

**U.S. China Policy and the Problem of Taiwan.** By William M. Bueler (Boulder: Colo. Assoc. Univ. Press, 1971).

Edwin O. Reischauer has well said that Mr. Bueler's "clearly written, well organized and soundly reasoned book deserves wide attention." This is especially true in light of Dr. Kissinger's recent missions to Peking. Since these occurred after the writing of *U.S. China Policy*, one wonders if the author now regrets his contention that Peking ". . . does not want an improvement in relations with the United States as long as the United States recognizes a rival Chinese regime on Taiwan." In terms of far-reaching improvements in relations, of course, his view probably retains its validity.

The first part of Mr. Bueler's study is a history of U.S.-Chinese relations from 1949 through 1970. Although extremely brief (67 pages), these chapters are well done. The ground covered, however, is already familiar to scholars if not to the general public. The remaining 60 pages are more original, although slightly marred by excessive repetition. They contain an analysis of the current situation and suggestions for the future of Taiwan. The author seems well qualified to deal with this subject by virtue of language training and five years residence on the problem island.

Not counting a small number of non-Chinese "aborigines," the native population of Taiwan consists of Chinese whose ancestors arrived between the 18th and 20th centuries. But there is also a "mainlander" Chinese population, that is, Chiang Kai Shek's Nationalists who came after 1945 and more especially as refugees after the communist victory on the mainland in 1949. Since then, neither Washington, Peking, nor Taipei has seriously considered allowing the native Taiwanese majority (85%) to determine its own destiny. Chiang's government justifies its heavy-handed domination of the Taiwanese by the myth that it is the legitimate government of all China, temporarily lodged on Taiwan until it can return to the mainland. The U.S. government tied itself to Chiang during the Korean War largely for strategic reasons but also because of pressure from the American right-wing; we were therefore obliged to accept both the myth of Chiang's political legitimacy and the corollary principle that the Taiwanese must be subjected to him.

After 1960, however, the U.S. progressively abandoned that myth, evolving in its place the two-China policy. American public opinion, moreover, disillusioned as it is by the Vietnamese War, now demands a scaling down of U.S. commitments in the Far East. Mr. Bueler suggests that the time may therefore be ripe for a just solution to the problem of Taiwan. China, he believes, might be satisfied by the removal of U.S. bases from Taiwan and the fall of Chiang's regime; she might then tolerate an autonomous Taiwan under native rule. In that case, America's pull-out would not necessarily be followed by a communist occupation which the Taiwanese apparently want no more than they desire a continuation of Chiang's rule. The U.S. could also feel that her national interests were being served by the establishment of an autonomous Taiwan. The author concedes that his hopes for Taiwan may be overly sanguine; in any event, the U.S. might be let off the hook by such a formula.

I have only two complaints. Mr. Bueler does not sufficiently emphasize the continuing relevance of Russia to U.S.-Chinese relations. Americans formerly hoped that they could contain both Russia and China. If the U.S. now seeks China's friendship, it is not only because of disillusionment with Chiang and the Vietnamese War; it is also because the U.S. and China are both threatened by an increasingly powerful Russia. My other complaint is a purely ritualistic one: footnotes belong on the bottoms of pages, not at the end of a book.

KARL LAREW

*Associate Professor, History  
Towson State College*