

## SHOULD NATO EXPAND TO EASTERN EUROPE?

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Since the fall of the iron curtain, which began in 1989 with the dissolving of East Germany, the role of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been questionable, and its future existence has been uncertain. To remain relevant to the security of its sixteen members, NATO must look to redefine its policies. The independence of Eastern European countries, such as Bulgaria, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, and the former Soviet states, has forced NATO to consider an "out-of-area competence."<sup>1</sup> The current issue of concern for the NATO allies is whether it should expand to the east. Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Hungary are currently under consideration to be accepted into NATO, and even more countries are waiting in the wings to join.

The objective of this paper is to examine the arguments for and against NATO expansion into the former Soviet block countries. In this examination, there will be a brief overview of the history of NATO, particularly in the case of its past expansion and adaptation. In addition, there will be an examination of NATO alternatives, such as President Clinton's partnership for Peace and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization should expand Eastward accepting the countries of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. NATO should also consider the admission of further applicants or look toward a future security arrangement with the OSCE. With the future of the East European states uncertain, NATO should act now to prevent further tragedies such as the former Yugoslavia. Additionally, it is still questionable if Russia has truly ended its expansionist past. NATO expansion is the only effective solution to a Russian threat; however, seclusion is not the answer. NATO must still pursue friendly relations with Russia and/or help promote democratization within it. As in the past, NATO still has a relevant role in Europe's security, maybe now more than ever.

Today the Cold War is considered over. The Soviet Union no longer exists and its corpse consists of a multitude of different states, with different ethnic blueprints. Furthermore, the former Soviet block countries, Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Romania, Hungary, and Albania, have elected to start over as democracies. Beyond the reorganization of their economies and governments, these countries also want renewed security. Of these countries, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary, are seeking immediate admittance into NATO. To some analysts, NATO expansion is logical. To others, NATO expansion is a decision that could end the alliance.<sup>2</sup>

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is perhaps the most successful military alliance of the twentieth-century. Since it was signed on April 4, 1949 its main purpose is to provide a principal defense for Europe in the event of a "hot" war. Article five of the treaty states that if one country comes under attack by another

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<sup>1</sup> Michael Kramer, "The Case for a Bigger NATO" in *Time* (December 10, 1994): 36.

<sup>2</sup> Charles A. Kupchan, "Expand NATO and Split Europe" in *New York Times* (November 27, 1994): 11.

country, all member countries in the alliance must come to the aid of that country. Europe, in the midst of the Cold War, was a very uncertain place. An attack by the Soviet Union, or any of its satellites, was always a threat.

Since the creation of NATO, expansion has been nothing new to the alliance. Starting with twelve members, the alliance added four new members, and Turkey and Greece were accepted into the alliance in 1952. Germany was admitted into NATO in 1955, and Spain was admitted into the alliance in 1982. Each of these countries was admitted into the alliance as new republics, and with some question of internal stability.

In Turkey, a new democratic party was elected in 1950 and led by Prime Minister Menderes. Menderes promoted economic reform, however, he ended free elections. In 1960, Menderes was overthrown by his Republican opposition, and a new constitution was written in 1961.

Greece ended a communist revolt with help from the United States in 1947. It was under control by a militant government until 1974. Furthermore, both Greece and Turkey eventually put strain on the NATO alliance during the 1970s with the Cyprus incident.

Germany entered NATO with the most controversy.<sup>3</sup> Economic reforms were going well for Germany, however, many other countries had hard feelings toward the country after the war.<sup>4</sup> Because the country was experiencing profound growth, many of the allies feared that Germany would again be a power to contend with.<sup>5</sup>

Spain had only begun to modernize itself in the 1980s. The Spanish economy was in shambles, and the government was still facing problems with Andalusian and Catalonian autonomy. Within Spain, the decision to join NATO received much opposition. Spain had traditionally held a neutral role; it did not participate in both World Wars.

With NATO's historically expansionist policy, it only seems logical to have the alliance move eastward. NATO successfully prevented the Soviet Union from expanding its reach westward. Countries like Greece and Turkey were rescued from communist influence because of the actions of the West,<sup>6</sup> yet there are still critics that dissect the issue. The Secretary General of NATO stated that it did not need any more "security consumers using countries like France, Spain, Greece, and Turkey as examples."<sup>7</sup>

Proposals have been made that NATO should expand to the south into some of the North African countries. Expansion to the south however, would overlook the priorities of the alliance. The alliance must first strive toward stability in its own back yard, before it attempts to solve the problems elsewhere. Diversion of NATO into another continent's affairs would weaken the U. S. pillar in Europe.

## ALTERNATIVES TO NATO

While the debate for NATO expansion has rolled on, many other European security groups have emerged. The OSEC and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) have

3 John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War Two* (CQ Press, 1992), 54.

4 *Ibid.*

5 *Ibid.*

6 Michael C. Pugh, *European Security Towards 2000* (New York: Manchester University Press, 1992), 63.

7 Steven Erlanger, "Pressure on NATO to Expand" in *New York Times* (February 9, 1995): A6.



been created to deal with the uncertainty of the North Atlantic Alliance and to bring Europe closer to common security.

The OSCE began in 1975 with the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act. Members of the OSCE include all of Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States, Georgia, Canada, and the United States. Follow up meetings were held in 1978 through 1979, 1980 through 1983, 1986 through 1989, 1992, and December 1994. On November 19, 1990 participating states signed the CFE treaty limiting conventional forces in Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. On November 21, 1990, the OSCE adopted the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. The charter established the Council of Foreign Ministers as the central forum for regular political consultations. In addition, the charter established the Committee of Senior Officials, the Secretariat in Prague, the Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna, and the Office for Free Elections in Warsaw.

So far the OSCE has earned the reputation of being an organization with good intentions, but with no way to enforce them.<sup>8</sup> According to the Secretary General of the OSCE, Dr. Wilhelm Hoyneck, "the OSCE cannot provide collective defense and does not therefore offer its members the active security guarantees of an alliance."<sup>9</sup> However, the OSCE does devote its energies to preventing conflicts and finding common ground for opposing states to negotiate. The OSCE has held much influence in getting Russia to remove its troops from the Baltic States, in getting Estonia and Latvia to introduce legislation to create a civil society and tranquilize ethnic tensions, and in developing effective crisis management in Moldova.<sup>10</sup> In order for the OSCE to develop into a framework of collective security, it would need to develop some type of "European Security Council."<sup>11</sup> The OSCE would also have to create peace-keeping or interventionary forces.<sup>12</sup> In this respect, the OSCE would be acting as a branch of the United Nations, operating within the broader framework of the UN Charter.<sup>13</sup>

One argued disadvantage for a larger role of the OSCE is Russian expansion.<sup>14</sup> Recently, Russia has called for a greater role of the OSCE. This reasoning is logical because for Russia to gain leverage as a greater power in the world, it would need a sphere of influence.<sup>15</sup> If the OSCE were to become the leading body for solving conflicts in Europe, then Russia could exercise an unmonitored right to intervene within the Commonwealth of Independent States.<sup>16</sup> Currently Russia is claiming oil rights under the Caspian Sea. And with peace-keepers in Azerbaijan, Russia has already claimed Azerbaijan under its sphere of influence.<sup>17</sup>

There are many potential advantages to the OSCE as far as providing a "Pan-European" security agreement. First, according to Adrian Hyde-Price, it could provide a framework for addressing the specific security concerns of the East

8 Kramer, 36.

9 Walter Kemp, "Giving Teeth to the OSCE" in *The World Today* (October 1994): 183.

10 *Ibid.*

11 Pugh, 131.

12 *Ibid.*

13 *Ibid.*

14 "All This Is Ours" in *The Economist* (November 26, 1994): 60.

15 *Ibid.*

16 *Ibid.*

17 *Ibid.*

Europeans, such as ethnic conflicts, minority rights, and border disputes.<sup>18</sup> Second, the OSCE has fifty-two members, including Russia and the other former members of the Soviet Union. This comprehensive membership can be seen as a major advantage over NATO, which has only begun to look toward the East.<sup>19</sup>

Former Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, Richard Holbrooke, sees the OSCE as framework for dealing with challenges that neither NATO nor the European Union (EU) is designed to address; however, he also believes the OSCE lacks coherence and the political mandate to meet the challenges facing it.<sup>20</sup> Holbrooke stresses that the role of the OSCE must be clearly defined.<sup>21</sup> With a membership that spans the globe, the OSCE is burdened with its diversity; it will be difficult for the members to agree on standards to be implemented.<sup>22</sup> Furthermore, the OSCE must be aggressive in its policy by addressing conflicts early.<sup>23</sup> Although the OSCE has presented itself as an innovative organization, it can no way be superior to NATO.<sup>24</sup> The roles of the two alliances are completely different.<sup>25</sup> Where NATO is in essence a reactionary body for the defense of Europe, the OSCE's main purpose is to offer preventative measures.

The Partnership for Peace was introduced at the NATO Summit in Brussels in January 1993. It was created to enhance security in the whole of Europe by "strengthening the relationship between NATO and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and other OSCE participating states."<sup>26</sup> Essentially, the PfP gives its member states an opportunity to intensify relations with NATO.<sup>27</sup> The Partnership for Peace states its objectives in the Framework Document: 1) to facilitate transparency in national defense planning and budgeting processes; 2) to ensure democratic defense forces; 3) to maintain the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the OSCE; 4) to develop cooperative military relations with NATO; 5) to develop, over the longer term, forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of NATO.<sup>28</sup>

So far the PfP has acquired twenty-five members, and has conducted first-class peacekeeping exercises. One of the peacekeeping exercises was conducted at the Polish Army's Biedrusko Training Area. According to the March 1995 issue *NATO Review*, the PfP learned some lessons from the exercises.<sup>29</sup> These lessons included the following: NATO and partner states need to develop and agree on a common peacekeeping doctrine; multinational peacekeeping operations require simpler, more understandable rules of engagement than unilateral operations; there is a clear need for extensive language training; substantial early training on handling visitors and

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18 Pugh, 132.

19 *Ibid.*

20 Richard Holbrooke, "America, A European Power" in *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 1995): 47.

21 *Ibid.*

22 *Ibid.*

23 *Ibid.*

24 *Ibid.*

25 *Ibid.*

26 Gebhardt Von Moltke, "Building a Partnership for Peace" in *The NATO Review* (June 1994): 3.

27 *Ibid.*

28 *Ibid.*

29 General George A. Joulwan, "NATO's Military Contribution to Partnership for Peace" in *The NATO Review* (March 1995): 4.



press is essential; both NATO and partner countries need to agree on a legal framework covering PfP exercises.<sup>30</sup>

Clearly the PfP has a long way to go before becoming a framework for European Security. The *NATO Review* sites the differing degrees of stability in the Central and East European countries as a key setback.<sup>31</sup>

It is pointed out by the *NATO Review* that the Partnership for Peace must not be confused with the expansion of NATO.<sup>32</sup> The PfP can be a means for those states which eventually want to be considered for the NATO membership, to establish an initial relationship with the alliance.<sup>33</sup> Furthermore, their ultimate membership is a political question, which must be decided by appropriate NATO organizations and sovereign states.<sup>34</sup>

Richard Holbrooke emphasizes that the PfP is the means by which the NATO alliance and nonmember countries can work together.<sup>35</sup> In cooperation, the PfP will provide a framework for judging each partner country's ability to carry out the obligations and commitments of NATO membership.<sup>36</sup> For the countries that do not become members of NATO, this cooperation will provide an important building block for European security.<sup>37</sup>

Although the PfP seems promising to some, it has not gone without criticism. According to *Time* analyst Michael Kramer, "stripped of its sweet-sounding provisions, the Partnership is anything but satisfactory to those it is designed to pacify."<sup>38</sup> A perceived flaw of the Partnership is that it does not ensure NATO membership. Polish Foreign Minister Adrzej Olenchowski complains,

It's a buzz-off project. They want us to divert scarce resources and go through all kinds of exercises to prove ourselves. They ask us to talk and walk and act like a duck. That's O.K. and we agree that letting us in right away could upset Yeltsin at a difficult time. What's not O.K. is that after we've done all that's asked of us, NATO reserves the right to say, 'Well, now we want you to be a chicken instead.'<sup>39</sup>

A frequently overlooked alternative to NATO is the European Union. Richard Holbrooke points out that the EU, although primarily an economic and political entity, also contributes greatly to European security.<sup>40</sup> Holbrooke states, "The integration of West European nations has virtually transcended the territorial disputes, irredentist claims, social cleavages and ethnic grievances that tore apart European societies in early eras."<sup>41</sup> Holbrooke also underscores how the EU's extension eastward will integrate and stabilize the two halves of Europe.<sup>42</sup>

Considering the creation of the OSCE and the Partnership for Peace, some analysts

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.)

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> Holbrooke, 43.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 44.

<sup>38</sup> Kramer, 36.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>40</sup> Holbrooke, 46.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*

have arrived at their own conclusions for NATO. In respect to former National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and a member of the Working Group on NATO Enlargement, Karsten Voigt, they see the OSCE and NATO expansion as a logical combination for the future security of Europe. Moreover, this combination must consist of a coalition with Russia.

Brzezinski believes that NATO should approach Russia with a two-part plan.<sup>43</sup> He suggests that in the expansion of the alliance, Russia should be invited to help create a new transcontinental system of collective security.<sup>44</sup> This plan would go beyond NATO expansion; it would satisfy Russian insistence on a wider all-European security system.<sup>45</sup>

Brzezinski's plan would have two components. There would first be a treaty of global cooperation between NATO and the Russian Federation.<sup>46</sup> Then a new mechanism for special security consultations within the OSCE would be created.<sup>47</sup> The treaty would stress that the expansion of NATO is not directed against Russia.<sup>48</sup> Furthermore, the new treaty might lead to eventual Russian membership.<sup>49</sup>

Brzezinski insists that NATO cannot be weakened in order to make the OSCE the central body for European security.<sup>50</sup> The OSCE is too diverse and disorganized to become the insurer of security; only NATO and Russia could successfully react for the interests of the OSCE.<sup>51</sup>

Karsten Voigt also sees potential in combining the OSCE with NATO expansion. He stresses the importance of a treaty with Russia; however, unlike Brzezinski, he also stresses economic investment in the promotion of cooperation. Voigt believes that the only way to convince Russia that NATO's goals are peaceful is to provide economic aid.<sup>52</sup> This aid would be given in packages that would promote the creation of open and free markets for Russia, the Ukraine, and Belarus. Mr. Voigt states, "if the West wishes to advance democracy in Russia and Belarus and support independence in Ukraine, it must make meaningful investments to these ends."<sup>53</sup>

Another difference in Voigt's approach is his equal treatment of the Ukraine and Russia. The Ukraine is not viewed as a victim of circumstance, as portrayed by Brzezinski. He suggests that the same proposal given to Russia should be extended to the Ukraine; the future of European security should be actively decided without any seats missing from the table.<sup>54</sup>

## ARGUMENTS FOR NATO EXPANSION

For most analysts, NATO expansion is a wise decision. As NATO Secretary-General Manfred Werner put it, "It would be a historic sin to miss the opportunity to

43 Zbigniew Brzezinski, "A Plan For Europe" in *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 1995): 32.

44 *Ibid.*, 35.

45 *Ibid.*

46 *Ibid.*

47 *Ibid.*

48 *Ibid.*

49 *Ibid.*

50 *Ibid.*, 36.

51 *Ibid.*

52 Karsten Voigt, "NAA: The Enlargement of the Alliance" in *The Working Group on NATO Enlargement* (May 1995): 15.

53 *Ibid.*

54 *Ibid.*, 17.



bind the East Europeans."<sup>55</sup> There are three good arguments for expansion. First, Russia is still questionable.<sup>56</sup> Second, it could be a nurturing atmosphere for developing democracies.<sup>57</sup> Third, there is a need for an effective security council to prevent further ethnic conflict in Eastern Europe.<sup>58</sup>

As mentioned in the introduction, ". . . the Cold War is considered over."<sup>59</sup> "Considered" is the key word in the sentence because Russia is still questionable. Some believe that Russia is genetically expansionist; the NATO line should be drawn between Russia and the Ukraine instead of between Poland and the Ukraine.<sup>60</sup>

The recent disturbances in Chechnya give observers reason to believe that Russia is not all that it appears to be. According to Polish Ambassador to the U.S. Andrej Krzeczunowicz, "Chechnya has changed the climate . . . people are more aware that the political environment is unstable and that changes in Russia may be irreversible."<sup>61</sup> The new Secretary-General of NATO, Willy Claes, acknowledges that Russia's recent military tactics have put pressure on NATO to expand.<sup>62</sup>

Another argument in favor of expanding NATO has to do with securing the democracies in the Central European countries. According to Polish Defense Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz, the primary motivation has little to do with Russia trying to reannex them.<sup>63</sup> "It's not to defend against a Russian attack," he explains. "We see that as a virtual impossibility. The key reason we want to be in NATO is to secure our own democracies."<sup>64</sup> Perhaps veteran "Politikya" commentator Adam Krzeminski says it best: "There is a crescent of insecurity from (the former) Yugoslavia through the former Soviet Union on up to the Baltic States and Poland. The East is unstable."<sup>65</sup>

Much of the insecurity in Central and Eastern Europe has to do with ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia and the rise of nationalism in Hungary.<sup>66</sup> These ethnic tensions are clear factors in influencing the East Europeans to push for NATO membership.<sup>67</sup> Poland Defense Minister Onyszkiewicz emphasized the need to keep down the very same nationalism that threatens Russia and destroyed Yugoslavia.<sup>68</sup> NATO has always been more than a security alliance.<sup>69</sup> Former National Security Council staff member Stephen Larrabee said, "West Germany wasn't a stable democracy before we let it into NATO. Belonging to the alliance helped it become one. It's silly to insist that the Central Europeans must be functioning democrats before they can join up. NATO can help them on the road, as it also helped stem authoritarian backsliding in Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Turkey."<sup>70</sup>

55 Kramer, 36.

56 Erlanger, A6.

57 Kramer, 37.

58 *Ibid.*

59 Text of Footnote

60 Thomas C. Friedman, "Porgy, Bess and NATO" in *New York Times* (April 9, 1994): E15.

61 Erlanger, A6.

62 *Ibid.*

63 Kramer, 37.

64 *Ibid.*

65 Elizabeth Pond, "The NATO Summit and Europe's 'Second Creation'" in *The Baltimore Sun* (January 9, 1995): 5F.

66 Kramer, 37.

67 *Ibid.*

68 *Ibid.*

69 *Ibid.*

70 *Ibid.*

Second to the former Yugoslavia, ethnic tensions are quite evident in Hungary. Before his death in 1993, Prime Minister Jozsef Antall declared himself the leader of all Hungarians. He extended his domain to protect ethnic Hungarians from discrimination in neighboring countries such as Serbia, Romania, and the Ukraine. "Nationalism and ethnic conflict have already led to two world wars," said Stephen Larrabee, "The time to act is now, and not with hollow promises."<sup>71</sup>

One of the main advocates of NATO expansion is Zbigniew Brzezinski. Brzezinski sees NATO enlargement as necessary to preserve the Euro-Atlantic alliance; however, both sides must define what constitutes Europe's security perimeter.<sup>72</sup> As discussed earlier, he also believes that a closer relationship between Europe and Russia must be constructed.

Brzezinski states that NATO was not just a response to a Soviet threat; it was also created to assimilate Germany into the European system.<sup>73</sup> Today, the unification of Germany and the liberation of Central Europe forces the alliance to address the issue of NATO expansion.<sup>74</sup> Brzezinski believes that failure to address the issue will debilitate an already weak Euro-Atlantic alliance.<sup>75</sup> This weakness has already been exploited by the Bosnian tragedy.<sup>76</sup>

Brzezinski also argues that the Partnership for Peace is too ambiguous. He questions President Clinton's plan with regard to eligibility. He believes providing security to all the members as impractical. All countries are not equal in terms of strategy.<sup>77</sup>

Russia's opposition must be considered carefully with the expansion of NATO. Brzezinski believes, however, that indecisiveness and delay will consolidate Russia's opposition so that any eventual move will be seen as conveying a hostile message to Moscow. While debating goes on within the alliance, leaders in favor of NATO expansion within Russia may be locked into a negative posture by the crescendo of Russian opposition.<sup>78</sup>

In his 1995 article in *Foreign Affairs*, "America, A European Power," Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke points out how the United States has become a European Power. The turmoil that has infected Europe since the fall of the Iron Curtain has triggered a stronger commitment than ever before in the U.S.<sup>79</sup> The United States must lead in the creation of a new security architecture that stabilizes Europe.<sup>80</sup> Holbrooke's solution for this architecture is NATO expansion. NATO is a usable foundation for the construction of stability in Europe.<sup>81</sup>

Holbrooke sees Eastern Europe as the focus for NATO expansion. In the past century, it has been the opening scene of both world wars. Without democracy, all the historical resentments and ethnic disputes will spread out of the Balkans and the Transcaucasus into Central Europe.<sup>82</sup> For this reason Holbrooke feels that NATO

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71 *Ibid.*

72 Brzezinski, 26.

73 *Ibid.*, 27.

74 *Ibid.*

75 *Ibid.*

76 *Ibid.*

77 *Ibid.*, 28.

78 *Ibid.*, 29.

79 Holbrooke, 38.

80 *Ibid.*, 39.

81 *Ibid.*, 40.

82 *Ibid.*, 41.



should act decisively; security in Europe is far from assured.

Holbrooke describes how the expansion process will be decided. In months to come, NATO will explain the how and why of expansion to PfP members who have expressed an interest in the discussions. In December 1995, NATO foreign ministers will meet in Brussels and review the results with the partners before deciding how to proceed. The process must be agreed upon by all sixteen NATO members. So far the middle course chosen includes the following key points:

1) The goal remains the defense of the alliance's vital interests and the promotion of European stability.

2) The rationale and process for NATO expansion will not be secret.

3) There is no timetable or list of nations that will be invited to join NATO.

4) Each nation will be considered individually, not as a part of some grouping.

5) The decision to who joins NATO and when will be done exclusively by the alliance.

6) Certain fundamental precepts in the original Washington treaty will be used as criteria, such as the conditions that new members must be democratic, have market economies, be committed to responsible security policies, and be able to contribute to the alliance.

7) It must be remembered that each new NATO member constitutes for the United States, a bilateral defense treaty that extends the U.S. security umbrella to a new nation.<sup>83</sup>

#### ARGUMENTS AGAINST NATO EXPANSION

NATO expansion has received strong opposition since the idea was introduced. These arguments include: NATO expansion will isolate Russia; expansion will cause more spending from the NATO budget; expanding to the East could weaken NATO and possibly cause division between the allies.

Some observers believe that pushing NATO's boundaries eastward promises to resurrect Europe's dividing lines.<sup>84</sup> Other analysts believe a role for NATO makes sense only if Russia again poses a threat to Central Europe. Enlarging the alliance would alter the balance of power on the continent and make Russia feel less secure.<sup>85</sup> NATO is still a military alliance that concentrates power against an external threat; this is precisely why NATO expansion could create "poles of opposition" or even worse a "cold peace".<sup>86</sup> The main concern of Boris Yeltsin is that expansion could be damaging to the partnership feelings of the democratic politicians in Russia.<sup>87</sup>

*New York Times* analyst Fred Ikle points out that NATO membership does not guarantee nor does it require democracy.<sup>88</sup> Ikle provides Greece as an example. In 1967, Greece was overrun in a coup by a military government that lasted seven years, but was still a member of NATO.

Ikle also points out that expansion will ruin NATO. If the United States pressured its reluctant European allies, France and Great Britain, it would jeopardize relations

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, 45.

<sup>84</sup> Charles W. Maynes, "For NATO, Expansion Could Prove Fatal" in *New York Times* (January 2, 1995): 16.

<sup>85</sup> Kupchan, 11.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>87</sup> Tim Zimmerman, "NATO Rumbles to the EAST" in *U.S. News and World Report* (November 21, 1994): 68.

<sup>88</sup> Fred C. Ikle, "How To Ruin NATO" in *New York Times* (January 11, 1995): A15.

between the U.S. and Europe.<sup>89</sup> The former Warsaw Pact countries could also weaken NATO by allowing a "Trojan Horse" to enter.<sup>90</sup> Ikle suspects that a revived K.G.B. could find collaborators in Eastern Europe.

Another argument against expansion is that there is no NATO budget. Fred Ickle says, "... today, such an infusion of money is out of the question."<sup>91</sup> It is no secret that some NATO allies are worried about the strategic implications and budgetary implications of expansion.<sup>92</sup> Repositioning troops and other formidable military preparations would require a hefty budget for NATO.<sup>93</sup>

Other critics of NATO expansion suggest that the alliance should take its time. *New York Times* analyst Jeremy Rosner claims that the U.S. Congress is approving additional members as if it were the YMCA.<sup>94</sup> Furthermore, he sees that a lack of seriousness of the issue is displayed because allies simply do not see Russia as a threat to Eastern Europe.<sup>95</sup>

One of the major opponents of NATO expansion is the Professor of American Foreign Policy at the Paul A. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University, Michael Mandelbaum. He sees the proponents of NATO expansion divided into two camps: 1) those who see NATO expansion as a catalyst to promote democracy; 2) those who see NATO expansion as protection for an external threat (Russia).<sup>96</sup>

Mandelbaum finds that if NATO expansion is for the promotion of democracy, those countries that will be admitted first will be the ones that are more capable of transition on their own.<sup>97</sup> It is actually Russia and the Ukraine who will find democratic transition the most difficult.<sup>98</sup> He sees that failure to promote these countries democracies could be the most devastating. Likewise, their success would have the biggest benefit.<sup>99</sup>

Mandelbaum further argues that NATO had little to do with the democratic success of Western Europe.<sup>100</sup> Instead it was the Marshall Plan that provided capital, market access, and incentives for economic cooperation. He sees the logical source for the candidates as the European Union.

Concerning Russia's aggressive behavior, Mandelbaum finds the Ukraine is a greater threat than the Central European countries.<sup>101</sup> No one is currently pushing the admittance of the Ukraine. NATO discussions only regard the Ukraine as marginal; however, it is central.<sup>102</sup> Mandelbaum states that as long as it acts as independent, it is a buffer between Russia and the rest of Europe. More important, the Ukraine is the best guarantee that Russia will remain peaceful.<sup>103</sup>

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89 *Ibid.*

90 *Ibid.*

91 *Ibid.*

92 *Ibid.*

93 *Ibid.*

94 Friedman, E15.

95 *Ibid.*

96 Michael Mandelbaum, "Preserving the New Peace: The Case Against NATO Expansion" in *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 1995): 9.

97 *Ibid.*

98 *Ibid.*

99 *Ibid.*

100 *Ibid.*

101 *Ibid.*, 10.

102 *Ibid.*

103 *Ibid.*



Although in opposition of NATO expansion, Mandelbaum does not believe that NATO should dissolve.<sup>104</sup> He believes that NATO is vital to the United States participation in European affairs. Perseverance by the United States will assure Germany that it does not need to arm itself to remain secure.<sup>105</sup> In addition, an armed Germany would make its neighbors feel less secure.<sup>106</sup> NATO will assure the Europeans that if Russia does resume an imperial foreign policy, the United States will be committed to forming an anti-Russian coalition.<sup>107</sup>

## CONCLUSIONS

Expansion of NATO should be made into Eastern Europe; however, the decision should not be made hastily. The NATO allies should continue the development of the Partnership for Peace program, and develop guidelines for membership. Additionally, NATO should not isolate Russia during the expansion process. Cooperation with Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States must be pursued to preserve a peaceful democratic transition in that region.

Although NATO expansion should be made, economic support to the Central European countries may serve as a better means of ensuring democracies. As Voigt points out, even Russia should be included in an economic package. Sufficient aid from the West would insure that Russia's goals are peaceful; however, this aid should not be provided by the U.S. only. The Europeans and the Japanese have an equal stake in the future of Central Europe.

Aid will provide the newly born democracies with the nourishment it needs; however, these newborn democracies still need a feeling of security on which to thrive. NATO is the only organization that is able to provide that security. The alliance gave this same type of security to the Marshall Plan. Without it, the economic aid distributed may have had a minimal effect for the recipient states.

Alternatives to NATO do exist. The OSCE, so far, has provided effective mediation in Eastern Europe; however, it has no means by which to enforce its resolutions. The Partnership for Peace provides a good link between NATO and Eastern Europe, and also provides a good basis for possible NATO membership. Currently, it is too ambiguous. As Brzezinski points out, every country in the organization does not have equal strategic importance. Furthermore, more work needs to be done to make the Pfp a viable entity.

Richard Holbrooke presents the European Union as an important entity in the stability of Europe. Since its creation, the EU has surpassed territorial and ethnic disputes. The expansion of the EU eastward will contribute greatly to the stability of Europe. Although the contributions of the European Union will be great, a NATO presence is still needed to satisfy the security concerns of the central Europeans.

As Brzezinski and Voigt state, cooperation between NATO and the OSCE could be the best solution to the future of European security. NATO could be the enforcement that the OSCE needs. In addition, the OSCE provides a structure for dealing with challenges that NATO cannot address.

Russia is still a threat to Eastern European security. (With declining popularity

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<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*

of Yeltsin, a new leader could be sworn in after Russia's next elections.) By instilling good relations with Russia, it will leave the proverbial "ball" in their court. Moreover, if aid is provided, it gives more incentive for democracy to prevail in Russia.

Fear of a "Cold Peace" with Russia should not be taken too seriously. Yeltsin made similar threats when it came to the reunited Germany's admission into NATO. The Bush Administration persevered, and ultimately the Kremlin caved in. A similar display of firmness must be made by President Clinton. In denying any future cooperation with NATO, Russia may suffer the same fate it did when turning down the Marshall Plan.

A common argument is "Whether NATO is willing to come to the defense of any of the Eastern European countries if attacked by Russia." This provokes the question whether Russia will really test the effectiveness of the alliance. An aggressive move by Russia into any of the Central European States would certainly be an act of war. Russia is not internally capable presently to make such move.

It is important to stress that NATO expansion does not have to be presented as a hostile move. As mentioned above, Russia could be included in an economic aid package. Another option is mentioned by Brzezinski and Voigt: offering an invitation to Russia to help create a transcontinental system of collective security. As Brzezinski specifies, the proposal would have two components: 1) A formal treaty of global security and cooperation between NATO and the Russian Federation; 2) The creation of a mechanism for special security consultations within the OSCE.

It would be a "historic sin" if NATO did not seek expansion. The West has a chance to embrace the countries of Eastern Europe and give them the security needed to promote their democratic transition. Additionally, NATO could prevent any ethnic tragedies similar to Yugoslavia between the countries of Romania, Hungary, and Slovakia. NATO should not miss this opportunity to reinvent itself. Without any clear definition for the future, NATO could be lost in the pages of the history books forever.