TOWSON STATE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

TOWSON STATE COLLEGE
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND

Volume X Number 1 Fall 1975

TOWSON STATE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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The
Towson State Journal of International Affairs
is indexed in
Historical Abstracts and/or America: History and Life
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Towson State Journal of International Affairs

The editors invite the submission of articles bearing upon problems in international relations. All manuscripts should conform to the *University of Chicago Manual of Style.* A precis of the *Manual* is available as *A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations.* Editorial communications and manuscripts should be addressed to the *Towson State Journal of International Affairs,* Box 1951, Towson State College, Baltimore, Maryland 21204.

Statements of fact and opinion appearing in the *Journal* are made on the responsibility of the authors alone and do not imply the endorsement of the editors or the publishers.

Subscriptions and inquiries about advertising may be sent to the Circulation Editor at Box 1951, Towson State College, Baltimore, Maryland 21204. The cost of subscriptions is $2.00 per year. The *Journal* is published semi-annually under the auspices of the Department of Political Science and the Committee on International Studies, Towson State College.

Produced by the Office of News and Publication Services

Towson State Journal of International Affairs

VOLUME X FALL 1975 NUMBER 1

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REVIEW OF BOOKS

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The study of international affairs as an academic discipline no longer belongs exclusively to the specialists in that field; rather, its scope has been extended to include the work of other related disciplines in recognition of the fact that international problems are not exclusively political in nature. It is the purpose of this journal to speak on matters involving international problems with many academic voices. More important, it is the purpose of this journal to permit undergraduate students to try their wings in describing, analyzing, and possibly suggesting solutions to the problems that have vexed nations in their contacts with each other.

The underlying premise of this journal is that undergraduate students *can* contribute effectively to a reasoned, moderate, academic analysis of international problems and that such contributions will have a more profound effect on the study of international affairs as well as on the student contributors to this journal than the passionate, partisan, and emotionally charged outbursts which have lately permeated American campuses.

Consequently, the *Journal* invites contributors to take an active interest in this publication. It encourages students as well as members of the Towson State faculty and the students and faculty from other campuses to contribute articles, reviews, and other pertinent materials.

SECRECY, CONSENSUS, AND FOREIGN POLICY: THE LOGIC OF CHOICE

By Earl C. Ravenal*

> I think if one looks at the requirements of foreign policy in the present period, one will find that some things must be done secretively.
>
> Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger
> Interview with Thomas W. Braden and
> Klaas J. Hindriks, Netherlands
> Broadcasting Foundation, February 9, 1975.

Most members of the official foreign policy community, and many members of the critical community of American intellectuals, including those who would call themselves liberals, professed to admire the main foreign policy initiatives of the Nixon-Kissinger administration — the opening to China, the detente with the Soviet Union, the extrication from Vietnam, the lowering of the feverish, obsessional competition for the Third World, and the energetic diplomatic activity in the Middle East. But, during the time of Watergate, most members of government quietly dissociated themselves from the *administrative style* of their president, and virtually all American intellectuals, especially the liberals, affected to be shocked and enraged by the conduct of the Nixon White House. And, since then, the *diplomatic style* of Kissinger — the cool, secretive amoralism, the manipulative and coercive use of power — has come under attack. Most of these critics seem to want essentially Nixon's foreign policies without Nixon's personal style, and Kissinger's diplomacy without Kissinger's philosophy of the world.

I think this is too much to ask — not because I happen not to admire either the substantive foreign policy or the administrative and diplomatic style of the Nixon-Kissinger administration, or, for that matter, the Ford-Kissinger administration. The reason, rather, is that these elements are integrally related to each other. In fact, they are related in a logical structure. They are woven warp and woof of the same fabric. Critics cannot pick a thread here and a thread there; they must have this whole fabric or an alternative one.

My inquiry here will be into this relationship among (1) foreign policy content, (2) diplomatic and administrative "style" (in the largest sense of the term — including the resort to secrecy and deception, or "openness" and the denial of secrecy), and (3) the constraints imposed upon foreign policy substance and form by the peculiar operation of the American political system — that is, (a) the American "constitution" (the whole set of political and social relationships that bind us to each other and bind us to our government), and (b) the presence or absence of a popular consensus for our foreign policies.

The Question of Style

The only item of innovation promised by incoming President Ford was a change of *style* in the executive branch of government. After the experience of

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the Nixon administration, in which executive independence became isolation and arrogance, and executive privilege became evasion and criminality, the promise of "openness" and "candor" was greeted appreciatively — even with abject gratitude — by Congress, the public, and the press. Virtually the only objections directed against the performance of Henry Kissinger by Americans have been to his *style* of diplomacy and administration: his disdain for consultation and collaboration; his penchant for swift, dramatic moves after secret reassessments; his amoralism and cool disregard for human consequences; his elaborate and obfuscating avoidance of scrutiny; and his suspicion and repression of internal dissent.[1]

Perhaps we should not be surprised at the salience of matters of style. After all, precisely at its most superficial level, style is a conspicuous feature at the interface of a government and its objects and subjects; it represents a personalization of national policy and conduct that seems to make these matters comprehensible to the average person. Even policy analysts and political scientists are usually more engaged by gossip than by their abstractions.

Style has been treated with a misplaced emphasis that might distort the evaluation of the foreign policy of the Nixon-Kissinger administration. Insofar as style is treated as an *aspect* of policy making, it is likely to be misunderstood and consequently exaggerated. But, insofar as style is understood as part of the *structure* of policy choice, it is important, and holds implications that are contrary to the likelihood of a simple change of foreign policy style. In one direction, diplomatic style — and the entire character of an administration — affect the choice of the objects of our diplomacy and the means by which we pursue those objects. And in the other direction, a certain diplomatic and domestic style is a necessary concomitant of certain foreign policy orientations, and cannot be changed without changing those orientations. If a change of orientations is held to be unlikely or undesirable, then it is idle — though it may be entertaining — to criticize style as if it were a completely autonomous and remediable element.

The key question — the "operational" question — about diplomatic and administrative style is not whether it is congenial or obnoxious to our values, or even whether it is benign or noxious to our system, but whether it is dispensable or necessary to certain substantive foreign policy orientations. In other words, is style just a characteristic of administrations or personalities, or is it an integral part of the diplomacy of a nation? This question matters

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[1]One of the earlier critiques of Kissinger's style was David Landau, *Kissinger: The Uses of Power*, Houghton Mifflin (Boston, 1972). In a more recent example, Roger Morris, "The Press as Cloak and Suitor," *The New York Times*, Op-Ed, (May 11, 1974), accuses Kissinger of "spend(ing) even less time on human rights issues than on economic problems," "convincingly argu(ing) against moralism in diplomacy," and being "reluctant to become involved in human rights issues, or to appear 'soft' in those he did deal with," and explains this in terms of Kissinger's "lack of self-confidence and identity." Thomas L. Hughes, "Foreign Policy: Men or Measures?" *The Atlantic*, (October, 1974), criticizes the "personalism" of the Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy. Richard Holbrooke, "Kissinger: A Study in Contradictions," *The Washington Post*, Outlook, (September 15, 1974), remarks that Kissinger is "devious," "deeply flawed," and "wholly without feeling for human suffering." And the publication of Marvin and Bernard Kalb's book, *Kissinger*, occasioned several long reviews that stress the Secretary's operating style; see particularly the review articles of James Chace in *The New York Times Book Review*, (August 25, 1974), and Ronald Steel in *The New York Review of Books*, (September 19, 1974).

because its answer makes a difference. In one case, we can exorcise a certain group of leaders and elevate another, and expect a meaningful change in the style of government without, necessarily, an alteration in the direction of our foreign policy. But, in the other case, the relationship between style and policy will assert itself, and there can be two outcomes: either (1) a sincere and thorough change of style will inhibit the pursuit of objectives and force their change; or (2) style will be tailored to suit foreign policy objectives that are held to be too important to sacrifice.

In this question of style, just as in questions of the substance of its foreign policies, a prognosis for the Ford administration turns not on its declarations or intentions, but on the logic of choice. In this respect, the cases of Chile and Cyprus are exemplary. These cases illustrate, respectively, the restrictions that (1) administrative style and (2) constitutional relationships can put on diplomatic style and, in turn, on the range of effective foreign policy action.

It is ironic that one of the first events to have embarrassed the Ford administration is one that was engineered by its predecessor: the subversion of the Allende government in Chile between 1970 and 1973.[2] This was no inadvertent, anarchial performance by an "invisible government," the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), but a calculated and multifarious program instigated by the highly official "40 Committee" and its chairman, Henry Kissinger.[3]

The covert nature of this action and the reactions of Congress and the President provide a paradigm of the relationship of foreign policy and diplomatic and administrative style. The essence of covert action is, by definition, "plausible deniability," the sanctity of covering the lie. Yet the Chilean revelation sent legislators and editorialists scurrying for the non-solution of congressional "oversight" — as if it could be both effective and compatible with the discriminating conduct of covert operations. But oversight, if ineffective, would merely invite congressional complicity, and, if effective, would risk public disclosure. The real problem is *what* is to be overseen.

In a larger and obvious sense, Realpolitik, in its entirety, stands in the same relation to healthy democratic processes as does covert action to legislative oversight and presidential candor. Just as oversight is not an effective adjunct to covert operations, but actually a contradiction, so openness in the executive branch is not a constructive complement to power politics, but probably an obstruction. But, from President Ford's espousal of covert operations in Chile (unprecedented except perhaps for Eisenhower's candid defense of the U-2 in 1960), we must conclude that he has not as yet realized that a problem of choice even exists, let alone reconciled himself to making that choice. He can have his preferred style of openness and candor, or the present flexible diplomacy and secret applications of force — but not both for very long.

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[2]It was disclosed that the CIA had spent $8 million to "destabilize" the Allende government. The second of the great CIA scandals from the Nixon (and prior) administration which surfaced during the first several months of the Ford administration—its illegal domestic surveillance—illustrates not so much this first question of administrative style as the second question (discussed below, in the case of Cyprus) of constitutional relationships.

[3]As Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The other members are the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and the Director of Central Intelligence.

The case of Cyprus illustrates another aspect of the tensions among administrative style, diplomatic style, and foreign policy choice. The administration's persistent attempts to continue military aid to Turkey after its extended occupation of northern Cyprus — despite several congressional amendments that would cut off or restrict this aid,[4] and despite the intent of the original military assistance legislation that the arms not be diverted against NATO members—called into question its recently proclaimed respect for congressional initiative and legal restraint. Thus, Cyprus provides a striking example of the "constitutional trade-off." It invites the Ford administration to contemplate its three basic choices: (1) operate within constitutional constraints, to the likely detriment of foreign policy efforts and outcomes; (2) attempt to operate outside the constraints, either evading or deceiving or intimidating opposition, and possibly precipitating a constitutional crisis; or (3) attempt to widen the constraints by a convincing display of leadership, eliciting a general expansion of public confidence or a particular delegation of congressional authority — a course of action that also has its costs.[5]

Most likely, this administration's reaction will be mixed. In some cases, its commitment to openness will impair effectiveness and limit the scope of action. But, more often, one suspects, this commitment will be displayed in rhetoric, and an open administrative and diplomatic style will be sacrificed to perceptions of strategic necessity. "Personalism" will continue as long as there remains anyone talented enough to pursue personal diplomacy. Secrecy will be attempted to the extent that it is still possible in the face of a more militant, aroused Congress and a more probing, suspicious press. Repression in the bureaucracy will prevail, as much as possible, with the temporary popularity of cabinet independence and principled resignations. And diplomatic non-consultation and tactical surprise will continue, wherever our allies' capacity for obstruction does not preclude it.

As we shall see, the operating style of the Nixon-Kissinger administration did not proceed solely from its continuing global pretensions or its desire to evade domestic constraints, but the *combination of both* led almost inevitably to a diplomacy of economic maneuver, a military policy of bluff and threat, and an internal regime of secrecy, repression, and evasion of constitutional restrictions. Therefore, it may have been shallow for critics to deplore the executive style (which they increasingly identified with Nixon), but to applaud the foreign policy achievements (which they increasingly attributed to Kissinger). They should have realized that style, including even the crimes of Watergate, is a concomitant of policy objects and situational constraints (as policy objects are the result of style and situational opportunities). It is just as meaningless now for critics to blame Kissinger for his amoral and devious style, while supporting his ambitious policy objectives, but seeking to impose

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[4]After failing to override several presidential vetoes of its stringent restrictions, Congress extended the deadline on arms shipments to the Turks until December 10, 1974—later until February 5, 1975— with the proviso that these arms not be transhipped to their army in Cyprus. The administration accepted this compromise, and the arms ban went into effect on February 5, 1975.

[5]I discuss these points more amply in Chapter 2, "Order and Consensus," and in my article, "Foreign Policy Consensus: Who Needs It?" *Foreign Policy*, (Spring 1975).

constraints that would require either abandonment of the objectives or refuge in deception and subterfuge.

Foreign Policy Consensus

It is the perennial anodyne of the foreign policy community to call for leadership and consensus, or to lament their lack. During the directionless period of Watergate, and since, it has become virtually an obsession. Not so long ago, in a speech before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council (January 24, 1975), Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, with a certain nostalgia, said: "Thirty years ago . . . men of both parties and many persuasions — like Truman and Eisenhower, Vandenberg and Marshall, Acheson and Dulles— built a national consensus for responsible American leadership in the world. . . Three decades of global exertions and the war in Vietnam have gravely weakened this sense of common purpose. We have no more urgent task than to rediscover it."

Of course, these sentiments were followed by a *warning* that "public debate once again must find its ultimate limit in a general recognition that we are engaged in a common enterprise," and by the famous invitation to the Congress to join in a "new national partnership" based on the further instruction that "the legislative process—deliberation, debate, and statutory law—is much less well suited to the detailed supervision of the day-to-day conduct of diplomacy." Nevertheless, the ringing call for consensus comes through all the warnings and qualifications.

A special variant of the call for consensus is the liberal-internationalist argument: that the American government should raise public consciousness; generate national support; bridge the gap between the leaders and the led; give wholesome and attractive content to foreign policy; and mobilize sentiment by making economic and social adjustments that will apportion costs fairly and give the people a greater common share in our foreign enterprises. The liberal-internationalist argument points out that the greatest impediment to a national consensus on foreign policy is the fact that *the burdens are unfairly distributed.*[6] It concludes that these inequities should be remedied, principally, for the sake of a more effective foreign policy.

We can grant the fact that there are disparities in burden-sharing. But, what is important is not so much the question of "who pays" for foreign policy, but what conclusions we draw from the answers. For it is quite possible to get the facts generally right, but the conclusion precisely backwards.

Before examining the relationship between inequities and foreign policies, we should discuss the inequities themselves. An important distinction should be made between two kinds of disparities, more or less directly related to foreign policy: (1) specific inequities, and (2) general inequalities. The first are directly related to the way we carry out our foreign and military policies. An example is our selective service system. Because of the structure of deferments, draft levies have fallen disproportionately on the poor and the less-educated — at least until the partial reform of educational exemptions late in

[6]See, for example, Charles W. Maynes, Jr., "Who Pays for Foreign Policy?" *Foreign Policy,* (Summer 1974).

the Vietnam war. (War related surtaxes and other specific measures might be similarly regressive.) We can confidently say two things about these specifically war-induced and war-aggravated inequities: (1) they should be straightened out, whenever the specific burdens are imposed; but (2) along with the specific burdens themselves, these inequities go away when there are no wars, no crises, no mobilizations.

The second kind of disparities is quite different: the inequalities built into the structure of our economy and society. These may or may not operate in circumstances such as mobilization for foreign wars to distort the allocation of specific burdens. An example is the tax preferences that are available in differing degrees to rich and poor, individuals and corporations, capital holders and wage earners. However well-documented these preferential arrangements might be as facts, it would be tendentious as well as invidious to define them all as "loopholes."[7] What is at stake here is not the plausible issue of the unfairness of these dispensations, but rather their legitimacy and utility in the framework of our type of system. The issue is not whether "America's largest corporations," who are "major beneficiaries of U.S. foreign economic policy," . . . "exploit . . . tax concessions." What we should want to know is whether the tax concessions and other preferential arrangements are actually inducing the risk-taking behavior and productive results for which they were designed.

In this regard, American industry has not profited so well from the Vietnam war and from war-induced inflation (with the exception of the defense contracting sector, and even that sector has belatedly suffered).[8]

American industry is gasping from its inability to replenish productive

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[7]Or even as "tax expenditures." One common target is corporate income taxes and exemptions. For example, Congressman Charles A. Vanik has demonstrated that certain corporations (particularly the 100 largest) pay considerably less than the statutory tax rate in given years, (studies reported in *Congressional Record*, (July 19, 1972), p. H6707ff., and in the *Washington Post*, (December 19, 1974). But, this is not necessarily mysterious, or illegal, or inequitable. Corporations do this because they lost money in prior years and are carrying forward and offsetting those losses; or because they are taxed elsewhere in the world and are crediting those taxes toward U.S. taxes; or because they are taking tax credits or accelerated depreciation on productive investments they have made.

Another frequent target is the special treatment of capital gains. Though it hapepns to be true that, under the present tax code, this "saves" recipients of capital gains $10 billion a year, a case could be made, on philosophical grounds, for not taxing longer-term capital gains at all (though admittedly it might be difficult in some cases to distinguish investments revalued by inflation from stock-in-trade turned over at a profit). But, one need not subscribe to any extreme argument to understand the case for a *lower* tax ceiling on capital gain; it would be made in terms of the probable encouragement of equity investment, which is in seriously short supply (see footnote below).

[8]With inflation for 1974 at the rate of 11.5 percent, the average listed stock was selling at less than five times its estimated current earnings (compared to 19 times in December 1968), and many companies were selling at less than twice their annual earnings. Corporate profits were near their historical lows; as a percentage of gross national product they were 5.2 percent after tax in 1973, and were running 4.8 percent for 1974 (compared to 7.9 percent in 1965 and 7.8 percent in 1966). Dividends were the lowest ever recorded: 2.2 percent of 1973 GNP and 2.8 percent of 1974 GNP—*before* investor's personal taxes on their dividend income. The debt-to-equity ratio of many American companies was precarious. Several large offerings of debentures by normally respected industrial corporations and utilities had to be withdrawn. Even 1974's "windfall" profits of international oil companies, and many others, were partially illusory, and certainly transient, since they included the difference between inventories acquired at lower prices and evaluated at current prices. (On the other side of the ledger, the effective tax rate for all American corporations for 1974 was at the lowest level in the last 20 years; and the transfer of income from other sectors to the relatively capital-intensive oil industry benefits capital-holders at the expense of wage-earners.)

assets. It cannot raise enough equity capital; it cannot easily pay the high interest on loans, or even borrow sufficiently; it cannot generate enough cash from internal operation through depreciation reserves.[9] All this restricts capacity and inhibits development and innovation in the face of national needs such as housing, transportation, energy generation, and the material sources and technologies this country must have to solve its problems of shortage and vulnerability.[10]

The fundamental trade-off between distributive justice (roughly equated with greater returns to labor) and productive effectiveness (roughly equated with greater returns to capital) is at issue in the Ford administration's deliberations about approaches to inflation, recession, and energy conservation, and in the legislation being drafted in the House Ways and Means Committee for the revision of the tax code. This implicit trade-off, submerged during several decades of relatively smooth growth of the total economy, can no longer be avoided. The previous continuously expanding "production frontier," allowing the allocation of surpluses to foreign policy objectives without prejudicing social welfare and capital investment (or forcing a choice between them), has palpably been closed. Thus, the trade-off aspects of the production curve—the distribution of burdens and rewards, and the sacrifice of objectives—are now stressed, rather than the infinite horizon—the increasing participation in benefits and the ample provision for every worthy purpose.

A trade-off does not mean that the terms are mutually exclusive, but rather

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[9]This set of statements will not pass unchallenged. Economists cannot decide whether we are experiencing a "capital shortage or glut," in the provocative words of Paul A. Samuelson, *Newsweek*, (August 26, 1974). Looking at high savings rates and unprecedentedly low multiples of earnings on the New York Stock Exchange, Samuelson wonders, if capital is supposed to be so scarce, "why does it sell at such a discount in the free market?" Samuelson's argument presents something of an equivocation: "capital," in the form of already created productive assets, *is* selling at a discount precisely because "capital," in the form of investible savings that ought to be going into the purchase of new equity shares, is "selling" at a *premium*, in terms of the return and the share of ownership necessary to attract it. Part of the reason for the reluctance to invest is the present tax treatment of individual capital gains, as well as of dividends and corporate profits. Samuelson himself states that "what comes hard these days is new equity capital." And, that is the point in this context: common stocks are made relatively unattractive; the relative attractiveness of fixed-income investments at high rates of return starves the equity market (and the savings-and-loan companies and, in turn, housing construction); individual companies, whose common stock is selling at extremely low price-earnings ratios, are inhibited from equity flotations because they would have to give away a disproportionate share of equity to raise capital; so they must float bonds and borrow from banks; debt-equity ratios become precarious (and the integrity of the banking system is undermined); Interest rates are abnormally high; borrowing reaches a limit, short of investment needs, but too high for corporate and banking soundness; the economy is stunted and distorted. Moreover, this is not just a recent phenomenon; Peter F. Drucker has said, *The New Republic*, (February 1, 1973), p. 23: ". . . American commercial banks have been pushed since 1960 into aggressive lending by the federal government and the Federal Reserve Board so as to replace increasingly scarce equity capital. For it is not true that equity money only became scarce when the stock market collapsed around 1970; except for "growth stocks" it had become scarce ten years earlier. This then created the 'European' situation for most businesses, that is, inability to raise equity capital. And we responded with the 'European' (or 'Japanese') answer." And it might not be a short-lived phenomenon either. According to a study by New York Stock Exchange economists, "Capital Gap Predicted for U.S.," *The New York Times*, (September 10, 1974) there will be a shortage of capital, from all sources, compared with America's needs over the next decade, on the order of $650 billion.

[10]For the past decade-and-a-half, increases in American productivity have been the lowest of all developed nations (less than one-third of Japan, about half of Western Europe, and even less than Britain; in fact, for the past two years, actually negative). This problem is derived from the low percentage of GNP devoted to capital investment (between 1960 and 1973 about 10 percent channeled into non-residential fixed investment, the lowest rate of any industrial nation) and research and development (between 1964 and the present declining from 3 percent to 2.5 percent, half of which is for military and space).

that they are both antithetical and complementary. Correspondingly, there are two alternative ways of looking at the economic problem that confronts us: (1) we could try to maximize productivity (through enhanced returns to capital), subject to the constraint of insuring sufficient returns to labor (through sufficiently liberal wage guidelines and a minimally equitable income policy, perhaps affecting dividends, profits, and executive compensation) to prevent labor's defection and obstruction; or we could try to maximize distributive justice, subject to the constraint of insuring minimally satisfactory capital generation and investment. The trouble, of course, is that there might be no adequate solution, within either statement of the problem. There might be no combination of measures—no consistent set of values necessary to satisfy the constraints— that will produce an effective policy. In short, we might just muddle along—but not necessarily "muddle through."

Whether or not our social and economic systems are candidates for equalization, the motive should not be the perfection of a foreign policy consensus. It is true that some disparities operate as a constraint on foreign policy. But, it is important to see why and how; for this we need a clearer model of the foreign policy process. In particular, we need to know which constraints "bite" harder and closer; by equalizing burdens, are we relieving one constraint only to tighten another? And, most important, is there *any* combination, any allocation that yields foreign policy elites the room they think they need for maneuver, staying power, or escalation? Would fairer burden-sharing produce more support or less support for active foreign policy? That is, are the terms "social justice" and foreign policy effectiveness positively related? Some think it obvious that fairer burden-sharing would produce more support.

Eliminating some kinds of inequities might make it *harder* to carry out an active, expansive foreign policy. For instance, equalizing the draft put student activists in the line of fire, brought Vietnam home to their (policy influential) parents, and helped abort the prosecution of the war. We cannot make blanket statements about inequities and foreign policy effects. We must see how the inequities operate as constraints: which groups are affected, and in which direction. In fact, the problem we are addressing here is precisely that preferences and sentiments cannot be smoothly aggregated for the whole nation. We are faced with a series of disaggregated, separate constraints generated by the circumstances of different groups, any one of which could inhibit the effective projection of foreign policy.

That raises another set of points about the relationship of the American social structure to our foreign policy. The first point begins with the fact that inequitable burden-sharing is not the only cause of foreign policy "dissensus." We must also recognize that different groups of Americans have widely disparate stakes in the *objects* of our foreign policy. These differential stakes run along the multiple lines of cleavage that divide this country—not just the divisions between rich and poor, educated and uneducated, but also the divisions of generation, class, politics, region, and race. Perhaps this country was not destined to be a coherent society, but rather an ill-fitted composition of heterogeneous groups, most of which came here to assert their separateness, affirm their identity, keep their distance, and maintain their autonomy—at

most, willing to join in selected common projects of limited duration and purpose. Some kinds of cleavage (ethnic, perhaps regional) cannot be effaced by income redistribution or other domestic reforms, because they are related not to burdens, but to sympathies—unequal or opposite interests in the *outcomes,* not just the costs, of foregn situations (viz. Israel, South Africa), to the extent, in some imaginable circumstances, of paralyzing America's choice of sides. We have to recognize the inhibitions of this state of affairs on a unified, positive foreign policy. Such a fragmented society is not a sufficient base for a policy of upholding world order and contesting a series of border challenges. It is for this reason that the United States cannot sustain foreign policies commensurate with its ostensible power.

The second point is that most foreign intervention does not unify the country or distract it from its problems, but exacerbates the divisions in American society. Vietnam, like all such wars (though perhaps more than most), demonstrated how fragile, tentative, and partial is the American social contract. The confused condition of public support was not a momentary "dissensus" brought about by the trauma of Vietnam. It is a basic condition that was accentuated by the Vietnam war. Ours is still a precarious society that cannot long bear the kind of strains, such as mobilization for foreign adventures, that expose the differential stakes of various groups.

There is not one unique prescriptive conclusion that can be drawn from the logic of social constraints, consensus, and foreign policy. There are at least three reactions that policy-making elites might have.

1. They can eliminate inequities and inequalities as one element (others being "education" and "leadership," particularly presidential) in mobilizing support for a more active foreign policy, to keep alliances intact, forces and defense budgets and military aid sufficient, and American pronouncements credible, as well as to promote foreign development and international resource transfers. This seems to be the preferred solution of the liberal-internationalists. It assumes that a certain style and scale of foreign policy can be maintained if, and only if, we eliminate these inequities.
2. They can deal with lack of consensus by bypassing it, operating in secrecy and with covert moves, insulating foreign policy even more than traditionally from the need for public support. This course is interesting because it is actually the one that the Nixon-Kissinger administration followed. That administration intended specifically to conduct foreign policy in the absence of a consensus (viz. Cambodia, the Indo-Pakistani war, perhaps detente with the Soviets). Indeed, the guiding concept of the Nixon Doctrine was to evade the economic and social constraints that became apparent in the Vietnam war. The Nixon-Kissinger administration acknowledged the constraints, but would not pay the "normal" price to widen them. Still, needing extraordinary room for foreign maneuver, that administration had to deal with domestic reactions by obfuscation and anesthesia (perhaps a better description would be narcosis, sometimes hypnosis). What its liberal critics failed to understand is that this was an objective requirement of that administration's policy, not a gratuitous and dispensable element of political or personal style.

Conversely, an open, persuasive style—particularly if it is successful in arousing support—has its costs. If a president widens public and congressional constraints through education and exhortation, he becomes committed to the result for which he has sought support. Directions become fixed; escalation is facilitated; adversaries become less approachable. Thus, active public support could be a special embarrassment for a policy of balance and maneuver. To the extent that Kissinger's policies require flexibility, subtlety, and control of graduation and surprise, and necessitate dealing with adversaries and placating unpopular clients, they admit as little of public enthusiasm and congressional impetus as they do of public challenge and congressional obstruction. This is a powerful reason why the Nixon-Kissinger regime never genuinely pursued consensus or understanding, but rather cultivated apathy and bemusement.[11] It is interesting to observe how long Kissinger's professions of courtship of America's hearts and minds, and President Ford's promises of candor and responsiveness, will last in the face of the more objective demand of a balance-of-power policy for stunted public participation. Cambodia and Cyprus, and perhaps the Middle-East, will provide the tests.

3. Or, finally, they can observe—live with—the constraints that the inequalities (and other factors) place on an active, particularly an expansive or interventionist foreign policy. They can deal with inequities and inequalities —or not—on their own terms, for reasons appropriate to them, without invoking foreign policy effectiveness as a rationale or purpose. They can keep the lack of consensus from becoming critical by cutting an open policy-making process—even somewhat chaotic, if that is how it turns out—respecting the verdict of the people and their representatives and taking the consequences in terms of our foreign policy effectiveness. But, this approach might be too much to expect from our policy-making elites, at least at this stage of history.

Contrary to the claims of almost all observers, that Vietnam fractured the common beliefs of the American "Establishment," there *is* a post-Vietnam consensus—but it is among foreign policy *elites*. It exists on a very basic level of foreign policy premises, and I think it is falsely oriented. But, policies that depend on a *national* consensus are doomed. Increasingly, objective international conditions are making certain interventionist policies too expensive and risky for the rewards, and thus unworthy of domestic sacrifices, however fairly they may be apportioned. It is not enough for our leaders simply to regain public trust, even if they could. The point is what our leaders do with this public trust. Certain foreign policies will outrun their public mandate, and no amount of economic or social fixing will create sufficient support.

Of course, leaders can mobilize the support of their nations in a defense against a direct threat to the homeland, to lives and property. The important point about such cases is that people perceive that they are risking and sacrificing their own welfare for their own welfare; and, in turn, the limits of toleration for domestic inequities are much wider (viz. Tsarist Russia versus Napo-

[11]Even with the bureaucracy—though here the primary reasons were fear of leaks and policy sabotage and the generation of obstructive coalitions.

leon, a depression-emergent American versus the perceived threat of Hitler). The trouble begins with limited wars. Public constraints on prosecuting a war will be tighter (that is, support for it will be less) as its purposes are seen to be more limited. A government may try to coerce support or anesthetize opinion; but that sort of thing becomes a contentious point in itself in a constitutional democracy. It might be—whether fortunately or unfortunately—that a country such as ours can fight, and therefore ought to fight, only very important wars, or none.

Perhaps what we need is not a foreign policy consensus, but a foreign policy *that does not require consensus;* that accommodates in our society a never-finished process of experiment and contention for distributive advantage; that allows our internal differences to remain unresolved because it generates fewer external pressures that demand their resolution.

The Cult of Sport

A foreign policy cannot even be defined without considering the sources of its support. "Support" is a complex of relationships, (a) between the executive branch and the public, the legislature, and certain interested groups, and (b) within the institutions of the executive branch itself. Both sets of relationships function as constraints; the second also acts to filter, bias, and shape proposals and programs.

The Nixon administration hoped to carry on its foreign strategy even in the face of adverse opinion readings. And yet, it was extraordinarily self-conscious about public support. The contradiction is resolved by noting that its strategy required—in fact, implied—not active support, but passive acquiescence. For such a cool equilibration of power, neutral exercise of control, and intricate apportionment of roles within our alliances, warm and positive domestic support might even be an embarrassment. President Nixon defined the quality of the support he was seeking:

> We must convincingly demonstrate the relationship between our specific actions and our basic purposes. In turn, the leadership can ask the American people for some degree of trust, and for acknowledgement of the complexities of foreign policy. This does not mean a moratorium on criticism. It means listening to the rationale for specific actions and distinguishing attacks on the broad policy itself from attacks on tactical judgments.[12]

This is a prescription for anesthetizing political dissent and attaining the requisite condition of apathy, bemusement, and deference that sums up to acquiescence.

The concomitant strategy toward the legislative branch was a sort of pacification, in which an attempt was made to win the legislature by superficial and subtle means of co-optation. The pattern included the acceptance of the outlines of congressional resolutions limiting foreign policy and military maneuver; the thin intrusion of a semantic wedge; and the widening of this wedge through subsequent actions. A consultative oligarchy of legislators was sometimes admitted to a sharing of intelligence and a complicity in a basically executive determination of policy.

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[12]Nixon II, p. 21.

The military exponents of executive policy were extended the promise of a revitalized professionalism of the Services, a strong "participatory" share in the elaboration of strategy, the determination of procurement and resource allocation, and the prospect of organization-enhancing weapons systems subjected to less stringent justification. Quite naturally, the reaction of the Services to any new national security policy is to accommodate to it by gravitating to where the "action" is—as they all adapted to the unconventional warfare vogue of the 1960's (even the Navy was operating in commando units far behind enemy lines). In the 1970's the Services again competed innovatively, this time to adapt their traditional arms to the aseptic connotations of the Nixon Doctrine. The Navy—by far the principal beneficiary—promoted its normal "over-the-horizon" posture (the presumably non-provocative, stand-off readiness to deliver overwhelming force) and its comprehensive "blue-water" strategy (the quiet worldwide reach). The Air Force insisted, characteristically, on the centrality of strategic attack (the attempted destruction of the enemy's will). The Army abstracted from its role of closing with the enemy and furthered a new mythology of remote engagement (the automated electronic battlefield and the prompt, precise, lethal reaction).

A Prediction: A Byzantine Age?

Since the beginning of the Nixon presidency, pressures and constraints have produced considerable displacement and accommodation of institutions and strategies—without producing constructive foreign and military policies. There has been a more complaisant arrangement with the military within the national security departments of the executive branch; a tighter, more self-contained military establishment, perhaps better managed, certainly more technologically formidable, and now manned by volunteers. There has been—particularly for Asia—a more selective strategy of intervention; an attenuated overseas presence; a large scale program of force-substitution that relies on allied contributions and U.S. arms transfer. This dispensation achieved a fair level of popular and congressional acquiescence. On the other hand, the same logic and the same compulsions could bring about nuclear threats, decisive interventions, and remote methods of destruction that obviate human involvement and diffuse moral considerations.

In larger terms, the Nixon Doctrine—the Nixon era itself—can be seen as signaling the beginning of a long secular transit for America. One can sense the emergence of the features of such a mature state as Byzantium—policing a more consolidated empire; exercising a more sophisticated blend of diplomacy and war, manipulation and coercion; deploying more parsimoniously its technically virtuose weapons and mercenary armies; dispensing internal welfare and resting content with a more settled mercantilism; superimposing self-centered executive institutions on a quiescent and deferent political base. Perhaps one should not overextend the parallel, but the historical analogy also suggests historical choices. The coming age could be neo-imperial, or it could be post-imperial. And the transition could be a grudging, baleful retreat; or it could be a tolerant concession to the condition of America's prospective long haul: the abandonment of the principle that this nation has a privileged purpose that it must impress on the rest of the world.

THE IMPACT OF SECRECY ON CONGRESSIONAL ABILITY TO PARTICIPATE IN FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING

By Carl Marcy*

To discuss the impact of secrecy on the participation of Congress in foreign policy decision-making, requires some background on the extent to which Congress does participate in making foreign policy. It is my view that Congress should operate in the area of foreign policy much as the Board of Directors of a corporation. Policy should be made by the Board to reflect the views of majority stockholders. Management is to carry out the policies; management's suggestions are welcome, but policy is the province of the stockholders and their Board of Directors.

There is much confusion at the present time in the Government, as to who makes foreign policy. Recently, the new Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Sparkman, said: "Under the Constitution *the President is the only one who can make foreign policy* and the Secretary of State in his agent . . ."

The President, and the Secretary of State, undoubtedly welcome such a statement, but what is the law? The opening sections of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, read, in part, as follows: ". . . *the Congress declares that it* is *the policy* of the United States to support the principles of increased economic cooperation and trade among countries . . . and the President is authorized to furnish assistance . . ." with such funds as "are appropriated to the President for such purposes . . ." The usual response of Presidents to an active role of the Congress in making foreign policy is that Congress acts with a "meat ax". It doesn't have the expertise to deal with such an esoteric subject as foreign policy. Finally, the Executive asserts, "if Congress only knew what we know, they would agree with what we are doing, but since Congress is a leaky sieve we can't trust them with our secrets."

Indeed, there is a respectable school of thought to the effect that a democracy can't conduct an effective foreign policy. That may be true, but we do have what we describe as a democratic form of government in the United States. I, for one, don't see how we can have a democracy in determining policy and a secretive dictatorship in determining and conducting foreign policy. We may as well start with the statement which I have seen attributed to Winston Churchill. "A democracy is the worst form of government, except for all others." Democracy demands debate. Debate requires blunt, candid communication which is in short supply. Significant debate also requires information widely disseminated. A substantial amount of information which does surface through official channels is self-serving and, while it may be true, too often it isn't the whole truth; the secrets are preserved.

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In addition to the problems of communication, information, and veracity, discussion of foreign policy itself has not been welcomed by the Executive. Ever since World War II when bipartisanship became the basis of the American intellectual's approach to U.S. foreign policy, public debate of foreign policy has been stifled. Whether the foreign policy apparatus has been under the guidance of Republicans or Democrats, it has been the preserve of the specialists. In the words of Senator Fulbright, "the Executive Branch, aided by many intellectuals, has purveyed the idea that foreign policy is an esoteric science which ordinary mortals, including Congressman and Senators (are) too stupid to grasp and which, therefore, (is) best left to the experts with their scientific methods of analysis and prediction."[1]

A foreign policy for the United States depends, in part, on information which Foreign Service officers can collect. It also requires judgments not crippled by commitments and perceptions of another age, or last year. One is reminded of an incident, before the time of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when witnesses from the U.S. War Department and the General Staff were trying to persuade a skeptical Congressman that money should be appropriated to buy gas masks for the horses of the then active First Calvary Division. The expert witnesses described the technical reasons why gas masks were necessary. When the Congressman asked how the gas masks were put on the horses, the Army witnesses produced the operating manual which told how the horse's head was first put in a brace, then the horse's mouth was pried open, the horse's nostrils plugged, and so forth. The Congressman's next question was, "How do you put the mask on the horse the second time?"[2] That finished the request. Good judgment does not necessarily go hand in hand with expertise or having inside information. Good judgment is not the prerogative of Kings, or Presidents, or Secretaries of State or Defense, or Foreign Service Officers, or committees of experts. Indeed, the fundamental assumption of a democratic form of government is that the judgment of the majority of its citizens, *given the facts,* is more likely to be better for society than the judgment of the experts. The war in Vietnam, the tilt toward Pakistan, the Bay of Pigs, the CIA intervention in Chile, the concept of a multi-national force to weld NATO together, home-porting in Greece, and now Cambodia, to name a few American ventures, conceived in secrecy by experts, but implemented by the taxpayers, suggest that the judgment of the informed, interested, person in the street, if he had been brought in on the secrets, could not have been much worse for the United States than that of the experts who determined, in secrecy, what they judged best for us all.

The Economist magazine observed last year that if a fault is to be found in the Foreign Service of the United States "it is in their resistance to the foreign policy implications of domestic affairs."[3] This fault may not be wholly that of the Foreign Service. It may be attributed, in part, to failure of ordinary mortals to ask questions about the "why's" of a foreign policy. It also may be due to the mesmerizing effect of constant repetition by the almost unanimous

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[1]*The Crippled Giant,* p. 212.
[2]This incident is described by Charles Burton Marshall in *The Limits of Foreign Policy.*
[3]*The Economist,* December 15, 1973.

foreign policy establishment, that leadership by experts in foreign policy is essential to the survival, not only of the United States, but to the survival of freedom itself.

It is easy to follow such leadership and be persuaded by it. The State Department helps by maintaining mailing lists supplying information in 38 areas of foreign policy; it produces weekly radio shows and a 30 minute monthly T.V. documentary, as well as magazines, newsletters, and background notes which cover every subject from Guadaloupe to détente. These media products present only the Administration's point of view on policy issues. Why should they present anything else? In their view it does not serve the efficient conduct of foreign policy to debate the "pros" and "cons" once a secret policy decision has been made. In addition, the State Department produces speakers on request, and invites individuals to attend national and regional conferences on foreign policy. It arranges "Scholar-Diplomat", "Banker-Diplomat", and "Executive-Diplomat" seminars, and contracts much of its research work to members of the academic community, not for purposes of debate but rather to solidify support. Press briefings and background sessions help the press get the Administration's positions across. It takes nerve to question a policy enunciated by the Executive. To dissent from policy is often viewed as unpatriotic. Even the Senate, with its specific Constitutional foreign policy duties, is chary of the role of critic as it is too easily branded as "irresponsible".

In the field of domestic affairs it is no disgrace to question an Administration policy, farmers, laborers, and businessmen do it every day. They are organized to make sure their interests are considered. There are few domestic secrets. These groups collect their own information and are accorded respectful hearings; but not in foreign policy. Let's not kid ourselves, how often and how effectively has any existing established institution vigorously questioned a foreign policy? The best and the brightest individuals in the foreign policy establishment, who shift back and forth between the academic world, foundations, and the government, regardless of political party, become so enamoured of their own policy decisions that they discourage debate and sterilize critics in the bureaucracy. It takes a disaster to make them ask questions, too late. Executive Branch officials, as all of us, are not psychologically equipped to question a Dulles or Kissinger. They have the "facts" and a service-oriented bureaucracy to back them up. The academic community, with too few exceptions, respects power, admires decisive Executive action, and gets along by going along. After all, they may be called to serve in Washington some day.

Finally, the more prestigious foreign policy institutions seek to "educate" the people to the necessity of a non-partisan, unified foreign policy, or to explore exotic subjects of primary interest to other explorers. It is a small, select group of Americans who are in on the foreign policy take-off, but it is the nation which suffers if there is a crash. To continue the analogy, the airliner goes down from what is often described as pilot error, or other error attributable to the experts who have become victims of the habit, as do we all, of doing things the same old way. Any passenger bold enough to ask whether or not the rear cargo door is properly locked, is viewed by the professionals as a "worri-

some nut," or "nervous nellie." There are groups which do exercise a degree of influence to counter existing well-established institutions. But, for the most part, they promote special interests and their activities are uncoordinated, even when their interests may temporarily coincide.

There is need for an institution able and willing to ask serious questions about Executive Branch foreign policies, and to expose them to the test of free-wheeling, open discussion. The need is for an institution dedicated to truth, openness, balance and recognition that foreign policy in the American democracy is, in the final analysis, the prerogative of the people and their collective judgment. This need is not met by existing institutions active in the field of foreign policy. Such groups do not serve as a conduit between the government, the academic community and the people. Articles in highly respected foreign affairs magazines are not read by many members of Congress or by most of the foreign policy oriented individuals in the United States, or even by the diplomatic community. Their articles are seldom relevant to action by Governments. They do not address the audience which, here or abroad, must be convinced that given policy merits support, and to the extent their output may be relevant. It is not tuned to needs for specific decisions.

More American citizens need to consider U.S. policies throughout the world by asking "why" those policies are pursued, rather than asking "why not" pursue the policies proposed by the professionals. Not long ago a former American Ambassador remarked:

> WE must be able to negotiate in secret. WE can't tell the guys on the Hill about negotiations because they leak all over the place. After the negotiations are over and WE decide on the best course of action, then WE will tell the Congress and the people in the street.

This is an example of elitism at its best, or worst, depending on one's point of view. My point of view happens to be that this attitude can lead only to disaster in a democracy. Sooner or later the man in the street marches on the establishment. In a symbolic way that accounts for our changed course in Asia in recent years. Our present policies toward Vietnam and China are as much the result of public pressure (doing what you must to get the vote, if you will), as they are of secret decisions and skilled leadership.

Power in a democracy is based on something more than people with privileged access to special information conducting secret negotiations and then bringing the Congress and the public along. To keep commitments secret, to keep secret, what an elite believes is in the best interests of all the people, until the people are called upon to sacrifice their blood and treasure is to invite national disaster. I do not argue that our foreign policy establishment has to "blab" everything, but I do suggest that keeping secrets from the Congress and from the American public has gotten out of hand. Much of the present disillusionment with the establishment is traceable to excessive secrecy and the "papa-knows-best" attitude we all recognize.

There are some secrets that should be passed on to the proper committees of Congress, but not necessarily given publicity. To those who would charge that to tell a secret to a member of Congress is to make it public, I can only say that the record does not sustain the charge. The rate of leakage is sub-

stantially greater from the Administration than from Congress. The Anderson Papers on the recent Indian-Pakistan fracas were leaked from the Administration. The Pentagon Papers were leaked from an Executive Branch contractor. The Kissinger leak on the Vietnam negotiations was, in current bureaucratese, selective declassification. Actually, of course, an average secret telegram in the Executive Branch is a piece of paper normally distributed to five or six agencies and scores of government employees, all bound by the same espionage laws and sworn to uphold the same Constitution as Members of Congress. One of the troubles with too much secrecy is that it impairs policy judgment. If only a dozen men knew the atom could be split, we might not, today, have nuclear power. If only a few people try to determine the best foreign policy course for the nation, we may end up with a policy, but no nation.

Decisions of Executive Branch operators, administering policies determined by Congress, would be more likely to be in the national interest if the judgment of men with different constituencies were brought regularly to bear on decisions, whether the decision is to homeport fleet units in Greece, extend base rights in Spain, or reduce American forces in Europe. Unfortunately, it has been a long time since congressional judgment on such decisions as these has been sought prior to a decision being made. I suspect few members of the Department of State know that its regulations provide that "the appropriate congressional bodies are (to be) kept advised of the intention to negotiate any especially significant treaties or executive agreements and of important developments concerning them.[4] There is nothing in this regulation which says that the only information to be given Congress is to be unclassified.

A constant problem for the proper committees of Congress is to obtain enough information to assist them in formulating general policy guidance. What courses are open to a committee when all it can get from the Executive is information which supports the policy position already taken by the President? Must the committee and its staff rely on a presidential decision to tilt toward Pakistan, and be denied access to a contrary point of view until Jack Anderson spills the beans? Should the committee have accepted without question, the assertions of the previous Administration, that 30 nations were giving material support to U.S. activities in South Vietnam, without asking and obtaining full and honest answers as to the *quid pro quo's* for such assistance? How can a congressional committee decide whether to authorize money for Radio Free Europe when denied access to studies carried on by the Administration with public funds, being told only that there has been a policy decision which should not be questioned because "father knows best"?

Some years ago, before the extent of American involvement in Laos was known to the public, the Committee on Foreign Relations had a secret session with a prominent official of the State Department. The subject of the hearing was American policy and involvement in Southeast Asia including Laos. No mention was made of some very significant aspects of American involvement. At a subsequent meeting of the Committee in executive session, and after the Committee's own staff had turned up information about activities in Laos, the

[4] 11 F.A.M. 723.5, c.

same official was asked why he had not given this information to the Committee at its earlier session. His answer was that he had not been asked. This kind of relationship between the Executive and the Congress leads to the absurdity in which a Member of Congress must ask officials if there is anything he should have asked that he didn't. It also leads to a situation in which Members of Congress are tempted to swear all Executive Branch witnesses to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

Democracy is a form of government in which the supreme power is vested in the people. The power is exercised through a system of representation and is not based on arbitrary class distinctions or privileges. The exercise of power in a democracy by the people must be based on access to information by the people or their representatives. The system becomes corrupt when there exists an elite which, in the exercise of power derived from the people, relies on excessive secrecy, selective declassification, and semantic slickness that creates doubt as to the credibility of government itself.

STYLES OF PRESIDENTIAL SECRECY

By Francis Rourke*

Since World War II, American politics have been dominated by both fear and fascination with secrecy. Many of the landmark events of national politics since then have had the issue of secrecy as one of their central features. It all began, probably, with the atom bomb—a development with awesome implications for modern society. Born in secrecy, The Bomb was developed behind tight security precautions until it was suddenly revealed to the world in August of 1945.

For the post-war generation, the bomb thus became a symbol of success through secrecy; it was an extraordinary technological accomplishment. It was a success also in terms of national policy since we succeeded in bringing World War II to an end by using it, or so it seemed in the eyes of the public, although historians were later to dispute the point.

Prior to World War II, it should be noted, the American government had exhibited a unique distaste for secrecy. The State Department took virtually no security precautions before that time. When Henry L. Stimson became Secretary of State during the presidency of Herbert Hoover, he abolished the code-breaking section of the department, commenting stiffly that "gentlemen don't read other people's mail." If Nixon had only listened to him.[1]

The development of the atom bomb was not the only point at which secrecy played a major role during World War II. D-Day was another such event, since the success of that venture depended so heavily on the preservation of secrecy regarding both the time and place of the Allied invasion of Europe. And in retrospect, the memoirs of one major participant in the war after another suggested a relationship between secrecy and the eventual Allied triumph. To be sure, there were failures as well. Some of the arrangements Roosevelt and Truman made in secrecy at Yalta and Potsdam came, in time, to be regarded as the American agreement to help in the forcible repatriation of some of those who had fled the Soviet Union during the war.

But these failures were generally regarded as exceptions. The dominant association that World War II created in the public mind was between secrecy and success. Popular culture in the post-war period reveals how strong this association eventually became. Witness, for example, the popularity of novelist Ian Fleming's James Bond, 007, the culture hero whose hallmark is secrecy. It is perhaps not without significance that James Bond was also favorite reading of one of our post-war presidents, John F. Kennedy. We should look more

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[1] See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Imperial Presidency* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1973), pp. 338-339.

closely into what our Presidents read as 40 or 50-year old boys under the covers at the White House. Of course, in Nixon's case, it is clear he had no time for reading. He was listening to tapes.

Johnson's evening reading habits are even more startling. What he read were FBI reports on his adversaries, and, of course, by the time he left office that included a lot of people. It kept him up half the night.

But it's easy to believe that all these significant developments in American politics can be explained in terms of the pathological peculiarities of our presidents. James Barber's recent study of the modern presidency, *The Presidential Character,* attempts to do just that.[2] In the same vein a Washington correspondent, Peter Lisagor, has said that most of the recent troubles in American politics can be explained in terms of the fact that, by chance, we elected as President two ding-a-lings back to back. A century from now that may well be the capsule historical judgment of our time.

But it is clear that explanation of the dominant role of secrecy in our politics must go deeper than that. The truth is that the general public and its representatives in Congress by and large have long accepted the association between secrecy and success. Occasionally, an event like the unsuccessful U-2 flight over the Soviet Union in 1960 would temporarily weaken this faith. But in the end, devotion to secrecy as a prerequisite to national security tended to restore itself as part of the dominant political consensus of the Cold War.

Moreover, secrecy tended to migrate from the agencies of the national government where national security was at the center of concern to those where it was only a peripheral matter. It spread also from the national security agencies in Washington to state and local police departments. This has been made vividly clear through the current investigation of spying and other undercover activities by police departments in cities like Chicago and Baltimore which were undertaken at the request and with the cooperation of national agencies.

No aspect of secrecy is more important than the fact that it is so highly contagious. In the nineteenth century Elihu Root worried a great deal about corruption in American municipal politics. He feared that it would flow from city to national government through the party organizations which were then highly decentralized and dominated by the local party units. A corrupt city, Root warned, must eventually corrupt the nation.[3] We can now see in the 20th century a reverse development. Unauthorized and illegal surveillance of lawful political activity by national security agencies like the CIA spread to local government as well. Practices designed for use in far-away places come home to roost in the neighborhoods of our cities.

I.

While this public and congressional faith in the equation between secrecy and success is firmly rooted in American political culture, it has been

[2] James D. Barber, *The Presidential Character* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1972).

[3] See Francis E. Rourke, "Urbanism and American Democracy," *Ethics,* Vol. 74 (July, 1964), p. 265.

deeply shaken in recent years. Vietnam and Watergate, following hard upon one another, called into serious question the widespread association between secrecy and success that had long prevailed in the post-war period. These landmark events suggested instead a contrary possibility; that secrecy may be a prelude to catastrophe for the country or for the President.

Certainly we have seen in the wake of Watergate and Vietnam a strengthening in the instruments and institutions of disclosure in American society: Congress, the media of communication, and public interest organizations like Common Cause and the Ralph Nader conglomerate. These institutions emerged from Watergate with their reputation and power greatly strengthened.

How permanent a trend this is remains to be seen, for it must be borne in mind that recent Presidents have derived great advantages from their use of secrecy and they will not forego these advantages quickly or easily. Viewing the presidency as a power-maximizing institution, it is clear that one of the most important aspects of secrecy is the simple fact that presidents have seen it as an essential ingredient in the development and exercise of their power. The use of secrecy is thus rooted in the operation and mystique of the modern presidency. To cut back on secrecy would be to cut back on the presidency and on its influence and leverage in the American political system.

What are some of the advantages presidents derive from secrecy? For one thing a great deal of the president's ascendancy in modern American politics, especially, though not exclusively in foreign policy, stems from the belief of other participants in the political system that he has better sources of information than they do. If the President shares his information with others, he loses his monopoly and part of his power. Secrecy enables him to avoid sharing this information.

Moreover, by sharing information the President may reveal that many of the facts he is relying upon are already available to the public in its own newspapers. George Reedy makes this point very clear in his *Twilight of the Presidency:*

> . . . On sweeping policy decisions, which are, after all, relatively few, a president makes up his mind on the basis of the same *kind* of information that is available to the average citizen. When Franklin D. Roosevelt decided to commit this nation against the Axis powers he had little relevant information on the Nazis, the Fascists, and the Japanese warlords that was qualitatively different from that which could be gleaned from the *New York Times.* When Harry Truman decided to resist Communist aggression in Korea, he knew very little more than that the forty-ninth Parallel had been crossed by Communist troops, a fact which was already in the headlines. When Lyndon Johnson decided to send troops into the Dominican Republic, he had no information advantage over his fellow Americans other than a brief telephone conversation with his ambassador (although later reams of factual data were gathered to justify the action).[4]

But perhaps the major advantage of secrecy from a president's point of view is that it gives him an enormous power of selective disclosure. Extra-

[4] George E. Reedy, *The Twilight of the Presidency* (New York: World Publishing Co., 1970), pp. 27-28.

ordinary discretion thus falls into his hands. He has authority to decide what is to remain secret, and he operates no legal restraint when he chooses to violate the secrecy system and make something public.

At a crude level this capacity for selective disclosure provides the presidency with an enormous capacity for intimidating other "actors" in the political system. And we don't necessarily need Watergate and its revelations about the White House "enemies" list to show us that fact. In his *Best and the Brightest,* David Halberstrom reveals that Lyndon Johnson once threatened the members of his Cabinet that they would spend the rest of their lives with the FBI and the Internal Revenue Service at their heels if they ever left office without his consent.[5]

His capacity for intimidation thus springs from the fact that the President can use the secrecy system to conceal information in his own hands, while simultaneously probing into other mens secrets through his command over organizations like the FBI, the CIA, and the IRS. The fact that the President has this kind of power helps to explain a phenomenon that has long puzzled observers of American national politics. Unlike other democratic countries, the United States has no tradition of high-level resignation over disagreements on policy among executive officials.

In Great Britain, on the other hand, there is a long-standing tradition of Ministerial resignation accompanied by denunciations of official policy. Consider, for example, this recent statement in a comparative study of secrecy in modern democratic states:

> It is at least worth speculating how different the political temper of the Congress, press, and public in the United States might be, today, if a McGeorge Bundy, a Robert McNamara, or a John Gardner had "gone public" after leaving Government. Would it have been necessary for an Ellsberg then to have taken the Pentagon Papers to the *New York Times?* In the United States, however, there are hardly any instances of such public resignations. Despite the absence of an Official Secrets Act, the career costs of calculated indiscretions of the kind commonplace among British leaders are horrendous in America.[6]

Clearly, a number of factors contribute to this absence of a tradition of resignation in executive politics in the United States. But not the least of these factors today is fear of reprisal by the President; a fear that springs from the President's control over the secrets of his subordinates and his ability to threaten to disclose these secrets.

This power not only enables a President to intimidate or silence opponents, it also permits him to win arguments. He can reach into the files and pull out information that will help him make his case before the bar of public opinion, while at the same time denying his adversaries access to data that might support their position or undermine his.

Combat with the President has never been an easy task in American politics; the growth of secrecy has made it doubly difficult. Lyndon Johnson

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[5] David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest* (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 530.
[6] Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband, *Secrecy and Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 436.

once pulled out a secret document on national television and declassified it on the spot in order to prove to his interrogator that he was right and that other accounts of policy-making in Vietnam at the time of the Tet offensive were wrong.[7]

One central aspect of this power of selective disclosure should be noted: the fact that it is a source of economic as well as political advantage for presidents. In his memoirs, the president in effect sells the secrets that he has been helping to accumulate while in office. These secrets thus become a source of profit to him. We have long thought of presidents as political animals rather than economic men, seeking power rather than profit. Recent history suggests we may have been on the wrong track. While Teddy Roosevelt may have thought of the presidency as a bully pulpit, Richard Nixon clearly viewed it as a tax shelter.

The use of selective disclosure by presidents and other high executive officials makes very hollow all the complaints that flow from the White House about leaks. One can fairly ask if it is legitimate for a president to release information from secret files when it suits his purposes, even though the information is partial and presents a false view of the facts, can it be illegitimate to do what Daniel Ellsberg did when he disclosed the Pentagon Papers and revealed how different the things being done in secret were from what government officials had been saying in public?

The President derives other advantages from secrecy besides the ability to monopolize information on which policy decisions depend and the power to disclose facts selectively. Secrecy gives a spurious appearance of unity to the executive branch—a unity that contrasts very favorably in the public eye with the Babel of confusion that often seems to well up from Congress. Secrecy also adds to the mystery of the president's office, helping to give it the air of authority on which it so often trades. If the President himself has no personal charisma, as has been true of some recent incumbents, then it becomes especially important to give the office as much charisma as he can. Efforts in this direction include surrounding his office with ceremonial trappings and living like a Tudor monarch in various castles throughout the country to which the President can repair at different seasons. In this context, having secrets of state is another way of exacting awe and deference from your subjects.

II.

Perhaps the most important question that both the Vietnam decisions, as revealed by the Pentagon Papers, and the Watergate episode raise is whether presidents themselves are always as well served by secrecy as they have in the past so often tended to imagine.

Put it this way, would President Lyndon Johnson ever have entangled himself in Vietnam, an event that destroyed first his reputation and then his career if he had not had the power of secrecy? We often think of Vietnam as being responsible for much of the secrecy we have endured in the past decade.

[7] David Wise, *The Politics of Lying* (New York: Random House, 1973), p. 96.

Is it not possible to turn the relationship around, to see Vietnam not as a source of secrecy, but as the product of it?

Clearly it was essential to Johnson when he began the escalation of American involvement in Indo-China in 1965 that the growth and implications of what he was doing be hidden from public view. The essence of the Johnson strategy in Vietnam was concealment, hiding from the American public, as much as possible, the expansion of the American commitment in Southeast Asia that was being planned in 1964 and carried out in 1965.

In domestic as well as foreign affairs, secrecy was a very important element in every Johnson strategy, and the record shows that he very frequently abandoned policies and plans when they were prematurely disclosed. It seems reasonable to believe, therefore, that without the possibility of secrecy, Johnson would never have embarked upon his ill-fated Vietnam policy.

Likewise in the case of Watergate, Nixon assured his associates that the courts would sustain his claim of executive privilege as sufficient justification for withholding evidence requested by the Special Prosecutor's office in connection with its investigation of the Watergate cover-up and the extent of White House involvement in it. Without this expectation of success in his use of secrecy, it seems very unlikely that Nixon would ever have embarked on the strategy of the "cover-up" which was to lead, in the end, to his departure from office, becoming dependent upon a pardon from his successor, Gerald Ford, to escape the possibility of imprisonment.

Recall also what President John F. Kennedy confessed after the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961. Kennedy had persuaded the *New York Times* not to publish some information it had received on plans for the invasion of Cuba by an exile group. After the invasion had failed, in a spectacular and humiliating way, Kennedy admitted ruefully that he would have been much better off if the *Times* had published the information in question and, as a result, plans for the invasion had been scrapped.[8]

The argument to this point can be reduced to essentially two propositions:

1. That presidents are not nearly as well served by the use of secrecy as they have often, in recent years, seemed to think. Secrecy often insulates the White House from reality and leads presidents into serious errors of judgment.

2. That the rationality of national policy also suffers because of secrecy. Mistakes are made that would not have occurred were it not for secrecy. It follows that the welfare of the American public is often the victim of the presidential addiction to secrecy.[9]

What the President is able to do with his use of secrecy is give the public the totally erroneous impression that there is unanimity within the executive branch with respect to the wisdom of executive plans and actions

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 176.

[9] As quoted in Raoul Berger, *Executive Privilege: A Constitutional Myth* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), p. 280.

in foreign affairs. It would have been very enlightening for the public to have known how much disagreement there was within the executive branch and among intelligence agencies as to what the situation was in Indo-China in the 1960's and what the United States could do about it. As Neil Sheehan put it in the *Pentagon Papers:*

> Knowledge of these policy debates and the dissents from the intelligence agencies might have given Congress and the public a different attitude toward the publicly announced decisions of the successive administrations.

These criticisms are not intended to suggest that secrecy can ever be eliminated from the conduct of foreign affairs. As long as we live in a world of competing nation-states, there will always be legitimate reason for each state to feel that its security and survival depend upon its ability to keep its defense plans and resources secret. Even here, however, it can be observed that nations often achieve as much by publicizing as they do by concealing their defense capabilities, since knowledge of these defense resources may deter attack.

In domestic affairs there is a case to be made for secrecy, especially where the issue of personal privacy is involved. Certainly there should be confidentiality with respect to the files of law enforcement agencies, IRS tax returns, and the records of all agencies that gather information relating to the private affairs of individual citizens. "The wrongs of secrecy should not blind us to the rights of privacy."[10] It should be noted that a chief source of serious threats to the privacy of citizens is the presidency itself. White House use and abuse of IRS files was one of the most startling revelations to emerge from Watergate.

Foreign affairs, however, fall squarely within the sphere of the people's business. Decisions made in this area may have life-or-death consequences for the average citizen and recent experience should have taught the public one lesson of overwhelming importance: the fact that there are very great risks attached to secrecy. A nation's security can be put in jeopardy as much by excessive secrecy as by excessive disclosure.

Growing recognition of this fact is responsible for the strenuous efforts now being made in a number of the Western democracies, including Canada and Great Britain, as well as the United States, to find some effective way of limiting the use of secrecy by government agencies in foreign affairs. Other democracies, too, have suffered from an excessive attachment to secrecy. In the Suez crisis of 1956, the costs of secrecy were brought home very dramatically to the British. A great many of the current proposals for the reform of secrecy focus on the idea of allowing some third party to adjudicate in situations where an outside person or organization has requested disclosure of information or access to data that the government has classified as requiring secrecy.

In the United States the new Freedom of Information Act, as enacted

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[10] For an excellent discussion of this point see Allen Weinstein, "Opening the FBI Files: An Interim Report", *Smith Alumnae Quarterly*, Vol. LXVI (February, 1975), p. 14. I am indebted to Lynne Brown for drawing this article to my attention.

in 1974 over President Ford's veto, allows the courts to rule on the validity of governmental claims that documents should be kept secret in the interests of national security. Before the passage of the 1974 law, executive agencies were left pretty much to themselves to determine what information should be withheld and what could be disclosed. The 1966 Freedom of Information Act had exempted so-called national security data from the requirements of disclosure.

There have also been proposals for a special body, made up perhaps of legislators as well as executive officials, which would oversee the process by which documents are classified and adjudicate disputes that arise when someone seeks the disclosure of information the government regards as requiring secrecy. But what the containment of executive secrecy most requires is a skeptical and aggressive attitude toward it on the part of Congress and its committees. It is Congress that must provide the most reliable defense against excessive secrecy in foreign affairs.

In this regard one of the most encouraging developments that has taken place in contemporary American politics is the new self-confidence Congress has exhibited in its own capacities in foreign policy. The country has profited a great deal from this development, however critical Secretary of State Kissinger may choose to be about it. Congressional involvement in Indo-China has, on the whole, been far more intelligent than the steps taken by the executive branch in that same area. Nor is there anything in the recent *Congressional Record* that compares in incompetence with the "Wheat Deal" that executive officials in the United States negotiated, in secret, with the Soviet Union in 1972; a deal that never would have been made on such outrageous terms if it had been publicly disclosed.

This Congressional involvement has been very public and has been accompanied by widespread discussion and debate in the press and in public forums. This open process stands in stark contrast to the system of secret policy-making by the executive branch that preceded the Vietnam War. It would be difficult to challenge the proposition that the country has been much better served by the public deliberations of Congress over foreign policy issues in the recent past than it ever was by secret foreign policy-making in Vietnam.

One final point should be made, and its importance cannot be over-emphasized. The traditional argument for secrecy in the conduct of foreign affairs by a democracy is that it is forced upon the government by the harsh necessity of deceiving foreign enemies. The brutal fact of the matter is, that the principal target of secrecy during the Vietnam War was not any foreign adversary but the American public itself. The sad consequences of that episode in American history will long remain an enduring monument to the hazards of secrecy for any society.

REVIEW OF BOOKS

Confrontation: The Middle East & World Politics

By Walter Laqueur

(Quadrangle, 308 pp., 1974. Bantam Books, 308 pp., 1974)

The contemporary writer who seeks to accomplish a treatment of the latest Arab-Israeli war and its regional and global dimensions is in more difficult and urgent straits than his counterpart in the immediate post—1967 period. Then, the need to assess responsibility for the crisis and to suggest modes for its resolution was not imperative.[1] Neither antagonist fitted clearly into the traditional mode of "the belligerent". Each of the parties took political risks in employing threatening language. The party who stood to gain the most—closure of the Straits of Tiran—miscalculated. A tragic spiral of hardly forseeable events and consequences transpired, leading ultimately to the conflagration.[2] When it was over the West emerged stronger. A diplomatic framework for a negotiated settlement soon evolved. The crisis was contained and general optimism prevailed over the prospects of greater stability in that region of the world.

By contrast, the 1973 war was the product of premeditation and conspiracy, sheathed by the guise of detente. In its wake, Europe and Japan have been reduced to political impotence and economic subordination. There is global fear that the events of 1973 and 1974 may be only the prelude to more aggravated difficulties in the future.

In this context, the serious public demands of the contemporary writer a work that surpasses mere chronicle and grapples with the questions of responsibility, modes for settlement and viable responses to the continuing crisis. Walter Laqueur, the prolific writer and commentator on Middle East affairs and world politics,[3] has, not unexpectedly, written such a book. Although his stated aim is "to provide an anatomy of a local crisis that became a world conflict" (preface), he goes beyond anatomization. His work offers diagnosis and prescription.

Responsibility

Egypt and Syria's attack, we are told, was motivated by their conclusion that alternative methods for reacquisition of their lost territories were non-

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[1]See, for example, M. Reisman, *The Art of the Possible: Diplomatic Alternatives in the Middle East* (1970) where the author admirably stays clear of allocating guilt, limiting his task to identifying "legitimate interests" in the conflict as a means toward formulation of diplomatic options for producing a settlement.

[2]See, however, regarding the question of forseeability, H. Haykal, "An Armed Clash with Israel is Inevitable — Why?", *Al Ahram*, May 26, 1967.

"It is in the light of the compelling psychological factor that the needs of security, of survival itself, make (Israel's) acceptance of the challenge of war inevitable . . . That next move is up to Israel. Israel has to reply now. It has to deal a blow. We have to be ready for it, as I said, to minimize its effect as much as possible. Then it will be our turn to deal the second blow, which we will deliver with the utmost effectiveness."

Reproduced in W. Laqueur (ed.), *The Israel-Arab Reader* 180, 185 (1969). See, generally, for an analysis of the factors leading to the outbreak of war in 1967, A. Gerson, "Trustee-Occupant: The Legal Status of Israel's Presence in the West Bank", 14 *Harvard International Law Journal 1*, 12-22 (1973).

[3]See *Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East* (1956), *The Middle East in Transition* (ed.) (1958), *The Soviet Union and the Middle East* (1959), *The Road to War*, 1967-8 (1968), and *The Israel-Arab Reader* (ed.) (1969).

existent. Israel was consolidating its hold, the West was losing interest and time was running out. Israel was intransigent and lacked diplomatic creativity. At least four opportunities for peace were bungled—in the immediate post 1967 period, in October 1967, in August 1970 at the end of the war of attrition, and in the nine months subsequent to Nasser's death and Sadat's assumption of power. "Levi Eshkol's government and later Golda Meir's voted for immobility. It had no long term concept of a settlement. True, the government made (or accepted) various peace proposals, but there was widespread relief when the Arabs in their intransigence rejected them, for the status quo seemed greatly preferable to any agreed settlement" (43). Israel's victory had an unbalancing effect on the country leading to a mystical quasi-religious revival that in turn clouded the government's sense of reality. "What can be safely said", he concludes, "is that the settlement likely to emerge after the fourth war will be of a kind that the Israeli government could have obtained without undue difficulty after the Six Day War" (254). "Had the Israeli danger loomed less large, had it not overshadowed everything else, there might not have been a new war in 1973." (35)

Taken in this context the argument that is posited, at least implicitly, is that Israel's intransigence, influenced by a transcendental revival within the country, impeded a settlement and that the Arab response was not an altogether unreasonable one.[4] It is an argument that is gaining increasing popularity, not least in European diplomatic circles. Recently *Newsweek's* De Borchgrave asked European experts at a roundtable discussion on the prospects of an impending world economic collapse whether the Europeans had not generally turned more pro-Arab as a result of their fear of a further oil embargo. Their response is illustrative. "1967 was a watershed because magnanimity was sadly lacking in that victory. And since then Israel progressively alienated our sympathy . . . (We) long for them to do something creative diplomatically."[5]

The facts and arguments that Prof. Laqueur marshals to substantiate his assertion are the following: Israel should have withdrawn from most of the occupied territories immediately after the 1967 war without extracting any conditions in return. Admitting that the humiliation of defeat would have remained, the effect of such a gesture, he suggests, would have been to

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[4]For an exposition of the view that the Arab attack may have been justified in international law see I.F.I. Shihata, "Destination Embargo of Arab Oil: Its Legality Under International Law" 68 *American Journal of International Law* 591, 607 (1974). "Egypt, in particular, expressed officially its readiness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel containing all the obligations provided for in Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) as broadly elaborated by the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General. In response, Israel defiantly insisted on territorial expansion. With such an intransigent Israeli position, encouraged in fact by the near total support of the U.S. Government and by the acquiescence of most other Western Powers, little choice was left for Arab states to regain control over their occupied territories." See in response, E. V. Rostow "The Illegality of the Arab Attack on Israel in 1973" 68 *American Journal of International Law* (forthcoming).

[5]*Newsweek*, January 13, 1975 pp. 34-35 interview with Belgium's Viscount Etienne Davignow, head of the International Energy Commission and Coordinator, of Foreign Policy for the Common Market and Andrew Knight, editor of the *London Economist*. See, also, as an example of growing American acceptance of this thesis a recent column by the usual staid James Reston of the *New York Times* where he writes: "And who are the friends of Israel anyway — those who urge her to give up territory *occupied by aggression* or those who urge her to hold on to everything she has?" (reviewer's emphasis), New York Times, January 31, 1975.

lower the intensity of the Arab stimulus to recover the lost territories. Instead, the Arab world would have vented their energies on the many problems they faced at home and abroad (35, 36). In October 1967, Nasser had second thoughts about the wisdom of a purely negative stand and, if sufficiently pressed, would in all probability have agreed to the demilitarization of the Sinai and a generally worded declaration of non-belligerency. "In the meantime, however, the Israeli position hardened; they asked for full maritime rights in the Suez Canal and they had the support of the Americans in demanding an end to all belligerency" (26). "The basic facts of political life should have induced the Israel government in 1967 to make an all out effort to defuse the conflict, to heal wounds and even to appease. *De-escalation* might not have worked but it was never really tried" (37) (reviewer's emphasis). Prof. Laqueur further suggests that it would have been more fruitful for Israel not to terminate the Jarring talks in 1970 and to have attempted new initiatives upon Sadat's assumption of power.

But was withdrawal without reciprocal benefit, while the Arab posture remained belligerent, an act that Prof. Laqueur or any other serious political analyst would have counselled Israel to do in 1967? Earlier in his book, Prof. Laqueur tells of the American acceptance of a Soviet draft formula during the General Assembly session convened on June 19, 1967. That draft would have required an immediate Israeli withdrawal from all the held territories in exchange for a declaration by all member states of the U.N. in the area that each enjoyed the right to maintain an independent national state of its own and to live in peace and security. "The Israelis", Prof. Laqueur states, "viewed this as virtual American surrender to the Soviet-Arab position, for the formula did not even mention Israel by name. Israel would have been in serious trouble had the Arabs decided to subscribe to this meaningless and non-commital declaration. However, much to the relief of the Israelis and to the dismay of the Russians, the Arabs found this concession much too far reaching and they rejected the resolution" (25). Moreover, it is not equally plausible that a unilaterally arrived at Israeli withdrawal might have been perceived by the Arabs as an act of humiliation rather than magnanimity, thus intensifying rather than diminishing Arab hostility?[6]

Prof. Laqueur's analysis of the "fruitful" period after the war of attrition and Sadat's assumption of power is equally unpersuasive. Israel terminated its participation in the Jarring mission in September of 1970 in response to Egyptian deployment of SAM missiles on the west bank of the Canal. This was in direct violation of the cease-fire agreement reached earlier under the auspices of the Rogers Plan which, incidentally, called for full Israeli withdrawal save for minor border rectifications. Was Israel's reaction unreason-

[6]It has been widely advanced that the immediate goal of the 1973 war was to enable the Arabs to regain their self-respect, to improve both their self-respect, to improve both their self image as well as their image vis-a-vis the world. Indeed, a basic strategem employed by Secretary of State Kissinger in the termination of the 1973 conflict was the need to stop the war on, say a 60%-40% winning basis, rather than a 100%-0% ratio, believing that Arab reacquisition of self respect in its military prowess was essential to the commencement of negotiations. The smashing Israel victory in 1967 coupled with a unilateral withdrawal might well have amounted in Arab eyes to a 100% + defeat. See regarding, the role of shame, revenge, and face-saving in Arab society, H. W. Glidden "The Arab World," *American Journal of Psychiatry* 128:8 (February 1972).

able? Israel resumed its participation in the Jarring mission, making a final break only after "the Jarring Plan encouraged the Egyptians to press demands that even a sympathetic mediator found unrealistic—such as retreat from all occupied territory including the Gaza Strip" (31).

Undoubtedly it is true that Israel could have exercised greater wisdom and initiative in its relations with its neighboring Arab states and especially in dealing with the Palestinian issue. The conclusion of Prof. Laqueur's chain of reasoning goes beyond this to suggest that Israeli intransigence was responsible for the crisis. But Prof. Laqueur hardly touches upon the Arab side. Thus, for example, no mention is made of the period of September and October of 1968 when Egypt rejected an American proposal, accepted by Israel, which supported the total return of Sinai to Egypt providing it be demilitarized and the state of belligerency terminated.[7]

Although Prof. Laqueur, wittingly or not, is engaged in an assessment of responsiblity for the 1973 crisis he appears unable to surmount the role of an "in-house" critic of Israel. His displeasure at the rise of ultra-nationalism and the political influence of the religious parties within Israel prior to 1973 causes a loss of perspective. When the Arab states refused to go along with peace initiatives, there may well have been popular governmental relief in Israel guided by the belief that time was on Israel's side. Does this, however, detract from the fact that, were the Arab states seriously interested in a favorable settlement, they had a great many opportunities that *they* might have exploited? It is true that in August of 1973, Israel's policy of "creeping annexation" took a leap forward with governmental acceptance of the "Galilee Paper", permitting increased Israeli settlement and the commencement of private land sales in the territories. But is there a proximate linkage between this event and the Arab attack? In short, was the 1973 war, for Israel, "the price of hubris?"[8] Or was there in fact little connection between the ascent of nationalist policies within Israel and the Arab resolve to go to war? Laqueur is inconsistent. He later writes: "The decision to attack Israel was taken in Cairo in the Spring of 1973. It was no sudden decision nor the first such resolve. After the immediate shock of the defeat of 1967, Nasser had assumed what had been lost by war could be restored only by war". (44)

Laqueur's inconsistency on this point is indeed unfortunate, for the question remains a fascinating one. Most probably, the ascent of nationalist policies in Israel and the decline of Western and Third World support were directly related in casual fashion. Was this erosion then a factor in Sadat's decision to opt for war? Did he conclude, upon surveying the international climate of opinion, that win or lose on the battlefront, the political victory was his for the gambit? That, given the necessity of choice, the trend of world opinion would now congeal into a pronounced global anti-Israel stance? Or was the decision to war based on internal pressures? External Arab pressure? Soviet influence? Prof. Laqueur's unidimensional treatment of the issue provides us with little new insight here.

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[7]See Rostow, *op. cit.*

[8]See for the earliest expression of this school of thought, N. Shepheard, "The Price of Hubris" *The New Statesman,* December 1973.

Military Aspects

Prof. Laqueur proceeds to maintain that Israel's views regarding the value of the territories not only made it impossible to achieve a political solution of the conflict but also distorted Israel's strategic thought, creating a "territorial illusion" that adversely affected its defense position in the 1973 War. "The high command had not only permitted the politicians to use pseudo-military arguments for political purposes, it had managed to deceive itself" (96). The Bar-Lev line as a static line of defense was inherently incapable of withstanding a major, well-prepared attack. From the strategic viewpoint, roving patrol units backed by artillery twenty miles back should have been employed. The static line was preferred "mainly due to the political desire to stress the absolute value of the territories as far as the country's defenses were concerned" (99). Here is an example of some of Mr. Laqueur's reasoning: "Before May, 1967, the Egyptian army for practical reasons had been kept in permanent quarters west of the Canal and only small forces were on the border with Israel. Thus, every Egyptian troop movement to the East was a warning sign . . . this advantage no longer existed as a result of the deployment of Israeli forces . . . if this was the case, the basic assumptions of the post-1967 period about greater security for Israel as the result of the acquisition of Sinai-rather than its demilitarization-had been wrong" (100).

Regarding Israeli battle strategy, Laqueur takes the Israeli general staff to task for not "penetrating deeply into Syrian territory, which would have caused Syria's collapse . . . The defeat of the Syrian army, the cutting off of Damascus, and an advance toward Jebel ed Druz would have given Israel several far-reaching consequences. First, it would have removed Syria from the fighting. Second, an advance toward Jebel ed Druz would have opened up positive political possibilities: traditionally many Druze had been favorably disposed toward Israel. Meanwhile, a holding action could have been fought on the Egyptian front which would not have been so difficult to accomplish" (110). Moreover, "energetic action against Syria might have left Israel with enought time to turn against Egypt and to repel the Egyptian forces at least up to the canal" (110). Not having adopted this strategy, Israeli GHQ should have advanced toward Cairo at a more rapid rate and should have been more willing to take risks. Time was of the essence. "For this reason it is not good enough to talk about 'being deprived of the fruits of victory'. Everyone knew in advance that this would happen if the time factor was ignored." Concluding, Laqueur writes that although "(i)t is too early to analyze in detail operations in the two threatres of war, it would appear that the obsession with the 'territorial issue,' which dictated strategic thought prior to the outbreak of war, also bedeviled the conduct of the war . . . the command continued a frontal attack against the Syrians after they had already been thrown back beyond the 1967 armistice lines, as if it were important to make further territorial conquests. The Israeli counterattack at Suez was launched before the Syrians had been totally defeated, as if it were strategically important that the Egyptians were holding a narrow strip of land" (113).

This reviewer can only suggest that Laqueur's characterization of Israeli military planner's preoccupation with Sinai and the Folan as being a "territorial illusion" requires greater amplification if it is to be credible.

Response

A great deal of confusion remains about the 1973 conflagration. The question of whether Sadat seriously expected to obtain from Israel greater concessions through war than through the exercise of the pre-1973 negotiation options remains unanswered. Could the motivating factor have been purely the psychological victory of assuaging the past humiliation with a show of military prowess? If so, were the Arabs' psychic needs exploited by a superpower whose survival and growth in the region is dependent on the maintenance of instability? Certainly if we look at the results the Soviet Union had much to gain: the outflanking of NATO to the South through greater Soviet infiltration in the Mediterranean basin and the cartelization of the industrialized world's oil by forces it might be capable of controlling.

Prof. Laqueur's answers to these questions are that Egypt and Syria "simply wanted to break the deadlock that had lasted for a long time and which had become intolerable" (187). Their plan received Russian approval. Leading Moscow newspapers called on the Arabs to make full use of the oil blockade and also suggested that they withdraw their multi-billion dollar deposits in Western countries (192).

Regarding the current dilemma and the influence of the oil weapon, Laqueur writes that it became clear that whoever ruled the oil fields potentially ruled Europe and Japan. The Soviet Union lost no time in congratulating the Arabs on their use of the oil weapon. In short time, Europe was reduced to the equation, as Laqueur bluntly puts it, of "$9 \times 0 = 0$" (175).

As of the time of this review, matters have worsened. The danger that one or more of the European nations simply will be unable to pay the sums demanded by the producers for oil "is immediate, within a matter of months".[9]

Already the industrialized nations of Europe are borrowing from the producers to pay for current consumption and are selling them their most sophisticated armaments en masse to preserve cash reserves.[10] If matters go unchecked the OPEC countries policies may in a relatively short time upset the world monetary system.

Do the United States, Western Europe and Japan have no alternative to impassively facing abdication of their political power to the Arab states and its sponsor? Europe has become increasingly more vocal in maintaining that

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[9]Farmanfarmaian, Gutowski, Okita, Roose and Wilson, "How Can the World Afford OPEC Oil?" 53 *Foreign Affairs* 207.

[10]"Virtually all of the industrialized nations, as well as most of those well along in the developing phase, could be expected to fall within this pattern of requirements (borrowing for consumption) at some time within the next five years. France, Italy, Japan, and the United Knigdom for example have already arranged individually to borrow from OPEC and other countries, as well as from the commercial banking system." *ibid*, 216. Optimists may find comfort in the words of Thomas D. Willet, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Research, upon releasing a detailed study on the probable effects of the Arab petro-dollar build up: "that continued oil deficits need not cause a financial collapse of the Western world should not be taken as a rationale for the view that the oil price increases are of little consequence. Short of war the oil price increases if maintained for any number of years will probably cause the greatest misallocation of resources the world has ever seen". *New York Times*, January 31, 1975, pp. 1, 42.

Israel is the cause of their troubles—its intransigence being responsible for the unleashing of the 1973 war and the use of the oil weapon. If only Israel would acquiesce to Arab demands and cease to be a major provocation to the Arabs, oil would creep back to a market level. In this regard, Laqueur commendably points out that the oil war is a struggle with a momentum of its own, quite separate from the Arab-Israeli conflict (252). It may be pursued, he tells us, in a variety of ways as "there are many ways of bringing pressure on the Arab oil producers, such as seizing their financial holdings in the West, but in the last resort only the threat of military action will deter those who have proclaimed their intention to ruin Europe" (251). Laqueur might have added, however, that time is against the West. The prospect of neutralizing the Soviet Union should resort to armed intervention prove necessary, rapidly declines with the increasing weakening of Europe and the strengthening of the Soviet position in the area.[11]

What Professor Laqueur might have done is to apply his conclusions as to the means of resolving the West's dilemma over oil to a generalized approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict. He would then have concluded that international stability in any region of the world cannot long endure without the acceptance and respect of minimal reciprocal rules inhibiting resort to force to solve political problems and that, accordingly, successful foreign policy demands the courage to act on convictions. Egypt and Syria consistently refused to make any serious attempt to negotiate a resolution of the conflict. Israel often stalled. The U.S. should have applied pressure on both parties to negotiate. Instead it deferred an explosive situation. When the Soviet Union mocked the spirit of detente by encouraging Syria and Egypt to attack Israel, the U.S. could have condemned the action, using the not inconsiderable power it possessed. It did not. The concept of adherence of principles of minimal use of force in the conduct of international relations and its corollary, condemnation for violations of this standard, was not only ignored but abandoned.

Prof. Laqueur's achievement in this book is thus mixed. He makes a worthwhile contribution in alerting us to the gravity of the West's current dilemma and its need to realize that the solutions may be painful ones indeed. But Laqueur's techniques of analysis fail him in diagnosing the roots of our problems. His treatment of the causality of the war is discursive and inconsistent. His treatment of the West's response to the initiation of the war lacks an adequate treatment of alternative courses of action. And overall, his work suffers from a unidimensional approach to a multifaceted problem. In the final analysis, Prof. Laqueur's work provides another example of the problem John Locke alluded to when he stated, "it is one thing to show a man that he is in error and another to put him in possession of truth."

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[11]See regarding the desirability, prospects and feasibility of American intervention, Tucker, "Oil: the Issue of American Intervention" 59 *Commentary* 21, (January, 1975).

Meeting at Potsdam. Charles L. Mee, Jr., (New York: M. Evans & Co., 1975. 301 pp.)

From 17 July to 2 August 1945, Joseph Stalin, Harry Truman, and Winston Churchill (who was replaced by Clement Attlee on 28 July) met at the Cecilienhof at Potsdam ostensibly to settle the fate of post-war Europe and to ensure lasting cooperation among the war-time allies. During the two weeks duration of the conference, the western press corps cooled its heels in nearby Berlin waiting to report on the anticipated peace agreement. But they were to be disappointed. The final declaration, as Charles Mee shows, was a "tripartite declaration of the Cold War." The participants, he caustically remarks, managed to rescue "discord from the threatened outbreak of peace."

It was at Potsdam that the "Grand Alliance" (Churchill's overblown metaphor) irrevocably fell apart. After all, it had been Hitler who had brought them together by waging war against them one by one, and Hitler's death had put an effective end to the cooperative effort. The inflamed rhetoric of the Cold War soon obliterated the fact that the alliance had always rested on a most tenuous foundation. The West and the Russians had always mistrusted each other's motives. But once the war had ended and the Cold War begun, both sides put forth the myth of a harmonious military and political cooperation now shattered by the other side's perfidious behaviour. Thus toward the end of the war and especially after its conclusion the former allies immediately began to haggle over the spoils of victory. Needless to say, their claims frequently produced counterclaims.

Stalin insisted that since the Red Army had played by far the leading role in Germany's defeat and since the Nazi invasion of Russia had caused immeasurable devastation, Russia should receive adequate compensation from Germany and its allies. Additionally, Stalin demanded a free hand in Eastern Europe, especially in Poland where his armed forces were already consolidating their position.

Stalin contended, as he had done at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, that control of Poland was irrevocably tied to the security of the Soviet Union and that no degree of Western opposition could change the position of the Soviet delegation on this all-important issue. Stalin, patiently and doggedly, refused to yield on this point. Thus Poland, over which World War II began in Europe, "became one of the *casus belli* of the Cold War."

But Truman was in no mood to recognize Stalin's claims. He ignored the advice by the State Department's experts on Soviet affairs. On board the *Augusta,* which carried Truman's entourage to Europe, the most informed man on Russia and Eastern Europe was Charles Bohlen who had served in the United States embassy in Moscow. Yet Truman never consulted neither him nor another passenger, H. Freeman Matthews, the chief of the European Division of the State Department. Most incredibly, Truman did not see fit to invite W. Averell Harriman, his ambassador to the Soviet Union, to come to Moscow. Instead, Truman turned for advice to his poker-playing friends and James Byrnes, his Secretary of State, a man with a "broad ignorance of for-

eign countries." At Potsdam, Byrnes and Truman were determined to give the Soviet Union absolutely nothing.

On the main point of contention, *i.e.*, the post-war status of Germany, the West and the Soviet Union stood at opposite poles. Stalin insisted on $20 billion in reparations from an exhausted nation, a policy meant to keep Germany prostrate. But to the United States and Great Britain the Russian demand posed several disadvantages: an impoverished and helpless Germany was no deterrent against potential Russian westward expansion; it might succumb to Communism; it could become neither an exporter nor importer of American goods; and if the United States intended to rebuild Germany, the Russian demand meant that American money and equipment would simply pass through Germany to Russia as reparations. To the Russians the question of reparations was paramount; to the United States the primary problem was to rebuild Germany. There could, therefore, be no meeting of minds on this point. As a result, both sides began to carve out spheres of influence in Germany. The seeds for two Germnaies were sown at Potsdam. The question of reparations, Mee notes, "split Germany consciously and intentionally, realistically and definitely."

It is a widely held belief by the American public that the United States seldom obtains the fruits of a military victory. The miliary wins a war and the diplomats then proceed to lose the peace. Following World War II, so the argument goes, the wily Communists became the beneficiaries of American diplomatic ineptitude. In contrast to this view, Mee presents a picture of American negotiating skills, hard bargaining, and intransigence. At Potsdam, Truman and his delegation conceded virtually nothing to the Russians (and to the British for that matter.) On the question of reparations, the American negotiator, Edwin Pauley, a shrewd businessman who had headed the United States delegation to the three-power Allied Reparations Commission in Moscow in April 1945, seemingly did yield to the Russians. He agreed that they deserved to receive the bulk of reparations—55% of the final amount. The United States and Britain were to receive 22½% each. Too late did the Russians realize that Truman had no intentions of granting the Russian reparations from the Western zones of occupation, especially, the industrialized Ruhr region. The Russians, in this fashion, received 55% of nothing.

The Potsdam Conference accomplished nothing of a positive nature. It merely fueled the mutual suspicions and distrust. Immediately, upon returning to Washington, Truman asked Congress to approve a program of military training and an increase in military spending. And in Moscow, Stalin summoned his nuclear scientists and ordered them to step-up their work on the atomic bomb without sparing the cost.

Mee has presented us another revisionist study of the origin of the Cold War. Stalin is no longer the sole culprit. Although Mee stresses that all participants at Potsdam must accept a portion of the blame for the Cold War, most of his criticism is reserved for Truman who resolutely refused to recognize the legitimacy of Russian demands. The evidence Mee presents suggests that Truman did not seek to avoid a conflict with Stalin and very little that he did at Potsdam "could be construed as part of a plan for tranquility."

The proponents of the liberal interpretation of the origin of the Cold War has insisted that it was a struggle between tyranny and freedom. Stalin, the bloody dictator, made postwar cooperation impossible. In contrast to this argument, *Meeting at Potsdam* clearly shows that neither Truman, Churchill, nor Attlee (not to mention Stalin) were interested in championing the cause of individual liberty. When they convened around the green baize table only national considerations mattered.

On the eve of the Potsdam Conference, the United States set off the first atomic bomb at Alamogordo, New Mexico. With this explosion the United States became the sole recipient of a most awesome weapon. Truman was now in a position to deal with Stalin from a position of added strength. At the same time he was now able to hasten the surrender of an already helpless and defeated Japan before the Russians, who had promised to join the war against Japan three months after the defeat of Germany and were ready to do so on 8 August 1945, could establish themselves in the Far East. Thus a sordid spectacle ensued. The Japanese were desperately trying to arrange an end of their war with the United States through the Soviet government with whom they still had diplomatic relations. But Stalin refused to become an intermediary fearing that an early Japanese surrender to the United States would deprive him of an opportunity to intervene against a weakened and exhausted opponent. Truman, who knew of the Japanese efforts to end the war, wanted to end the conflict but without Russian military or diplomatic contributions. Thus the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, "the greatest thing in history" according to Truman. The use of the atomic bombs, Mee concludes, was thus "wanton murder." Mee here restates an argument raised first in 1948 by the British physicist P. M. S. Blackett *(Fear, War and the Bomb)* and popularized in 1965 by Gar Alperovitz *(Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam.)*

Charles Mee has written a valuable, highly readable study that concentrates on an event generally neglected by historians who have focused on the Yalta Conference and later events especially in 1947 add 1948. *Meeting at Potsdam* was written for a general audience, not specialists in the field, and it is by no means the definitive, the last word. It remains, nevertheless, a most useful contribution to our understanding of the origins of the Cold War.

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Comparing Foreign Policy: Theories, Findings and Methods, edited by James N. Rosenau, (New York: The Halsted Press, 1974) 442 pp.

Early in 1967 a group of scholars met for a three day session of collaboration to develop ideas for a series of books dealing with foreign policy. Out of this meeting there arose the conviction that not enough was known about the field of foreign policy, leading to the creation of the Inter-University Comparative Foreign Policy (ICFP) project. Close cooperation over a six year period, by scholars from over ten universities across the country, has produced a diverse series of essays representing a common commitment to comparative analysis in foreign policy research. The aim of the ICFP was to expand Rosenau's pre-theory, in which the need for comparative inquiries into foreign policy phenomena is emphasized. Indeed, the focal point of most of the essays in *Comparing Foreign Policies* is on Rosenau's own concept of adaptive behavior in foreign policy.

Rosenau defines foreign policy as:

> . . . the authoritative actions which governments take — or are committed to take — in order, either to preserve the desirable aspects of the international environment or to alter its undesirable aspects.

While admitting the necessity for applied research in foreign policy analysis, Rosenau is convinced that a comparative approach, though slow in producing results for more expedient problems, can contribute to a broader understanding of the problems that do arise, thus enabling a greater capacity to resolve those problems in the future. In this area of pure research, the particular aspect of foreign policy to be analyzed is left to the discretion of the researcher. The only limitations being the researcher's ability to relate the comparison to the overall subject and that the researcher follow the proper methodological rules.

The essays have been grouped into three general categories following Rosenau's introductory essay in Part I. Emphasis is placed on a theoretical approach in Part II. Here the tremendous influence of Rosenau's pioneering efforts in the areas of theory and comparison can be strongly detected. Taken as a whole, they present many new aspects, either expanding upon or contradicting the basic concepts previously established by Rosenau. In Part III the heart of the comparative approach is presented, concerning itself, primarily, with empirical findings. Beginning with an extension of Rosenau's "pre-theory" of 1966, Rosenau and Hoggard find that internal factors are powerful in the explanation of international interaction than external or systematic factors. This finding acted as a departure point for the further investigations that followed, for the determining factors in foreign policy analysis. Each of the proceding essays in Part III deal with a particular element derived from the initial conclusion reached by Rosenau and Hoggard. The final section of *Comparing Foreign Policies,* Part IV, deals with the methodological problems arising in the realm of pure research of foreign policy phenomena.

As the field of foreign policy analysis, using the comparative approach, is still relatively new, the seventeen essays included in this volume comprise, more or less, a "state of the art" survey. Though extremely complex in nature,

Comparing Foreign Policies: Theories, Finding and Methods will enable analysts of almost any related field, to investigate the dynamics by which the nation-state of today deal with their international environments.

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