## Supplementary Materials for: "The Long Shadow of The Big Lie: How Beliefs about the Legitimacy of the 2020 Election Spill Over onto Future Elections"

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#### Section A: Further Details on the AIOD Study

Here, we primarily draw on two waves of the AIOD Study: one conducted in September – October 2022 before the midterm elections, which serves as our pre-election wave, and one in November 2022, which serves as our post-election wave. The survey runs in three replicates, as explained in Annenberg IOD Collaborative (2023), to simplify administration and allow better tracking of changes over time. Here, the pre-election wave was in the field from September 27th – October 3rd (replicate 1), October 18th – October 24th (replicate 2), and November 3rd – November 7th (replicate 3). The post-election wave was in the field November 9th – November 15th (replicate 1), November 18th – November 22nd (replicate 2), and November 30th – December 6th (replicate 3). Splitting the data by replicate does not change our substantive conclusions.

All currently active panelists were invited to take both waves discussed in the paper. In the preelection wave, 4,746 panelists were invited to take the survey, 3,696 of whom completed it (for a completion rate of 77.9 percent). In the post-election wave, 4,723 panelists were invited to take the survey, 3,725 of whom completed it (for a completion rate of 78.9 percent). Question wordings are given in the pre-analysis plan in Table 1 in the paper, as well as in our pre-analysis plan in Section B of the Supplementary Materials. Table S1 provides the demographics for the panelists as measured in our Spring 2022 survey. Given the high retention of the AIOD panel, demographics do not vary significantly by wave.

In Figures 1, 2, and 4, as well as Table 1 in the paper, we employ post-stratification weights (details of the weights are given in Annenberg IOD Collaborative 2023). As discussed in the online appendix of that book, these do include design effects (we employ the general weights, rather than the replicate-specific weights, as we do not separate our analyses by replicate here). For the difference-in-differences analyses, we do not weight the data, as it is less clear what post-stratification weights mean in this sort of a model. We also do not use any missing data imputation for our analyses reported here.

#### [Table S1 Here]

#### Section B: Pre-Analysis Plan

We pre-registered our analysis at OSF on 21 September 2022. That pre-registration is available at <u>https://osf.io/2fymh/</u>.

#### Section C: Deviations from the Pre-Analysis Plan

We report three main deviations from our pre-registration. First, there are a few typos in the subscripts in the difference-in-differences model included in the pre-registration, we have corrected them in the paper. Second, we did not pre-register the hypothesis about the stability of belief in election skepticism. Instead, as we analyzed and presented the data in various seminars and workshops, it became clear that was an important part of our findings of great interest to readers, so we updated the paper to include it.

Finally, due to space restrictions (and coherence of the paper), we cannot include all of the analysis we discussed in the PAP in the body of the paper. Three such analyses stand out. First, we argued that some Democrats might argue that election losses were due to election disenfranchisement (paralleling the link to voter fraud). We tested this in Table S2 below, using the model from the body of the paper.

#### [Insert Table S2 about here]

As readers can see, winning and losing, or beliefs about 2020 legitimacy, have no effect on beliefs about voter disenfranchisement. This may be because these are not triggered by winning/losing, or perhaps because they have not been as fully absorbed by Democrats as the rhetoric around voter fraud has been by Republicans. This is an important topic for future research.

Second, we also specified that we would test for heterogeneous effects by racial attitudes and conservative media consumption. Racial attitudes were measured in the June 2020 wave of the AIOD survey by asking respondents about three related measures: how well different stereotypes described Black and white people, how much discrimination Black and white people face in the U.S. today, and items from the racial resentment battery that tap whether Black people face unique racial hardships in America. We follow Annenberg IOD Collaborative (2023) and combine these measures into one aggregate scale ( $\alpha = 0.69$ ), with values ranging from -1 to 1; higher values indicate higher levels of anti-Black animus (i.e., negative stereotypes of Black Americans, beliefs that white people face more discrimination than Black people, and that Black people do not face unique racial hardships).<sup>1</sup> To measure media consumption, the AIOD asked respondents in the April – May 2020 wave, the June 2020 wave, the August – September 2020 wave, and the September - October 2020 wave how often they got information from various types of media sources, including conservative media outlets such as Fox News. Following Annenberg IOD Collaborative (2023), we combine these four measures into an index, where higher values indicate greater use of these outlets ( $\alpha = 0.81$ ). Table S3 presents the results, with heterogeneous effects by racial attitudes given in the top panel, and heterogeneous effects by conservative media consumption given in the bottom panel.

[Insert Table S3 about here]

We see that the moderating effect of these variables is inconsistent, with some effects in gubernatorial, but not senatorial, elections (we leave exploring this difference for future work). But we would caution readers from interpreting that this means that these attitudes do not matter. First, given that these are four-way interactions, even with our large sample size, we are undoubtedly under-powered to detect them. Second, as Annenberg IOD Collaborative (2023) documents, racial attitudes and conservative media consumption are—aside from candidate choice—the strongest predictors of beliefs in the illegitimacy of 2020. Those who think 2020 is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Attentive readers will note that this partially conflates anti-Black animus with status threat (i.e., the beliefs that once privileged groups are now the targets of discrimination so that, for example, white people face more discrimination than Black people). As Annenberg IOD Collaborative (2023) explains, the two are so strongly correlated that the measures yield very similar results.

illegitimate largely hold racially conservative attitudes and consume large amounts of conservative media, so the model struggles to disentangle these effects. Given this, the "moderating" effect of these variables is unclear, because they are all so tightly correlated with one another.

Third, we did not include the results of spillover across races in this analysis (and note that here, we use a different specification to test for spillover than the one originally specified in the PAP; we realized in conversations with colleagues that our original test was not correct). One particularly pernicious consequence of election skepticism is that it might spill over, not just from 2020 to 2022, but across multiple elections within 2022, and even to future elections, such as 2024. Because Pennsylvanians and Wisconsinites voted in two significant statewide contests in 2022—senator and governor—some of them will have voted for both winning candidates, some will have voted for one winner and one loser, and some will have backed both losing candidates. As a result, the results of one race might affect how voters perceive the legitimacy of the other. For example, if a voter backs the losing candidate for governor, that might impact how they view the legitimacy of the senate election, especially if they are an election skeptic (as again, the logic of voter fraud transfers across elections). Table S4 tests for this effect.

#### [Insert Table S4 about here]

In columns 1-2, we subset to voters who backed the losing senatorial candidate and ask what the effect of also voting for the losing gubernatorial candidate was on perceptions of the legitimacy of the senate election (columns 3-4 show the parallel results for gubernatorial elections). That is, does your vote in the governor's race shape your beliefs about the legitimacy of the senate race? We focus here on those who voted for the losing candidates because the effects of losing on perceptions of legitimacy are generally larger than the effects of winning (Anderson et al. 2005).

In column 1, we see that election losses do spillover across races. The positive  $\beta_1$  shows that if you voted for the winning gubernatorial candidate (but losing senatorial candidate), having voted for the winning governor spills over into your views of the senate election. Voters are clearly drawing inferences across races, and voting for one winner makes people realize that even contests that their preferred candidate lost were, in fact, legitimate. The contrast between columns 1 and 2 is also highly instructive. In column 1, we see that those who backed both the gubernatorial and senatorial candidates who lost think the Senate election was less legitimate. But in column 2, we see that this effect is driven by those who think the 2020 election was illegitimate—it is this belief, more than backing two losing candidates, that drives this betweenrace spillover (note that these findings replicate in columns 3 and 4). Accepting that one election could be stolen generalizes across other races as well.

So far, we have tested the effects of voting for the winning or losing 2022 candidate, and the interaction with beliefs about 2020, on perceptions of the legitimacy of the 2022 elections. Our findings tell us what citizens think about the most recent elections, but what about future ones? By the logic we developed above, the effects should also spillover onto future elections as well: respondents who doubt the legitimacy of the 2020 outcome, and support a candidate who loses in 2022, should also believe that the 2024 presidential election will be less legitimate. We estimate

the same difference-in-differences estimation strategy used in table 2 with expectations about the 2024 election as the dependent variable in Table S5.

#### [Insert Table S5 about here]

In columns 1 and 3, we find that voting for the losing candidate in 2022 lowers post-election belief in the legitimacy of the 2024 election, and in columns 2 and 4, we see that the effect is concentrated among those who viewed the 2020 election as illegitimate. In columns 5 and 6, we show that those who lost both elections—and see 2020 as illegitimate—have especially large effects, reinforcing the message from Table A4 above. This highlights how the effects of election skepticism can accumulate once they become embedded, suggesting a potentially very vicious spiral. 2020 skepticism does not just poison that election, but spreads, like an oil stain, out across future contests as well.

Across both Tables S4 and S5, we see an important finding not only about the unique role of 2020, but the effects of legitimacy spillover more generally. Past studies were correct that beliefs about the presidential election's legitimacy likely swamp the effects of other concurrent races. But in midterm election years, there is large and notable spillover across races, both within and between years. Perceptions of legitimacy are not just a function of any one election, but of the multiple elections in which a given voter participates. The limitation of these spillover effects, however, is that with only three states, and two with multiple simultaneous elections, we have less power to detect such spillovers. We view these results as important, but more preliminary than the other findings in our paper, and an important task for future studies will be examine spillover in other contexts.

#### Section D: Open-Ended Text Analysis

To further investigate the dynamics of election skepticism, we leverage open-ended responses included in the post-election wave. Respondents were asked to explain, in their own words, why the winner won their state's gubernatorial or senatorial contest (all MI respondents were asked about the governor's race, in PA and WI, respondents were randomly asked about either the senate or governor race). To model these responses, we used the Analysis of Topic Model Networks approach (Walter and Ophir 2019). This method is comprised of three steps: Topic modeling, topic networking, and community detection of related topics. Topic modeling (in this case using latent Dirichlet allocation, see Blei et al. 2003) is an unsupervised machine learning method for identification of topics in large textual data, where "topics" are distribution lists of word probabilities based on co-occurrences of words in the same response.<sup>2</sup> Topics were labeled qualitatively by examining the words, unique words, and top 3 responses most representative of each topic. Lists of the most common words in each topic are provided in Table S6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Based on recommended procedures (Maier et al. 2018) we pre-processed all of the responses, removing stop-words (including contexts specific stop-words such as names of candidates, states, and names of offices), punctuation, numbers and symbols, and converted all text to lowercase. For hyper-parameter tuning, we utilized 5-fold cross validation iterating over a range of topic numbers (from k=2 to k=36) and various levels of the alpha hyperparameter (from  $\alpha$ =50/k to  $\alpha$ =1/k). We found the model with k=14 and  $\alpha$ =2/14 to offer optimal results, based on perplexity scores.

#### [Insert Table S6 about here]

We then calculated a network of topics in the second step, based on the co-occurrence of topics in the same responses. We used cosine similarities over the document-topic matrix as edges in a network where each topic serves as a node, and their co-occurrence serves as edges, and used a backbone method to discard non-significant edges. Lastly, in the third step, we utilized a community detection algorithm, Louvain (Blondel et al. 2008), to group topics into broader themes. More simply, we constructed a network in which all topics are connected to each other based on their tendency to be mentioned by the same respondents. We then segmented the network to groups of topics that tend to be more connected to topics in their own cluster than in other clusters. The resulting network can be found in Figure S1.

#### [Insert Figure S1 about here]

Our topic model identified 14 topics, clustered into four themes: Cynicism, Issues, Character, and Comparisons. The most common theme (depicted in blue in Figure S1) focused on cynicism, comprising of 35.71 percent of the network. These responses centered on delegitimizing explanations for the winner's victory, focusing on voter fraud and political corruption. One participant claimed that elections were skewed by "voter fraud with mail in ballots and early voting," while another concurred that "he [the winner] won only by mail in ballots and voter fraud or votes that were mailed with no date or signature were counted." Many also targeted the Democrats specifically, as in the case of a participant who said "for now, there are limits to how much the left can cheat, at least here in Wisconsin. Arizona elections are outrageously corrupt," underscoring the linkage to partisanship seen in the body of the paper.

Voters in this cluster also often emphasized rural grievances, claiming that big urban counties override what the rest of the state wants. For example, one participant said that the elections were determined based on the fact that "there is no electoral college in the state elections so the bigger cities (who tend to vote democrat) override the votes of all the other countries. Democrat voters would have voted in a pineapple if that was who was on the ticket." This underscores an important point about Trump's claims of voter fraud in 2020: he centered his claims on large urban areas, especially those controlled by Democratic mayors and governors (Annenberg IOD Collaborative 2023). These types of responses underline that thinking and help to show how not only the general argument, but even the particulars of Trump's claims, carry forward across elections. This supports the claim that some voters interpret the election through a delegitimizing lens; we return to the role of election skepticism below.

Participants using the second theme (comparison, shown in red, comprising 28.57 percent of responses) often argued that the elections were decided based on the relative strengths and weaknesses of each candidate. In particular, many of these respondents emphasized the extremity of candidates and how it played to the hands of their rivals. For example, a participant said that the winner won because "he didn't have extreme radical opinions or sexual harassment statements." Some connected between extremism and Donald Trump's endorsement, like a participant who said that Dr. Oz was "a mouth piece for Trump and the right wing, with no experience in leading." Participants using this theme often blamed Trump's toxicity for

candidates' losses: "The Republican gubernatorial candidate was very extreme and endorsed by Trump," said one participant, and another argued that the elections were determined by "people's anger with Donald Trump and the Jan. 6 incident, and the public's negative perception of Republican/ the people who keep saying that the election was stolen."

Some using this theme tried to make sense of the voting patterns of sub-populations who preferred one candidate over another. One explained that the "Dobbs decision from the Supreme Court was a wake-up call, especially for younger voters, about the extremism of the Republican party and its willingness to eliminate fundamental rights." Finally, some simply argued that the best, more qualitied candidate won. For example, a participant using the quality of candidates topic said that "he was the better candidate. Certainty has his flaws and could have been beaten but Mandela Barnes had more glaring flaws."

The third theme (character, shown in green and comprising 21.43 percent of responses) focused on the role played by candidates' credibility and competence. Participants emphasized that "Whitmer has a good track history as governor" or that "Tudor Dixon did not have any form of valid experience," often emphasizing the incumbent's track record. Trustworthiness and credibility played a key role in this theme. A participant said that a candidate won because "he's a likable, easily understood guy, trying to make sound decisions for the greater good in the state of WI." Similarly, other participants discussed candidates being "fair minded and honest", and another attributed a candidate's win to being a person who "practices what he preaches and lives the life of a regular person, not a politician".

Finally, the issues theme (14.29 percent of responses, shown in grey) focused primarily on abortion, with participants saying that "basic rights for humans (especially women)" and "policies that people want especially protection of women's right to choose" played a key role in the race. Other policies around issues such as healthcare, education, police brutality, crime, inflation, infrastructure, taxes, and gay rights were also mentioned by respondents as key issues.

But are election skeptics more likely to cite some of these themes versus others? To deepen this analysis, we examined the relationship between the themes and respondents' skepticism about the 2020 election results. For simplicity's sake we only used the responses for the governor races, thus having only one answer per respondent. To analyze these relationships, we used the Wilcoxon signed-rank test measuring the difference in topic and theme loading for responses based on whether they were skeptical of the election results. Table S7 present the results of this analysis for the themes and topics.

#### [Insert Table S7 about here]

The mean presented is the mean difference between skeptics and non-skepticism in the prevalence of a topic or theme used in responses. We identified significant differences in all themes, and in many topics. Election skeptics talked more about topics from the cynicism ( $\Delta$  Means = .226, p < .001) and less about character ( $\Delta$  = -.112, p < .001), comparisons ( $\Delta$  = -.075, p < .001), and issues ( $\Delta$  = -.039, p < .01). In terms of specific topics, election skeptics were more likely (all p < .001) to talk about voter fraud ( $\Delta$  = .077), rural grievances ( $\Delta$  = .062), negative campaigning ( $\Delta$  = .037), political corruption and rot ( $\Delta$  = .028), and cynicism ( $\Delta$  = .022). Non-

skeptics talked more about candidates' trustworthiness ( $\Delta = -.032$ , p < .05), competence ( $\Delta = -.04$ ), incumbency record ( $\Delta = -.04$ ), and abortion ( $\Delta = -.033$ , p < .05).

This underscores an important point about election skepticism: these voters center their explanations on corruption, rot, fraud, and a belief that big cities steal elections, more than on comparisons of the candidates' traits, or the issues in the campaign. In effect, election skeptics see the world through a delegitimizing lens, reinforcing the patterns we saw in the body of the manuscript.

#### Section E: Additional Analyses

In the body of the paper, we discussed several different additional robustness checks we conducted with the data. To begin, consider the estimates of Table 1 using alternative measures of electoral legitimacy. We used three different alternative measures. Instead of using beliefs in the legitimacy of the 2020 election taken from the May 2022 wave, we could instead use that same item, as measured in either November 2020 or January 2021. Finally, instead of directly assessing the legitimacy of the 2020 election with the standard question, we could instead use a scale of items the AIOD survey asked to gauge beliefs in the legitimacy of the outcome<sup>3</sup> taken in the November 2020 wave. Table S8 presents these results.

[Insert Table S8 about here]

As these results make clear, no matter what measure of legitimacy we use, we get substantively the same answer. No matter how we measure belief in the legitimacy of the 2020 election, we find that those who think 2020 was illegitimate are more likely to think that the 2022 and 2024 elections are going to be illegitimate, even before any ballots are cast. The "big lie" really does cast a shadow on future elections.

We can also control for three variables that strongly predict beliefs that the 2020 election was illegitimate: conspiratorial thinking (a generalized belief that shadowy forces control events, even when other explanations are present, see Brotherton, French, and Pickering 2013),<sup>4</sup> consuming conservative media sources, and racial attitudes; these latter two variables are measured as discussed above in appendix C. As Annenberg IOD Collaborative (2023) discusses, these factors strongly predict being an election skeptic, so including them in our model muddies the waters somewhat, but we include them here in the interest of completeness. Table S9

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> These items included: [1] To the best of your knowledge, did more Americans vote for Joe Biden or Donald Trump for president in the 2020 presidential general election? [2] Do you feel that the Biden campaign was trying to steal the election, or don't you feel this way? [3] Do you think Joe Biden was legitimately elected president, or not? [4] How much of an impact, if any, do you think voter fraud had on the 2020 presidential general election? (None at all – A great deal) [5] Who do you think benefitted most from the voter fraud? (5 point scale, Biden benefited much more – Trump benefited much more). These items have a very high degree of internal consistency (alpha = .94). <sup>4</sup> The AIOD study included an index of generalized conspiratorial thinking, abstracting away from specific conspiracy theories. Items comprising this come from responses to "how much do you agree or disagree with the following statement[s]?": [1] Much of our lives is controlled by plots hatched in secret places [2] Even though we live in a democracy, a few people will always run things anyway [3] The people who really 'run' the country are not known to the voters (5 point scale, Strongly agree – Strongly disagree). These items have a high degree of internal consistency (alpha = .81).

presents the results for 2022 gubernatorial contests; results for senatorial and 2024 presidential results are similar.

#### [Insert Table S9 about here]

Controlling for these factors does not change our results: the effect of beliefs in the 2020 election remains the strongest predictor that these elections will similarly be illegitimate. Note that each of these variables (racial attitudes, conservative media consumption, and conspiratorial thinking) also predicts beliefs in the illegitimacy of the 2022 elections, but we emphasize that is because they predict beliefs in the illegitimacy of the 2020 election. Given this, we focus on the specification presented in Table 2, but includes these tables as a robustness check on our results.

We also argued throughout the paper that the effects of election skepticism are due to the party's embrace of it, but an alternative hypothesis would be that Republicans were always less likely to accept election results (that is, there is a pre-existing difference whereby our Republican/Trump voter respondents were always more skeptical of electoral legitimacy, even prior to the 2020 election). The AIOD data allows us to test this hypothesis. As we noted in the body of the paper, the AIOD survey asked about the legitimacy of the 2020 election in the June 2020, October 2020 (pre-election), November 2020, January 2021, and May 2022 (post-election) waves, and these multiple over-time measures allow us some unique leverage to test this idea. To begin, we can use each measurement of 2020 legitimacy to predict pre-election beliefs in the 2022 gubernatorial elections. If Republicans were always more skeptical of electoral legitimacy, then we should see that as respondents' confidence in the legitimacy of the 2020 election increases, then belief in the legitimacy of the 2022 election should decrease in every single wave (i.e., 2020 election skeptics are more skeptical of all elections). Here, we use gubernatorial elections in the interest of simplicity.

#### [Insert Table S10 about here]

In Table S10, we see that this is *not* what we find. Consistent with Table 2 in the body of the paper, in every post-election wave (November 2020, January 2021, and May 2022), the less confident one is that the 2020 election was free and fair, the less confident one is that the 2022 gubernatorial election will be free and fair. But notice what happens with the pre-election measures of electoral legitimacy (those taken in June and October 2020): the coefficient is *positive*, suggesting that those who were more skeptical that 2020 would be free and fair are more confident that 2022 will be free and fair. Why do we observe this pattern? The answer is in Figure 1: pre-election, many Democrats—recalling Trump's 2016 rhetoric and his claims about fraud—were concerned that the 2020 election will not be free and fair. We do not observe the expected relationship—those more skeptical of 2020 legitimacy being more skeptical of 2022—until we use the post-election measures. This underscores the role of Republican elites, most notably Trump, casting doubt on the election's legitimacy.

Indeed, we can also see something similar by using each earlier wave of 2020 legitimacy to predict the May 2022 wave of electoral legitimacy. If our argument is correct, then we should see that the pre-election waves should be only weakly predictive, but the post-election ones should be much more strongly predictive of the May 2022 values. We test this in Table S11.

#### [Insert Table S11 about here]

This is what we find: the post-election November 2020 value is twice as strongly related to the May 2022 value as the pre-election October 2020 value (and then January 2021 is even more strongly related, though the relationship is less stark). Note that even the June 2020 value is predictive, and Figure 1 in the paper explains why: there are some voters who do not change over time. But because there is such a significant pre-election to post-election sorting on this issue, it is not simply a pre-2020 attitude that lingers. Instead, once Trump and the Republican Party activate this with the claim of a stolen election, it emerges as a stable attitude.

We can also use this pre-election to post-election shift in the perceived legitimacy of the 2020 election to further support this argument. We can look at the change across the AIOD panel—from June 2020 to May 2022—in beliefs about the 2020 election to predict beliefs about the 2022 election. If our argument that it is Trump's actions, rather than pre-existing differences, that explain our effects, then we should see that those who came to see the 2020 election as less legitimate over time should have lower confidence in the legitimacy of the 2022 elections (if, instead, Republicans/Trump voters always had lower confidence in elections, we should not find such an effect). In effect, this is replicating Table 2 using the difference in 2020 legitimacy, rather than just the May 2022 measure of electoral legitimacy. We look at this specification in Table S12.

#### [Insert Table S12 about here]

This is the pattern that we observe: those who became more skeptical of the 2020 election over time (DL, where higher values mean increased skepticism over time) are also those who are more skeptical of the 2022 outcomes (both Senate and Governor). If we look at those whose belief in 2020 electoral legitimacy decreased over time (i.e., those who moved in the direction of Trump's rhetoric) we see this pattern even more sharply (RL). This helps to alleviate concerns that there was some pre-existing (pre-2020) skepticism about elections among Republicans. Rather, it suggests that the "big lie" was what changed their beliefs in electoral legitimacy.

Finally, we turn to the effects on voter turnout. One might expect that if election skeptics truly did not believe that elections were legitimate, they would simply not turnout (if it's all rigged, then why bother?). We can test this argument in two ways: using both self-reported turnout data and validated turnout, obtained via i360 (which cleans and packages voter files to campaigns and researchers). For the latter analysis, however, we only have ½ of our sample, however, because our university's IRB required them to obtain each respondent's explicit permission to match their survey responses to the voter file, and many respondents would not grant it to them.

These results are included in Table S13 of the appendix. We find null effects: while illegitimacy is negatively correlated with turnout, after controlling for validated 2020 turnout and respondent demographics (age, education, gender, race, party identification, ideology, state of residence), we find that beliefs about electoral legitimacy do not affect turnout, either self-reported or validated (perhaps unsurprisingly, past turnout is the key driver of current turnout). It's a bit difficult to know how to interpret this finding, especially given that turnout is so habitual (Aldrich,

Montgomery, and Wood 2011). It may be that even if people say they are skeptical of elections, they turn out because they want to try and prevent the other side from stealing the election: i.e., if enough of us turn out, then they won't possibly be able to steal it. Or alternatively, it may be that this process accrues more slowly over time, and over multiple repeated losses, people drop out of the electorate; this is an important topic for future research.

[Insert Table S13 about here]

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Category	Response	Frequency	Percent
Age	Age 18-24	398	10.77
Age	Age 25-34	596	16.14
Age	Age 35-44	555	15.02
Age	Age 45-54	618	16.73
Age	Age 55-64	691	18.71
Age	Age 65 or older	836	22.63
Education	Less than 4-year Degree	2626	71.07
Education	4-year Degree or Greater	1069	28.93
Gender	Male	1782	48.24
Gender	Female	1903	51.49
Gender	Trans/Non-Binary/Other	10	0.28
Party ID	Democrat (w/ Leaners)	1808	48.93
Party ID	Independents, Other, None	364	9.85
Party ID	Republican (w/ Leaners)	1523	41.21
Race/Ethnicity	White	3041	82.30
Race/Ethnicity	Black	344	9.31
Race/Ethnicity	Hispanic	158	4.29
Race/Ethnicity	Asian	72	1.94
Race/Ethnicity	Other Race	76	2.07

 Table S1: Pre-Election 2022 Wave Sample Demographics

	Governor	Governor	Governor	Governor	Governor
Post-Election (PE)	-0.066	-0.089	-0.094	-0.051	-0.100
	0.005 (< 0.001)	0.006 (< 0.001)	0.007 (< 0.001)	0.052(0.322)	0.007 (< 0.001)
PE*Candidate Lost (CL)		0.066	0.032	-0.014	0.060
		0.011 (< 0.001)	0.026 $(0.212)$	$0.061 \ (0.818)$	$0.066 \ (0.365)$
PE*2020 Illegitimate (IL)		· · · · ·	0.050	-0.052	0.098
_ 、 ,			$0.031 \ (0.107)$	0.085(0.541)	0.047 (0.037)
PE*CL*IL			0.012	0.117	-0.096
			$0.045\ (0.789)$	$0.094\ (0.213)$	$0.182\ (0.598)$
Sample	Full	Full	Full	Trump	Biden
Ind. F.E.s	Х	X	X	X	X
Respondents	3666	2873	2649	781	1578
Num.Obs.	6467	5187	4828	1332	2978
R2	0.776	0.762	0.758	0.778	0.734
R2 Adj.	0.484	0.465	0.463	0.460	0.432
RMSE	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.12
	Senate	Senate	Senate	Senate	Senate
Post-Election (PE)	-0.059	-0.076	-0.096	-0.047	-0.102
	0.006 (< 0.001)	0.009 (< 0.001)	0.011 (< 0.001)	0.042(0.267)	0.012 (< 0.001)
PE*Candidate Lost (CL)	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	0.025	0.022	-0.011	0.025
		$0.012 \ (0.045)$	$0.015 \ (0.137)$	0.065(0.862)	$0.016 \ (0.132)$
PE*2020 Illegitimate (IL)			0.078	0.013	0.162
_ 、 、			0.024 (0.001)	0.055 (0.810)	$0.081 \ (0.046)$
PE*CL*IL			0.020	0.074	-0.033
			$0.036\ (0.568)$	$0.084\ (0.379)$	$0.115\ (0.773)$
Sample	Full	Full	Full	Trump	Biden
Ind. F.E.s	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Respondents	2467	1934	1777	527	1077
Num.Obs.	4371	3504	3249	891	2048
R2	0 782	0.769	0.770	0.794	0.743
	0.765	0.105	0.110	01101	0.110
R2 Adj.	0.785	0.485	0.491	0.490	0.457

#### Table S2: Belief that Voter Disenfranchisement Affected the 2022 Outcomes

Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with the associated standard errors and (p-values) below.

	Governor	Senate		Governor	Senate
Post-Election (PE)	0.058	0.094	Post-Election (PE)	0.075	0.089
	0.009 (< 0.001)	0.015 (< 0.001)		0.007 (< 0.001)	0.012 (< 0.001)
PE*Candidate Lost (CL)	-0.025	-0.033	PE*Candidate Lost (CL)	-0.095	-0.024
	$0.022 \ (0.247)$	$0.020 \ (0.107)$		$0.034\ (0.005)$	$0.017 \ (0.152)$
PE*2020 Illegitimate (IL)	0.090	-0.002	$PE^{*}2020$ Illegitimate (IL)	0.054	0.034
	$0.030\ (0.003)$	$0.027 \ (0.937)$		$0.043\ (0.209)$	$0.035\ (0.338)$
PE*CL*IL	-0.092	-0.098	PE*CL*IL	-0.009	-0.101
	$0.041 \ (0.026)$	0.038 $(0.010)$		$0.063\ (0.885)$	$0.051 \ (0.049)$
PE*Racial Attitudes (RA)	-0.033	0.012	PE*Conservative Media (CM)	-0.038	-0.021
	0.019(0.082)	$0.030 \ (0.689)$		$0.036\ (0.291)$	$0.052 \ (0.689)$
PE*CL*RA	0.164	-0.006	PE*CL*CM	0.241	0.019
	0.070(0.018)	$0.042 \ (0.879)$		$0.079\ (0.002)$	$0.074 \ (0.802)$
PE*IL*RA	0.093	0.023	PE*IL*CM	0.051	-0.009
	0.069(0.177)	0.064(0.717)		$0.114 \ (0.653)$	$0.077 \ (0.905)$
PE*CL*IL*RA	-0.331	-0.153	PE*CL*IL*CM	-0.309	-0.140
	0.111(0.003)	0.089(0.084)		0.142(0.030)	0.111 (0.208)
Respondents	2395	1616	Respondents	2330	1576
Num.Obs.	4686	3169	Num.Obs.	4564	3090
B2	0.868	0.856	R2	0.866	0.856
B2 Adi.	0.729	0.705	R2 Adj.	0.725	0.705
RMSE	0.10	0.11	RMSE	0.10	0.11

## Tables S3a & S3b: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Racial Attitudes & Conservative Media Consumption Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with the associated standard errors and (p-values) below.

	Senate	Senate	Governor	Governor
Post-Election (PE)	0.056	0.058	0.070	0.060
	0.008 (< 0.001)	0.009 (< 0.001)	$0.014 \ (< 0.001)$	$0.036\ (0.097)$
$PE^*Gov. Lost (GL)$	-0.109	0.046		
	$0.015 \ (< 0.001)$	$0.038\ (0.230)$		
PE*Sen. Lost (SL)			-0.095	-0.004
			$0.021 \ (< 0.001)$	$0.058\ (0.946)$
PE*2020 Illegitimate (IL)		0.009		0.017
		$0.044\ (0.837)$		$0.046\ (0.710)$
PE*GL*IL		-0.218		
		$0.064 \ (< 0.001)$		
PE*SL*IL				-0.122
				$0.072\ (0.091)$
Sample	Senator Loss	Senator Loss	Governor Loss	Governor Loss
Ind. F.E.s	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Respondents	1020	923	684	625
Num.Obs.	1964	1802	1325	1225
R2	0.873	0.874	0.825	0.822
R2 Adj.	0.736	0.740	0.637	0.634
RMSE	0.11	0.11	0.13	0.13

**Table S4: Beliefs about Legitimacy Spill Over Across 2022 Races***Note:* Cell entries are OLS coefficients with the associated standard errors and (p-values) below.

	Senate	Senate	Governor	Governor	Pooled	Pooled
Post-Election (PE)	0.049	0.044	0.051	0.055	0.042	0.055
	0.005 (< 0.001)	0.006 (< 0.001)	0.007 (< 0.001)	0.010 (< 0.001)	0.009 (< 0.001)	0.010 (< 0.001)
PE*Candidate Lost (CL)	-0.048	-0.029	-0.032	-0.010		
	0.009 (< 0.001)	0.021 (0.157)	$0.010 \ (0.002)$	0.014 (0.475)		
$PE^{*2020}$ Illegitimate (IL)		0.036		-0.001	0.003	0.052
		0.027 (0.189)		$0.019 \ (0.957)$	0.019(0.871)	$0.046\ (0.261)$
PE*CL*IL		-0.057		-0.100		
		0.037 (0.120)		0.028 (< 0.001)		
PE*Won Both					0.013	
					$0.014 \ (0.334)$	
PE*Won One						-0.013
						$0.014 \ (0.334)$
PE*Lost Both					-0.021	-0.035
					$0.041 \ (0.597)$	$0.041 \ (0.392)$
PE*IL*Won Both					0.049	
					$0.050 \ (0.328)$	
PE*IL*Won One						-0.049
						0.050(0.328)
PE*IL*Lost Both					-0.090	-0.139
					0.052(0.087)	0.067 (0.039)
Respondents	3098	2848	2086	1909	2071	2071
Num.Obs.	5970	5551	4025	3728	3698	3698
R2	0.867	0.867	0.867	0.868	0.867	0.867
R2 Adj.	0.724	0.726	0.724	0.729	0.727	0.727
RMSE	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11

**Table S5: Beliefs about Legitimacy Spill Over from 2022 to 2024***Note:* Cell entries are OLS coefficients with the associated standard errors and (p-values) below.

Topic	Name	Top Words
X1	Rural grievances	state,democrat,cities,vote,big,democrats,areas,voters,won,counties
X2	Trump toxicity	trump,election,republicans,republican,candidate,denier,also,donald,michaels,think
X3	Issues	issues,education,roads,cares,state,crime,important,hard,health,many
X4	Quality of candidates	candidate,better,best,choice,qualified,republican,opponent,job,much,even
X5	Competence and public record	record,strong,well,track,proven,general,competent,opponent,experience,leader
X6	Political corruption and rot	office,media,can,many,see,one,want,social,wanted,made
X7	Incumbency record	job,good,done,great,pandemic,covid,leader,things,competent,well
X8	Voter types	think,party,voters,republican,voted,vote,democrats,won,democratic,also
X9	Cynicism	know,think,vote,like,voted,won,sure,really,enough,man
X10	Trustworthy	cares,honest,working,person,state,like,best,better,good,fair
X11	Negative campaigning	campaign,money,ads,ran,negative,also,voters,incumbent,opponent,name
X12	Extremity of views	extreme,opponent,views,moderate,right,radical,voters,far,abortion,candidate
X13	Abortion	abortion, rights, stance, women, right, also, women's, won, reproductive, access
X14	Voter fraud	votes, voting, got, fraud, voter, election, ballots, vote, mail, early

#### Table S6: Top Words Associated with Each Topic, Open-Ended Text Analysis

#	Theme Name	p-value	Mean Difference (skeptics – non skeptics)
Them	ies		
1	Cynicism	p<.001	.226
2	Issues	p<.01	039
3	Comparisons	p<.001	075
4	Character	p<.001	112
Topic	CS		
14	Voter fraud	p<.001	.077
1	Rural grievances	p<.001	.062
11	Negative campaigning	p<.001	.037
6	Political corruption and rot	p<.001	.028
9	Cynicism	p<.001	.022
8	Voter types	p=.34	.003
3	Issues	p=.26	006
2	Trump toxicity	p=.35	02
4	Quality of candidates	p=.39	026
12	Extremity of views	P=.07	032
10	Trustworthy	p<.05	032
13	Abortion	p<.05	033
5	Competence and public record	p<.01	04
7	Incumbency record	p<.01	04

Table S7: Mean differences between topic and theme loadings for election skeptics and non-skeptics

	Senate	Senate	Senate	Governor	Governor	Governor	2024	2024	2024
2020 Illegitimate $(01/21)$	-0.511 0.018 (<0.001)			-0.533 0.015 (<0.001)			-0.577 0.017 (<0.001)		
2020 Illegitimate $(11/20)$		-0.456 0.018 (<0.001)		()	-0.476 0.015 (<0.001)			-0.507 0.017 (<0.001)	
2020 Illegitimate (Scale)		(	-0.495		(	-0.513		(	-0.576
)			0.018 (< 0.001)			0.015 (< 0.001)			0.017 (< 0.001)
25-34	-0.022	-0.032	-0.017	-0.011	-0.018	-0.003	-0.027	-0.035	-0.017
9E AA	0.024 (0.355)	0.025(0.201)	0.024 (0.494)	0.019 (0.566)	0.020 (0.382)	0.020(0.871)	0.022 (0.236)	0.024 (0.140)	0.022 (0.444)
0.0-44	-0.009 0.024 (0.705)	-0.026 (0.258)	-0.011 0.024 (0.652)	0.019 (0.867)	0.020 (0.453)	0.020 (0.718)	-0.022 (0.317)	-0.044 (0.065)	-0.010 0.022 (0.480)
45-54	0.032	0.018	0.040	0.034	0.019	0.054	0.012	-0.005	0.034
1 C 1	0.024 (0.181)	0.025 (0.465)	0.024 (0.099)	0.019 (0.077)	0.020(0.357)	0.020 (0.006)	0.023 (0.598)	0.024 (0.848)	0.023 (0.133)
55-64	0.026	-0.003 0.024 (0.886)	0.038 0.038	0.036	010.0	0.053 0.06)	0.000 0 677)	-0.021 0.023 /0.368	0.027
65+	0.031	0.009	0.047	0.045	0.024	0.065	0.014	-0.012	0.036
	0.023(0.177)	0.024(0.721)	0.023 ( $0.044$ )	0.019 (0.017)	0.020(0.220)	0.019 (< 0.001)	0.022 (0.527)	0.023(0.592)	0.022(0.100)
Four Year Degree	0.046	0.058	0.042	0.034	0.048	0.029	0.032	0.044	0.025
$M_{el}$	0.010 (< 0.001)	0.010 (< 0.001)	0.010 (< 0.001)	0.008 (< 0.001)	0.008 (< 0.001)	0.008 (< 0.001)	0.009 (< 0.001)	0.010 (< 0.001)	0.009 (0.007)
Male	0.010 (< 0.001)	0.010 (< 0.001)	0.010 (<0.001)	0.008 (<0.001)	(100.0) < 0.001	0.008 (< 0.001)	0.009 (<0.001)	(100.0) < 0.010	0.009 (<0.001)
Black	-0.057	-0.046	-0.055	-0.050	-0.029	-0.051	-0.050	-0.035	-0.053
	0.024 (0.016)	0.025(0.069)	0.024(0.022)	0.016(0.001)	0.017 (0.089)	0.016(0.001)	0.018(0.006)	0.020(0.081)	0.018(0.004)
Hispanic	-0.058	-0.055	-0.063	-0.043	-0.045	-0.052	-0.027	-0.032	-0.030
	0.024(0.015)	0.025(0.032)	0.024 (0.010)	0.019 ( $0.025$ )	0.020(0.028)	0.020(0.008)	0.022(0.234)	0.024 (0.187)	0.022(0.185)
Asian	0.029	0.028	0.028	-0.004	-0.029	-0.003	0.037	0.005	0.036
Other Race	(1227) (0.331) -0.027	0.032 (0.377) -0.037	0.031 (0.368) -0.030	0.025 (0.885) 0.05	0.027 (0.284) -0.005	0.026 (0.911)	0.029 (0.208) -0.027	0.031 (0.865) -0.028	0.029 (0.214) -0.041
Office Marce	0.029 (0.361)	0.031 (0.238)	0.030 (0.185)	0.023 (0.822)	0.024 (0.824)	-0.016 0.023 (0.428)	0.026 (0.312)	0.028 (0.317)	0.026 (0.123)
Democrat	0.023	0.041	0.053	0.022	0.038	0.046	-0.007	0.021	0.016
	0.018 $(0.210)$	0.019(0.035)	0.018(0.004)	0.014(0.126)	0.015(0.014)	0.015(0.002)	0.017(0.681)	0.018 (0.234)	0.017(0.336)
Republican	0.086	0.082	0.100	0.088	0.078	0.096	0.050	0.039	0.063
Liberal	-0.002	0.003	(TOO.O.) 6TO.O	0.002	0.011	0.018	-0.018	0.007 0.007	-0.003
	0.013(0.857)	0.013(0.824)	0.013 $(0.579)$	0.010(0.853)	0.011 (0.298)	0.010(0.089)	0.012(0.123)	0.013 $(0.560)$	0.012(0.776)
Conservative	-0.021	-0.052	-0.029	-0.012	-0.043	-0.018	-0.014	-0.044	-0.016
	0.015(0.171)	0.016 (< 0.001)	0.015(0.061)	0.012(0.334)	0.012 (< 0.001)	0.012(0.143)	0.014(0.316)	0.015(0.003)	0.014(0.259)
IMI				0.030	0.029	0.031	0.008	0.012	0.011
ΡΔ	-0.011	-0.005	-0.016	(200.0) 600.0	0.010 (0.004) -0.001	(TNN:N) 0TN:N	0.011 (0.444) -0.003	0.0012 (0.302)	0.011 (0.331) 
	0.010(0.247)	0.010 (0.602)	0.010 (0.092)	0.009 (0.470)	0.010(0.925)	0.010(0.217)	0.011 (0.759)	0.012 (0.733)	0.011 (0.423)
Num.Obs.	2274	2149	2274	3393	3212	3394	3393	3213	3394
$R_2$	0.455	0.426	0.440	0.461	0.431	0.443	0.423	0.388	0.420
R2 Adj.	0.451	0.422	0.435	0.459	0.428	0.440	0.420	0.385	0.417
RMSE	0.22	0.23	0.23	0.22	0.23	0.23	0.26	0.27	0.26

 Table S8: Using the Various Post-Election Measures of Legitimacy

	Governor	Governor	Governor	Governor	Governor	Governor
2020 Illegitimate	-0.525	-0.527	-0.498			
	0.016 (< 0.001)	0.016 (< 0.001)	0.016 (< 0.001)			
Racial Attitudes	-0.061		. ,	-0.211		
	0.016 (< 0.001)			0.017 (< 0.001)		
Conservative Media	. ,	-0.049		· · · ·	-0.251	
		0.020(0.012)			0.021 (< 0.001)	
Conspiratorial Mindset			-0.118			-0.305
			0.017 (< 0.001)			0.018 (<0.001
25-34	-0.012	-0.016	-0.026	-0.007	-0.041	-0.024
	0.022(0.588)	0.023(0.491)	0.021(0.208)	0.025(0.765)	0.025(0.103)	0.023(0.286)
35-44	0.003	-0.010	-0.020	0.013	-0.031	-0.020
	0.022(0.877)	0.022(0.662)	0.021(0.329)	0.024(0.601)	0.025(0.221)	0.023 (0.390)
45-54	0.033	0.015	0.010	0.066	0.023	0.021
10 01	0.022 (0.139)	0.022 (0.508)	0.021 (0.637)	0.025(0.007)	0.025(0.354)	0.023 (0.369)
55-64	0.022 (0.100)	0.022 (0.000)	0.021 (0.001)	0.020 (0.001)	0.020 (0.004)	0.020 (0.000)
55-04	0.001	0.010	0.002	0.002	0.052 0.024 (0.194)	0.022
65.1	0.021 (0.140)	0.022 (0.475)	0.020 (0.310)	0.024 (<0.001)	0.024 (0.154)	0.022 (0.013)
00+	0.024	0.014	0.010	0.001	0.040	0.043
Four Veen Dernee	0.021 (0.251)	0.022 (0.020)	0.020 (0.020)	0.024 (<0.001)	0.024 (0.005)	0.022 (0.031)
Four fear Degree	0.011	0.011	0.011	0.034	0.000	0.049
N ( - 1 -	0.009(0.228)	0.009(0.207)	0.008(0.184)	0.010 (<0.001)	0.010 (< 0.001)	0.009 (<0.001
Male	0.031	0.025	0.017		0.049	0.032
	0.008 (<0.001)	0.009 (0.003)	0.008 (0.033)	0.010 (<0.001)	0.010 (<0.001)	0.009 (<0.001
Black	-0.059	-0.051	-0.029	-0.057	0.001	0.026
	0.018(0.001)	0.018(0.005)	0.017(0.084)	0.021 (0.007)	0.021 (0.959)	0.019(0.159)
Hispanic	-0.021	-0.028	-0.052	-0.025	-0.026	-0.038
	0.022 (0.345)	0.022 (0.213)	0.021 (0.012)	0.024 (0.313)	0.025 (0.294)	0.023 (0.104)
Asian	0.007	0.002	0.018	0.023	0.012	0.042
	0.028 (0.809)	0.029 (0.953)	$0.026 \ (0.485)$	0.031 (0.471)	0.033 (0.704)	0.029 (0.139)
Other Race	0.006	0.000	0.012	-0.037	-0.021	0.010
	0.024 (0.813)	0.026 (0.992)	0.023 (0.605)	0.028(0.184)	$0.030 \ (0.486)$	0.026 (0.699)
Democrat	0.018	0.021	0.006	0.116	0.131	0.101
	0.016 (0.246)	0.016(0.183)	0.015 (0.684)	0.018 (< 0.001)	0.018 (< 0.001)	0.017 (< 0.001
Republican	0.075	0.068	0.047	0.032	0.037	-0.015
	0.016 (< 0.001)	0.016 (< 0.001)	0.015(0.003)	0.018(0.076)	0.019(0.050)	0.017(0.392)
Liberal	-0.013	-0.001	-0.002	-0.014	0.015	0.016
	0.011(0.244)	0.011(0.921)	0.011(0.852)	0.013(0.276)	0.013(0.242)	0.012(0.166)
Conservative	-0.026	-0.019	-0.023	-0.127	-0.113	-0.122
	0.013(0.042)	0.013(0.156)	0.012(0.053)	0.014 (< 0.001)	0.015 (< 0.001)	0.013 (<0.001
MI	0.032	0.035	0.026	0.021	0.026	0.011
	0.010(0.002)	0.010 (<0.001)	0.010 (0.008)	0.012(0.070)	0.012(0.028)	0.011 (0.328)
PA	-0.002	0.002	-0.007	-0.012	-0.014	-0.021
	0.010(0.871)	0.010(0.865)	0.010(0.467)	0.012(0.304)	0.012(0.232)	0.011 (0.052)
Num Obs	2686	2648	2066	2833	2783	3138
Do	2000	2040	2300	2000	2100 0.080	0 2120
	0.494	0.480	0.488	0.280	0.282	0.312
nz Auj. DMCE	0.490	0.481	0.484	0.280	0.277	0.308
RMSE	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.25	0.25	0.25

#### Table S9: 2022 Gubernatorial Election Beliefs, Controlling for Conspiratorial Thinking, Racial Attitudes, and Conservative Media Consumption

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Post-Election (PE)	0.014	0.030	0.068	0.071	0.072
	$0.007 \ (0.059)$	$0.006 \ (< 0.001)$	$0.004 \ (< 0.001)$	$0.004 \ (< 0.001)$	$0.004 \ (< 0.001)$
2020 Illegitimacy (June 2020) * PE	0.097				
2020 Illegitimacy (Oct. 2020) * PE	0.013 (<0.001)	0.061			
		0.014 (< 0.001)			
2020 Illegitimacy (Nov. 2020) * PE			-0.045		
			0.011 (< 0.001)	0.040	
2020 Illegitimacy (Jan. 2021) * PE				-0.049	
2020 Illegitimacy (Spring 2022) * PE				0.011 (<0.001)	-0.048
					0.012 (< 0.001)
Individual F.E.s	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num.Obs.	6663	6738	6797	6842	6802
R2	0.867	0.866	0.868	0.866	0.865
R2 Adj.	0.718	0.717	0.720	0.715	0.717
RMSE	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11

### Table S10: Belief in 2022 Gubernatorial Legitimacy, Using Pre- and Post-Election Measures of 2020 Electoral Legitimacy

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
June 2020	0.192			
	$0.017 \ (< 0.001)$			
Oct.2020		0.307		
		0.017 (< 0.001)		
Nov. 2020			0.646	
			0.014 (< 0.001)	
Jan. 2021			, ,	0.748
				0.013 (<0.001
25-34	0.004	0.032	0.006	0.005
	0.026(0.861)	0.025(0.196)	0.020(0.756)	0.017(0.788)
35-44	0.007	0.036	0.012	-0.005
00 11	0.025(0.776)	0.025(0.150)	0.020(0.529)	0.017 (0.791)
45-54	-0.037	0.020 (0.100)	-0.008	-0.023
10 01	0.025 (0.149)	0.012 0.025 (0.646)	0.000 (0.682)	0.020
55-64	-0.056	-0.004	-0.010	-0.038
00-04	-0.000	-0.004 0.024 (0.861)	-0.010	-0.030 0.017 (0.025)
65	0.025 (0.025)	0.024(0.001)	0.019 (0.003)	0.017 (0.025)
00+	-0.002	-0.007	-0.029	-0.040
	0.025(0.011)	0.024(0.787)	0.019(0.123)	0.017 (0.006)
4-year Degree+	-0.106	-0.096	-0.065	-0.045
	0.010(<0.001)	0.010 (<0.001)	0.008 (<0.001)	0.007 (<0.001
Male	-0.036	-0.035	-0.029	-0.020
	0.010 (< 0.001)	0.010 (< 0.001)	0.008 (< 0.001)	0.007(0.003)
Black	-0.068	-0.069	-0.038	0.001
	$0.021 \ (0.001)$	$0.020 \ (< 0.001)$	$0.016\ (0.017)$	$0.014 \ (0.954)$
Hispanic	-0.007	-0.002	0.015	-0.001
	$0.026\ (0.782)$	$0.025\ (0.925)$	$0.019\ (0.438)$	0.017 (0.959)
Asian	-0.049	-0.055	0.020	-0.011
	$0.032\ (0.134)$	$0.031 \ (0.081)$	$0.025\ (0.438)$	0.022 (0.620)
Other Race	0.052	0.031	0.000	0.021
	$0.030\ (0.081)$	$0.028 \ (0.278)$	$0.022 \ (0.986)$	0.020(0.277)
Democrat	-0.205	-0.180	-0.075	-0.048
	0.018 (< 0.001)	0.017 (< 0.001)	0.014 (< 0.001)	0.013 (<0.001
Republican	0.150	0.140	0.032	0.009
	0.019 (< 0.001)	0.018 (< 0.001)	0.014(0.028)	0.013(0.497)
Liberal	-0.072	-0.081	-0.028	-0.018
	0.013 (< 0.001)	0.012 (< 0.001)	0.010(0.004)	0.009(0.037)
Conservative	0.224	0.200	0.078	0.027
comber (darre	0.015 (< 0.001)	0.014 (< 0.001)	0.011 (< 0.001)	0.010(0.008)
MI	0.017	0.023	0.008	0.010
	0.017 0.012 (0.153)	0.020 0.012 (0.044)	0.000(0.409)	0.010 0.008 (0.215)
PΔ	0.012 (0.100)	0.012 (0.044)	0.005 (0.405)	0.000 (0.210)
IA	0.013 0.012 (0.100)	0.012 0.012 (0.301)	0.000	0.012
	0.012 (0.109)	0.012 (0.301)	0.009 (0.010)	0.008 (0.128)
Num.Obs.	2917	2983	3023	3171
R2	0.542	0.576	0.727	0.773
R2 Adj.	0.539	0.574	0.725	0.772
DMCE	0.26	0.25	0.20	0.10

#### Table S11: Predicting May 2022 Values of 2020 Legitimacy using Prior Waves' Values

	Governor	Governor	Governor	Governor
Post-Election (PE)	0.048 0.005 (< 0.001)	0.063 0.007 (< 0.001)	0.073 0.004 (< 0.001)	0.078 0.005 (< 0.001)
Change in 2020 Illegitimacy * PE (Spring '22 - June '20, DL)	-0.079 0.011 (< 0.001)	-0.048 0.016 (0.003)	(	(
Reduction in 2020 Illegitimacy * PE (Spring '22 - June '20, RL)			$\begin{array}{c} -0.060 \\ 0.011 \ (<\!0.001) \end{array}$	0.028 0.027 (0.304)
PE * Cand. Lost (CL)		-0.024		-0.027
PE*DL*CL		-0.046		0.014 (0.058)
PE*RL*CL		0.035 (0.162)		-0.087 0.032 (0.008)
Ind. F.E.s	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num.Obs.	6170	5069	6170	5069
R2	0.866	0.865	0.864	0.865
R2 Adj.	0.720	0.724	0.716	0.723
RMSE	0.11	0.10	0.11	0.10
	Senate	Senate	Senate	Senate
Post-Election (PE)	0.048 0.006 (< 0.001)	0.094 0.008 (< 0.001)	0.067 0.006 (< 0.001)	0.094 0.008 (< 0.001)
Change in 2020 Illegitimacy * PE	-0.068	-0.024	( ,	( ,
(Spring '22 - June '20, DL)	$0.014 \ (< 0.001)$	$0.019\ (0.208)$		
Reduction in 2020 Illegitimacy * PE (Spring '22 - June '20, RL)			-0.043 0.014 (0.002)	0.013 0.019 (0.501)
PE * Cand. Lost (CL)		-0.091		-0.043
PE*DL*CL		-0.111		0.011 (<0.001)
PE*RL*CL		0.029 (<0.001)		-0.127 $0.029 \ (<0.001)$
Ind. F.E.s	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num.Obs.	4139	3408	4139	3408
R2	0.853	0.857	0.852	0.855
R2 Adj.	0.694	0.707	0.691	0.703
RMSE	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11

### Table S12: Change in 2020 Electoral Legitimacy Predicts 2022 Election Legitimacy

	VV	VV	VV	SR	SR	SR
2020 Illegitimate	-0.070	-0.024	-0.008	-0.090	-0.054	-0.028
-	0.023(0.002)	0.019(0.205)	$0.028 \ (0.765)$	0.019 (< 0.001)	$0.021 \ (0.012)$	0.032(0.389)
2020 Turnout	. ,	0.705	0.645	, ,	0.447	0.341
		$0.027 \ (< 0.001)$	0.028 (< 0.001)		$0.029 \ (< 0.001)$	0.031 (< 0.001)
25-34		· · · ·	0.107			0.036
			0.043(0.014)			0.052(0.494)
35-44			0.166			0.091
			0.043 (< 0.001)			0.051(0.077)
45-54			0.226			0.134
			0.043 (< 0.001)			0.051(0.009)
55-64			0.237			0.164
			0.042 (< 0.001)			0.050(0.001)
65+			0.267			0.178
			0.042 (< 0.001)			0.050 (<0.001)
Four Year Degree			0.043			0.060
			0.016(0.006)			0.018 (< 0.001)
Male			0.029			0.043
			0.025 0.015 (0.056)			0.018 (0.016)
Black			-0.060			-0.015
			0.035(0.087)			0.042 (0.720)
Hispanic			-0 104			-0.164
			0.104			-0.104
Asian			0.039 (0.008)			0.040 (<0.001)
			-0.007			-0.078
Other Race Democrat Republican			0.000 (0.209)			0.004 (0.227)
			0.000			-0.040
			0.046 (0.695)			0.050 (0.471)
			0.092			0.140
			0.031(0.003)			0.036 (<0.001)
			0.062			0.140
Liberal			0.032(0.055)			0.038 (<0.001)
			0.039			0.072
Conservative			0.020(0.049)			0.023 (0.002)
			0.026			0.025
1.07			0.023(0.247)			0.026(0.337)
MI			0.010			-0.015
PA			0.018 (0.561)			0.021 (0.494)
			-0.021			-0.019
			$0.018 \ (0.246)$			$0.021 \ (0.365)$
Num.Obs.	1723	1722	1612	2657	1567	1476
R2	0.006	0.289	0.364	0.009	0.139	0.197
R2 Adi.	0.005	0.289	0.356	0.008	0.138	0.186
BMSE	0.37	0.31	0.29	0.38	0.33	0.32

# **Table S13: 2020 Legitimacy Beliefs Do Not Affect 2022 Turnout Decisions**Note: VV (Vote Validated Turnout); SR (Self-Reported Turnout)



#### Figure S1: Topic Network, Open-Ended Text Analysis

*Note*: Edges represent co-occurrence of topics in the responses, color represents community membership (Louvain). Network is weighted and undirected. Edges filtered using the 'backbone extraction' method.