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STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The study of international affairs as an academic discipline no longer belongs exclusively to the specialists in that field; rather, its scope has been extended to include the work of other related disciplines in recognition of the fact that international problems are not exclusively political in nature. It is the purpose of this journal to speak on matters involving international problems with many academic voices. More important, it is the purpose of this journal to permit undergraduate students to try their wings in describing, analyzing, and possibly suggesting solutions to the problems that have vexed nations in their contacts with each other.

The underlying premise of this journal is that undergraduate students *can* contribute effectively to a reasoned, moderate, academic analysis of international problems and that such contributions will have a more profound effect on the study of international affairs as well as on the student contributors to this journal than the passionate, partisan, and emotionally charged outbursts which have in the past permeated American campuses.

Consequently, the *Journal* invites contributors to take an active interest in this publication. It encourages students as well as members of the Towson State faculty and the students and faculty from other campuses to contribute articles, reviews, and other pertinent materials.

BRITAIN'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PERSIAN GULF AND THE FORMATION OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, 1968-1971

by Nelson R. Beck*

In December, 1971, the British squadron at Sharjah turned southward, heading for the Straits of Hormuz and home. The retreat from the Persian Gulf, a movement begun in 1968, finally was complete. Political problems in both Britain and in the Gulf, growing financial crises, nationalist movements, and the increased futility of military actions against revolutionaries, all influenced the withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. While the recent devaluation and pressure from back-bench elements influenced the Labour party decision to withdraw British forces from East of Suez, and though the Conservatives indicated their intention to maintain a military presence in the Gulf; ultimately, Britain's bases in the region were doomed as a result of local and international politics. Nationalism throughout the Middle East, as well as the increasingly precarious position of landed military bases following the Suez Crisis and the advent of nuclear weapons, meant that oil supplies and refineries were in danger of attack by subversives. Against such elements, the military installations at Bahrain and Sharjah not only would be ineffective but would intensify the threat from revolutionaries. Hence, both the Labourites and the Conservatives attempted to build political and military stability into the Persian Gulf rather than enforcing security with British forces.

As 1968 opened, British troops in the Gulf region totalled 8,400 men, not including those in the Royal Navy at sea. The land forces included 300 members of the navy, 4,700 members of the army, and 3,400 members of the Royal Air Force. These figures included the forces at Mesirah and Mauritius. The number within the Gulf proper, principally at Bahrain and Sharjah, equalled 6,500, with an additional 730 men in the Royal Navy.[1]

The land and air forces were centered at Bahrain and Sharjah where the most modern equipment was located. Bahrain, the primary base in the Gulf, served as the naval headquarters and the location of the Joint Services Headquarters under a Rear Admiral. Subordinates to this officer were senior officers in charge of the three services. Bahrain contained one army battalion

and was the site of an airfield that accommodated the largest jet aircraft and handled over 250 R.A.F. Air Support Command aircraft each month. Much of this traffic constituted flights to the Far East. Sharjah, located on the Trucial Coast, had a modern, if limited, airfield which served as the base for helicopters and for tactical transport and maritime patrol aircraft. The total of R.A.F. and R.A.F. Regiment personnel was 800 while that of the one Army battalion was 1,900 men.[2] Weapons at the two bases included artillery, armoured cars, ground-attack and fighter-reconaissance aircraft, tactical transport planes of both the fixed-wing and the rotary-wing types, and long-range maritime-reconaissance aircraft.[3]

In addition to the land and air forces, the Royal Navy also patrolled the region. Manned by about 730 men and officers, the three frigates and six coastal minesweepers intervened often to solve oil disputes. The frigates were modern ships with comprehensive aircraft early-warning, aircraft-direction radar, and radar-controlled gunnery systems. Afloat, each of the frigates also carried an anti-submarine helicopter and twenty Royal Marines.[4]

The Gulf military units conducted joint military exercises for regional defense. Maritime exercises in the area, air-defense operations, and search-and-rescue maneuvers in conjunction with the powers in the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) pointed out the importance of Gulf forces as a defense against potential Soviet aggression. Gulf forces also operated in connection with NATO, SEATO, and Commonwealth forces on joint maneuvers.[5]

British Politics

In his speech of January 16, 1968, Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced cuts in government expenditures to the House of Commons in view of the recent devaluation. Wilson's program included reductions in expenses both at home and abroad: in appropriations for education, family allowances, and defense.[6] The budget cuts of 1968 reflected the division within the Cabinet over the amount of the defense budget and the size of the troop reductions. The monetary crisis of 1967 created the need for increases in the charges for National Health Insurance and for decreases in welfare spending. In the face of such blows to social welfare, the left-wing back-benchers in the party agitated for equal reductions in military funding.[7] Because back-bench influence held a prominent place in Labour Party structure, Wilson could avoid dividing the party only by means of compromise.[8]

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[2] Center for Strategic and International Studies, *The Gulf: Implications for Withdrawal* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, Special Report Series No. 8, 1969), pp. 79-82 (hereafter cited as C.S.I.S.)

[3] CMND, 3540, pp. 19-20.

[4] C.S.I.S., pp. 79-82.

[5] CMND, 3540, pp. 19-20.

[6] *H.C. Deb.*, 5th series, 776 (1968): 1578-1584.

[7] D. C. Watt, "The Decision to Withdraw from the Gulf," *Political Quarterly* 39 (July-Sept. 1968): 317; "Still East of Suez," *New Statesman* 71 (Feb. 25, 1966): 245; Frank Giles, "Labour's Wrong Way of Doing the Right Thing," *Sunday Times*, April 5, 1970, p. 12.

[8] Douglas Houghton, "The Labour Back-Bencher," *Political Quarterly* 40 (Oct.-Dec. 1969): 455-457; Harold Wilson, *A Personal Record: The Labour Government, 1964-1970* (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), pp. 480-485.

The new policy meant the withdrawal of British troops East of Suez. The proposed budget for 1968-1969 totalled £227m., a decrease of £58m., at constant prices, from the 1967-1968 budget. Realizing that such defense cutbacks meant a reduction in the ability of forces to perform as many duties, the government made policy changes. Defense efforts henceforth were to be concentrated in Europe and the North Atlantic while the deadline for withdrawing troops from the Persian Gulf, Singapore, and Malaysia was moved ahead from 1975 to 1971. The total manpower of the three services was reduced by 75,000 men and the Gurkha brigade in the Indian Ocean was to be cut to 6,000 men by 1971. In addition, Britain canceled orders for 50 F.111 aircraft from the United States. Other reductions involved the R.A.F. transport force and the support facilities including the Ministry of Defense.[9]

The subsequent debate over the withdrawals East of Suez, and those from the Persian Gulf in particular, centered around the relatively small cost of maintaining forces in view of the tremendous economic value of the region. Britain's military presence in the Persian Gulf cost her £12m. per year,[10] a figure that contrasted sharply with the enormous economic benefits of the area. British companies owned thirty percent of the petroleum rights in the Gulf, an investment that equalled £900m.[11] In addition, Gulf oil accounted for fifty percent of British consumption and annual British exports to the region were valued at £700m. Other benefits came from the investment of British money in sterling securities and the resale of Gulf oil to non-sterling areas.[12]

The arguments regarding the value of petroleum investments and supplies did nothing to dissuade Wilson from his decision to withdraw. In the first place, the government contended that the £12m. spent for defense in the Gulf each year did not include expenses of the supporting troops and bases East of Suez whose total cost per year equalled £140m.[13] In the second place, the troops located in Bahrain and Sharjah did not guard the major sources of British petroleum. Indeed, the government argued that a major portion of Britain's oil came from Kuwait, Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. The troops located in the Gulf, at least in the past, had been more concerned with maintaining political stability in the region. Without such security, opponents of Wilson feared that the region might come under Soviet or Iraqi control, thereby endangering the entire Gulf and the British oil supplies.[14]

In spite of the opposition to withdrawal, the new emphasis upon expense reductions and, more importantly, upon internal stability rather than outside protection continued to be themes of Labour's Gulf policy. In January 1968, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan of Abu Dhabi, speaking in behalf of the other

[9] CMND, 3540, pp. 1-2; Wilson, *A Personal Record*, p. 483.
[10] H.C. Deb., 5th series, 754 (1967): 134.
[11] The Times (London), Nov. 14, 1967, p. 11.
[12] C.S.I.S., pp. 64-66.
[13] H.C. Deb., 5th series, 758 (1968): 1346-1347.
[14] The Times (London), Nov. 14, 1967, p. 11.

sheikhs on the Trucial Coast, offered to pay a sum of £25m. per year for the maintenance of British troops in the Gulf after the December 1971 deadline.[15] Though the Defense Minister, Mr. Denis Healey, refused this offer on the grounds that the amount of £25m. could not meet the entire cost of Persian Gulf forces and the supporting facilities, actually he declined because the continued presence of troops made them vulnerable to nationalist activity.[16] In the past, stability had been imposed by external forces stationed on fixed land bases. Such bases, however, had a decreased utility with the advent of aircraft carriers and long-range F.111K jets,[17] and were increasingly subject to attack by revolutionaries. [18]

While correct in its assessment of the political and economic situation in the Persian Gulf, the Wilson Government failed to canvass opinion in the Gulf States which were quite unprepared for the announcement. This decision, which threatened their security, came without any previous discussion with the states involved.[19] Conservatives recognized this problem and criticized the Labourites for their lack of careful planning.[20]

During 1968 and 1969, the shadow prime minister, Edward Heath, toured the Gulf where, he said, he found considerable enthusiasm among the rulers for the Conservative readiness to maintain a force in the area.[21] The fact that the Labour defense estimates of 1968 had their roots in partisan political matters involving left-wing Labourites helped to encourage the Conservatives to reverse the Labour decision.[22] The Heath victory in 1970 reopened the issue of retreat by pointing to the abruptness with which the Labourites presented their policy to the Arab Emirates.[23] As a result, from several months prior to the 1970 election until March 1971, the Conservative policy was based on consultations with the states in the area to determine if a reversal of the Labour policy would serve British interests in the region.[24] In June 1970 Heath promised to alter the 1968 plan,[25] while as late as January 1971 the Conservative Minister of State for Defense, Lord Balmiel, told the Commons that forces necessary to meet existing commitments would be maintained.[26] In the end, Conservative opposition to withdrawals served only to prolong divisions within the Gulf. Although the Conservatives were correct in their views of the Labour decision, they failed at the time to recognize the significance of political problems and rising nationalism in the Gulf region. Ultimately, the Conservatives worked for the same goals as those toward which the Labourites strove: stability and security maintained by the powers within the Persian Gulf.

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[15] *Ibid.*, Jan. 22, 1968, p. 1.
[16] *H.C. Deb.*, 5th series, 758 (1968): 348.
[17] *Ibid.*, 5th series, 753 (1967): 997; Wilson, *A Personal Record*, pp. 480-485.
[18] Phillip Darby, "Beyond East of Suez," *International Affairs* (London) 46 (October 1970): 659-660.
[19] William Luce, "A Naval Force for the Gulf," *Round Table* 59 (October 1969): 349 (hereafter cited as Luce, "A Naval Force.")
[20] *The Times* (London), August 20, 1968, p. 7.
[21] *Ibid.*, April 4, 1969, p. 4.
[22] Darby, pp. 655-656.
[23] Luce, "A Naval Force," p. 349.
[24] *The Times* (London), June 3, 1970, p. 9.
[25] *Ibid.*, June 23, 1970, p. 7.
[26] *H.C. Deb.*, 5th series, 809 (1971): 232-233.

Threats on the Periphery

Foreign powers, the Soviet Union, Iraq, Egypt, and the Dhofar revolutionaries in particular, served as a major inspiration for nationalist movements within the Persian Gulf and acted as a threat to the stability maintained by local governments and by Britain. The possibility of Soviet aggression did not pose as great a problem as did that of the various Middle East countries. True, Russia had a foothold in the Persian Gulf through a treaty of friendship with Iraq which allowed unspecified military facilities from the Soviet Union to be located in the Gulf;[27] indeed, Soviet warships presented themselves in the Gulf soon after the announcement of the British retreat.[28] However, Soviet attempts to gain diplomatic favours in Kuwait met with little success while her efforts in Saudi Arabia failed. In fact, the Soviet Union did not present a great challenge as long as the Suez Canal remained closed, and her interests in the Middle East in reality centered almost entirely upon the Arab-Israeli conflict.[29] To the degree that the Soviet Union did pose a threat, the Iranian navy and air force provided a counterpoise. Because the Shah feared Soviet aggression, as a result of his profitable petroleum sales to the West, he had a vested interest in maintaining a balance of power. This policy coincided with the British efforts at maintaining stability within the region. The emphasis upon a balance meant that the Gulf States had to be strengthened. Hence, Britain sold various types of military equipment to the Shah. Iran purchased, from the United States as well as Britain, Phantom jets, C130 transport planes, helicopters, missile systems, Chieftain tanks, and a naval force of small but fast vessels including hovercraft.[30] In fact, just prior to the defense statement of 1968, Parliament authorized a loan of £266m. to Iran for the purchase of arms.[31]

A more immediate danger to peace and stability in the Persian Gulf lay in Iraq. Traditionally opposed to Iran, Iraq strove to make her navy equal that of the Shah by purchasing, from the Soviets, patrol boats capable of carrying the Styx missile.[32] In addition, Iraq attempted to annex Kuwait and supported Bahraini independence from Iran. Concerning the former, Britain believed that the best solution was Kuwaiti neutrality. Unable in 1967, as in 1973-1974, to force Kuwait to sell her oil, Britain and the West met with Kuwaiti cooperation in the Arab oil boycott in that year.[33] Following this, Britain and Kuwait agreed to end their defense agreement of 1961 by which Britain had terminated her protectorate while granting military aid to Kuwait against Iraq.[34] Kuwait requested the termination of the 1961 treaty because its provisions, as well as growing demands in Kuwait for job opportunities and government positions, brought about the type of dissatis-

[27] David Housego, "Iran in the Ascendant," *Round Table* 62 (October 1972): 504
[28] *H.C. Deb.*, 5th series, 766 (1968): 40.
[29] Luce, "A Naval Force," pp. 351-353.
[30] Housego, pp. 498-503.
[31] *The Times* (London), January 11, 1968, p. 4.
[32] *Ibid.*, May 13, 1968, p. 5.
[33] *Ibid.*, June 8, 1967, p. 4.
[34] *Ibid.*, May 14, 1968, p. 7.

faction beneficial to Baathist agitators. Hence, the treaty ended in May, 1971.[35] Iran also recognized the danger of Baathist subversives in Kuwait and thus favored the ending of the treaty at that time.[36] In regard to the latter, Iraq supported Bahraini nationalists in their opposition to Iran's claims of sovereignty. Iraq's denunciations of the Iranian claim to Bahrain constituted an affront to the Shah and served to disrupt Gulf stability. With the end of the Kurdish rebellion in northern Iraq, that nation's Pan-Arab Baathist party turned its attention to the preservation of Arab unity in the Gulf. Therefore, Iraqi support went to Bahrain's National Liberation Front, thus presenting the dangers of war and interruption of the oil supply.[37]

As in the case of Iraqi designs upon Gulf countries, the Egyptian threat lay not so much in overt acts of aggression as in covert support of revolutionaries. Formerly, Gulf shipping accounted for $300m. annually in Egypt's Canal revenues.[38] Egypt's interest in the Persian Gulf declined after the closing of the Suez Canal. Yet, in his support of Arab nationalism, Nasser signified his approval of Faysal's sponsorship of Bahraini independence, thereby presenting Iran with a security problem. While Egyptian and Saudi Arabian support for Bahraina independence angered the Shah at a time when closer Arab-Iranian relations seemed imminent,[39] it must be remembered that Egypt feared Gulf unity or any Gulf defense plans that would include Iran.[40] Egyptian subversion in the Gulf focused upon Bahrain and Kuwait where discontented educated groups, those forming the middle class, demanded changes in sheikhly government. Socialists, supported by Egypt, also exploited the discontent of the powerless impoverished urban elements.[41]

One last subversive movement threatened Gulf security from the outside. The Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf (PFLOAG) started a revolt in Dhofar in 1965. The movement gained support from Southern Yemen, the Soviet Union, China, and Egypt. The rebels aimed to overthrow the personal rule of the Sultan of Oman and strove to drive out the British-officered Trucial Oman Scouts (TOS). Intending to liberate the entire Gulf from British economic control, the revolutionaries attempted to link up with subversives and nationalists elsewhere in the Gulf. The danger of such infiltration posed a problem to British oil interests along the Arabian shore and to the stability maintained by the Trucial Oman Scouts.[42] After the overthrow of Sultan Sayed in July 1970, his son Qabas, with the aid of the TOS, proceeded to reconquer much rebel territory in Dhofar. Yet, once again, the British presence served as an impetus for

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[35] *Ibid.*, July 7, 1970, p. 4.
[36] "Sir Alec Up the Gulf," *Economist* 236 (July 18, 1970): 14-15 (hereafter cited as "Sir Alec.")
[37] *The Times* (London), April 28, 1970, p. 6.
[38] C.S.I.S., p. 74.
[39] *The Times* (London), February 5, 1968, p. 4.
[40] *Near East Report: A Washington Letter on American Policy in the Near East* 12 (January 23, 1968): (hereafter cited as *Near East Report.*)
[41] William Luce, "Britain in the Persian Gulf," *Round Table* 57 (July 1967): 278.
[42] *Near East Report* 16 (January 5, 1972): 2-3; R. M. Burrell, "Problems and Prospects in the Gulf," *Round Table* 62 (April 1972): 218-219; *The Times* (London), August 3, 1970, p. 7.

nationalist activity, especially against the British air base at al-Masirah Island.[43]

Internal Divisions

Foreign subversives served to intensify the economic and political problems plaguing individual Gulf states and helped to deepen the divisions among them. In turn, Britain recognized that Gulf unity and security could be achieved only from within the region. However, Iranian claims to Bahrain and the Gulf islands, conflicts among the Trucial States and with Saudi Arabia, and the desire of the Conservatives to maintain a British presence prolonged the efforts to bring unity to the Trucial States.

A primary example of increasing nationalism lay in Bahrain. Here the economic advances and political awareness proved dangerous to the stability of the Gulf and to the safety of British troops. The development of the petroleum industry in Bahrain created enormous amounts of new wealth, thereby making possible hotels, educational and medical facilities, roads, a port, and a fresh water system.[44] However, economic developments greatly outstripped the political rights of the people. While restricted political reforms granted a cabinet and departmental control in the government, over thirty percent of the oil revenue and a majority of bureaucratic positions went to members of the ruling Khalifa family, most of whom were uneducated. The lack of political and economic opportunity aroused the ire of educated young men. Since oil companies could provide only a few jobs, many persons remained in the free secondary schools until twenty years of age or older. Men trained in such schools, as well as those educated in Beirut and Cairo, resented the Khalifa control of the economy and government. They also directed their dislike against Europeans and Americans who often received salaries higher than those paid to the Bahrainis.[45]

Rising nationalism endangered the British forces stationed in Bahrain. As early as the 1950's developing nationalism throughout the Middle East brought young Bahrainis into the streets to protest against British influence in Bahrain.[46] Inspired by Nasser, the Bahrain National Liberation Front came into existence[47] and, though this group did not act openly against the British after 1965, it presented the danger of an attack upon British troops.[48] As a result, the British military command in the area resorted to a policy of keeping the army in the background. To do so, it prohibited the display of flags or bands near Bahraini towns and forced servicemen to wear civilian clothing while in the presence of the indigenous people. Furthermore, the services restricted their training exercises to remote areas.[49]

The British had hoped to safeguard Bahrain from revolutionary influences by including that state in the proposed Gulf federation. Such a plan

[43] "Sir Alec," p. 14; Burrell, pp. 218-219.
[44] M. Wall, "Club of the Gulf," *Economist* 235 (June 6, 1970): xxi-xxii.
[45] "Why Britain Should be Generous," *Economist* 219 (May 14, 1966): 688-691.
[46] Wall, p. xxii.
[47] *The Times* (London), October 9, 1967, p. 4.
[48] *Ibid.*, October 16, 1967, p. 6.
[49] *Ibid.*, March 18, 1968, p. 5.

was soon shattered, however, by the Iranian claim to Bahrain. In 1968, when Britain announced that she would withdraw her forces from the Gulf and began actively to sponsor a federation, the Iranian government objected.[50] As long as Britain had been the major power in the Gulf, she had served to protect Iran from Arab revolutionaries. The withdrawal of British forces and the inclusion of Bahrain in any federation of Arab states had obvious strategic and political implications for Iran. Bahrain, united with the other Arab states, would pose a military, political, and economic problem to Iran: it would endanger her petroleum cargoes. As a result, Iran claimed sovereignty over Bahrain and, to substantiate her claim, pointed to Iran's rule there prior to the days of British dominance.[51]

Nevertheless, Iran realized that her claims to Bahrain might also disrupt stability in the Gulf. True, early in 1968 the Shah threatened military retaliation if the Arab nations ignored Iran's interest in Bahrain.[52] Yet, he realized that a move against Bahrain would arouse the hostility of the Arab world and, in turn, endanger Iranian oil shipments.[53] As a result, in January 1969 the Shah announced that he would not use force against Bahrain and that he was willing to drop Iran's traditional claim to the island if such action would assure security for the region's economy.[54]

However, despite his desire for Gulf stability, the Shah hesitated to abandon his claim to Bahrain unless he could do so with dignity,[55] and he feared that an independent Bahrain would be weak and hence serve only as a breeding ground for subversives. In addition, Edward Heath's tour of the Gulf during 1969 instilled in many Iranians the belief that a Conservative government in Britain would reverse the decision to withdraw. In fact, only Britain's continued stress upon Gulf stability persuaded the Shah that Bahrain must be independent.[56]

To permit Bahraini independence while maintaining his own prestige and power, the Shah proposed, in September 1969, that the United Nations inquire into the desires of the indigenous people, and that a plebiscite be held.[57] Thus, in March, 1970, Iran and Britain submitted the dispute to the United Nations.[58] The Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, sent members of the Good Offices Mission under the leadership of his Personal Representative, Mr. Vittorio Winspeare, to gather information concerning Bahrain's leaders, institutions, people, and organizations.

Winspeare reported his findings in April, 1970. According to his investigation, a majority of Bahraini citizens were Arab in origin, Muslim in religion, and nearly unanimous in desiring a fully independent sovereign Arab state. Winspeare stressed that Bahraini views on the matter of independence did

[50] *Ibid.*, May 30, 1968, p. 8.
[51] Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *The Persian Gulf: Iran's Role* (Charlottesville, Va.: University Press of Virginia, 1972), pp. 45-47.
[52] *The Times* (London), March 14, 1968, p. 6.
[53] *Ibid.*, January 19, 1968, p. 5.
[54] *Ibid.*, January 7, 1969, p. 4.
[55] Luce, "A Naval Force," p. 350.
[56] *The Times* (London), March 6, 1970, p. 8.
[57] *Ibid.*, September 18, 1969, p. 6.
[58] *Ibid.*, March 30, 1970, p. 4.

not divide along religious lines in spite of the Shia minority in the state. Though no real differences in opinion could be found between urban and rural persons, those in urban areas seemed more aware of the problem. Younger persons and members of the educated classes tended to be more pro-Bahrain. As a result, Mr. Winspeare concluded that Bahrain should be a free and independent state determining its own foreign relations.[59] Hence, on May 11, 1970 the U.N. Security Council met, discussed the matter and, after a majority of the nations agreed with the conclusions of Winspeare, adopted a resolution calling for the independence of Bahrain from Iran.[60]

With the resolution of the Iran-Bahrain issue, a major obstacle to Gulf unity was cleared away. Yet, Britain's attempt to bring Bahrain into the proposed federation of the Trucial States met with both Bahraini and Iranian opposition. Repeatedly at meetings of the Trucial States Council, efforts at federation failed as a result of Bahrain's demands for proportional representation in any union. The meeting held in October 1970 failed to achieve unity because of this issue. Bahrain, the most advanced and sophisticated state, and possessor of the highest literacy rate, demanded greater unity than did the other states, and called for proportional representation in the legislature and for popular suffrage.[61] Given the size of her population, such representation would have amounted to virtual Bahraini control of the assembly.[62] The other states, whose people were generally illiterate and whose rulers had personal control of the governments, naturally feared the Bahraini proposals for a more democratic structure.[63]

Following the announcement by the Conservatives in March 1971 that Britain would indeed leave the Gulf by December 1971, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia began actively to support a federation. A joint Kuwaiti-Saudi Arabian delegation toured the Trucial States and Bahrain during April 1971 in an effort to bring about stability.[64] The Kuwaiti-Saudi proposals for federation, though not made public, apparently called for equal representation for each of the nine states in a federal assembly. In order to appease Bahrain, the delegation proposed that proportional representation be instituted after a period of four years. Bahrain made it clear that she would declare her independence if the Emirates refused to accept these conditions.[65]

Actually, Bahrain had little incentive to join the federation. Because Bahrain was more sophisticated and more populous, and since she had a higher literacy rate than any other state, it was only natural that she should demand proportional representation and refuse to join the federation when her hopes were not fulfilled. Furthermore, with the settlement of the Iran-Bahrain dispute, the latter had no reason to tie herself to a federation for

[59] United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, Supplement for April, May, and June 1970, 30 April 1970. *Note by the Secretary-General: Report of the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General in Charge of the Good Offices Mission,* Bahrain (S/9772), annex I, pp. 166-169.

[60] United Nations, Security Council, 25th year, 11 May 1970, *Question of Bahrain* (S/1536), pp. 1-15.

[61] *The Times* (London), July 21, 1970, p. 5.

[62] *Ibid.,* February 11, 1971, p. 12.

[63] *Arab Report and Record,* February 15-28, 1971, p. 107 (hereafter cited as *A.R.R.*)

[64] *Ibid.,* April 1-15, 1971, p. 187; *H.C. Deb.,* 5th series, 812 (1971): 1227-1228.

[65] *A.R.R.,* April 16-30, 1971, p. 210.

mutual protection. In addition, at a time when the Trucial States were having difficulties forming a governmental structure, the people of Bahrain were able to establish an Advisory Council of State and an elected assembly of their own.[66] Thus, by May 1971, Bahrain was prepared for independence. At that time, Iranian officials expressed the opinion that Britain had abandoned hopes of a federation of nine states. Both Sir William Luce, the personal representative of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary for Persian Gulf Affairs, and the Kuwaiti-Saudi Arabian mission had failed to find satisfactory terms for the inclusion of Bahrain.[67] By June, 1971, it became obvious that there existed no hope that Bahrain would join the Arab Emirates.[68] On July 18, 1971, Britain transferred its two companies of troops from Bahrain to the military base at Sharjah, thereby leaving the locally trained Bahrain Defense Force responsible for the military security of Bahrain.[69]

In August 1971, Bahrain declared her independence. The action was decisive insofar as it separated Bahrain from the Arab Emirates permanently and because it ended the treaty relationship with Britain that had existed since 1882.[70] At the same time, Britain achieved a new form of stability through a Treaty of Friendship. In keeping with Sir William Luce's proposal, the agreement treated Bahrain as a sovereign and independent nation and stated the intention of both sides to consult together during times of need. In addition, the treaty said that the two countries would settle all disputes peacefully within the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. In this fashion, Britain hoped to maintain security in the Gulf while establishing independence in Bahrain.[71]

The treaty, however, was more a symbol than a guarantee of stability in the Gulf. After Britain's retreat, the real guarantor of peace in the Gulf would be Iran. In May 1970, Iran sent a goodwill mission to Bahrain, a mission that was reciprocated by a Bahraini visit to Tehran, June 13, 1970. At this time a number of issues were discussed, among them the increase in trade between the two nations. Closer relations brought about the signing of an agreement concerning the demarcation of the continental shelf. This accord, signed in June 1971, had enormous significance for both countries in regard to the drilling of oil.[72] Furthermore, good relations with Bahrain would enable Iran to lease the Al-Mahraq base from Bahrain after the British withdrawal. Indeed, an agreement to that effect had been one of the conditions for Iran's recognition of Bahraini independence. As a result, Iran

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[66] David Holden, "Can U Thant's Man Narrow the Arab-Persian Gulf," *Sunday Times,* April 5, 1970, p. 8 (hereafter cited as Holden, "U Thant's Man"); David Holden, "The Persian Gulf: After the British Raj," *Foreign Affairs* 49 (July 1971): 723 (hereafter cited as Holden, "Persian Gulf.")

[67] *A.R.R.*, May 16-31, 1971, p. 259.

[68] *The Times* (London), June 29, 1971, p. 7.

[69] *A.R.R.*, July 16-31, 1971, p. 375.

[70] Great Britain, *Exchange of Notes Concerning the Termination of Special Treaty Relations between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the State of Bahrain and its Dependencies* (Parliament, *Papers by Command*, CMND, 4827), London: H.M.S.O., August 1971; *The Times* (London), August 16, 1971, p. 1.

[71] Great Britain, *Treaty of Friendship between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the State of Bahrain and its Dependencies* (Parliament, *Papers by Command*, CMND, 4828), London: H.M.S.O., August 1971.

[72] Ramazani, *The Persian Gulf*, p. 55.

instructed Bahrain to ignore Kuwait's overtures for union with the federation and to interfere in no way with the Iranian claims to the Gulf islands. Kuwait, while favoring Gulf unity, opposed Iran's claims to the islands in the Straits of Hormuz. Since Kuwait supported Arab unity and since Iran, an ally of the West, depended upon the islands in the Straits for the free passage of petroleum, it was necessary to keep Bahrain out of the Arab federation, out of Kuwaiti hands, and under close watch by Iran.[73]

Here then is the key to the failure of the Kuwaiti-Saudi mission and the reason that Qatar did not join the federation. While Qatar's ruling family established the state's first written constitution and provided for elections to a consultative assembly, Qatar generally expressed a favorable attitude toward the unification movement. Yet, Qatar ultimately declared its independence and signed a Treaty of Friendship with Britain.[74] Just as Bahrain had close relations with Kuwait, so Qatar had similar ties to Saudi Arabia. While Bahraini membership in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) would have given Kuwait influence in the UAE and over the Straits islands, Quatar's membership would have aided Saudi Arabia. Certainly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait desired Gulf stability. However, Saudi ties to Qatar would have helped Faisal influence the federation control the Gulf islands, to the detriment of Iran and the West. This would tend to suggest that the Kuwaiti-Saudi mission earlier in 1971 did not fail of itself but that Sir William Luce and the Iranians allowed it to die.[75]

A similar political and strategic problem detrimental to federation and to Iranian cooperation in Gulf union arose in regard to the islands in the Straits of Hormuz, Abu Musa and the two Tunbs. As part of her treaty obligations to the Trucial States, Britain had acknowledged Sharjah's claim to Abu Musa. The two Tunbs were claimed by another of the Trucial States, Ras al-Khaimah.[76] In December 1969 the Ruler of Sharjah granted drilling rights off the shore of Abu Musa to Buttes Gas and Oil, an American petroleum corporation. At the same time, Sharjah extended its territorial waters to a twelve mile limit and then added an additional twenty-four miles. Meanwhile, another of the Trucial States, Umm al-Qawain, had granted drilling rights at Abu Musa to Occidental Petroleum. Hence, the latter state disputed Sharjah's claims to territorial waters and Abu Musa.[77]

Britain's treaty obligations to protect Sharjah, but more so her fear that the dispute over Abu Musa would interrupt oil shipments and thereby trigger Iranian intervention, brought the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy to the scene. First directing its attention against Occidental Petroleum, the Foreign Office ordered the company not to begin its drilling operations in

[73] *Ibid.*, pp. 54-55; *A.R.R.*, June 16-30, 1971, p. 320.
[74] Great Britain, *Exchange of Notes Concerning the Termination of Special Treaty Relations between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the State of Qatar* (Parliament, *Papers by Command, CMND,* 4849), London: H.M.S.O., September 1971; Great Britain, *Treaty of Friendship between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the State of Qatar* (Parliament, *Papers by Command,* CMND, 4850), London: H.M.S.O., September 1971; Holden, "U Thant's Man," p. 8.
[75] *The Times* (London), July 2, 1971, p. 8.
[76] Burrell, p. 213.
[77] *The Times* (London), June 1, 1970, p. 19.

the contested region R.A.F. jets began shadowing the Occidental equipment in the area and soon thereafter the Royal Navy boarded the company's rig to prevent its being moved into the disputed region.[78] British minesweepers remained in the vicinity until, finally, Occidental withdrew from the area. In taking this action, Britain helped to thwart a potentially dangerous situation, one in which an internal Gulf conflict threatened to disrupt the free flow of oil.[79]

However, the problem presented by Arab nationalists to British oil and military facilities called into question the feasibility of continued British action.[80] The danger of Arab terrorism drove the Shah to demand a British retreat in spite of the Conservatives' offers to the contrary.[81] As a result, after the Conservatives announced, in March 1971, that the withdrawal would be completed by the end of the year, Britain looked to Iran to take her place in the Straits of Hormuz. The Shah now claimed Iranian suzerainty over the Gulf islands and refused to recognize any federation until his claims were established.[82]

Throughout 1971 Iran claimed the islands for strategic reasons. John D. Anthony of the Middle East Institute argues that Iran's claim to, and later conquest of the Gulf islands was rooted, to a large degree, in domestic Iranian politics. Anthony said that when the Shah relinquished his claim to Bahrain, he lost prestige at home. His desire to regain that prestige had as much, if not more impact upon his claim to the islands as did their strategic importance.[83] While domestic Iranian politics undoubtedly played a role, I would suggest that strategic considerations were of primary importance. For example, on May 5, 1971, William Luce arrived in Teheran and discussed Iran's claims to the islands in the Straits of Hormuz. It is significant that such discussions with the Shah were conducted at the same time that the Kuwaiti-Saudi Arabian mission failed to achieve federation.[84] Just as Iran wished to keep Bahrain out of the federation, so she hoped to prevent Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah from joining the union until those states admitted Iran's right to control the Gulf islands. Both the presence of British troops at al-Masirah Island and the British action at Abu Musa threatened to provoke revolutionaries from Dhofar into an attack upon the Gulf islands. Such a threat, as well as cooperation of the Trucial States, in any future oil boycott, would have endangered Iranian oil shipments.[85]

During the last half of 1971, Britain recognized the necessity of keeping the oil lanes open. As a result, she backed the Iranian claim to the islands

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[78] Ann T. Schulz, "A Leadership Role for Iran in the Persian Gulf," *Current History* 62 (January 1972): 30; *The Times* (London), June 2, 1970, p. 24.

[79] *Ibid.*, June 3, 1970, p. 1, and June 6, 1970, p. 11.

[80] David Holden, "We're Not Wanted in the Gulf, Sir Alec," *Sunday Times*, August 16, 1970, p. 10.

[81] "Sir Alec," pp. 14-15.

[82] *The Times* (London), June 29, 1971, p. 7; Housego, p. 503; Ramazani, *The Persian Gulf*, p. 59.

[83] John D. Anthony, *Arab States of the Lower Gulfs People, Politics, Petroleum* (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1975), p. 28.

[84] *A.R.R.*, May 1-15, 1971, p. 235; Schulz, p. 50; Holden, "Persian Gulf," p. 726; Alvin R. Cottrell, "A New Persian Hegemony?," *Interplay* 3 (September 1970): 14-15.

[85] *The Times* (London), August 3, 1970, p. 7.

and warned the rulers of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah that Iran would occupy the islands by the end of the year. Hence, when in June 1971, Iran actually offered to purchase the islands, Luce advised the two states to negotiate with Iran. The Shah offered the states a percentage of the oil revenues from the offshore drilling.[86] Luce proposed the partitioning of Abu Musa and the sale of the larger section to Iran; the portion that contained important military sites. In return for this sale, the Ruler of Sharjah was to receive the right to select the petroleum company that would drill there, provided that the company followed Iranian laws.[87] In spite of Sharjah's objections, the plan was finally accepted. Sharjah agreed to the stationing of Iranian troops in certain areas where Iran received full jurisdiction. In turn, Sharjah was allowed to permit Buttes Gas and Oil to continue its explorations. Iran agreed to contribute £1.5m. per year in revenues to Sharjah until that state's oil income reached £3m. annually. Most importantly, Iran recognized the United Arab Emirates.[88]

The settlement of the dispute over Abu Musa represented an important diplomatic and strategic victory for Britain. Not only did Iran begin to cooperate more fully with the United Arab Emirates, she also filled an important power vacuum in the area. Without this agreement Abu Musa would have been unguarded since Britain evacuated her Sharjah base at this time. By means of this agreement, Britain's policy of using local powers to maintain security was partially achieved.[89] The Iranian recognition of the United Arab Emirates was also important since, by refusing to sanction the UAE pending a settlement of the Abu Musa dispute, Iran had been able to drive a wedge between the Trucial States. This she had done through her economic influence in Dubai.[90]

As a result of the strategic importance of the Tunbs Islands, Sir William Luce supported Iran's claims there also. When the Shah asked Ras al-Khaimah for a settlement and threatened to seize the Tunbs if a satisfactory agreement was not reached,[91] Sheikh Saqr bin Muhammad al Wasim, Ruler of Ras al-Khaimah, declined to cooperate with Iran. Luce warned him that, since the treaty he had with Britain was about to expire, he could expect no aid from Britain.[92] Luce suggested that Saqr cede his suzerainty over the Tunbs in exchange for an annual payment of £1.6m. by Iran and a forty-nine percent share of the oil revenues.[93] When Saqr rejected this suggestion, Iran occupied the two Tunbs, November 30, 1971. Britain refused to take any counter-action, stating that her treaty with the Trucial States expired on November 30, 1971. Indeed, Luce's earlier warnings to Ras al-Khaimah and the British failure to act at the time of the invasion demonstrated the desire

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[86] *Ibid.*, June 30, 1971, p. 8; *A.R.R.*, June 1-15, 1971, p. 287.
[87] *The Times* (London), November 2, 1971, p. 8.
[88] *Ibid.*, November 30, 1971, p. 6.
[89] *A.R.R.*, September 16-30, 1971, p. 503.
[90] *The Times* (London), June 29, 1971, p. 7; also, July 2, 1971, p. 8, and July 21, 1971, p. 6.
[91] *Ibid.*, July 2, 1971, p. 8.
[92] *Ibid.*, November 30, 1971, p. 6.
[93] *A.R.R.*, November 1-15, 1971, p. 574.

on the part of the British to allow Iran to fill the power vacuum and to replace Britain as the stabilizing force in the Gulf.[94]

In regard to the Tunbs, the Arab reaction pointed to the need for Iranian control of the Straits of Hormuz. Immediately following the Iranian occupation of the Tunbs, Algeria, Libya, South Yemen, and Egypt denounced the action. Libya nationalized the British Petroleum Company, Ltd. and withdrew all Libyan deposits from British banks.[95] More importantly, Iraq severed diplomatic relations with Britain,[96] on the grounds that she had conspired with Iran to bring about the occupation.[97] Furthermore, as early as June 1971 Kuwait raised its voice with Iraq in opposition to Iran's designs on the Gulf islands.[98] Since Iran had refused to recognize a federation as long as Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah held the Gulf islands, and because Iran wielded her influence among the Emirates through her control of Dubai's trade, she drove Ras al-Khaimah away from the union.[99] Under these circumstances, Ras al-Khaimah began courting Arab countries, Iraq and Kuwait in particular, and refused to join the United Arab Emirates.[100] In this situation, if Ras al-Khaimah had controlled the Tunbs, the islands would have been easy prey for Kuwait and Iraq, especially during times of hostilities such as the Yom Kippur War of 1973. In that case, Arabs could easily disrupt the flow of Iranian oil.

Along the Arabian shore of the Gulf there existed numerous threats to stability, one of these being the Saudi Arabian claim to the Buraimi Oasis. Buraimi, located on the Abu Dhabi-Oman border, had been claimed by the Saudis in the early 1950's. In 1952 and 1955 the British successfully countered attempts by King Faisal to buy the support of local tribesmen. Indeed, between 1955 and 1966 the Oasis had been administered jointly by Abu Dhabi and Oman, with Sheikh Zayed of Abu Dhabi acting as governor.[101] However, Faisal reasserted his claim in 1968 when the British announced their decision to withdraw.[102] After the Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company began drilling, in 1970, in a region south of Buraimi and close to Saudi Arabia, Faisal set his eyes on the Oasis and demanded a plebiscite. He called for the return to Abu Dhabi of former Abu Dhabi inhabitants residing at the Oasis and stated that he desired a Saudi frontier running from a point north of Buraimi to the headland of Jabal Dhannah. Such a claim meant that much of Abu Dhabi would be absorbed into Saudi Arabia.[103] However, while the dispute continued until July 1974[104] and discouraged strong Saudi support

[94] *Ibid.*, November 16-30, 1971, p. 598.
[95] Ramazani, *The Persian Gulf*, pp. 63-64.
[96] *The Times* (London), December 1, 1971, p. 1.
[97] *Ibid.*, December 2, 1971, p. 8.
[98] *A.R.R.*, June 16-30, 1971, p. 320.
[99] *The Times* (London), July 2, 1971, p. 8, and July 21, 1971, p. 6.
[100] *Ibid.*, June 30, 1971, p. 8, and July 20, 1971, p. 12; *A.R.R.*, November 1-15, 1971, p. 574; Ramazani, *The Persian Gulf*, p. 62.
[101] *The Times* (London), April 5, 1968, p. 5; Anthony, *Arab States*, pp. 31-32; Richard Johns, "The Emergence of the United Arab Emirates," *Middle East International* no. 21 (March 1973): 10.
[102] *The Times* (London), July 4, 1970, p. 5; Holden, "Persian Gulf," pp. 726-727.
[103] *The Times* (London), July 16, 1970, pp. 4, 5.
[104] Anthony, *Arab States*, p. 32.

for the leadership of Abu Dhabi in the UAE, Faisal was a supporter of Arabism and unity in the Gulf. To appease Zayed, Faisal offered to cede a section of Buraimi, thereby enabling Abu Dhabi to retain its principal oil fields. In reality, the problem of Buraimi resulted largely from the conflicting personalities of Zayed and Faisal. Actually, these men were traditional, conservative rulers with a basic interest in averting a military confrontation.[105]

In spite of the settlement of the disputes over Bahrain and the Gulf islands, a major obstacle to union lay in the formulation of defense plans. Meeting on October 22, 1968, the Trucial States called upon their federal council to devise a plan for an army, air force, and a navy to replace Britain's 6,500 men in the area. The proposal that resulted called for unified training and a unified command while permitting the states to maintain their individual forces.[106] The best basis for such a federation defense force lay in the Trucial Oman Scouts, a military organization composed of 1,400 local men but trained and officered by the British.[107] Indeed, Sir John Willoughby, the military advisor to the Trucial States, called for the absorption of the Trucial Oman Scouts into a federal Union force. Fearing the dangers of internal subversion and revolution, Willoughby recommended that a standing defense committee be established with a temporary headquarters at Sharjah and that the states purchase eight coastal patrol craft, four to patrol Bahrain and four for the protection of the strategic Ruus Al Jibal peninsula. He suggested further that aircraft be employed to assist patrol boats forty miles off shore and that the federation force include a mobile brigade group of 2,000 men with two motorized battalions having an armoured reconnaissance squadron and supporting arms.

Willoughby also advised that the Union Air Force should include nine Tigercat fire units to protect the air bases and Hunter ground attack aircraft, four each at Bahrain, Abu Dhabi, and Sharjah. Furthermore, there should be sixteen helicopters for close support, these to be divided among the above bases and Dubai, and four light transport aircraft for short landings and for take-offs from rough surfaces. The initial cost of such a force was estimated at £11,050,000; the annual operating cost would total £7,050,000.[108]

Such recommendations fostered division between the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai and thereby threatened the very stability that the British military advisor attempted to create. Sheikh Rashid of Dubai agreed with the Willoughby proposals and hoped to incorporate the Trucial Oman Scouts into a brigade commanded by the UAE while dissolving any separate forces maintained by individual emirs. However, to defend Buraimi and his growing oil wealth, Zayed of Abu Dhabi built his own Abu Dhabi Defense Force.[109]

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[105] John D. Anthony, "The Union of Arab Emirates," *Middle East Journal* 26 (Summer 1972): 279-280; *The Times* (London), July 16, 1970, p. 4.
[106] *Ibid.*, October 23, 1968, p. 6.
[107] *Ibid.*, April 8, 1969, p. 9.
[108] *Ibid.*, July 21, 1969, p. 4. Maj.-Gen. Sir John Edward Willoughby had served in the Second World War and in Korea. Between 1965 and 1967 he had been Inspector General of the Federal Regular Army of South Arabia and Security Commander in Aden. Between 1968 and 1971 he was Advisor on Defence to the Federation of Arab Emirates.
[109] *The Times* (London), July 30, 1969, p. 4.

This unit totalled 4,000 men[110] and had Vigilant anti-tank missiles with warheads capable of piercing all known armoured vehicles at ranges of 200 to 1,500 yards.[111] Abu Dhabi resisted the proposal to combine this force with the Trucial Oman Scouts since the latter contained troops from Zayed's economic rival, Dubai.[112] Furthermore, Zayed viewed the TOS as an instrument of British imperialism.

In reality, Sheikh Zayed probably expressed opposition to the Trucial Oman Scouts out of fear of nationalist retaliation. The Scouts actually benefited both Abu Dhabi and Britain. In the past they had helped to fight Saudi raiders at the Buraimi Oasis. The British hoped to maintain the TOS to fight guerrillas and to protect British troops leaving in 1971.[113]

Economic rivalries also stood as a blockade on the road to federation. Prior to Bahraini independence, that state had come into conflict with Dubai in the entrepot trade, thus prompting Dubai to oppose all efforts that would have hampered her role as a free port. As a result, after its foundation in 1968, the Union's Committee for Customs and Trade met only twice.[114] In addition, while Abu Dhabi and Dubai possessed great wealth from their oil and trading ventures, Ajman, Umm al-Qawain, Ras al-Khaimah, and Fujairah remained poverty-stricken. Such areas disliked being dependent upon the wealth of larger states and opposed domination by them. This problem helped to influence the demands of the smaller states for equal representation.[115]

Similarly, the disparities in wealth influenced many of the less significant sheikhdoms to favor a continued British presence. For example, Ajman, with a population of about 3,000, derived the greater portion of its income from the sale of passports and commemorative postage stamps. The major part of these revenues resulted from the state's involvement with Britain and the outpost of the Trucial Oman Scouts located there. The proposed British withdrawal thus threatened the economy of Ajman.[116]

The division of opinion among the Trucial States helped to encourage the opposition of the Conservatives toward withdrawal. During his 1969 tour of the Gulf, the shadow Prime Minister, Edward Heath, let it be known that in the event of a Conservative victory, he would reconsider the withdrawal decision and consult Britain's interests in the region.[117] While reactions within the area varied, the Trucial States seem to have favored more consultation if not a reversal of policy. Prior to the election in 1970 Heath had stated that the nine states preferred a change from the Labourite plan.[118] Indeed, the Emirates welcomed the Conservative victory hoping that it would result in greater consideration of their interests.[119] The states generally felt that the policy of retreat merely removed the age-old protection which had been inter-

110 *Ibid.*, July 16, 1970, p. 5.
111 *A.R.R.*, January 1-15, 1971, p. 27.
112 D. C. Watt, "Can the Union of Arab Emirates Survive?" *World Today* 27 (April 1971): 145 (hereafter cited as Watt, "Arab Emirates.")
113 "Nine, Eight, or Seven," *Economist* 232 (August 23, 1969): 30-31.
114 Watt, "Arab Emirates," p. 146.
115 Burrell, p. 215.
116 *The Times* (London), February 9, 1968, p. 8.
117 *Ibid.*, April 4, 1969, p. 4.
118 *Ibid.*, June 23, 1970, p. 7.
119 *Ibid.*, July 21, 1970, p. 5.

posed between them and more powerful states and that had prevented inter-state rivalries from flaring into violence.[120] Sheikh Rashid of Dubai supported a continuation of the British presence and argued that Abu Dhabi and Bahrain actually favored this but merely refrained from asserting their opinions out of respect for the concept of Arab unity.[121]

While the Emirates viewed the British forces as an asset, the surrounding nations of Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia saw matters differently. They recognized that British troops, rather than preventing nationalist and revolutionary upsurges, would merely constitute a sore spot and a target. Fearing Iraqi subversion against the British and against Gulf stability, Iran opposed the Tory viewpoint and called for withdrawal.[122] In like manner, Kuwait feared that if British troops remained in the Gulf they would only incite extremists and thereby actually threaten security.[123] Kuwait supported the federation and granted financial assistance to the emirs but, like Iran, felt that Iraqi Baathists would attempt to establish revolutionary regimes in Bahrain and the Trucial States.[124]

Confronted by opposition from Iran and Kuwait and, indeed, from the Emirates, the Conservatives came to see the inevitability of retreat. In July 1970 the Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, met the Shah in Brussels. At that time Home stated that the government would consult all the states in the region before making any decision concerning withdrawal.[125] This policy, however, hindered movements toward unification by encouraging the sheikhs to believe that Britain would continue her role as arbiter.[126] Indeed, Sheikh Rashid of Dubai stated that the Conservative indecision over withdrawal had damaged the region economically and had discouraged efforts at unity.[127] Moreover, the Western petroleum interests in the Gulf also favored a continuation of the Labour policy. Like Iran, the oil companies realized that nationalist and extremist activities would be directed not only against bases but also against refineries.[128] In general, the companies felt that their existing agreements would enable them to continue oil shipments without military support.[129]

The realities of Gulf politics became obvious to Sir William Luce. Having served as Governor of Aden from 1956 to 1960, and as British Political Resident in the Gulf from 1961 to 1966, Luce had extensive experience in Persian Gulf affairs. The Personal Representative of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary for Persian Gulf Affairs between 1970 and 1972, Luce carried on discussions as the Heath government promised.[130]

He arrived in the Gulf in July 1970 and conferred with leaders of the

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[120] Luce, "A Naval Force," p. 349.
[121] *The Times* (London), July 14, 1970, p. 5.
[122] *Ibid.*, June 23, 1970, p. 7, and June 29, 1970, p. 5.
[123] *Ibid.*, July 8, 1970, p. 6.
[124] "Sir Alec," pp. 14-15; *The Times* (London), June 29, 1970, p. 5; also, July 8, 1970, p. 6, and July 13, 1970, p. 4.
[125] *Ibid.*, July 11, 1970, p. 4.
[126] *Ibid.*, March 2, 1971, p. 7.
[127] *Ibid.*, March 3, 1971, p. 6.
[128] *Ibid.*, January 17, 1968, p. 25.
[129] *Ibid.*; A.R.R., January 1-15, 1971, p. 27.
[130] *The Times* (London), July 28, 1970, p. 4.

various states, especially Iran. Luce apparently became aware of Iran's opposition to the presence of the British military. At the same time, however, the Iranians expressed no reservations about the continued naval operations by the British in conjunction with NATO and the Central Treaty Organization.[131] Accordingly, in October 1970, when Luce advised the government to carry out the plans for withdrawal, he recommended an occasional naval patrol by a Commando carrier.[132]

As a result of Luce's tour in 1970 and 1971, Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home announced on March 1, 1971 that the Conservatives would complete the withdrawal by December 1971. In his speech to the House of Commons, Home stated that Britain would support the Trucial States in their moves toward federation. Part of this offer included Treaties of Friendship whereby the two sides would consult together in times of need. The other half of the offer involved transferring control of the Trucial Oman Scouts to the federation to serve as the nucleus for a union army. On this point the Conservatives were carrying out the Labour policy of strengthening local armed forces in anticipation of the British retreat. Home also indicated his willingness to second British officers and personnel to the Union's forces. In addition, Britain offered the use of Royal forces to assist in training the army of the federation. Furthermore, training exercises involving the British army and the R.A.F. would be carried out regularly and the Royal Navy would patrol the region. In return, Britain would receive overflying rights.[133]

The similarities between the earlier Labour policies and those of the Conservatives are significant. At the time of the 1968 announcement to withdraw, the Foreign Office had carried on close discussions with the Shah of Iran.[134] Sir William Luce pursued the same course in 1971. In like manner, the Conservatives' offer of support for the Trucial Oman Scouts found a precedent in the policy of the previous Labour Government.[135]

After Home's speech before the Commons, a partisan debate ensued. The former Defense Minister, Mr. Denis Healy, pointed out that his government had also supported the union and had tried to launch it through support for the Trucial Oman Scouts. Healy then blamed the slow progress of the federation upon Tory hesitation with regard to the timing of the withdrawal. At this point, Home stated that, while Labour favored the union, they made no real provisions for either the future of the British in the area or the organization of the Arab Emirates.[136]

In spite of the arguments presented here, the important point is that of continuity of themes. Stability in the region, carried out by local forces rather than by a British presence, was the basis of policy under both the Labourites and the Conservatives. To achieve a secure situation both parties worked with Iran to insure the presence of a strong and friendly power

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[131] *Ibid.*, September 23, 1970, p. 8.
[132] *Ibid.*, October 14, 1970, p. 7.
[133] *H.C. Deb.*, 5th series, 812 (1971): 1227-1228.
[134] *The Times* (London), January 9, 1968, p. 1.
[135] *Ibid.*, July 21, 1969 p, 4.
[136] *H.C. Deb.*, 5th series, 812 (1971): 1230-1231.

in the region.

Following the announcement of March 1971, William Luce in close cooperation with Iran, began working for unity, Treaties of Friendship, overflying rights, and overall stability and security. The rulers of the Trucial States generally reacted favorably to the proposals for a Treaty of Friendship and for British support of the Trucial Oman Scouts in exchange for over-flying rights.[137]

On April 15, 1971 the joint Kuwaiti-Saudi Arabian delegation that intervened in the Bahraini independence dispute arrived in Dubai for talks with the Rulers of Dubai, Sharjah, and Fujairah. This trip, as well as their mediation in behalf of Bahrain, indicated their determination to achieve stability. Because Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were major oil producers, they had a stake in Gulf security and thus desired the successful formation of a union.[138] However, in spite of the generally favorable reception given to the Luce proposals, and despite the Kuwaiti-Saudi Arabian efforts at achieving federation, powers hostile to Britain continued to work against British diplomatic efforts. Iraq attacked the plans for Friendship Treaties and overflying rights, and called for a complete withdrawal. Cairo opposed the treaty proposal, declaring that it was against international law to provide military assistance and troops for training exercises. While Cairo accused Britain of arranging treaties for the purpose of dividing and ruling the Gulf, the Soviet Union called the plans for federation a "figleaf of British presence."[139]

As was indicated above, Sheikh Zayed of Abu Dhabi opposed the absorption of his own defense force in the Trucial Oman Scouts out of a fear of nationalist retaliation. To appease nationalists and educated persons, Zayed established a cabinet and a National Consultative Assembly, both measures being aimed at the development of more representative institutions. The sixteen-member cabinet would determine political, economic, and social policies, and would approve legislation before submitting it to Zayed for ratification. In reality, Zayed favored federation. He emphasized that union was his primary objective and that laws passed by the new assembly would be made to conform to the federal constitution. Indeed, he pointed to his Consultative Assembly as part of the foundation of the new union.[140]

With the concurrence of Abu Dhabi, and with the settlement of the Bahraini issue, federation went ahead rapidly. Since their first meeting in February 1968, the states had used the Trucial States Council as the framework for federation.[141] Now, on July 18, 1971, six of the Trucial States (excluding Ras al-Khaimah) met in the Trucial States Council, formed a federal constitution, and agreed to a federation based upon the new constitution. The problem of military defense was solved in July 1971 when it was agreed that the new union would support the 1,700 man Trucial Oman

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[137] *A.R.R.*, March 1-15, 1971, p. 135.
[138] *Ibid.*, April 1-15, 1971, p. 187.
[139] *Ibid.*, March 1-15, 1971, p. 135; *The Times* (London), March 4, 1971, p. 9; G. Dymov, "Persian Gulf Countries at the Cross-Roads," *International Affairs* (Moscow) no. 3 (March 1973): 53-54.
[140] *A.R.R.*, June 16-30, 1971, p. 319 and July 1-15, 1971, p. 347.
[141] *The Times* (London), February 20, 1968, p. 4.

Scouts. At the same time, individual emirates were permitted to retain control of their own forces. In the event of disaster the individual forces were to be merged into the federal force.[142]

Federation finally came at the end of November 1971. An organization headed by Colonel F. deButts was appointed to control the Trucial Oman Scouts.[143] On November 25, 1971, with the TOS secure and the British treaties about to end, the federation was announced. Formal declaration came on December 2, 1971 at a meeting held in Dubai[144] and the government was instituted on December 9, 1971. Comprising six states (all but Ras al-Khaimah), the new federation had a population of 250,000. According to the terms of the constitution the United Arab Emirates had a President and Vice-President, each elected for five years. The first President was Sheikh Zayed, Ruler of Abu Dhabi, while the Vice-President was Sheikh Rashid of Dubai. The federal structure contained an assembly which was elected on the basis of equal representation from each of the states and from which were selected the Prime Minister and the various cabinet members. The first Prime Minister was Sheikh Maktoum, heir to Sheikh Rashid. Cabinet officers controlled defense, foreign affairs, economic planning, and justice. Finally, there was a Federal Council containing four representatives of each of the seven states.

The significant factor in the federal constitution lay in the strong influence given to the rulers of the individual states. Because the countries composing the United Arab Emirates had remained almost unchanged, governmentally, since the nineteenth century, the emirs shared little of their vast oil wealth with the mass of the people. The majority of the population was illiterate and poverty-stricken while the sheikhs and their families held the economy and government under close control. As in the case of the Prime Minister, Sheikh Maktoum, officials in the federal structure were generally the relatives of the local rulers. Hence, unlike the more sophisticated state of Bahrain where educated persons demanded a part in government and in finance, the Trucial States contributed revenues to the federal government according to the willingness of the local rulers.

Immediately following its foundation, the United Arab Emirates began to establish relations with the outside world. Iran recognized the new federation on December 4, 1971 and on December 6, 1971 the first British Ambassador, Charles Treadwell, presented himself in Abu Dhabi.[145] Like Qatar and Bahrain in September, the UAE joined the United Nations on December 15, 1971. At that meeting of the U.N. General Assembly, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen opposed UAE membership on the grounds that the new federation was still under British control.[146]

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[142] *Ibid.*, July 19, 1971, p. 4; *A.R.R.*, July 1-15, 1971, p. 347, and July 16-31, 1971, p. 375.
[143] *Ibid.*, November 1-15, 1971, p. 574.
[144] *Ibid.*, November, 16-30, 1971, p. 598.
[145] *Ibid.*, December 1-15, 1971, p. 622. Charles Treadwell has served in the Sudan Political Service and in the Sudan Judiciary, 1945-1955. He had been at the Foreign Office and held the position of British High Commissioner in Lahore.
[146] *Near East Report* 15 (September 22, 1971): 149-152; United Nations, Office of Public Information, *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1971, vol. 25 (New York: United Nations, 1972), pp. 219-221.

The reasons behind the accusation from Yemen lay in the Trucial Oman Scouts and in the Treaty of Friendship between Britain and the UAE. As shown earlier, British officers and troops were seconded to the TOS as a means of assuring a strong military force among the Emirates. In addition, upon termination of the old treaties, Britain instituted a Treaty of Friendship whereby the states agreed to consult together in times of need. Britain also received overflying rights in exchange for her support of the TOS, thereby helping her to secure the base at al-Masirah Island and retain her link with the Far East.[147]

By the end of December 1971, the last British troops disappeared from the Persian Gulf. The general withdrawal from East of Suez demonstrated Britain's changing position as a world power. The defense statements of 1966 and 1968, indeed the general trends in diplomatic and military thinking since the Suez Crisis, all indicated that two new policies had been developed. In the first instance, British officials realized that as a power with decreased economic and military strength, Britain must focus her attention upon the defense of Europe in cooperation with NATO. In the second instance, rising nationalism throughout the world, as well as the introduction of costly aircraft carriers, made the maintenance of landed bases an anachronism. Continuing to hold the military facilities at Bahrain and Sharjah meant risking uprisings, which could threaten not only those bases, but the valuable oil refineries of the region. Nevertheless, if fixed military outposts no longer served a useful purpose, it was still imperative to maintain stability in the Gulf. The retreat in 1971, therefore, represented not so much an end of the old Middle East policies as it did a change in the way Britain implemented them. The efforts to achieve stability were no longer made in the form of external British military pressure but rather, in the guise of Gulf unity and cooperation. In spite of earlier denunciations of the Labour policy of 1968, the Conservatives recognized the new problems of nationalism and soon altered their thinking. To achieve a secure situation in the Persian Gulf, the Conservatives, after 1970 and especially after March 1971, worked to unify the Arab Emirates and to strengthen Iranian military power as a substitute for British involvement. Hence, it became necessary to resolve internal conflicts among the Trucial States as well as to settle problems with Iran. Regarding this latter point, Iranian concern over safe passage for her oil exports and for security of the Gulf from foreign influences coincided nicely with British policies. Accordingly, much of the effort at promoting unity and at the settling of disputes fell to Iran. Britain's new policy was thus one of achieving stability through the local powers. Iran and the Trucial Oman Scouts took over where Britain left off.

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[147] Great Britain, *Exchange of Notes Concerning the Termination of Special Treaty Relations between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Trucial States* (Parliament, *Papers by Command*, CMND, 4941), London: H.M.S.O., December 1971; Great Britain, *Treaty of Friendship between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United Arab Emirates* (Parliament, *Papers by Command*, CMND, 4937), London: H.M.S.O., December 1971.

THE PROBLEM OF MAJORITY RULE
IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

by Kathleen Bremen*

Actions in the General Assembly in recent years have caused shock to the American and other more developed nations. They have included such incidents as the refusal to seat the South African delegation, the "Zionism is Racism" resolution, giving observer status to the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the continual attack on the developed countries. The consternation in the United States has been so great that there has been some talk about leaving the United Nations, "for it appeared to have changed itself into a headquarters tent convenient for plotting wars and demolitions."[1] Certainly, there is increased radicalism in the United Nations since the admission of former colonies in Asia and Africa. However, the fact that these so-called "third world" countries have a majority does not immediately mean that radicalism follows. Radicalism does occur when their first attempts at action are frustrated by the fact that though they are a majority in the United Nations, they have no power. They can easily be frustrated by the economic and political might of the developed nations, if such actions advance that far. Usually, the third world is frustrated by the Security Council, in actuality the veto of the major powers, because this is the only body within the United Nations which can act. So, like a child who has tried to explain and cannot, the "third world" countries then throw a "temper tantrum." In spite of the frequent frustration of both the developed and undeveloped nations in the United Nations, there appears to be some hope when some sort of concencus is reached. The significance here comes with the implementation of the General Assembly resolutions as opposed to just passing the resolutions. Further, if and when mutual concencus reaches such a level, it may have some effect on international law.

As we are discussing the ability of the General Assembly to act, one should first know what are the duties and responsibilities of the General Assembly. The functions of the General Assembly are essentially defined in the United Nations charter in Articles 10 through 17.[2] Articles 10 and 11 allow the General Assembly to discuss anything within the scope of the United Nations charter though the stress in Article 11 is on international peace and security and make recommendations to the parties involved. This

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is limited by Article 12 which declares that anything under discussion by the Security Council cannot be under discussion by the General Assembly unless the Security Council specifically requests so. Article 13 allows the General Assembly to initiate studies and to make recommendations to promote international cooperation in the political, economic, social, cultural, educational and health fields. Article 14 allows the General Assembly to recommend measures to solve peaceably any situation, except those discussed by the Security Council. Article 15 allows the General Assembly to receive and consider reports from both the Security Council and other organs of the United Nations. Article 16 deals with the international trusteeship. Article 17 gives the General Assembly the power of the purse, allowing them to determine how much each nation will pay, and how it will be divided among the needs of the United Nations.

The articles which are of particular importance in this discussion are articles 10 through 14. The major point of all these articles is that the General Assembly may only make recommendations. It may not act in most cases when a crisis comes to the attention of the United Nations, although it does have power in certain areas such as budgetary decisions. Actions are limited to the Security Council. The Security Council, however, is limited by the veto system whereby the five permanent members (France, Great Britain, the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union and the United States) can individually stop any action of the Security Council, including any action to be taken indirectly against themselves.[3]

Because of this veto, a recommendation may be passed by an overwhelming majority in the General Assembly, but the Security Council may not act. Three basic assumptions had been made regarding the principle of veto power and the structure of the United Nations when the United Nations charter was formulated. They were: 1) great powers acting in unison could stop any threat to international peace 2) combined wisdom and strength of the great powers would be sufficient to meet all threats and 3) the great powers would not be threatened. Unfortunately all three assumptions have proven false.[4] The great powers seldom act in unison in major political crises because somehow most crises relate to them. Examples such as Vietnam, where UN action was never taken, or Israel, where there were peace-keeping forces separating the beligerants, show how one great power can effectively stop or negate any Security Council action which uses force.

The Congo crisis of 1960-1964 as a peace-keeping operation with the troops was successful only in stopping the secessionist trend, not in deciding what the political future of the Congo would be. Further it opened the still unsolved question of the financing of peace-keeping forces.[5] As to the wisdom of each individual super power, this involved each nation's concept of the situation and of the United Nations. James P. Sewell argues that the different

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[3] United Nations Charter, Article 27 paragraph 3. See also Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, p. 457.
[4] Morgenthau, pp. 459-60.
[5] Robert G. Wesson, "The United Nations in the World Outlook of the Soviet Union and the United States," *Soviet and American Policies in the United Nations*, pp. 16-17.

ideological backgrounds of the United States and the Soviet Union inhibits any possibility that these two nations will look upon the United Nations in the same light.[6] So, the Security Council is limited, but where does the power reside? Does this help or hinder the General Assembly?

As mentioned before the General Assembly only has the power of recommendation. The effectiveness of any recommendation will be limited by the context in which the United Nations is viewed. It is known that the United States and the Soviet Union do not agree, but they are not the only nations in disagreement. Although there are many minor differences in interpretations, there are two major beliefs as to the purpose of the United Nations: 1) that the organization is a valid instrument in the world for peaceably settling the differences among nations, or 2) that the United Nations is a political forum, and as such, political gains, often by embarrassing opponents, should be sought.[7] The second holds dominance today due to the history of ineffectiveness of most actions of the General Assembly. Any nation that came into the United Nations, as did most of the Afro-Asian nations, with an idealistic goal were quickly disillusioned. Disillusionment quickly led to frustration, for though the nations had the majority vote, they lacked the power to implement their vote. Even the General Assembly with its limited powers could not act without the political and economic might of the great nations of the world.

The resolution is the major method by which the General Assembly makes its will known. But, it is not the passing of the resolution, but the implementation of the resolution which is important. The trend of effectiveness of a resolution depends upon the compliance with and implementation by the member states, especially the parties directly concerned and also how the resolutions themselves promote not only the specific purposes of the case, but also the general purposes of the United Nations.[8] Based on a survey done for the Princeton Center for International Studies, a resolution which is passed, but not implemented has a seventy-nine per cent chance of ineffectiveness, as opposed to an eighty-nine per cent chance of effectiveness for those resolutions which are implemented.[9] The basic categories by which a resolution can be assessed are: 1) time and circumstances 2) nature of the resolution 3) methods and procedures recommended 4) the characteristics of the vote and 5) the attitude and expectations of the members. The last is the most important because it also takes into account great power support, as well as the amount of total General Assembly support. If the great powers support, abstain or are absent for a vote, it means that the chance of the resolution being effective is seventy-one per cent as opposed to thirty-one per cent if only one permanent member of the Security Council opposes it. Resolutions which obtain eighty five or more per cent of the total vote have a seventy per cent chance of implementation, meaning that a great majority of the members must agree

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[6] James P. Sewell, "Keeping the Peace: Soviet and American Security Policies," *Crisis and Continuity in World Politics*, pp. 414-23.

[7] For point one see John McLaurin, *The United Nations and Power Politics*, p. 8. For point two, see Abraham Yeselon and Anthony Gaglione, *A Dangerous Place*, pp. 6-7.

[8] Gabriella Rosner Lande, "An Inquiry into the Successes and Failures of the United Nations General Assembly," *The United Nations in International Politics*. pp. 106-7.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 109. This survey is limited because the resolutions considered were only until 1962. But I have found no evidence to the contrary of the results which have been formulated.

to a resolution for any sort of effectiveness.[10] However, the preceding statistics show that even if an overwhelming majority does vote for a resolution, there exists a strong possibility that one of the permanent members of the Security Council can counter the will of the majority.

An interesting point is that when disagreement on an issue has been recorded in the Council, the probability of the implementation of that Assembly resolution is higher than if there was no friction.[11] However, effectiveness is not measured in this case, so one can only assume that it is still decisively limited by the attitude of the great powers. What it does show is that the General Assembly does make a greater effort to solve a problem which the Security Council cannot.

Further, the best way to solve a dispute is to treat all parties to it as equals, and to avoid purely concilliatory or coercive measures. It seems that resolutions with specific terms are twice as likely to succeed as those with general terms. However, the effectiveness was not all related to any specific principles within the United Nations charter.[12] What this may point to is that a true concensus of the majority is the way that the General Assembly proves most effective. Further, it proves the solution is much more important than abstract ideas and principles. This lends itself to concensus for it is easy for nations to agree on an abstract principle. The problem is deciding what each nation has agreed upon.

The limitations of the powers and the effectiveness of the General Assembly led to the early discontent and the desire for change. One of the first efforts to attempt a change was the concept of the "Little Assembly" as put forth by the United States' delegation in September, 1947. The purpose was to set up an "Interim Committee of the General Assembly on Peace and Security" to be in session during the assembly recesses. The committee would consist of all members of the General Assembly. The main functions would be to consider that which arose in the interim which required recommendation for peaceful settlements of disputes and to make these recommendations at the next session of the General Assembly; to advise the General Assembly anytime it thought it appropriate to call a special session of the Assembly; and to make general recommendations on the promotion of international cooperation for peace and security. The purpose of the proposal was to combat the inefficiency of the Security Council.[13]

The Soviet bloc reacted against the proposal declaring that it violated Article 24 of the charter, and it was an American attempt to circumvent the Security Council veto. Despite these Soviet objections, the proposal was passed due to the pro-American majority in the General Assembly. But with this policy in effect, it had not changed the power of the General Assembly to any great degree. The "Little Assembly" could deal with the issues, but it still only had the power of recommendation. Any major political crisis still

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[10] *Ibid.*, p. 119.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 111-112.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 113.
[13] McLaurin, p. 214.

needed the support of all five of the permanent members of the Security Council to be solved, whether the crisis began in the interim period or not. The "Little Assembly" had been political and anti-Soviet in nature, thus ensuring its failure. The obvious move would have been to develop a politically neutral, technical study to prepare reports and preliminary recommendations.[14] However, the problem would be that it is almost impossible to decide what constitutes a politically neutral committee.

The next step that was initiated in order to avoid the Security Council veto was the "Uniting for Peace" of November 3, 1950. This resolution was an American ploy to avoid the Soviet veto of actions in Korea. The original Korean action had been sanctioned by the Security Council because the Soviet delegation at the time was boycotting the Security Council. However, the Soviet delegation ended their boycott while the Korean action was taking place, most likely to stop the United Nations involvement in Korea. The United States, the only participant in force in the Korean action, wished to keep the United Nations' cloak around its goals. Thus the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution was proposed and passed.

The "Uniting for Peace" resolution reaffirmed that the "primary duty of all Members of the United Nations" is to seek peaceful settlement of international crises, but that the Security Council, as the primary organ responsible for peace, could not always maintain this objective. The failure of the Security Council neither relieved the Members of their obligations, nor deprived the General Assembly of its rights, nor relieved it of its responsibilities. Rather, the General Assembly could take over consideration of the matter once the Security Council had failed. Should it not be in session at the time, an emergency session could be called by the votes of seven Members of the Security Council. It further recommended that each nation set aside a certain amount of troops to be ready for call by either the Security Council or the General Assembly. Other measures included a Peace Observation Commission to report on areas of potential danger and a collective Measures Committee to study and make a report to both the Security Council and the General Assembly on any methods that might be useful in maintaining and strengthening international peace.[15]

The Western argument, especially that of Dean Acheson, in his capacity as the United States' Secretary of State, centered on the theme that the Soviet Union was purposely being an obstacle to peace. There were four ways in which the Soviet Union attempted this:

1) by trying to collapse the non-Soviet world
2) they kept a shroud of secrecy about and within their country
3) they were building their armies at a rate that far exceeded what was necessary for defensive purposes and
4) they made use of the international communist movement for both direct and indirect action.[16]

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[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 215-16.
[15] G.A.O.R., Fifth Session, 377(5) Uniting for Peace, 3 November 1950, p. 10.
[16] G.A.O.R., Fifth Session, 279th Plenary Session.

This statement was more propaganda than anything else, and I doubt that many of the nations, save few who are plagued by the fear of communists everywhere, bought it. The better and more interesting argument was that of Brazil in the same session. Brazil argued that the right of veto had been abused. The Security Council was of course the primary organ responsible for action for the maintenance of peace, but if the Member states were unwilling to take the risks involved, this did no good. Then what would have to be done is to enlarge and strengthen the powers of the General Assembly, and to let these nations take the risks.

The legal argument was whether or not the "Uniting for Peace" resolution violated Articles 10, 11, and 14 of the charter, which limit the General Assembly to make recommendations only. Further, it was a violation of Article 27, paragraphs 1-3, which provide for the principle of unanimity of permanent members. The Soviet Union and her allies argued that it was in definite violation of Article 27, paragraph 3; which it is. It deliberately takes away the power specifically given in the charter to the Security Council.[17] However, Hans Morgenthau says that on the contrary, it was not illegal. His argument for this agrees with the United States argument that under Article 24, paragraph 1 the Security Council is only given primary responsibility. Some organ had therefore to take secondary responsibility, and it is the General Assembly which is the next in line. Further, as to the violations of Articles 10, 11, and 14, the General Assembly was only recommending action. It did not force the Members to comply, but each Member that did comply did so because they voted for and believed in the resolution.[18] Thus the difference in actions taken under "Uniting for Peace" resolutions by the General Assembly and the Security Council was that the General Assembly resolutions were not binding except on the conscience of the Member states.

Even so, the above argument is at best shaky. Secondary responsibility was never delegated, just assumed based on the limitation set by the word primary. Further, the Western bloc nations realized that the majority of the arguments were political rather than legal. The small nations expressed their dissatisfaction in light of what the United Nations Charter was supposed to be. Further, they argued that the majority may be mistaken in some cases:

> But it would obviously be mistaken to state that the majority must necessarily be wrong and requires the guardianship of Security Council in all circumstances. In substance that statement would be equivalent to maintaining that the very idea of the United Nations is a mistake, that the principal of sovereign equality of states has no practical meaning, and that the privilege of veto should be the supreme law of the international community to which even the interests of general peace should be subordinated.[19]

The political argument won over the legal argument by the tyranny of majority of Western countries.

The "Uniting for Peace" resolution still stands. It was used in Korea and the Hungarian crisis against the will of the Soviet Union. It may be argued

[17] G.A.O.R., Fifth Session, 299th Plenary Session, I November 1950.
[18] Morgenthau, pp. 462-63.
[19] G.A.O.R., Fifth Session, 299th Plenary Session, 1 November 1950, p. 302.

that the Congo situation strengthened the legality of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution because of an advisory opinion given by the International Court of Justice. The opinion implied that the resolution had some validity because the actions in the Congo were not enforcement actions. However, the same opinion puts a damper on the legality of the resolution by declaring that actions should be in conformity with the organization of the Charter.[20] By the power to remove from the agenda anything which cannot be solved in the Security Council, the General Assembly limits the actions of the Members of the Security Council. For now, though:

> The "Uniting for Peace" may have seemed to rust, almost unused; but rust or not, the weapon hangs over the heads of the veto wielding Council Members. Each of these, a latter-day Damocles, is now inclined, when on the point of vetoing a resolution that might bring it down upon him, to swivel a wary eye at the ceiling and think again.[21]

The United States had the majority in the General Assembly when the "Uniting for Peace" resolution was passed. Now, the "third world" has the majority. I have no available examples of the resolution being used against the United States, but as the resolution is still valid, who can say what will happen?

As politics is an important issue in the United Nations, it is essential to discuss the nature of the blocs within the General Assembly. During the late 1940's and until the late 1950's the bloc was easily defined. It was a Western bloc consisting of the leaders of the United States, Canada, France, Britain and Italy, but encompassing most of the rest of Europe, except Finland, as well as Australia, Israel, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa. However, even within this bloc there were special interest groups, such as the Colonial, Commonwealth, or Common Market Nations. The nature of the bloc meant that they were cohesive when it came to East-West questions, especially if it involved the embarrassment of the Soviet Union. The minority bloc was the Soviet bloc consisting of Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Ukraine, the United Soviet Socialist Republic, and Yugoslavia; the last only for a period until the 1950's. The Soviet bloc has remained the most cohesive bloc within the United Nations.[22] Part of the reason may be that the latter had always been a minority group which was under attack. Today, it remains a relatively cohesive bloc which is sometimes in the majority when the Soviet Union adjusts its policies to be in coordination with the "third world" nations. With the admittance of new nations, beginning in 1955 with the opening of the United Nations' membership and continuing into the 1960's with the decolonization of most of Africa, the Western majority bloc dwindled to a minority.

The present bloc is loosely termed the Afro-Asian bloc. It includes most of the former colonies of Africa, as well as some support from Latin American nations. Of course, there exist special regional groups within their major

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[20] Rahmatullah Khan, *Implied Powers of the United Nations*, pp. 69-71.
[21] John Stoessinger, *The United Nations and the Superpowers*, p. 20.
[22] Thomas Hovet, Jr., *Bloc Politics in the United Nations*, pp. 30-45.

group, including the Arab states alignment, the Black African group, and the South Asian groups. Also, special interest groups like the OPEC nations are taken into account. There are three major issues on which the "third world" countries tend to vote together. These are economic, colonial, and human rights issues. Economic issues produce a great interest because the part of the world we are referring to can be defined as developing. As a group, they tend to believe that the Western powers owe them for past exploitation, from when these nations had colonial status. The other two issues, decolonization and human rights have a tendency to be combined. To the developing nations, human rights often bear the connotation of freedom of indigenous peoples from foreign oppressors. Colonial issues are of great importance because the ex-colonies felt the need to speak for the freedom of the remaining colonies.[23] It is precisely this subject which shows the strength of majority rule. Countless resolutions have been made on colonial issues. Again, these nations can not implement their own recommendations. It is hard for these nations to accept their inability to solve colonial questions, because such situations remind them of their past oppression.

To further explain the cohesion that has occurred among the developing nations, when it comes to colonial affairs; a small case study of South Africa will ensue. South Africa has, since its independence in 1920, continued a strict apartheid policy forcing white minority rule on a black majority. The United Nations has been involved with complaints of racial discrimination in South Africa since 1946. However, concern over apartheid and the resulting continual pressure to change the system did not begin until 1960 with the increased membership of African and Asian nations. The General Assembly moved from general to specific resolutions in their condemnation of South Africa, a move directly related to the growing influence of the African nations. In July, 1963, the African nations pressured the Security Council into agreeing that the situation in South Africa was a "threat to the peace," thus making the provisions of Chapter III with regard to mandatory collective measures applicable. But as of today, the new nations had been unable to push the United Nations into a frontal assault backed by the mandatory collective measures against South Africa.[24]

A corolary development was occuring in connection with South-West Africa. In 1960, the case of the jurisdiction of South-West Africa was brought before the International Court of Justice by the only two African members of the League of Nations: Liberia and Ethiopia. The Court was asked by these two states to find that South Africa had violated the Mandate, by extending the apartheid policy into South-West Africa, by unilaterally making changes in the legal status of the territory, and by failing to submit annual reports to the Assembly. The decision came back in 1966 unfavorable to the African nations. The Court had decided in an 8 to 7 decision that the applicants had no legal right or interest in the subject and thus it was unnecessary for the Court to rule upon it.[25] This was a decision the new

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[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 30-45.
[24] David A. Kay, *The New Nations in the United Nations, 1960-1967*, pp. 65-72.
[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 73 and 76.

nations neither expected nor welcomed. They firmly believed that politically they were correct. Justice had to be done, but the Court had drawn a line between what was legal and what was just. The General Assembly decided to act to ensure justice. A draft resolution in the 21st Assembly (1966) was sponsored to terminate South Africa's Mandate with the General Assembly assuming direct responsibility. The resolution clearly called for enforcement measures, a step that neither the Western nor Latin American nations were willing to take. The Latin American nations, using their influence among the "third world," proposed an amendment which changed the concept of action by the General Assembly to only recommending action by the Security Council. The resolution as amended was passed by the General Assembly.[26]

The radicalism was controllable in 1967, but not so in 1973, when the General Assembly voted not to take the credentials of the South African delegation. This was the epitomy of radicalism, for it was a move not quite legal in dealing with credentials, according to the United Nations Charter. There was no contesting delegation to which the seat could be awarded. The move can be explained, though, in light of 13 years of attempting to solve the South African problem, and having nothing accomplished through the United Nations. Resolution after resolution was issued which in effect was not worth the paper it was written on. The continued frustration of trying to end something that was protected by the Western powers led from logic to radicalism. It made the developing nations protest their inadequacy in political and economic might by protesting in a way that they could enforce. Further, it was a slap in the face to the West for their policies. However, it did not solve the situation.

Even as the Afro-Asian bloc develops today, there is a definite lack of cohesion among the nations. The difference comes in distinguishing the "third world" from the "fourth world." There are three major characteristics of the "fourth world" nations. These nations are usually:

1) economically unsound
2) politically childish
3) not always known to follow traditional rules of diplomacy.

As of 1975, 35 states could be loosely set into this category. This comprises a large group within the mathematical majority that often opposes the United States and Europe. It expounds both an anti-imperialist and anti-communist ideology, though it is hard to determine what is the political ideology which exists. Continuance of the close cooperation of the two groups is at best risky, for the "fourth world" wants and needs economic aid. These countries, having few natural resources of their own, will take aid from friend and foe alike. If they had it their own way, aid would come through the major United Nations organizations.[27] But, as of yet, the Arab nations tend to ignore their request while the United States insists on bilateral aid. Arab money has bought these votes before; who can say that it could not be the

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[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 76-78.
[27] Richard E. Bissell, "The Fourth World at the United Nations," *World Today*, Volume 31, September 1975, pp. 376-82.

United States or Western Europe in the future, provided the problem is not colonial in nature. The future relations of these countries may determine a potential bloc in the United Nations.

The question which arises is what action of the United Nations can be considered law-creating. Certainly, such actions as the condemnation of South Africa cannot be considered law-creating. What, then, if anything can be determined as law-creating? It must involve a general norm of international law and not a specific, time-limited solution. One argument given is that nothing is law-creating in a General Assembly resolution because this is a recommendation and thus cannot be a source. The argument continues with the fact that suggestions had been made at the San Francisco Conference, that the General Assembly be empowered to enact rules of law, after such laws were approved by the Security Council. This had been rejected implying that the United Nations was not a law-creating body. Also, the General Assembly thought in terms of political and not legal significance. Policies and law should be separated as much as possible. Further, there exist notorious instances of non-implementation of resolutions. How can a resolution be a law, if it is not even implemented, though it may have been passed by a unanimous vote.[28]

There are some flaws with the above argument. Though it is true that the General Assembly resolutions are recommendations, so are the opinions of jurists and known scholars in the field of international law. The recommendations of scholars may be considered a source of international law, although not a primary one.[29] Also, all customary international law is implied through use, usually resulting from practice, which normally comes about as a political or convenient solution. It is impossible to absolutely separate political from legal goals; for most political disputes do have legal goals. The unanswered question is how much politics belongs in international law.[30] The question of implementation is the best argument given so far. As practice is important in determining customary international law, implementation is a necessity.

A good example of non-implementation is the human rights issue. The Human Rights Declaration was passed with a sizeable majority. However, the Covenants of Human Rights which were completed in 1966 had only just received the bare minimum of ratifications, 35 states, by 1975. Though entered into force by the 35th signatories, the Covenants prove non-implementation of declarations. One of the reasons may be that the nations do fear that the Covenant will constitute a source of international law. This is true in many cases. Opposing interests will vote for some principle in a declaration, but not sign a convention "for the very reason that the declaration is not viewed as creating, or necessarily expressing, binding law."[31] To argue otherwise has been done, but it is hard to justify.

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[28] Obed Y. Asamoah, *The Legal Significance of the Declarations of the General Assembly of the United Nations,* pp. 1-16.

[29] Gerhard Von Glahn, *Law Among Nations,* pp. 19-21.

[30] Asamoah, p. 10.

[31] Alice B. Haemmerli, "International Norm-Creation for a Divided Society: A Reappraisal of Some Perennial Problems," *Orbis,* Volume 20, Number 2, Summer 1976, p. 330.

The General Assembly of the United Nations is an arena of conflicting interests, all of which desire to have their opinion heard. When there is a general majority concensus, including the great powers, action can be taken that will be effective and perhaps law-creating. Otherwise, this leads to the frustration and increased radicalism within the majority of the General Assembly. But, the increased radicalism has a countereffect of creating discontent and a sense of hopelessness about the ability of the United Nations. Majority voting, especially in the context of norm-creation for international law, has the psychological effect of being a weapon to embarrass or pull a nation into place rather than attempting to reach a general concensus. Also, it in a sense passes the buck because the majority nations do not have to take the responsibility for their vote. There exists the problem of a voting bloc settling so that each member will support the others on almost any issue. This voting inertia would circumvent any need for negotiation, but at the same time it could limit the effectiveness of any resolution. The blame for failure would be put upon the minority and, yet, the majority was just as guilty for refusing to negotiate.[32]

Majority rule within the General Assembly has no value unless it encompasses concensus at the same time. Concensus implies two things: a description of agreement and a means of reaching agreement.[33] This differs from majority rule because while a vote is taken no guarantee of the meaning or the reason of the vote is ascertained. The responsibility for a decision is inherent in majority concensus, while it does not have to be in a majority vote. Also, a degree of clarity is necessary in majority concensus because a description of agreement is a necessary characteristic. Ambiguity may be a device deliberately employed by those who wish to obtain a majority vote, but it cannot be a part of a majority concensus.

The best of both worlds is when majority concensus and majority vote happen to be one and the same. This shows a conscious effort to responsibly decide an issue, and not make a worthless resolution designed for embarassment. However, the problem is that overlapping of majority concensus and vote is rare. The Western and "third world" powers seldom agree on methods. Rhetoric thus begins to play a huge role because reasoning is ont even considered.

In conclusion, the General Assembly of the United Nations is a political body, which is sometimes able to come to a majority concensus. When such a concensus is reached, the General Assembly is most likely to implement its wishes. The conflict arises when the numerical majority of the developing nations and the economic majority of the developed nations disagree. Seldom can either side attain their goals, for the former has the votes, while the latter has the power of implementation. This leads to frustration on both sides, with the developing nations venting their anger through radical resolutions, which only serves to embarrass the developed nations. The developed nations retaliate by forecasting gloomy predictions about the future of the United

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[32] *Ibid.,* p. 335.
[33] *Ibid.,* p. 336.

Nations, and by talking wildly and senselessly about leaving the failure, known as the United Nations. So far, the situation has not come to this. Reform is another possibility. The trend in reform is either reactionary, that is, trying to reinforce strict adherence to the Charter, or it is revolutionary, attempting to establish norms of international law on a questionable basis.

The General Assembly of the United Nations will continue to exist for an indeterminant amount of time. However, its effectiveness is limited and in need of improvement. Tyranny of the majority, any majority, will ruin the purpose of the United Nations.

NATIONAL CHARACTER AS A DETERMINANT IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

by Jean M. Zawitoski*

American national character can best be described as those patterns of thought and mood which shape our attitudes and opinions toward the external world and which account for our reactions and responses to international problems. While thought and mood are often subject to wide variations of intensity and duration, certain tendencies, discerned from an observation of the American culture, can be identified and classified as essential to an understanding of what it is that distinguishes Americans from other nationals and how that uniqueness determines the direction of American foreign policy.[1]

Alexis de Tocqueville, one of the most astute observers of the American scene in the early 19th century, noted that "the majority of the citizens who are subject to error . . . cannot have an interest opposed to their own advantage."[2] While de Tocqueville was, of course, referring to the advantages a democratic form of government had over aristocracies, his thought is relevant to an American characteristic influencing our attitudes toward involvement in the affairs of other nations; i.e., Americans tend to place a greater emphasis on private values as opposed to social group, political or religious-moral values. Thus, personal success and achievement are always in the forefront of the goals Americans set for themselves, and upward-mobility is the watchword for the direction American activity takes in this regard. The means employed to the end of achieving the material evidence of success—money, position and the accumulation of material goods—is characterized by a high degree of competitiveness and an obsessive drive to not only "keep up with the Joneses," but to surpass them if possible.

But, to the American, all things are possible; he is generally an incurable optimist, whose sights are always on the future, rather than the past. As the American poet, Walt Whitman, put it so aptly:

> Thou mental, moral orb-thou New, indeed new, Spiritual World!
> The Present holds thee not-for such vast growth as thine,
> For such unparallel'd flight as thine, such brood as thine,
> The FUTURE only holds thee and can hold thee.[3]

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[1] Scott and Dawson, *Readings in the Making of American Foreign Policy*, (The Macmillan Company, 1965) p. 51.
[2] Alexis de Tocqueville, "Democracy in America," 1835, ed. Carl Cohen, *Communism, Fascism and Democracy*, (Random House, N.Y., 1972) p. 591.
[3] Walt Whitman, "Leaves of Grass," *The Heritage of America*, ed. Henry Steele Commager and Allan Nevins, (D. C. Heath and Company, Boston, 1939) p. 1128.

His poetic description of America sums up the historical background that has contributed to the development of a peculiar egocentricity and idealism in the American national character which frequently occurs antithetically and which subsequently produces a fluctuation of attitude between isolationism and interventionism.

Because Americans do spend most of their energy in the effort to advance their position in life, public policy holds little meaning for them until and unless they perceive that policy as impinging on their private interests. Consequently, Americans have traditionally been more closely oriented to domestic issues such as taxes and the provision of government services; and even in this domestic area, a certain inertia can be found that precludes active involvement until some crisis or threat to their security is recognized. It follows, therefore, that in the absence of crisis or threat, the more remote the problem, the less inclination Americans have to become involved. This tendency then holds great significance to those who would understand the pendulum-like swing in American foreign policy between the extremes of isolationism and being "the policeman of the world."[4]

Although isolationism was not officially adopted as American foreign policy until the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, evidence of a propensity toward that position can be found as early as 1801 in the First Inaugural Address of Thomas Jefferson, who referred therein to the separation by "nature and a wide ocean" from the turmoil of the Old World, from whence the early settlers had fled under the pressure of religious persecution and economic disadvantage. Evidence of the American concern with self-advancement, to the exclusion of all other interests, can be found in that address, with its emphasis on the American characteristics of self-reliance, self-determination, equalitarianism, individualism and anti-authoritarianism.[5] These characteristics had been the natural outgrowth of the American experience of frontier life and the establishment of a democratic form of government that was to guide the improvement of that life.

The role frontier life played in the formation of these traits of American character cannot be underestimated. The conditions encountered in that emerging society were bleak and hard. Therefore, as Americans struggled to overcome their hardships, each successful step forward became a building block of self-confidence that acted as a spur, driving the nation to its expansion westward.

The relative absence of outside inhibiting factors to the fulfillment of America's "Manifest Destiny" during the 19th century can be attributed to the geography of the nation, whose security was protected by two oceans separating the American continent from Europe and Asia and to the insurance of the free flow of trade provided by Great Britain's supremacy of the seas. When foreign nations did threaten to interfere in the Western Hemisphere, America responded to meet that threat under the provisions of the official

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4 Scott and Dawson, *Readings in the Making of American Foreign Policy,* (The Macmillan Company, 1965) pp. 52-55.
5 Thomas Jefferson, "First Inaugural Address, 1801," *The Heritage of America,* ed. Henry Steele Commager and Allan Nevins (D. C. Heath & Co., Boston, 1939) p. 217.

foreign policy of non-intervention established by the Monroe Doctrine of 1823—a policy that remained in effect up until the advent of World War I, permitting America to make great economic advancement under the aegis of the industrial revolution.

Coincidently, with America's accumulation of material wealth, the national character began to acquire the traits of optimism and idealism regarding its own pursuits and a cynicism in its view of the external world.

With the exception of the Civil War period, the American experience with conflict had endowed them with implicit faith in the peaceful resolution of disputes and in their political institutions that made such agreement possible. Imbued with the euphoria that typically accompanies success, the American mind adopted the attitude that no task was impossible, no obstacle insurmountable to men of good will. The deduction therefrom was that all problems had a solution and that the problems could be avoided by discussion and the reconciliation of "mis-understandings." The natural sequence of attitude formation, developing from this premise, was to view war as an aberration and to view those engaged in warfare as somehow lacking in the virtues they ascribed exclusively to themselves.

The initial reaction of Americans to the outbreak of war in Europe, in 1914, was one of shock that agreement had not been reached by international arbitration; a reaction that was quickly followed by horror, disgust and a determination to keep out of it. A policy of neutrality was adopted and predominated until April of 1917, despite a changing mood in America, from indifference to apprehension and anxiety as the population began to divide its opinion along ethnic lines. This occurrence was predictable given the heterogeneity of the population of America, whose roots were to be found in the diverse cultures of Europe. But America was neither emotionally nor militarily prepared for war and virtually no steps were taken to arm our forces. It was not until the summer of 1916, more than a year after the American passenger liner, Lusitania, had been sunk by German U-boats, with the loss of hundreds of American lives, that Congress provided a significant strengthening of the armed forces. America, led by President Woodrow Wilson continued to display an aversion to war and to idealistically hold fast to the hope that American involvement could be averted. Wilson's narrow victory in the election of 1916, wherein his supporters laid great stress on the slogan, "He kept us out of war," indicated an intensification of the mood of anger and fear on the part of the American people—a mood that was to swing even further, reversing itself as it swung, to an overly-optimistic appraisal of America's role as saviour of the world. By the time Congress had officially declared war in April of 1917, America was prepared to "make the world safe for democracy."[6]

The Americans' emotions were mobilized through a concerted campaign of propaganda designed to whip-up hatred for the enemy; the people responded so well that they viewed Germany as the embodiment of evil

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[6] Samuel Eliot Morison, *The Oxford History of the American People*, (Oxford University Press, 1965) pp. 848-860.

with which no compromise could be made. Thus, Wilson's main objective in going to war—to achieve a just and lasting peace—would be thwarted as a consequence of America's need to be convinced that its self-interest was at stake before support could be obtained for the war effort.[7]

In retrospect, some historians have concluded that had America not clung so tenaciously to an isolationist policy after World War I began, her early involvement in that conflict might possibly have facilitated an earlier end to the war, preventing the disastrous loss of life, the breakdown of civilized standards and the success of the Russian Revolution.

Before the Armistice was signed in November of 1918, a revolution had taken place in Russia, an Ally in the War, and America's response to that event revealed another facet of the American national character—a tendency to refuse to consider more than one problem at a time. Under the strain of the World War, social and political instability within Russia had reached the point of civil upheaval, so that by late 1916, Russia's capacity to participate fully in the War had begun to disintegrate. Moderate-liberal Russian leaders tried in vain to warn Allied statesman, at the time of the inter-Allied conference in Petrograd in 1917, of the seriousness of the Russian internal crisis. The Allied answer was to the effect that the war must be the principal preoccupation, that everything depended on the defeat of the Germans, after which everyone would somehow or other receive what he wanted.[8]

However, with the end of hostilities, that great surge of idealism that had soared during the war was dashed to the ground, and the inflated American Ego crumbled with the collapse of the unsatisfactory peace that followed. The idiosyncrasy of Americans, who often set impossible goals for themselves, had become counter-productive when the results achieved had failed to live up to their expectations. In the wake of the psychological shockwave of disillusionment that ripped through the American society, up-rooting and transforming its entire culture, a major flaw in the American national character was exposed. When the reality of failure confronts the American Dream of success, there is a tendency to over-react in the attempt to compensate for obvious short-comings. The 1920's stands as one illustration of a psychological reaction to disillusionment that was manifested in demonstrations of irrational behavior: the witch-hunts for a scapegoat, to absorb the frustrations of a society unsure of itself, focused its fear on the unknown. The Ku Klux Klan was re-activated against the Negro, the Catholic and the Jew. Veterans' groups vented their spleen on the Socialist movement, aided and abetted by the Attorney General, in the "Big Red Scare."[9]

In the mad scramble to find its way "Back to Normalcy," to get on with the task of re-building the American Dream, the nation withdrew once again into its shell of isolationism, and the nation proceeded to dismantle its armaments prematurely. Few lessons had been learned from the experience of World War I; military unpreparedness for war was to leave the United

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[7] Samuel Eliot Morison, pp. 873-874.
[8] George F. Kennan, *Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin,* (Little Brown & Co., Boston, 1961) pp. 4-17.
[9] Frederick Lewis Allen, *Only Yesterday,* (Harper & Row, N.Y., 1964) Ch. III, pp. 38-62.

States vulnerable some twenty years later when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor.

Prior to that attack, America continued to follow the traditional pattern of non-intervention, despite German advances that threatened to over-run Europe. It was not the lack of perception on the part of America's leadership, however, that restricted America's role to "aid short of war," but it was the status quo mentality of the American character that resisted the idea of the use of American power; a resistance that faded rapidly on the "day of infamy," when no doubt remained concerning the immediate danger to American security.[10]

Many mistakes were made during that war: misplaced trust in the power of personal diplomacy and in the promises of potential adversaries, and an underestimation of the potential military capability of nuclear weapons. The explosions of the atom bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, effectively bringing World War II to an end, reverberated upon the American consciousness, awakening the American mind to an awareness of itself as a great world power, who could no longer bask in the luxury of its former isolationist policy. Thus, technology became the lever of alteration of thought and mood in America that was to produce significant change in the national character.

The mid-twentieth century ushered in a period of revaluation of the national interest doctrine within the framework of a nuclear age. Soviet expansionism which threatened the balance-of-power met a toughened American character determined to prevent any other power from threatening its survival. The Truman Doctrine of containment of Communism radically changed the isolationism of American thought and mood to interventionism, wherever and whenever a challenge was perceived. Foreign policy took three main lines of direction. Having broken the traditional American fear of standing armies, military bases were established all over the world and defense spending spiraled. Massive foreign aid programs to strengthen shaky economies in nations of strategic importance were initiated, and Americans began to accept "psychological warfare" as a weapon to prevent strategic areas from falling into the orb of communism.[11]

Foreign aid in the form of food and medical supplies was not limited, to areas of strategic importance, however, and billions of dollars were expended to provide assistance to the emerging nations of the world, reflecting another trait of the American national character—generosity and humanitarianism.

Beginning with the Marshall Plan in 1947, the United States has responded to crisis after crisis in every nook and cranny of the globe. The American is basically empathetic, moved deeply by pain and suffering and will readily "give you the shirt off his back" if he perceives your need to be greater than his own. At the same time, he has an abiding fear of being

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[10] James MacGregor Burns, *Roosevelt, the Soldier of Freedom—1940-1945,* (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., N.Y., 1970) pp. 34-35.
[11] Max Lerner, *America As A Civilization,* (Simon & Schuster, Inc., N.Y., 1957) pp. 894-897.

"used" or of being looked upon as a "soft touch." He does not mind doing his share, but he deeply resents incessant demands that he do more. When he gives, he is not looking for anything in return than the gratitude one might expect from helping a neighbor in a troubled time; he is deeply offended, therefore, when his help is viewed as stemming from some ulterior motive.[12] Consequently, when confronted with repeated evidence of ingratitude on the part of those assisted, coupled with a faltering domestic economy as a result of America's commitments abroad, his ire is aroused and translates into pressures on his government to cut foreign aid spending.

In the functioning of foreign policy, the separation of powers between Congress and the Executive presents a serious problem. In wartime, a President may carry the nation along from crisis to crisis against a common danger, but in the absence of a recognition of that danger, opposition frequently arises within Congress from the political enemies of the Administration, precluding any consensus on the direction foreign policy should take. In a democratic system of government, where the people are habituated to the idea of a representative expression of the "will of the people," a lack of consensus in their legislative body undermines their faith in their leadership. Once doubt has been implanted and a "credibility gap" established, the American mood of indifference to foreign policy can and often does change rapidly, as was demonstrated in the controversy that erupted over U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

What had begun as a "police action" in Southeast Asia had incrementally advanced to a large scale commitment of troops and resources, which, to the American mind, constituted a prolonged war that remained undeclared by the Congress of the U.S. Lacking a comprehension of the justification for American involvement and distrustful of the pronouncements of its leadership, great clamor arose for withdrawal from Vietnam. Although the Korean War of the Fifties had been entered without a formal declaration, the change in the mood of Americans caused this apparent usurpation of power by the Executive branch to become the focal point of the controversy. Campus demonstrations and out-breaks of violence became part of the scene of the Sixties, as the storms of protest gained momentum.

As the controversy over Vietnam came to a head in 1968, it forced the retirement of President Lyndon B. Johnson, the election of Richard M. Nixon and a subsequent withdrawal of troops in Vietnam. It can be seen, therefore, that a democratic form of government is peculiarly vulnerable to an aroused citizenry. The danger in making foreign policy decisions in an atmosphere of emotion is that hasty or improvised revisions of policy may often be made with little thought given to the long-range consequences.[13]

In the Seventies, as the domestic economy worsened, America began to turn inward once again threatening a resurgence of neo-isolationism. However, as Max Lerner pointed out, isolationism could prove to be strong and

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[12] James J. Kilpatrick, "U.S. Stingy, Hard-hearted? Opposite Is True," *The Baltimore Sun,* 10 Dec. 1974, p. A25.
[13] Lerner, p. 924.

enduring "only among a people with resources, labor power and home markets rich enough to keep them self-sufficient." Although Americans have generally been slow to accept the reality that they are not completely self-sufficient, recent energy crises have begun to enlighten the American mind, particularly in regard to its dependence on the Middle East for the raw material of its technology. It is evident that American pragmatism and idealism will both be tested in the crucible of the Arab-Israeli dispute, and that the national character itself is likely to undergo a series of personal crises in the process. From what has been examined in the national character in the past, failure to reach a peaceful settlement in that tinder box of the Mid-East, could conceivably result in American over-reaction, irrational behavior or hasty and improvised foreign policy moves.

If world conditions have altered drastically in the interim between the frontier society and the emergence of America as a world power, the shaping currents have remained largely unchanged: America still has not found the means by which to apply decisive leverage power in world affairs without embarking on "a series of interventionist adventures," nor has she satisfactorily reconciled the impulse to extend the democratic idea in the world without seriously damaging her domestic interests.[14]

Despite the cyclic tendencies that have been demonstrated as propensities of the American national character, it would be an error to make any generalization that would be lasting. Like an organism, national character is in a constant state of evolution, occasionally regressing into an old familiar pattern of behavior, but it is always in balance with its component parts: its history, geography, population, technology, military capability, government, natural resources and leadership. The whole of national character is the sum total of its parts, and its effect on American foreign policy depends on time and the nature of the problem involved. In an age of nuclear weaponry, government leaders must always take attitudes and opinions into consideration in determining the direction of foreign policy, but they must simultaneously assume the responsibility for enlightening the public mind, clarifying the alternatives and guiding the nation in the choice between those alternatives.[15]

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[14] Lerner, p. 894.
[15] Lerner, p. 924.

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UNITED KINGDOM — ECONOMY

by Edward R. Stollof*

The Position of the United Kingdom at the End of the War

On the continent the war had not only destroyed industrial plants, transport systems, and economic life generally but it had disrupted the whole process of political life as well. The war had been different for the British; it had left them not with a sense of national failure and a feeling of national inadequacy but with a sense of national achievement and cohesion and an illusion of power. The emotional support for European unity, which was strong on the Continent, was almost entirely lacking in the United Kingdom.[1] Britain emerged from the war undefeated and unoccupied and her national institutions were regarded as vindicated and strengthened.[2]

The United Kingdom, badly damaged, was operating under a stringent set of wartime regulations, which had turned it into the most fully mobilized economy that the six years of war produced. A trading nation with a complex economic system geared to vast flows of imports and exports, the United Kingdom found itself at the end of the war with much of its merchant fleet gone, a number of its ports badly damaged, a large part of its male labor force scattered around the earth—and some of its best customers unable to buy much or unwilling to take their traditional imports because they had built up their own industries or had found new sources of supply. Nevertheless, the economy of Britain, compared with the economics of some of the other countries, appeared relatively strong and viable. A great rebuilding job was in prospect, but the machinery of normal business, though rusty, was reasonably intact.

Overview of the British Economy

The United Kingdom is composed of four major geographic entities: England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. Manufacturing and trade account for Britain's major occupations. The country imports all of its oil, cotton, rubber, sulphur, four-fifths of its wool, half of its food and iron ore, as well as

amounts of paper, tobacco, and chemicals. Metals and metal-using industries contribute over fifty percent of its exports.[3]

Among the immediate problems facing the country as a whole are serious economic woes: inflation, balance of payment's difficulties, and the threat of economic stagnation. Although possessing only about 2% of the world's population, the United Kingdom ranks second (after the United States) in world trade (contributing over 10% of the total). It serves as the central banker of the sterling area, which embraces one-fourth of the world's population (almost half the world's trade is conducted in sterling). Overseas investment, shipping, tourism, and various commercial and financial services contribute importantly to the national economy. With limited agricultural land and few natural resources (apart from coal and some low-grade iron ore), the country absorbs about a fifth of the total world exports of primary products and accounts for about a fifth of total world exports of manufacturers. For each agricultural worker, there are eleven workers in manufacturing, mining, and building. All of these factors underscore Britain's vulnerability to outside economic forces.[4]

The country's present economic ills come at the heels of a period of outward and somewhat illusory prosperity. Despite a successful program of post war recovery (involving rationing and price controls), wages rose faster than productivity with the lifting of controls, the population's purchasing power exceeded the available supply of goods. Increased automation and adoption of mass production methods helped to raise industrial production, but the investment for modernization of plant and equipment on the whole was insufficient to sustain a continuous expansion of the economy. Britain's rate of economic growth became one of the lowest in Europe. The country found it increasingly difficult to compete with France and Germany, to earn enough overseas to pay for its heavy food and raw materials imports, and to build up gold and foreign exchange reserves needed in present day complex trade relationships.[5]

The Macmillan government, in 1961, launched an austerity program and sought to enlist the cooperation of British labor and management in an effort to hold wages down and to work out jointly economic plans and policies to spur economic growth.[6]

Balance of Payments

Components of the Balance of Payments.

1. The payments made to Great Britain for its exports of goods and on the other side of the account, the payments made to Great Britain for its imports.

2. Account is taken of the payments made for shipping services, as far as they have not been included in the cost of imports.

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[3] Warren J. Nystrom and Peter Malof, *The Common Market: The European Community in Action* (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1962), pp. 28-33.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] *Ibid.*

3. Payments are made across national frontiers for certain financial services, such as insurance.

4. There is British capital invested or lent abroad, and foreign capital invested or lent in Great Britain.

5. There are certain special government items, including especially the cost of maintaining British armed forces, embassies, and consular services outside Great Britain, and on the other side, similar costs incurred in Great Britain by other countries; and with these are reckoned any payments made by one Government to another except on account of capital loans.

6. Citizens of one country make gifts to citizens of another country.[7]

All of these payments enter into the balances of the countries concerned, and are estimated and cancelled out, leaving the differences to accrue as credits or debits in the total current account.

Commitments and Capabilities.

The United Kingdom has taken on a number of important commitments bearing on its balance of payments position. Broadly speaking, and at the risk of underplaying other national objectives that also have implications for the balance of payments, these can be listed under five headings:

1. A commitment to maintain full employment and to achieve a faster rate of economic growth at home.[8] Economic growth at home is concerned with the capacity of the economy to produce, whereas management of aggregate demand is concerned with the level of total demand relative to the capacity of the economy; it is this which determines the level of employment. An increase in the capacity to produce can be brought about through managerial and technical innovations that increase the productivity of employed labor and capital; and it can be brought about by adding to the capital stock at a more rapid rate, so that labor has more capital with which to work.[9] The efforts to raise the rate of growth reflects two concerns: observation of higher rates of growth in virtually all other industrial countries, and continuing frustration in meeting from Britain's limited output the numerous claims by housing, social services, defense, exports, etc. More rapid growth would make it easier-in-the-future to satisfy these high demands. However, British growth in the period 1955-65 was very rapid by comparison with its own past. At 2.5% a year per worker, this growth was matched only in the 1870's and 1880's, if historical data can be relied on. From this perspective, Britain's postwar growth offers a record deserving of pride, not lament. But it apparently was not adequate to satisfy national aspirations.[10]

2. A commitment to preserve relatively unrestricted freedom of international transactions on current account. For well over a century a principal element of British foreign economic policy has been the promotion of international trade. This has generally meant keeping trade relatively free of

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[7] G. D. H. Cole, *The Post-War Condition of Britain* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1975), p. 195.
[8] Richard E. Caves, *Britain's Economic Prospects* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1968), p. 153.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 162.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 163.

restrictions. Britain, on balance, has continued to work toward a reduction in trade barriers. It participated actively in the post-war trade liberalization under the OEEC and traiff reductions under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), urged on Europe a Free Trade Area in 1958, took the lead in forming the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1959, and accepted a commitment to keep all current account transactions free from exchange restrictions under Article VIII of the IMF Articles of Agreement in 1961. In November, 1964 the British government did take steps to restrict imports by imposing a surcharge of 15% on imports of most manufactured products. The surcharge was expected to have a double edged impact. By making imports relatively more expensive, it would shift demand away from them to competing domestic products. By taxing imports that continued despite the surcharge, it would give rise to additional tax revenue and thus tend to reduce domestic expenditure.[11]

    3. A commitment to maintain an extensive diplomatic and military role in the world.[12]

    4. A commitment to export capital to the rest of the world.[13]

    5. A commitment to retain in London an international finance center of the first rank, and with that to maintain a fixed exchange rate.[14]

    By early in 1949 the twin policies of budgetary disinflation and wage restraint had been remarkably successful in raising exports and production, while at the same time curbing inflation. The main effect of devaluation was to revalue the dollar upwards. In the middle of 1950 commodity prices began to rise steeply as a result of the Korean War boom. To the deterioration in the British balance of payments situation which this brought about was added to the problem of rising government expenditure of rearmament. It became more difficult to manage the economy by aiming at an overall budgetary surplus, with cuts falling heavily on domestic consumption. Controls over the allocation of strategic raw materials and over some prices were reintroduced.[15]

    The balance of payments situation continued to deteriorate right up to the general election in October, 1951 when the Conservatives returned to power. In 1952 a recession occured in some export and consumer goods industries; it was partly the result of a fall in United States and Australian purchases of British goods, and partly due to domestic inventory adjustments made necessary by the hectic stockpiling activity of the previous year. Fortunately, so far as the balance of payments was concerned, the fall in exports was more than compensated by a fall in import prices. A fairly neutral budget in 1952 was followed by one in which a small net boost was given to consumer spending. Although the fall in industrial production in 1952— Gross Domestic Product failed to rise—the budgets of 1952-53 represent for the first time in the post war period budgetary policy was consciously used to stimulate rather than to restrain the economy. After 1952 economic condi-

[11] Caves, p. 153.
[12] *Ibid.*
[13] *Ibid.*
[14] *Ibid.*
[15] Donald Winch, *Economic and Policy: A Historical Study* (New York: Walker and Company, 1969), p. 287.

tions were favorable to a resumption of the process of decontrol, though some food rationing remained as late as 1954, and some controls over the allocation of materials were in force until the latter half of the fifties.[16]

Again and again a rapid rise in demand and production led to an excess demand situation making necessary the introduction of restrictive measures; and then, after a short pause, growth would begin to accelerate again. It is possible to distinguish four such cycles of activity since the devaluation of 1949; from 1952-57, 1958-61, 1962-66, and 1967-69. It is clear that balance of payments difficulties were an integral part of this cyclical pattern. Such difficulties were a regular feature of British life in the 50's and 60's, becoming acute in 1955, 1960, 1964-65, and 1967-68. The intervals between successive balance of payments crises grew shorter and the crisis themselves increased in severity. Whereas between 1952 and 1958 the current account was in deficit only once, to the tune of £155m, there was a current account deficiency of £265m in 1960, £395m in 1964, and again over £300m in the successive years 1967 and 1968.[17]

Successive governments struggled with these cyclical and balance of payments problems. The aim of the so-called fine tuning that went on was to maintain some semblance of price stability along with sustainable growth in a full employment economy. The results were unsatisfactory, partly because the task meant reconciling potentially conflicting policy objectives; partly because unemployment diminished during the upward phase of the cycle with a lag on income and price changes. The result was that restrictive measures tended to be postponed, and then had to be applied with a good deal of severity in order to limit the trade deficit and to prevent a substantial outflow of capital. As soon as the balance of payments position was permitted, expansion was resumed. There was thus created the well known- and much disliked- "stop-go" pattern of activity.[18]

The British Balance in 1954.

In 1954 the total balance of current payments for Great Britain was estimated at £160 million on the right side—i.e., current receipts exceeded current payments by that amount. Britain exports and re-exports of goods were valued at £2815 million; and imports at £300 million—an adverse balance of £192 million. After heavy deficits of £2946 and 1947, a bare balance was recovered in 1948 and 1949, and a substantial one in 1950. The serious deficit of 1951 was due mainly to the sharp rise in prices which followed the outbreak of the Korean war.[19]

Armament Economics

At its end Britain was the country with, perhaps after Russia, the most complete system of war economy with a very large and comprehensive arma-

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[16] Caves, p. 160.
[17] *Ibid.*
[18] Caves, p. 161.
[19] Cole, p. 198.

ments industry in relation to its material resources and a correspondingly far flung network of areas of military influence in relation to its manpower.[20]

The hangover of these world power complexes has remained one of the most persistent factors in Britain's post-war policy and has burdened the economy with intolerable handicaps, for the official determination to maintain a position of independent military power with all the weapons in the modern arsenal continues to affect the British economy long after this policy has proved impracticable.[21]

In Britain the attempt to maintain a full-fledged arms industry has imposed a growing strain on industrial development and the balance of payments. To spend huge sums on the maintenance of large numbers of unproductively employed able-bodied men supported by costly equipment reduces the resources available for domestic consumption. The attempt to maintain an arms industry producing virtually the whole range of modern weapons from rockets and nuclear arms to aircraft, tanks, and fighting ships must have locked up a sizeable portion of Britain's low capital investment. (Some of these projects have rendered no return at all). In economic terms a modern Armaments industry absorbs huge sums of capital relation to output which is subject to unusually rapid technological obsolescense. In addition, it swallows large and extremely scarce human resources in arms research and development which competes directly, and with superior powers of attraction, with economically productive uses; for a country in the position of post-war Britain to pursue the will-o-the wisp of arms self sufficiency is therefore, by itself an almost infallible recipe for economic decline.[22]

Sterling

Great Britain is the center of a group of countries, mainly members of the British commonwealth, and together constituting what is called the sterling area. The countries within the area, instead of managing independently their own international finances, make use for this purpose of the Bank of England, with which they keep their accounts. Instead of holding their own reserves of gold or foreign currencies in order to meet claims falling upon them, they hold Balances in the Bank of England, with which they replenish by paying in their receipts from other countries and draw upon for making their foreign investments. The Bank of England has therefore to be ready at all times to meet their claims for foreign money and is helped to do so by the sums of such money it receives from them.

Sterling became quantitatively much more important as a reserve currency during the second world war, with the accumulation of huge sterling balances by India, Egypt, and other areas as a result of the United Kingdom wartime expenditures. For the most part, these holders of sterling were members of the sterling area, which meant that they did not bar international

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[20] E. Strauss, *European Reckoning: The Six and Britain's Future* (London: George Allen and Unwin LTD, 1962), p. 111.
[21] *Ibid.*
[22] *Ibid.*, p. 112.

not lie in the vast extension of social services, nor in the fact that certain branches of industrial activity have been nationalized, nor even in the greater preoccupation with high unemployment as the supreme objective of policy, though it is not unconnected with any of these things. It lies rather in the fact that the State has claimed the right and assumed the duty of making and implementing on behalf of the community one of the most fundamental economic choices, namely the distribution of productive resources between present and future uses." In other words, the rate of saving has come to be substantially determined by the State; and so have the forms in which new capital is to be treated. In 1950 the share of the national resources devoted to public investment was 2.8%; twenty years later it was almost exactly double.[28]

Between 1950 and 1970 the fastest growing items in the accounts were public capital formation and expenditure on the social services and education. In terms of expenditure, therefore, the government was responsible for something like 35% of investment expenditure and 16% of consumption expenditure, the government was clearly the dominant force in the economy. In other ways too the influence of government increased. Policy as distinct from expenditure, was latterly ever active in pursuit of faster economic growth, full employment, and a healthy balance of payments. Government provision, government subsidy, government contract, and government regulation were, by the later 1960's, the order of the day. It began to appear that the government was willing to turn its hand to everything.[29]

The growth of government power, like so many other features of modern economic development, is not unique to Britain. In many ways, Britain is more like other nations, and they are more like her than used to be the case. Thus Britain is no longer an imperial power (although she still shoulders military and diplomatic responsibilities overseas which puts an unusual strain on her balance of payments); she is a European power with extensive international interests and connections. And she is no longer the workshop of the world, but one of the workshops of the world. Differences between countries have further been reduced by international trade. Increasingly, there have been investments made by Americans in Britain and by British citizens in France, and so on, and there are international companies operating across national frontiers, with the result that national interests become confused and begin to lose their meaning. A process of fusion and convergence is at work, and it has affected no country more strikingly, especially since 1945, than Britain.[30]

Monetary Policy

As it turned out, the worst difficulties of the post war years were now at an end. The Korean War did not prove to be the start of the third world war, as many feared at the time. The terms of trade, (by this, I mean the relation

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[28] Carlo M. Cipolla, *The Fontana Economic History of Europe: Contemporary Economics One* (Great Britain: William Collins, Sons and Company LTD., 1976), p. 174.
[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 175-176.
[30] *Ibid.*, p. 177.

between the average prices of imports and exports. The terms are favorable to a country when the proceeds of an average unit of exported goods will buy a large quantity of imported goods, or in other words, when export prices rise faster, or fall less, than import prices) which has turned violently against Britain as a result of stockpiling for Korea, turned in her favor. And the balance between demand and supply in the domestic economy was now more even. The new government thus had more room to maneuver, and it made things easier for itself by reintroducing an active monetary policy.[31]

Beginning in November, 1951, Bank rate became mobile once more. A series of attempts were made in the following years to restrict, reduce, and redirect the volume of bank advances and to vary hire purchase regulations in support of alternating policies of credit restrictions or ease. With the disappearance of import controls and the gradual return to convertibility at this time, the external value of the pound began to loom large in the Calculations of Conservative Chancellors. Monetary policy, therefore, was pressed more and more into the service of both internal and external stability, with changes in bank rate being used to attract foreign balances into London and as a signal for changes in the direction of domestic monetary policy. If the matter had rested here, with monetary policies being used in support of fiscal policy as part of a balanced package, no more would need to be said. But this was not the case. Many Conservatives regarded the revival of monetary policy as the natural complement to the removal of physical controls; it was believed to be a free market or pricing device which operated in a flexible, rapid and non-discretionary fashion. It could be presented as the antithesis of Labour Ideas on detailed planning and discriminatory intervention.[32]

As a result of the stimulus given to consumer spending in the 1953 budget, fairly rapid expansion took place in the period 1953-54. By 1955 nearly exclusive reliance was placed on the "resources of a flexible monetary policy" to control boom conditions which had partly been encouraged by an unwise expansionary budget aimed at the electorate rather than at the needs of the economy. On this occasion monetary policy proved ineffective.[33]

In 1959 there appeared the Report of a *Committee on the Working of the Monetary System,* commonly called the *Radcliffe Committee,* which took the view that money is a nebulous concept and that attempts to control its quantity must be ineffective and without influence on the economic system.[34] This view gained widespread acceptance in the 1960's and as a result monetary policy began in that decade to be relegated once more to a secondary position and fiscal policy became more important.

Fiscal Policy

The primary objectives of Fiscal Policy in Britain, include high employment, a satisfactory rate of growth, and a reasonably stable price level. To these is

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[31] *Ibid.,* p. 158.
[32] Winch, p. 289.
[33] *Ibid.*
[34] Cipolla, p. 158.

The lag in the British performance occured mainly during three periods: in 1950-52, in 1955-57 and in 1961. Although the Common Market countries displayed varying patterns and rates of development, all of them grew more rapidly than the United Kingdom. Between 1950 and 1955 and between 1955 to 1961 the E.E.C. countries as a whole grew about twice as fast as the British economy. For the period from 1950-61 the GNP per head rose by 26% in the United Kingdom and by 61% in the E.E.C. The distinctive feature of these critical years (1950-52, 1955-57 and 1961) is that the British balance of payments was under strong pressure, while there were either external surpluses in the common market countries, or balance of payments difficulties of a less serious or transitory nature.[40]

Real growth slowed down in Great Britain already in the early months of 1956, and as regards industrial production, growth was brought to an almost complete halt between the 4th quarter of 1955 and the 1st quarter of 1959. At the beginning of all three of these critical periods, when the British government undertook to curb home demand, there was an acute shortage of labor in Britain. Since demand was exceeding the supply—so runs the argument—the government had but one way of fighting inflationary price increases and the depletion of foreign exchange reserves, and this was by cutting home expenditure, or at least from preventing it from rising too fast.[41]

Three different factors might be held responsible for the slower growth of Britain relative to the E.E.C. countries.

1. The first of these factors is supply: the productive capacity of labor may have been growing more slowly in the United Kingdom than on the continent.

2. Secondly, effective demand may have fallen short of the full employment of resources either because demand had been directly depressed by the inadequate growth of exports.

3. Thirdly, it could be because of the deflationary measures taken by the government in order to restore the external balance of the British economy.

Once a country is settled in a vicious circle, both demand and supply will tend to grow more slowly.[42]

With the single exception of Germany which by 1960 reached a higher output per head than Britain, none of the other Common Market countries had caught up with the United Kingdom until the end of the period. Admittedly, income per head has been growing faster in the E.E.C. countries than in Britain; but the British level was so much higher in 1950, and even in 1955, that only in Germany has the growth been fast enough to allow this country to overtake Britain by the end of the period. If we disregard the case of Germany, the lesson seems to be that there has been an upward re-adjustment in Europe during the 1950's with a narrowing of the differences which were so substantial in the immediate post war years. But it would be difficult to

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 5.
[41] *Ibid.*, p. 6.
[42] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

argue that there has been an obvious tendency for the Common Market area as a whole to overtake the United Kingdom.[43] The period between 1950 and 1961 can broadly be described as one during which output per head in the Continental countries gradually approached that of Great Britain.[44]

There can be no doubt that in terms of *potential* supply the United Kingdom was, of all Six countries, in the worst position at the beginning of the period. This stands out clearly if one compares the increases in the population of working age, the rate of participation in the labor force, the degrees of unemployment and the distribution of the labor force by industry.[45]

The upshot is that by *all* these criteria the United Kingdom can be ranked as the country which was in the weakest position to increase the supply of labor for manufacturing industry. All of the other countries had at least some source from which they were able to add to manufacturing employment. Only Britain was in a position where an almost stationary trend in the population of the working age coincided with an initially high rate of participation, low unemployment and little possibilities of transfer from agriculture to industry.[46]

By looking back one can see five steps by which post-war illusions crumbled within five years:

1. The beginning of 1961 which really came at the end of 1956: it was the failure of the Suez expedition that first tore the veil from Britain's postwar illusions in no uncertain way Suez demonstrated that Britain, could no longer "go at it alone" even against the minor countries of the Middle East.[47]

2. In 1957, the White Paper on Defense (insisting in reductions in conventional forces) left Britain almost isolated among her NATO allies and 1958 saw, simultaneously, the nadir in her relations with both France and West Germany.[48]

3. The warm glow spread by the professional public relations men in the elections year of 1959 proved the sundown of national euphoria. The fiasco of the Paris Summit, six months later, marked the failure of Mr. Macmillan's attempt to plan an independent role on the world diplomatic stage and end more illusions on Britain's margin of maneuver in foreign policy.[49]

4. 1960 saw the collapse of "Blue Streak" and the end of the policy of an independently delivered British nuclear deterent. By the end of 1960, Britain's sluggish economic growth compared with that on the Continent could no longer be ignored, and over the economy, the gathering clouds that burst in the balance of payments crisis of the spring of 1961 finally exploded economic complacency.[50]

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[43] *Ibid.*, pp. 18-20.
[44] *Ibid.*, p. 20.
[45] *Ibid.*, p. 28.
[46] *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.
[47] U. W. Kitzinger, *The Politics and Economics of European Integration: Britain, Europe and the United States* (New York: A. Praeger, Publisher, 1963), p. 191.
[48] *Ibid.*
[49] *Ibid.*
[50] *Ibid.*, pp. 191-192.

5. In early 1961 it was only the central banks of the Continent, that by their Basle agreement saved the pound sterling from devaluation.[51]

Suez, "Blue Streak," Paris, the Growth League Tables and Basle—these marked the five stations on Britain's road to Europe.[52]

Is There an Economic Need for the United Kingdom to Become Involved in European Integration?

General effects of Economic Integration on member countries.

Intergration will have a marked effect upon the economics of the member countries. Economic integration will supposedly have some immediate (static) effects upon the member countries and will also cause some changes over a longer period of time (dynamic effects).[53]

The immediate consequences that are expected as a result of the formation of a customs union come directly from the internal reduction of trade barriers. With the removal of internal tariffs, inefficient producers within the Community will no longer be protected from imports coming from other member countries and therefore will have to reduce their output. Efficient producers, on the other hand, will find many new markets opening to them as the trade barriers crumble and they will be able to expand production. The expansion of efficient production and the contraction of inefficient production within each country should make everyone better off than before. Also, the prices of those products that we previously protected by high tariffs will be reduced to the benefit of all consumers. Since the Common Market also provides for the free movement of workers and (capital) between member countries, a further gain will come from the matching of unemployed workers with available jobs.[54]

The long run dynamic consequences of a customs union arise from a number of considerations. With a much larger market secure against impediments to trade, a manufacturer can safely build a much larger plant than would have been possible before integration. With larger output usually comes economies of scale. Large scale machinery involving the latest technological advances can be used, even though very expensive, because the cost can be spread out over so many units. In fact with the expansion of output, cost savings of many kinds are possible which will lower the overall costs of a unit of production. This suggests that a customs union will allow a country to use its resources more efficiently overtime, increasing productivity and thereby achieving a higher rate of economic growth.[55]

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[51] *Ibid.*, p. 192.

[52] *Ibid.*

[53] William Diebold, Jr., "The Process of European Integration," in *The Common Market: Progress and Controversy,* ed. Lawrence B. Krause (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), pp. 7-8. William Diebold, Jr. is Director of Economic Studies of the Council of Foreign Relations. He has been at the Council since 1947 and has been a visiting lecturer at Columbia University. In this article, Mr. Diebold traces the history of the European Integration movement step by step from the start of the OEEC to the formation of the EEC. He describes the content of the Rome Treaty and the institutions which it created.

[54] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[55] *Ibid.*

The customs union will probably also increase the flow of foreign investment into the area. Foreign firms will be attracted by the larger markets and the desire to get behind the tariff wall. This may well increase the total level of investment and the rate of economic growth of the community. Finally, the Common Market may increase the degree and intensity of competition within the community. The increase in the number of competitors within the market combined with the legislative restraints against monopolistic practices, may undermine the cartelization of European Industry. *If* restrictive business practices are given up, their economic growth would be stimulated.[56]

The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).

The treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community—the first of the Communities of the Six—France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands—came into effect in the Summer of 1952, two years after Schuman had made his dramatic proposal for pooling coal and iron and steel resources of France and Germany and of the other European countries willing to join in putting them under the control of an independent authority.[57] The European Coal and Steel Community was the first supranational organization created in postwar Europe. Although restricted to two sectors of the economy, it was able to demonstrate the benefits that could follow from freedom of movement of goods, labor and capital.[58] In a short while tariff quotas on the movement of coal, steel and iron ore within the Community were removed, subsidies tapered off, and a number of measures were taken to end discriminatory freight rates. Common rules were established for price policies and the new Community made progress in regulating cartels and concentrations.[59]

One of the great innovations of the Schuman Plan was the creation of supranational bodies with real but limited powers. The High Authority —which even had the ability to tax—used its powers with caution, seeking to *lead* more than to *command*. Many of its actions required the consent of the governments, in law or in fact.[60]

Little Europe got started in 1950 and remained a group of six largely because Britain was not prepared to embark on the course of close integration the others chose. There were many reasons for this. A principal factor was unwillingness to accept supranational institutions and the idea of an eventual United States of Europe. Britain did not want to be enclosed in a purely European Organization because of the strain it feared would be placed on Commonwealth ties and its special links with the United States. Economically, the British thought in global terms and felt that throwing in their lot with a purely European group would create problems for their overseas trade and the international position of the pound sterling and the City of London.[61]

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[56] Diebold, p. 9.
[57] Camps, p. 11.
[58] Roy F. Willis, *European Integration* (New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1975), p. 19.
[59] Diebold, p. 32.
[60] *Ibid.*
[61] Diebold, p. 37.

When faced with the question, "Would you agree to a supranational authority which has the power to tell Great Britain not to cut any more coal or make any more steel, but to grow tomatoes instead?" Winston Churchill said unequivocally, "I should say without any hesitation, the answer is No."[62]

The British Government signed an association agreement with the Coal and Steel Community on Dec. 21, 1954. Britain was prepared for close economic cooperation with the Continent, but always on terms that permitted London to keep most of its freedom of action in the outside, global economy. A treaty of association with the Coal and Steel Community provided means of dealing with some mutual problems.[63]

Proposals of a Free Trade Area and the establishment of EFTA.

Having succeeded with the European Coal and Steel Community, the Six—(France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries)—went on to establish the E.E.C. and Euratom in 1958. The community was to establish a customs union and a common agricultural policy; to forge close cooperation or common action over a wide range of economic policies; and to do this with the help of some more or less supranational institutions. Again, the British refused to join, on the grounds that they needed to keep their national sovereignty to determine their relations with the Commonwealth and other countries overseas, particularly the United States, and to control their own economic policies, in particular their agricultural system.

Britain first proposed a free trade area that would include the Six and the other members of the OEEC. These countries would gradually remove tariffs and quotas on trade in industrial products among themselves. Agricultural trade would be treated separately and each member would keep its own tariff and trade policy in relations with the rest of the world. The E.E.C. would continue to exist but the other members of the free trade area would not make similar commitments to form an economic union.[64] An expert from the United Kingdom pointed out that there were advantages in a free trade area arising from the fact that it did not require drastic modifications in the tariff policy of each state with respect to the rest of the world and that this fact was particularly important where a country's tariff included preferential treatment for certain goods. Furthermore, he argued that a free trade area would result in fewer disturbances for the industries in the member countries and less change in the cost of living than would the establishment of a common tariff.[65]

"Long term negotiations failed."[66]

Britain's next step was to join with Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, Austria, and Portugal to form the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), in 1959. Significantly, the EFTA agreement took the form of a

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[62] Kitzinger, p. 190.
[63] W. G. Jensen, *The Common Market* (London: G. T. Foulis and Company LTD., 1967), pp. 105-107.
[64] Diebold, pp. 37-38.
[65] Camps, p. 38.
[66] Diebold, p. 38.

convention (Stockholm Convention), rather than a treaty, to emphasize that its scope was more limited and narrower than that of the E.E.C. It shared with the Treaty of Rome the objective of eliminating tariffs and quotas among members, but made no provision for a common external tariff. As a free trade area rather than a customs union, the EFTA permitted each member to keep its autonomy in setting its own tariffs against non-members and lacked the elaborate machinery of the E.E.C.[67]

Though economically less powerful than the Six, the Seven constituted a substantial economic bloc, with 90 million people, the resources of the British Commonwealth, and a combined export-import trade almost ¾'s as large as that of the common market.[68]

The preamble of the EFTA Convention set forth the basic objectives of the Association:

To eliminate barriers to trade between member countries in order to promote in each a sustained expansion of economic activity, full employment, increased productivity and the rational use of resources, financial stability, and continuous improvement of living standards.[69]

With the Community developing strongly, the British soon realized their mistake. Increasingly, British policymakers and opinion leaders acknowledged the unreality of former conceptions of greatness. There was a growing awareness that traditional symbols of sovereignty could not preserve the substance of power and influence. The Commonwealth no longer served as a reservoir of strength and united political support. The United States had made it plain that it could not recognize any special relationship with Britain outside a European context. Clearly, the Seven's informal cooperative approach to economic integration could not match the energetic and imaginative drive of the E.E.C., Britain's growing balance of payments problems and need to increase exports only emphasized its economic vulnerability. "The sluggishness of the British economy in contrast to the expansion in Europe, the willingness of British industry to face increased competition, changes in the Commonwealth, and a benevolent American attitude toward the prospect of British membership all went into this calculation. The basic decision, however, must have been taken on the grounds of a fundamental assessment of the future of Britain's political and economic relationship to Europe and to the rest of the free world."[70]

The decision to negotiate with the Six in terms of joining the E.E.C. represented a radical change in British policy. The conclusion that participation in the community was the right course of action was not reached suddenly nor was it reached simultaneously by all those who share the main responsibility for decision making; but by the summer of 1960 the British Government was agreed that a 'close association' with the Six was needed. Advocates of joining made comments like this one: In the simplest terms, if

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67 Nystrom and Malof, p. 94.
68 *Ibid.,* p. 96.
69 *Ibid.*
70 Diebold, p. 39.

we do not get involved in Europe, we shall find ourselves in twenty years time remarkably like those tourist advertisements for Britain in the *New Yorker*—quaint, charming, pleasantly prosperous, and rather ineffectual. Britain negotiated to join the Six. But their entry was vetoed by General de Gaulle in January, 1963, and it was not until ten years later that they, together with the Danes and the Irish, were able to join the Community, turning the Six into the Nine.[71]

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[71] Camps, See Chapter 10 which is an excellent chapter on the reappraisal of British Policy.

REVIEW OF BOOKS

Arms, Men and Military Budgets: Issues for Fiscal Year 1977. Editors William Schneider, Jr., and Francis P. Hoeber. (Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., N.Y., 1976, 288 pgs.)

"The current and projected US Defense posture is inadequate to meet the threat posed by the Soviet Union." With this ominous statement, the authors of Arms, Men and Military Budgets, Issues for Fiscal Year 1977 examine what can be done about it and what national effort will be required to correct an imbalance which has been in evidence since 1964.

This book is composed of a series of seven essays which will take the reader in a crisp but engrossing fashion through those areas of National Defense composed of Strategic Forces, General Purpose Forces, the Military Manpower Question, Military Research and Development and, probably the most enlightening essay of all, Soviet Defense Expenditures. Each of the authors has extensive experience in the areas of National Defense and policy analysis from both the military and civilian standpoints.

In the first essay, Summary and Conclusions the authors, William Schneider, Jr. and Francis P. Hoeber, who have written numerous monographs and essays in the field of defense and foreign policy, painstakingly compare the US and Soviet Defense Budgets and Defense Strategies. Their conclusions, based on hard facts and figures are that Soviet military expenditures have increased dramatically in the past ten years while the burden of US defense expenditures is at the lowest level in a generation. Their point by point comparisons of US and Soviet military forces, Army, Navy, Airforce and personnel indicate that the Soviet military expenditures have increased by 33⅓ percent while the US military expenditures has decreased by 10 percent in the past ten years. The increased military and civilian personnel costs are identified as the primary reason for this inbalance. Their realistic solution is to eliminate the high turnover volunteer system and replace it with long term enlistments and a curtailment of forced release from active duty policies which has reached twenty percent at the eight year point. A complete modernization of military benefits, including retirement and compensation, is also offered as a solution to free monies for weapons modernization and increased Research and Development.

In essay number two, Francis P. Hoeber, president of a consulting firm on Defense and economic affairs, analyzes the current status of the US Strategic Forces. These forces are composed of landbased Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and strategic bombers. The author charts his way through the current strategic offensive arms strength of both the Soviet Union and the US. He traces the development of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) from their inception in 1969 until the present. His conclusions are that the SALT talks, while they have changed the direction of the growth of Soviet strategic forces, have not limited the growth. The Soviets continue to build a lead in both numbers of missiles and throw-weight. Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, former Naval Chief of Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, identifies five categories of Soviet violations of the SALT agreements in the area of Silo dimensions,

deployment of ICBMs, over-construction of silos, deployment of larger missiles as replacements, and interference with national means of verification. The author emphasizes that the Soviet Union is continuing to develop their strategic forces rapidly and stonewall against inhibition by SALT to limit their force objectives. Unless the US forces hard compliance with both the spirit and letter of the SALT agreements, the Soviet Union will have strategic superiority by the early 1980's. It is generally agreed by defense experts that the US has had a static strategic force level by most measures while the Soviets have caught up. The time has come for the US to stop resting in the areas of strategic defense. The idea of parity leaves too much potential for superiority. The author urges that the downtrend of expenditures must not continue if bare equivalence of force levels is to be achieved with the Soviets. Future budgetary increases are essential to mitigate the rapidly approaching threat of US strategic inferiority and inability to implement US influence in world affairs.

In the third essay, Arnold Moore outlines the current US General Purpose Forces of the Navy and Marine Corps. Comparisons are made to the Soviet Naval Forces in the areas of budget, equipment and manpower. Particular emphasis is placed on the US capability to meet the expanding Soviet naval power in the areas of surface warfare, antisubmarine warfare and amphibious assault capability. Are present or prospective US military forces adequate or inadequate, well designed or poorly designed to meet the Soviet challenge? The author concludes that the Soviets have indeed increased their general purpose naval forces since 1965 but have dramatically increased the capability of these forces, especially in the areas of anti-ship missiles, nuclear-powered submarines and air-capable ships. It is also evident that the Soviet surface forces are now widely deployed in peacetime, and are frequently used to further the goals of Soviet foreign policy. On the other hand, the US naval force has declined in force size. The author, however, is quick to point out that a decline in capability can be avoided if the decline in force levels can be reversed, if present construction programs are kept on schedule in the addition of new and effective ships and aircraft, and, most importantly, if planned procurements are funded. The Soviet navy is revealed as numerically superior to the US not only in the number of ships and submarines but in the average number of deployment days. It is time for a complete reassessment of current policies of force reductions. The US must recognize that it is the unexpected which keeps happening and reducing forces to the minimum for planned contingencies will not enable worldwide US interests to be protected. In order for the US to counter the Soviet military capability, our General Purpose Forces must be designed to recognize long lead times involved in going from a weaker US posture to a stronger one. Sufficient mobility, logistics and readiness to make quick action are a necessity. World wide deployment of our forces is essential so that possible trouble spots are within reach of significant forces to counter the threat. As a former analyst of defense problems at the Center for Naval Analysis, the RAND, and the Offices of the Secretaries of Defense and Transportation, Mr. Moore is eminently qualified to sound the alarm over the growing Soviet Naval forces.

In his discussion of General Purpose Forces of the Army and Air Force in the fourth essay, William Schneider, Jr. compares the current and projected forces against the most plausible stressful threat that can be arrayed against those force. Before any comparison of any current or future force structures can be made, it is necessary to examine the defense budget trends of both military manpower and military equipment. Although the funds for the Department of Defense have increased by 27 per cent in the fiscal years 1973-1976, the increased budgetary allocation for defense has not permitted a corresponding increase in the ability of the Department of Defense to purchase an increased volume of goods and services. The high rate of inflation eroded the purchasing power of the defense dollar. Based on this inflation, the author projects that by 1980, the US will be spending in terms of purchasing power, 15 per cent less. If current trends are followed, it is clear that the resources available for all defense functions will be reduced. From the author's point of view, it would be gravely inappropriate to reduce these efforts. He makes an in-depth comparison of the Soviet military forces, equipment, mobilization ability, deployment ability, logistic and resupply ability, Air Force and modernization with US forces. As in the previous essays, the author makes it clear that the US is lacking in comparison to the Soviet's forces. The fact that the US has a desperate shortage of Army divisions reduces the US capabilities in the most important geopolitical areas where US Forces face their Soviet counterparts, that is, in Europe. The author recommends that higher levels of investment in defense procurement, research and development and operations and maintenance will provide substantial increases in military effectiveness and will enable it to be obtained with force levels not much higher than those which exist today.

Any discussion on military budgets must address the question of military manpower in depth. In the fifth essay, Steven Canby and Robert Butler do just that. Their approach is based on the cost of the switch from conscription to voluntarism and the adoption of the principle of pay comparability between government and civilian sectors. The cost of military manpower has reached almost unmanageable proportions in the Defense Department today. The authors have suggested marginal changes which would decrease the cost of military manpower without reducing military effectiveness. They suggest a reduction in pay level, retirement costs and changes in operating procedures. Military retirement costs appear to be the area in which the biggest cuts are to be made. Military retirement costs have increased from 1.2 Billion to 8.4 Billion dollars from FY 1964 to FY 1977. The authors provide an in-depth analysis of man-power costs, benefits, and training costs. They have calculated that the US government could realize a savings of 15 Billion dollars annually with the implementation of their recommendations. Of the total savings, annual trimmings from marginal changes to present practices yields 2 Billion; future weighted and contributory retirement savings yield 2.5 Billion; pay level changes yield 2 Billion; and changes in training management would yield between 10 and 12 Billion yearly, exclusive of productivity gains. It must be realized, however, that much of these proposed manpower savings will have to be inserted back into the military in the form of modernization investment

and greater numbers of combat units, if the US is to maintain an even parity with the Soviets in the 1980's and beyond.

In the sixth essay, Bruno Augenstein, a former Chief Scientist for Satellite Programs, Lockheed Missile and Space Systems Laboratories, analyzes the efforts of the US in the areas of military Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDTE). The author points out that the US is in a military competition, primarily with the Soviet Union, and it is only our lead in military RDTE that enables us to compete. Any shrinkage in the Defense budget for RDTE will accelerate an instability in our industrial base, which could produce major uncertainties in our ability to respond rapidly in an emergency. He advocates that skilled engineering teams be kept together and that the US permit a larger number of new starts in an environment of both lower absolute military budgets and continued economic inflation. A healthier defense industry would result by spreading over the industry a larger number of intensive engineering development programs which bring weapons systems to the operational test state before production commitments, rather than having very few, although very large, development and production contracts which only a small portion of the industry can successfully capture. The Soviets continue to introduce significant numbers of new weapon systems of all kinds. It is increasing its advantage in the number of new starts. The author recommends that the US must develop steady state funding independent on promises of yearly dramatic performances increases and technology infusions which purport to persuade the funding process, as now practiced, to proceed; the US must continue to exploit its current technology leads; the US must continue to exploit its civilian and military RDTE interaction; and finally the US must seize opportunities potentially available to both itself and the Soviet Union. US inhibitions weighing against the above have been significantly in the institutional and policy constraints surrounding funding. The Soviets are in a better position to overcome such constraints. The author warns that such an ability, plus the acquisition of purely technological know-how, could bring the Soviets to a position of preeminence. On the other hand, the US pursuit in the field of RDTE in the military production area could apparently begin to compensate, in an affordable way, for the current starkly greater capacity of the Soviets to produce military hardware.

The final essay of this compendium examines Soviet Defense Expenditures. The author, William T. Lee, is a specialist on Soviet military and economic affairs. He makes the point that in the past fifteen years the Soviets have achieved their goal of quantitative military superiority but they have not had the same success in pursuing their other goal of qualitative superiority. A detailed comparison is made of the structure of the US and Soviet national security expenditures for the past twenty years. The most striking features of this comparison are that Soviet expenditures for personnel costs are currently 13 percent of their national security expenditures while the US spends 52 percent for personnel costs; RDTE expenditures are currently running 66 percent of the current Soviet defense budget but only 30 percent of the US defense budget. The relative decline of the US national security expenditures since the mid-1960's was accompanied initially by widespread questioning

of the political utility of military manpower, and subsequently, by the tacit abandonment of US strategic nuclear superiority. In the Soviet Union, the objective of quantitative and qualitative superiority, first announced in 1961 has been pursued with determination. Soviet national security expenditures began to grow faster than their Gross National Product under Khrushchev and are planned to continue to do so through 1980. These massive resource allocations to the national security expenditures reflect the build up of Soviet strategic forces and General Purpose Forces as described in the previous essays. The present priorities of the Soviet leaders are clear, at least through 1980, as is the tolerance of the Soviet people for paying the price of their leaders' priorities. The conclusions to be drawn could not be clearer. The Soviet Union has drastically increased its military capabilities and the overall threat to the US has never been greater. Every aspect of the balance of forces has been examined and in almost every major category, the US is found to have conceded superiority to the Soviets or will have done so within a few years. If the essays sound alarmist to the reader, they were meant to be. But they are based on cold, hard facts. The concerned citizen will find this book more than doleful prophecy. It is a reasoned examination of the relevant arguments about the present state of our defenses vis-á-vis the Soviet Union and what we must do to improve them. The current balance of power is more precarious than anything we have ever faced before.

THOMAS A. STETZ
Major, USAR

The Russian Revolution: A Study in Mass Mobilization. John L. H. Keep. (New York: Norton, 1976. xvii, 614 pp.)

The Bolshevik-Menshevik slit of 1903 within the Russian Marxist movement occurred in part over the question of the nature of revolution. The Menshevik placed their trust in the Marxist analysis of history. Economic forces, they argued, will inevitably sharpen the contradictions within bourgeois society and the result will be a spontaneous mass uprising of the oppressed who will sweep away the old order. To the Bolsheviks, however, such spontaneity has always been anethema. They saw it as a right-wing deviation that threatened to lead to an accommodation of the revolutionary movement with the existing system. Such an approach would foster inactivity and a prolonged wait for the proper historical conditions to bring about the inevitable revolution. The Bolsheviks argued, instead, for the creation of a disciplined leadership of the revolutionary elements—the vanguard of the proletariat—to stage the political, economic, and social transformation of Russia. The revolutionaries, Lenin argued, must control events—rather than have circumstances control them—and they must consciously seek to stage an uprising.

In retrospect, the October Revolution seems to have proven Lenin correct. The Bolshevik seizure of power appears to have been a conscious, deliberate act. Since 1917, this interpretation has been the only one acceptable in the Soviet Union. In the West, too, historians have generally taken this view (although there have been some notable exceptions such as Robert Daniels' *Red October: The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917,* 1967.) Lenin here emerges as the genius—evil or glorious, depending on your political orientation—without whom the revolution would not have taken place. Lenin's will, direction, power of persuasion, and organizational abilities appear to be the outstanding features necessary to explain the October Revolution. Lenin here becomes the creator of an historic event.

In contrast to his conventional interpretation John H. L. Keep, Professor of Russian History at the University of Toronto, offers a different picture. He has presented us a study detailing the contributions by the "lower depths" of Russian society. It was these individuals who were the "actual makers of the revolution," not the Bolshevik leadership. His lengthy treatment of the subject, despite its considerable length, does not present, therefore, a "full account of the role played in that revolution by the Bolsheviks." He concentrates, instead, on the influence of the various "mass organizations" which had come into existence since the Revolution of 1905: the *soviets* (councils) of workers, soldiers, and peasants, the trade unions, factory committees, and militia organizations. "This is where the pulse of revolution beat most strongly." These mass organizations were the elemental force creating the revolution.

To achieve their aims, the mass organizations needed smaller, directing bodies which in turn eventually became the prime sources of Bolshevik power. They ideally complemented Lenin's revolutionary methodology and organizational approach to the vexing problem of how to stage an insurrec-

tion. The Bolsheviks sought to gain the control of these bodies and ultimately they succeeded all too well. All this is well known. But, as Keep continually stresses, the spontaneous character of mass agitation created the revolution and Lenin's reputation. It often surprised the revolutionary leadership who were constantly faced with "massive pressure from below."

The Bolsheviks were the beneficiaries of industrial anarchy, the breakdown of authority in the villages caused by the unresolved peasant question, and the impact of World War I on the imperial army. Workers, peasants, and soldiers all demanded radical action. Their pressure and the ineptitude of the various provisional governments as well as other revolutionary parties such as the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries were responsible for putting a Bolshevik insurrection on the agenda.

The Russian Revolution consists essentially of two parts. The first half analyzes in considerable detail the reasons for the mounting radicalism in Russia culminating in the October Revolution. The second half concentrates the Bolsheviks' attempts to control these mass organizations once the seizure of power had taken place. In the cities the Bolsheviks had a measure of success. But in the countryside the results were different. The village emerged triumphant; there "the great distribution of property, [from landlord to peasant] dreamed of for centuries . . . [was] accomplished in the main during the winter and spring of 1917-18 . . . by the peasants themselves and with only a minimum of guidance by the central authorities." Such spontaneous, successful revolutionary activity only deepened the schism between the city and the village, "the *leit-motif* of the epoch." To solve Russia's food crisis during the civil war, the Bolsheviks sent out requisitioning detachments to tame the peasant organizations. But by the spring of 1918, Keep argues, the mass organizations had been generally neutralized and the Bolsheviks had become masters of these popular bodies. This in turn made it possible for them to defeat their enemies in the civil war.

Professor Keep has rendered the student of Russian history a valuable service. *The Russian Revolution* is another contribution of the growing body of histories "from the bottom up." He has drawn extensively from both Western and Soviet sources, although Soviet archives remain closed to foreigners who wish to pursue the study of such a sensitive topic. But Keep's interpretation is by no means new. Others, such as Menshevik N. N. Sukhanov as early as 1922, have presented a similar argument. *The Russian Revolution,* is however, the most impressive, detailed, and scholarly study of the role and influence of Russia's mass organizations of 1917.

HARRY PIOTROWSKI
Department of History
Towson State University

American Diplomatic Relations With the Middle East, 1784-1975: A Survey.
Thomas A. Bryson (Metuchen, New Jersey: The Scarecrow Press, 1977, 431 pp.)

As an example of the clumsiest sort of Arab Propaganda, this book deserves recognition. As a serious work in diplomatic history, it is beneath scorn. From beginning to end the author belabors the point that the United States needs Arab oil, and for that reason should abandon all support for Israel. As a Macchiavellian polemicist suggesting that morality is irrelevant to the interests of Great Powers, the author would have found himself in intellectually respectable company. Professor Bryson, however, is troubled by occasional twinges of conscience and cannot adopt such a cold-blooded economic view of human fate. He therefore devotes himself to making everything done by Israel seem sordid, and everything done by the Arabs noble. It is his obvious hope that a portrait of Israel tarred by that brush will make it easier for the reader with some elemental decency to agree that the Jews of Israel are expendable to keep the oil flowing from Arabia.

The author informs us that he wrote the book because until now there has been no single survey of United States Diplomatic experience in the Middle East. If that is so, the work is still undone. Only the first fifty seven pages are devoted to the years 1784-1914. The other 248 pages of text are largely devoted to an examination of the role of Zionism in producing what he likes to describe as an "aberration of American foreign policy." The author rests his scant attention to the first 130 years of United States history on the fact that John Quincy Adams set a policy of non-intervention in the affairs of the Turkish Empire, even when religious persecution threatened lives and property. The author makes no mention of Secretary of State John Forsyth's energetic defense of the Jews of Damascus, threatened with massacre in 1840. He mentions Secretary of State Seward's protests against the dispatch of Egyptian conscripts to Mexico 1863-1867, but refers to the unfortunate men as Sudanese and seems unaware that the decision to send them or not to send them was made at Cairo rather than at Constantinople. He also implies that American Protestant missionaries confined themselves to proselytization among Eastern Christian sects because Moslems were impervious to their blandishments. He neglects to note that Turkish law positively forbade any attempt to make Christians out of Moslems.

Since the author is so preoccupied with Jews and Zionism in a negative sense through most of the book, the reader is surprised to see no reference made to American interest in the indigenous Jews of the Near East until he discusses World War I. The reader who depends upon this book for his information will remain unaware that Jews constituted a clear majority of the population of Jerusalem after the eighteen fifties and formed a plurality of the population there for decades before that.

Once Dr. Bryson really warms to the subject closest to his heart, however, he abandons all restraint. While perfectly prepared to categorize Jewish terrorism against the British, he parades a choice selection of euphemisms to

gild similar Arab activities. Thus he dwells at great length upon the highly controversial "massacre" of Arabs at Deir Yassin and outdoes even the most rabid Arab propagandists by stating that 250 bodies were thrown into a single well. Quite apart from the physical improbability of the feat, the polemic is weakened by the fact that he does not refer to a single Arab massacre of Jews. The massacres of Jews in 1929 are dismissed as riots. No reference is made at all to the Arab slaughter of medical personnel at Mt. Scopus or of the defenders of K'far Etzion.

He dwells repeatedly on the often disproved claim that 750,000 Arabs were expelled from Israel as a matter of Zionist policy. He makes no attempt to strike any balance by referring to the well documented unsuccessful efforts of the Jewish Mayor of Haifa to persuade the Arabs to remain. In what is an evident attempt to give the appearance of fairness, Professor Bryson remarks, in passing, that Iraq "compelled many Jewish residents to flee" but adds that today "several thousand Jews remain in Iraq." He does not trouble to add that before their expulsion the Jews of Iraq numbered more than 120,000.

Under the author's facile hand, Nasser's Fedayeen terrorist raids against Israel were merely responses to Israeli attack. He admits that Israel had been guaranteed the right to free passage through the Straits of Tiran by President Eisenhower in exchange for Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai after her victorious campaign of 1956. Nevertheless, he blames the Congress for failing to grant President Johnson specific authorization to use the navy to keep the straits open, in fulfillment of a clear American commitment. Oddly enough, however, the author blames Israel for making its preemptive strike in June 1967, arguing in spite of the facts which he has himself presented, that Nasser did not necessarily mean to attack Israel even though he had blockaded Israel's Red Sea port and forced the United Nations to pull back its protective cordon of troops in the Sinai buffer zone. In his unabashed litany of falsehood, the author states that Israel attacked Jordan in 1967 when he surely knows that the reverse was true.

That he puts Israel in the same racist camp as South Africa would be ridiculous if the Arab propaganda machine had not managed to place such a canard on record as a United Nations Resolution. It goes without saying that he accepts the Arab definition of U.N. Resolution 242, that he believes that the P.L.O. is a fit partner for peace negotiations, and that he regards the "Problem of the Palestinians" as the central issue at stake.

Professor Bryson strikes the nadir when he launches an attack upon American Jewry, the United Jewish Appeal, and the Jewish Agency. He manages in a less than subtle fashion to make it appear that Jewish charitable efforts in the United States are not only exclusively concerned with Israel, but that they are conducted in a manner which smells vaguely of chicanery and disloyalty.

The bibliography of this book is extensive and impressive. The footnotes reflect the same slant which characterizes the rest of the work. The author returns consistently to a limited caucus of fellow propagandists in support of his more outrageous claims. He carefully sandwiches known Zionist authors

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between such footnotes so that a reader looking for such things would conclude that scholarly balance was being maintained.

In view of the foregoing, it need not be said that this book should be catalogued under propaganda, but has no place on shelves devoted to diplomatic history.

ARNOLD BLUMBERG
Professor of History
Towson State University

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