Appendix, Chapter 3



Figure 11.1: This figure illustrates each election in the gubernatorial data set by state and year. Each dash indicates a year in which the state in question held an election recorded in our data set.

Persistence in Presidential and Gubernatorial Voting

Our analyses of persistence consider presidential voting in all elections between Franklin Roosevelt's first election in 1932 and Barack Obama's re-election in 2012. The reason for starting in 1932 is simple: Chhibber and Kollman (2004) argue that the New Deal shifted the balance of authority from the states to the federal government, and so encouraged parties to focus on capturing federal power, namely Congress and the Presidency. In that view, the growth of federal authority and spending during the New Deal made the federal government a more important electoral prize. By including elections just before that transformation, we are able to observe the nationalization that they attribute to the growth of federal authority, and can compare it to any changes we observe in later periods.

By estimating a separate linear regression for each year, we can predict the two-party Democratic vote share using the prior election's vote share as well as fixed effects which capture any state-specific idiosyncrasies such as home-state advantages or targeted campaigning. A coefficient of zero indicates that knowing the prior election result tells us nothing about the current election result; a coefficient of one indicates a one-to-one correspondence between the prior election and this one.[1] To prevent smaller counties from unduly influencing the estimates, we weight the regression using the total number of presidential votes in each county.

[1]Coefficients can be above one in cases where the electorate grows more geographically polarized between elections. For example, a county that supported the Democrats at 30% initially might fall to 28%, while one that supported the Democrats at 70% might grow to 72%.



Figure 11.2: Electoral Persistence, Presidential Voting. This figure plots the coefficients from separate models predicting the two-party share of the Democratic presidential vote in each election using the prior two-party vote share. The dots indicate mean estimates, while the vertical lines illustrate 95% confidence intervals.



Figure 11.3: Electoral Persistence, Gubernatorial Voting. For gubernatorial elections in midterm years, this figure plots the coefficients from separate models predicting the two-party share of the Democratic gubernatorial vote in each election using the two-party gubernatorial vote share from four years prior. The dots indicate mean estimates, while the vertical lines illustrate 95% confidence intervals.

Appendix, Chapter 4



Figure 11.4: **In-state Google Searches**. This figure depicts the share of Google searches in the state in question for recent and current governors (gray lines) as compared to President Obama (black line). The y-axis is normed to 100 as the maximum value attained by any politician, and it is typically the attention Obama received upon being elected president in November 2008. Shading distinguishes the period when each governor was in office.



Figure 11.5: **In-state Google Searches**. This figure depicts the share of Google searches in the state in question for recent and current governors (gray lines) as compared to President Obama (black line). The y-axis is normed to 100 as the maximum value attained by any politician, and it is typically the attention Obama received upon being elected president in November 2008.



Figure 11.6: **In-state Google Searches**. This figure depicts the share of Google searches in the state in question for recent and current governors (gray lines) as compared to President Obama (black line). The y-axis is normed to 100 as the maximum value attained by any politician, and it is typically the attention Obama received upon being elected president in November 2008.



Figure 11.7: **In-state Google Searches**. This figure depicts the share of Google searches in the state in question for recent and current governors (gray lines) as compared to President Obama (black line). The y-axis is normed to 100 as the maximum value attained by any politician, and it is typically the attention Obama received upon being elected president in November 2008.



Figure 11.8: **In-state Google Searches**. This figure depicts the share of Google searches in the state in question for recent and current governors (gray lines) as compared to President Obama (black line). The y-axis is normed to 100 as the maximum value attained by any politician, and it is typically the attention Obama received upon being elected president in November 2008.



Figure 11.9: **In-state Google Searches**. This figure depicts the share of Google searches in the state in question for recent and current governors (gray lines) as compared to President Obama (black line). The y-axis is normed to 100 as the maximum value attained by any politician, and it is typically the attention Obama received upon being elected president in November 2008.



Figure 11.10: **In-state Google Searches**. This figure depicts the share of Google searches in the state in question for recent and current governors (gray lines) as compared to President Obama (black line). The y-axis is normed to 100 as the maximum value attained by any politician, and it is typically the attention Obama received upon being elected president in November 2008.

Appendix, Chapter 5

Effects of Living Near 9/11 Targets

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
(Intercept)	−0.15	1.09	0.71
	(1.87)	(1.85)	(1.91)
Logged Distance, 9/11 Sites	−0.04*	−0.04*	−0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Tract Household Gini	1.23	0.81	0.97
	(0.76)	(0.75)	(0.76)
Tract Log Med. Hsh. Income	0.21	0.10	0.11
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Tract % Black	−0.21	−0.25	−0.12
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.23)
Tract % Immigrant	−0.20	−0.19	−0.11
	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.37)
Tract % with BA	−0.53*	−0.41	−0.40
	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.32)
Tract % Same Home '95-'00	−0.10	0.00	0.05
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.28)
Tract Density	0.02	0.04	0.04
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Change in Income	−0.02	−0.03	−0.04
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
2000 Income	0.08	0.07	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Some High School	−0.29	−0.26	−0.42
	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.37)
High School Degree	−0.06	−0.07	−0.10
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.34)
Some College	−0.19	−0.18	−0.22
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.34)
Associate's Degree	−0.13	−0.16	−0.19
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.34)
Bachelor's Degree	−0.31	−0.33	−0.38
	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.34)
Post-graduate Training	−0.36	−0.35	−0.37
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.34)
Male	−0.05	−0.06	−0.06
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Black	−0.10	−0.04	−0.11
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)
Hispanic	0.16	0.15	0.13
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.17)
Age in Years / 100	0.41**	0.35*	0.22
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.21)

$^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

The results presented in Chapter 5 and in Table 11.1 illustrate the relationship between various contextual factors of interest and related attitudes. However, in each of those analyzes, we made specific assumptions about what threshold to use in identifying communities that were near the 9/11 sites, in high-crime areas, close to nuclear power plants, or the like. Put more technically, our models in Chapter 5 assume that we have the functional form of the relationship between the key contextual variable and attitudes specified correctly. Here, we instead present results which allow those thresholds to vary.

For example, in the case of anti-terrorism spending, we might instead estimate a set of models in which we incrementally increase the threshold distance at which we declare a respondent to live near the 9/11 sites. The top panel of Figure 11.11 shows the estimated effect for varying distance thresholds. For example, starting from the left, we see that if the threshold is 19 miles, the 2.9% of NES respondents living within that threshold of a 9/11 target are on average -0.11 lower in terms of their anti-terrorism spending preferences on the 1-3 scale. However, this sample is sufficiently small that the confidence intervals span from -0.48 to 0.26, as illustrated by the left-most vertical line in the top panel. The effect of living near the 9/11 targets is maximized for those within 70 miles: there, it is 0.28, which is 42% of the dependent variable's standard deviation. Moving to the right of the top panel of Figure 11.11, the effect becomes positive at 25 miles, and the first statistically significant positive result we observe is at 52 miles. Respondents living within 52

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Weak Democrat		-0.03	-0.11
		(0.10)	(0.10)
Lean Democrat		-0.17^{*}	-0.20^{*}
		(0.10)	(0.10)
Independent		0.01	-0.02
		(0.12)	(0.13)
Lean Republican		0.03	-0.03
		(0.10)	(0.11)
Weak Republican		0.08	0.01
		(0.10)	(0.11)
Strong Republican		0.34^{***}	0.26^{**}
		(0.09)	(0.11)
Liberal			0.26^{*}
			(0.16)
Slightly Liberal			0.30^{**}
			(0.14)
Moderate			0.37^{**}
			(0.18)
Slightly Conservative			0.35^{**}
			(0.14)
Conservative			0.34^{**}
			(0.15)
Extremely Conservative			0.38^{**}
			(0.16)
R^2	0.06	0.11	0.14
Adj. R^2	0.03	0.07	0.08
Num. obs.	594	592	554

$^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table 11.1: **Regression Results, Support for Anti-Terrorism Spending**. Dependent variable: support for anti-terrorism spending. Source: NES 2004.

miles of either 9/11 target are 0.27 higher on anti-terrorism spending scale, with a 95% confidence interval from 0.04 to 0.51. Significant results persist for thresholds between 52 and 146 miles.

Are these effects substantively meaningful? One way to answer that question is to provide a benchmark. Accordingly, we also calculate the change in anti-terror spending attitudes associated with shifting from being a strong Republican to a strong Democrat, and indicate that change and the associated 95% confidence interval with the gray triangle. The bottom panel of Figure 11.11 illustrates the share of respondents who fall under each threshold, allowing readers to evaluate the relevance of each estimated effect. While 8% of respondents are within the 52-mile threshold, for example, 17% are within the 146 mile threshold. Across a range of distances, the core conclusion is that living near the 9/11 targets did correlate with heightened anti-terrorism attitudes.



Figure 11.11: **Proximity to Terrorist Attacks and Attitudes toward Anti-Terrorism Spending**. Source: 2000-04 National Election Study Panel. The top panel illustrates the effect of living within varying distances on respondents' support for anti-terrorism spending. It also shows the change in predicted support when comparing a strong Democrat with a strong Republican using the gray, dashed lined. The bottom panel shows the share of respondents who fall within each threshold.

People who live near the 9/11 targets are likely to differ from other Americans in a host of ways. If the different attitudes we detected above are really a product of the attacks, we should not expect to observe them in 2000, before the attacks took place. The same NES respondents were asked a question about attitudes toward military spending in 2000, providing a "placebo test" which allows us to see whether the same geographic patterns held before 9/11. As Figure 11.12 shows, they did not. At no threshold do the respondents living near Washington, D.C. or New York City appear discernibly more supportive of defense spending in 2000. The results above are thus likely to reflect a genuine response to 9/11 among those who lived closest.



Figure 11.12: **Placebo Test, Proximity to Terrorist Attacks and Attitudes toward Defense Spending**. Source: 2000-04 National Election Study Panel.

Effects of Living in High-Crime Communities



Figure 11.13: **Local Crime Rates and Fear of Crime**. Source: General Social Survey



Figure 11.14: **Local Crime Rates and Support for Anti-Crime Spending**. Source: General Social Survey



Figure 11.15: **Local Economic Conditions and Perceptions**. Source: Pew 2006 Survey



Figure 11.16: **Ozone Pollution and Perceptions of Danger**. Source: GSS 1994, 1996, 2000



Figure 11.17: **Ozone Pollution and Support for Environmental Spending**. Source: GSS 1994, 1996, 2000



Figure 11.18: **Proximity to Coasts and Importance of Global Warming**. Source: 6 Pew Surveys, 2006-2010



Figure 11.19: **Proximity to Nuclear Power Plants and Support for Nuclear Power**. Source: Pew 2009 Survey



Figure 11.20: **Proximity to Wolves and Attitudes toward Wolf Hunting**. Source: 2012 Survey Module



Figure 11.21: **Proximity to Federal Lands and Attitudes toward U.S. Government**. Source: 2006 SCCBS



Figure 11.22: **Proximity to Military Bases and Attitudes toward Defense Spending, 2000**. Source: 2000-04 National Election Study Panel



Figure 11.23: Source: 2000-04 National Election Study Panel



Figure 11.24: **Local Income Inequality and Salience of Inequality**. Source: NES 2004



Figure 11.25: **Local Income Inequality and Attitudes on Tax Cuts**. Source: NES 2004

Appendix, Chapter 6



Figure 11.26: For select years, this figure shows the share of U.S. Senators born in the state they represent.

Appendix, Chapter 7



Figure 11.27: **Topics from State Party Platforms.** This figure depicts the results of LDA fit to a corpus of 37,092 segments from 1,579 state party platforms between 1918 and 2014. It illustrates the distribution of topic probabilities for each state party platform for select topics. Each top is labeled with the 8 highest-scoring words in that topic.



Figure 11.28: **Topics from State Party Platforms.** This figure depicts the results of LDA fit to a corpus of 37,092 segments from 1,579 state party platforms between 1918 and 2014. It illustrates the distribution of topic probabilities for each state party platform for select topics. Each top is labeled with the 8 highest-scoring words in that topic.



Figure 11.29: **Topics from State Party Platforms.** This figure depicts the results of LDA fit to a corpus of 37,092 segments from 1,579 state party platforms between 1918 and 2014. It illustrates the distribution of topic probabilities for each state party platform for select topics. Each top is labeled with the 8 highest-scoring words in that topic.



Figure 11.30: **Topics from State Party Platforms.** This figure depicts the results of LDA fit to a corpus of 37,092 segments from 1,579 state party platforms between 1918 and 2014. It illustrates the distribution of topic probabilities for each state party platform for select topics. Each top is labeled with the 8 highest-scoring words in that topic.



Figure 11.31: **Topics from State Party Platforms.** This figure depicts the results of LDA fit to a corpus of 37,092 segments from 1,579 state party platforms between 1918 and 2014. It illustrates the distribution of topic probabilities for each state party platform for select topics. Each top is labeled with the 8 highest-scoring words in that topic.



Figure 11.32: **Topics from State Party Platforms.** This figure depicts the results of LDA fit to a corpus of 37,092 segments from 1,579 state party platforms between 1918 and 2014. It illustrates the distribution of topic probabilities for each state party platform for select topics. Each top is labeled with the 8 highest-scoring words in that topic.



Figure 11.33: **Topics from State Party Platforms.** This figure depicts the results of LDA fit to a corpus of 37,092 segments from 1,579 state party platforms between 1918 and 2014. It illustrates the distribution of topic probabilities for each state party platform for select topics. Each top is labeled with the 8 highest-scoring words in that topic.



Figure 11.34: **Topics from State Party Platforms.** This figure depicts the results of LDA fit to a corpus of 37,092 segments from 1,579 state party platforms between 1918 and 2014. It illustrates the distribution of topic probabilities for each state party platform for select topics. Each top is labeled with the 8 highest-scoring words in that topic.



Figure 11.35: **Topics from State Party Platforms.** This figure depicts the results of LDA fit to a corpus of 37,092 segments from 1,579 state party platforms between 1918 and 2014. It illustrates the distribution of topic probabilities for each state party platform for select topics. Each top is labeled with the 8 highest-scoring words in that topic.



Figure 11.36: **Topics from State Party Platforms.** This figure depicts the results of LDA fit to a corpus of 37,092 segments from 1,579 state party platforms between 1918 and 2014. It illustrates the distribution of topic probabilities for each state party platform for select topics. Each top is labeled with the 8 highest-scoring words in that topic.

Appendix, Chapter 9



Figure 11.37: **LDA Results, Chicago Tribune**. This figure presents the over-time distribution of 9 topics from a 40-topic LDA model fit to *Chicago Tribune* articles between 1932 and 1989. Each gray dot depicts the share of a given article estimated to fall within the specified topic. The trend is presented via black smoothing lines.



Figure 11.38: **LDA Results, Chicago Tribune**. This figure presents the over-time distribution of 9 topics from a 40-topic LDA model fit to *Chicago Tribune* articles between 1932 and 1989. Each gray dot depicts the share of a given article estimated to fall within the specified topic. The trend is presented via black smoothing lines.



Figure 11.39: **LDA Results, Chicago Tribune**. This figure presents the over-time distribution of 9 topics from a 40-topic LDA model fit to *Chicago Tribune* articles between 1932 and 1989. Each gray dot depicts the share of a given article estimated to fall within the specified topic. The trend is presented via black smoothing lines.



Figure 11.40: **LDA Results, Chicago Tribune**. This figure presents the over-time distribution of 9 topics from a 40-topic LDA model fit to *Chicago Tribune* articles between 1932 and 1989. Each gray dot depicts the share of a given article estimated to fall within the specified topic. The trend is presented via black smoothing lines.



Figure 11.41: **LDA Results, Chicago Tribune**. This figure presents the over-time distribution of 4 topics from a 40-topic LDA model fit to *Chicago Tribune* articles between 1932 and 1989. Each gray dot depicts the share of a given article estimated to fall within the specified topic. The trend is presented via black smoothing lines.



Figure 11.42: **LDA Results, Los Angeles Times**. This figure presents the over-time distribution of 9 topics from a 40-topic LDA model fit to *Los Angeles Times* articles between 1932 and 1989. Each gray dot depicts the share of a given article estimated to fall within the specified topic. The trend is presented via black smoothing lines.



Figure 11.43: **LDA Results, Los Angeles Times**. This figure presents the over-time distribution of 9 topics from a 40-topic LDA model fit to *Los Angeles Times* articles between 1932 and 1989. Each gray dot depicts the share of a given article estimated to fall within the specified topic. The trend is presented via black smoothing lines.



Figure 11.44: **LDA Results, Los Angeles Times**. This figure presents the over-time distribution of 9 topics from a 40-topic LDA model fit to *Los Angeles Times* articles between 1932 and 1989. Each gray dot depicts the share of a given article estimated to fall within the specified topic. The trend is presented via black smoothing lines.



Figure 11.45: **LDA Results, Los Angeles Times**. This figure presents the over-time distribution of 9 topics from a 40-topic LDA model fit to *Los Angeles Times* articles between 1932 and 1989. Each gray dot depicts the share of a given article estimated to fall within the specified topic. The trend is presented via black smoothing lines.



Figure 11.46: **LDA Results, Los Angeles Times**. This figure presents the over-time distribution of 4 topics from a 40-topic LDA model fit to *Los Angeles Times* articles between 1932 and 1989. Each gray dot depicts the share of a given article estimated to fall within the specified topic. The trend is presented via black smoothing lines.



Figure 11.47: **Ratios of Local, State, National Newspaper Coverage**. For available newspapers ranked 6th to 24th in circulation, this figure illustrates the ratio of local to national coverage by year using black diamonds and state to national coverage by year using red circles. The ratios were estimated using the *Newsbank* archive.



Figure 11.48: **Ratios of Local, State, National Newspaper Coverage**. For available newspapers ranked 26th to 44th in circulation, this figure illustrates the ratio of local to national coverage by year using black diamonds and state to national coverage by year using red circles. The ratios were estimated using the *Newsbank* archive.



Figure 11.49: **Ratios of Local, State, National Newspaper Coverage**. For available newspapers ranked 46th to 64th in circulation, this figure illustrates the ratio of local to national coverage by year using black diamonds and state to national coverage by year using red circles. The ratios were estimated using the *Newsbank* archive.



Figure 11.50: **Ratios of Local, State, National Television Coverage**. For select local television stations, this figure illustrates the ratio of local to national coverage by year using black diamonds and state to national coverage by year using red circles. The ratios were estimated using the *Newsbank* archive.



Figure 11.51: **Ratios of Local, State, National Television Coverage**. For select local television stations, this figure illustrates the ratio of local to national coverage by year using black diamonds and state to national coverage by year using red circles. The ratios were estimated using the *Newsbank* archive.



Figure 11.52: **Ratios of Local, State, National Television Coverage**. For select local television stations, this figure illustrates the ratio of local to national coverage by year using black diamonds and state to national coverage by year using red circles. The ratios were estimated using the *Newsbank* archive.



Figure 11.53: Ratios of Local, State, National Television Coverage. For select local television stations, this figure illustrates the ratio of local to national coverage by year using black diamonds and state to national coverage by year using red circles. The ratios were estimated using the *Newsbank* archive.



Figure 11.54: **Ratios of Local, State, National Television Coverage**. For select local television stations, this figure illustrates the ratio of local to national coverage by year using black diamonds and state to national coverage by year using red circles. The ratios were estimated using the *Newsbank* archive.

	Know Governor	Know Mayor
Intercept	−4.959*	−6.385
	(2.038)	(3.580)
DMA in State Capital	0.796*	−0.406
	(0.302)	(0.524)
Log Mkt. Size	0.226	0.240
	(0.149)	(0.251)
News from Nat' Network	0.590*	−0.323
	(0.250)	(0.436)
News from Cable TV	0.002	−0.005
	(0.259)	(0.487)
News from Local TV	0.684*	0.037
	(0.237)	(0.411)
News from Print Papers	0.270	−0.208
	(0.284)	(0.433)
News from Online Papers	0.150	0.732
	(0.321)	(0.459)
News from Radio	0.674*	0.887
	(0.303)	(0.490)
News from Magazines	−0.077	−0.825
	(0.577)	(1.564)
News from TV Talk Shows	−0.192	−0.734
	(0.345)	(0.545)
News from Internet	0.444	−0.096
	(0.308)	(0.512)
Desc. Governor	−0.243	
	(0.237)	
Education	0.085	0.113
	(0.054)	(0.097)
Income	0.003	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.004)
Age	1.624	1.529
	(0.840)	(1.432)
Male	0.184	0.585
	(0.231)	(0.377)
Black	−0.215	0.462
	(0.425)	(0.878)
Hispanic	0.304	0.616
	(0.435)	(0.693)
Party Identification	0.038	0.033
	(0.062)	(0.096)
Partisan Extremity	0.221	−0.033

	(0.137)	(0.221)
Has Children	−0.155	−0.597
	(0.278)	(0.433)
Married	0.315	0.283
	(0.258)	(0.440)
Homeowner	0.152	0.272
	(0.273)	(0.491)
Co. % Black	−1.416	1.345
	(1.105)	(1.881)
Co. % Hispanic	2.213*	0.006
	(1.121)	(1.615)
Co. % with BA	0.883	−5.545
	(1.828)	(3.622)
Co. Median Hsh. Income	−0.029	0.018
	(0.015)	(0.027)
Co. Pop. Density	−0.009	−0.011
	(0.019)	(0.044)
Co. Total Pop.	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Num. obs.	503	168

Table 11.2: **Regression, Knowledge of Governor/Mayor**. This table reports logistic regression models fit to the 2014 GfK survey.