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The study of international affairs as an academic discipline no longer belongs exclusively to the specialists in that field; rather, its scope has been extended to include the work of other related disciplines in recognition of the fact that international problems are not exclusively political in nature. It is the purpose of this journal to speak on matters involving international problems with many academic voices. More important, it is the purpose of this journal to permit undergraduate students to try their wings in describing, analyzing, and possibly suggesting solutions to the problems that have vexed nations in their contacts with each other.

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DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD A UNITED GERMANY

James D. Johnk*

The United States entered the second World War with a certain hesitancy and a basic desire not to make specific commitments on local questions of postwar settlement with respect to East Central Europe. A lack of identity was evident in United States policy; that is, there was a desire to actively cooperate with the Allied powers but without a clear view as to where she stood in relation to the other powers, most especially Great Britain and the Soviet Union. The United States now found herself in a situation which necessarily forced her to abandon her self-imposed semi-isolationism. For this reason she was diplomatically immature and ill equipped to handle effectively the developing situations with which she now had to contend. Therefore, any policies hinging on postwar settlements for Central Europe were actually devoid of effective and relevant precedent upon which to fall back. The United States as the newcomer to international intrigue was forced to slowly and painfully seek out its interests and develop appropriate policies from scratch.

United States policy makers did foresee the obvious drawbacks to any premature commitments. There was the initial fear that the allies might squabble over the spoils and would perhaps contribute to the war effort only until their particular aims had been met. There was the further realization that a Soviet military collapse was a possibility and such a collapse would drastically alter the complexion of the war. Most important was the hope that the mistakes of World War I, when several secret treaties and commitments severely jeopardized the peace settlement, would not be repeated. With these points in mind the United States sought to place top priority on merely winning the war.

Apart from these political considerations, the United States, in the early years of the war, was quite aware of her military weakness. Therefore, she did not feel that she could argue hard or effectively with the Soviet Union which sought firm territorial guarantees. In May of 1942, the Anglo-Soviet twenty year treaty was signed. The treaty did omit any territorial guarantees, but this was only because of American insistence. The British had been willing to make concessions to the Soviets but the arguments of Roosevelt and Cordell Hull persuaded them to do otherwise.[1] The Americans felt that granting a territorial guarantee in this case would establish precedent for later claims.

The formulation of a definite United States policy in Europe was further hampered by the fear that the American public would oppose any post-war involvement. The Roosevelt administration,

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[1] Stephen D. Kertesz (ed.), *The Fate of East Central Europe* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1956), p. 53.

therefore, was forced to operate initially on the premise that American troops would return to the United States immediately after the war. This possibility of an American post-war withdrawal greatly vexed the British. They maintained a far more realistic outlook on the European situation than the Americans and foresaw quite early that any future European conflict would pit Britain against the Soviet Union. Without American cooperation, the British felt they could not possibly defend Western Europe. Roosevelt was asked to reconsider the American stand.

The United States, despite its no-commitment policy, did seek to establish some pronouncements of joint war aims of the allied powers. From their efforts toward allied unity, evolved the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Charter. Both were agreed to by the Soviet Union in the Moscow Declaration of November 1, 1943.[2] This acceptance brought about quick response by Secretary Hull in an address to Congress in November of 1943.

> As the provisions of the Four Nation Declaration are carried into effect, there will no longer be need for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power, or any other of the special arrangements through which, in the unhappy past, the nations strove to safeguard their security or to promote their interests.[3]

The optimism expressed by Hull is perhaps indicative of the U.S. attitude during the war and for a few years after it. The U.S. saw the allied cohesion resulting from a common enemy as a foundation for future cooperation. That perhaps this cooperation could terminate and reverse itself was not fully visualized due to U.S. naiveté.

At both the Moscow and the Teheran Conference in late 1943, the U.S. expressed the belief that the most important step was to get Soviet support for basic policies. These were identified as a policy for Germany and establishment of the United Nations. The U.S. felt that with Soviet agreement on these policies, the future of East Central Europe could be resolved with relative ease. It is interesting to note that as early as the summer of 1942 a paper was prepared by the State Department favoring a European unification plan but was discarded as it was pointed out that this did not correspond to general U.S. thinking. This resulted not because of a suspicion of any European unity, which had been viewed in an economic sense; but rather in the U.S. determination that any post-war policy must receive a firm agreement from the Soviet Union.[4] Thus, it is apparent that concern for Soviet wishes governed American policy long before such intentions were officially proclaimed.

American reluctance to assert herself again became evident prior to 1944 as she opposed the acceptance of any area outside of her own theater of command. East Central Europe was always considered

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[2] *Ibid*, p. 56.

[3] *Ibid*, p. 58.

[4] Max Beloff, *The United States and the Unity of Europe* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1963), p. 2.

as a British sphere by the U.S. due to the governments-in-exile in London. The U.S. staunchly opposed a proposal to move these governments to Washington.[5] The United States exhibited her inability to understand existing power relationships as she delegated all negotiations over the Eastern European area to the British and the Soviet Union. Secretary of State Hull did acknowledge the fact that the U.S. was not really concerned about this area of Europe, at least when compared to the "big" issues.[6] This apparent unconcern certainly did not indicate American desire to see Eastern Europe dominated by the Soviets but, it did encourage the Soviet Union to apply pressure on Britain at the negotiating table. The U.S. did not seem to realize that the British power was hopelessly overextended and that she could in no way withstand the Soviet challenge. Thus in 1944, several armistices were concluded in Eastern Europe with the installation of massive Soviet power. These included Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. The Allied Control Commission in these areas would be under the general direction of the Soviet High Command. The British were forced to agree that this arrangement would exist only until the cessation of hostilities with Germany. From the time of the end of hostilities to the signing of peace treaties, no provision for the Allied Central Commission was made.[7] This obviously placed complete post-war control in the hands of the Soviets.

It was not until the Yalta Conference on February 3-11, 1945, that the U.S finally realized that it had to take an active rather than a passive interest in the area. It became quite evident that the U.S. could no longer wait for a post-war conference to settle the various issues regarding European liberation and occupation. The State Department drafted detailed recommendations which were to hopefully express a positive U.S. policy designed to safeguard the independence of Eastern Europe. A Declaration on Liberated Europe was drafted and a plan for a four-power Emergency High Commission for Liberated Europe was devised to carry out the declaration. Roosevelt presented the Declaration at Yalta and it was accepted with few changes. But for some unknown reason he did not present the plan for the Emergency High Commission.

Roosevelt's deletion gave rise to a great deal of speculation since no official explanation was offered. It has been suggested that Roosevelt feared antagonizing the Soviets and thereby losing their participation in the war against Japan. (The Soviets had not yet declared war on Japan and did so only on August 8, two days after the first atomic bomb was dropped.) The second suggestion alludes to a Roosevelt dislike for the inclusion of the French Provisional Government as had been proposed. Neither suggestion has been verified.[8] Regardless of the reason, it represented the last opportunity for the U.S. to assert itself effectively in matters pertaining to Eastern Europe. The Soviets were, therefore, in no way convinced

[5] Kertesz, p. 64.

[6] *Ibid*, p. 65.

[7] *Ibid*, p. 67.

[8] *Ibid*, p. 68.

of a sincere U.S. attitude and interest; and embarked on vigorous policies to fulfill their own interests and solidify their positions.

The prime concern of the U.S. all along seemed to be the future of post-war Germany at the expense of Eastern Europe. This seems to be supported by the fact that by the time of the Potsdam Conference, although Truman no longer had to fear loss of Soviet participation against Japan, he felt he could not exert great pressure on the Soviets with regard to Eastern Europe. He feared the Soviets might hamper any negotiations for an agreement on post-war policies toward Germany which he regarded as urgent. Yet when the Soviets at Potsdam demanded recognition of Soviet-dominated governments in Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria, Truman insisted vehemently that recognition would not be granted until a free government was established, free of external pressure. The new U.S. stand at Potsdam came as somewhat of a surprise and did slow Soviet progress in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, the Soviets had progressed so far already and were confident in their policies. Further U.S. protests proved ineffectual.[9]

The U.S. had finally realized that reliance on Britain to conduct the European matters had been a mistake. By the time the U.S. sought to assert herself, Britain was far too committed to a division-of-spheres policy to be of any support for the U.S. attempt. The only recourse left was to pick up the pieces and try to salvage some gains from the Soviets.

The Yalta Conference also bore a direct relation to Germany. It was agreed that the forces of the three major powers were to occupy a separate zone of Germany. France was to be invited to take a zone if she so desired. A Central Control Commission was established consisting of the Supreme Commanders with a headquarters in Berlin.[10]

The seriousness with which the U.S. took the Yalta agreements was shown in a restricted directive to the U.S. Commander in Chief in Germany two months after the conference. The directive privately suggests to the commander that the U.S. does in fact recognize the Control Commission as the supreme organ of control over Germany and that each commander was to follow its directives. The prime effort of the U.S. commander should be toward decentralizing the political and administrative structures and develop regional, local and municipal agencies. He was also to adopt measures to effectuate the equal distribution of essential commodities in the zones.[11]

The U.S. aims in the preceding directive were discussed, formalized and accepted by the four powers at the Potsdam Conference in August of 1945. It was agreed that as far as practical there would be uniform treatment of the German population throughout Germany.

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[9] *Ibid*, p. 90.

[10] Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, Yalta Conference, Sec. 2 *Occupation and Control* (Paragraphs 2 and 3).

[11] Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, *Directive to Commander in Chief of U.S. Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of Germany.* (JCS 1067/6, April 26, 1945) (Sec. 3).

The powers agreed to prepare for eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis. The administration of affairs in Germany was to be directed towards a decentralization of the political structure and the development of local responsibliity. All democratic political parties with rights of assembly and public discussion would be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany. Representative and elective principles would be introduced into regional, provincial and state administrations as rapidly as possible depending upon success. And finally, no central German government would be established; but in areas of finance, transport, communications, foreign trade and industry, central administrative agencies would be established.[12]

It must be noted that the Potsdam Agreement did not establish a specific time wherein the various aspects were to be enacted. Application of the provisions was to be as soon as possible, requiring quadripartite agreement to determine when the proper time had arrived. The U.S., attempting to gain some measure of success from the Potsdam Agreement expressed either (it is difficult to ascertain which) impatience with or doubt about the agreement. About a year after Potsdam, the U.S. initiated a move to prompt action on the implementation of the Potsdam principles. It is possible that the U.S. became resigned to the fact that the Potsdam agreements would not be fulfilled, yet there is still optimism in the statement.

On July 20, 1946, the U.S. issued a statement inviting the other occupying powers to join in an economic fusion with the U.S. zone. The U.S. was of the opinion that no zone is self-sustaining. A union of two or more zones would improve conditions in the zones involved. This union would be in effect only until the quadripartite agreement, which would permit the application of the Potsdam decision to treat all of Germany as an economic unit, could be reached.[13] The U.S. also proposed administrative arrangements in fields of transport, finance, communication, industry and foreign trade with any other zone. It was hoped that these arrangements would develop into the central agencies agreed upon at Potsdam. Throughout this proposal, the U.S. stressed the point that it was not trying to divide Germany but merely promoting its treatment as an economic unit.

The dispute over the creation of a central German government continued. The U.S., in order to break the stalemate, proposed in the spring of 1946 a twenty-five year treaty for the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany. The proposal was voiced by Secretary of State Byrnes and rejected by Molotov, because in his opinion it was first necessary to set up a German government and then obtain a peace treaty with that government for demilitarization.[14]

Through January of 1947, the U.S. had been involved in many of these merry-go-round discussions in which little was accomplished. The U.S. through this period, had always felt compelled to act in

[12] Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, *Potsdam Agreement*, August 2, 1945 (Sec. III, Germany, A. Political Principles, 2, 3, 9).

[13] Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, *Statement by U.S. Member Inviting Other Members to Join in an Economic Fusion with the U.S. Zone*, (Appendix "A" to CONL/M (46) 19), July 20, 1946.

[14] Ferenc A. Vali, *The Quest for a United Germany* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 14.

conjunction with allied, particularly Soviet, approval. With General George C. Marshall succeeding Byrnes in the State Department, this attitude changed and a new era of diplomacy evolved. Marshall viewed lack of western allied power as a deterrent to effective diplomacy. He noted that in May of 1945 the U.S. had 3,500,000 men in 68 divisions and 149 air groups in Europe. Only ten months later, in March of 1946, the U.S. had only 400,000 men, no air force, and a homeland reserve of planes totaling 550 planes with 175 first class pilots. During this time, the British only maintained two divisions in Germany.[15] Marshall hoped to correct this military imbalance with the Soviet Union to be able to continue talks from a position of strength.

In June of 1947, a State Department memorandum was issued. It was authored by a group under the direction of Charles Kindelberger, an expert on the position in Germany. The memorandum fostered the idea of European integration through a political approach. If active cooperation would not be possible with the Soviets, then the friendly areas of Western Europe would have to be strengthened. There were two objectives. The first was to try for a degree of cooperation from the Soviets to perhaps eventually permit such things as international control and reduction of armaments. The second objective was to secure certain strategic advantages and deny such advantages to the Soviet Union so that in case of war, western chances of winning would be greatly enhanced. The general tone is best expressed by the following passage from the memorandum.

> Like all United States foreign policy, policy in Germany is of necessity afflicted with the schizoid attitude toward the Soviet Union: solidarity forever if at all possible, but a well-protected flank if not.[16]

The memorandum concludes with a very general statement of U.S. policy.

> All U.S. policies for German recovery should be tested not only according to their contribution to recovery in Germany and to the reduction of the U.S. financial burden in Germany, but also according to their contributions to European recovery and to the reduction of the U.S. burden in Europe generally.[17]

Under George Marshall's direction, the U.S. embarked on further policies which served to enlarge the breach between East and West. The first main policy was the Truman Doctrine. This merely signified a U.S. acceptance of responsibility for military and economic support in Greece and Turkey. The British had to relinquish the responsibility due to financial crises. Thus American power was now extended 1000 miles beyond the Soviet flank to the Black Sea and the Caucasus.[18]

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[15] Theodore H. White, *Fire in the Ashes—Europe in Mid-Century* (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1953), pp. 32-33.

[16] Beloff, p. 18.

[17] *Ibid.*

[18] White, p. 35.

The second policy consisted of the Marshall Plan, which was first publicly announced on June 5, 1947 at the Harvard commencement address. Marshall took the Plan with him to the London Foreign Ministers' Conference of December 1947. He had hoped to get Soviet assurances for a united Germany and a settlement for Austria. Instead, he found a hostile Molotov stating that there were no longer any grounds for discussion as it was quite clear to the Soviet Union that the Marshall Plan was an attempt to undermine the Soviet position in Eastern Europe.[19] This was the last Foreign Ministers' Conference at which attempts were made to gain any real Soviet cooperation based on the superficial alliance created during the war.

The U.S. continued efforts in behalf of her desire to see a stable united Germany. At the Washington Council of Foreign Ministers on April 5-8, 1949, the three western occupation powers entered into a Trizonal Fusion Agreement.

> The Governments of the United Kingdom, France and the United States agree to enter into a Trizonal Fusion Agreement prior to the entry into effect of the Occupation Statute. The representatives of the three occupying powers will make the necessary arrangements to establish tripartite control machinery for the western zone of Germany, which will become effective at the time of the establishment of a provisional German government.[20]

The Occupation Statute mentioned in the preceding statement was also drafted at the Washington Conference. It specified that the individual *Lander* or states were to be given full legislative, executive and judicial powers. Demilitarization, control of the Ruhr, foreign affairs and de-nazification would still be left to the occupying authorities. The statute would come into force on September 21, 1949.[21]

The Trizonal Agreement and the Occupation Statute both represented U.S. efforts towards the reconstruction of Germany despite Soviet intransigence and protests. The culmination of these efforts came in August of 1949, when the German Federal Republic (GFR) was formed in the three western zones. Eastern response was swift as on October 7, 1949, the Constitution of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was put into effect. According to General Chuikov, chairman of Soviet Control Commission, this was in response to the illegitimate establishment of a German Federal Republic in the West. He felt that the GFR was an attempt to aggravate the splitting of Germany.[22]

In response to the Soviet declaration, the Allied High Commission ardently defended the formation of the GFR on October 10, 1949. The Commission differentiated between the composition and

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[19] White, p. 39.

[20] Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, *Trizonal Fusion Agreement*, Washington, April 8, 1949.

[21] Beate Ruhm von Oppen (ed.), *Washington Three Power Meeting* (Cmd. 7677, p. 6), *Documents on Germany Under Occupation 1945-1954* (London: Oxford University Press, under auspices of Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1955), p. 375.

[22] Office of U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, *Declaration by General Vassily Chuikov, Chairman of Soviet Control Commission, on Formation of German Federal Republic*, October 8, 1949.

development of the GFR and the GDR and announced the illegality of the East zone government. The commission also cited a statement from the Washington Conference of Foreign Ministers.

> . . . a major objective of the three allied governments was to encourage and facilitate the closest integration, on a mutually beneficial basis, of the German people under a democratic federal state, within the framework of a European association.[23]

These exchanges constituted only the beginning of many such exchanges, most of which stressed the illegality of one or the other of the German governments. Any question of reuniting Germany through a four-power agreement seemed now to be obsolete. The U.S. now felt it necessary to consult with the GFR and by the same token the Soviets insisted that the GDR must be consulted and permitted to partake in any negotiations.

The establishment of both German governments also brought about a significant change in American strategy in Europe. Originally, the idea of German unification was considered as a weapon against further Soviet advances into Europe. But when the East Zone was made into a quasi-independent state, western views, particularly American, on unification changed. The U.S. now saw a need for incorporating Germany into its overall containment policy. Obviously, this meant placing a greater emphasis on defensive measures in West German and in West Berlin. By this change, the interests of the U.S. and West Germany were no longer in complete accord. Germany still granted top priority to German unity and still sought to maintain an offensive policy to attain it.[24]

In 1950, the U.S., with hopes for implementing another phase of its containment policy, obtained British and French agreement for a remilitarization of West Germany. This obviously exacted a strong Soviet protest in December of 1950 accompanied with a call for a four-power conference to devise plans for carrying out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration regarding German demilitarization. The U.S. termed this proposal as unrealistic and stated that the western desire to rearm West Germany was a last alternative security measure necessitated by the Soviet training of East German military units. The U.S. further deplored the general Soviet attitude since the war and stated that a conference designed to discuss the overall problems would be in order. It was hoped that such a conference would not be limited strictly to a discussion of Germany.[25]

This last point reflects the waning of U.S. interest in unification and an increased desire to develop an effective policy on a European scale, undoubtedly in conjunction with her policy of containment. It may be argued that the German question or even the European question was overshadowed by the U.S. desire to effect an understanding with the Soviet Union within the new bipolar balance of power.

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[23] Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, *Allied High Commission Statement on Formation of Germany Democratic Republic*, October 10, 1949.

[24] Vali, p. 245.

[25] Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, *U.S. Reply to Soviet Note of November 3, 1950 Regarding the Four Power Talks*, December 22, 1950.

Nevertheless, the U.S. continued to bolster the political prestige of the GFR by revising the Occupation Statute in March of 1951. This transferred to the Federal Government the authority to make decisions regarding competence in foreign affairs. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs was established and the Federal Government was made wholly responsible for its personnel. The Federal Government was also authorized to appoint official representatives in London, Washington and Paris and did not require allied approval to establish diplomatic representation in countries where it has already maintained consular offices.[26]

The Soviet Union at this time continued to submit proposals for unification of Germany. Two such proposals even advocated the withdrawal of all foreign troops from all of Germany within a year of formulation of a peace treaty. The Soviet Union obviously foresaw the growing military alliance in Europe and by neutralizing Germany hoped to split any such alliance. The U.S. rejected both proposals and counted on Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, to publicly restate American aims. He did so in a speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors on April 19, 1952. Acheson firmly reasserted the American rejection of both Soviet notes and reemphasized the U.S. desire for an all-German government based on free elections. He stated further that the three allied powers, with consultations of the GFR, were engaged in a great step forward toward building up the unity of Western Europe through a common defense policy and that it would continue. Acheson also noted the main points that had emerged from the Soviet discussions of elections and creation of a German government. First, the Soviets were unwilling to relax control over the East Zone. They would not even discuss ownership of vast East German industry. Secondly, the Soviet Union was bending every effort to infiltrate into Germany. Finally, the Soviet Union insisted that every major exercise of power by an all-German government would have to be open to Soviet veto.[27]

These last three points were intended to justify or explain the U.S. rejection of the Soviet proposals. Yet the Soviet note of March 10, 1952, to which Acheson chiefly addressed himself, seemed to contain more of the three points, least of all a veto provision for the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, this opened the way for U.S. leadership in negotiating the peace treaty with West Germany that was drafted on May 26, 1952. The Western powers retained only the right to station troops in Germany and the right of presence in Berlin.[28] This move on the part of the three western allies represented an independent move disregarding the Soviet proposals. It had been preceded by years of diplomatic bickering and was now seemingly resolved. Yet it took two years before the French decided not to ratify the treaty which therefore never did go into effect.

Official termination of the occupation regime finally came about upon the conclusion of the Paris Agreements on October 19-23, 1954. Until this time, the fate of Germany had been negotiated on equal

[26] Ruhm von Oppen, *Allied High Commission Decision No. 11: Competence of the Federal Government in the Field of Foreign Affairs*, March 6, 1951.
[27] Office of the High Commissioner for Germany, *Address by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Delivered Before the American Society of Newspaper Editors*, Washington, April 19, 1952.
[28] Vall, p. 30.

terms between the West and the Soviets. After 1954, the West Germans became free to negotiate, apart from the West, with the Soviets and to make any arrangements for unification it saw fit. West Germany has repeatedly insisted that reunification be decided by a free vote of the people and not by an outside power. The U.S. has supported this policy and also insists that a united Germany be permitted to refuse or join Nato or remain neutral.[29]

Without the occupation control over German policy, the U.S. had to adapt her own policies somewhat. She was now faced with wooing the West Germans into the western camp through their own initiative. This chore was rapidly accomplished with West German entry into Nato in 1955. Under the guise of Nato, the U.S. seemingly used West Germany to further U.S. policies. This is shown by the fact that the majority of Nato ground forces were German. U.S. defense policy rested primarily with the idea of nuclear retaliation. Yet the German troops were so deployed with non-nuclear capability so as to present an alternative to the Soviets. The Germans objected to this policy for they readily recognized the fact that even a short, localized war that did not escalate to a nuclear exchange, would leave German territory devastated. They, therefore, insisted only nuclear retaliation be offered to the Soviets as the price for aggression.[30]

From this question of nuclear weapons arose the Rapacki Plan in 1957. It was directed against the manufacture and presence of nuclear weapons in both Germanies. Poland and Czechoslovakia promised to follow suit. In May of 1958, the U.S. rejected the plan on the grounds that the plan had been defeated long ago by the policies of arming both Germanies for strength in the forward positions of the two blocks.[31] Thus the East and West, while proclaiming a desire for German unification, created a situation wherein unification seemed an impossibility.

Let us retrace our steps a few years to 1955, when the German Summit Meeting embarked on a discussion of German reunification. The four powers agreed that reunification was their responsibility and to be enacted through free elections. The West interpreted this flatly as a Soviet promise for elections; however, the Soviets maintained their own interpretation. They claimed that any further negotiations would have to include the East Zone and that any plan that would liquidate the East Zone government would not be acceptable. At the follow-up meeting in November of 1955, the Soviet concept of "free" elections was clarified for the West which had been puzzled by the loss of an apparent victory. The Soviets meant free "list" elections on the communist model. Molotov stated that truly free elections would merely turn the East Zone over to the West and thereby jeopardize the security of the Soviet Union. The Soviets in turn proposed an all-German council composed of representatives of the parliaments of both Germanies which would not "affect the

[29] Thomas K. Finletter, *Foreign Policy: the Next Phase The 1960's* (New York: published for Council on Foreign Relations by Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. 105.

[30] Peter Calvocoressi, *International Politics Since 1945* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 119.

[31] *Ibid*, p. 29.

social order of the German Democratic Republic or the German Federal Republic."[32]

It became quite obvious that the Soviets were seeking recognition for the East Zone by having them included in the negotiations. The Soviet view also became evident with respect to its concept of a united Germany, a Germany consisting of two distinct states joined only by a loose administrative council devoid of any real power. After the initial meeting in July of 1955, the Soviets obviously foresaw the questions that would be proposed at the follow-up meeting. They sought there, on September 20, 1955, to enhance the prestige of the GDR in the form of a treaty. The treaty stated that Soviet and GDR relations were based on full equality and mutual respect for each other's sovereignty. GDR was granted "freedom" to decide home and foreign policy including relations with the GFR. The treaty also specified that Soviet troops were in East Germany by the will of the GDR and in no way interfered in the internal affairs of the GDR. The combined fundamental aim was to achieve a peace settlement for all of Germany.[33]

The United States recognized the careful grooming the Soviets had given the GDR in preparation for their bid to have the GDR admitted as a negotiating partner. This acceptance would have been contrary to the U.S. contention that the government of the GDR constituted an illegal representative of the German people. Any acceptance of the GDR for the purpose of negotiating a German unification plan would be tantamount to official recognition. The U.S. at this time was not willing to admit to this possibility.

The Soviet reluctance to encourage a true unified Germany has been subject to considerable speculation. The fact that a united Germany, even if under a communist regime, would become second in power only to the Soviet Union in Europe, could be a factor in the hesitancy of the Soviets. A united Germany might well vie for influence in Eastern Europe with the Soviet Union and could perhaps present a setback to Soviet leadership, perhaps not as leader of the international communist movement but certainly in the economic sphere.[34]

Even after the rejection of Soviet proposals, the U.S. still found it necessary to assure West Germany of its support and state its continued acceptance of the thesis that Europe cannot be stable in the presence of a divided Germany. In a joint communique issued by President Johnson and Chancellor Erhard on June 13, 1964, the U.S. asserted that any negotiations conducted with the Soviet Union on related matters such as arms control, will not in any way prejudice reunification.[35]

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[32] Paul E. Zinner (ed.), "Treaty on Relations Between Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the German Democratic Republic," Moscow, September 20, 1955, in *Documents on American Foreign Relations 1955* (New York: published for Council on Foreign Relations by Harper and Brothers, 1956), p. 108.

[33] Thomas K. Finletter, *Foreign Policy: the Next Phase* (New York: published for Council on Foreign Relations by Harper and Brothers, 1958), p. 85.

[34] W. W. Kulski, *International Politics in a Revolutionary Age* (New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1968), p. 21.

[35] Vali, p. 250.

Although reunification is not the principal goal of the United States, it is sure to remain so for the Germans. Therefore the U.S. through the 1960's no longer actively sought reunification, but had to tread carefully so as not to upset new German initiatives in Eastern Europe. These new initiatives were begun under Kiesinger and revolve around recognition of countries practicing polycentrism, or an independent form of communism. (Yugoslavia and Rumania). This policy represented an abandonment of the Hallstein Doctrine which stated that West Germany would not extend diplomatic recognition to any country recognizing East Germany.[36] The U.S. essentially watched these events with approval and consulted frequently with the GFR.

Former Secretary of State Acheson stated in 1963:

> Germany's division and its occupation (by Russia) threatens the stability and peace of Europe and the security of the United States.
>
> Germany's geographical position and strength make that country indispensable to the existence of both a united Europe and a European defense.
>
> . . . my thesis is that making political and military judgments affecting Europe a major—often the major—consideration should be their effect on the German people and the German government. It follows from this that the closest liaison and consultation with the German government is absolute necessity.[37]

It appears that not all members of the U.S. State Department were as pro-German as Acheson. There seemed to be a lack of flexibility. This is particularly evident in the retention of a "European clause" in U.S. non-proliferation treaty proposals. This clause leaves the door open for the creation of an independent European nuclear force. The retention of the clause seems to indicate U.S. desire to further bind West Germany to Nato rather than improve relations with the Soviet Union. Through 1966, the State Department preached that reunification will come about by "the adhesion of the East German people to some . . . system of western unity"—in other words, by appending themselves to a united Western Europe.[38]

No new American policy has been officially formalized in the last two or three years, especially since the evolution of Willy Brandt's *"Ostpolitik."* There is evidence that perhaps some mutual East German-West German recognition could come about and the U.S. would be forced to reconsider its interests in light of new developments. In view of the latest Moscow treaty and Polish treaty, there is careful consideration of their effects on the western alliances. It is now no longer the U.S. who must give assurances to West Germany, but West Germany must now show that her new policies

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[36] *Ibid*, p. 155.

[37] *Ibid*, p. 246.

[38] Frank Church, "U.S. Policy and the New Europe," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 45, No. 1 (October, 1966), p. 49.

do not conflict with previous commitments. Not only does the future of U.S. European policy depend in great part on the success or failure of the Ostpolitik, the future of Willy Brandt, who faces a strong opposition in the Bundestag, is also in the balance. It is perfectly conceivable that a Brandt successor would reverse policies and stifle any further progress along the lines of an Ostpolitik. With this case the U.S. would feel no need to alter her own policies and could continue to foster the status quo policy which has developed since about 1955.

It is perhaps clear through this progression of events that the U.S. maintained three clear policy "eras" with regard to Germany. The active post-war attempts at reunification, the 1947-1955 era wherein the U.S. sought to strengthen western Germany apart from Soviet cooperation yet still maintaining negotiations, and finally the era of the status quo in which Germany was incorporated into the western defense plan. The present stage is as yet undefined and remains dependent upon current European diplomatic events. Yet the United States must realize that it is a virtual inevitability that Germany will, if for no other reason than geographic location, continue to make overtures to the Eastern European block.

DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES GRANTED TO OFFICIALS OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE UNITED NATIONS

John A. Strylowski*

Officials of the United Nations Secretariat constitute a body of international civil servants which, because of its international status, requires a new class of privileges and immunities based on, yet different from, the privileges and immunities traditionally granted to national diplomats. In possessing an international secretariat the United Nations is by no means unique; it has benefited from the experience of other organizations with similar administrative bodies of an international complexion. The diplomatic privileges and immunities now enjoyed by members of the United Nations Secretariat are the result of an international system which began with the League of Nations in 1919 and is still being modified.

With the creation at the end of World War I of the League of Nations, a new class of officials was brought into being—the international civil servant. The unique and unprecedented character of this group presented new problems in the realm of international law. It was obvious that this new class of officials would need certain privileges and prerogatives for the discharge of duties which were international in scope. These prerogatives would have, for the first time, to transcend national loyalties and prejudices.

The Covenant of the League was not as specific in outlining the provisions for the establishment of the secretariat as the United Nations Charter was later to be; it merely postulated the establishment of a secretariat at Geneva consisting of a secretary general and whatever secretaries and staff he required.[1] It was the secretaries-general of the League who built the secretariat on the administrative skeleton provided by the Covenant. The work of the secretaries general, notably that of the first secretary, Sir Eric Drummond, established the tradition of a true international civil service.

Before the establishment of the League, there was no permanent group of diplomats with international functions; diplomats went home after conferences disbanded. In 1919, therefore, there was no congeries of rules for the treatment of international personnel, since the situation of the League was without precedent.[2]

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[1] Dag Hammarskjold, "The International Civil Servants in Law and Fact," David A. Kay, (Ed.), *The United Nations Political System*, New York, 1967, p. 143.

[2] Stephen Goodspeed, *The Nature and Function of International Organization*, New York, 1967, p. 386. There is some disagreement with Professor Goodspeed on this point. One author states that before the inception of the League international secretaries were "not uncommon," he points out that the Hague Conference of 1907 had a twenty-five member secretariat appointed by member nations (Leland M. Goodrich, *The United Nations*, New York, 1959, p. 131). Young places the origins of international civil servants even further back, noting that articles 13 and 14 of the Convention of Contingents of the Panama Congress of 1826 provides immunities for international officials. The staff of the European Danube Commission (beginning in 1856) had similar privileges. He says, however, that not until the establishment of the League were such privileges "of world-wide concern" (Tein-Ghieng Young, *International Civil Service Principles and Problems*, Brussels, 1958, p. 61). Another author maintains that, while there were precedents for an international secretariat, they were "anticipations" of the later developments by the League, rather than prototypes (Inis Claude, Jr., *Swords Into Ploughshares*, New York, 1956, p. 195). Goodrich maintains, however, that the advent of such international technical organizations as the International Telegraphic Union (1865) and the Universal Postal Union (1874) necessitated the establishment of "Permanent Bureaus of Secretariats" (my italics). He notes that they were composed of national officials lent for the purpose with no sense of international loyalty. See Goodrich, p. 132.

In postwar Europe, with its rampant nationalism, the idea of a civil service with international loyalties was not easy to implement. The opposition was typified by Sir Maurice Hankey, who maintained that the work of the organization should be apportioned among nine national secretaries, each with his own national staff.[3] Certain representatives, such as Britain's Arthur Balfour, had the foresight to realize that the functionaries of an international political organization such as the League must, if they were to be effective, be above nationalistic tendencies. He maintained that, once appointed to the League Secretariat, the responsibility of an official was not to his country, but to the League of Nations.[4]

Largely through the efforts of Sir Eric Drummond, the views of men like himself and Balfour prevailed. It was his interpretation of the vague provisions of the League Covenant that led to the establishment of a secretariat which was truly international in its composition.[5] That his confidence in an international organization was justified was shown by the resounding success of the secretariat as a viable administrative organ. Drummond's visionary policy is of lasting consequence to international organization, and has been called "one of the most important events in the history of international politics,[6] important because if offered "indisputable proof" of the feasibility of a viable international secretariat "which had hitherto been denied."[7]

Drummond's policies were later approved by the League Council, which, on May 19, 1920, stated: "The members of the secretariat, once appointed, are no longer servants of the country of which they are citizens, but become, for the time being, servants only of the League of Nations. Their duties are not national but international."[8] The staff regulations of the League Secretariat enjoined League officials to discharge their duties with the interests of the organization alone in mind, and forbade them to follow orders from any authority outside of the League.[9]

Under the leadership of its British Secretary General, the League Secretariat developed along the lines of the British Civil Service. That is to say, in the tradition of British civil servants, employees of the League considered their jobs as not having political overtones. Their loyalty was to the organization.[10] This idea is of lasting importance and should not be misconstrued.

Loyalty to the League did not mean denationalization of employees. It was a loyalty in official capacities only. League officials were expected to be normally patriotic, but to place the interests of world society above apotheosis of the national state.[11]

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[3] Goodrich, p. 132.
[4] Kay, pp. 143-144.
[5] *Ibid*, p. 143.
[6] Claude, p. 196.
[7] *Ibid*, p. 196.
[8] *Ibid*, p. 203.
[9] League of Nations, *Staff Regulations of the Secretariat of the League of Nations*, Geneva, 1945, Kay, p. 144.
[10] Kay, pp. 144-145.
[11] Claude, p. 203.

The creation of this body of civil servants loyal to an international organization gave rise to problems of status hitherto not encountered. It was obvious that the work of the League officials would require them to travel and perhaps reside at length in foreign countries, but since they would not be employed for the benefit of any nation the diplomatic accreditation necessary for the successful performance of their duties. The solution was for League officials to be granted by the League special status which would be recognized in member countries.

The Covenant of the League of Nations states that League officials "when engaged on the business of the League shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities."[12] The important phrase in this provision is "when engaged on the business of the League." It is this clause which distinguishes the privileges of League officials from those enjoyed by diplomats. While diplomats enjoyed their privileges and immunities in both their official and unofficial capacities, League officials could only use the privileges and immunities to which they were entitled while performing their duties as officials of the League.[13] This is the distinction between the privileges accorded international officials; it is based on the idea that functions of diplomats are fundamentally different from those of international officials.

A. A. Evans, commenting on the functions of international officials, said it was wrong for the League to grant them the same status as diplomats because their needs are different in three ways: (1) No sovereign state offers them protection in case of violation of privileges (2) They are not servants of the states of which they are nationals and may require protection against them (3) Some privileges which they might abuse need not be granted.[14]

The first two differences require an extension of normal diplomatic privilege to allow the officials immunity in the countries of which they are nationals, while the second requires a curtailment of normal diplomatic privilege, eliminating privileges not necessary to the efficient discharge of official functions.

The controversy over the status accorded to League functionaries continued throughout the existence of the organization. Joseph L. Kunz maintains with Evans that it is an "exaggeration" to expect diplomatic immunity for League officials. The League, he maintains, was not a state, therefore, the reciprocity and sovereign responsibility on which diplomacy is based were lacking.[15] The law governing

[12] Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 7, Paragraph 4.

[13] This interpretation was upheld in Swiss courts between the two wars. See Martin Hill, *Immunities and Privileges of International Officials. The Experience of the League of Nations*, Washington, 1947: Norman L. Hill, "Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities in International Organizations," *Georgetown Law Journal*, XX (1931-1932), 45-46: Philip C. Jessup, "Status of International Organizations: Privileges and Immunities of Their Officials," *American Journal of International Law*, XXXVLL (1944), p. 368: Lawrence Preuss, "Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities of Agents Invested with Functions of International Interest," *American Journal of International Law*, XXV (1931), 694.

[14] A. A. Evans, "The International Secretariat of the Future," Public Administration," XXII (1944), pp. 70-71.

[15] Joseph L. Kunz, "Privileges and Immunities of International Organizations," *American Journal of International Law*, XLI (October, 1947), 841; see also David Jayne Hill, *Annuaire*, Institut De Droit Internationals, XXXIII, Session De Lausanne, 1927, I, pp. 420-438.

the privileges and immunities of international officials should, he posited, be "emancipated" from the law governing diplomats,[16] as the needs of the former sometimes exceed, and sometimes fall short of, those of diplomats.[17]

The Secretary General of the League believed that the privileges and immunities granted to international officials should extend beyond those given to diplomats and apply to the officials in their own countries. He noted that, because of the nature of their jobs, League officials might need the protection of immunity more in their own country than in a foreign one.[18]

The Swiss government further complicated the question of status by, with the aid of the League, dividing the secretariat into three categories, each of which enjoyed varying degrees of immunities. The higher administrative officials of the League comprised an extraterritorial category, with full diplomatic privileges and immunities. Within the non-extraterritorial category, and enjoying limited privileges and immunities, were the lower administrative and clerical personnel. The last group, the staff of Swiss nationality, had no diplomatic privileges, but did enjoy tax exemption and immunity from acts performed in their official capacities.[19]

Contemporary with the League, the International Labour Office (ILO) was forming an international secretariat. Under its French head, Mr. Albert Thomas, the ILO secretariat developed in ways which differentiated it in many respects from the secretariat of the League.[20] The ILO tended to be more politically involved, and had a somewhat greater range of immunities than its counterpart in the League.[21]

Drummond of the League and Thomas of ILO provided contrasting models for an international civil service: the former that of quiet, efficient administration, the latter that of "dynamic leadership" in policy formulation.[22] The United Nations was later to draw on elements of each model.

The secretariat, originally intended to have only a minor administrative function within the League, grew to be an integral part of the organization, whose advice was eagerly sought by member

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[16] Joseph L. Kunz, "Privileges and Immunities of International Organizations," *American Journal of International Law*, XLI (October, 1947), pp. 828-862.

[17] *Ibid*, p. 841.

[18] Secretary General to Head of the Swiss Federal Political Department, January 11, 1925, Young 64-65. The following points are also made in the latter: (1) The League had a different status from sovereign states, therefore no existing laws covered the privileges and immunities of its officials. (2) If League officials had privileges and immunities in their own countries a "special class" would not be created, since the privileges and immunities were not for their personal benefit. (3) If secretariat personnel were exempt from jurisidiction in their own country they could still be disciplined by the League (by means of a waiver of immunity) if national officials requested. (4) The idea that diplomatic privileges and immunities could not be enjoyed in one's country was not a tenet of international law (British and French authorities allowed their officials diplomatic privileges at home.) *Ibid*, pp. 64-65.

[19] Young, pp. 72-73. These provisions were an unfortunate precedent for two reasons: They were based on diplomatic privileges and immunities and they distinguished among employees with regard to nationality. The second involves the concept of the "special relationship" of an international organization with the country in which its headquarters is located, of which more will be said in connection with the United Nations.

[20] Goodrich, p. 132.

[21] Carol McCormick Crosswell, *Protection of International Personnel*, New York, 1952, p. 41.

[22] Claude, p. 196.

nations.[23] It served the important function of being a permanent manifestation of the existence of an international organization, even between meetings.[24]

Most importantly, the League Secretariat proved that an international civil service could be brought into existence and could function efficiently.[25] Indeed, the League Secretariat has been called among the most efficient civil service administrations the world has produced.[26]

Because of the fine example of the League, the Secretariat was recognized in the early stages of the framing of the United Nations Charter as having great importance.[27] Widely acknowledged to be the "outstandingly successful" achievement of the League, the concept of an international secretariat was retained for use by the United Nations.[28]

From its inception in 1945, the United Nations and its employees have possessed prerogatives based on the prototypes established by the League. Although there have naturally been modifications, the delineation of the special status of the United Nations buildings[29] and personnel[30] is based on precedents established by the League.

The United Nations Charter, which provides the basis for United Nations privileges and immunities, is supplemented and amplified by the Convention of Privileges and Immunities of 1946, which has been ratified by most member nations.[31] These two documents are the legal foundation of the United Nations prerogatives and are direct descendents of the League of Nations.

Organizationally, the United Nations parallels, but does not duplicate its predecessor.[32] The secretariat of the United Nations is divided into departments[33] and presided over by a secretary general, in the manner of the League.[34] Unlike their counterparts in the League, however, the Secretary General and the secretariat have executive responsibilities.[35] The secretariat not only forms the staff

[23] Goodrich, p. 132.
[24] *Ibid.*
[25] Egon F. Ranshofen-Wertheimer, "The Position of the Executive and Administrative Heads of the United Nations International Organizations," *American Journal of International Law*, XXXIX (1945), 390.
[26] *Ibid.*
[27] Goodrich, p. 133.
[28] Claude, p. 197.
[29] Goodrich, p. 155; Goodspeed, pp. 106-107.
[30] Goodspeed, p. 386.
[31] One major exception is the United States, which has claimed special prerogatives as the host country of the United Nations. The United Nations has signed with the U. N. the United Nations Headquarters Agreement, which delegates authority over United Nations property, and has passed into law the International Organizations Immunities Act which provides for the immunities of officials of the United Nations and the specialized agencies in the United States.
[32] Since it is the secretariat with which this paper is concerned, the other differences are not discussed here.
[33] The United Nations Secretariat, following the recommendation of the U. N. Preparatory Commission, was first organized into eight departments and an executive office of the Secretary General. Departments at that time were headed by officials of differing ranks. In 1953 the secretariat was reorganized into eleven departments, each now headed by an undersecretary (each undersecretary being of equal rank.) See Goodrich, p. 143.
[34] Interestingly, the United Nations Secretariat also parallels the League in that its original purpose was to serve the policy-making organs. Increasingly more importance is assumed by the secretariat as it is asked to do more studies and research (Sydney D. Bailey, *The Secretariat of the United Nations*, New York, 1962, p. 23).
[35] Claude, pp. 194-195; Kay, 147.

of the United Nations, it is its executive branch; and the Secretary General, as head of this branch has executive responsibilities as the "head" of the United Nations.[36]

Candidates for the office of Secretary General are nominated by the permanent members of the Security Council and approved by a simple majority of the General Assembly[37] for a five-year term.[38] The Secretary General is responsible to the General Assembly for the administration of the Secretariat[39] and the performance of such jobs as the General Assembly may assign to him.[40] Jobs delegated by the General Assembly may involve political, rather than administrative, responsibility.[41] Due in part to this, the role of the Secretary General has become increasingly political,[42] with responsibility in other areas delegated.[43]

In light of his political responsibility, the Secretary General is invested with other broad prerogatives by the Charter.[44] He may bring matters to the attention of the General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council and may make oral or written statements to the Security Council and General Assembly.[45] The Secretary General uses his office to carry on unpublicized discussions with governments through their United Nations ambassadors and to initiate talks between individual members of the United Nations.[46] This extension of the powers of the Secretary General has not been unopposed,[47] and has given rise to the question of the neutrality and impartiality of the Secretary General. However, as Dag Hammarskjold noted, neutrality is not always possible, or even necessary.[48]

The Secretariat has a special importance because it is the tangible evidence of the continuing existence of the United Nations, even between the sessions of the General Assembly.[49] With this in mind, it is the special concern of the United Nations that the Secretariat be geographically representative of the organization. Also important is the protection of United Nations officials from coercion by any government.

Because of the necessity for a truly international secretariat composed of the citizens of many nations, several criteria must be used in selecting Secretariat employees. The competitive examina-

[36] Hammarskjold states the designation of the Secretary General as chief administrative officer broke with the League tradition. The administrative powers, he says, were only implicit in the Covenant, were made implicit in the Charter. (Kay, p. 147.)

[37] It is necessary that the Great Powers agree on the choice; the Secretary General may not be selected by the General Assembly alone.

[38] A second five-year term is possible at the conclusion of the first, the General Assembly or the Security Council may modify the term as they see fit. (Goodspeed, p. 368.)

[39] United Nations Charter, Article 100.

[40] United Nations Charter, Articles 98-99.

[41] Kay, p. 150.

[42] Especially under Secretary General Hammarskjold.

[43] Goodspeed, p. 371.

[44] United Nations Charter, Article 99.

[45] He may also address the Trusteeship Council and the Economic and Social Council, but only if invited by those groups to do so.

[46] Goodspeed, p. 375.

[47] In 1960, because of Dag Hammarskjold's actions in the Congo Crisis, Nikita Khruschev recommended the appointment of a "troika" executive agency; the motion, however, received no support. See Goodspeed, p. 370.

[48] "I am not neutral," he stated, "as regards the Charter. I am not neutral as regards facts. But what I do claim is that even a man who is in that sense not neutral can undertake and carry through neutral actions, because that is an act of integrity." (Bailey, p. 28.)

[49] Claude, p. 193.

tions used by civil services in western nations are not used, because, especially in the selection of higher officials, other factors are often of greater importance.[50] Although the United Nations Charter implies that employees are to be selected on the basis of merit, for political reasons it is mandatory that the Secretary General consider geographic distribution.[51] The two are considered together,[52] though in filling higher positions nations are represented in proportion to the amount of their contributions to meet United Nations operating expenses.[53]

The question of the loyalty of international officials is of course an important one, and is treated in the Charter, which says that while performing their duties U. N. Officials "shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the organization."[54] The influence of the League on this provision is immediately apparent.[55]

It is not enough that each secretariat member, using his own national views, helps arrive at a compromise; secretariat members must have a truly international point of view.[56] The oath required of all accepting appointment of the secretariat affirms that the employee will discharge his duties "with the interests of the United Nations only in view" and not in the interests of any national government.[57] The United Nations staff regulations stress the same idea.[58]

Sidney Bailey notes that attachment to one's national traditions or people is not incompatible with international loyalty[59] and goes on to assert that impartiality is in part a result of training and association.[60] The question, as one observer has pointed out, is not one of dual loyalties but of dual service. Service to an international organization should not conflict with national allegiance.[61] This, however, is not always the case.

Concomitant with the idea of loyalty to an international organization is the need for the protection of international officials in cases where their responsibilities as international functionaries place them in danger of restriction by a sovereign state.

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[50] Goodrich, p. 149.

[51] *Ibid*, p. 147.

[52] One author claims that the emphasis on geographic distribution is too great, resulting in the retention of undertrained or inefficient officials representing the underdeveloped countries (L. Elvin, "An International Civil Service? What Should Be Done," *Fabian Journal*, XL, (July, 1957, 6) Goodrich notes that to make up for the appointment of less qualified employees in-service training has been initiated. Goodrich, p. 147.

[53] *Ibid*, p. 148.

[54] United Nations Charter, Article 100.

[55] Kay, pp. 145-146.

[56] Goodrich, p. 130.

[57] Goodspeed, p. 384.

[58] L. C. Green, "The International Civil Servant: His Employer and His State," Grotius Society Transactions, XL (1954), 147.

[59] Bailey, pp. 28-29. F. Honig would qualify this, for, while he says loyalty must not be transferred from one's nation to an international organization, he holds that one should to some extent "loosen the natural bond of affinity to his country of origin." (F. Honig, "The International Civil Service: Basic Problems and Contemporary Difficulties," *International Affairs* (1954) 175). This would seem to go beyond what was expected of members of the League Secretariat, as mentioned earlier.

[60] Bailey, pp. 28-29.

[61] Green, pp. 148-149. Although he also states that international officials should "place the interests of the organization they serve above all else" and "take instructions from no one else, including their national state." (*Ibid.*, p. 147.)

The importance of this type of protection is recognized in Article 100 of the United Nations Charter, which enjoins each member to "respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary General and the staff and not to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities."[62]

Significantly, the Charter does not mention the word "diplomatic" in connection with officials' immunities.[63] It stipulates that Secretariat officials "shall enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the organization."[64] This adoption of the functional rather than the diplomatic approach to immunities reflects the realization, in light of the experience of the League, that a different variety of immunities is needed by international officials for the discharge of their duties than is needed by diplomats.[66]

Secretariat officials are not diplomats, since they do not represent sovereign states, but have a unique status which transcends national loyalty and responsibility.

They do not receive their immunities to allow them to conduct the official business of a state, as do diplomats, for their duties are to the world community. The United Nations could not truly accredit diplomats, since diplomatic privileges are born of the theory of the sovereign right of states. The privileges and immunities of international officials come only from the organization they serve.[67]

United Nations officials receive only such diplomatic privileges and immunities as are necessary to the efficient, unhindered performance of their duties as functionaries of the organization. The privileges and immunities which they enjoy are not for their personal benefit and are not merited in any way, but are conferred solely in the interests of the organization.[68] The Secretary General has the right and duty to waive the immunity of Secretariat Members if it impedes the progress of justice and may be waived without damage to the interests of the United Nations.[69] Annually a list of secretariat officials entitled to immunities is compiled by the Secretary General and given to all member nations.[70]

The guarantee of the privileges and immunities of United Nations officials is the Convention of Privileges and Immunities,[71] formulated in 1946. All privileges, immunities, exemptions and facilities granted to diplomatic envoys are accorded to the Secretary General, the undersecretaries and their families[72] by the convention. This

[62] United Nations Charter, Article 100. This provision is explicitly phrased in light of the League experience with the Fascist governments of Germany and Italy. See Kay, p. 146.
[63] Young, p. 62.
[64] United Nations Charter, Article 5, Section 2.
[65] Goodrich, p. 155; Young, p. 62; Crosswell, pp. 40-41.
[66] Young, p. 62.
[67] *Ibid.*, p. 63.
[68] Goodspeed, p. 386; Young, p. 68; Crosswell, p. 41 U. N. staff regulations state that the statu of U. N. officials furnishes "no excuse" for their failure to obey any laws in their persona capacities. Young, p. 68.
[69] Crosswell, p. 42.
[70] *Ibid.*, p. 43.
[71] Hereafter also referred to as the Convention.
[72] It should be noted that this does not technically mean they have full diplomatic privileges an immunities. The Secretary General and undersecretaries are still limited in their immunity b Section 20 of the Convention, which states their privileges and immunities are only for the use i the interests of the organization (Crosswell, p. 42.)

does not mean, however, that they are considered as diplomats. Their privileges and immunities are granted only the interests of the United Nations. In cases where it is deemed necessary, the Security Council may waive the immunity of the Secretary General.[73]

It is important that officials of the United Nations be able to speak freely and without fear of intimidation in their official capacities. To ensure this, the Convention provides secretariat members with immunity from legal process for all actions and spoken or written statements made in an official capacity.[74]

It has been argued that, since this immunity is of such vital importance to the effective functioning of the United Nations, it should be extended to cover unofficial statements and actions, as is done for diplomats.[75] At present, however, this immunity applies only to official actions, in most countries.

Taxation of U. N. personnel immediately presented unusual problems. If each nation were allowed to tax the income of its nationals employed by the organization large inequities in real income would be created, making it difficult to attract qualified employees from many nations. In view, then, of the problems taxation would create, the Convention provides for tax exemption for U. N. employees, but only on salaries and emoluments paid to them by the organization.[76]

United Nations Secretariat officials are distinguished from diplomats by the possession of a privilege uniquely necessary to their duties as officials of an international organization. They are granted a special document called a *laissez-passer,* which is recognized by all member nations as a valid travel document.[77] Although it has international validity, the *laissez-passer* is not called a passport, since it is the prerogative of sovereign states to issue passports.[78] National governments may require visas of U. N. officials, but not all of them do so.[79]

Although United Nations officials may of course carry with them the passport of their own country, the *laissez-passer* is definitely an advantage, since their actions may at times make them undesirable to certain nations, including their own. By virtue of the *laissez-passer,* U. N. employees are exempt from any restrictions their native country, or any other, may put on their ability to travel.[80]

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[73] *Ibid.*

[74] Convention on privileges and immunities, Article V, Section 18.

[75] Honig, pp. 180-181. He proposes in the event of such an extension, that the Secretary General be allowed to waive immunity in cases where he feels it is being abused. It is noted that several countries have already done this unilaterally and there are no cases of the privilege being abused. (*Ibid.*)

[76] Convention on Privileges and Immunities, Article V, Section 18. An exception to this is the United States, which, as mentioned previously, has not signed the Convention. U. S. Nationals employed by the United Nations have their incomes taxed. To eliminate the inequity thus created, American employees of the U. N. are reimbursed by the United Nations the amount of their salary paid in taxes. The United States really gains nothing, since to make up for the money paid to American nationals it must contribute a greater amount to the United Nations (Honig, p. 181; Goodspeed, p. 38). Honig contends that, on the part of the United States, this is an example *par excellence* of the confusion of diplomatic privilege and privileges conferred in the interests of the United Nations (Honig, p. 181).

[77] Convention on Privileges and Immunities, Article V, Section 18.

[78] Crosswell, p. 46.

[79] An example being the United Kingdom (*Ibid.*).

[80] *Ibid.*

The above are the more salient prerogatives granted to United Nations personnel. The Convention, however, grants additional privileges and immunities to officials which, while not as striking as the others may be, are still quite necessary to their jobs. All United Nations personnel are exempt from obligation to serve in the armed forces of any nation.[81] They and their spouses and dependent relatives are not subject to alien registration of the immigration restrictions of any member nation. The same privileges as are granted to diplomatic officials for the use of exchange facilities are granted to secretariat members, who are also entitled in time of war to the same repatriation facilities as diplomats. Finally, on their first arrival in a country, United Nations personnel may import their furniture and possessions duty-free.[82]

These privileges and immunities are all indispensable to the efficient performance of the Secretariat's duties, and all, as previously stated, are not for the personal benefit of the officials concerned, but apply to them only in their official capacities.[83]

Since it has not ratified the Convention on privileges and immunities, the United States is an exception to the rules regarding privileges and immunities as outlined here in some very important respects. Objections of certain Senators to the provisions of the Convention for the immunity from taxation and military obligation of international civil servants prevented Congress from ratifying the Convention. Instead it passed the International Organizations Immunities Act,[84] which provides substantially the same protection for international officials as the Convention, with the exception that United States nationals are exempt from neither taxation of income nor military service.

Other special provisions of the International Organizations Immunity Act concern foreign nationals in the service of the United Nations.[85] No person is entitled to the benefits of the law unless the Secretary of State has been notified of and approved his status as a United Nations employee or the dependent of such an employee. The Secretary of State has the right to withdraw the privileges and immunities of a citizen of a foreign country if that country does not grant identical privileges and immunities to United States Nationals in similar positions.[86] Concerned with the presence of aliens whose views might oppose or undermine those of the United States Government, Congress provided that, if the Secretary of State found the presence of an international civil servant undesirable, he could notify

[81] Again, the United States is an exception. United States nationals are still subject to the Selective Service Act.

[82] Convention on Privileges and Immunities, Article V, Section 18.

[83] This becomes even more apparent when the privileges granted to U. N. employees are contrasted with those enjoyed by diplomats. For instance, diplomats are not required to pay duty on possessions they import at any time, whereas United Nations officials are only allowed to import possessions duty-free at the time of first taking up residence in a country.

[84] Public Law 291, 79th Congress, Chapter 652, First Session H. R. 4489.

[85] The remaining matter not touched on by the Act is the validity of the *laissez-passer*; this, however, is covered in the Headquarters Agreement between the United States and the United Nations. The United States has pledged in the agreement to admit all United Nations officials to the Headquarters in New York, so whether or not they possess the *laissez-passer* is of little importance (Crosswell, p. 48).

[86] *Ibid.*, p. 50.

the government and organization concerned and, after a reasonable amount of time, require that person to leave the United States.[87]

As the host country to the United Nations, the United States rightly believes that it has a special relationship with the organization. However, the prerogatives which have been claimed by the United States not only exceed the benefit to which it is entitled, they contradict the principle of international cooperation on which the United Nations is based.[88]

The questions raised by the International Organizations Immunities Act are at the crux of the debate over the desirability of privileges and immunities for international officials which has continued since the days of the League. Should the prerogatives of national governments yield to those of an international organization in the interests of its efficiency? Most theorists, especially those who have been connected with international organizations, agree.[89]

It is invaluable for international officials to have special privileges and immunities for the discharge of their duties and to enable them, in the course of their work to be able to deal with national diplomats on a more or less equal footing.[90] There is, in fact, a great deal of sentiment in favor of extending the privileges and immunities of international officials to cover their unofficial acts,[91] thereby making the application of immunities less reliant on the subjective judgments of national governments.

Involved as they are with the issues of national pride and sovereign jurisdiction, the privileges and immunities of international officials will probably not, in the foreseeable future, be free from controversy. They contradict nationalistic tendencies and create resentment among patriots. The fact remains, however, that they are necessary for the successful functioning of the United Nations, as they have been for any international organization.

[87] *Ibid.*, p. 51. Honig rightly asserts that this provision is "incompatible with the basic concept of the relationship between international organizations and national governments." (Honig, p. 181).

[88] *Ibid.*

[89] There are, however, some notable exceptions. One well-known opinion is that diplomatic privileges for international officials are of doubtful value, since, if their behavior is exemplary, as it should be, they will encounter no difficulty. This opinion holds that an international official who is seriously restrained by the law is obviously in need of such restraint and should not be occupying his position. (P. E. Corbett in Young, p. 87); a Soviet scholar has maintained that the immunity of international civil servants has limits and cannot release those servants from the jurisdiction of their states; the immunity of international civil servants, he says, is designed for the recognition of the principle of sovereign equality of the participating states. See O. V. Bogdanow, "Immunity of Employees of International Organizations and its Distortion by Imperialist Reaction," *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXXIV, No. 4 (October 18, 1952), pp. 75-78.

[90] Young, p. 88. A contrary opinion is that the privileges and immunities are of symbolic importance, of little functional value in the daily proceedings of international organizations (Young, p. 88).

AN INVENTORY AND ANALYSIS OF THE WORLD POLITICS SIMULATION PROPOSITIONS

Avery W. Ward*

Introduction

The purpose of this essay is to itemize and to analyze the essential assumptions of World Politics Simulation (WPS)—developed primarily, but not entirely, by William D. Coplin at Wayne State University.[1] The concern here is not upon the methodological basis of simulation; rather, it is the substantive propositions about international relations. This is a verbal statement of the WPS international relations theory.

Although the primary and immediate object here is to verbalize WPS, questions concerning the utility and validity of simulation as a theory-building technique will be raised. Some partisans of the simulation approach contend that theory expressed through the medium of simulation is characteristically elegant and precise. These attributes are a function of the "operating" quality of simulation models. Models that "operate" purportedly require a small number of variables with considerable explanatory power and precisely defined relationships between the variables.[2] It is also held that simulations provide the opportunity to discover poorly developed areas in theoretical knowledge, and the occasion for simulators to advance propositions in these areas. Consequently, theory-building through simulation media should contribute to more elegant, complete, and systematic theory.

The question of the validity of the theory expressed through the simulation techniques will be a constant issue throughout this essay. The problem of simulation validity has many different phases, depending upon the type and purpose of simulation. The ultimate question—an intersubjective one—when evaluating a simulation is, however, its "heuristic pay-off."[3] The subjective nature of this issue precludes any individual attempt from resolving it. The hope here is that by verbalizing WPS, we will contribute to communication, and eventually agreement, between the simulation and non-simulation theorists on the extent to which the theory contained in the simulation is valid.

World Politics Simulation is a man-computer simulation of international politics. Although we are looking at WPS as a theory-

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[1] World Politics Simulation has undergone a series of modifications. The model analyzed here is WPS-II. The materials describing WPS-II, and used for this analysis are: *World Politics Simulation: Background Materials*, *World Politics Simulation: Participants' Manual*, and *World Politics Simulation: Administrative Manual*.

This author's experience with WPS-II includes observing and administering the simulation at Wayne State University (1967-1969) and at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (January, 1969).

[2] For an analysis of the type of theory required by a simulation model see Sidney Verba, "Simulation, Reality, and Theory in International Relations," *World Politics*, Vol. 16, April, 1964, p. 499.

[3] Hermann, Charles F., "Validation Problems In Games and Simulations With Special Reference to Models of International Politics," *Behavioral Science*, vol. 12, 1967, p. 219.

building technique, it has primarily been used as a teaching device.[4] The model contains national decision-making roles filled by human participants. As the roles are played, the simulation builds an environment for decision-making. The WPS decision-making environment consists of two constructs—a domestic and an international environment. The domestic environment is heavily programmed, and is represented by two feedback mechanisms. The Policy Influencer (PI) feedback represents domestic political support for the decision-makers from various political groupings in the society. The Economic-Military (E-M) feedback represents fluctuations in the economic development and military capability of each nation.

The international environment is not programmed; it only develops form and substance through the running of WPS. It consists of the confluence of foreign policy outputs from each nation. There are eight hypothetical nations and an international organization (I.O.) in WPS. The foreign policy outputs are actions such as trades, economic aid, propaganda, use of force, international agreements and communications.

Although the techniques of theory-building through simulation models may require precisely stated propositions; they may also result in an obscure form of expression. The task here is to derive the propositions from "simulation language" and to express them in verbal terms. The WPS propositions are contained in two different forms—in mathematical formulas and in the structural mechanisms of the model.

The following portions of this essay consist of four parts. In the first part, propositions relative to decision-making are examined. The decision-making propositions are derived from the structure and rules of WPS. The next section focuses upon propositions about the operation of the domestic environment. Propositions concerning the Economic-Military module and derived from the mathematical equations and tables of stochastic processes regulating its behavior, and from the structural relationships within the model. The propositions structuring the functioning of the Policy Influence module are contained in the PI Response tables, and in the relationships between the various groupings, and between the groupings and the decision-makers.[5] The third section is an analysis of the propositions associated with the international environment. WPS approaches international relations theory by focusing upon the domestic—rather than systemic—determinants of foreign policy. Consequently, there are relatively few systemic propositions; most of them concern the role or absence thereof of international institutions in world politics. The WPS propositions are listed serially with no commentary. The last section is an evaluation of the quality of WPS as a theory and of the "heuristic pay-off" of WPS for the development of a science of international relations.

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[4] World Politics Simulation is now being used for teaching purposes at Wayne State University and at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

[5] The PI Response tables are tables of data predicting the response of specific political groupings to categories of decision-making actions. The data was collected from country specialists in the Department of State.

Inventory of WPS Propositions

I. *Decision-making propositions*

1. All national decision-making units have similar role structures.
2. Role differentiation within a decision-making unit sometimes leads to conflict in the decision-making process.
3. Conflict patterns within each decision-making unit are similar.
4. The decision-maker's desire to remain in office is a crucial factor in decision-making action.
5. Foreign policy goals are a product of domestic conditions and of decision-makers' values.
6. Decision-makers operate in an environment of uncertainty and risk, but can take actions to reduce both uncertainty and risk.

II. *Propositions on the Functioning of the Domestic Environment*
Domestic politics propositions

1. Domestic political forces are represented by the ability of domestic political groupings to render political support to the decision-makers, and by the attitudes expressed toward each decision.[1]
2. The domestic political forces of each nation may be viewed as eight to ten groupings.
3. The types of domestic political groupings vary for each country.
4. All domestic political groupings perceive the world in the same way.
5. All domestic political groupings behave in similar ways—expressing their attitudes to the decision-makers and rendering political support to the decision-makers.
6. All domestic political groupings react to the same decision-making actions.
7. Domestic political groupings are never entirely pleased by decision-making action.
8. Domestic political groupings react to foreign policy and economic policy decisions in terms of their gratification.
9. Domestic political groupings assess international events toward their state as hostile or friendly (e.g. communications), military or non-military (e.g. trade or aid), and as formal or informal (e.g. negotiations).
10. Domestic political groupings react to factors other than foreign policy and economic policy decisions in terms of their support for the decision-makers.
11. Domestic political groupings have the ability to remove decision-makers from office.

[1] The ability of domestic political groupings to render political support is symbolized by the WPS Power Weights. The political groups' attitudes are symbolized by a seven point WPS PI Satisfaction scale.

12. Domestic political groupings are able to reduce a nation's military and economic capability.
13. As the domestic political groupings become more dissatisfied with the decision-maker's actions, the probability of a revolution increases.
14. Domestic political groupings affect the capability of a nation to defend against subversive attacks.
15. Some domestic political groupings become more important in times of subversive wars than they normally would be in determining the capability of a state to defend against subversive war.
16. The ability of domestic political groupings to punish or to reward decision-makers does not vary, regardless of the type of decision-making action perceived.
17. It is easier for domestic political groupings to remove decision-makers from office in democratic countries during election years than in non-election years.
18. In autocratic countries, the amount of political support the decision-makers need to maintain in order to hold office is invariant over time.
19. The decision-maker's power to control the domestic political groupings is limited by the types and number of groups which may be manipulated, by the economic and military costs involved, and by the temporary character of such decision-making actions.

Economic-Military system propositions

1. All national economies have similar components (BC's, CU's, etc.).[2]
2. National economies vary in the amounts of basic resources they possess, and in their productivity rates.
3. The productive capacity of an economy is a function of the size of its basic resource base and of its productivity rate.
4. The productivity rate varies for each component product of the economy.
5. The capacity of the economy to sustain growth is limited by depreciation losses.
6. The growth of the productivity rate is a function of the size of the productivity rate and of the amount of total basic capability invested in development investment.
7. The productivity rates of the economy increase fastest, for each percentage unit of total basic resources invested in

[2] The propositions about the functioning of the Economic-Military system use the following terms, which are defined here in terms of the WPS concepts:

a. *Basic resources*—The basic resources of the national actors are symbolized in WPS by Basic Capability Units (BC's).
b. *Productivity rate*—The productivity rate is the ability of an economic system to produce its basic resources (BC's) into other products (e.g. FCn's, CU's, etc.). The productivity rate is symbolized in WPS by the Generation Rate (GR).
c. *Products*—Products are components of the economy produced by the conversion of BC's. The products consist of the following: Consumer Units (CU's), Welfare Units (WU's), Conventional, Subversive, and Nuclear Capability Units (FC's, FCn's, respectively).
d. *Development Investment*—The investments made in research and development are symbolized by Development Investment (DI) in WPS.

development investment, when the economy is in the "Take-off" stage of development.[3]

8. There is a characteristic cross-national distribution of the various national economies' productivity rates.[4]
9. Domestic political groupings perceive two aspects of economic development—the amount of goods and services produced, and the amount of economic capability invested in development investment.
10. The demands of domestic political groupings increase in proportion to the growth of the economy.[5]
11. Basic domestic economic policies affect the domestic political groupings.
12. International trading can be based on the comparative advantage principle, but political groupings react on non-economic factors to trade.
13. Domestic political groupings perceive the growth of military capability.
14. The effectiveness of the use of force to gain political support is limited.[6]
15. The use of force entails economic liabilities.
16. Force can be used to subdue other forces.
17. There are three types of military capability—nuclear, conventional, and subversive.
18. There are two levels of military capability deployment—offensive and defensive.
19. At the offensive level, there is no interchange between the three types of force, but there is an interchange at the defensive level.[7]
20. Only the nations with the greatest economic capacity possess nuclear capability.
21. Nations possessing nuclear capability have a retaliatory strike nuclear capability.

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[3] The percentage unit of total basic resources invested in development investment is represented by Qx, where Qx = BC's in DI for GRx.

$$\frac{\text{Total BC's}}{}$$

The "Take-off" stage of economic development is defined in WPS as the stage where $1<GR>1.5$. See *WPS: Administrative Manual*, p. 45, for the formulas used to compute economic development.

[4] An analysis of the WPS economic systems at Zero Period has revealed that the "developing" nations have 70% of their Generation Rates in the "Take-off" stage, while the "developed" nations have only 33% of their Generation Rates in that stage. Therefore, the "developing" nations are able to make faster progress increasing their productivity, with less Qx, than are the "developed" nations.

[5] The PI demands increase in proportion to the growth of the economy. For example, of the PI's demand for the current economic period an increase of 10% over n (where n is the amount produced in the previous economic period), then in the succeeding economic period, the demand will be for an increase of 10% over (n+.1n). In the next period the demand will be 10% over (n+.2n+.01n), etc. The demands will increase (if they are met each period; if not met, they will remain constant) until after 11 economic periods they will be more than double what they were in the first economic period in WPS. Therefore, the decision-makers are unable to satisfy permanently the Policy Influencer demands; they are ever increasing.

[6] The Policy Influencers perceive the use of force against other nations (some PI's support it; some do not); but they also perceive the economic and military results of the use of force. Consequently, the PI support gained in the initial use of force may be counteracted by the results of war—a decrease in military capability.

[7] Defensive Conventional Force Capability Units (FCs-D) or Defensive Subversive Capability Units (FCs-D) may be used to defend against subversive attacks.

22. Offensive nuclear capability is more difficult to produce than defensive nuclear capability.
23. An attacking nuclear force destroys both military and non-military sources of the defender's capability.
24. An attacking nuclear force always receives some destruction.[8]
25. As the attacking nuclear force becomes smaller in size, the destruction rates to it become greater.
26. In a conventional war, the attacker has a higher probability of losing more forces than the defender in an initial attack (if the attacking and defending forces are equal in strength).
27. In a conventional war, the attacker has a much greater probability of winning than does the defender in a counter attack, if the opposing forces are equal.
28. In a subversive war, the attacker has a 100 per cent probability of losing more forces than the defender, if the opposing forces are equal.

III. *Propositions on the Functioning of the International Environment*

1. The International Organization (I.O.) serves as a setting for institutionalized cooperation and formal and informal communication between states.
2. The International Organization is dependent upon the states for financial support and legal authority.
3. The International Organization can make decisions which the states may feel they should enforce.
4. The staff of the International Organization enjoys very little autonomy.
5. In terms of formal legal, and institutional restraints, the state is an independent actor in the international environment.
6. International rules may develop organically, but they are flexible and amorphous.
7. Alliance blocs exist, but they can change.
8. Economic and military strength among the various states is distributed according to a bi-polar structure.

IV. *An Evaluation of World Politics Simulation*

The purpose of this section is to analyze the contribution of WPS to the development of a science of international relations. There are two levels of analysis to this issue. At one level, the focus is upon the quality of "verbalized" WPS qua theory; at another level, it is

[8] Propositions 24 and 28 are contained in WPS' tables of stochastic processes.

upon the heuristic value of "operating" WPS.[1] At both levels, cursory reference is made to WPS in terms of the condition of contemporary international relations theory.

The issue of the intrinsic value of a theory relates to its structure as a deductive, systematic, and empirical body of thought. Most philosophers of science agree that the ideal type of theory is composed of a limited number of universal propositions with a high degree of explanatory power; that the theory's component propositions propose precise relationships; and that the theory produce, by the rules of deduction, increasingly specific predictions that are empirically testable. It is also agreed that the predictions' degree of correspondence to the explicanda* is one rule for assessing the theory's validity.[2]

As a formal theory in a verbalized form, WPS is not the ideal type. It does not consist of a small number of propositions that possess a high degree of explanatory power; rather, it is composed of a large number of general statements that have a low degree of explanatory power. A proposition's explanatory power inheres in its ability to produce specific empirical propositions (or predictions). The ability to produce specific empirical predictions depends upon three distinct factors—the proposition's levels of generality, universality, and specificity. WPS's propositions possess high levels of generality and universality, but low levels of specificity.

A proposition's level of generality partially determines its explanatory power. A proposition gains in explanatory power as its level of generality increases. The generality of a proposition refers to how many different classes of empirical propositions may be deduced from the original proposition. The range of phenomena subsumed under the proposition's subject is the locus of this quality. For instance, Newton's laws of gravitation gain their power along the dimension of generality because they include not only the class of empirical propositions predicting how specific apples fall, but they explain the forces of attraction between all bodies. The WPS propositions are at a high level of generality—a variety of different classes of empirical propositions may be derived from each component proposition. For example, from the assertion that "All domestic political groupings perceive the world in the same way" it can be predicted that military groups, bureaucratic groups, political parties, economic interest groupings, and others have similar perceptions of the world.

A second factor involved in determining a proposition's explanatory power is the frequency with which the proposed relationship

[1] The World Politics Simulation is conceptualized here as constituting two distinct theories. The substantive assumptions about international politics constitute "verbalized" WPS. The preceding propositional inventory represents "verbalized" WPS. The interaction of the substantive assumptions and the methodological assumptions of the simulation (i.e. assumptions introduced into the model via the use of surrogate decision-makers) through a simulation "run" constitute "operating" WPS. "Operating" WPS is represented by WPS's output during an operation of the simulation.

[2] The philosophy of science notions assumed here have been stimulated primarily by the following fine works: Homans, George C., *The Nature of Social Science*, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, Inc., 1967), Kaplan, Abraham, *The Conduct of Inquiry*, (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1964). Meehan, Eugene J., *The Theory and Method of Political Analysis*, (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1965). Nagel, Ernest, *Logic Without Metaphysics*, (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1956). Nagel, Ernest, *The Structure of Science* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, Inc., 1961). Popper, Karl R., *Conjectures and Refutations*, (New York: Basic Books, 1962). Popper, Karl R., *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1959). VanDyke, Vernon, *Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis*, (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1960).

* EDITOR'S NOTE: *This word does not appear in standard American dictionaries.*

between the subject and object obtains. A proposition gains in power as the probability of its prevalence increases. The most powerful assertions—universal propositions—are those which prevail at all times. The proposition that "Domestic political groupings are never entirely pleased by decision-making" is a universal proposition. Except for the unprogrammed relationships that may exist or develop in the international environment, the majority of WPS propositions are universal.

The final and most important factor which partially determines the proposition's explanatory power is the specificity of the proposed relationship between the proposition's subject and object. The proposition gains in explanatory power as the specificity of the relationship increases. The difficulty with the "verbalized" WPS's component propositions is that the majority of them (for reasons analyzed below) fail to establish precise relationships. For example, the proposition that "The decision-maker's desire to remain in office is a crucial factor in the decision-making process" is low in explanatory power along the dimension of specificity because it does not hypothesize how or why the desire is crucial. The lack of specificity in the WPS propositions is crucial—unless a proposition maintains high levels along all three dimensions, its explanatory power is impaired.

The major difficulty with WPS as a verbalized theory is that it can not be used to make specific empirical predictions. There are a multiplicity of reasons for this incapacity; they relate immediately to the structure of WPS, and in a larger sense to the unique characteristics of the phenomena of international behavior and to the general state of knowledge about that behavior.

The ability of WPS to produce empirical propositions is inhibited by the imprecise relationships which obtain within the model—little in logic can be deduced from amorphous relationships.[3] There are two aspects to the imprecise quality of the WPS relationships. The primary locus of imprecision exists *within* the propositions themselves (as analyzed above). A secondary source of imprecision derives from the relationships that prevail *between* the component propositions. This latter aspect involves the theory's systematic quality. WPS is not a hierarchially-structured, deductive theory; rather, it is a list of factors that are in some way related to the phenomena of international relations. The exact way in which the individual factors determine the patterns of international behavior is not established.

"Verbalized" WPS is at a high level of generality—the relationships it proposes prevail for many different sets of conditions that may exist within a loose bi-polar international environment. Relationships that obtain for many different international conditions (even within the parameters of a loose bi-polar structure) lack a high degree of specificity because their manifestation depends sharply upon the contingencies of each context. Herein lies the difficulty of using "verbalized" WPS as a predictive device—its context is too general for the derivation of specific propositions. George C. Homans notes the crucial role of the theoretical context by stating that "Our frequent experience in social science is to find that a proposition holding

[3] Homans, *Nature of Social Science*, p. 25.

good in one set of circumstances does not hold good in another."[4] For instance, the proposition that "The decision-maker's desire to remain in office is a crucial factor in decision-making action" may oscillate from being very crucial to not so crucial, depending upon its specific context. Hence, in deriving empirical propositions, it is indispensable that specific contexts be defined.

The contention here is that non-predictive theories ("verbalized" WPS and most other theories of international relations) are insufficient—the test of explanation ought to be prediction.[5] Although this may be an ambitious criterion to impose upon the study of international relations, we do not believe that it is held in vain. Indeed, WPS as an "operating" theory portends to be a seminal tool for he development of more powerful (perhaps predictive) theory; the remainder of this essay suggests how WPS may be useful in contributing to systematic international relations research and theory-building.

International Relations has experienced much difficulty in moving down the long road to more powerful theory.[6] Much of this difficulty has arisen from the nature of international behavior itself. Prediction is possible only in areas where the number of variables are limited and known in advance, and where the relationships of the variables are specific. The numerous and complex variables associated with international behavior, and the obscure relationships prevailing between them have been persistent stumbling blocks to the development of predictive theory. WPS, as an "operating" theory, meets these exigencies.

WPS does not eliminate the problems associated with the prediction of international affairs, but it does mediate them. WPS consists of several variables assumed to be crucial determinants of international relations. Although WPS contains too many factors to be called an elegant theory, the criterion of elegance is expendable for an operating theory.[7] The value placed on elegance originated partially for aesthetic reasons, and partially for pragmatic ones. In a predictive verbal theory, the number of variables must be at a minimum to permit logical deduction. WPS circumvents the necessity to be elegant by not operating in a deductive fashion; rather, it purportedly operates in a way analogous to the referent system.[8]

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[4] *Ibid.*, p. 85. Hoffman also notes that "Each concept we use has a different meaning in different contexts of space and time." In Hoffman, Stanley H., "International Relations: The Long Road to Theory" in Rosenau, James N. (ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York: The Free Press, 1961), p. 430.

[5] Homans, *op. cit.*, p. 105, notes "But prediction runs parallel to explanation: the two problems are really the same one. And the better we are able to explain what has happened, the better we shall be able to predict what will."

[6] See Hoffman, *op. cit.*

[7] Note Kaplan's (*op. cit.*, p. 317) observations on the issue of elegance: "Indeed, the argument can sometimes be made *against* a theory . . . that the trouble with it is that it is too simple; Nature sometimes seems to prefer complexity."

WPS may be considered by some to be an elegant theory because it is composed of a small number of concepts—Policy Influencers, Economic-Military system, a Decision-makers. However, each concept is really a cluster of several variables.

[8] "Operating" WPS achieves its operating quality through the surrogate function of participant decision-makers. The methodological assumptions of this technique are of dubious validity and need further investigation. Some of those assumptions are: college students (sometimes professionals) may be used to represent real world decision-makers, a simulated environment (where the decisions made are not for "keeps") may be used to represent an environment in which the decisions made often have weighty consequences for many people, and simulated time periods (which last only a few hours) may be used to represent physical time periods of several years during which the decision-makers accumulate and have reinforced much experience.

The problem of how variables combine to produce social phenomena looms large in social science. Abraham Kaplan has noted that,

> 'The rules of combination are not logically necessary principles. Even in the simple case where all factors are favorable, it does not follow that the combination of them will be favorable.' We need to know, not only the separate factors that are determinative of behavior, but how they interact with one another. It is not always possible to advance step by step; to arrive at a good theory may call for as much boldness as imagination.[9]

WPS provides an imaginative, if bold, approach to combining the variables hypothesized to be determinative of international behavior. The variables of "operating" WPS interact through the medium of participant decision-makers' behavior. This surrogate function is at once the source of "verbalized" WPS's weakness as a predictive theory, and "operating" WPS's source of utility as a theory-building device. It is extremely difficult (if possible) to deduce predictions from "verbalized" WPS's component propositions because the rules by which the variables combine to produce certain phenomena are unknown. In the case of "operating" WPS, it is not necessary to know the rules of combination; they are provided by human participant decision-making processes. The heuristic value of WPS is that it readily permits the analysis of the rules of combination followed by the participant decision-makers under various conditions.[10]

"Operating" WPS possesses two distinct qualities which contribute to its value as a theory-building device. In a technical sense, WPS has the qualities of a laboratory type research tool: it affords the researcher the opportunity to replicate his tests, and to manipulate and to observe directly his data—a situation rarely existing in the referent system. WPS's ability to generate a rich supply of data, also rare in the referent system, is another of its technical advantages. In a theoretical sense, WPS possesses the qualities and capabilities of a predictive theory. This latter set of qualities particularly recommends WPS for theory-building purposes in international relations.

A paradoxical tension exists between the generality of a theory and its explanatory power. Stanley Hoffman has conceptualized this paradox as the "social scientist's dilemma: a 'social whole' such as a total field can never be grasped scientifically, and we can only deal with selected aspects. But if we do not start with at least an approximation of the whole, and concentrate either on single trends or on limited empirical research, those fragments of the whole can not be assessed correctly."[11] We concur in Hoffman's assumption that the most feasible approach to building theory is to trade-off higher levels of generality for lower levels of specificity in order to maximize explanatory pay-offs.

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[9] Kaplan, *op. cit.*, p. 326.

[10] As noted in the introduction, simulation theories supposedly force the simulations theorist to develop complete theories; and often he may be forced to advance propositions in theoretically underdeveloped areas. This may be true if the simulation is all machine; but the use of human participants in a man-machine model relaxes this requirement considerably.

[11] Hoffman, *op. cit.*, p. 431.

"Operating" WPS creates theory which maximizes explanatory power pay-offs. WPS as an operating theory reduces the generality of "verbalized" WPS for all bi-polar conditions to specific types of conditions within the bi-polar parameters. Through its operation, as the participant decision-makers follow the rules of combination, the component propositions of WPS assume specific relationships within a specific international context: or, in other words, through its operation WPS provides empirical predictions within specific contexts.

The suggestion here is to analyze the simulate* relationships as they obtain within specific international contexts. This proposal may be a way out of the "social scientist's dilemma": by limiting research to specific contexts of the international system, it may be possible to discover the dominant variables and their rules of combination within each context. There are various practical ways to conduct such research. The international context may be programmed, or it may be allowed to develop freely. In either case, the simulator may derive from an analysis of the simulate* context middle range theories explaining the effects of international conditions on state behavior, or vice versa. If the international environment is programmed and held as a constant, then the simulator is limited to exploring the national actors' reactions to their environment. On he other hand, if the international context is allowed to develop freely, then the simulator may explore the relationships between national actor behavior and change in the international system. For instance, if the international context is programmed with specific relationships existing at time t_0, and then allowed to develop freely to time t_1, it may be possible to discover the dynamics of change from one context (e.g. war) to another (e.g. peace). Research interests dictate the particular technique of analysis used.

The objective in using this aproach to theory-building is to develop a series of macro theories at a middle level of generality.[12] Each theory would be macro because its primary focus is upon systemic behavior; each one would be at a middle level of generality because its focus is upon a specific context of the international system. If the concentration in International Relations remains on developing overarching grand theories (e.g. "verbalized" WPS and to a greater extent Easton's systems analysis model), explanatory power will continue to be sacrificed for high levels of generality. Of course, however, the ultimate test of the value of theories derived from an analysis of simulate conditions is how useful they are in explaining the referent system.

In concluding this essay, we come to the ultimate issue, WPS's validity. The notion of validity is complex conceptually and empirically. Here validity is conceptualized as being composed of three different dimensions—value as a predictive device, value as a heuristic tool and coherence to the established bodies of thought. There are no foregone conclusions about WPS's validity along any one of these

[12] Hoffman (*Ibid.*) notes that International Relations needs macro theory in order to be an autonomous discipline.

* EDITOR'S NOTE: *This word is not listed in adjectival form in standard American dictionaries.*

dimensions. In closing, our objective is to indicate areas that need further consideration in evaluating WPS.

The supreme test of a theory's validity is in its ability to predict occurrences in the real world. "Verbalized" WPS is not capable of prediction, but "operating" WPS does possess that capability. However, we doubt, and have not argued, that "operating" WPS will predict specific real world events. Rather, the contention is that it develops theoretical relationships in specific simulate* contexts; and an understanding of the simulate* relationships may be useful in understanding the empirical relationships of similar real world situations. This quality of WPS relates to the second dimension of a theory's validity, its heuristic value. The heuristic value of WPS lies in its ability to facilitate research, to stimulate new questions, and to suggest theoretical relationships. WPS's heuristic utility is, in the last analysis, an empirical question to be determined by its actual application as a theory-building device.

A third test of a theory's validity is whether the relevant scholars believe or do not believe that it should be published and used for research and teaching.[13] This aspect of a theory's validity is "a subjective question or, better, an intersubjective one."[14] The question of intersubjective validity is a crucial area for WPS: some relevant scholars express jaundiced views about anything smacking of "simulation". This skepticism probably derives partially from a communications gap created by the simulation language. The effort here has been to close that gap by verbalizing WPS; and the anticipation is that a meaningful dialogue between the simulators and nonsimulators will ensue. Pending that dialogue, there can be little confidence in WPS's intersubjective validity.

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* See Editor's Note on previous page.

[13] Kaplan, *op. cit.*

[14] Van Dyke, *Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis*, p. 191.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

Seeking World Order: The United States and International Organization to 1920. By Warren F. Kuehl (Vanderbilt University Press, Nashville, 1969).

Seeking World Order by Warren Kuehl is an account of the American role in promoting international machinery for the prevention of war up to the time of the United States Senate's final rejection of the Treaty of Versailles in March 1920. Although beginning with a discussion of early European and American plans for international organization, this book concentrates on the period from 1890 to 1920 with special attention devoted to the era of the Wilson administration and the constituting of the League of Nations. Kuehl focuses primarily on the views of American internationalists and their efforts to make an international organization a reality.

This study well deserves the attention of students of American foreign policy. It is the most detailed and comprehensive monograph thus far published on the subject. It also represents the most extensive research and synthesis of documentation yet undertaken on the league question. Kuehl's use of contemporary newspapers and periodicals, as well as tracts published by various peace groups and proponents of international organization, is unsurpassed. *Seeking World Order,* moreover, is based on a considerable body of manuscripts, including some little used but important collections of documents. Kuehl has investigated public records and approximately forty collections of private papers. They include the papers of such prominent Americans as Edward M. House, Henry Cabot Lodge, Elihu Root, Henry L. Stimson, William H. Taft, and Woodrow Wilson. Kuehl has neglected neither the papers of American pioneers of the movement, such as Raymond L. Bridgman, Hayne Davis, and Benjamin Trueblood, nor of peace organizations, such as the League to Enforce Peace, the New York Peace Society, and the World's Court League.

It is abundantly evident in this study that a wide variety of views existed in the United States as to the composition and functions of an international organization. The study further substantiates the view that the American concept of a league of nations did not originate in the decade immediately preceding the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. Its roots may be traced well back into the 19th century.

Kuehl's assessment of the American debacle over the league of nations issue is undoubtedly the most interesting and useful of his appraisals. He rejects the interpretation that the defeat of the Treaty of Versailles and with it the Covenant of the League of Nations was due primarily to political partisanship or personal animosities. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, for example, is portrayed as a man of convictions and principle whose decisions were determined by issues rather than political expediency or a hatred of President Wilson. It is also clear that Kuehl does not agree with the thesis that the United States Senate did not reflect or represent the views of the American public in attacking the Covenant and attempting to modify

it by means of reservations. Kuehl maintains that the struggle was basically over ideas and "because not so much one between those for and against the League as it was between those who could not agree upon the nature of the League they wanted" (p. 339). Furthermore, he contends that the Covenant "did not reflect the prevailing patterns of internationalist thought which had emerged in the United States" (p. 344). Thus, the Senate's rejection of the Treaty of Versailles was done neither in disregard of public sentiment nor without reasonable justification.

Kuehl fixes responsibility for the rejection of the Covenant principally on Wilson. Wilson, he asserts, may have been the foremost champion of a league; but he was only an internationalist-comelately, and a generalist on the subject at that, who failed to cooperate with league proponents and to keep fully informed as to their thinking. Consequently, by remaining aloof, Wilson forged a document for international organization which was not in keeping with current thinking. Article X, for example, with its controversial guarantee of political independence and territorial integrity was too radical for most Americans. In other respects the Covenant was not advanced enough. Wilson's intransigence resulted, therefore, not only in an unsatisfactory and unpopular Covenant but also in the alienation of league supporters, whom he desperately needed in the ensuing struggle with the Senate.

Seeking World Order, therefore, supports the charge voiced by John Chalmers Hinson and others that the debate over the league was grounded on honest and fundamental differences of opinion rather than partisan politics or emotion. Kuehl also joins an increasingly growing number of historians who have been critical of Wilson's role in the league movement. Kuehl, however, is less critical of Wilson's unwillingness to yield to Senate reservations as he is of Wilson's attitude toward those internationalists who favored the creation of an international organization. Unlike many of Wilson's critics, however, Kuehl states that Wilson's decision to participate in the negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference was sound inasmuch as it insured the creation of a league of nations.

While *Seeking World Order* is the most detailed account available on international organization, and makes a notable contribution to our understanding of the league of nations issue, it is by no means the definitive study on the subject. Kuehl's book contains a number of misleading or inaccurate statements. Chapter twelve which discusses the efforts at the Paris Peace Conference to formulate the League of Nations Covenant is a prime example. Kuehl contends that Secretary of State Robert Lansing did no more than comment on various league drafts prepared by Wilson (p. 267). He also leaves the impression that Lansing believed that guarantees should be the heart of the Covenant (p. 275). Actually, Lansing fervently urged Wilson and Colonel House to make an international court the nucleus of any plan for a league of nations and strongly opposed Wilson's mutual-guarantee concept. He suggested a negative or self-denying guarantee only as a means of mitigating what later became Article X of the

Covenant. Kuehl also confuses attempts by the American and British delegations to reach an accord on a league plan in January 1919 with the efforts of the conference's Commission on the League of Nations in February to reach an overall agreement on the details of the Covenant (pp. 270-271). His statement that all British drafts for a league of nations, including that of General Smuts, had provided for a world court (p. 280) while incorrect is perhaps more pardonable. This has been frequently asserted by historians. However, it was not until the close of January 1919 that any member of the British delegation specifically called for the establishment of a permanent, international court. Until then none of the plans prepared by members of the British Government (the Phillimore *Draft Convention* of March 1918, the Smuts Plan, and the various proposals of Lord Cecil) had specifically called or provided for the establishment of a permanent court. The Smuts Plan, in particular, advocated the use of ad hoc arbitration panels, stating that it would be difficult to establish a permanent court in light of the problems in finding a method of selecting judges.

In his selection of sources Kuehl made some curious but not vital omissions. He failed to examine the papers of Wilson's official advisor on foreign policy, Secretary of State Lansing, which are available at the Library of Congress. Lansing's role in the formulation of the League Covenant, it is true, was negligible. His views on the league were not solicited or acted upon by President Wilson. Nevertheless, a perusal of Lansing's papers would at least have prevented Kuehl from depicting Lansing erroneously. And while Kuehl examined the records of the Department of State, he neglected researching another relevant group of records also on deposit at the National Archives, namely the voluminous records of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace. These records contain a multitude of league plans received by the American delegation to the Paris Peace Conference.

Redundancy and repetition also characterize segments of *Seeking World Order,* making reading often tedious. This is due to Kuehl's overconcern with the details of countless plans for international organization. A discussion of such plans is indeed warranted, but objection is raised to the necessity of elaborating upon so many of them, especially those of similar content or the more impractical schemes of dilettantes.

Perhaps the biggest disappointment in *Seeking World Order,* however, is Kuehl's treatment of the movement for modern international organization in its embryonic stages. Kuehl often neglects or fails to sufficiently explain the motivation or justification for a particular proposal, policy or development. He does not exercise sufficient value judgment, rarely challenging, for instance, the practicability or merits of 18th and 19th century schemes for international organization.

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Science, Politics and Gnosticism: Two Essays. By Eric Voegelin, (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1968).

Utopia: The Perennial Heresy. By Thomas Molnar, (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1967).

The history of political thought has largely been an eternal contest between two schools of thought that differ fundamentally on the nature of man, society and politics. It is conflict between those who "imagine the world to suit their policy, and those who arrange their policy to suit the realities of the world."[1] In response to the current intensity of the utopian drive for predominance in political thinking and practice, a number of thoughtful studies have been produced within the last decade upon the nature and origins of utopian thought. The two books considered in this review can be looked upon as largely complementary, for they offer perhaps the most cogent, lucid, and successful analysis of utopian or ideological thought of this generation. Few books have equalled Voegelin's attempt to expose the logical and philosophical errors that are inherent in the utopian schematic structures.

"Realism and utopianism," writes Molnar, "are two different ways of appraising the human condition, and they will remain in conflict until the end of time."[2] Utopianism, though, is not to be regarded as a mere naive wish-fulfillment, but as a positive evil. It is an evil, Molnar maintains, because it leads men to commit evil. Utopianism enslaves the mind while simultaneously unfettering it from a decent regard for moral norms. Finding himself unjustly born into a world of imperfection, the utopian condemns its ills and faults not so much on moral grounds as upon ontological grounds. Rising his sights above the seamy reality that he now envisions, he proclaims a world of his own making, uncorrupted by the more distasteful aspects of human life. In his drive to return either to a Rousseauian state of nature or toward some future technological utopia, he finds that no evil is too abhorrent for him to commit in pursuit of his objectives. The very act of violence will be a redemptive force, cleansing the society of its evil and corruption. Any barbarous act will be condoned as long as the end is good.

At the roots of utopian thought, notes Molnar, there is a defiance of God. The utopian secularizes religious terminology. His ideological objective is to achieve by political power and revolution the Christian promise of eternal peace and happiness here on earth. His pride is unlimited and he yearns for enormous power. Full of the righteous hubris of a Savonarola, he assumes that his ideology is a sort of afflatus which has given him justification to manipulate and shape mankind's fate.

His thinking is one-dimensional. Rather than considering the complex configuration of events that history and existing political

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[1] Albert Sorel, *L'Europe et la Revolution Francaise*, cited by E. H. Carr in his *Twenty Years Crisis: 1919-1939*, Harper Torchbooks (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 11.

[2] Molnar, p. 226.

facts have presented him, he transforms all into a single ideological system which has all the worst aspects of the principle of *numero unius exclusio alterius*. While all political theory is guilty of enumerating some facts while excluding others, utopianism deliberately selects those facts which support its case, while excluding the others which would not be so beneficial to its viewpoint. As Molnar notes, the utopian "is able to fit data into a Procrustean bed of his desires."[3] Possessed with this intellectual approach, they transform in their ideological pronouncements the nature of man into something that would be compatible with their visions of the perfect society. Thus, they become involved in an inevitable contradiction. Although they may speak of unrestrained freedom in their future society, they must so organize freedom that they would "turn it into slavery."[4]

While Molnar's book is a highly readible and engaging critique of utopian thought, Eric Voegelin's work is the product of over two decades of scholarly research and analysis of utopian, or gnostic movements, as he prefers to call them. Voegelin's value as an analyst of utopian thought is further enhanced by the fact that he is currently one of the few living political philosophers writing today. Voegelin, though, is not nearly as readible as Molnar. Indeed, he is an intellectual challenge to even the most erudite of scholars. He deliberately obscures the thesis of his work under awesome mounds of scholarship and technical historical references. Few students of political thought have the intellectual dexterity necessary to follow his thought through all the esoteric Hebraic, Greek and German references.[5] More concerned with achieving some definition of the political good within modern political philosophy, his arguments against gnosticism are more squarely on philosophical grounds than Molnar's.

Dante Gremino has hailed Voegelin as possibly the "greatest political philosopher of our age and also one of the most underrated."[6] Although his scholarly output has radically reappraised political philosophy, Voegelin has largely gone unnoticed within academic circles. Among some political scientists there seems to be an almost arrogant pride taken in their ignorance of Voegelin. A case in point would be John Roche, intellectual-in-residence for the Johnson Administration, who remarked recently that he had not read Voegelin's *The New Science of Politics* and did not intend to, because it seemed to be about "someone called Saint Joachim of Flora."[7] However, Voegelin's failure to receive proper recognition for his work cannot be solely contributed to some "conspiracy of silence" on the part of *academia*. For, indeed, much of Voegelin's work waits still to be translated from its original German. Therefore, it might be expected

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[3] Molnar, p. 206.

[4] *Ibid*, p. 8.

[5] It has been suggested to this author in private conversation with Russell Kirk, a noted American political thinker, that Voegelin's apparent obscurantism is due to a habit that he nurtured while living under the Nazi regime. If one's political doctrines are too well known, then he runs the risk of inciting enemies that someday "will get you."

[6] "Revival of Political Theory," *Journal of Politics, XXV* (August, 1963), pp. 437—460.

[7] Russell Kirk, *Enemies of the Permanent Things: Observations of Abnormality in Literature and Politics* (New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1969), p. 264.

that his influence will increase in America as more of his books become available in English.[8]

His latest book, reviewed here, is a continuance of the theme that he established in *The New Science of Politics*. Here he offers a philosophical analysis of contemporary gnostic movements. "By gnostic movements we mean such movements as progressivism, positivism, Marxism, psychoanalysis, communism, fascism, and national socialism." Also included are intellectual movements such as "positivism, neo-positivism, and the variants of psychoanalysis."[9] He calls these ideological mass-movements gnostic movements primarily due to their similarity with the medieval gnosticism. Noting the common philosophical and pyschological outlook of medieval and contemporary gnosticism, he observes that gnosticism is always characterized in a thinker if he believes the world to be an alien place from which he must be delivered. The gnosis is the knowledge of where we were, where we are going, where we have been flung, and how we might be delivered. It is characterized in modern thought by the fact that its aim is the destruction of the old world and the passage into the new.[10]

The proper role of political science then must be to "assist in exorcising the demons—in the modest measure of effectiveness that our society grants to *episteme* [the political wisdom] and its therapy."[11] His objective, therefore, is to strain the gnostic ideology out of contemporary political philosophy and return philosophy to its proper ontological bearings.

Utopian or gnostic thought has permeated not only contemporary political philosophy, such as Herbert Marcuse or the Marxist theorists, but has also affected the study of history in respect to the recent outgrowth of revisionist historians and theory in international relations. As Molnar and numerous other writers have noted, there are many who when faced with the prospect of a universal holocaust today "would avert it through equalization of atomic power," or "who see universal disarmament as the only answer. No matter which of the two positions prevail, they say, peace can be preserved only by a supranational agency, ultimately world government".[12] Each believes that man through a simple political act can establish peace and happiness, eternal upon this earth. Only the unreasonable or uninformed few prevent Mankind from achieving this humane ideal.

Through their impressive historical and philosophical analysis of utopianism, Voegelin and Molnar have contributed a significant amount to the exorcism of some intellectual demons from political

[8] The most notable interpretative essays on Voegelin include: Kirk's *Enemies of Permanent Things*, pp. 253-281 and his review of Voegelin's *Orders and History: Volume 1, Israel and Revelation* in *The Yale Review* (March, 1957), 446-476; Ellis Sandoz, "Eric Voegelin and the Nature of Philosophy," *Modern Age* XIII (Spring, 1969), 152-168 and his review of Voegelin's *Science, Politics and Gnosticism* in *The Intercollegiate Review*, V (Winter, 1968-69), 117-123; and an uncompleted PhD dissertation at Tulane University by Vincent M. Byrnes entitled "An Analysis of Gnosis as the Symbolic Form of Western Political Consciousness in the Work of Eric Voegelin," which was reported in the *American Political Science Review Newsletter, 1*, (Summer, 1968). Books by Voegelin translated into English include his *The New Science of Politics* (1952), *Order and History: Volume 1, Israel and Revelation* (1956), Volume II: *The World of the Polis* (1957), and Volume III: *Plato and Aristotle* (1952).

[9] Voegelin, p. 83.

[10] *Ibid*, pp. 10-11.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 49.

[12] Molnar, p. 216.

science. Although, if utopianism is to be exposed generally as the devious intellectual fraud that it is, then Voegelin's and Molnar's works must be regarded as the mere bare beginnings of the struggle against demons and other intellectual freaks.

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Russia, China, and the West 1953-1966. By Isaac Deutscher (Fred Halliday, ed., Penguin Books, Middlesex, 1970).

This book represents a collection of essays and newspaper articles dealing with Russia during the period of de-Stalinization and published posthumously, some three years after Deutscher's death in 1967.

Penguin's backleaf description of the book hints at both the strengths and weaknesses of the book. These can best be summarized as "the immediacy of contemporary journalism" and "an attempt to present the texts in a narrative sequence so that they form, in as far as is possible, a continuous commentary."

The journalistic immediacy is indeed evident in every page of Deutscher's text; the episodes of Russian internal and external policies are told with a startling bravado, since Deutscher claims knowledge of the deepest motives underlying the policy-making leadership in the Kremlin. The feeling of the book is of a chatty, frothy newspaper column, in which Khrushchev, Beria, Molotov, Kaganovich, Mao, Malenkov, Zhukov, and other Communist leaders cheerfully flit about, pirouetting this way and that, like so many marionettes on an historic string of Deutscher's devising. No attempt is made to place Soviet policy in a serious historical or doctrinal framework. Instead, cheerfully confident tautological generalities leap at the reader from practically every page, striking an equal balance of astonishment and delight at the author's courage. Early in an article dated 5 March 1954, Deutscher confidently tells us that

> Contrary to popular belief, the spectre of a rearmed Germany does not cause a single sleepless night to the men in the Kremlin, who know perfectly well how many sleepless nights that spectre must cause to Germany's Western European neighbors. (p. 15)

Not very much later, (10 February 1955) he explains the dismissal of the "consumptionists" lead by Malenkov, by invoking the spectre of a rearmed Germany, which immediately causes the Kremlin to abandon its ideas of economic liberalization in favor of a massive armaments increase. He concludes that

> Molotov apparently had this counter-coup to the armament of Western Germany in mind when he said at the last session of the Supreme Soviet that the 'Western imperialists' would adopt a different language *vis-a-vis* Russia once they saw what were the Soviet counter-measures. (p. 33)

A similar ambivalence may be found in Deutscher's description of the roles of individual members of the Politburo. In an article dated 26 February 1956, he described Mikoyan's role at the Twentieth Party Congress, which was devoted to the denunciation of the personality cult, as that of the chief architect of a movement to re-establish collective leadership. Here Mikoyan is pictured "as the mouthpiece of militant anti-Stalinism" (p. 58), demolishing the person and the doctrine of his erstwhile master in a speech where "he consciously borrowed . . . terms, as well as many other ideas and formulas, from none other than Trotsky, who coined them." (p. 59)

Yet at the end of the book, Mikoyan, who is described as the architect of Khruschev's downfall, finds himself forced out of the Politburo "without even a vote of thanks for his forty years service." (p. 325) This dismissal is then characterized as giving much satisfaction to "crypto-Stalinists," who, in the same article, are shown to have been cast aside permanently: "The Congress did not rehabilitate Molotov and Kaganovich, the Stalinist die-hards whom Khruschev had expelled from the Party." (p. 324) The Twenty-Third Congress thus seems to cast aside Stalinists and anti-Stalinists at the same time, and Mikoyan's role in forty years of Party leadership is left in a miasma of contradictions.

The intrinsic problem of the book is that it is nothing more than a collection of articles written by Deutscher over a period of thirteen years, which have no unifying idea or principle to hold them together. This episodic treatment is further aggravated by the fact that the editor of this collection was not sensitive to the all too obvious contradictions and confusions of these articles, so that the general chronological framework which is provided in no way alters the fact that the book is very confusing and quite unsatisfactory as a serious analytical work. Beyond this, Deutscher's avowed Marxism, though framed in the guise of anti-Stalinism and anti-Khruschevism, makes a number of so-called insights in the role of such Western Marxists as Thorez and Togliatti highly suspect, from an ideological and historical viewpoint.

The book does contain a chronology of events which may be helpful to the reader who is not acquainted with the major events of the last two decades, but this chronology is not keyed to specific articles describing the events listed. A rather extensive index is also available, but there is no bibliography, and no authorities are cited by way of verification of Deutscher's numerous controversial assertions. On balance, then, the book is of no intrinisic value to the serious student of Soviet affairs; but rather, it must be considered at best as a collection of dated articles suitable for casual bedtime reading.

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Diplommetry.* By I. P. Singh (Somaiya Publications, Pvt. Ltd., Bombay, India, 1970, 114 pages).

In a small volume of 110 pages, Dr. Singh undertakes the task of quantifying diplomacy. The problems of diplomatic life which he had experienced in the Indian Foreign Service inspired him to develop a quantitative, measurable approach as an aid in the solution of such problems. Diplomacy to Dr. Singh is the formulation, conduct and evaluation of foreign policy. Diplomatic actions, accordingly, are intended to achieve some combination of the following goals: "to strengthen the security of the country, or to ward off an element of danger to its security; to augment the prosperity of the country or to eliminate a threat to its well being; to stress the country's sovereignty or to stave off an affront to that sovereignty; to enhance the influence of the country over its fellow states or to remove a factor which tends to diminish its influence over them or some other similar aim."

Dr. Singh views the primary function of diplommetry as an aid in achieving those objectives, by providing "a conversion table to diplomats by which they can translate complex political situations into figures up to a reasonable reliable degree." Dr. Singh is very careful to note that what he proposes should be used "only for guidance and should never be taken as answers to diplomatic riddles."

Basically his approach is to develop formulae and indices using well known measurable factors of a nation and to apply these to various diplomatic problems. His list of factors are a nation's population, manpower, total government expenditures, total exports, total imports, value of foreign aid given and value of foreign aid received.

From these basic data of nations, Dr. Singh develops a calculus of national self interest, a quantitative measure of how a nation should proportion diplomatic effort among its basic goals. He proceeds to develop a ledger of diplomatic achievements, an indicator of a nation's relative diplomatic success. Another chapter is devoted to evaluating particular diplomatic actions of a nation by developing calculus of positive and negative points resulting from such actions.

Dr. Singh holds forth the promise of a system unraveling complex problems of diplomatic life. On closer examination, one is left with the uneasy feeling that his solutions raise as many questions as they purport to answer. An example will help to illustrate why this is so.

Dr. Singh sets up rules for measuring and combining factors in his development of a calculus of national self interest. Thus a primary goal of a sovereign state, ensuring its physical security is measured by the number of men in arms in that state. A threat to a country's security is measured by the differential in armed strength which Dr. Singh terms the "Defense Quotient" of a country. Specifically, the "Defense Quotient" of a country is the ratio of armed manpower of the country to the armed manpower of its adversary. If country B with three million in armed manpower threatens country A with one million in armed manpower, country A's Defense Quotient

* EDITOR'S NOTE: *This word does not presently appear in standard British or American dictionaries available to this editor.*

is one million divided by three million or ⅓. The inverse of this, 3/1, is the Absolute Defense Need of a country to achieve parity with its adversary. Recognizing that in the short run (a period of a year) many factors can affect the threat to a nation and that only marginal additions to the size of armed forces are possible, Dr. Singh makes certain qualifications. The defense problem, in the short run, depends upon the attention the country is paying to its defense threat in its budget compared with the attention its adversary is similarly paying to its defense. Thus, a nation's security problem is the "Absolute Defense Need" modified by the "Quotient of Defense Attention." There is no indication of how this modification or weighting process is taking place.

Assuming the security problem to be 3/1 as stated above, (for simplicity without the above modification) Dr. Singh proceeds to measure the appropriate share of national attention that ought to be devoted to this problem. The total national attention available to a country is measured by the size of the federal government's annual budget. If 20 percent of the federal budget is devoted to defense and the adversary has three times the armed strength, the country must devote 20X3 or 60 percent of its national attention to security or 60 percent of its diplomatic attention to national security. This type of analysis is used by Dr. Singh to measure other components of a nation's self-interest such as, share of prosperity, share of influence and share of sovereignty.

Dr. Singh's use of a nation's manpower as the basis of the measure of a nation's security is somewhat dubious. He reasons that nuclear weapons whether in the hands of both nations or in the hands of only one is merely a marginal threat. Security should be assessed, in Dr. Singh's analysis, on the basis of conventional armaments. However, once having established this, Dr. Singh proceeds to discount differences in the quality and quantity of firepower for three reasons: one reason is the extreme difficulty if not impossibility of comparing fire power; the second reason is that most countries possess similar types of fire power; and thirdly, weapons generally are in direct ratio to manpower.

In the modern world with tremendous variations in the quality and quantity of firepower and in the quality of manpower, comparisons based on quantities of manpower appear to be, at best, a superficial approach. Granted the fact that Dr. Singh's comparisons of manpower are merely rules of thumb, a comparison the author asserts could be discarded if better rules are found. The question arises concerning the value of such comparisons. The sole use of measured manpower fails to recognize the trade-offs between manpower and firepower and the other strategic factors in defense. Other questions also come to mind. For example, why is a nation's federal budget the best measure of the "national attention" of a country? Why should the product of the percentage of the federal budget devoted to defense and "Absolute Defense Need" (even modified by the Quotient of Defense Attention) be the proportion of diplomatic attention paid to security?

Consider, for example, the case of a nation devoting the absurdly low percentage of one percent of its federal budget to defense and all other conditions prevailing as stated before, i.e., an Absolute Defense Need ratio of 3/1. The diplomatic attention devoted to its security according to Dr. Singh's measure would be the product of three and one percent or three percent. The threat is no less than before and most likely greater since the nation has been spending so little for defense. Yet the result leads to a smaller amount of diplomatic attention to be devoted to the problem of security.

In developing the other parts of his calculus of self interest Dr. Singh proceeds to ascertain the percentages of diplomatic attention to be devoted to the other basic goals of prosperity, influence, and sovereignty. He carefully examines the appropriate characteristics and creates measurements for these goals which results in a percentage of diplomatic attention to be devoted to each of them. These percentages are developed independently and are unrelated to each other. In fact, in his example, the sum of the percentages is greater than 100 percent. He defines the situation as one appearing illogical but in fact rather than being illogical "all it means is that the demands on the country's diplomatic attention are greater than its capacity to cope with them effectively." He proceeds to scale down these shares proportionately so that the total attention does come to 100 percent.

To the reviewer, the procedure is illogical. The initial percentages are not related in any logical manner to each other, and therefore there is no reason to treat these factors on pro rata basis. Throughout his text there are numerous points where similar objections can be raised. The non-mathematical sections dealing with the complexities of diplomatic situations, such as uncertainties arising from the human factor, were a delight to the reviewer. Dr. Singh is very aware of these non-quantifiable complexities in human endeavors. However, it is these very non-quantifiable factors that limits, if not completely vitiates, Dr. Singh's attempts at quantification.

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