. Democrat
3. Independent

Q8b. If Q8a = 1 or 2: Would you call yourself a strong [Republican/Democrat] or a not very strong [Republican/Democrat]?

1. Strong
2. Not very strong

Q8c. If Q8a = 3: Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic party?

1. Republican
2. Democratic
3. Neither

I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing the United States of America. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad way of governing the United States?

Q9. The first one is having a strong leader who does not have to bother with congress and elections. Is this a very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad way of governing the United States?

1. Very good way of governing the United States
2. Fairly good way of governing the United States
3. Fairly bad way of governing the United States

4. Very bad way of governing the United States

Q10. What about having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country. Is this a very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad way of governing the United States?

1. Very good way of governing the United States

2. Fairly good way of governing the United States

3. Fairly bad way of governing the United States

4. Very bad way of governing the United States

Q11. What about having the military rule. Is this a very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad way of governing the United States?

1. Very good way of governing the United States

2. Fairly good way of governing the United States

3. Fairly bad way of governing the United States

4. Very bad way of governing the United States

Q12. What about having a democratic political system. Is this a very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad way of governing the United States?

1. Very good way of governing the United States

2. Fairly good way of governing the United States

3. Fairly bad way of governing the United States

4. Very bad way of governing the United States

Now we'd like you to read a brief news article about recent political events. Please read it carefully, and then we'll ask you some questions about it once you're finished. Please click to the next screen to read the article.

[RANDOMLY ASSIGN SUBJECTS TO CONDITION T.A, T.B, or T.C]

T.A: The PARTY<sup>1</sup> governor of a state in the United States wants to determine

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<sup>1</sup>In conditions T.A-T.C, subjects read about a same-party governor. So Democratic (Republican) or Independents who lean toward the Democratic (Republican) Party read about a Democratic (Republican) governor; pure Independents are randomly assigned a Democratic or Republican governor. PARTY is simply a placeholder for the appropriate party label.

the state budget without input from the state legislature. This would require changing the state constitution, which currently gives the legislature power over the budget. The PARTY governor has decided to put this change to the voters in a special referendum election: The state will hold a yes-or-no vote in which citizens can decide directly whether or not to give the governor total control over the budget.

The PARTY governor argues that this reform is necessary because gridlock in the legislature has delayed the budget process in recent years, hurting the state's citizens. But critics say that the reform would make the governor too powerful, and that the legislature should continue to control the budget, as this provides an important check on the governor's power.

T.B: The PARTY governor of a state in the United States wants to determine the state budget without input from the state legislature. This would require changing the state constitution, which currently gives the legislature power over the budget. The PARTY governor has decided to put this change to the voters in a special referendum election: The state will hold a yes-or-no vote in which citizens can decide directly whether or not to give the governor total control over the budget.

The PARTY governor argues that this reform is necessary because the legislature is controlled by lobbyists and special interests that are preventing him from governing in the best interests of the state's citizens. But critics say that the reform would make the governor too powerful, and that the legislature should continue to control the budget, as this provides an important check on the governor's power.

T.C: The PARTY governor of a state in the United States wants to determine the state budget without input from the state legislature. This would require changing the state constitution, which currently gives the legislature power over the budget. The PARTY governor has decided to put this change to the voters in a special referendum election: The state will hold a yes-or-no vote in which citizens can decide directly whether or not to give the governor total control over the budget.

The PARTY governor argues that this reform is necessary to prevent the other party's extreme agenda from being enacted. But critics say that

the reform would make the governor too powerful, and that the legislature should continue to control the budget, as this provides an important check on the governor's power.

Q13. We just asked you to read a brief news story about the governor of a state that who wants to control his state's budget. In the article, what was the governor's reason for wanting more control over the budget?

1. Gridlock in the legislature has delayed the budget in recent years, hurting the state's citizens
2. He needs to prevent the other party's extreme agenda from being enacted
3. Lobbyists and special interests in the legislature are preventing him from acting in the best interest of the state's citizens
4. He did not give a reason

Q14. What party was the governor from in the article you just read?

1. Republican
2. Democrat
3. Didn't specify

Q15. If you had the opportunity to vote in the special election discussed in the article you just read, would you support or oppose the governor's plan to give him control of the budget?

1. Definitely would support the governor's plan
2. Probably would support the governor's plan
3. Probably would oppose the governor's plan
4. Definitely would oppose the governor's plan

Q16. Is the governor's plan to give him control of the budget consistent with democracy?

1. Completely consistent with democracy
2. Mostly consistent with democracy
3. Mostly inconsistent with democracy
4. Completely inconsistent with democracy

Now we'd like you to read another brief news article about recent political events. Please read it carefully, and then we'll ask you some questions about it once you're finished. Please click to the next screen to read the article.

[RANDOMLY ASSIGN RESPONDENTS TO CONDITIONS T, U, V, W, X, Y, OR Z. THIS IS AN INDEPENDENT AND ORTHOGONAL RANDOMIZATION TO THE ONE ABOVE. THE PROBABILITIES ARE:

- T.T: 1/3
- T.U: 1/12
- T.V: 1/12
- T.W: 1/6
- T.X: 1/12
- T.Y: 1/12
- T.Z: 1/6

T.T: The Governor's Council on Wednesday unanimously confirmed Judge Elspeth "Ellie" Cypher to the Supreme Judicial Court. She will also be the first supreme court justice from Bristol County in more than a century, according to Governor's Councilor Joseph Ferreira. "The words exceptional, awesome, brilliant, kind and fair come to mind when you talk about Judge Cypher," Ferreira said. Cypher will replace Justice Margot Botsford, who reaches the mandatory retirement age of 70 this month.

Cypher has served on the Appeals Court since 2000 after she was nominated by Gov. Paul Cellucci. She is a former Bristol County prosecutor who graduated Emerson College and obtained her law degree from the Suffolk University Law School. A Pittsburgh native, Cypher is married with one son. She has taught at the University of Massachusetts School of Law, formerly the Southern New England School of Law.

T.U: In a U.S. state, a justice on the state's Supreme Court announced that he will retire in March. The Democratic governor, who is stepping down from office in January, immediately appointed a Democrat to replace the retiring justice.

The outgoing governor argued that he has power to appoint this new justice under the state's constitution, but critics charge that this is a partisan

power grab because the judicial vacancy will not occur until after the outgoing governor leaves office. In the past, governors have not appointed justices to fill vacancies after their own time in office. The incoming governor is a Republican, and has stated that he plans to appoint a Republican to the Court.

Voters in the state protested the outgoing Democratic governor's judicial appointment, and the governor backed down from the plan. Instead the incoming Republican governor will appoint a new justice once the current justice retires in March.

T.V: In a U.S. state, a justice on the state's Supreme Court announced that he will retire in March. The Democratic governor, who is stepping down from office in January, immediately appointed a Democrat to replace the retiring justice.

The outgoing governor argued that he has power to appoint this new justice under the state's constitution, but critics charge that this is a partisan power grab because the judicial vacancy will not occur until after the outgoing governor leaves office. In the past, governors have not appointed justices to fill vacancies after their own time in office. The incoming governor is a Republican, and has stated that he plans to appoint a Republican to the Court.

Republicans sued and the case was heard in the state's Supreme Court, which ruled that the current governor cannot appoint a new justice. Instead the incoming Republican governor will appoint a new justice once the current justice retires in March.

T.W: In a U.S. state, a justice on the state's Supreme Court announced that he will retire in March. The Democratic governor, who is stepping down from office in January, immediately appointed a Democrat to replace the retiring justice.

The outgoing governor argued that he has power to appoint this new justice under the state's constitution, but critics charge that this is a partisan power grab because the judicial vacancy will not occur until after the outgoing governor leaves office. In the past, governors have not appointed justices to fill vacancies after their own time in office. The incoming governor is a Republican, and has stated that he plans to appoint a Republican to the Court.

Despite opposition, the current governor was successful, and his new justice will join the court in March.

T.X: In a U.S. state, a justice on the state's Supreme Court announced that he will retire in March. The Republican governor, who is stepping down from office in January, immediately appointed a Republican to replace the retiring justice.

The outgoing governor argued that he has power to appoint this new justice under the state's constitution, but critics charge that this is a partisan power grab because the judicial vacancy will not occur until after the outgoing governor leaves office. In the past, governors have not appointed justices to fill vacancies after their own time in office. The incoming governor is a Democrat, and has stated that he plans to appoint a Democrat to the Court.

Voters in the state protested the outgoing Republican governor's judicial appointment, and the governor backed down from the plan. Instead the incoming Democratic governor will appoint a new justice once the current justice retires in March.

T.Y: In a U.S. state, a justice on the state's Supreme Court announced that he will retire in March. The Republican governor, who is stepping down from office in January, immediately appointed a Republican to replace the retiring justice.

The outgoing governor argued that he has power to appoint this new justice under the state's constitution, but critics charge that this is a partisan power grab because the judicial vacancy will not occur until after the outgoing governor leaves office. In the past, governors have not appointed justices to fill vacancies after their own time in office. The incoming governor is a Democrat, and has stated that he plans to appoint a Democrat to the Court.

Democrats sued and the case was heard in the state's Supreme Court, which ruled that the current governor cannot appoint a new justice. Instead the incoming Democratic governor will appoint a new justice once the current justice retires in March.

T.Z: In a U.S. state, a justice on the state's Supreme Court announced that he will retire in March. The Republican governor, who is stepping down

from office in January, immediately appointed a Republican to replace the retiring justice.

The outgoing governor argued that he has power to appoint this new justice under the state's constitution, but critics charge that this is a partisan power grab because the judicial vacancy will not occur until after the outgoing governor leaves office. In the past, governors have not appointed justices to fill vacancies after their own time in office. The incoming governor is a Democrat, and has stated that he plans to appoint a Democrat to the Court.

Despite opposition, the current governor was successful, and his new justice will join the court in March.

Q17. In the article you just read, what did the outgoing governor ACTION<sup>2</sup>?

1. Appoint a new justice to the state Supreme Court
2. Change the budget process
3. Change the shape of congressional districts
4. Pass a new law
5. None of the above

[RANDOMLY ASSIGN SUBJECTS TO CONDITIONS M OR N. THIS IS AN INDEPENDENT AND ORTHOGONAL RANDOMIZATION FROM THE TWO ABOVE]

[IF SUBJECTS ARE ASSIGNED TO CONDITION M:]

Q18. Do you approve of the outgoing governor's APPOINTMENT<sup>3</sup> a new justice to the state's Supreme Court?

1. Strongly approve

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<sup>2</sup>In conditions T.T, T.W, and T.Z, the respondents read an vignette about a governor who is successful in appointing a new judge. So ACTION is a placeholder for the word "do." In conditions T.U, T.V, T.X, and T.Y, the respondents read an vignette about a governor who is unsuccessful in appointing a new judge. So ACTION is a placeholder for the phrase "try to do."

<sup>3</sup>In conditions T.T, T.W, and T.Z, the respondents read an vignette about a governor who is successful in appointing a new judge. So APPOINTMENT is a placeholder for the phrase "appointment of." In conditions T.U, T.V, T.X, and T.Y, the respondents read an vignette about a governor who is unsuccessful in appointing a new judge. So APPOINTMENT is a placeholder for the phrase "effort to appoint."

2. Somewhat approve
3. Somewhat disapprove
4. Strongly disapprove

Q19. Is the governor's APPOINTMENT a new justice consistent with democracy?

1. Completely consistent with democracy
2. Mostly consistent with democracy
3. Mostly inconsistent with democracy
4. Completely inconsistent with democracy

[IF SUBJECTS ARE ASSIGNED TO CONDITION N:]

Q19. Is the governor's APPOINTMENT a new justice consistent with democracy?

1. Completely consistent with democracy
2. Mostly consistent with democracy
3. Mostly inconsistent with democracy
4. Completely inconsistent with democracy

Q18. Do you approve of the outgoing governor's APPOINTMENT a new justice to the state's Supreme Court?

1. Strongly approve
2. Somewhat approve
3. Somewhat disapprove
4. Strongly disapprove

[IF SUBJECTS ARE ASSIGNED TO CONDITION U, V, W, X, Y, OR Z:]

Q20. Earlier, we told you about a governor who tried to appoint a new justice to his state's supreme court. Do you remember if he was successful in that effort?

1. Yes, he successfully appointed the judge
2. No, the court blocked his appointment of the judge
3. No, he withdrew the nomination in the face of public pressure

[IF SUBJECTS ARE ASSIGNED TO CONDITION W OR Z:]

- If Q20 = 1: Yes, that’s correct. The governor successfully appointed a new justice.
- If Q20 = 2 or 3: No, that’s incorrect. The governor successfully appoint a new justice.

[IF SUBJECTS ARE ASSIGNED TO CONDITION U OR X:]

- If Q20 = 1: No, that’s incorrect. The governor withdrew the nomination in the face of public pressure.
- If Q20 = 2: No, that’s incorrect. While the judge wasn’t seated on the court, it was because the governor withdrew the nomination in the face of public pressure.
- If Q20 = 3: Yes, that’s correct. The governor withdrew the nomination in the face of public pressure.

[IF SUBJECTS ARE ASSIGNED TO CONDITION V OR Y:]

- If Q20 = 1: No, that’s incorrect. The courts blocked the governor’s appointment of the judge.
- If Q20 = 2: Yes, that’s correct. The courts blocked the governor’s appointment of the judge.
- If Q20 = 3: No, that’s incorrect. While the judge wasn’t seated on the court, it was because the courts blocked the governor’s appointment.

Q21. Earlier, we asked you about the governor in a different state, who has proposed a special election (referendum) that would allow voters to decide whether he should have more power over the state budget. How likely do you think it is that the voters will approve the governor’s plan to give him control of the budget?

1. Extremely likely
2. Very likely
3. Not too likely
4. Not at all likely

Q22. Overall, how democratically do you think the United States is being governed today?

1. Completely democratically
2. Mostly democratically
3. Not too democratically
4. Not at all democratically

In this study, we asked you to read about a governor who tried to appoint a new justice to his state's Supreme Court. This is a combination of something that happened in North Carolina and in Vermont. In neither case did a new justice end up on the court. To find out more about these cases, visit: <http://www.burlingtonfreepress.com/story/news/politics/government/2017/01/03/vt-supreme-court-weighs-gov-shumlins-authority/95887910/> and <http://www.wsocvtv.com/news/local/republicans-could-retake-nc-supreme-court/466387424>.

## **B Information on Reporting Standards**

The following is the information needed to comply with the JEPS [reporting stands for experimental research](#).

A **Hypotheses:** see the body of the paper

B **Subjects and Content:**

- (a) The subject pool is all Americans with Internet access. Recruitment is handled by Survey Monkey, the vendor, who recruits subjects online to complete its study (via banner ads, web links, etc.). Subjects were recruited between January 17th and March 9 2018. Due to issues with the Survey Monkey platform unrelated to our study, it

## C Additional Analyses

### C.1 Descriptive Statistics and Balance Tests

Table C.1: Descriptive Statistics Table (Full Sample in Experiment 1)

| <b>Variable</b>                    | <b>Mean</b> | <b>Std. Dev.</b> | <b>Min.</b> | <b>Max.</b> | <b>N</b> |
|------------------------------------|-------------|------------------|-------------|-------------|----------|
| gender_pre==Female                 | 0.527       | 0.499            | 0           | 1           | 3398     |
| gender_pre==Male                   | 0.473       | 0.499            | 0           | 1           | 3398     |
| Year of birth                      | 1969.844    | 16.545           | 1900        | 2000        | 3390     |
| race==Caucasian                    | 0.817       | 0.387            | 0           | 1           | 3396     |
| race==African-American             | 0.056       | 0.229            | 0           | 1           | 3396     |
| race==Hispanic                     | 0.058       | 0.233            | 0           | 1           | 3396     |
| race==Asian                        | 0.028       | 0.164            | 0           | 1           | 3396     |
| race==Other                        | 0.042       | 0.2              | 0           | 1           | 3396     |
| education==No high school degree   | 0.021       | 0.142            | 0           | 1           | 3393     |
| education==High school degree      | 0.095       | 0.294            | 0           | 1           | 3393     |
| education==Some college            | 0.224       | 0.417            | 0           | 1           | 3393     |
| education==Associate's degree      | 0.112       | 0.315            | 0           | 1           | 3393     |
| education==Bachelor's degree       | 0.308       | 0.462            | 0           | 1           | 3393     |
| education==Post-graduate degree    | 0.24        | 0.427            | 0           | 1           | 3393     |
| hh_income==\$0-\$9,999             | 0.064       | 0.244            | 0           | 1           | 3341     |
| hh_income==\$10,000-\$24,999       | 0.088       | 0.283            | 0           | 1           | 3341     |
| hh_income==\$25,000-\$49,999       | 0.186       | 0.389            | 0           | 1           | 3341     |
| hh_income==\$50,000-\$74,999       | 0.154       | 0.361            | 0           | 1           | 3341     |
| hh_income==\$75,000-\$99,999       | 0.124       | 0.33             | 0           | 1           | 3341     |
| hh_income==\$100,000-\$124,999     | 0.093       | 0.29             | 0           | 1           | 3341     |
| hh_income==\$125,000-\$149,999     | 0.049       | 0.216            | 0           | 1           | 3341     |
| hh_income==\$150,000-\$174,999     | 0.04        | 0.196            | 0           | 1           | 3341     |
| hh_income==\$175,000-\$199,999     | 0.021       | 0.144            | 0           | 1           | 3341     |
| hh_income==\$200,000+              | 0.054       | 0.226            | 0           | 1           | 3341     |
| hh_income==Prefer not to answer    | 0.126       | 0.332            | 0           | 1           | 3341     |
| party7==Strong democrat            | 0.284       | 0.451            | 0           | 1           | 3407     |
| party7==Not very strong democrat   | 0.144       | 0.351            | 0           | 1           | 3407     |
| party7==Lean democrat              | 0.163       | 0.37             | 0           | 1           | 3407     |
| party7==Pure independent           | 0           | 0                | 0           | 0           | 3407     |
| party7==Lean republican            | 0.108       | 0.311            | 0           | 1           | 3407     |
| party7==Not very strong republican | 0.117       | 0.321            | 0           | 1           | 3407     |
| party7==Strong republican          | 0.183       | 0.387            | 0           | 1           | 3407     |

Table C.2: Balance Table for Full Sample in Experiment 1

| Variable                           | (1)<br>Polarization |                     | (2)<br>Gridlock    |                     | (3)<br>Special Interests |                     | (1)-(2) | T-test   |         |
|------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|---------------------|---------|----------|---------|
|                                    | N                   | Mean/SE             | N                  | Mean/SE             | N                        | Mean/SE             |         | (1)-(3)  | (2)-(3) |
| gender_pre==Female                 | 1096                | 0.517<br>(0.015)    | 1165               | 0.530<br>(0.015)    | 1137                     | 0.534<br>(0.015)    | -0.012  | -0.017   | -0.004  |
| gender_pre==Male                   | 1096                | 0.483<br>(0.015)    | 1165               | 0.470<br>(0.015)    | 1137                     | 0.466<br>(0.015)    | 0.012   | 0.017    | 0.004   |
| Year of birth                      | 1094                | 1969.864<br>(0.499) | 1160               | 1969.984<br>(0.485) | 1136                     | 1969.683<br>(0.493) | -0.120  | 0.181    | 0.301   |
| race==Caucasian                    | 1095                | 0.829<br>(0.011)    | 1161               | 0.806<br>(0.012)    | 1140                     | 0.817<br>(0.011)    | 0.023   | 0.013    | -0.010  |
| race==African-American             | 1095                | 0.048<br>(0.006)    | 1161               | 0.053<br>(0.007)    | 1140                     | 0.065<br>(0.007)    | -0.005  | -0.017*  | -0.012  |
| race==Hispanic                     | 1095                | 0.052<br>(0.007)    | 1161               | 0.065<br>(0.007)    | 1140                     | 0.056<br>(0.007)    | -0.013  | -0.004   | 0.008   |
| race==Asian                        | 1095                | 0.028<br>(0.005)    | 1161               | 0.031<br>(0.005)    | 1140                     | 0.024<br>(0.005)    | -0.003  | 0.005    | 0.007   |
| race==Other                        | 1095                | 0.042<br>(0.006)    | 1161               | 0.045<br>(0.006)    | 1140                     | 0.039<br>(0.006)    | -0.003  | 0.003    | 0.006   |
| education==No high school degree   | 1095                | 0.019<br>(0.004)    | 1160               | 0.022<br>(0.004)    | 1138                     | 0.021<br>(0.004)    | -0.002  | -0.002   | 0.000   |
| education==High school degree      | 1095                | 0.095<br>(0.009)    | 1160               | 0.091<br>(0.008)    | 1138                     | 0.100<br>(0.009)    | 0.004   | -0.005   | -0.010  |
| education==Some college            | 1095                | 0.225<br>(0.013)    | 1160               | 0.226<br>(0.012)    | 1138                     | 0.221<br>(0.012)    | -0.001  | 0.004    | 0.005   |
| education==Associate's degree      | 1095                | 0.109<br>(0.009)    | 1160               | 0.107<br>(0.009)    | 1138                     | 0.120<br>(0.010)    | 0.002   | -0.012   | -0.013  |
| education==Bachelor's degree       | 1095                | 0.305<br>(0.014)    | 1160               | 0.315<br>(0.014)    | 1138                     | 0.304<br>(0.014)    | -0.010  | 0.001    | 0.011   |
| education==Post-graduate degree    | 1095                | 0.247<br>(0.013)    | 1160               | 0.241<br>(0.013)    | 1138                     | 0.234<br>(0.013)    | 0.007   | 0.014    | 0.007   |
| hh_income==0-9,999                 | 1077                | 0.062<br>(0.007)    | 1149               | 0.067<br>(0.007)    | 1115                     | 0.062<br>(0.007)    | -0.005  | 0.000    | 0.005   |
| hh_income==10,000-24,999           | 1077                | 0.091<br>(0.009)    | 1149               | 0.091<br>(0.008)    | 1115                     | 0.083<br>(0.008)    | 0.000   | 0.008    | 0.008   |
| hh_income==25,000-49,999           | 1077                | 0.196<br>(0.012)    | 1149               | 0.195<br>(0.012)    | 1115                     | 0.168<br>(0.011)    | 0.001   | 0.028*   | 0.027*  |
| hh_income==50,000-74,999           | 1077                | 0.141<br>(0.011)    | 1149               | 0.147<br>(0.010)    | 1115                     | 0.175<br>(0.011)    | -0.006  | -0.034** | -0.028* |
| hh_income==75,000-99,999           | 1077                | 0.126<br>(0.010)    | 1149               | 0.128<br>(0.010)    | 1115                     | 0.118<br>(0.010)    | -0.002  | 0.008    | 0.010   |
| hh_income==100,000-124,999         | 1077                | 0.092<br>(0.009)    | 1149               | 0.087<br>(0.008)    | 1115                     | 0.100<br>(0.009)    | 0.005   | -0.008   | -0.013  |
| hh_income==125,000-149,999         | 1077                | 0.048<br>(0.007)    | 1149               | 0.048<br>(0.006)    | 1115                     | 0.051<br>(0.007)    | 0.000   | -0.003   | -0.003  |
| hh_income==150,000-174,999         | 1077                | 0.034<br>(0.006)    | 1149               | 0.039<br>(0.006)    | 1115                     | 0.047<br>(0.006)    | -0.005  | -0.012   | -0.007  |
| hh_income==175,000-199,999         | 1077                | 0.020<br>(0.004)    | 1149               | 0.021<br>(0.004)    | 1115                     | 0.022<br>(0.004)    | -0.000  | -0.002   | -0.002  |
| hh_income==200,000+                | 1077                | 0.066<br>(0.008)    | 1149               | 0.050<br>(0.006)    | 1115                     | 0.047<br>(0.006)    | 0.016*  | 0.019**  | 0.003   |
| hh_income==Prefer not to answer    | 1077                | 0.123<br>(0.010)    | 1149               | 0.128<br>(0.010)    | 1115                     | 0.128<br>(0.010)    | -0.005  | -0.006   | -0.000  |
| party7==Strong democrat            | 1098                | 0.260<br>(0.013)    | 1166               | 0.283<br>(0.013)    | 1143                     | 0.308<br>(0.014)    | -0.023  | -0.047** | -0.025  |
| party7==Not very strong democrat   | 1098                | 0.146<br>(0.011)    | 1166               | 0.154<br>(0.011)    | 1143                     | 0.132<br>(0.010)    | -0.009  | 0.014    | 0.022   |
| party7==Lean democrat              | 1098                | 0.162<br>(0.011)    | 1166               | 0.161<br>(0.011)    | 1143                     | 0.167<br>(0.011)    | 0.001   | -0.005   | -0.006  |
| party7==Pure independent           | 1098                | 0.000<br>(0.000)    | 1166               | 0.000<br>(0.000)    | 1143                     | 0.000<br>(0.000)    | N/A     | N/A      | N/A     |
| party7==Lean republican            | 1098                | 0.109<br>(0.009)    | 1166               | 0.101<br>(0.009)    | 1143                     | 0.115<br>(0.009)    | 0.008   | -0.005   | -0.013  |
| party7==Not very strong republican | 1098                | 0.116<br>(0.010)    | 1166 <sup>17</sup> | 0.123<br>(0.010)    | 1143                     | 0.111<br>(0.009)    | -0.007  | 0.005    | 0.012   |
| party7==Strong republican          | 1098                | 0.207<br>(0.012)    | 1166               | 0.178<br>(0.011)    | 1143                     | 0.167<br>(0.011)    | 0.029*  | 0.040**  | 0.010   |

Notes: The value displayed for t-tests are the differences in the means across the groups. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.

## C.2 Construct Validity & Correlates of Support for Democracy

As discussed in Appendix B1 of the PAP, we included the four World Values Survey items used to measure support for democracy in our study, so we can produce a correlation matrix of these items, which we present in Table C.3:

Table C.3: Correlations between questions about views on democracy. The blank entries for Q16 indicate that it was not included in our survey.

|                                                     |      |      |      |       |      |      |   |      |  |
|-----------------------------------------------------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|---|------|--|
| 1. Strong leader (Q9)                               |      |      |      |       |      |      |   |      |  |
| 2. Expert rule (Q10)                                | 0.35 |      |      |       |      |      |   |      |  |
| 3. Military rule (Q11)                              | 0.55 | 0.33 |      |       |      |      |   |      |  |
| 4. Democratic political system (Q12; Reverse Coded) | 0.16 | 0.01 | 0.16 |       |      |      |   |      |  |
| 5. Average of Q9-Q12                                | 0.78 | 0.66 | 0.75 | 0.47  |      |      |   |      |  |
| 6. Support budget plan (Q15)                        | 0.43 | 0.25 | 0.38 | 0.10  | 0.44 |      |   |      |  |
| 7. Budget plan democratic (Q16)                     | ■    | ■    | ■    | ■     | ■    | ■    |   |      |  |
| 8. Support court packing (Q18)                      | 0.13 | 0.06 | 0.12 | -0.02 | 0.11 | 0.16 | ■ |      |  |
| 9. Court packing democratic (Q19)                   | 0.12 | 0.05 | 0.11 | -0.03 | 0.09 | 0.12 | ■ | 0.72 |  |

It turns out that abstract views of democracy are, at best, weakly correlated with responses to specific examples of anti-democratic behavior. The only real exception to this pattern is that there is a modestly high correlation between belief that a country should have a strong leader and responses to experiment 1 ( $\rho = 0.43$ ), which is unsurprising because experiment 1 is describing exactly that phenomenon (there is also a reasonably high correlation between experiment 1 and support for a military ruler,  $\rho = 0.38$ ). The World Value Survey items do not seem to even correlate all that highly with one another (again, except for stronger leaders and military ruler, which respondents may interpret as being effectively the same thing). This suggests that our strategy of using specific examples of anti-democratic behavior is a more effective gauge of the public’s support for democratic institutions.

We can also consider the individual-level correlates of democracy. In particular, given the findings in Foa and Mounk (2016), we are particularly interested in whether younger voters have lower support for democracy. Table C.4 gives the results:

We find a weak relationship for age, but it is that, *contra* Foa and Mounk (2016), older voters are somewhat more skeptical of democracy. But overall, the key result is that all of these correlations are quite modest. These individual-level characteristics are, at best, weakly correlated with support for democracy.

|              | (1)                | (2)                | (3)                | (4)                | (5)               | (6)               | (7)               | (8)               |
|--------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
|              | Q12                | Q12                | Q15                | Q15                | Q18               | Q18               | Q19               | Q19               |
| Age          | -0.07***<br>(0.01) | -0.05***<br>(0.01) | -0.10***<br>(0.01) | -0.07***<br>(0.01) | -0.03**<br>(0.01) | -0.03*<br>(0.01)  | -0.01<br>(0.01)   | -0.01<br>(0.01)   |
| Education    |                    | -0.10***<br>(0.01) |                    | -0.11***<br>(0.01) |                   | -0.01<br>(0.01)   |                   | 0.01<br>(0.01)    |
| Male         |                    | -0.05*<br>(0.02)   |                    | 0.04+<br>(0.03)    |                   | 0.10**<br>(0.03)  |                   | 0.16***<br>(0.03) |
| Constant     | 2.10***<br>(0.04)  | 2.45***<br>(0.05)  | 2.34***<br>(0.04)  | 2.68***<br>(0.05)  | 2.40***<br>(0.05) | 2.38***<br>(0.06) | 2.41***<br>(0.05) | 2.29***<br>(0.06) |
| Observations | 4830               | 4795               | 4329               | 4297               | 4051              | 4023              | 4037              | 4009              |
| $R^2$        | 0.019              | 0.048              | 0.033              | 0.065              | 0.002             | 0.004             | 0.000             | 0.006             |

Standard errors in parentheses

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table C.4: Individual-level correlates of support for democracy. Note that in these analyses Q12 (WVS Support for Democracy) is reverse-coded to aid in interpretation.

### C.3 Effects Conditioned by Partisanship

Readers might wonder—given the current political climate—if there are partisan differences to our executive budget-control scenario. While we investigate co-partisan effects in the body of the paper, we pool Democrats and Republicans together.

The results in Table C.5 show no heterogeneous treatment effects. While we show intercept differences in experiment 1 (across conditions, Republicans are somewhat more supportive of the governor’s actions), but there is no pattern of significantly different slopes (i.e., the treatment effects do not differ by party).

### C.4 Did The Type of Resistance to the Governor Matter?

In section B4 of the PAP, we discussed conducting an exploratory analysis of the whether the type of resistance to the governor’s court packing plan (voter protest versus court action) would change updating vis-a-vis the executive budget-control experiment. We call this an exploratory analysis for two reasons: first, we are under-powered to detect such an effect, and second, we lack a clear theoretical rationale for why voters would react differently in these scenarios. Table C.6 gives the effects.

There seems to be no difference in effects on updating: seeing the governor’s plan in

|                             | (1)                | (2)     | (3)      | (4)      | (5)      | (6)      |
|-----------------------------|--------------------|---------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
|                             | Q15                | Q15     | Q18      | Q18      | Q19      | Q19      |
| Republican                  | 0.17***            | 0.19*** | 0.07*    | 0.02     | 0.05     | -0.01    |
|                             | (0.03)             | (0.05)  | (0.03)   | (0.04)   | (0.03)   | (0.05)   |
| Other-party Extremism       | -0.06 <sup>+</sup> | -0.04   |          |          |          |          |
|                             | (0.03)             | (0.04)  |          |          |          |          |
| Gridlock                    | -0.05              | -0.04   |          |          |          |          |
|                             | (0.03)             | (0.04)  |          |          |          |          |
| Rep × Other-party Extremism |                    | -0.06   |          |          |          |          |
|                             |                    | (0.07)  |          |          |          |          |
| Rep × Gridlock              |                    | -0.00   |          |          |          |          |
|                             |                    | (0.07)  |          |          |          |          |
| Co-partisan                 |                    |         | 0.65***  | 0.61***  | 0.42***  | 0.38***  |
|                             |                    |         | (0.03)   | (0.04)   | (0.03)   | (0.04)   |
| Blocked, Voter Protest      |                    |         | -0.82*** | -0.83*** | -0.62*** | -0.62*** |
|                             |                    |         | (0.05)   | (0.05)   | (0.05)   | (0.05)   |
| Blocked, Court Action       |                    |         | -1.01*** | -1.02*** | -0.84*** | -0.84*** |
|                             |                    |         | (0.05)   | (0.05)   | (0.05)   | (0.05)   |
| Succeeded                   |                    |         | -0.71*** | -0.71*** | -0.49*** | -0.49*** |
|                             |                    |         | (0.04)   | (0.04)   | (0.04)   | (0.04)   |
| Republican × Co-partisan    |                    |         |          | 0.10     |          | 0.11     |
|                             |                    |         |          | (0.06)   |          | (0.07)   |
| Constant                    | 1.86***            | 1.85*** | 2.46***  | 2.48***  | 2.57***  | 2.59***  |
|                             | (0.02)             | (0.03)  | (0.04)   | (0.04)   | (0.04)   | (0.04)   |
| Observations                | 4349               | 4349    | 3429     | 3429     | 3414     | 3414     |
| $R^2$                       | 0.009              | 0.009   | 0.240    | 0.241    | 0.138    | 0.139    |

Standard errors in parentheses

<sup>+</sup>  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table C.5: Investigating for heterogeneous treatment effects by party, experiments 1 and 2.

experiment 2 (court packing) fail for any reason makes subjects think the governor in experiment 1 (budget control) will be less likely to get his way. That said, there is a borderline significant effect ( $p = 0.09$ ) for all subjects on the assessment of how democratically the U.S. is being governed. Here, seeing the voter protest block the governor's appointment makes subjects think the U.S. is being governed more democratically, seeing the governor's plan blocked by the courts makes them think

|                                     | Will Governor’s Plan Pass |                     | How Democratic is US |                     |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
|                                     | (1)                       | (2)                 | (3)                  | (4)                 |
| Blocked, Voter Protest              | -0.031<br>(0.033)         | -0.079*<br>(0.032)  | 0.024<br>(0.037)     | 0.013<br>(0.039)    |
| Blocked, Court Action               | -0.064+<br>(0.033)        | -0.064+<br>(0.033)  | -0.050<br>(0.037)    | -0.044<br>(0.039)   |
| Succeeded                           | 0.058*<br>(0.027)         | 0.050+<br>(0.027)   | 0.027<br>(0.031)     | 0.013<br>(0.033)    |
| Constant (No pushback mean)         | 2.044***<br>(0.019)       | 1.997***<br>(0.020) | 2.249***<br>(0.021)  | 2.243***<br>(0.023) |
| Observations                        | 3991                      | 3410                | 3991                 | 3410                |
| $R^2$                               | 0.004                     | 0.006               | 0.001                | 0.001               |
| Pass Attention Check?               | N                         | Y                   | N                    | Y                   |
| Sig. Diff. btwn Blocked Conditions? | N                         | N                   | N                    | N                   |

Standard errors in parentheses

+  $p < 0.10$ , \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$

Table C.6: Does the reason why the governor’s plan failed matter? The row labeled “Sig. Diff btwn Blocked Conditions?” states whether or not the effects of the two different reasons the governor’s plan failed (voter protests versus court action) affect the outcome variable at the  $\alpha = 0.05$  level. The row “Pass Attention Check?” indicates whether or not we include only subjects who passed the attention check.

it is being governed *less* democratically. This is fascinating, and seems to reflect a belief that the courts are a less democratic way of governing (possibly since they are unelected). We note, however, that the difference falls short of statistical significance for the more attentive subjects, so this is an interesting possibility worthy of future study rather than a definitive result.

## C.5 Court-packing experiment result using the full response distribution

In the main text we analyze the court-packing experiment by putting both support and consistency with democracy on a binary scale to ensure that our findings are not an artifact of using different scales to measure the two outcomes. Table ?? shows that our finding is robust to measuring both outcomes using the full 4-point response distribution on which we collected both measures

Table C.7: Robustness of court-packing experiment: dependent variables measured using full range

|                           | <b>Difference</b>    |                      | <b>Support Act</b>  |                     | <b>Consistent</b>   |                     |
|---------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
|                           | (1)                  | (2)                  | (3)                 | (4)                 | (5)                 | (6)                 |
| Own-party governor        | 0.232***<br>(0.026)  | 0.264***<br>(0.027)  | 0.656***<br>(0.034) | 0.713***<br>(0.037) | 0.424***<br>(0.034) | 0.449***<br>(0.036) |
| Constant (Out-party mean) | -0.241***<br>(0.018) | -0.256***<br>(0.019) | 1.940***<br>(0.024) | 1.893***<br>(0.026) | 2.180***<br>(0.024) | 2.149***<br>(0.026) |
| Observations              | 3407                 | 2957                 | 3407                | 2957                | 3407                | 2957                |
| $R^2$                     | 0.023                | 0.031                | 0.097               | 0.112               | 0.044               | 0.049               |

Standard errors in parentheses

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

## D A Typology of Voters

In the body of the paper, we introduced a typology of voters. While we cannot estimate whether a given voter is of a particular type, we can use our data to estimate the fraction of each type in our sample. To see how, consider the following formalization. Let  $T_i$  be a treatment that is equals one if respondent  $i$  receives a vignette in which the governor is a co-partisan and zero if respondent  $i$  receives a vignette in which the governor is from the other party. Define potential outcome  $S_i(T_i)$  as respondent  $i$ 's support of the governor's plan when receiving treatment  $T_i$ . Define potential outcome  $C_i(T_i)$  as respondent  $i$ 's beliefs about whether the governor's plan is consistent with democracy. Assume that  $S_i(0) \leq S_i(1)$  and  $C_i(0) \leq C_i(1)$  (e.g. people cannot support a policy more, or think a policy is more democratic, when the policy is being proposed by a governor from the other party than a governor from their party). This restriction leads to existence of nine possible types:

1.  $S_i(0) = 0, C_i(0) = 0, S_i(1) = 1, C_i(1) = 1$  (i.e., "Rationalizers" ),
2.  $S_i(0) = 0, C_i(0) = 0, S_i(1) = 1, C_i(1) = 0$  (i.e., "Militants"),
3.  $S_i(0) = 0, C_i(0) = 0, S_i(1) = 0, C_i(1) = 1$  (i.e., "Enablers"),
4.  $S_i(0) = 0, C_i(0) = 0, S_i(1) = 0, C_i(1) = 0$  (i.e., "Liberal Democrats"),
5.  $S_i(0) = 0, C_i(0) = 1, S_i(1) = 0, C_i(1) = 1$  (i.e., "Anti-Majoritarian"),
6.  $S_i(0) = 0, C_i(0) = 1, S_i(1) = 1, C_i(1) = 1$  (i.e., "Partisans")
7.  $S_i(0) = 1, C_i(0) = 0, S_i(1) = 1, C_i(1) = 0$  (i.e., "Autocrats")
8.  $S_i(0) = 1, C_i(0) = 0, S_i(1) = 1, C_i(1) = 1$  (i.e., "Advertisers")
9.  $S_i(0) = 1, C_i(0) = 1, S_i(1) = 1, C_i(1) = 1$  (i.e., "Majoritarians")

The data from our experiment can be summarized as follows:

|                | <b>Other Party</b>  |                   | <b>Own Party</b>    |                   |   |
|----------------|---------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|---|
|                | <i>Democracy</i>    |                   | <i>Democracy</i>    |                   |   |
| <i>Support</i> | <i>Inconsistent</i> | <i>Consistent</i> | <i>Inconsistent</i> | <i>Consistent</i> | . |
| <i>No</i>      | <i>a</i>            | <i>b</i>          | <i>e</i>            | <i>f</i>          |   |
| <i>Yes</i>     | <i>c</i>            | <i>d</i>          | <i>g</i>            | <i>h</i>          |   |

Each letter in this table represents the share of the respondents receiving that treatment that gives that a given combination of response. Consequentially,  $a+b+c+d = 1$

and  $e + f + g + h = 1$ . We would like to use these data to estimate  $s_1, s_2, \dots, s_9$ , where  $s_j$  is the share of the population who has the  $j$ th type (meaning that  $\sum_{i=1}^9 s_i = 1$ ). Based on our setup we know that:

1.  $E[a] = s_1 + s_2 + s_3 + s_4$ ,
2.  $E[b] = s_5 + s_6$ ,
3.  $E[c] = s_7 + s_8$ ,
4.  $E[d] = s_9$ ,
5.  $E[e] = s_4$ ,
6.  $E[f] = s_3 + s_5$ ,
7.  $E[g] = s_2 + s_7$ ,
8.  $E[h] = s_1 + s_6 + s_8 + s_9$ .

From this formulation, it immediately follows that  $\hat{s}_9 = d$  and  $\hat{s}_4 = e$ , and so we can rewrite this problem as:

1.  $E[a'] = E[a - d] = s_1 + s_2 + s_3$ ,
2.  $E[b] = s_5 + s_6$ ,
3.  $E[c] = s_7 + s_8$ ,
4.  $E[f] = s_3 + s_5$ ,
5.  $E[g] = s_2 + s_7$ ,
6.  $E[h'] = E[h - d] = s_1 + s_6 + s_8$ .

What remains are six data points to solve for seven unknowns, so restrictions are needed to be able to solve this system of equations. To solve this, we further assume that  $C_i(1) - C_i(0) \leq S_i(1) - S_i(0)$  (i.e., partisanship only affect consistency if it also affects support). An implication is that  $s_3 = s_8 = 0$ . This assumption allows us to rewrite the problem as:

1.  $E[a] = s_1 + s_2 + s_4$ ,
2.  $E[b] = s_5 + s_6$ ,
3.  $E[c] = s_7$ ,
4.  $E[d] = s_9$ ,

5.  $E[e] = s_4$ ,
6.  $E[f] = s_5$ ,
7.  $E[g] = s_2 + s_7$ ,
8.  $E[h] = s_1 + s_6 + s_9$ .

Our system is now overdetermined because it has eight equations and seven unknowns. One way to solve is with maximum likelihood. We can define a likelihood function as follows:

$$L(s_1, s_2, s_4, s_5, s_6, s_7, s_9 \mid T_i, S_i, C_i, s_1 + s_2 + s_4 + s_5 + s_6 + s_7 + s_9 = 1) = \prod_{i=1}^n [(s_1 + s_2 + s_4)^{(1-S_i)(1-C_i)} (s_5 + s_6)^{(1-S_i)C_i} s_7^{S_i(1-C_i)} s_9^{S_i C_i}]^{(1-T_i)} [s_4^{(1-S_i)(1-C_i)} s_5^{(1-S_i)C_i} (s_2 + s_7)^{S_i(1-C_i)} (s_1 + s_6 + s_9)^{S_i C_i}]^{T_i}.$$

The results in the body of the paper come from maximizing this likelihood in our data.

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