


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STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The study of international affairs as an academic discipline no longer belongs exclusively to the specialists in that field; rather, its scope has been extended to include the work of other related disciplines in recognition of the fact that international problems are not exclusively political in nature. It is the purpose of this journal to speak on matters involving international problems with many academic voices. Most important, it is the purpose of this journal to permit undergraduate students to try their wings in describing, analyzing, and possibly suggesting solutions to the problems that have vexed nations in their contacts with each other.

The underlying premise of this journal is that undergraduate students *can* contribute effectively to a reasoned, moderate, academic analysis of international problems and that such contributions will have a more profound effect on the study of international affairs as well as on the student contributors to this journal than the passionate, partisan, and emotionally charged outbursts which have in the past permeated American campuses.

Consequently, the *Journal* invites contributors to take an active interest in this publication. It encourages students as well as members of the Towson State faculty and students and faculty from other campuses to contribute articles, reviews, and other pertinent materials.

THE U.S. AND THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF ITALY AND FRANCE: NO UNCERTAIN PAST BUT STILL AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE

By Simon Serfaty*

History, it appears, is increasingly turned into what remains when nearly everything has been forgotten. Accordingly, history is now more easily imagined than remembered, especially by those who would like to see in the past a justification for a new future. So it is with current treatments of the Communist Parties (PCs) of Western Europe: memories of earlier postwar years are often far too selective, thereby distorting not only the realities of yesteryear, but those of tomorrow as well. Thus, some observers focus their analysis almost exclusively on the persistence of external influences and stalinist structures. They describe these parties today as they always were said to be: foreign and undemocratic. Others, conversely, stress the decline of such influences and the erosion of such structures. They ascribe to these parties a national legitimacy and an institutional normalcy which were admittedly lacking during the cold war years.

Not surprisingly, both views are exaggerated: no longer what they used to be, the PCs are not yet what they may wish to become. The weight of history still forces a heavy burden on them. Following the fateful events of May 1947, the dramatic party battles against every expression of American leadership, every initiative toward European unity, and every foreign policy followed by the national leadership leave little room to the imagination of the observer. Without the intensity of feelings which characterized those years, the words and the arguments of the time almost acquire a laughable quality—the rumor, for example, started by *L'Unita*, according to which 150 famous Italian paintings (including masterpieces by Raphael, Tintoretto, and Titian) were to be given to the U.S. in return for American aid, or Togliatti's attacks against de Gasperi as “the Austro-American Chancellor.”¹ In fact, of course, at least up to 1956 for the Italian Communist Party (PCI), and up to 1968 for the French Communist Party (PCF), instances are few when the alignment with Soviet policies was less than total. Moscow was not only the guarantor of parties isolated into a political ghetto from which there appeared to be no exit: it was also the promised land of a working class neglected in the midst of the growing affluence of the 1950s. Thus, at the French National Assembly in 1948,

*Director of the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. His next book, *After Thirty Years: A Fading Partnership?*, will be published by Praeger in late 1979.

Paper presented at the Eleventh Annual Earle T. Hawkins Symposium on International Affairs, Towson State University, April 4, 1979.

¹*Unita*, April 11, 13, and 15, 1948; *New York Times*, April 7, 1948. Quoted in Ernest E. Rossi, *The United States and the 1948 Elections* unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (University of Pittsburgh, 1964), pp. 85-86.

Maurice Thorez, then the PCF's General Secretary, could speak of his pride and relief in the event of the entry of Soviet troops in Paris, even while Palmiro Togliatti, Thorez's counterpart in Rome, was charging that the Truman administration had considered the use of atomic bombs against certain cities and regions in Italy, had these voted in favour of the PCI and its allies.²

Differences between the PCs slowly began to emerge from 1956 on. While Thorez applauded the use of Soviet force in Hungary in 1956, Togliatti deplored it, without, however, condemning it. While destalinization was warmly applauded by the PCI, it was widely ignored by the PCF. While throughout the 1960s the French communists fiercely opposed the Rome Treaty as a capitalist conspiracy, their counterparts in Italy soon applauded the real part it played in promoting the economic miracle of the country. And while the PCF came out of the Gaullist challenge with an eroded electoral base but with a strengthened stalinist structure, the PCI took advantage of the widespread disappointments engendered by the *apertura* of the early 1960s to increase steadily its electoral appeal even while it was making its own structures generally more flexible (as reflected, for example, in the subsequent role of the party's flanking organizations.)

Nor is the weight of history heavy with regard to foreign policy only. On domestic matters too, there was an orchestration of communist obstruction following their departure or dismissal from their respective national governments.³ Irrespective of any international influences, it is such obstruction that helped de-legitimize them. "A sort of circular movement of strikes is developing from sector to sector, as if there was a secret conductor," pointedly noted Paul Ramadier on June 3, 1947. "It affects, as if by chance, the most sensitive points of our economy."⁴ Indeed, events in the fall of that year, when France was virtually shut down, gave substance both to Ramadier's complaint and to Thorez's warning that nothing could be done without a communist party whose role, Thorez claimed, was only beginning. Although more moderate in tone, the same music of discord and confrontation could be heard in Italy as well, making the gap between the communists and the other parties grow ever wider.

Yet, that such a gap developed with American blessing should not be overlooked either. We too, in a genuine sense, are historically compromised, even if the record remains somewhat unclear as to whether we used Ramadier and de Gasperi in forcing Thorez and Togliatti out, or whether instead, Ramadier and de Gasperi used the Truman administration in legitimizing actions which they intended to take in any case.⁵ What is clear, however, is that at least following the 1947 break, American policies intervened in the domestic processes of both countries and, in so doing, helped distort the very democratic structures they were meant to protect. So it was, for instance, with the Italian elections of April 1948, in which case the interference of no other

²*Unita*, April 22, 1948. Quoted in Rossi, op. cit., p. 89.

³See my *After Thirty Years: A Fading Partnership?* (New York: Praeger, 1979), Chapter Four.

⁴*Annee Politique, 1947* (Paris: Fayard, 1948), p. 113.

⁵See my essay entitled "The United States and the Communist Parties in France and Italy, 1945-1947," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Spring/Summer 1975, pp. 123-46.

country, including the Soviet Union, equalled that of the U.S. in trying to influence, directly and indirectly, openly and covertly, the Italian electorate. Consequently, a substantial number of voters (between one-fifth and one-third) were simply disenfranchised in both France and Italy, thereby limiting significantly the rules of majority alternance.

Without giving either the PCI or the PCF a new past, it might nevertheless be possible to find in them a new present as the relative adjustment of their domestic and international outlooks is acknowledged for both parties. Whatever differences there may have been in pace, timing, and motivation, the evolution of the PC's foreign policies peaked with Berlinguer's commitment to the continued participation of Italy in the Atlantic Alliance in 1975 (following the party's "recognition" of the European Economic Community more than a decade earlier), and with the PCF's endorsement of the French nuclear forces in 1977 (five years after a theoretical endorsement of all French international alignments through the 1972 Common Program).

Yet, there are strict boundaries to such evolution, boundaries which still affect both the future of the parties as well as the future of American policies toward them. Thus, the evidence strongly suggests that the European policy of the PCI is all the more European as it remains genuinely anti-Atlantic.⁶ In a pseudo-gaullist way, the PCI remains anxious to end Europe's original sin (its East-West division), liberate it from American and Soviet dominance through a disentanglement from both military alliances, and open it to the various opportunities said to be offered by the new states of the developing world. From within, the PCI wants to work in the European Community in order to pave its way toward true socialism. Vis-a-vis the world without, the PCI wants to shape the making of a stronger and more self-assertive Europe which would consolidate the terms of detente between the two superpowers.

Thus, the PCI's commitment to the West, however significant it may be within the context of the past thirty years, remains quite limited. To be sure, less is now said by the PCI of Italy's propensity to "yield to American arrogance": especially since the advent of the Carter administration, the rhetorical excesses of earlier years have clearly subsided. Accepted by the communist press more warmly than any previous American president since the end of World War II, Carter has helped the PCI shape a new and more moderate image of America—"a better world," it was written in late 1978, "than what we believed and led others to believe."⁷ The PCI now finds a split in the much maligned American monolith, a split between the so-called old professionals at the State Department and at the Pentagon, and Carter's new political team: the former, it is said, defend a past which the latter consider to have been not only a mistake but also a shame.⁸ Consequently, the PCI promptly absolves Carter of the responsibility of policies allegedly favoured by this new conspiracy of former liberals turned neo-conservatives. All in all, an effort is made to explain, or even, occasionally justify, U.S. policies "in an interna-

⁶For a further treatment of this point, see my "The PCI and Europe: Historically Compromised?" *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Fall 1977, pp. 275-87.

⁷L. Paggi, "Inchiesta Sugli Stati Uniti," *Rinascita*, December 22, 1978, pp. 50-51.

⁸"Novita per l'America Latina," *Rinascita*, July 1, 1977, p. 26. See also L. Safir, "Dietro Carter, l'Ombra di Kissinger," *Rinascita*, January 27, 1978.

tional situation that becomes increasingly less controllable by the traditional poles of power.”⁹ In other words, prior tendencies to assume the worst about American intentions, and to present American policies in the worst possible light have diminished. At last, the U.S. has acquired in the communist press the semblance of a human face.

Yet, more practically and more immediately, the PCI's stated willingness to live in and with NATO does not yet reflect the presence of a foreign policy consensus among the various Italian political parties. Reiterated by Berlinguer and other members of the PCI's directorate at regular intervals, the commitment to NATO is clearly and explicitly said to be confined in time and in substance: “until the military blocs are replaced by other security systems,” as Berlinguer told the *New York Times* in March 1976, the Atlantic Alliance might “give major emphasis to the political functions of NATO in contrast to the military function traditionally pre-eminent,” as Senator Franco Calamandrei told *Il Tempo* in November 1977.¹⁰ But with the party's attention focused on the U.S. threat to Italy's autonomy more than on any Soviet threat to Italy's security, NATO is seen, paradoxically enough, as a defensive alliance against Western interference rather than an alliance against Eastern aggression. For, as Ugo Pecchioli, another member of the directorate, put it in the aftermath of the statement issued in Washington on January 12, 1978, “Brezhnev has never made certain statements whereas Carter . . .”¹¹ That the Soviet Union might pose a geopolitical threat to Western Europe is found to be unthinkable because the relationship of forces continues to favour the West in a way that is seen as irreversible given the endemic weakness of the Soviet economy. In short, there remains among most (albeit, admittedly, not all) members of the PCI's leadership a stubborn refusal to discard the old ideological prejudices, and even consider the hypothesis of an act of military or political hostility initiated by and from Moscow.¹²

As indicated, this attitude stands in sharp contrast with persistent references to the continued American threat to Italian democracy and security. As the PCI sees it, the American threat is threefold. Politically, it stems from the pressures exerted by Washington against communist participation in the government, pressures regarded by many in the party as being all the more determining as the Christian Democrats themselves conveniently seek them to justify their own policies.¹³ “Why didn't our party enter the government?” asked Berlinguer in July, 1978. And the PCI's General Secretary to answer his own question: “in the first place, [because of] heavy pressures of several Western governments, particularly the U.S.,” thereby relegating the Christian Democratic party's own resistance to secondary importance.¹⁴ Reference is also made by some (Ugo Pecchioli, for example) to the support extended by

⁹See for example, A. Jacoviello, “Le Incertesse di Jimmy Carter e il Vertice della Guadalupa,” *Unita*, January 9, 1979.

¹⁰Enrico Berlinguer in *Unita*, March 23, 1976; Franco Calamandrei in *Il Tempo*, November 18, 1977.

¹¹Ugo Pecchioli, in *L'Espresso*, March 26, 1978.

¹²See, for instance, an interview granted by Giancarlo Pajetta to the *Corriere della Sera*, March 30, 1976.

¹³As Fanfani did in his interview with Eugenio Scalfari: “The Countries of NATO and those of the EEC have made us know in thousands of ways that their solidarity . . . would diminish greatly in case of a presence in the government . . . of the PCI.” *La Repubblica*, May 20, 1979.

¹⁴Enrico Berlinguer, Report to the Central Committee of the PCI, July 24, 1978.

Washington to terrorist forces in Italy: "In the area of the black plots, we know the places of connection and protection . . . the German services . . . [probably] also some sectors of the American secret services . . ." ¹⁵ Although never explicitly substantiated, the charge of covert U.S. involvement in the activities of the Red Brigades finds its way in the communist press and in meetings that help feed the mistrust of the rank and file toward the West generally, and U.S. policies specifically.

Strategically, the PCI argues, the American threat results from its adventurism in the Third World as well as from a refusal by a lingering cold war clique in Washington to abide by the rules of detente and respond to repeated Soviet initiatives on various issues. Thus, the presence of the Soviet Union in Africa is promptly explained by PCI analysts as a reflection of the "international solidarity" extended by Moscow toward movements of national liberation. Consequently, Soviet gains emerge as a logical reward for such support, a support that has been extended "since the early and difficult years of decolonization." ¹⁶ On the other hand, the U.S. is described as the adversary of such national movements. A prisoner of the multinational corporations, it opposes the making of an "oblique line which goes from Ethiopia to Angola through Zaire . . . Such a line would cut the African continent, reinforcing all the progressive regimes, extending Cuban-Soviet areas of influence, and worsening the internal crises of the pro-Western regimes." ¹⁷ In sum, the "whole Atlantic world under the hegemony of the U.S." is forced into neo-colonialist interventions such as that of France in Zaire in 1978.

Beyond Africa, the PCI's directorate finds in the foreign policy of the U.S. a "factor of uncertainty and disturbance: from the attempts to achieve a unilateral solution to the Middle East conflict, to SALT, and to the ambiguity of U.S. attempts to create a framework of international relations among the major powers." ¹⁸ To be sure, criticism of American policies is not limited to communist circles in Italy. Stronger indictments are made continuously by non-communist groups and personalities all over Europe, not to mention the steady pounding of analysts in the U.S. What is significant, however, is the relative absence of a comparable critique of Soviet policies on these same issues—SALT, the Middle East, Southeast Asia. "It is a question of fact," noted Armanda Cossuta, another member of the party's directorate, in April 1977, "the Soviet Union is objectively interested in stopping the arms race: this is part of traditional Soviet policy, based on detente and peace." ¹⁹

Finally, economically, the PCI's assessment of the American threat emphasizes a Western economic system in crisis which attacks countries that have freed themselves or wish to free themselves from the stifling influence of the American-led capitalist bloc. Such crisis, it is argued, is the result of misguided and exploitative American policies. Thus, the PCI's reaction to the 1971-74

¹⁵Ugo Pecchioli, in *Corriere della Sera*, May 29, 1977.

¹⁶Giancarlo Pajetta, "La Distensione alla Prova," *Rinascita*, June 23, 1978, p. 25; Romano Ledda, "Il Secondo Risveglio Africano," *Rinascita*, April 22, 1977, p. 16.

¹⁷Yves Benot, "Chi Tiene le Chiavi dell'Africa Australe?" *Rinascita*, September 29, 1978, p. 38; A. Pancaldi, "Nuova Grandeur? Forse, Ma in Conto Terzi," *Rinascita*, June 9, 1978, p. 23.

¹⁸Statement by the directorate of the PCI, *Unita*, February 21, 1978.

¹⁹Armando Cossuta, in *Corriere della Sera*, April 6, 1977.

monetary crises was especially virulent. A sharp criticism of U.S. policies ("the end of a myth and of a system" that was "doomed from the very beginning," wrote PCI economist Eugenio Peggio of the 1971 devaluation of the dollar; an effort to maintain "an inadmissible protectorate over oil-consuming and oil-producing countries," wrote *L'Unita* of 1974 Washington Conference) came together with a harsh rebuttal of the Italian government ("its yield to U.S. arrogance") that contrasted with the PCI's implicit endorsement of French policies and rhetoric meant "to deliver the Community . . . from the American attempt to regain . . . the reins of the whole Western economic world."²⁰ Such criticism has continued unabated since, although over the years the PCI's critique of the crisis has been enlarged somewhat to give a full share of responsibility to West Germany and Japan. At times, some of the party analysts have uncovered a coordinated strategy in the behavior of the three dominant capitalist countries—"between the brutal German deflationary policy and the relatively more expansive American one which is based on the devaluation of the dollar. The U.S. devaluation of the dollar has obliged, as it were, the Germans to a greater revaluation. Germany and Japan have thus increased their political influence in Western Europe and in the Far East. In practice, it has been as if the U.S. had offered a partial delegation of its own power to Germany and Japan in these two areas as an exchange for a slowdown in their rate of growth."²¹

Of course, too much can be made out of selected pronouncements by various members of the party's leadership. The assumption of "monolithism" within the PCI may be all the more spurious in the area of security issues as competence to speak on such issues is much more limited than the willingness to address them. Countervailing arguments can often be found in the declarations made by the like of Giorgio Napolitano, Sergio Segre, Franco Calamandrei, or Giorgio Amendola. Yet, on balance, the impression remains that ideology still weighs heavily in the PCI's perception and presentation of, as well as reaction to, international realities. Viewed in this light, the PCI's calls for a "more active foreign policy" for Italy are, from the standpoint of current U.S. interests, troublesome. For within the NATO area too, the party's leadership and that of NATO are usually at odds too. Thus, while the PCI argues for the maintenance of Italian defense forces it frequently acts against proposals going in the direction of upgrading them: against the 1975 Navy Promotional Laws (and neither for nor against the 1977 Army and Air Force promotional laws); against NATO's Long Term Defense Program; against the acquisition of the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) because it is U.S.-built, and against the Tornado multiple role combat aircraft even though it is European-built.

In these cases too, there have been over the past years some changes in the party's tone and attitudes toward similar issues. The case can also be made that more information, if available to the party, might accelerate such evolution. Yet, in the meantime, there exists a pervasive obstruction by the PCI to

²⁰See respectively *Unita*, August 16, 1971; February 5, 1974; August 21, 1971; and January 16, 1974.

²¹V. Valli, "L' Economia Americana degli Anni '70," *Politica e Economia*, September-October, 1978, pp 30-34.

NATO policies, an obstruction that would surely erode further whatever meaning is left to Italy's membership in the Alliance. In short, participation of the PCI in the Italian government would not truly imply systematic and dramatic reversals in the positions taken by Italy within the European Community and in NATO, especially during an initial phase when such a government would be primarily concerned with domestic problems. Participation would, however, imply a new "hang tough" attitude, as well as additional doubts and uncertainties over existing divisions and controversies within both the Community and the Alliance.

As to PCF adjustments to the foreign policy consensus set by the Gaullist legacy of the 1960s, they come together with a definite and troubling Soviet flavor.²² So it is, for instance, with the PCF's endorsement, in May 1977, of the French nuclear deterrent. The PCF's reversal on this question is embellished with touches which conform to Marchais' candid boast that the French communists take nothing back of their past struggles against the *force de frappe: tous les azimuts* as if to add to, if not replace, the gaullist targets of deterrence, (previously confined to the East); no first use, as if to confirm with Kremlin policy; no anti-city strategy, as if to cripple a force still too small to consider any other strategy at all; collegial decision, as if to preempt it altogether, regardless of the targets; and no additional investment in conventional forces at the very time when French military budgets are reversing an old trend of decline in this area.²³

Vis-a-vis Europe too, the PCF's policy adjustments have been hesitant and generally much less convincing than in the case of the PCI. Thus, in the party's monthly publication, *Les Cahiers du Communisme*, the twentieth anniversary of the Rome Treaty could still be greeted with the same gloom as its signing had been received by *L'Humanite* in its time: "It is not exaggerated to think that for the workers, peoples and nations concerned, the balance sheet of the European Community is one of bankruptcy."²⁴ Accordingly, even while the PCF supports "an" idea of Europe, it still rejects whatever content the Community takes as Lome, the enlargement of the EEC, the direct elections for the European Parliament, and the European Monetary System all face vociferous opposition from the PCF, in contrast to the PCI's general endorsement of all of these initiatives. Taken altogether, the foreign policy of the PCF suffers from too much that is old (going back to the cold war era) or borrowed (from the Kremlin, from the PCI, and from Gaullism, however contradictory this mixture may be at time). On most issues, the PCF remains a foreign Gaullist party as it attempts to force into the Gaullist consensus a Eurocommunist rhetoric and pro-Soviet policies.

We started with the question of a new past. It might be appropriate therefore to end with the question of a new future. Independently of American

²²For a discussion of the security policies of the French Left, see Michael Harrison, "A Socialist Foreign Policy for France?" *Orbis*, Winter, 1976, pp. 1471-1498, and "The Foreign and Defense Policy of a Socialist France," *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Fall, 1975, pp. 345-362.

²³Raymond A. Burrell, *The French Communist Party, Nuclear Weapons, and National Defense: Issues of the 1978 Election Campaign*, National Security Affairs Monograph Series, 79-2, January 1979.

²⁴Quoted in William Friend, "The French Left and Europe," in *The Foreign Policies of the French Left*, ed. Simon Serfaty (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1979).

preferences, the future of the PCs in France and in Italy looks, not surprisingly, uneven.

In the case of France, it appears difficult today to visualize a perspective for the PCF other than that of an opposition party for reasons which relate both to the French electorate and the French Left. It has been said before, but it can be said again: France is primarily a conservative country with an occasionally revolutionary rhetoric. The poets may have praised a Paris that is itself only when it tears its cobblestones.²⁵ In fact, however, the French never hesitate for long between the security of the status quo and the uncertainties of change. The defeat of the French Left in March 1978 reflected the fears of an electorate whose dissatisfaction with the existing majority failed to outweigh its concern over the perceived economic adventurism and political unreliability of a disunited coalition. Since March 1978, the divisions have proliferated, within the Left as well as within each one of the two parties that comprise it. In this light, a defeat of Giscard D'Estaing in 1981 is most unlikely, and the only way for the French socialists to enter the government, or form one of their own, between the next presidential elections and the following legislative elections (in 1983) may well be through a further displacement of the Socialist Party (PS) toward its center, at the expense of whatever remains of its alliance with the PCF.

Quite different is the current posture of the PCI. Notwithstanding its losses at the elections of June 1979, the PCI continues to face a much brighter future than the PCF. With foreign policy widely dismissed by the Italian electorate as an issue of secondary importance, the PCI maintains a presence that is impressive and unaffected by the June 1979 elections: a national and populist party with a reputation for efficiency and integrity, and a commitment to law and order which many in Italy see as second to none. Since the elections of June 1976, Premier Andreotti has shown how difficult it can be to govern with the PCI; as of June 1979, it may well be shown how difficult, if not impossible, it is to govern without the communist party. At some point in the future, the majority will have to be enlarged in a way that is deemed to be sufficient by the communist leadership.

At that time, U.S. policy makers will face an obvious and difficult dilemma. Support for the new coalition might consolidate the PCI's stay in power by helping the party confirm its own claims of national efficiency and international acceptability. But opposition to a new coalition that would include the PCI might help the party justify its own failures within such a coalition by pointing to American de-stabilizing opposition and obstruction. Just as in the 1970s the Christian Democrats relied on U.S. support to stay in power and to explain their denial of communist demands for participation in the Italian government, now in the 1980s, the PCI might rely on U.S. opposition to remain in power and explain its dismissal of christian democratic demands that they leave the government. How much support for the new coalition—and how little opposition—will have to depend on the PCI's ability to follow, in practice, the new directions which it has begun to define in theory. Only then will the future of the relationship between the party and the U.S. differ from a past of reciprocal animosity and mutual excesses.

²⁵See my "The Fifth Republic under Valery Giscard d'Estaing," in *The Foreign Policies of the French Left*, op. cit.

THE CHINESE PRESENCE IN EASTERN EUROPE: A NEW PERSPECTIVE OF THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

by Andrew Gyorgy*

In view of the relevance and importance of this novel aspect of the traditional Sino-Soviet dispute, let me present my conclusions first: we must regard the People's Republic of China as a threat to Soviet hegemony, considerably more so than the current menace of Euro-communism. Eastern Europe has developed into a crucial battle front in the context of this dispute.

Although Professor Robin Remington is, theoretically speaking, right when suggesting that: "Peking certainly has not deprived Moscow of either Eastern European human and natural resources or of ideological support,"¹ it is also obvious more than four years after her excellent chapter had been written that in East-Central Europe the Chinese presence is already a *fait accompli* within the current framework of the global multipolarity of international Communism. For purposes of this paper, multipolar or polycentric Communism ought to be defined as a process substantially weakening the ideological and organizational unity of both European and world Communism. By opening up a tentative, but highly significant, "Second Front" (to use a World War II expression) in Eastern Europe, the Chinese brand of Communism has been indirectly strengthening the relative position of individual national Communist parties—be they autonomous, semi-autonomous or totally dependent—vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

Two other factors should be taken into consideration right here:

1. in the course of the last year-and-a-half to two years, the Chinese Communist Party seems to have taken the initiative in the Sino-Soviet dispute, whether in the U.N. and related areas of international organization or in the world Communist movement itself. The initiative is obvious to students of the dispute who have increasingly noted its threatening tone. Indeed, we could assert that the Chinese have gradually turned red while the Russians have turned yellow, to use a chromatic metaphor; and
2. the high degree of Chinese *elan* and motivation has already affected individual national Communist parties in Eastern Europe to the extent that the Soviet Union's leadership position has been damaged both in its hegemony—and

*Professor of International Affairs and Political Science, The George Washington University, Washington, D.C.
Paper presented at the Eleventh Annual Earle T. Hawkins Symposium on International Affairs, Towson State University, April 4, 1979

¹See "China's Emerging Role in Eastern Europe," in *The International Politics of Eastern Europe*, ed. by Charles Gati, Praeger Publications, New York, 1976, p. 99.

power—relationships with these key, once-“satellite” Communist parties.² For most of these parties the recently escalating combination of native brands of nationalism as well as the external impact of the Sino-Soviet dispute has clearly contributed to the gradual emergence of latent polycentric and centrifugal tendencies. In this context, East European elites, active party-members, but even the ubiquitous fellow-travelling opportunists, could not help but view the Sino-Soviet dispute as a two-front ideological and power struggle between the two Communist giants. Such a lengthy and truly protracted conflict is bound to disrupt eventually that front of “bloc-unity,” so characteristic of an earlier ideological stage of the Stalinist monolith.

Manifestations of the “Chinese Line.” The so-called “Chinese Line” is not only vaguely present on the Eastern European political scene, but it has already asserted itself along at least three parallel dimensions, namely diplomatic, economic and political (although not necessarily in this order of importance).

Before examining these individual dimensions, one must also stress that underlying all this “maneuvering for position,” is the reciprocal conviction between the Soviet and Chinese leaders on the one hand and the various Eastern European Communist leaders on the other that a major break between the USSR and China is inevitable in the long run. Thus, in the short- and middle-run, it is understood at least tacitly by all sides that *both* the PRC and the USSR have to be diligently engaged in the recruitment of allies while steadily placing the blame for the break itself on the other contending party.

I. The Chinese Diplomatic Presence

The P.R.C. maintains large and active Embassies in each of the eight East European countries.³ The large number of regular foreign service officers assigned to these Embassies is surprising in itself, and their arranging cultural, social and diplomatic activities embrace a wide variety of functions in these diplomatically prominent capital cities. Warsaw, for example, was successfully used in the 1970-1973 period as the first meeting—and engagement—ground between PRC and American diplomats to set the stage for the American “Opening to China.” More than thirty secret meetings were held between then U.S. Ambassador to Poland, Walter Stoessel, Jr., and his Chinese counterpart meeting over a period of several months alternately either in the Embassy of the United States or the Embassy of the PRC. Thus Poland emerged as an invaluable, confidential mediator in the preparation for one of the most momentous diplomatic break-throughs of our times: the Kissinger and Nixon visits to

²Below we are offering a fourfold categorization of East European parties in terms of the *fractionalizing influence* of the dispute.

³This is true even of Bulgaria and Albania with which *normally* regular diplomatic relations are maintained. Occasionally temporary strains develop and the Ambassadors are recalled. In the case of Bulgaria, the presence of a *charge d'affaires* usually means that one Ambassador is being changed for another one while the recent ideological break between the PRC and Albania postulates something else: increasingly tense relations between these two countries suggest that charges are at present, and will be, permanent, not temporary, and that the relatively low-level reciprocal diplomatic representation presages continually cool and semi-hostile relations between the two countries.

the PRC in the early 1970's were actually planned and their details hammered out in Eastern Europe, thanks to the active and vigorous American and Chinese representation in Warsaw, a supposedly closely watched Soviet "satellite".

Other Chinese diplomatic activities in Eastern Europe cover a wide range of activities. There are frequent "special trips" as well as reciprocal high-level exploratory and "fact-finding" excursions, particularly between Hungary and China, Poland and China, and before August 1968, between Czechoslovakia and the PRC. In addition to endless cultural trips involving scholars, scientists, teachers, students, architects, agronomists, and industrial specialists on this bilateral basis of lengthy exchange trips (truly a "saturation campaign" in view of the distance and expense factors), there have been much more significant high-level visits to key Eastern European countries by leading Chinese Communist diplomats. To the obvious embarrassment of the Soviet Union, the Chou En-Lai mission to Hungary and Poland in late 1956-early 1957 occurred in a distinctly *post-revolutionary* atmosphere coming on the heels of the Polish disturbances in Warsaw, and the bloody suppression of the Budapest revolt in October-November 1956. Some East European observers actually dubbed these diplomatic excursions, always cleverly staged, significant and yet unobtrusive, as *pre-revolutionary*, rather than *post-revolutionary*, in nature. In 1977 Marshal Tito paid a state visit to Peking, followed by Nicolae Ceausescu from Rumania; both received a full red-carpet treatment from the PRC post-Maoist leadership. In August 1978 the PRC party chief, First Secretary Hua Kuo Feng, visited both Bucharest and Belgrade with a large entourage of both government representatives and party specialists. All of these diplomatic visits are expected to proliferate in the near future, invariably involving the highest level diplomats on both sides.

From the overall diplomatic perspective, Eastern European nations clearly fall into the following four major categories in terms of their role and function in the USSR-PRC-East Europe triangular relationships:

1. first there is a group of three countries so closely bound to the USSR that this linkage prevents any direct participation in the Sino-Soviet dispute or any "Chinese line," however attractive or interesting this opportunity may appear to them. Their tightly drawn "Soviet line" excludes any major and *visible* rapprochement toward the PRC. Here we are obviously referring to the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria;
2. a much more colorful second group, although still closely tied to the USSR in the three key areas of foreign economic (COMECON), foreign military (WTO) and foreign political (UN and various agencies of world organization) policies, has a sufficient amount of internal leeway ("Domesticism"), to develop certain relationships with the PRC. These countries are Poland and Hungary which have had intensive cultural and political relationships with the PRC, based on vigorous and valuable academic research on China in their Universities and advanced Institutes;⁴

⁴Lately these two countries' relationships with the PRC have distinctly deteriorated under Soviet pressure. The PRC top leadership even rejected the condolences of Poland's Gierek and Hungary's Kadar following Mao's death on September 10, 1976.

3. the third group is a truly maverick combination of Rumania and Yugoslavia with close and more-than-correct diplomatic, economic and political ties to the PRC. There are two basic reasons for this ideological affinity; first the non-aligned status of Yugoslavia and the relatively aloof non-bloc (or semi-bloc) posture of Rumania are factors of great relevance to the PRC both in its struggle against the USSR, and in its self-propelled leadership ambitions among the Third World countries. Secondly, friendly relations with Communist China offer ample room for manipulation to both sides, aimed against the USSR, and paying off especially handsomely in the foreign trade field between these two unorthodox Eastern European countries and the People's Republic of China. Thus the key slogan could well be labelled a mutual (and profitable) technological interrelationship; and
4. last and not least, a small one-country group, namely Albania, whose intensive study presents a veritable field-day for American Tiranologists (observers of what goes on in Tirana, capital of Albania). Here we witness a currently totally disgruntled Chinese "ex-Satellite" whose attitude is still a threat to purported Soviet hegemony and whose future behavior remains still doubtful in the long run, in view of the recent rift with the PRC, dictated primarily by economic motives and complaints of non-performance. Albania has tried hard to aspire eventually to the role of a "Chinese satellite," but this dubious status has eluded her so far. The mutual economic record of "non-cooperation" with the PRC has been particularly discouraging despite the common link of active anti-Sovietism binding together the two countries, David and Goliath, 11,000 miles away from each other.

II. The Chinese Economic Presence

Quite logically, the Chinese economic presence roughly approximates the political categories described above. In order of *foreign trade* importance, Rumania and Yugoslavia ought to be mentioned first in terms of both a flourishing and expanding bilateral trade with the PRC. Additionally, Poland, the GDR, and Hungary have increasingly lively and meaningful bilateral trade relations with Communist China consisting primarily of the export from these East European countries of heavy industrial production goods (Ikarus busses and Diesels from Hungary, electronics, chemicals, optical instruments from Poland and the GDR) in exchange for canned and processed Chinese foodstuffs to all of these countries and to Czechoslovakia. Hungarian and Polish foodstores, in particular, are filled with Chinese canned food products which are eagerly sought by Eastern European consumers. The most relevant single observation for the student of Eastern European politics is that the Soviet Union does not seem to be in any position to obstruct and veto (or not even to slow down) these prominent Eastern European economic ties with the People's Republic of China. In effect, one often forms the impression that to some extent the USSR welcomes these *Mittleuropa* ties to the PRC, in order to relieve its own economy, and in particular its foreign trade export-capability, of increasing direct bilateral trade with its ex-satellites. Thus, foreseeable future trends point in the direction of a sizeable foreign-trade volume increase between the PRC and the four most "sensitive" as well as receptive Eastern European nations, namely Yugoslavia, Rumania, Poland and Hungary.

On the whole, Communist China's commercial *Westpolitik* is a great success, although whether the PRC's ruling elite eventually desires to see the emergence of an economically *very* strong East-Central Europe, under more-or-less remote Soviet tutelage, remains to be seen. In recent months, Chinese Communist leaders have increasingly stressed the necessity of a strong and viable Western Europe and a vigorous European Economic Community, both of these entities to counterbalance Soviet economic power in the East. On the other hand, Eastern Europe's economic strengthening *by itself* should not be minimized from the PRC's point of view, implying an economic buildup of these countries for ultimately political (anti-Soviet) purposes over a twenty to twenty-five year period.

III. The Chinese Political Presence

The PRC's political presence has been particularly noteworthy in the deliberations of the United Nations and its allied agencies in the field of international organization. For reasons noted above, Yugoslavia and Rumania were particularly concerned with taking a pro-Chinese side in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Both of these East European countries were anxious to assert their international importance along two parallels, and related, dimensions:

1. first of all, at different times, but in a similar vein, both Tito and Ceausescu offered their services as mediators in the perennial Sino-Soviet dispute itself, while
2. simultaneously they wanted to exploit and utilize to a maximum extent (particularly Marshal Tito) their leadership position in the non-aligned Third World as well as in the world Communist movement.³ Their politically pro-PRC stance thus proved to be exceptionally useful to the Chinese cause, not once, but repeated frequently in recent years, in complete juxtaposition to the notably anti-Chinese, and dogmatically pro-Soviet countries of East-Central Europe, such as Bulgaria the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia. If nothing else eventuates as a result of these Rumanian-Yugoslav efforts, it is clear that even the geopolitically remote influence of the PRC has already succeeded in breaking up the once-monolithic ideological unity of Eastern Europe into three, politically active, sub-groupings: the Yugoslav-Rumanian and "Third Force" line, the Czech-Bulgarian-GDR pro-Soviet line, and last, but not least, the Polish-Hungarian middle-of-the-road (but nominally totally pro-Soviet) line.

It is clear from these developments that the political destinies and ideological orientation of the smaller East-Central European nations will both depend on, and be molded by the overriding triangular relationships of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. and PRC. None of the eight countries of Eastern Europe is in a position (not even Tito's Yugoslavia) to act as a sovereign and independent na-

³Well phrased by Professor Stephen Fischer-Galati, the problem is the following: "(Rumania's) . . . overt but unsuccessful attempt to mediate the Sino-Soviet conflict, . . . was determined not by any sympathy with the Chinese ideological positions—other than those challenging Russia's domination of the camp—but by the belief that if successful, Rumania would become the leader of a "third force" in the international Communist movement." See S. Fischer-Galati, "Rumania and the Sino-Soviet Conflict," in *Eastern Europe in Transition*, edited by K. London, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1966, p. 271.

tion when confronted with the vagaries and overwhelming forces of international Communist and world politics.

The Linkage Between the U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe and Eurocommunism

One of the most puzzling and challenging phenomena on the Eastern European political scene is the issue of linkages between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the ruling Communist parties of the Eastern European regimes and the recent growth and proliferation of Eurocommunism, specifically in Italy and France. For purposes of this article, it is important to note that the intensification of Eurocommunism has been truly two-dimensional as far as the key (and most sensitive) countries of East-Central Europe have been concerned. Thus, it is important to stress that the growth of Eurocommunism has actually been both external in terms of accelerating relationships between the Communist parties of Italy, France, Spain and Portugal, and the more sensitive nations of Poland and Hungary, on the one hand, and internal or *endemic* on the other, in terms of Eurocommunist forces and trends asserting themselves in such key and eminently responsive countries as Yugoslavia, Rumania and Hungary in particular.⁶

It is almost impossible to pursue the impact of Eurocommunism on Eastern Europe in the form of murky academic over-generalizations. In the above mentioned two-dimensional setting of this influence (both external and indigenous), three significant and closely related problem-areas have emerged, steadily affecting both the present and the more crucial future course of Eurocommunist-East European relations. These three features are the Brezhnev Doctrine, the European Common Market and the German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's intensification of *Ostpolitik*.

I. The Brezhnev Doctrine

Leonid Brezhnev had probably very little to do with the official "Doctrine" named after him; it is not a startlingly novel theory of International Politics to begin with, although it was certainly applied in a most dramatic form in August 1968 on the body politic of a Czechoslovakia completely unwilling and incapable of defending itself against the five-nation Warsaw Pact invading force. While the Eurocommunist parties of Western Europe were horrified by the crude, "overkill" type of application of military power, the doctrine itself—as an appendage of the traditional "Socialist Commonwealth" concept—has been well known since Lenin's earliest days in power in newly formed Bolshevik Russia and, to use Chancellor Bismarck's felicitous and truly historic phrase, it has traditionally served as a "Reinsurance Campaign" slogan and guideline for over a hundred years.⁷ Its crude military application

⁶See the comprehensive and excellent paper by Professor Richard V. Burks on *Titoism and Eurocommunism: A Comment*, p. 27, a report on a conference held in October 1978, at the City University of New York.

⁷For a good analysis of this point, see Robin Remington's "China's Emerging Role in Eastern Europe," C. Gati, ed. op. cit., pp. 89 et seq.

to Czechoslovakia reaffirmed—in “one fell swoop”—both the strengths and weaknesses of such long-standing principles in international politics as the spirit of a “New Pragmatism,” the “Sphere of Influence” concept or the ambiguous problem of “Domesticism,” analyzed above. To put it bluntly, but realistically, when the Czech Communist leadership of Alexander Dubcek exceeded the permissible perimeters of domestic leeway and *Lebensraum* (in the spring and summer of 1968), the WTO intervention became necessary and inevitable.

For the Eurocommunist parties of Western Europe, the militant implications of the Brezhnev Doctrine were nothing short of catastrophic for a period of several years. The specter of direct military intervention loomed large over such controversial countries as Yugoslavia or Rumania but when no further WTP moves were carried out vis-a-vis these theoretically imperiled nations, some of the latent forces of Eurocommunism gradually re-emerged again on the Eastern European political scene although at first in a timid and cautious manner. The tentative conclusion one can reach here is that the dilemma and obvious conflict between the Brezhnev version of “Socialist Internationalism” versus the prevailing economic or political nationalism of individual Eastern European states is bound to generate grave and continuing problems. The Eurocommunist factor in itself is also going to assert itself as a healthy factor of complicating the once drably monolithic picture of East Central Europe, both in a fractionalizing and Westernizing manner of ideological assertiveness and organizational operation.⁸

II. The European Common Market

In terms of the basic triangular relationships between the USSR-Eastern Europe and the People's Republic of China, the European Common Market and the various Eurocommunist parties which have sprouted in these Western European countries have had a mixed and varied impact on East-Central Europe. The EEC itself, with or without the Italian, French, Spanish and Portuguese Communist parties, has had a veritably magnetic impact on the four East European countries of the so-called “Northern Tier” (the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary), affording each of these countries to take a 180 degree turn toward the West. This significant economic realignment has been greatly aided by the Eurocommunist parties which have been acting as successful bridges between their own EEC-member countries (like France or Italy) and such East European regimes as Poland or Hungary, nations already displaying a familiar affinity toward the West. In addition to these ready-made conduits between East and West (the PCF, PCI and PCE), the Common Market's economic impact has also radiated through the two uneasy neutrals on the East-West periphery, namely Austria and Finland. The 1973 admission of three new members into the EEC (an accomplishment of the post-De Gaulle era) has further enhanced the *magnetic* as well Westernizing influence of the

⁸For Eurocommunist purposes, both in Italy and Spain, the Brezhnev doctrine itself has been considered nothing more than a pale and mediocre retroactive justification of an illegal act of “great-power intervention.

European Common Market which, in turn, has further contributed to the latent and anti-Soviet and the more open Eurocommunist sentiments endemic in the region. Thus a truly *divisive* situation has been slowly developing within the two tiers of East-Central Europe (North and South), with the resultant effects of weakening, or at least considerably influencing, both the political superstructure as well as the economic infrastructure of the region. More concretely, we can view the specific impact of EEC as a case-study in promoting an aura of economic internationalism with technologically high-grade Western products and services pouring into the area. Thus the bilated recognition of the EEC by Leonid I. Brezhnev, discussed in his March 1973 Tbilisi speech in a paragraph or two, was a reluctant and only partial Eastern Acceptance of the obvious Western fact of a major and continuing *Wirtschaftswunder*.

III. The Federal Republic's Ostpolitik

The most significant single external influence on the countries of East-Central Europe may well be the FRG's highly successful *Ostpolitik*, or policy toward Eastern Europe. In view of the diverse, exciting and controversial accomplishments of this meaningful West German policy, originally launched in 1963 but more fully developed in the era of Willy Brandt's tenure first as Foreign Minister and later as Chancellor of the Federal Republic, it would be counterproductive to recapitulate here the factual background and ideological meaning of this national policy and its continuing impact on the East European states to the West of the Soviet Union.⁹ What is of importance to us here is the clear-cut and historically ever-recurring fact that the nations of East-Central Europe are again caught between two sets of truly conflicting forces: on the one hand, Moscow's national security needs, military demands and economic problem-areas which can briefly be listed in the following manner:

1. the increasingly weakening and generally dubious quality of the Soviet Communist leadership;
2. the long-term, and generally adverse consequences of the military occupation of Czechoslovakia ever since August 1968;
3. the generally deteriorating relationship with the People's Republic of China (Analyzed above);
4. the necessity for the USSR to have a *status-quo* position of relative tranquillity in Central and Eastern Europe (the "sphere of influence" or "security zone" complex), and finally,
5. the need for some pattern of long-term accommodation with NATO and the United States in the military and strategic armament fields (possibly a SALT II agreement as well as some tangible success in the MFR negotiations in Vienna).¹⁰

On the other hand, for the 150 million people of East-Central Europe the

⁹For a brief summary of the recent highlights of *Ostpolitik*, see Andrew Gyorgy, "Ostpolitik and Eastern Europe," in Chales Gati, ed., *The International Politics of Eastern Europe*, op. cit., pp. 154-72.

¹⁰Interesting, and closely related, political phenomena are ably analyzed in Richard R. Staar's recent study: *The Bear Versus the Dragon in the Third World*, Hoover Institution Reprint Series, Stanford University, 1979, pp. 93-105.

relatively permanent objectives and non-negotiable policy requirements of the Western neighbor, the German Federal Republic, are also of crucial importance. Being caught in such a "double pincer" or "double squeeze" type of situation would not be a first time occurrence in the turbulent course of East-Central European or Balkan history. This is the area's traditional role as a "buffer," or more recently as a "satellite" zone between East and West in the midst of the much-tortured continent of Europe.

The following "non-negotiables" emerge as FRG postulates from the West and aimed at the restless East of Europe:

1. to have the East European regimes' tacit acceptance that the Federal Republic of Germany is part and parcel of both the West European military (NATO) as well as economic (EEC) alliance structure;
2. to have a guarantee concerning West Berlin's current viability and future security, hopefully keeping the Western half of the divided city incorporated into the body politic of the FRG proper, and
3. to improve in a long-term context the Federal Republic's dubious and uneasy relationship with the German Democratic Republic by clarifying in clear, and not overly legalistic, terminology such ambiguous guiding principles as "Two States in One Nation" as well as the GDR's "Delimitation" Policy.

No wonder that the "Chinese presence" has increasingly asserted itself in Eastern Europe in the past few years. The East European scene again presents a murky scene with such diverse actors as the native political elites, the Soviet rulers, the Eurocommunist "partisans" and the leading statemen of the People's Republic of China all fishing in the perennially troubled waters of a political region best noted for launching two World Wars in our century.

EUROCOMMUNISM AND THE SOVIET BLOC: CONFLICT AND CONCILIATION

by Joan Barth Urban*

In June 1976 a Conference of European Communist and Workers' Parties was held in East Berlin that was widely heralded as signaling the end to Soviet primacy within the *European Communist* movement and the emergence of a pan-European coalition of autonomist CPs.¹ The members of that coalition included the Romanian and Yugoslav parties from the Eastern half of the continent and the French, Italian, and Spanish parties from the West—the so-called "Eurocommunist" Triad. And their accomplishments were far from negligible. Through joint pressure exerted over some twenty months they managed to wrest from Moscow a number of concessions on the declaration finally approved at the East Berlin Conference.² On the one hand, the document omitted any reference to two of the Soviet party's most cherished doctrines: the notion that there are "general laws" of socialist construction binding on all Communist parties, whatever their geographical locale or proximity to power; and the concept of "proletarian internationalism" defined as the subordination of individual party or national interests to the interests of the international Communist movement as a whole. On the other hand, the document explicitly spelled out that mutual criticism among CPs was not tantamount to anti-Communism, thereby legitimizing the ever widening trend toward European CP criticism of Soviet reality, a subject that will be pursued in some depth in this paper.

Nevertheless, less than three years after the East Berlin Conference, that same autonomist coalition proved incapable of toeing a common line on the outbreak of the Sino-Vietnamese border war. The Italian, French and Spanish CPs chose to back Moscow on what must be considered a cardinal tenet of Soviet foreign policy: condemnation of Peking and sympathy for Hanoi. Yet the Romanian and Yugoslav parties—ostensibly the ones most susceptible to Soviet blandishments—assumed a posture of strict neutrality, simply calling

*Professor of International Affairs and Political Science, The Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C.

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¹Kevin Devlin exhaustively analyzes the antecedents, preparations and outcome of the 1976 Berlin conference in "The Interparty Drama," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, D.C.), XXIV, 4 (July-August 1975), pp. 18-34, and "The Challenge of Eurocommunism," *ibid.*, XXVI, 1 (January-February 1977), pp. 1-20.

²The English text appeared in *New Times* (Moscow), 28 (July 1976), pp. 17-32.

for the withdrawal of *all* foreign troops, the Chinese from Vietnam and the Vietnamese from Cambodia.³

In view of this turn of events, my paper addresses the inter-related questions of the depth and the limits of the Eurocommunist confrontation with Moscow. The first section briefly describes the proposed Eurocommunist alternative to the Soviet model of socialist construction and international conduct. The middle, and most substantial, section details the Italian and French CPs' respective critiques of socialism Soviet-style during the recent past, particularly the period since the 1976 East Berlin summit. The last section explores the countervailing tendencies in the Eurocommunist-Soviet relationship. It seeks to explain why the Western CPs have rejected an open rupture with Moscow in favor of a policy of conciliation that entails not only ongoing inter-party ties but staunch support for key Soviet foreign policy positions.

The Eurocommunist Alternative

During the period under investigation the Italian and Spanish Communist Parties (PCI and PCE respectively) set forth a vision of socialist pluralism and regionalism the very articulation of which was tantamount to a direct challenge to the domestic legitimacy of the single-party Soviet-oriented Communist systems of East Europe. For both Latin European parties the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 acted as a catalyst in the evolution of their programmatic thinking. The PCI had a tradition of theoretical innovation and political assertiveness vis-a-vis Moscow dating back to the mid-1920s. Not surprisingly, therefore, it joined its impassioned defense of the Dubcek reform movement with the postulation of a democratic and pluralist alternative to Soviet-style socialism. In his report to the party's Twelfth Congress in February, 1969, Luigi Longo, then PCI General Secretary, gave his official blessing to the notion of a socialist society in which "a plurality of parties and social organizations" would be "engaged in a free and democratic dialectic of contrasting positions, something qualitatively different from the experiences known till now." Such a conception of socialist pluralism was antithetical to the CPSU's "general laws for the construction of socialism," foremost among which were the leading role of the Communist party and the obligatory inculcation of Marxism-Leninism. Over the years the concept of socialist pluralism adumbrated in the wake of the Czechoslovak crisis was gradually broadened to include the notions of civil rights, competitive elections, and the secular, or non-ideological, state generally associated with the Eurocommunist vision of socialism that evolved in the second half of the 1970s.⁴

Under the guidance of Santiago Carrillo the Spanish Communist Party

³See the articles by Michael Dobbs and Ronald Koven in *The Washington Post*, February 20, 1979, p. A8; cf. *l'Unita*, February 19-20, 1979, *passim*.

⁴For a detailed exploration of CPSU-PCI relations during the 1970s, see my "Moscow and the PCI: Kto Kogo?" paper delivered to the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C., Sept. 1-4, 1977. A revised version is forthcoming in *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Autumn 1979).

seconded the PCI's call for a pluralist model of socialism. But the Spanish party was more forceful in its support for socialist regionalism, that is, an entente of developed socialist states in West Europe distinct and independent from the Soviet bloc in East Europe. The concept of a regional mutuality of interests among CPs from similar national environments was not, of course, new to the Communist movement. It was popularized under the rubric of "polycentrism," the term coined by Palmiro Togliatti in his celebrated *Nuovi argomenti* interview of June 1956. Still, it was the PCE leaders who conveyed the impression the common, regional interests pointed in the direction of a united socialist West Europe rather than merely a congruence of strategic views on socialist revolution and construction. Moreover, in the early 1970s PCE spokesman Manuel Azcarate charged the CPSU with sacrificing revolutionary change in West Europe to the interests of the Soviet state and the preservation of the pan-European status quo, i.e., the division of Europe into Soviet and American spheres of influence. He thus provided a theoretical rationale for according primacy to regional solidarity among the West European CPs.⁵

In November 1975 the French Communist Party (PCF) signed a joint communique with PCI, a step that was interpreted by many observers as signifying that the French party was also shifting to a more pluralist strategy. The communique, pointedly "Italian" in its rhetoric, was soon followed by the much vaunted PCF decision—formally announced at its Twenty-second Congress in early February 1976—to drop the slogan "dictatorship of the proletariat" from its party program.⁶ Given the sectarianism and militancy so characteristic of PCF cadres in the past (and exemplified by their support for the Portuguese Communists during Lisbon's hot summer of 1975), the party's new "Eurocommunist" face met with considerable scepticism. Indeed, the shift in strategic orientation from Moscow to Rome was probably more the result of a calculated gamble than a genuine change of heart. By the autumn of 1975 the French Communists confronted three harsh realities: 1) their Portuguese comrades had failed in the attempt to seize power in Lisbon through minority manipulation and intimidation of the majority; 2) their PCI comrades had scored a stiking victory in the June 1975 Italian regional elections by operating according to legal and constitutional procedures; and 3) at home the French Socialists posed a growing threat to PCF dominance within the Union of the Left. The PCF leadership thus must have reasoned that by adopting Eurocommunist rhetoric they would increase their support among French voters.

When local elections and public opinion polls indicated that this was not to be the case, the French CP reverted to orthodoxy. In mid-1977 its doctrinaire intransigence on key domestic economic and political issues provoked a rupture with its Socialist allies in the Union of the Left and led to their defeat in the March 1978 parliamentary elections. But already earlier, as will be dis-

⁵The PCE's regional orientation is analyzed in Eusebio M. Mujal-Leon, "The Domestic and International Evolution of the Spanish Communist Party," in Rudolf L. Tokes, *Eurocommunism and Detente* (New York: New York University Press, 1978), Chapter 4.

⁶For an illuminating discussion of the evolution of PCF-CPSU relations see Ronald Tiersky, "French Communism, Eurocommunism, and Soviet Power," in Tokes, *Eurocommunism and Detente*, Chapter 3.

cussed below, the PCF's restraint in criticizing Soviet repression raised grave questions regarding the depth of the party's commitment to civil rights and political pluralism.

Eurocommunist Criticism of Socialism Soviet-style

Since 1956 PCI spokesmen have publicly criticized the errors they perceived in Soviet-style socialism, albeit with fits and starts until 1968. Notable during this period were Togliatti's allusions in 1956 to the possible degeneration of the Soviet system under Stalin and his remarks on the need for democratization of the USSR in his Yalta Memorandum of August 1964. However, following the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia prominent PCI members assumed a more critical posture toward Soviet reality, in both a positive and a negative sense. As an example of the latter, in 1971 Maurizio Ferrara—long-time party member and official Togliatti biographer—appealed in *Rinascita* for the implementation in practice of the Soviet Constitution of 1936, condemning Moscow's violations of the civil rights guaranteed by that constitution. As an example of the former approach, in 1974 Central Committee member Adalberto Minucci stressed the Soviet Union's potential for—rather than lack of—liberty, reasoning that the USSR's high level of economic development made possible and necessary some degree of economic decentralization and political democratization. Four months later Minucci was advanced to membership in the PCI *Direzione*, or executive committee.

During the early months of 1976, concurrent with the final negotiations for the European CP Conference in Berlin, PCI spokesmen began ever more frequently to berate the CPSU leadership for its use of repressive, or "administrative," measures in dealing with domestic dissent and for its pretensions to "Monolithic unity" in Soviet political life. For example, in February 1976 a two-part *l'Unita* series by Giuseppe Boffa deplored the failure of the CPSU to complete the process of destalinization. Boffa not only denounced the regime's continuing recourse to "administrative measures" and failure to guarantee to Soviet citizens the civil rights promised them by their constitution. He also debunked the very notion of unanimity in a society as complex and highly educated as the Soviet Union, declaring that "at this point the need for the free expression of ideas, for their open confrontation, for the legitimacy of dissent cannot but make themselves felt with insistence. A society sure of itself derives from these battles of ideas a stimulus for more progress . . ." Boffa's diatribe against Soviet insistence on monolithic unity was soon followed by an article by Adriano Guerra which underscored the actual degree of diversity among CPSU publicists. Guerra distinguished two groups—those who spoke in "monolithic and bureaucratic terms from a time past," and those who displayed a more sophisticated and flexible grasp of contemporary political issues, both domestic and international. In the former category he placed *inter alia* Konstantine Zarodov, renowned as the sectarian editor of *Problems of Peace and Socialism*. In the latter group he included analysts from the Soviet Institute of World Economy and International Relations.

Guerra's article appeared in *l'Unita* on February 19. Five days later Brezhnev delivered a report to the Twenty-fifth CPSU Congress which fell squarely into Guerra's first category of "monolithic and bureaucratic terms from a time past" in its stress on "general laws" of socialist construction and "proletarian internationalism." *l'Unita* correspondent Franco Fabiani's coverage of the Soviet congress bespoke the PCI's reaction. Fabiani reported with barely concealed irony the parrot-like reaction of the other CPSU speakers to Brezhnev's report, especially on "proletarian internationalism." He also described the infrequent speeches on Soviet cultural problems as "essentially routine and . . . bureaucratic." He noted without comment various delegates' rebuttals of Western charges regarding Soviet repression of dissidents. But on this score the PCI's position was made clear on March 17 when *l'Unita* published a favorable commentary on Soviet dissident historian Roy Medvedev's latest *samizdat* manuscript.⁷

During the winter of 1976-1977 PCI commentaries on Soviet bloc systems entered a new phase. In contrast to the occasional criticism of 1956-1968 and even the more pointed jibes of the post-1968 period, *l'Unita's* attacks on Soviet-East European restriction of freedom and civil rights now began to assume a *systemic* and *systematic* character. They were systemic in that they struck at the heart of the political system, arguing that the political dissidence and economic imbalances extant in that area could be overcome only by democratizing political and economic structures. They were systematic in that Soviet-bloc repression of dissent was regularly noted and denounced in *l'Unita*, form of editorial censure. That this dual approach represented official PCI policy was suggested in a late January 1977 article in *l'Unita* by Central Committee member and PCI historian, Paolo Spriano.⁸ Spriano differentiated between two types of legitimate criticism of socialist systems: "occasional, political" denunciations of individual cases of persecution; and "permanent social-historical" criticism of contradictions between, *inter alia*, the economic base and the superstructure. Spriano's first category fit the PCI media's coverage of the current dissident movement. His second category corresponded to my concept of systemic criticism.

Two examples of PCI systemic criticism were a late December 1976 front-page article in *l'Unita* dealing with the general problem of dissent in socialist systems and a *Rinascita* article earlier that same month dealing with the political-economic crisis in Poland. The *l'Unita* piece argued that dissent in the socialist countries was but the tip of the iceberg of intellectual malaise; that many intellectuals, while toeing the party line in public, lived lives that were in reality "fantastically, wildly 'separated'" from official life; that this was caused by the party-state's arrogation of full political control over the "totality of social relationships;" and that the solution was to "legitimize politics" by permitting the existing differences and contradictions in socialist society to surface, to go public as it were. The author concluded with the heretical notion that the "coexistence of ideas" was technically *inevitable* in modern society.⁹

⁷For detailed references see my paper cited in note 4 above.

⁸*l'Unita*, January 26, 1977, p. 3.

⁹*Ibid.*, December 29, 1976, pp. 1 and 14.

The *Rinascita* article focused on Poland in the aftermath of the June 1976 price-hike riots. It implicitly backed the dissident Workers' Defense Committee; it stressed the mounting and broadly-based intellectual ferment; it called for political organization of the largely Catholic peasants *qua* Catholics, i.e., through their national representative, the Church; and it directly linked the resolution of Poland's economic and political problems to greater participation in the decision-making process at all levels.¹⁰

On the level of systematic "political" criticism of the Soviet bloc regimes, *l'Unita* responded to the mounting dissident movement from mid-1976 onward (post-Berlin, not post-Helsinki) with the following pattern of coverage. First it reported the official regime charges against the opposition. It then juxtaposed to the official line, either in the initial report or in a subsequent issue, the dissidents' views—giving direct quotations as needed to present their defense. Thereafter it proceeded to censure editorially cases of official harassment or arrest and to uphold the rights of political dissent and the free expression of all views, citing at times the Helsinki declaration in support of its position.

The prime targets of PCI censure during the winter of 1977 were the Czech, Soviet, and Polish regimes—in descending order of intensity. In the case of Czechoslovakia, "Charter 77" dominated *l'Unita* coverage. It will be recalled that the "Charter 77" document appealed to the Prague regime to respect the rights guaranteed to its citizens by the Czech constitution and international human rights covenants. For some weeks after its initial publication in the West on January 6, scarcely a day passed without some reference in the PCI daily to official harassment of its signers—for the most part former activists in the 1968 Dubcek reform movement. The first full-scale—and front-page—*l'Unita* editorial denouncing the Prague regime's conduct came on January 12, but the paper's editorial policy was already clearly indicated in a January 8 news report deploring an official attack on the "Charter 77" signers as agents of "anti-Communist and Zionist centers." The January 12 editorial was followed by a series of collective and individual protests by PCI members and organizations as well as further editorial commentaries when appropriate.

As for the Soviet Union, the cases of Orlov and Ginzburg elicited considerable attention in *l'Unita*. TASS was cited for the official charges. Orlov and Ginzburg was quoted in their own defense prior to their arrests. Medvedev and Sakharov were quoted in their behalf both before and after their arrests. *l'Unita's* editorial censure came on February 6.

l'Unita's treatment of the dissident issue in Poland differed somewhat from its coverage of the USSR and Czechoslovakia. The official Polish denials of police brutality toward workers arrested in June 1976 were juxtaposed to statements to the contrary by the Workers' Defense Committee and larger groups of sympathetic supporters among the Polish intelligentsia. However, in the case of Poland *l'Unita* refrained from outright editorial censure, doubtless reflecting the PCI's calculation (later proven to be accurate) that the counsel of moderation would ultimately prevail in the Polish regime's treatment of political dissent.

¹⁰*Rinascita*, XXXIII, 49 (December 10, 1976), pp. 21-22.

In contrast to the PCI, the PCF was restrained in its public criticism of Soviet bloc systems until the second half of 1975. However, from October 1975 onward the PCF assumed an ever more defiant attitude toward Moscow on issues of domestic dissidence as well as *Soviet foreign policy*. Indeed, it began to argue that Moscow's concern for maintaining close diplomatic relations with Paris served to reinforce the status quo in France and was, therefore, a violation of proletarian internationalism.

PCF-CPSU tensions over the nature of Franco-Soviet relations had probably been simmering for some time. Moscow's eagerness to pander to the powers-that-be in the Elysee were evident ever since De Gaulle's rupture with NATO in the mid-1960s. But only in the 1970s, under the twin prods of economic crisis and leftist electoral gains, did the contradiction between Soviet *raison d'état* and PCF militancy come to the surface. For despite the growing clout of the Union of the Left, Moscow did not alter its line. During the Twenty-first PCF Congress in October 1974, *Pravda* compressed Marchais's critique of President Giscard d'Estaing's foreign policy into one terse sentence while waxing enthusiastic over the fiftieth anniversary of Franco-Soviet diplomatic relations. In the same vein, *Pravda's* coverage of Brezhnev's trip to Paris the following December for the annual Franco-Soviet summit was extensive and glowing.

A clear signal of French Communist displeasure at this attitude of business as usual came in May 1975 when the PCF issued a statement deploring those in the Communist movement who would "go easy on imperialism, for the sake of diplomatic considerations or domestic opportunities." This appeared to be a two-pronged attack, first on the CPSU for its policy of detente *qua* status quo and secondly on the PCI for its late 1974 shift to qualified support of NATO. But just then the Portuguese crisis intervened, upstaging all other issues in international Communist relations.

Giscard's visit to Moscow October 13-18, 1975 marked the decisive turning point in PCF-CPSU relations. By way of backdrop, on October 10 the PCF Politburo drafted a communique stating its resolute opposition to the political status quo in France, defined in this case as Giscard's pro-Atlantic orientation as well as his domestic conservatism. The statement also chided Brezhnev for not publicly repudiating Premier Jacques Chirac's reported appeal to him the previous March to help restrain the PCF's militancy. Although the communique was dated October 10, it was not published in *l'Humanite* until October 13, the date of Giscard's scheduled arrival in Moscow. The very same issue of *l'Humanite* carried an interview with Jean Kanapa, the PCF's late international affairs spokesman, in which he insisted that French Communist support for detente in no way precluded the PCF from pursuing its "revolutionary struggle in France . . . against the Giscardian power of the monopolies, for democracy and socialism." It would appear that both the Politburo communique and the Kanapa interview were timed to coincide with Giscard's visit to Moscow, thereby throwing down the gauntlet to the CPSU. *Pravda* carried an abridged version of the communique, omitting the personal attacks on Giscard and Brezhnev.¹¹ Then on October 15 Brezhnev unexpectedly cancelled a

¹¹*Pravda*, October 15, 1975, p. 4.

scheduled meeting with Giscard, to the consternation of Western newsmen many of whom assumed (once again!) that the general secretary was on his death bed.¹² As Brezhnev reappeared in sound health the following day, it seems more than probable that on October 15 he was simply back at the CPSU Secretariat trying to cope with this latest challenge to Soviet authority.

The PCF protests notwithstanding, the Brezhnev-Giscard talks ended with their usual fanfare and the signing of a series of Franco-Soviet technical agreements. On October 25 *l'Humanite* resumed the offensive with an article condemning Soviet imprisonment of dissident mathematician Leonid Pliushch in a mental institution. *Pravda* replied the next day with a long unsigned commentary hailing Franco-Soviet state relations. Then came the PCF-PCI joint declaration of mid-November 1975 in which the French endorsed what was essentially the PCI line on a reformist revolutionary strategy and socialist pluralism in West Europe.

The nadir in PCF-CPSU relations came during the Soviet party's Twenty-fifth Congress with Brezhnev, in a direct challenge to the PCF, not only declared that Franco-Soviet state relations and views on a number of foreign policy questions had grown closer, but also claimed that "this has met with widespread support from the french people and the majority of political parties in France."¹³ Marchais, who had pointedly boycotted the congress, quickly informed the world that the PCF was not one of those parties. On February 26, the day after Brezhnev's report appeared in *Pravda*, *l'Humanite* retorted with verbatim excerpts from the PCF leader's scorching attack on Giscard's foreign policy at the French party's Twenty-second Congress earlier that same month.

On the other hand, during late 1976 and early 1977 PCF-CPSU relations appeared to stabilize at a point mid-way between the acrimony of 1975-1976 and the amity of the preceding years. The PCF viewed with equanimity, at least in its public pronouncements, the projected return visit of Brezhnev to Paris in early summer 1977, the first Brezhnev-Giscard summit since the catalytic October 1975 meeting in Moscow. The party daily *l'Humanite* regularly reported on Soviet domestic affairs in a sympathetic if bland manner (see the frequent "Letter from Moscow" column by Serge Leyrac)—in contrast to *l'Unita's* sparse coverage of current events in the USSR. And in mid-January 1977 the PCF daily featured a lengthy analysis of Soviet-French trade, the gist of which was to underscore the vast untapped potential for the expansion of such trade on a mutually beneficial basis.¹⁴

As for *l'Humanite's* coverage of the post-Berlin Conference wave of dissidence in the Soviet bloc, it contrasted rather sharply with that of *l'Unita*. The PCF daily's approach to the repression of dissent was neither systemic nor systematic; it was instead selective and relatively superficial. In terms of in-depth reporting during late 1976 and early 1977, *l'Humanite* focused on the "Charter 77" case, dealing only cursorily with specific developments in the Soviet Union and Poland. Indeed, with regard to cases of dissent in the latter

¹²*New York Times*, October 17, 1975, p. 7.

¹³*Pravda*, February 25, 1976, p. 3.

¹⁴*l'Humanite*, January 13, 1977, p. 3.

two countries, *l'Humanite* largely confined itself to reports emanating from official regime sources or international press services.

Only in the case of the GDR's deprivation of dissident balladist Wolf Biermann's citizenship did the PCF press follow *l'Unita's* pattern of coverage. On November 17 *l'Humanite* reported the facts as stated by the GDR. On November 19 it described with lengthy quotations the declaration of solidarity with Biermann and protest against the GDR's action signed by a dozen or so prominent SED writers and artists. Then on November 22 it published an article (not an editorial) by Claude Prevost denouncing the East German regime's action and defending Biermann's right to express his views even if they were dissident—and at times provocative.

By way of contrast, *l'Humanite's* censure of the Czech regime's treatment of the "Charter 77" signers was relatively mild and conspicuously belated. Whereas *l'Unita* denounced the Czech leadership in a front-page editorial on January 12, *l'Humanite* delayed editorial censure of Prague until January 25. Whereas *l'Unita* was systematic in its coverage of developments in Prague following the publication of "Charter 77," including such sensitive issues as Zdenek Mlynar's appeal to Western communist and socialist parties for support against the Czech regime's mounting persecution of those involved, *l'Humanite* was selective and sporadic in its coverage, remaining silent *inter alia* on the Mlynar appeal. Whereas some of *l'Unita's* reports cited the Helsinki declaration in support of the legality of "Charter 77," *l'Humanite* implicitly denied its relevance in a statement by columnist Yves Moreau that insisted upon parallel progress on all fronts related to the Helsinki declaration, i.e., arms control, expanded trade, and human rights.¹⁵

Perhaps this brief comparison of the PCI and PCF press treatment of Soviet bloc dissent can best be concluded by pointing out that during the winter of 1977 *l'Humanite* published an article on the subject every 2–3 days whereas *l'Unita* published 2–3 articles on the subject almost every day.

One final note. In February 1977 the PCF came out with what appeared to be a flurry of commentaries on repression in the Soviet Union and East Europe. On closer inspection, however, they turned out to be restrained in tone, couched in generalities, devoid of systemic analysis, and brief to a fault. It is difficult to avoid the suspicion that their sudden appearance was geared to the forthcoming municipal elections in France (in which Socialist gains turned out to be more pronounced than those of the PCF).

To turn briefly to the Spanish Communist Party (PCE), it preceded the PCF in its public allegations regarding Moscow's status quo orientation in Europe and went further than the PCI in its disapproval of Soviet political repression. As an organization that was itself outlawed and persecuted for some four decades, the Spanish party doubtless felt a genuine empathy for political dissidents in the USSR and East Europe. Accordingly, in the summer of 1976 the PCE paper, *Mundo Obrero*, described the Soviet political structure as "totalitarian." In 1977 party leader Santiago Carrillo himself questioned the socialist credentials of the Soviet system, arguing in "Eurocommunism" and

¹⁵*Ibid.*, January 17, 1977, p. 3.

the State that CPSU rule represented the dictatorship of one stratum over another. And *Mundo Obrero* published in full the "Charter 77" declaration.

Unlike the French and Italian CPs, the PCE commanded relatively little domestic clout even after its legalization in the spring of 1977. In the nationwide elections of 1977 and 1979 it won about 10% of the popular vote compared to the PCF's consistent hold over 20-odd percent of the French electorate and the PCI's surge well above the thirtieth percentile in the Italian elections of the mid-1970s. The Spanish party's leverage within the European Communist movement was correspondingly less than that of its French and Italian comrades. Its significance lay rather in its role as pace-setter and whipping boy with regard to anti-Soviet criticism. On the one hand, the CPSU would periodically attack the PCE leadership for its defiance, thereby hoping to intimidate the larger parties into assuming a more compliant posture (lest they suffer the same fate). On the other hand, Moscow's inability to cow either the PCE or the other Eurocommunist parties into submission served to underscore the ever widening limits of permissible inter-party criticism within the European Communist movement.

In the late 1960s the CPSU was so outraged over the Spanish party's criticism of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia that it sought covertly to overthrow the Carrillo leadership. Then during the winter of 1973-1974 Moscow resorted to public polemics with Carrillo's close associate, Manuel Azcarate, because of his insinuations that the Soviet Union preferred East-West detente to revolutionary change in the West.¹⁶ Neither measure was successful in halting either PCE defiance or the emergence of the Eurocommunist entente. And finally the Soviets were obliged to seek an accommodation with the PCE leaders, conceding their right to disagree with the CPSU in return for their agreement to participate in the East Berlin Communist summit.

However, in mid-1977 Moscow chose to bring the simmering Soviet-Eurocommunist tensions into the open by once again attacking the PCE. The medium selected was the Soviet foreign policy weekly, *New Times*, and the immediate target was Carrillo's "*Eurocommunism*" and *the State*, a pamphlet published in April 1977 with an eye to the forthcoming Spanish parliamentary elections. The impact was a sharp escalation of polemics that had already intensified during the winter of 1976-1977 over the issues of human rights and Soviet bloc dissent.

The *New Times* attack, written anonymously, refrained from discussing the domestic strategy of the Western CPs, focusing instead on "Eurocommunist" foreign policy as defined by Carrillo. Moreover, the article conceded that there were two forms of Eurocommunism, one supported by the enemies of socialism and one supported by "the Left, including the Communist parties," which embraced those "common features characteristic of the present strategy of the Communist parties of the developed capitalist countries." *New Times* denounced even the latter version of Eurocommunism as "erroneous," given the fact that there was only "one" scientific communism (witness the "General Laws"). However, it reserved its heavy guns for Carrillo's inter-

¹⁶See the Mujal-Leon Chapter cited in note 5 above.

pretation of Eurocommunism which, it declared, "coincides precisely with the meaning attached to it by the imperialist opponents of communism."¹⁷

In brief, *New Times* argued that imperialism's latest anti-Communist tactic was to split the international Communist movement, to set the CPs of West Europe against those of East Europe, and that Carrillo was objectively, if not willfully, serving this aim. The article went on to chide the Spanish leader for maintaining that regional solidarity among Western CPs had priority over their relations with the socialist states of East Europe. It also charged him, rather lamely, with favoring the perpetuation of military blocs because of his call for a united Western Europe "independent of the USSR and the USA." Finally, it accused him of "conscious anti-Sovietism" for denying that the Soviet Union was a "workers' democracy where the organized proletariat is the ruling class."

The critique of the second, "leftist," variant of Eurocommunism as "erroneous" was most certainly aimed directly at the PCI, the first Communist party to accept the label of Eurocommunist, while the specific charges against Carrillo could be construed as embracing the PCI as well. The Italian party reacted accordingly. In measured but resolute terms it rebuked Moscow for its polemic against Carrillo and rebutted the innuendoes against its own policies.

The PCI's response to the *New Times* challenge, as reflected in *l'Unita*, included extensive coverage of rebuttals by Carrillo and the PCE Central Committee in the Spanish media as well as Italian Communist editorials critical of the Soviet move.¹⁸ The gist of the Italian party's arguments were as follows. First of all, Moscow rather than Carrillo was guilty of splitting the Communist movement by its use of abusive language and its veiled inclusion of other parties in the *New Times* attack. Secondly, the PCE's call for a Europe "independent of the USSR and the USA," just as the PCI's similar call for a Europe "neither anti-Soviet nor anti-American," would ultimately contribute to the dissolution rather than the perpetuation of military blocs. In fact, *l'Unita* quoted Carrillo verbatim to the effect that it was Moscow who preferred the European status quo to the prospect of genuine independence and autonomy in both West and East Europe! Thirdly, on the question of support for human rights and Soviet-bloc dissenters, which for Moscow constituted the cutting edge of "anti-Sovietism," an Italian participant in top-level PCI-CPSU talks on July 1, 1977, reported that the Italians had insisted that the defense of human rights, including "basket three" of the Helsinki Declaration, was not only legitimate but should in no way impede the progress of arms control talks.¹⁹ In other words, on the most sticky issue then dividing Moscow and Washington under the new Carter Administration, the PCI tilted to the West.

One final note. The PCF's response to the *New Times* attack on Carrillo was

¹⁷"Contrary to the Interests of Peace and Socialism in Europe: Concerning the book 'Eurocommunism and the State' by Santiago Carrillo, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Spain," *New Times*, 26 (June 1977), pp. 9-13.

¹⁸*l'Unita*, June 24—July 5, 1977, *passim*. See especially "Un pesante attacco d'una rivista sovietica a Santiago Carrillo," *l'Unita*, June 14, 1977, p. 14; "L'eurocomunismo, 'Tempi Nuovi' e noi," *ibid.*, June 28, 1977, p. 1; and "Madrid: la risposta di Carrillo in una conferenza stampa," *ibid.*, pp. 1 and 14.

¹⁹Conversazione con Macaluso: I colloqui a Mosca—Le nostre tesi e quelle sovietiche," *l'Unita*, July 5, 1977, pp. 1 and 14.

relatively subdued, in line with its reaction to the "Charter 77" case. While publishing brief reports on the Soviet article and Carrillo's riposte, *l'Humanite* refrained from editorial commentary except to argue that attacks by one CP against another CP's secretary general were inadmissible.²⁰ However, a year later the French party was to sharply intensify its criticism of the Soviet system, thereby suggesting that its earlier restraint was the result of internal party considerations rather than conscious compliance with Soviet wishes.

Eurocommunism versus Moscow: Conflict and Conciliation

Underlying all the specific clashes between the West European CPs and the Soviet-oriented regimes of East Europe during the 1970s was the singular fact that relations among them had begun to acquire some of the characteristics of the historic relationship between Social Democracy and Leninism. The schism within the European Marxist movement a half century earlier had been a rupture between ideological brothers whose shared vision of a future Communist society was flawed by bitter controversy over the means to that end. For the Leninists of the Third Communist International the Socialists' commitment to democratic methods in the quest for social change spelled treason: their reformism would only shore up the capitalist order by dulling the revolutionary impulses of the common worker. For the Socialists the Leninists' use of dictatorial methods to preserve their power likewise spelled treason: party-controlled social development would never lead to the liberation of human potential envisioned by Karl Marx.

Some of these same themes lay at the heart of the controversies that wracked the European Communist movement during the 1970s. However, historical analogies are never exact. And in this case there was one compelling difference: the protagonists in the contemporary intra-Communist debate disclaimed any intention of repeating the organizational rupture of 1920. Their political and ideological differences notwithstanding, they extolled the enduring nature of pan-European Communist ties.

To be sure, the Soviet leaders and their loyalist allies disparaged "Eurocommunism" with remarkably little restraint, as witnessed by the June 1977 *New Times* attack on PCE leader Santiago Carrillo. The CPSU's long-standing polemics against the Italian Communist leadership were more subtle yet no less barbed.²¹ Nevertheless, the Soviet leaders went to great lengths to paper over those differences in time for the sixtieth anniversary of the Great October Revolution in November 1977. In early autumn Russian emissaries conferred with Carrillo in Madrid, assuring him of equal time to present his views if only he would attend the festivities. (Carrillo, it might be noted, had not attended the CPSU's Twenty-fifth Congress in 1976.) As a gesture of good will, *Pravda* published a lengthy feature by its editor-in-chief lauding the achievements of the Spanish CP and referring sympathetically to Carrillo. When the PCE chief was actually prevented from speaking in the Great Hall of the Kremlin on

²⁰ *L'Humanite*, June 24, 28, and July 7, 1977.

²¹ For details see my paper cited in note 4 above.

November 2, 1977, the Soviet leadership pleaded innocence (Carrillo, they claimed, had arrived too late for his speech to be translated into the seventeen languages required for the occasion) and proceeded to shower their attention upon PCI General Secretary Enrico Berlinguer. Despite the influx of guests from some 100-odd countries, Brezhnev and the two Soviet leaders most directly responsible for relations with non-ruling CPs, Mikhail Suslov and Boris Ponomarev, managed to find time the very next day to meet with Berlinguer for fifty minutes "in an atmosphere of cordiality and friendship."²² In view of the close political ties between the Spanish and Italian CPs, the Kremlin's respectful treatment of Berlinguer must be interpreted as an attempt to minimize the negative impression conveyed by their clash with Carrillo.

Just as the CPSU leadership strove for a public image of pan-European Communist harmony, so too the Eurocommunist triad of major non-ruling parties rejected the idea of a break with Moscow. Upon his return to Madrid on November 4, 1977 Carrillo declared that the Spanish Communists didn't want, nor did the Moscow incident represent, a rupture with the USSR, a theme which he repeated a week later at a joint press conference in Rome with Berlinguer.²³

As for the PCI, Berlinguer and others had rejected the idea of a rupture any number of times, particularly at moments of high tension with the CPSU. Two such cases had already occurred during 1977, first the previous winter after the Italian CP's outspoken defense of the Czech "Charter 77" movement, and then in July after the PCI's rebuttal of the *New Times* attack on Carrillo. In a January 30, 1977, speech to an assembly of Communist workers in Milan, Berlinguer had hailed as immutable three PCI principles: the goal of socialism, the operational rule of democratic centralism, and the maintenance of international Communist ties.²⁴ In an interview over Italian TV the following month, Berlinguer once again insisted on the preservation of correct PCI relations with the CPSU.²⁵ Similarly, after the July 1977 high-level PCI-CPSU talks in Moscow following the *New Times* polemic, a member of the Italian delegation reiterated his party's opposition to a "rupture" with the CPSU, arguing that a break in inter-party relations would not be in the interests of either the PCI or Italy.²⁶

As we have already seen, friction between the French Communist Party and the Soviets developed at a different tempo and along different lines than in the case of the PCE and the PCI. The quality of personal links at the leadership levels varied accordingly. While the French representatives at the November 1977 Moscow celebration did not become involved in the Carrillo flap, PCF leader Georges Marchais chose not even to attend the festivities. Nevertheless, the head of the French delegation declared in the Kremlin that despite their dif-

²²For the text of the PCI-CPSU communique on the meeting and the PCI's account of both the meeting and Carrillo's confrontation with the Soviet leaders, see *l'Unita*, November 4, 1977, pp. 1 and 14. The Carrillo incident is analyzed by Eusebio Majal-Leon in "Th PCE in Spanish Politics," *Problems of Communism*, XXVII, 4 (July-August 1978), pp. 15-37.

²³*l'Unita*, November 5, 1977, p. 16 and November 11, 1977, pp. 1 and 13.

²⁴*Ibid.*, January 31, 1977, pp. 1 and 4, especially p. 4.

²⁵*Ibid.*, February 11, 1977, pp. 1 and 11, especially p. 11.

²⁶"Conversazione con Macaluso," see note 19 above.

ferences "fraternal ties have always existed and continue to exist between the CPSU and the PCF."²⁷

This same pattern of outspoken criticism followed by professions of ongoing solidarity was to be repeated in mid-1978, especially in the case of the PCI. All three Eurocommunist parties heatedly denounced the Soviet trials and sentencing of dissidents Orlov, Scharansky and Ginzburg during the late spring and summer of 1978. The PCI's protests were accompanied by public signals of an interest in normalizing party ties with Peking,²⁸ a particularly galling slap in Moscow's face given the CPSU's furious reaction to Chinese party chief Hua Guofeng's tour of Romania and Yugoslavia in August of that year. Yet at the same time a veritable spate of statements appeared in the PCI press denying any intention whatsoever of a break with the CPSU.²⁹ Moreover, Berlinguer made a point of stressing his party's ideological affinity with the Soviet comrades in his speech to the annual festival of *l'Unita* in mid-September.³⁰ And the very next month he journeyed to Moscow for top-level talks with the CPSU leaders, thereby underscoring the PCI's intention of observing reasonably proper norms in inter-party conduct despite the ongoing PCI-CPSU differences. (That those differences remained—and that the CPSU had paid a price for Berlinguer's visit—was evidenced by the fact that the joint communique signed at the close of the bilateral talks reiterated two of the major Soviet concessions at the 1976 East Berlin conference: the positive value of non-alignment and the legitimacy of disagreements among CPs.)³¹ The Spanish CP didn't quite match the PCI's conciliatory mode of behavior. However, in late October 1978 it too indicated its readiness to remain on at least speaking terms with the Soviet bloc by receiving a delegation of the Bulgarian CP, previously one of the most trenchant critics of Eurocommunism.³² Only the French party stayed aloof from this new round of pan-European CP contacts, intensifying instead its ties with Titoist Yugoslavia and criticism of the Soviet system.

How is one to explain this blend of criticism and conciliation vis-a-vis Moscow on the part of the West European CP's? Three major reasons come to mind, involving questions of ideological affinity, historical identity, and residual pro-Sovietism. First of all, considerable ideological agreement continues to exist among the West and East European CPs not only with regard to the obvious issue of militant, third world "liberationism" but also with regard to the economic structure of a socialist society. Despite the polemical exchanges of the 1970s, PCI leaders from Berlinguer on down repeatedly endorsed the "fundamental directions" of Soviet economic policy, claiming that it represented the interests of the working class. For Italy they projected a mixed

²⁷See PCF delegate Paul Laurent's speech in *Pravda*, November 3, 1977, p. 8.

²⁸*L'Unita* published feature articles positively evaluating recent Chinese political developments on July 19 and 21, 1978, p. 3; its coverage of Hua Guofeng's August tour of Romania and Yugoslavia was also sympathetic. PCI international affairs spokesman Giancarlo Pajetta discussed at length the appropriateness of normal interparty relations with the Chinese Communists in early September; see *L'Unita*, September 9, 1978, pp. 1 and 12.

²⁹See, for example, the statements by Pajetta and Minucci in *L'Unita*, July 24 and 30, 1978, p. 1 and pp. 1 and 14 respectively.

³⁰Full text in *L'Unita*, September 18, 1978, pp. 1, 3-5.

³¹For the text of the communique see *Pravda*, October 10, 1978, p. 1; for Berlinguer's press conference on the trip see *L'Unita*, October 12, 1978, pp. 1 and 14.

³²See Manuel Lucbert, "Moscou et l'Eurocommunisme," *Le Monde*, November 10, 1978, pp. 1 and 5.

economy under socialism but for the USSR they merely sought more extended participation in economic decisionmaking. In a more striking example of convergent views, PCF leader Georges Marchais voiced allegiance to the "general law" of "common ownership of the principal means of production and exchange" even at the French party's twenty-second congress in February 1976—notwithstanding the escalating polemics with the CPSU.³³ The PCF's later rupture with the French Socialists over the question of how far to nationalize French industry in the event of an electoral victory by the *Union de la gauche* should thus have come as no surprise. As for the Spanish party, in "Eurocommunism" and the State Carrillo deplored not so much the economic structure of Soviet society as the absence of democratic control over the public sector and within the workshop.

A second consideration that binds the Eurocommunists to the CPSU is the simple fact of their historical identity. A new generation of leaders may be coming to power. But the men now in their fifties were nurtured in their twenties on the ideals of international solidarity, Soviet ideological prowess, and the historic breakthrough of the Great October Revolution. And the surviving members of the Comintern generation were at one time intimately linked to Moscow by a web of personal and bureaucratic ties. Carrillo remarked revealingly in his speech to the Berlin conference, "today we have grown up." But adults rarely disavow their parents, however critical of their upbringing they may be in retrospect. Not only that, but it would be rather absurd for the West European CPs to break with the Soviet Union of the 1970s when they failed to do so in the 1930s or late 1940s. How could their leaderships explain such inconsistency to themselves, let alone their followers? Finally, unlike the Chinese and Yugoslav Communists, whose historical legitimacy is rooted in their lonely partisan struggles, the legitimizing matrix of the major West European CPs may be traced to events and time-frames that inextricably link them to the CPSU. The current PCI leaders proclaim themselves disciples of Gramsci and Togliatti. Yet both men are hailed in turn as one-time guardians of Comintern interests (Gramsci in the mid-1920s and Togliatti in the mid-1930s). The PCF acquired its mass base during the Popular Front era of the 1930s, a time when its Stalinist credentials were beyond reproach. The PCE emerged as a significant political movement only during the Spanish Civil War when it was perforce subordinated directly to Soviet power.

This brings us to the third question of residual pro-Sovietism. A rupture with the CPSU by any one of these Western CPs would be likely to provoke a schism in that party itself, encouraged all the while by the Soviets. The rank-and-file members who flock to the Soviet booths as local festivals of *l'Unita* and *l'Humanite*, who delight in cut-rate excursions to Moscow and Leningrad, would be incensed and bewildered. To be sure, pro-Soviet sentiments seem to be on the wane. Nevertheless, an undetermined number of older militants still harbor the ideological image of the "peoples' democracies" inculcated during the Cold War years and reinforced by their first-hand experience with the unemployment statistics and the staggering disparities in income distribution that prevailed in Mediterranean Europe during the early postwar years and

³³*L'Humanite*, February 5, 1976, p. 11.

continue in evidence to this day. Thus for Eurocommunist leaders to break with Moscow would mean to risk an undetermined degree of damage to the internal cohesion of their cadres. And they would also lose that aura of transcendent internationalism that must account for some of their devoted following.

In addition to the above reasons for continuing Eurocommunist ties to Moscow, there is what might be called a negative source of West European CP affinity with the CPSU, namely, the absence from their relationship of *nationalist* frictions. Here the Western CPs part company with their East European autonomist allies, the Romanians and Yugoslavs. To be sure, the Romanian and Yugoslav parties share a number of the CPSU's ideological views. The Romanian CP's historical matrix is also firmly rooted in the Third International, the Ceausescu regime's efforts to obscure that fact notwithstanding. But of residual pro-Sovietism there remains not a trace in terms of effective political influence. The reality of inter-state hostilities has exploded the myth of international Communist camaraderie and gone far in undermining what remains of ideological and historical ties with the CPSU. Indeed, the Romanian and Yugoslav leaderships' visceral insistence on sovereign independence and equality vis-a-vis Moscow constitutes the fundamental link between themselves and Peking.

For the Eurocommunists, on the other hand, the preservation of East-West detente takes precedence over rigid adherence to the principle of CP autonomy. This is true even in the case of the PCF and PCE who in the past deplored the status quo implications of detente. Baldly stated, the emergence of superpower detente was the essential precondition for the West European parties' political advances in recent years. By the same token, their claim to a share of domestic power is threatened by the deterioration of Soviet-American relations and the spectre of a return of Cold War polarization at the domestic as well as the international level. There are of course many reasons for the growing strains between Moscow and Washington during the second half of the 1970s. Peking's unabashed anti-detentiste posture, its attempt to rally the West to an anti-Soviet crusade (the mirror-image of its efforts to rally Moscow to an anti-imperialist crusade some two decades ago) is but one cause among many. Nevertheless, the critical importance to the Eurocommunists of a relaxation of international tensions helps explain their support for the Soviet position on the Sino-Vietnamese border war. And their alignment with Moscow on this issue underscores, in turn, the point that considerable political space remains for a mutuality of Soviet-Eurocommunist views.

REVIEW OF BOOKS

The Powers That Be. David Halberstam. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979.)

The Powers That Be, the extensive analysis of five media giants by David Halberstam, is, for the most part, a less-than-flattering portrayal of the methods used by CBS, *Time*, *The Washington Post*, and the *Los Angeles Times* to gain their holds on the American media system and a sharply critical comment on their approaches to the dissemination of information to the American Public. *The New York Times*, the fifth medium discussed, is the only corporate entity which is presented as having performed in a consistently responsible way in its rise to and its stay at the top of the newspaper world, thus avoiding the criticism leveled at its counterparts by the author.

Halberstam traces the history of his subjects in terms of performance at times of historical importance (elections, Watergate, the Vietnam War, World War II) and through an analysis of the lives and behavior of persons responsible for making them powerful, influential, and wealthy. The author finds as a general theme in performance, the attitude of those in power that what will make a profit is what should be used as the criterion for "objectivity" in presenting content to the public. He finds in terms of the "human factor" that *these media* rose to power and wealth under the direction of overpoweringly dictatorial individuals, some of whom seem to have been driven by compulsions that could be labeled as bizarre, and, possibly, mentally debilitating.

William Paley, the founder of CBS and still Chairman of the Board, is defined quite harshly as the author's writing develops. He is pictured as a user of people, discarding them (even "friends") after they have served their purpose—which usually meant after they had helped CBS to rise in the corporate world of media. Halberstam elaborates on this point in a thorough presentation of the conflict between Paley and Edward R. Murrow, which culminated in very shabby treatment by CBS of one of its greatest stars.

Paley is presented as one interested only in profits. Media content was secondary, and social responsibility was tolerated, but only if it did not interfere with profits. He also is characterized as an ego-maniacal, insecure individual who isolates himself from the business he nurtured and, to a great extent, from reality by his great wealth and princely lifestyle. Halberstam indicates that CBS's development as a media power can be attributed in great part to Paley's character and attitudes, but so can the network's shortcomings, mistakes, and lapses of social sensitivity.

The author reserves his most acid comments for the Chandler family of Los Angeles, owners of the *Los Angeles Times*. Without belaboring the point, he demonstrates that their lack of professionalism in the journalistic tradition, their greed, and their robber-baron tactics when California was growing from the 1930's to the 1960's were the direct causes of their paper once being labeled nationwide as the second worst newspaper in print. The family is shown conclusively to have used the "power of the press" for their own benefit, often to the detriment of the people their newspaper was to serve. There is even ample hinting of illegality in their methods.

Only under Otis Chandler, the current publisher, has the paper developed social responsibility and gained respectability. Halberstam reveals, however, that these changes have been met with severe opposition, and the road has

been rough for Otis and his ideas. However, he has succeeded in changing the paper for the better.

Henry Luce, like Paley, also was a driven man, but he was driven by political fervor not profits. *Time* magazine reflected his compulsions just as CBS reflected Paley's. As the son of a missionary, Luce, raised in China, hated communism and insisted that *Time* hate communism also. The objectivity of the magazine, therefore, was affected by its publisher.

In his relationship with his reporters, Luce was dogmatic. The love/hate contact between him and Theodore White reflected the complexities of Luce, showing that his political fanaticism could destroy his feelings for others and even place the credibility of his magazine in jeopardy. Luce does, however, fare better in Halberstam's writing than does Paley, the profit-maker.

The most tragic chapters of analysis are devoted to the *Washington Post* under its dynamic and tragically ill publisher Phil Graham, a manic-depressive who committed suicide in 1963 and was replaced as publisher by Kay, his wife. Brilliant and businesslike, Phil Graham, nonetheless, was capable of using his newspaper as a weapon whenever he chose to do so. Like Paley, Graham was motivated by profit, but only because profit showed that he was a "success" in his own right and not just the son-in-law of Eugene Meyer, the owner of the newspaper and Kay's father.

Paradoxically, as the *Washington Post* grew in reputation and financial stability, its charismatic publisher sank into severe mental illness. It remained for the newspaper to reach its greatest power under the direction of his widow, who had been tormented by her husband's ridicule ("Do you know the first thing that Kay does every morning? She looks in the mirror and says how lucky she is to be married to me.")—said Phil at a dinner party shortly after their marriage), his public affairs, and his mental instability.

On the positive side, the *New York Times* is given a good review in its rise to the top of the newspaper world. In Halberstam's opinion, the Ochs and Sulzberger families were dedicated to making their newspaper the best one published. To this end, they insisted upon social responsibility and balanced reporting in what was printed, the hiring of the best reporters, and constant attention by themselves and all who worked for them to the image of the *New York Times*.

It also becomes clear in Halberstam's writing that the proprietors of the *Times* are, unlike those in control of the other four mediums mentioned in the book, remarkably free of fanaticism either to profit-making or restrictive ideology. Much of the clear-headedness in the operation of the *Times* seems to be attributable to their desire through several generations of ownership and control to let the professionals hired by them do what they are hired to do (present the news) without insisting that the reporters bend the content to fit the publisher's biases and causes. The Ochs-Sulzberger dynasty plays an active role in running the enterprise, but they do not use it as an extension of the family or its views.

An interesting aspect of *The Powers That Be* is Halberstam's treatment of the professionals in the media. His analysis finds the strong and the weak, the good and the bad. In analyzing the practitioners of their crafts, Halberstam spends much time depicting the struggle between what he considers to be a

media saint, Edward R. Murrow, and the CBS hierarchy, personified by William Paley. The author details the craftsmanship and quality that Murrow brought to his job as opposed to the pettiness and greed shown by CBS. It is clear that the author considers Murrow to be a type of hero, professionalism battling against irresponsibility.

Halberstam also treats Walter Cronkite and Dan Rather well. Again, it is clear that he admires Cronkite for what he has brought to his profession and for what he is—a principled practitioner of his trade. While perhaps not admiring Rather as much as Cronkite or Murrow, Halberstam makes it evident that he likes Rather's toughness and professionalism even in the face of tremendous pressure for him not to take the path that he has chosen in doing a story. Halberstam seems to like those who "rock the boat" a bit, especially when the boat needs rocking.

Kyle Palmer of the *Los Angeles Times*, James Aubrey of CBS, and Frank Stanton of CBS occupy the opposite end of the evaluative scale. Halberstam uses them as examples of much of what is and was wrong in the media. They are shown to be, by and large, unprincipled, opportunistic, and even dangerous in their views of how media should operate and why. The author also seems to indicate that this type of individual may be more prevalent in media than the kind personified by Murrow, Cronkite, and Rather.

Halberstam's style is readable and interesting, quite necessary in a book of 736 pages. It is evident that he has done much research in compiling his material. The sheer organizational task of so much data was a tremendous task, as evidenced by the fact that the book took seven years of writing time. The interspersal of the solid fact and the gossipy anecdote makes for reader interest, but may also be the book's major shortcoming. As with other modern writers, namely Woodward and Bernstein, the author is addicted to using direct quotes in his writing, quotes that may have been uttered years ago, yet are recalled verbatim by individuals in the book. One wonders how accurate these statements are or the circumstances in which they occurred, because memories usually dim as time goes by. Complete recall, most would agree, is difficult at best, perhaps impossible in the everyday events of life. Thus, the credibility of some of the best aspects of the book may be in question.

The Powers That Be and its value also must be viewed in terms of the author himself. What particular biases did he bring to the writing of this book, if any? He has been very much involved with the media in his career. Has his involvement colored his writing? One can only speculate about distortion, but it is interesting that the *New York Times*, one of Halberstam's former employers, is the one subject in the book to be treated kindly. The reader must decide the question of fairness himself.

Halberstam indicates, while indicting, that these media giants are and have been evolving. They have shown change in their operational behavior because the persons controlling them have changed. The old tyrannical Chandlers are gone. Luce has died. Kay Graham is not Phil Graham. Only William Paley still holds on, and he is old, very old. When new persons have gained control, the image of each of these media entities has been altered. The new do not think like the old. In every case, the change has been beneficial, the author indicates.

The power of each medium may be as great or greater than it has been in the

past, but the power is used more responsibly. These media institutions never will be weak or powerless. Therefore, one comes away from this book feeling that it is far better for the power to be used more sensitively (as it appears to be now) than the way that the power was used as these media forces fought their way to the top in the world of information dissemination—ruthlessly and irresponsibly.

MICHAEL E. STANLEY
*Department of Speech and
Mass Communication
Towson State University*

Russia, the Soviet Union, and the United States: An Interpretive History.
John Lewis Gaddis. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1978.)

John Lewis Gaddis, Professor of History at Ohio University, has written a brief survey, an "interpretive history" of Russian-American relations from the American War for Independence until 1976. The book is part of a series, "America and the World," edited by Robert A. Divine and published by John Wiley and Sons. Divine claims in the "Foreword" to this volume that Gaddis' work is a "comprehensive account" which offers a "balanced and perceptive understanding" of a complex topic.

In general, the book is a useful, concise summary of how the United States perceived the foreign policies of Russia and the Soviet Union. It is an extremely well-written and lucid account and Gaddis offers the reader numerous interesting observations.

Gaddis' approach to this controversial topic, however, is extraordinarily one-sided. It is by no stretch of the imagination a "balanced" account. Far from it. If Gaddis had stated that his sole intention had been to present a brief overview of how United States governments have seen the foreign policy aspirations of Russia and the Soviet Union, he would have succeeded admirably. But the book consists primarily of a discussion of American foreign policy *vis-a-vis* Russia. While the book tells us much about the American position, we are told very little about Russian foreign policy.

Take, for example, Chapter III: "The Russian Revolution, 1917-1920." It should have been called: "How Woodrow Wilson Sought to Solve the Problem of the Bolshevik Revolution." Page after page explains how Wilson was looking for a way to deal with the Russian Marxists. Lenin's and Trotsky's policies are scarcely mentioned. When Gaddis does briefly refer to the foreign policy of the Bolsheviks, he cited the American Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, not Lenin or Trotsky. The chapter covers the civil war and foreign intervention, events which have had a significant bearing on how the Soviet leadership has seen the world, especially the United States, since then. Yet Gaddis tells us virtually nothing on how these events affected the behaviour of the Bolsheviks. Not surprisingly, the chapter is based almost exclusively on sources published in the United States; only two of the 62 footnotes contain Soviet sources. This criticism pertains to other chapters as well. This failure to consider the Soviet Union's point of view is at first irksome but it soon becomes an annoyance of the first magnitude.

At times it appears as if Gaddis has willfully ignored Soviet publications on the topic. In his "Bibliographical Essay," he repeats the time-worn argument that Soviet sources are "much less accessible" than American sources. True enough. But there is no shortage of primary and secondary sources published in the Soviet Union that explain the foreign policy of Soviet Russia. A scholar does not have to accept the Soviet arguments, but he must deal with them. And Gaddis has frequently refused to do so. Ironically, the statement that the lack of Soviet sources makes it difficult to analyze Soviet foreign policy is a recent one. Not too long ago, especially during the 1950s and 1960s, scholars as a rule have had no difficulty in writing about this topic. There existed, they have pointed out, a wealth of evidence from which to evaluate the Communists'

behaviour: Stalin's speeches, *Pravda*, diatribes by Vyshinskii, books, articles, pronouncements by Party members, etc., etc.

Gaddis explains in his "Preface" that in such a book it would be "inappropriate" to present a "detailed examination of historiographical disputes." But should an "interpretative history" not seek to deal with these issues? To be sure the discussion cannot be "detailed;" after all the text runs a mere 279 pages. But it cannot be avoided. A few examples: Gaddis treats the Yalta Conference in slightly more than one page and never mentions Stalin's stand on Poland. Yet it was the Yalta Conference that led to the initial breakdown of cooperation between the wartime allies. Gaddis chastizes Stalin for mistrusting American efforts to negotiate a German surrender to American troops. Scholars have shown, however, that Stalin had good reason for his leery attitude. Some Americans did, after all, seek a German surrender to keep the Red Army out of Central Europe. The highly controversial question of the use of atomic weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki is dismissed in a few sentences and with the conclusion that the United States had no choice in the matter. Gaddis covers the Truman Doctrine in less than a page by telling the reader that United States intervention in Greece was justified. Did not Stalin hold certain views on the Greek civil war, a conflict he did not create but was held responsible for by Truman? In discussing the Cuban Missile Crisis, Gaddis sees no connection between the CIA-sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion and the nuclear confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. To him they are separate incidents. Yet time and again Gaddis cites in his notes the books of historians who have offered a different point of view.

One final example: Gaddis states that the United States offered Stalin economic assistance under the Marshall Plan, "but with the expectation, which proved to be correct, the it would be turned down." But why did Stalin behave so predictably? Gaddis does not say. Yet it was this rejection, liberal historians have told us in the 1950s and 1960s, before revisionist historians raised their voices, that marked the end of all cooperation between the Western nations and the Soviet Union and which marks the beginning of the Cold War.

In short, *Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States* falls short of its professed goal. It tells the story of one protagonist but not the other.

HARRY PIOTROWSKI
Associate Professor
History Department
Towson State University

Hitler: The Man and the Military Leader. Percy Ernst Schramm. (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1971.)

Percy Ernst Schramm's *Hitler: The Man and Military Leader* is an exciting in-depth analysis of Adolf as a person and as Führer of the Third Reich. Using first-hand information acquired from his work in the Reich archives, and as the official stenographer of Oberkommando Wehrmacht, Dr. Schramm brings to light many facts about Hitler which have been hitherto unknown. The private table conversations between Hitler, Bormann, and their shadowy intimates in the Bavarian Berghof and the Wolf's Lair are of particular interest.

It was in these highly secretive locales that Hitler and his circle of comrades convened to discuss matters of policy and ideology before thrusting them on the German people. Schramm, possessing the talents of an historian, combined with those of a stenographer, has captured these conversations verbatim, and added his own rather remarkable insights. The result is an extremely authoritative, concise, and readable work.

There is an excellent introduction to the work by Donald S. Detwiler, a long-time student and understudy of Schramm, that provides a summary of Schramm's wartime duties and experiences in the Wehrmacht. Detwiler also explains that Schramm's preliminary essay is entitled "Anatomy of a Dictator", not "Diagnosis of a Dictator". The former provides a key to understanding Adolf Hitler, without lapsing into an opinionated treatise on political morality.

Detwiler also reveals that this is the first work of Schramm's to be published that concerns the twentieth century. Percy Ernst Schramm is chiefly a reknowned and scholarly medievalist who has written many books and articles on popes, kings, and other nobility, and how they viewed themselves. This technique achieves interesting results when applied to an autocrat such as Adolf Hitler.

"Anatomy of a Dictator" is an outline of Hitler's personality and ideology as the leader of the German people. It includes everything from his physical characteristics to his ethical ambivalence; his relationships with friends, views about women and society, lifetime resentments, artistic tastes, his general knowledge, ego, and that little-known commodity, health.

The first realization one receives after reading this biography is Hitler was the victim of a very narrow, outdated mind. The degree of narrowness can be clearly understood, as all fanatics and demagogues possess it in varying quantities. What comes as a bit of a surprise, however, is that Hitler viewed the crucial decades of 1930 and 1940 with the eyes and mind of a man straight out of the Wilhelmine period.

Since the world after 1918 did not appeal to him, he chose to ignore it. As a result, he harbored stagnated attitudes about foreign countries and people—despised his contemporary culture, and like most repressive despots in history, wished to return to some romanticized time in the past. To Hitler, that was the time of comradeship, struggle, and common effort in the trenches of World War I. In essence, his fondest memories were of the war—and so he strove to perpetuate it.

The table conversations deal with all manner of subjects, including the ideas that formulated Hitler's concept of destiny and willpower. Schramm points out that Hitler's philosophy was basically monistic, similar to that professed by Ernst Haekle. This accounts for his atheistic and social darwinistic tendencies. However, ambivalent as ever, Hitler also believed in "Providence"—a vague, all-encompassing force which was his personal benefactor.

Schramm says that it was a combination of providence, social darwinian "law of the jungle", and the pseudo-scientific race theory that was at the root of Hitler's concept of personal willpower. Hitler practiced and believed that the law of nature was the only universal law, whereby the leaders of a superior people had not only the right, but the obligation to take what they desired by tooth and claw. This concept was heavily reinforced in Hitler's mind by his *misreading* of Friedrich Nietzsche; particularly *Beyond Good and Evil*, and *The Will To Power*.

Thus Hitler's morality centered around a pure form of Machiavellianism that was devoid of any scruples. It was also devoid of any feelings of sympathy or empathy with his fellow man. Schramm quoted Helmuth Greiner, his predecessor as diarist, and occasional dinner companion of Hitler as saying: "I have never heard a word come over his lips which even suggested that he had a warm or compassionate heart." Hitler was obsessed with the idea of emotional rigidity, and prided himself in remaining "eiskalt" during the most trying of situations.

In spite of the volumes of negative aspects which have been written about Hitler, Schramm also saw a brighter side. Hitler did not have the lack of emotions which he believed he did. Hitler had a genuine love for children and animals, and was very close to those men with whom he identified as soldiers. He also helped Germany to recover her place in world politics in the mid 1930's which helped him to earn the love and respect of the majority of the German people.

Schramm ultimately presents a very unbiased view in looking at both the good and bad aspects of Adolf Hitler. Donald Detwiler remarks that *Hitler: The Man and the Military Leader* is not very popular in Germany, because the public there is unwilling to read about Hitler in any but the harshest light. Schramm, rather than off-handedly condemning the man, simply relates the record of his actions. As a result, the work appears to be about as objective as is humanly possible.

Schramm's objectivity reaches its zenith when describing Adolf Hitler, the military leader. Here he emphasises that Hitler's role as Commander-in-chief of the German army gradually changed from 1939 to 1945, because Hitler himself changed radically in those six years. After the success of Heinz Guderian's Blitzkrieg in Poland, France, Norway, the low countries, and the Balkans; Hitler's self confidence soared to an immeasurable degree. In only two years he had changed from being an outlaw gangleader of a defeated country, to a tremendously successful military leader with a string of impressive victories.

Hitler, by 1941, had shown his countrymen and the world that he was as competent a general as he was a statesman. In his seven years in power he had not lost a single land battle. Schramm suggests, quite understandably, that a

career such as this would undoubtedly effect one's ego. Thus, in the winter of 1941-42, when Hitler appeared to be making all of the correct decisions, such as forming his army into defensive hedge-hogs around Moscow, while his generals contemplated the wrong ones, he made a drastic and impromptu decision.

He relieved Field Marshal Von Brauschisch from command of OKW and assumed personal command of the Wehrmacht. This command was not relinquished until Hitler shot himself in May of 1945. He was thus responsible, for better or worse, for the final word on *all* military decisions made in the Third Reich.

Schramm's record says that this centralization of command was in some ways quite necessary after 1943 when Germany was fighting a "poor man's war", and that Hitler only sped up the process of disintegration. But the net result was that he dominated all decision making and used his generals as highly paid non-commissioned officers. He refused to allow his subordinates any freedom of action whatsoever, and succeeded in destroying most personal initiative for the remainder of the war.

According to Schramm, Hitler thought this to be highly desirable for two reasons. First, he thought he knew more about conducting warfare than the military specialists of the general staff; and secondly, he harbored a great mistrust of officers representing the old Prussian aristocracy. His worst fears came true in 1944 when Colonel Von Stauffenberg and a group of anti-nazis attempted to assassinate him. Hitler was not at all surprised to find large numbers of staff officers involved in the attempted coup.

At this time, says Schramm, the Hitlerian system of checks and balances came into being. That is, every department in the Reich began to watch every other department, with the SS delegated to role of the chief watchdog.

To make a grim situation worse, the army found itself on the defensive on all fronts in 1944, due to the many reversals in the U.S.S.R. Afterwards, there were many instances when the generals had to either retreat, or be engulfed by masses of the allied armies. It was at this time that Hitler sought to remove the word retreat, or "straightening of the front", from the German language. A good example of this is revealed in Walter Goerlitz's *History of The German General Staff*, that demonstrates the consequences of acting on one's own initiative. General Von Sponek, a subordinate under Von Kleist in the Caucasus, retreated on his own order in the face of an enormous Russian offensive. Within one week, Sponek found himself dismissed from the army, and confined to a military prison. Such action was enough of an example for most generals to shut up, sit tight, and let the Fuhrer run the war.

The reason for Hitler's obsession with holding ground was that he believed it looked bad for an army to retreat. Prestige should actually be one of the last considerations when making a military decision, but with Hitler, it was the first. Hitler's major drawback as a military commander was that he was much too concerned with public opinion. A second major flaw, says Schramm, is that Hitler's decisions not to withdraw was also based on his First World War experiences. He believed that rear areas held a magnetic force to the front-line troops, and any attempt to order a retreat before it was absolutely necessary would have an avalanche effect. That is, an orderly retreat could

turn into a panic-stricken rout.

Schramm does not let up here however, but goes on to a heavy criticism of the wavebreak doctrine that Hitler issued concerning fortified areas. The doctrine suggested that the forces within a fortified defensive position should never retreat under *any* circumstances—even if they became surrounded. This doctrine could only have worked in the event of a limited siege. In most cases, the fortress was bypassed and isolated—supply was cut off, and the troops within were forced to surrender or starve.

Hitler cared little about this however, and when General Otto Lasch surrendered Königsberg on April 9, 1945 to the Soviets (because there was no one left to offer resistance), Hitler had him condemned to death. Since Lasch was already a prisoner of war, the sentence was carried out on his next of kin.

Just as remarkable is Schramm's assertion that Hitler began having doubts of winning his war in 1942. Schramm attributes this information to General Jodl, Hitler's chief confidant throughout the war. In spite of this, Hitler would not contemplate surrender. Victory, he thought, would come to the side that exhibited the greatest amount of perseverance. He still hoped irrationally for the creation of some miracle weapon, that would save Germany in the nick of time. By mid 1944 however, the vast majority of his manpower and miracle weapons had been devastated by the allied onslaught; and he lost every vestige of time, or a peace settlement, that he might have had.

MONTGOMERY J. PHAIR,
B.A., Towson State University

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