CONCEPTUAL AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE CRISIS IN U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS: TOWARD A NEW POLICY FORMULATION

By Howard J. Wiarda*

Election campaigns are now a virtually non-stop part of the American political landscape, with nary a pause in between for reflection, let alone reasoned public policy analysis. We have just finished one campaign and the next has already begun; actually, our presidential sweepstakes now start long before the previous midterm election. There is much political posturing by present and would-be candidates, the think tanks have begun to take up their familiar positions, and the study groups and commissions whose agendas include not just foreign policy research projects, but also positioning for the National Security Council slots in the next administration — whatever it may be — have already held their first meetings.

Amid this hue and cry and the comings and goings of administrations and the personalities in them, it still remains necessary to step back and assess with some detachment — if that is possible in such a politicized city as Washington — where we have been in a policy sense, what we are doing, where we are going, and where we should be going or would like to go. We need to probe beneath the rhetorical flourishes and hyperbole which tend to entrap all administrations and their oppositions in order to assess, evaluate, and, if necessary, reformulate the directions of our foreign policy. For the fact is not only are we a quite different nation than we were twenty years ago, but our position in the world has been altered significantly as well. At the same time, Latin America has undergone some profound transformations, new issues have come to the fore, and the area's historic "special relationship" with the United States is undergoing a time of testing and reexamination. But in the fever of almost continuous campaigning to which we are now subjected, neither party can afford to address these changes and their policy implications, except perhaps superficially and at the margins of the real issues. While we fiddle, however, the relationship with Latin America burns, crying out for new and hopefully deeper assessments.

Conceptual and Political Dimensions of the Problem

I have suggested in greater detail in other writings[1] that at the heart of our difficulties in Latin America are a series of fundamental conceptual problems and misconceptions. These include the following:

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[1]Howard J. Wiarda (ed.), *Politics and Social Change in Latin America: The Distinct Tradition*, 2nd ed. (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1982); Wiarda, "The United States and Latin America in the Aftermath of the Falklands/ Malvinas Crisis," in Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, United States House of Representatives, Ninety-Seventh Congress, Second Session, July 20 and August 5, 1982, *Latin America and the United States After the Falklands/ Malvinas Crisis: Hearings* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1982) 22-42; and Wiarda, "The United States and Latin America: Change and Continuity" in Alan Adelman and Reid Reading (eds.) *Stability/ Instability in the Caribbean Basin in the 1980s* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1983).

1. Latin America occupies a relatively low place on our list of foreign policy priorities. Historically it has ranked behind the Soviet Union, Western Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.
2. The United States does not understand Latin America very well. Our comprehension of the area is shrouded in myths and stereotypes.
3. The United States pays attention to Latin America only in times of crisis. The rest of the time we tend and hope to ignore the area.
4. Not only do we not understand Latin America very well, but we do not *want* to understand it. Our viewpoints tend to be patronizing, condescending "superior." We see the area as having little culture, "no history" (Hegel), and without virtues from which we might learn. We refuse to take Latin America seriously or to understand it *on its own terms.*
5. We tend to view Latin America through the prism of our own domestic political debates. Worse, we use Latin America as a laboratory for policies that, for fear of retribution or other dangerous consequences, we would not dare try out in other higher-priority areas. In some instances, Latin America policy and positions are used almost as "bones" that we throw to some domestic constituency.
6. In the United States, Latin America policy is frequently viewed as a continuous morality play; sometimes repressive governments are viewed as "devils" by one administrations and sometimes *Fidelistas* and Russians are so identified by other administrations. In this pageant, pragmatism and realism are sometimes lost.[2]
7. The problems of misunderstanding and misconceptions are not all one way: the mistaken notions, stereotypes, and ethnocentrism that Latin Americans carry around regarding the United States — and their sheer ignorance of our political institutions — is at least as great as our own of theirs.

These are all strong, provocative statements; the case has clearly been overstated somewhat in order to more forcefully make it. The fact is, however, that we do consistently misinterpret, disparage, misunderstand, condescend toward, moralize about and underestimate Latin America. But that is only part of the picture. For it is also clear that in this country we (or at least some persons) *do* pay attention to Latin America, we *do* care about the area, we *are* — albeit often dimly — aware of its growing importance to us, we do not treat it *wholly* as a reflection of our domestic politics, we *do* recognize the changed circumstances in Latin America, the area *has* come to press itself upon our consciousness, and we *have* begun to recognize that our institutional paraphernalia do not always work well in other cultures or societies. Although past miscomprehension, ignorance, and ethnocentrism of Latin America are still with us, the issue may no longer be that legacy, but rather whether and how we face up to the new realities in Latin America and in our relations with it.

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[2]Paul Sigmund. "Latin America: Change or Continuity?" *Foreign Affairs,* 60 (1981) 629-57.

New Realities in Latin America and in U.S.-Latin American Relations

The new realities in Latin America and in United States-Latin American relations are many and complex; a full book would be required to discuss them adequately. Here we can only list these new realities briefly and in a very general fashion, recognizing that further qualification, discussion, and specificity are necessary.

1. The United States is presently in a generally weaker position vis-à-vis Latin America than was the case 15-20 years ago. Then, the United States was "practically sovereign on this continent"[3]; today that is no longer so. Our foreign assistance is down and hence our leverage is diminished; our AID, military, and other missions are greatly reduced; the American business community is no longer dominant throughout the area; our presence overall is considerably less than it was; the American system has been tarnished as a model to emulate; our capacity — or even willingness — to influence events in Latin America is considerably diminished.
2. There will not be any major new assistance programs for Latin America. It is clear that neither the Congress nor the American people are willing to support bold foreign aid initiatives that would enable the United States again to play a leading formative role in the area. There will not be another Alliance for Progress; Americans do not want it, and we cannot afford it.[4] Indeed posite direction: protectionist walls are being thrown up, isolationism is rising, and the one major foreign assistance program we have, the Caribbean Basin Initiative, has been heavily gutted particularly in its crucial trade and market access stations.
3. There is considerable apprehension whether the United States, in its present circumstances, can carry out any rational, coherent, sustained foreign policy. The debate over Central America policy, the fate of the Caribbean Basin Initiative, and the vetoing of the proposal for Radio Martí essentially by one radio station in Iowa — whatever one thinks of the merit of this particular issue — lend credence to this statement. Many seasoned Washington observers, looking at the drumbeat in the popular media about El Salvador, for instance, the strength and independence of some U.S. domestic interest groups who all but carry out their own separate foreign policies, the murky bureaucratic politics of policy in the foreign affairs area, the overriding desire for reelection and hence headlines on the part of all office-holders, and the "divided government"[5] between president and Congress, wonder aloud if in fact we can conduct a serious foreign policy. We are so deeply divided, and with each major interest or "concurrent majority" having a virtual veto power over policy as once envisioned by John C. Calhoun,[6] that we have reached a stage of near *immobilisme*. The French

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[3]The phrase is attributed to Secretary of State Richard Olney, on the occasion of the Venezuela-British Guiana boundary dispute of 1895.

[4]John E. Rielly. "The American Mood: A Foreign Policy of Self Interest". *Foreign Policy*, No. 34 (Spring, 1979) 74-86.

[5]Glen Gordon. *The Legislative Process and Divided Government.* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts, Bureau of Government, 1966).

[6]Calhoun. *A Disquisition on Government.* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1953).

THE UNITED STATES AND AFRICA

By William H. Lewis*

Contrary to the prevailing belief of our day, the continent of Africa has not always been relegated to a marginal position by American strategic planners and foreign affairs specialists. In the decade immediately following the Second World War, Africa was regarded as a vital link in the defense of Western security interests. This perspective was the product of frustrated American expectations concerning the post-war international order, and the growing likelihood of competition and confrontation with the Soviet Union. Indeed, by 1948-49, the institutions that the United States had helped to create at Bretton Woods and at San Francisco appeared threatened by rising Cold War rivalries.

It was in Europe and the Mediterranean region that the United States initially concentrated its efforts to meet what was seen as a Soviet challenge to the stability of international society. Europe was prostrate economically, lacking in strong political leadership, and without the resources essential for the protection of national sovereignty and territorial boundaries. Because Europe and the nations bordering on the eastern Mediterranean were not only centers of modern civilization, but the beacon for budding democracies elsewhere, the security of these regions became an abiding preoccupation of senior American policymakers. As a result, the Truman Doctrine (1947), the Marshall Plan (1948), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO-1949) were fashioned to bolster the defense capabilities of democratic regimes.

Nevertheless, strategic planners in Washington recognized the military frailties of nations that had enlisted in NATO. Western Europe constituted an inherently weak nucleus from which to deter Soviet aggrandisement. The armed forces of the continental constituency were in the process of rehabilitating from the devastation of World War II; their economies lacked a military-industrial foundation; and the morale of their citizenry did not offer any confidence that a lengthy struggle against Soviet forces could be sustained. Western Europe was war weary and clearly without the internal resources essential for effective defense. For its part, the United States was not prepared to maintain sizable garrisons of General Purpose Forces in Europe — demobilization of troops was the *leitmotif* of the American public. Moreover, by 1950, most U.S. ground forces were committed to the defense of the Republic of Korea, which had suffered invasion by North Korean troops in June of that year.

A counter-strategy was required to meet the anticipated Soviet threat in Europe, a strategy that would permit the United States time to mobilize its full industrial potential and manpower resources. The approach finally adopted accepted the likelihood that Western Europe might well fall before the full weight of American resources could be brought to bear. NATO planners concluded that they would have to look to Africa to establish a defensive line in depth. Africa's northern littoral was a natural geo-strategic choice. In addition to proximity, Africa was attractive for a variety of related reasons:

1. The African continent was under European colonial domination and likely to remain so throughout the decade of the 1950s.

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2. The overwhelming majority of the peoples inhabiting the northern third of Africa were Moslem and therefore presumably opposed to Communist blandishments.
3. North Africa already possessed a military infrastructure network of some importance — e.g., Mers-el-Kebir (Algeria), Bizerte (Tunisia), el Adem (Libya), and Suez (Egypt).
4. The continent commanded a manpower resevoir that could be tapped should circumstances require it.
5. Access to "choke-points" such as Gibraltar, Capetown, Djibouti, and the Suez Canal, offered the expectation of naval supremacy and secure lines of logistical reinforcement.

Africa, in due course, became a strong point for NATO planners. The United States placed the continent high on the list of its geo-strategic priorities by constructing four large Strategic Air Command bases, together with a naval air station, and intelligence communications collection points in the French Protectorate Zone of Morocco; the enlargement of a gigantic air base, Wheelus Field, outside Tripoli, Libya; and the establishment of major facilities in Liberia and Ethiopia.

The political-military strategy formulated in 1950 required less than a decade to unravel. Several factors explain this denouement. Foremost, the Soviet Union, because of the debilitating effects of World War II on its own society (including 30 million casualties), had no intention or capability of launching a lengthy war of attrition with the United States and its European allies. Secondly, technological factors, such as the nuclear breakthrough, intercontinental missile systems, and dual-purpose aircraft and submarines, added to the military superiority and deterrence posture of the United States. Finally, and of comparable significance, the rise of nationalist forces in Africa blunted NATO planners and frustrated strategic theoreticians in the United States. By the end of the decade, independence was coming to Africa, and the age of colonialism was in full eclipse.

The second phase of American foreign policy reflected rapid adjustment to the "winds of change" sweeping the African continent. This was a period of Third World discovery in the Olympian precincts of the White House and the Department of State, and Africa bulked large as a region little known or understood by most Americans. This was also a period of Black "Consciousness" and heightened civil rights agitation in the United States, which tended to coalesce with American discovery of the Africa being swept by decolonization. The result was a combination of near utopian romanticism during which American resources were expended on economic assistance in hopeful anticipation that all of the newly emergent African nations would find their futures vouchsafed by close alignment with the United States and the "western democracies." This was a period of great expectations, of various stages of economic growth and "take-off," and of direct competition with the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Republic of China for access to basic resources, markets, and political influence.

This phase came to a melancholy conclusion with the civil war in Nigeria, the eruption of acrimonious disputes over American policies in the "White Redoubt" regions of southern Africa, and the emergence of authoritarian military and civilian regimes concerned with the preservation of political power rather than the

distant promised land of economic "take-off" anticipated under free enterprise and political pluralism.

As the decade of the 1960s came to an end, American leaders were compelled to adjust their policies to harsh realities. White regimes in southern Africa were not prepared to surrender political control to African nationalism without a protracted struggle. At the other end of the spectrum, the former Metropoles (colonial nations) were resistant to the proposition that they should sacrifice their economic, commercial and military influence in erstwhile colonies. Also, the Soviet Union would not foreswear efforts to topple moderate African regimes through arms aid to so-called "liberation" movements. United States policies during the 1969-75 period tilted in favor of the "White Redoubt" regimes of Southern Africa, and adopted a posture of benign neglect with respect to the remainder of sub-Saharan Africa.

The American policy of neglect seemed to be well-grounded as events during the decade of the 1970s appeared to demonstrate. Although Africa had witnessed dramatic changes in the previous generation, serious disabilities impaired hopes for political stability and economic progress. Sub-Saharan Africa was the poorest of the world's major regions, with a level of per capita income that continually sagged against the Malthusian pressures of the population. The equation is distressing in the extreme: the ten-fold increase in energy prices has pauperized more than a dozen African nations; at the same time, agricultural productivity has declined, leading to a surprising turn towards food importation; during the decade, price supports for minerals and other primary resources (with the exception of energy) virtually collapsed, which induced greater external borrowing and a heightened debt burden at precisely a time when export earnings were in decline. The product of these economic forces, when combined with maladministration of programs, is a gloomy profile of uncertainty and disillusionment.

The Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, The Honorable Chester A. Crocker, outlined the immediacy and poignancy of Africa's economic problems during an address before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on October 5, 1983.*

> "The adverse economic impact of the 1973 and 1979 oil price increases, record high debt servicing costs, galloping inflation rates, and slowed economic expansion due to the recession in the West, have brought many African states to the verge of bankruptcy. Development programs must be scaled down and major internal structural reforms will have to be carried out to weather this crisis. The recent meeting of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank focused on these grim issues and could offer no easy outs, no quick fixes."

On the political plane, few African nations had progressed towards representative democracy. Authoritatian rule — civilian or military — was the dominant pattern during the 1970s (and remains prevalent today). However, beyond this generalization, most American strategic thinkers had to acknowledge that wide variations in African political experience had been obtained. Nigeria, for example, had returned

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*See "U.S. Interests in Africa," U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C., *Current Policy* No. 330, October 5, 1981.

to constitutionalism and civilian control as the decade came to a close; two of Africa's most notorious rulers, Idi Amin of Uganda and Bokassa of Central Africa, had been defenestrated; while some measure of repression existed in Tanzania and the Ivory Coast, their venerable leaders (Julius Nyerere and Felix Houphouet-Boigny) preferred exhortation and public dialogue to secure political cooperation.

Nevertheless, the majority of independent African states suffered from a distressing number and complex mix of frailties and disabilities. Key among them were competing regional and ethnic loyalties, tensions between traditionalism and modernism, failure to establish solid foundations for national identity and national loyalty, together with weak bureaucracies, limited technical expertise, and thin administrative networks. These disabilities were reflected in frequent eruptions of violence, civil war, and secessionism. At one point in mid-1982, armed hostilities claimed the Western Sahara, Chad, Eritrea, the Ogaden Province of Ethiopia, Uganda, Namibia, and Angola, with episodic outbursts claiming other regions and nations with disturbing frequency.

The African continent, as a result, has attracted foreign intervention in various forms, including commando raids and filibustering expeditions by European mercenaries, the injection of Cuban combat troops in Angola and Ethiopia, and the use of French "intervention forces" *inter alia* to protect allies and friendly regimes throughout francophone Africa. The continued presence of Cuban forces has produced some uneasiness among African leaders, and, in the instance of the governments of Angola and Ethiopia, a realization that Soviet and Cuban military assistance is not an unmixed blessing. Moreover, in southern Africa, their support for the MPLA regime at Luanda has resulted in a widening of hostilities and military burdens without compensating involvement in the negotiations that are in progress between Pretoria and Luanda, and the United Nations "Contact Group" (led by the United States) dealing with the future status of Namibia.

As the decade of the 1970s came to a close, United States policies and perspectives with respect to Africa were undergoing a dramatic transformation. President Carter and his team of African affairs specialists had brought to Washington in 1977 a strategy that, grounded on human rights principles, emphasized peaceful change and resolution of disputes, recession of white regimes from power in southern Africa, a de-emphasis of military assistance programs in favor of economic aid, and termination of "Big Power" rivalries in Africa. The *sine qua non* of American policy was the maxim, "African problems should be resolved by Africans." (The notable exception to the latter were the "White Redoubt" issues of Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa, where the Carter Administration was fully prepared to intervene in the cause of Black majority rule.) The President and his special emissary to Africa, Ambassador Andrew Young, even challenged the Soviet Union to cease its arms transfer program and to compete with the United States in the provision of economic assistance, a challenge which Moscow ultimately ignored.

While success was registered in securing the white settler agreement for the transfer of political power to the Black leadership of Robert Mugabe and Robert Nkomo in Rhodesia (present day Zimbabwe), the Carter Administration encountered numerous setbacks to its basic strategy elsewhere in Africa. The number and sheer weight of conflict situations emerging during the initial Carter years multiplied prodigiously and proved beyond the capabilities of African leaders or their

regional body, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), to resolve through mediation. In several instances, these conflicts demanded foreign intercession — as during the Shaba (Zaire) crises of 1977 and 1978 when French and Belgian paratroopers were required to rescue mining communities at Kolwezi; or when French air units were deployed to Dakar to protect Mauritanian iron ore mines from attacks by Western Saharan guerrilla forces; or when French paratroop forces overthrew the Emperor Bokassa after his human rights depredations became intolerable. Similarly, the United States could do little beyond official protestations over Soviet and Cuban involvement in the 1977-78 Ethiopian-Somali war, and rising Soviet arms transfers to selected African nations. Nor were Carter Administration exertions in behalf of the United Nations regarding Namibia rewarded with independence for that nation.

All of these factors, together with disturbing events in the Persian Gulf-Red Sea areas, led to a recasting of American foreign policy. *Realpolitik* became the order of the day by 1979, dictated by the overthrow of the Shah of Iran, the Khomeimi "revolution," the seizure of American diplomatic hostages at Tehran, and the movement of Soviet military forces into Afghanistan. These events produced shock and dismay, followed by steadfast determination to confront the challenges with realism and the material resources at our disposal. At the heart of the new American approach was the following:

1. A determination to support rulers and governments in the Middle East and Africa that shared our national purposes and endorsed our policies. Support would come in the form of arms aid *and* economic assistance.
2. A renewed willingness to approach African problems in geo-strategic terms, including competition with the Soviet Union for access to influence, material resources, and popular support.
3. An acknowledgement that the former European colonial powers have a role to play, based on experience and self-interest, that the United States could not (nor should it wish to) emulate.

The hallmark of the sea change in American policy was the State of the Union Address by President Carter to the American Congress in January 1980. Declaring the Persian Gulf region "vital" to American national interests, President Carter announced the formation of a Rapid Deployment Force capable of being moved expeditiously to the Gulf should circumstances warrant.

The new force compelled a shift in American perspectives with respect to Africa. Once again, American defense planners would view the African continent as a means for achieving a geo-strategic end. But this time, the end would be the defense of the Persian Gulf rather than Western Europe. To achieve this objective, a complex series of military requirements would have to be met — of particular importance would be overflight, landing and access rights to airfields in northern Africa and the Red Sea area, opportunities to pre-store war material at these locations, and access for naval visitation and support facilities in the Western Indian Ocean. To meet these requirements the United States launched negotiations with Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, and Kenya; concomitantly, agreements were concluded to increase arms transfers and economic assistance to these nations, as well as to Tunisia and Morocco. Enlarged military aid was promised the Bourguiba government because of an incident in 1980 which found a commando force of Tunisians, armed and abetted by the Qaddafi regime, attempting to seize control of

Gafsa, a small mining town in southern Tunisia, in order to foment a national uprising. While the effort was thwarted, the Carter Administration concluded that failure to assist a moderate Arab leader, particularly after the fall of the Pahlevi dynasty in Iran, would have adverse consequences for United States interests throughout the Middle East.

The deteriorating situation in Morocco was even more worrisome to American officials. King Hassan, a close friend, had supported American foreign policy initiatives in the Middle East and Africa for a number of years, and had even quietly served as intermediary in bringing President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin together to the launching of the Camp David peace process. At American urging, the king had even dispatched Moroccan forces to Shaba province in 1977 to turn aside an invasion force launched from neighboring Angola. By 1979-80, King Hassan confronted security problems of his own induced by guerilla forces — the *Polisairio* — that were contesting the Moroccan annexation of former Spanish Saharan territories in 1975. The *Polisario* had become sufficiently emboldened as a result of earlier battlefield successes to launch attacks in Moroccan territory outside the Western Sahara. Concerned with the deteriorating security situation faced by Hassan, the Carter Administration expanded its arms transfers to Morocco and terminated its previous prohibition against their use in the Sahara — a prohibition which had been used as a symbol of American support for the principle of self-determination to be accorded the Sahraoui people of the region.

The general shift in Carter Administration policy and strategy found most African leaders passive, but others were deeply troubled by the recrudescence of Cold War rivalries and the likelihood that Africa would become an arena for East-West competition. On the whole, however, the majority accepted the inevitability of foreign intrusion and turned their primary attention to pressing domestic concerns.

In the decade prior to 1978-9, Africa was accorded the lowest priority on the agenda of foreign policy issues confronting the U.S. government. Successive secretaries of state experienced severe difficulty in mastering such terms as *apartheid, indaba,* or *Sahel.* No American president, with the exception of Jimmy Carter, had visited sub-Saharan Africa, and few other senior officials were tempted to venture into the political thickets of the region. By comparison, Africa is today one of the front-line concerns of the Reagan Administration. The Vice-President concluded an extensive tour of sub-Saharan countries in 1982; Secretary of State Haig was a frequent visitor to northern Africa during his stewardship; innumerable Congressional sub-committees and their staffs have crisscrossed the continent in an effort to comprehend local needs and problems.

Cynical observers might view such comings and goings as more show than substance; indeed, each new American president and his entourage of foreign policy advisers seeks to establish the impression of having fashioned new foreign policy perspectives and approaches in various Third World regions — and Africa is now the rule rather than the exception. In reality, the Reagan Administration's policies, after more than two years of implementation, reflect a greater measure of continuity rather than discontinuity when compared with the approach of President Carter, *circa* 1979-80. In brief outline, the Reagan approach has been to:

1. enlarge and consolidate security ties with Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Somalia and Kenya;

2. expand the number of facilities that might be available to the Rapid Deployment Force should circumstances in the Middle East require;
3. substantially increase proposed level of security assistance to selected countries in northern and sub-Sarahan Africa; and
4. confront directly efforts by the Soviet Union and its "surrogates" — e.g., Cuba, Libya and Ethiopia — to destabilize moderate African regimes.

In brief, the Reagan Administration's approach has tended to be competitive and confrontational where destabilization efforts by adversaries have threatened American national interests. Thus, in August 1981, units from the U.S. Sixth Fleet conducted maneuvers in the Gulf of Sidra, an area claimed by Libya, which led to a serious incident between Libyan and American aircraft; this was followed by deployment of RDF forces to Egypt and Sudan in the wake of the assassination of President Sadat in October 1981; in 1982, American military aid for Niger, Sudan, and Liberia was increased significantly. Throughout, the U.S. government has sought to frustrate the Qaddafi regime in its efforts to undermine Western influence throughout Africa.

In southern Africa, the Reagan Administration has diverged somewhat from the policies of the Carter period. With respect to Namibia, it has carried on a negotiating process with the Republic of South Africa to move that territory to independence. The negotiations, first launched in 1977, have been conducted under the auspices of the United Nations with the United States heading a five-nation "contact group" which includes the United Kingdom, France, West Germany and Canada. While progress has been registered, the South African government has demanded as a precondition for its final agreement that all Cuban combat troops be withdrawn from neighboring Angola. The United States has supported South Africa in its demands — but, should the negotiations falter and ultimately fail due to South African recalcitrance, the United States would earn a substantial measure of African opprobrium and censure.

The Reagan Administration has also made a significant tactical shift in its approach to South Africa and its internal policy of racial separation *(apartheid)*. Unlike President Carter, who adopted a posture of direct confrontation, Reagan and his foreign policy advisers prefer an approach involving "constructive engagement." Assistant Secretary of State Chester A. Crocker outlined the attributes of this approach in an article published in *Foreign Affairs* prior to his appointment:

> "(A)... useful building block is... understanding that European-American collaboration and mutual respect are the only valid basis for any future undertakings directed toward South Africa — on Namibia or other issues. Similarly, we should continue the readiness under recent U.S. administrations to bring our policies out into the open and to meet publicly with Africa's top leadership when circumstances warrant it. Constructive engagement is consistent with neither the clandestine embrace nor the polecat treatment."[1]

The results of this strategy are inconclusive at this stage. Namibia is not yet independent, nor has South Africa made far-reaching changes in its approach to black-white relationships. However, the time of testing for United States policies is

[1]Chester A. Crocker, "South Africa: Strategy for Change," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1981, p. 346.

to be a lengthy one during which early judgments are likely to prove hazardous at best. What is clear at this juncture, however, is that the Reagan Administration's posture is confrontational with some regimes in Africa — Libya and Ethiopia — for geo-strategic reasons, while "accommodationist" with South Africa for the same reasons. This two-track approach requires diplomatic skill and dexterity to achieve positive results in terms of our national objectives.

In the interim, the United States appears to have come full cycle over the past three decades. The continent, once again, is at the center of globalist planning and our political-military needs. Whether our hopes and expectations are well grounded will be determined in the critical period immediately before us.

THE MIDDLE EAST IN CRISIS

By Louis J. Cantori*

"All you have to do is look at a map . . ."
Richard Pipes (Interview on National Public Radio)

This quotation by a former member of President Reagan's National Security Council is cited in order to illustrate the centrality of the Soviet Union to U.S. thinking about the security of the Middle East. The "obviousness" of the Soviet threat is said to follow from the fact of the Soviet military presence in neighboring Afghanistan and the general manner in which the U.S.S.R. geopolitically rims the Middle East region. What this statement also reveals is the preoccupation of the Reagan administration with the global dimensions of Soviet influence. Such global perspectives perhaps have significant validity in the specific concern with the security of Western Europe and North America but in the Middle East such concern verges on myopia. The fact of the matter is that the policy of both superpowers but especially that of the Soviets tends to be a secondary factor to the primary ones of the Middle Eastern states for influence and control among themselves. The Arab-Israeli conflict, or perhaps more accurately the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, evidences itself in Lebanon and the West Bank. The most serious instance of the rivalry of Middle Eastern states is the protracted war between Iran and Iraq and the more muted Syrain-Egyptian rivalry for leadership of the Arab states. Reality frequently intrudes upon fantasy and while U.S. policy has never been seriously energized on the West Bank issue, the bloodshed and violence of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 has rudely demanded policy attention. Likewise, the Persian Gulf Iranian-Iraqi war has shown no evidence of Soviet instigation and only slight Soviet involvement at all in the form of modest weapons supplies to Iraq.

In short, the Middle East provides significant evidence of a more general phenomenon, namely the primary importance of regional conflicts and the frequently secondary importance and influence of superpowers. In this perspective, the relationship of two "client" states to their superpower patrons is instructive. In April 1976 in spite of specific instructions to the contrary from the Soviets, the Syrians sided in the Lebanses Civil War on the side of the rightist Christian Phalange against the then seemingly victorious leftist Muslim Lebanese and Palestinian forces. The Syrian pursuit of their own national interest prevailed. Likewise, the Israelis have established a pattern of the pursuit of their national interest in contradiction to American policy wishes. In doing this, the Israelis have admittedly been bi-partisan. Thus they denied to the Democratic President Carter that they had agreed at Camp David in 1978 to freeze their settlement policy of the West Bank for five years, and in September 1982 they rejected out of hand a Reagan peace proposal that was not similarly rejected by the Arab states and which many thought had a real possibility of reenergizing the peace process.

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American Policy Interests in the Middle East

In order to better discuss the implications of these regional conflicts and issues for American foreign policy it is well to review these interests especially as they evidence themselves at the present time. These interests are the containment of Soviet influence, the safeguarding of strategic oil reserves and the security of Israel. The containment of Soviet influence is felt to be an imperative for the geopolitical ones of safeguarding NATO's eastern flank in the form of Greece and Turkey and the neutralizing of Soviet influence in both the Eastern Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. The former area relates to NATO security and the latter to the security of the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf. While the Soviets have maintained a fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean as do the Americans, this has on the whole been of symbolic rather than real importance (e.g. the impunity of the U.S. Navy bombardment of the Shuf Mountains of Lebanon in September 1983). In fact, it is possible to argue that besides appearances to the contrary, e.g. 17,000 advisors in Egypt between 1967 and 1971, Soviet influence has been of fluctuating but only marginal importance.

The issue of the security and freedom of access to Arab oil has had two dimensions in recent years. There is first the strategic importance of this oil to NATO countries and Japan. One half or more of Middle Eastern oil goes to these countries. A second U.S. concern has been its own dependence on this oil. The vacillating importance of this oil to the U.S. can be seen in the fact that prior to the 1973 War, the U.S. imported 530,000 barrels a day (1972), in 1973 the figure was 915,000, in 1977 the figure was 3,185,000 and in 1980 it was 2,523,000. Thus in the mid-1970's oil was of acute concern to the U.S. and more recently it has diminished somewhat in importance although the NATO and Japanese security concerns remain.

A combination of the effectiveness of Zionist organization and leadership plus humanitarian sympathy for the plight of World War II Jews as victims of the Holocaust both created world, and especially American, support for the founding of the Israeli state after 1945. This Zionist political effectiveness has built upon this humanitarian sentiment and has succeeded in creating a very near political imperative that any American administration must respond to both Congressional pressure and the pressure of the appeal of the Jewish vote in the key giant electoral vote states of New York and California in presidential elections. The result has been that while the pursuit of its anti-Soviet interests and secure oil interests has resulted in times when American policy has been directed towards gaining a degree of Arab support, U.S. policy has always tended to come back to its pro-Israeli course.[1] In the pre-1973 period, for example, American policy in the 1950's gradually freed itself from its tendency to defer to steadily weakening British imperial interests and for a time attempted to cultivate anti-Soviet Arab sentiment.

The "strategic consensus" doctrine envisioned more than this, however. With its military emphasis, it sought primarily basing rights, but it also sought the buildup

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[1]Brzezinski reports in his *Power and Principle* (1983) that at a White House foreign affairs breakfast on August 3, 1979 President Carter indicated his lack of interest in continuing an active Middle East policy especially in regard to Israeli West Bank settlements because of the latter's potential for domestic political damage.

of the military strength of the states of the region to counter what was felt to be an imminent Soviet military threat in the Persian Gulf. The relative importance of the latter issue was open to disagreement. From the point of view of Israel and the Arab states of the region, the primary foreign policy issue was the question of their security vis-à-vis one another. Soviet influence was seen less in military invasion terms in the Gulf area and more in terms of the Soviet ability to capitalize upon domestic instability in order to further its influence. This disparity in points of view evidenced itself in the difficulty of gaining U.S. basing rights in the Middle East. Even when the U.S. was successful in gaining a minimum of agreement in this, such as in Egypt and Oman, there was to be no permanent stationing of troops and access to them was to be only under extreme conditions of hostility. In fact, the significance of the Soviet threat from the point of view of friendly Middle Eastern states has had more of a tactical value for these states in their relationship to the U.S. Thus Israel has been able to argue that it was indeed the only truly reliable military ally of the U.S. in the region. Likewise, when the Saudi Arabians have pressed for arms purchases from the U.S. these have been justified as strengthening its anti-Soviet capabilities.

Arab sentiment, however, was either anti-imperialist in its stance (i.e. largely anti-British and therefore "anti-Western") or more preoccupied with the Palestinian issue. American policy remained firmly in support of Israel as evidenced in economic assistance, even though until 1968 Israel sought its arms elsewhere. With the failure of U.S. policy to respond with significant economic and military aid to Egypt especially, the very Soviet influence it had sought to frustrate actually increased. With Israel obviously beginning to plan to hold on to the territories it captured in the 1967 war, she found herself cut off from European and especially French military supplies. As a result, Israel became increasingly dependent upon the U.S. for both weapons and economic assistance. This dependency seldom led to the ability of the U.S. to influence Israeli policy in concert with its own. Thus, for example, in 1970 when the U.S. was attempting to get the Israelis to agree to a ceasefire in the War of Attrition with Egypt and to support the U.S. peace initiatives of Secretary of State Rogers, the U.S. shipped large numbers of the latest tanks and aircraft *before* gaining Israeli commitment to the ceasefire but not to either the Rogers Plan or that of U.N. Ambassador Gunnar Jarring.

Pre-Reagan Era Foreign Policy

The October War of 1973 represented a diplomatic turning point in the Middle East. The purpose of the Egyptian attack, as conceived by President Sadat, was to break the diplomatic impasse. By securing a foothold in Israeli occupied Egyptian Sinai, Sadat succeeded in his objective. The furtherance of the diplomatic process was attributable to the two remarkable personalities of Sadat and the American negotiator Henry Kissinger. Behind these personalities, however, lay the imperatives of the world oil shortage. What quickly followed were the military disengagement agreements of Sinai I (Sinai Desert and the Golan Heights) and Sinai II (more of the Sinai including some oil fields) in 1974 and 1975. The energy crisis of the 1970's remained an imperative in the situation, however, and with the advent of President Carter in 1977, President Sadat saw his opportunity. What followed was

his dramatic visit to Jerusalem in November 1977 followed by the diplomatic initiative of President Carter at Camp David in 1978 and the bilateral peace treaty with Egypt in 1979.

President Carter's coming to office in 1977 coincided with the electoral victory of Manachem Begin and his Likud coalition. Begin was persuaded by Carter to evacuate Sinai by stages and this was accomplished by April 1982. The Israeli motives for agreeing to this were twofold. First, the peace treaty itself detached its most formidable military opponent from the Arab ranks. Second, Begin seems to have felt that if Sinai was restored to Egypt, Israel, after some vagaries about "autonomy" for the Palestinians, would take over what was referred to as "Samaria" and "Judea", i.e. the West Bank. In fact, neither the Egyptians, who could do nothing about it, and the Americans, who chose not to do anything about it, were in agreement to this. In fact, to them "autonomy" meant in effect the creation of a West Bank state. In this fashion, the very real accomplishments of the American diplomacy of the 1970's was flawed by the failure to deliver upon the promise of Camp David and address the question of the Palestinians and the West Bank. The reasons for the failure to do so were twofold. First, President Carter himself had his own 1980 re-election to look forward to and therefore was content to rest upon the political laurels of the March 1979 bilateral treaty between Egypt and Israel. In addition, he feared the political effectiveness of the American Israeli lobby. Secondly, American policy also became increasingly distracted by first the 1979 revolution in Iran and then the American hostage crisis in that country.

Reagan Anti-Communism and Military Security Policy: "The Strategic Consensus"

President Reagan took office determined that he was going to redirect American foreign policy worldwide from what he felt to be its lack of forcefulness and decisiveness under Carter. The expression of this determination in the Middle East seems to have had a certain irony about it. The irony resulted from the fact that the new policy seemed to have more of a military security emphasis than a political one. As a result, on the one hand, the Rapid Deployment Force already created by Carter was taken over and adopted by Reagan. On the other hand, the situation demanded a more political approach as well as evidenced by the fact of the growing tensions on Israel's northern border with Lebanon and on the West Bank itself. Thus, having tended to deemphasize a political approach in favor of a military one, the administration found itself faced with a situation that was in fact neither adequately described by the doctrine of a strategic consensus nor susceptible to a military solution. The result was a fall back to the Carter framework of Camp David in the form of the continuation of the autonomy talks on the West Bank and the political band aid efforts of Philip Habib to deal with the consequences of Israel military initiatives in southern Lebanon, the bombing of an Iraqi nuclear reactor and massive aerial bombardment of Beirut in June, 1981. As a result, a Reagan foreign policy in the Middle East which set out to be different from that of his predecessor encountered the realities of the Middle East as a conflict area and found this area inadequately conceptualized by the doctrine of an anti-Soviet "strategic consensus." Not having anything more adequate in policy terms to deal

with the Middle East, it therefore ended up significantly adopting the very approach it wanted to avoid.

The question of the containment of Soviet influence in the region was the center piece of American Middle East policy in the first two years of the Reagan administration. The doctrine of the "strategic consensus" as articulated by Secretary of State Haig was intended to address itself to this problem. This policy envisioned an agreement by the principal Middle Eastern states as to the danger of the expansion of Soviet influence in the region. In the most general sense, such an anti-Soviet stance already existed. Thus for example, Saudi Arabia's anti-Soviet sentiment is expressed in the absence of diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. The Israelis likewise do not have such a relationship with the Soviet Union, a state of affairs which is partly of its own choosing and partly due to the Soviet's detachment from a state regarded as an enemy by its Arab sympathizers. Even Egypt while it maintains the formality of relations with the U.S.S.R. has downgraded these to a non-ambassadorial level.

"Strategic Consensus" and Political Reality

Even while the strategic consensus doctrine was already in place, "reality" already had begun to intrude itself. At the time that the Begin government had taken power in 1977 there had been 3,000 Israelis on the West Bank. In February, 1981, there were approximately 25,000 and the government announced that the number would be increased 40 percent in that year. Intent on that policy and being generally assertive in its foreign policy, the Israelis bombed a nuclear reactor near Baghdad on June 7th. The U.S. and the world community in general severely condemned the action. On June 11th the U.S. suspended shipment of four F16 fighter aircraft to Israel, but on the next day President Reagan informed the Israeli Ambassador that no fundamental reevaluation of the U.S. relationship with Israel was planned. Eventually shipment of the aircraft was authorized. In the next month, 300 Lebanese were killed in an aerial attack on Beirut. A week later, the special American envoy Philip Habib, succeeded in getting an agreed upon ceasefire. During this same period, on again and off again autonomy talks were held pursuant to the 1978 Camp David agreement. The basic fruitlessness of these talks was perhaps overridden by the ultimate promise of the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian treaty namely that April 1982 was set as the date for the final evacuation of Sinai by the Israelis. Under these conditions, the Egyptians tolerated the excesses of the bombing of Iraq and Lebanon and maintained the formalities of the autonomy talks.

The ceasefire negotiated by Philip Habib lasted into the spring of the next year. During this period, the Israelis complained regularly that the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon troops were ineffective in preventing acts of PLO violence against northern Israel. This was in spite of the fact that Israel also had its own *cordon sanitaire* of twelve miles in depth governed by its Maronite Christian renegade, Lebanese Army officer Saad Haddad. All during the winter of 1982 reports and public statements were forthcoming from Israeli government officials about the possible need for punitive action by Israel in Lebanon in order to stop acts of PLO violence. In February, the Minister of Defense, Ariel Sharon, met with Secretary of

State Alexander Haig where Israeli invasion plans of Lebanon were allegedly discussed. Whether Haig actually gave approval for these plans is a matter of dispute. It is generally agreed that even if Sharon only got an amber light rather than a green light, it is said that he did not get a red light. In April 1982 Israel once more bombed Beirut claiming once again that it was provoked by PLO acts of violence. This major violation of the ceasefire resulted in an apparently carefully limited rocket response by the PLO firing into uninhabited areas of northern Israel. On the sixth of June, Israel launched its invasion of Lebanon. The official justification by the Israeli U.N. ambassador was that since the conclusion of the ceasefire seventeen Jews had been killed, seven Israelis killed in Israel plus an Israeli diplomat killed in Paris. In addition, seven Jews not identified as Israeli citizens were killed elsewhere in the world. Thus for seven Israelis possibly killed in Israel, Operation Peace for Galilee was launched to safeguard Israel's northern region. By the time this campaign had reached a ceasefire in September 1982, about 15,000 Lebanese and Palestinians had been killed as well as 500 soldiers.

Almost from the outset, the American policy response was ambivalent. While official statements of condemnation were forthcoming from the U.S., no coercive acts to persuade the Israelis from ceasing the use of U.S. supplied weapons for offensive purposes were forthcoming. In fact, less officially, the invasion was looked at positively as having created new diplomatic opportunities.

Later in July, Secretary of State Haig resigned as a result of internal differences within the Reagan administration that appear to have been only indirectly related to U.S. policy in the Middle East.

By July, the at first self-described "limited" invasion of Lebanon had reached Beirut. The savagery of Israeli air attacks upon the city provoked a worldwide humanitarian outcry and as the Israelis appeared to be marshalling for an attack upon the beseiged city, the U.S. intervened in order to bring about a ceasefire. Under the agreement of the ceasefire, PLO members were evacuated to other parts of the Arab world under supervision of U.S. Marines as part of a multi-national force. The U.S. had also assured the Palestinian leadership that their families remaining behind would be protected. President Reagan quickly withdrew the Marines. In the aftermath of the assassination of the newly elected Lebanese President Bashir Gemayel, the Israelis encouraged the Christian Phalange to enter the Palestinian refugee camps of Shatilla and Sabra to "cleanse" them of "terrorists." Two and a half days of massacre of 1,000 men, women and children followed, a massacre known to Israeli officers and officials who were severely condemned by the Israeli government's own Kahan Commission of inquiry.

The Reagan Peace Proposal

The reintroduction of U.S. Marines into Lebanon as part of a multinational military force signaled that a new period of U.S. policy activision was about to be inaugurated. The clearest signal was President Reagan's new policy statement broadcast on September 1, 1982 and amplified a few days later by the new Secretary of State Schultz before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The policy proposal attempted to build upon Camp David by providing for a five year transition period of self-governing autonomy for the Palestinians of the West

Bank and Gaza. During this period all settlement activity was to cease and at the end of this period, the Israelis and the Palestinians were to be denied sovereignty over the two areas. Instead, at the end of the period they would be affiliated with Jordan. These proposals were immediately rejected by the Israelis but they were not rejected out of hand by the Arab states. In fact eight days later on September 9th an Arab Summit at Fez, Morocco published a declaration which while not embracing the Reagan proposal directly was stated in moderate language calling for a U.N. role in assisting the West Bank and Gaza towards political independence. It also stated that the U.N. Security Council "... guarantees peace among all states of the region...". The statement was remarkable because the latter reference was to the willingness of the Arab states to recognize Israel's existence and because it accepted the "half a loaf" formula of the Reagan proposal that the Palestinians would have to accept only part of the historical Palestinian Mandate as their homeland. The specific and most difficult disparity between the two plans was that the Reagan plan denied the possibility of Palestinian sovereignty. Nonetheless, a positive diplomatic opportunity seemed to present itself both substantively and as a mood.

There were at least four major assumptions behind the proposal which have since proved questionable. The first was that American efforts to strengthen the central government of Lebanon and bring about the evacuation of foreign forces could be done while simultaneously pursuing the larger peace effort. Always the optimists, it was thought that the evacuation of foreign forces would take weeks. Weeks subsequently turned into months and months into more than a year. The only success the effort has had, if indeed it is a success, is the conclusion of an agreement between Lebanon and Israel which permitted the latter a continuing role in Lebanon. Much heralded at the time, this agreement has become moot because putting it into effect depends on a similar agreement with Syria. American policy seems to have had an unwarranted assumption that Syria would acquiesce easily in an agreement to withdraw. It is very difficult to find a basis for this optimism unless it was that the Syrians would get the Israelis away from its borders and that the devastating air battles between Syria and Israel in which the Syrians lost over eighty-five planes had beaten the Syrians into submission. The weakness argument overlooks three factors, however. The Syrians may have had a disaster in the air war but it has been said that 200 of the slightly more than 500 Israelis killed in Lebanon were killed in a ground war stalemate in which the Syrians fought well. In addition, the Soviet Union has been quick to rearm Syria and especially provide it with thousands of Soviet technicians to man the new SAM 5 air defense system. And finally, the historical hegemonial role of Syria in Lebanon was overlooked. Israel would perhaps like to make Lebanon into a sphere of influence but the fact is, it has always been one for Syria.

A second assumption was that Jordan would easily agree to play its appointed role as a custodian for the West Bank and Gaza. The basis for this assumption appears to have been that the West Bank from 1949 until 1967 was part of Jordan. Overlooked, however, was the possible domestic danger King Hussein would be in from the majority Palestinians of his kingdom if he acquiesced in agreement that denied Palestinan sovereignty. If Jordan was to come in on the agreement and endanger itself politically it needed evidence of American steadfastness and credibility.

In searching for this evidence, all the Arab states looked critically at U.S. policy vis-à-vis Israel. The third assumption was that Israel would embrace the proposal. Instead, it immediately rejected it. What was American policy to be in light of this rejection? Would Israel be compelled to accept it? There is no evidence that this was attempted. In fact, the proposal lacked credibility also in relation to its provision for a ceasing of Israeli settlement of the West Bank. American policy had previously called such settlements illegal and Reagan had previously called for a stopping of the process. Neither in the past nor immediately after the announcement or since then has pressure been brought to bear on Israel in order to establish this credibility.

Related to the foregoing question of credibility is a fourth unwarranted assumption, namely that the West Bank Palestinian population would accept the American policy of not talking to the PLO and be willing to talk directly with the Americans and the Israelis outside of its aegis. If American policy had established credibility among Arab actors it is possible, but perhaps not likely, that this might have happened. Without this credibility of performance it was unlikely to happen at all.

As events have unfolded in the more than a year since the announcement of the proposal, it has become evident that it was still-born. The ingredients of the proposal displayed evidence of a significant amount of energy that went into its formulation. The proposal once announced, however, has hung listless and increasingly forgotten even though after a year of dormancy President Reagan still insists it is central to his Middle East policy. The fate of the proposal is illustrative of U.S. policy vis-à-vis Israel. It was Israel after all that flatly and clearly rejected it, and yet it is Jordan and the Palestinians who in their reluctance to endanger themselves in the absence of American credibility are now accused of having frustrated it.

U.S. Policy in Lebanon

With the at best non-development of the broader peace initiative, American policy throughout 1983 became more and more preoccupied with its Lebanese policy. This policy was twofold in character, first to strengthen the authority of the central government and second to relate this concern to the effort to bring about the foreign evacuation of Lebanon. With the appreciative relief of Philip Habib and his replacement by Associate Director of the National Security Council Robert McFarlane, U.S. policy continued to attempt to persuade the Syrians to withdraw. Even as these efforts of a more restricted sort than the grander peace process design were being made, however, events developed to narrow the effort even further. On September 4th, 1983, the Israelis acted on one of their frequent statements that they were going to withdraw to the south from the dangerous areas of the Beirut-Damascus road, the suburbs of Beirut and the Shuf Mountains to the Awali River just north of Sidon.

The Israelis felt impelled to do so not only for the preceding reasons of danger and steady casualties but also because their ignorance of Lebanese politics had made their position untenable. When they first occupied the largely Druze Shuf, their policy was one of collaboration with the Maronite Christians. The latter

were invited to reenter the area after their expulsion from it in the 1975-76 civil war. They set about settling political accounts. Meanwhile Israel's own domestic Druze population were bringing pressure to bear as their compatriots were treated brutally by the Phalange. The precipitous withdrawal of the Israelis thus permitted the Druze of the Shuf to exact revenge and in the process of doing so rekindled the civil war. The nature of the withdrawal also was inimical to U.S. policy of strengthening the central government. Instead of phasing their withdrawal in stages and permitting the regular Lebanese army to establish its authority, the sudden withdrawal not only excluded the central government but encouraged the Druze to consolidate their control of the area by attacking the strategically important town of Sug al-Gharb overlooking Beirut and the multi-national troops. The attack imperiled the Lebanese Army and caused politically sensitive casualties to U.S. Marine members of the multi-national force.

In sum, U.S. policy finds American negotiators more and more busy about less and less. As the Reagan administration gears itself up for the November 1984 presidential elections there will be less and less inclination to take chances or to put pressure on Israel. A pattern seems to be emerging in which a convening of a national conciliation committee will effectively negotiate political differences in the postage stamp-like area around Beirut. When these differences are dealt with, American policy is likely to make a trumpet-like announcement of a significant diplomatic success while eighty percent of the country remains tacitly under the control of the Syrians and the Israelis. It has been said that de facto partition is the policy position within the National Security council and with the latter under William Clark having come into policy prominence over the U.S. State Department (symbolized in the case of U.S. policy by the appointment of Robert McFarlane from the NSC as U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East), de facto partition has great significance.

A self-proclaimed U.S. diplomatic triumph might be sufficient to cool things until the presidential elections of November 1984. Partition itself, however, is not a solution for Lebanon. Already, the Syrians in the north are viewed as religious heterodox intruders by the majority Sunni Muslim population and the Israelis in the south are also coming under attack by the well organized opposition of the Shiite population, the largest single ethnic grouping in Lebanon.

Conclusion

U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East under Ronald Reagan began with a regional expression of more global anti-Communism. The specific Middle East conflict area that was being thought of in terms of the Alexander Haig doctrine of strategic consensus was the Persian Gulf. Essentially, foreign policy in this area has consisted of acquiring basing rights for the increased Rapid Deployment Force already begun by President Carter. In addition, the military strengthening of the states of this area is also part of this policy, e.g. AWACS, F15's, tanks, etc. to Saudi Arabia. Thus a basic anti-Communism was joined to an instinct to define foreign policy less in terms of political factors and more in terms of military ones. In fact as one looks at U.S. policy in the Gulf today in the aftermath of the recent shift of foreign policy decision-making from the Department of State to the NSC, one

might also note the policy paramountcy in the Gulf of the Department of Defense under Casper Weinberger.

While these assumptions and directions have yet to be challenged in a Gulf where even the existence of a war between Iran and Iraq since 1980 has yet to create a crisis atmosphere, this is not the case of the Arab-Israeli dispute. In the latter case, the implacable Israeli policy of completing the annexation of the West Bank and Gaza and the determination to extirpate the Palestine Liberation Organization in Lebanon has had the effect of forcing these crises upon a Reagan administration that would have undoubtedly chosen to ignore them. This might have been its preference because anti-Communism did not seem to be an appropriate fit to the situation and because it would have preferred to follow a benign policy vis-à-vis Israel. Thus the empty formality of the autonomy talks was pursued in 1981 and 1982 only to be punctuated by Israeli air raids in Iraq and Lebanon. The conflict that ensued was eased by the near miraculous arrangement for a cease fire by Philip Habib in the summer of 1981. Again, however, an assertive and expansionist foreign policy by Prime Minister Begin and Ariel Sharon as well as then Foreign Minister Shamir was disruptive and led to invasion and massacre. Only in the face of this, did Reagan finally respond with his political plan in September 1982. The effect of this plan was to shift the onus for its ineffectiveness onto the very people (Jordan and the Arab states) who considered it discussable and away from Israel who had immediately rejected it. The moribund status of the Reagan plan combined with the anticipated *de facto* partition of Lebanon has resulted in a perhaps momentary situation of relative calm in Lebanon and the West Bank. It can be conjectured, however, that the medium long term is one in which significant instability and violence will develop as local populations begin to resist Syrian and Israeli occupation in Lebanon, Palestinian West Bank leadership begin to violently express their political hopelessness against Israeli occupation, a re-radicalized P.L.O. accelerates acts of political violence in Israel and as, on the model of post 1948-49 war Arab regime instability, domestic political oppositions in Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and other states begin to bring present leaders to account for having "lost" the West Bank. As Harold Saunders, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs, has put it, until 1983 the U.S. has had Arab or Israeli policy options. After 1983 the situation may become so polarized that the U.S. will lose this flexibility and will have to choose sides.

TRANSPORTATION, HUMAN CAPITAL, AND GROWTH

By Carl M. Guelzo*

How do economies grow and develop? This is a question that has intrigued economists and plagued politicians for years.

If nations do not explode or implode by complex intereactions of consumption, investment, and government spending *a la* Samuelson[1] or teeter nervously on a Domar knife-edge,[2] how does growth take place? Does Solow's addition of labor make the matter easier for governments to apply?[3] Examination of the causes of the poverty of nations is varied, ranging from enervating climate,[4] through colonial exploitation,[5] to a general lack of personal ambition among the population.[6] All so far have been found wanting and have been contradicted as general explanations of national poverty;[7] but if a single *leit-motiv* can be found to appear consistently in analyses of national poverty, it is this: National poverty begins on the farm.

If, indeed, agricultural poverty is a leading symptom, then the second-order difference equations of Samuelson and the first-order differential equations of Domar and Solow may not be especially helpful to economic planners or convincing to the average peasant as a way to personal affluence. The farmer and politician alike in the less developed nation are concerned with output and the national and personal survival such output ensures. This does not make the task of planning a development strategy less complex. Should development depend on the growth of output, then the number of variables to be considered expands so enormously that we could agree with Bruton when he writes that, in such a case, "growth depends on almost everything."[8]

The purpose of this essay, of course, is not to examine "almost everything," but to look at the human element in the developmental process and discern, if we can, how transportation influences this human capital. Economic growth is so relative that the human element seems to be the only factor truly central to the developmental process. As Ritchie has pointed out, the grey industrial suburbs of London composed of featureless single-family dwellings are a noticeable improvement over the filthy slums they were a century ago, in which four or five families lived in a single room.[9] Judging from this, much of the development process seems to hinge on improving the quality, quantity, and the general lot of this human element. A great deal has been done, but by whose standards are the results to be gauged? A farmer of Southeast Asia living in what appears to Western eyes to be hopelessly inadequate quarters considers himself twice blessed if both he and his few chickens

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[1]Paul A. Samuelson, "Interaction Between the Multiplier Analysis and the Principle of Acceleration," *Review of Economic Statistics* (May 1939), pp. 75-78.

[2]Evsey Domar, "Capital Expansion, Rate of Growth, and Employment," *Econometrica* (April 1946), pp. 137-147.

[3]Robert M. Solow, "A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* (February 1956), pp. 65-94.

[4]S. F. Markham, *Climate and the Energy of Nations* (London: Oxford University Press, 1942), p. 24.

[5]Joan Robinson, *Economic Philosophy* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1964), p. 45.

[6]Ellsworth Huntington, *Civilization and Climate* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1958), p. 35.

[7]Albert O. Hirschman, *The Strategy of Economic Development* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1958), p. 3.

[8]Henry J. Bruton, *Principles of Development Economics* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 18.

[9]Charles Ritchie, *The Siren Years* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, Ltd., 1974), p. 74.

and pigs are out of the monsoon rains. What then is a rigorous definition of "better off"? In practice, we do the best we can with the resources available. Well, then, what can be done?

At the very beginning of his work, Adam Smith emphasized the importance of the "skill, dexterity, and judgment with which" a nation's labor is applied.[10] Smith elaborates on this theme of developing human capital:

> The annual produce of the land and labour of any nation can be increased in its value by no other means, but by increasing either the number of its productive labourers, or the productive power of those labourers who had before been employed.[11]

In truth, a nation can account itself rich in human capital when possessed of a literate, industrious nation. We can point to South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan as success stories in the developmental process. Each of these nations is poorly endowed with natural resources, but each is also richly supplied with an educated population accustomed and willing to work hard. Yet other nations whose workers labor long and with great diligence defiantly remain poor despite the ministrations of teachers in local schools.

Schooling, while undoubtedly helpful in the developmental process, may not be the central ingredient after all. Sirkin has pointed out:

> The inclination of backward societies is to regard education as a symbol of status rather than a useful tool, with the result that formal education produces mainly people who regard themselves as above farming or other maunal labor. This attitude, while consistent with the training of an elite, is a serious obstacle to the achievement of the skilled agricultural and industrial labor force which is required for rapid technological advancement.[12]

Certainly something has gone awry, for the examples of Central Africa and South America would indicate that literacy and diligence do not ensure development any more than the prevailing political ideology.

Albania, for example, stubbornly remains poor despite decades of Communist rule. The Vietnamese seem to be no better off no matter who runs the country. The problem is further blurred by the fact that the farm villages of the poor countries do not use available resources inefficiently.[13] Repeatedly, studies have shown that agricultural methods do not remain stagnant for generations, but are actually improved in easily digested, non-threatening increments.

Poverty is not without its advantages provided the ambitions of individuals do not extend much beyond adequate supplies of food, shelter, and clothing, and enough progeny to run the farm and guarantee a prayer-filled hereafter. The major advantages include:

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[10]Adam Smith, *An Equiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, ed. Edwin Cannon (Modern Library Edition, New York: Random House, Inc., 1937), p. lvii.

[11]*Ibid.*, p. 326.

[12]Gerals Sirkin, *The Visible Hand: The Fundamentals of Economic Planning* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1968), p. 117.

[13]Theodore W. Schultz, *Transforming Traditional Agriculture* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 45.

1. What resources are available are generally used as efficiently as the current technology will permit.
2. The individual is not burdened with absorbing or rejecting large technological leaps.
3. When innovations appear, they are small and the adjustment process can proceed without undue risk to survival.[14]
4. The instinct to risk-aversion can be given unfettered vent in the fields, at home, and in the hereafter.[15]
5. No one need expend an undue amount of energy in striving for an upward mobility that has proven unattainable for centuries.[16]

These advantages make the grip of poverty uncommonly strong. How is this grasp to be broken and the individual set on the way to contributing to national economic growth?

Education is only a partial answer, and so the search for answers continues.

The idea of the dual economy — islands of urban industrial development surrounded by seas of agriculture in which swim those working at far less than their capacity — suggested by Lewis[17] describes the beginning of development as a shift of the under-employed labor and resources from the agricultural to the industrial sectors.[18] Apparently, this under-employed labor will not make such a move easily. The ties to home, family, and the safe and secure existence these represent are difficult to sever.

Education can help but is not a complete answer. The unlettered have accommodated to their poverty; the educated know that something better exists but fall back into accommodation when, despite their education, they find their circumstances invincible. Formal schooling provides the knowledge that escape is possible; those with the will to escape must then be provided with the means of escaping. In this provision of an escape hatch lies a route to personal advancement and ultimate national economic development.

Myrdal describes an ascending spiral in this developmental process; some of which can be ascribed to transportation. The construction and operation of transport facilities provides employment which leads to higher incomes for those who make the transition from the farm. Higher incomes create a demand for goods and services which, in turn, induce local businesses to expand. A more general expansion ensues when the local increases in economic activity begin to spread to the national economy.[19] Does this mean that poverty can be overcome and development started simply by providing the means for the physical movement of goods and people? The answer is both "yes" and "no."

Physical mobility can be an aid in the developmental process. The seething vitality of Hong Kong derives in good measure from people who have used

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[14]John W. Mellor, *The Economics of Agricultural Development* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 244.

[15]Bruton, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

[16]John K. Galbraith, *The Nature of Mass Poverty* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 62-63.

[17]W. A. Lewis, "Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor," *The Manchester School,* May 1954.

[18]John C. H. Fei and Gustav Ranis, *Development of the Labor Surplus Economy* (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1964), pp. 7-8.

[19]Gunnar Myrdal, *Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions* (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, Inc., 1957), p. 25.

physical mobility as a means of escaping into a more dynamic economic environment. The refugees of post-World War II Europe contributed mightily to the prosperity of the countries in which they settled, while the Enclosure Movement of 18th Century England helped create the labor supply for the Industrial Revolution by displacing peasants from the farms.[20] Nor should we ignore the impetus given to the development of manufacturing in the northeastern United States by the influx of labor displaced from Europe by famine and war.[21]

Transportation, of course, provides a means for this physical mobility. As Rostow has pointed out, transportation is one of the leading industries which historically has supplied a stimulus to economic development.[22] The conventional wisdom on this point is both clear and in great abundance. Transportation provides an avenue for commerce which serves to deepen capital, ease unemployment, widen and diversify the market,[23] unite the nation,[24] promote the specialization of labor, lay the basis for the development of large-scale production,[25] and, as the textbooks proclaim in untold volumes of petrified knowledge, adds mightily to the general welfare. To this list should be added the provision of one more powerful aid to the developmental process: an avenue of escape from the economics of agricultural poverty.

As obvious as the physical aspects of transportation may be in aiding both people and nations to develop, mobility is by no means the only contribution. People were securing the advantages of escape long before the advent of the railroad in their countries by ox cart, boat, and most often by foot. A second type of mobility is of interest at this point: economic mobility. Economic mobility may well involve physical departure from an area, but economic escape can just as easily occur within a nation. If the talented but discontented members of a population can be provided with the means of developing their skills and with the means of escaping poverty within their own country, a formidable engine of economic growth can be set in motion.

National economic development needs physical capital as both fuel and catalyst, but an abundance of physical capital avails little if the lack of developed human capital, with skills and knowledge, prevents effective use of available resources.[26] Formal schooling at all levels from grammar to graduate school carries the development of the human capital only part way. Development is related to both formal learning and practical experience at the individual level.[27] It is the personal and practical experience which carries the process of human capital development to the point at which the individual is able to contribute to national economic development.

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[20]Dudley Dillard, *Economic Development of the North Atlantic Community* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 130.

[21]Ralph Gray and John M. Peterson, *Economic Development of the United States* (Rev. ed.; Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1974), p. 248.

[22]W. W. Rostow, *The World Economy* (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1978), p. 105.

[23]Bruton, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-103.

[24]Robert C. Lieb, *Transportation: The Domestic System* (Reston, Va.: Reston Publishing Co., Inc., 1978), p. 6.

[25]D. Philip Locklin, *Economics of Transportation* (4th ed.; Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1954), p. 8.

[26]Hla Myint, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

[27]Fei and Ranis, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

One specific type of human capital is usually in critically short supply in most developing nations: administrative talent.[28] Here transportation appears not only as a means of physical carriage but as a means of teaching and training as well.

The national developmental process requires planning; perhaps not in the detail of Soviet or Indian socialist planning, but at least in the establishment of national economic objectives and identifying the means by which the objectives might be achieved — in other words, a strategic rather than a tactical approach.[29] Poor planning undoubtedly accounts for some of the difficulties emerging nations experience when charting their way to growth; but planning requries administrative talent — the very type of developed human capital in shortest supply. Where education can identify and develop the needed talent, transportation can give these talents employment, further training, and experience.

In a certain sense, it is fortunate that free markets in the economic concept of perfect competition are either not much in evidence in developing nations or are so localized as to have little impact on the developmental process. This situation is advantageous in circumstances in which human capital is little developed because free markets make few demands for administrative talent. Where economic activity is confined to small geographical areas, the lack of energetic managers creates no difficulty. At the same time, these small market areas provide no press for the development of persons with the managerial and administrative skills to handle the complexities of organizations more complex than sole proprietorships. And in yet another way is the economic growth process frustrated by a lack of managerial skills when most needed. Diversified markets and industrial development do make heavy demands for managers whose presence aids the general process of growth.

Transportation helps widen and diversify existing markets and gives access to the resources needed for industry.[30] As the demand for managerial talent grows, the building of a transportation network, establishing the physical plant required, and the efficient operation of the facilities all require a broad spectrum of technical and administrative abilities and talents. The practical experience obtained in building, operating, and maintaining a transportation network gives apprentice managers a wealth of training and background in both planning and solving operational problems.

In addition to the on-the-job type of administrative training provided, transportation employees are introduced to the discipline of the workplace. Nature imposes a strict seasonal discipline on the peasant farmer; the industrial employment found in transportation imposes yet another type of discipline: the necessity of being at a certain place at an appointed time, and once there, producing a given quantity of work. The consequences of breaking the discipline of nature can cause great hardship and privation, even death; breaking the discipline of the workplace imposes consequences equally severe: missed schedules, train wrecks, collapsed bridges, mixed signals, misdirected freight — all great inconveniences to persons and firms dependent on a reliable system of transportation.

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[28] *Ibid.*, p. 50.

[29] Myrdal, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

[30] John K. Galbraith, *Economic Development* (Sentry Edition, Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1964), p. 66.

If the accommodation to poverty is to be escaped, the allure of tradition must first be broken. On the farm, the customary ways of doing things, of conducting one's personal life, serve to preserve life. The ways of tradition, once learned, become easy to practice and even easier to observe meticulously since rigorous observance brings the approbation of friends, family, and neighbors and even, perhaps, of the respected and feared representatives of the local religious persuasion. The untraditional nonconformist is greeted with scorn and even occasional outbursts of fury. After all, the gods must not be angered lest unspeakable dangers befall.

Employment in the construction and operation of a system of transportation, however, is a sharp break with tradition. Custom does not indicate how a locomotive will be run or a motor truck operated. The conventions of an agrarian society become totally irrevalant at the helm of a canal boat, and the individual is grandly free of customary usages in the way the work will be done. Being able to brush aside the heavy hand of tradition thus provides a means of cultural escape from poverty without losing the abilities the individual can devote to aiding national economic growth.

The contribution transportation makes to national growth is thus manifold in nature. The more obvious improvements worked by access to markets and materials are supplemented by both individual and national physical and economic mobility. Escaping from tradition also releases the individual from bondage of accommodation to poverty. There then follows the refinement of the administrative skills needed so desperately in the developmental process of a nation. Transportation further contributes to the development of managerial talent in the daily problems connected with running a system of transport. If the development of human capital is essential to the development of a nation economically, then transportation plays a larger role than ever suspected.

Political Capacity in Developing Societies, Somjee, A. H., (St. Martin's Press: New York, 1982, 111 pages)

Let me begin, as any reviewer should, by telling you what Somjee aspires to do in this volume; what he does; and finally, what, if any, contribution he has made to the discussion of political development in the third world.

Professor Somjee is on the faculty of the Department of Political Science at Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, British Columbia, and Director of the Institute of International Development. He is the author of several volumes on developing countries, and has conducted extensive fieldwork in rural and urban India.

The present volume is an attempt on Professor Somjee's part to re-orient the direction of many of the studies of political development. He avers, and it is undeniable, that much of the literature of political development has been concerned with the emergence of viable political structures. Yet, as he points out, there is no equivalent concern with the creation of political capacity among the oppressed throngs that constitute the bulk of the population in third world countries. Professor Somjee hopes to partially rectify that imbalance with this volume.

Chapter One is an intellectual criticism of the literature on political development in the third world. His observations here are well taken. He notes, for example, that the concepts used in the literature have tended to either have been formulated in advance of the study of the societies in question, or to be based upon Western models of political development that have not been demonstrated to be applicable to the situation in the third world. Further, Somjee objects to the lack of scholarly criticism in the field, a practice which he suggests results in either reinforcing other's views without inquiry or, alternatively, remaining silent and non-commital on them. Finally, Somjee is correct in suggesting that the end result of political development is rather ambiguously discussed in the literature, or summarily dismissed by simple omission. All of these features of the scholarly examination of political development in the developing countries are indeed widespread and regrettable.

Professor Somjee's response to these deficiencies in the field is to introduce the study of political capacity within the discipline. Briefly, this means that Professor Somjee wishes to examine developing societies to determine the mechanisms that permit the populace to transform their traditionally submissive attitude to political authority into a modern and effective dialogue in the political arena. Thus, he is interested in what factors contribute to developing political capacity, and conversely, what factors deter the emergence of a politically active populace in an emerging state. Political capacity, as Mr. Somjee envisions it, involves a number of forms, including direct participation (including organization, mobilization, dissent, and the demand of political accountability), judicial action, and outright agitation.

The balance of the book is divided into two parts, followed by a concluding chapter. In the first part, Mr. Somjee examines the evolution of political capacity in India under the constraints induced by extreme social inequality. In the second part, Mr. Somjee compares problems in the development of political capacity in Japan, Yugoslavia, Mexico, and Nigeria with the situation he has outlined for India.

Let me say at this point that it is this portion of the book which is the least satisfying. For all of Mr. Somjee's reputed expertise on development in India, the chapter is surprisingly bland. The observations he makes border on the trite and insipid. For example, there is no presentation of in depth field or documentary data. The chapter is written in suggestive, almost speculative terms, and does not distinguish among the various classes in the Indian population (other than the obvious differences between the elite and the underclass). Certainly any study which desires to understand the mechanisms of emerging political capacity in a population should consider social class, among other variables.

Professor Somjee's discussions of Japan, Yugoslavia, Mexico, and Nigeria suffer from similar insufficiencies. First, the discussions are exceedingly short, averaging seven printed pages apiece. Second, they are at a level of generality that is rather shocking given the ambitious tenor of the introductory chapter. Third, there is no link-up between the discussion for each country. The information is presented only in the general context of a discussion of developing political capacity and without sufficient reference to the comparative status of the other countries.

Somjee's concluding chapter does nothing to dispel the inadequacies of the previous two sections. Generally, it appears that he falls victim to his own criticism that conceptual formulations are often under-researched and tend to outrun their explanatory utility. However, Somjee's ideas are suggestive, and commonsensically, they appear sound bases for a truly empirical study, which is not attempted here. Especially useful are his conjectures upon the parameters of political capacity. Certainly, it is easy to believe that overcoming ascriptive constraints (such as ethnic and social origins) might be a necessary precondition to active political participation. Similarly, understanding the political process as an instrumental arena for inducing change and redistributing power would appear requisite. Unfortunately, Professor Somjee's theory remains undeveloped, and largely at the level of a mental construct.

In sum, Professor Somjee has produced an array of criticisms of political development theories that are sound and well taken. He is indisputably correct that such theories have suffered from western based ethnocentrism and conceptual and value ambiguity. Furthermore, he has some suggestive ideas about what political capacity entails. They are sensible ideas and worth examining in greater detail. They are also ideas worth documenting through the collection of empirical evidence. Unfortunately, this volume does not do either: Professor Somjee has not carefully examined his allusory "theory" of political capacity, nor has he really presented any data. This is the work that Professor Somjee recognizes must be done; perhaps we can hope that he will begin doing it in a careful manner in a subsequent volume.

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DE GAULLE, Bernard Ledwidge. (St. Martin's Press: New York, 1982, 418 pages)

Strangely enough, the most recent and complete biographies so far published on three of the more important and influential figures of literature and politics in France over the past fifty years — Céline, Camus and de Gaulle — have not been written in French, but in English. The reason for this anomaly stems from the fact that these three men are still politically controversial in France, making it difficult for a French biographer to be completely objective. Céline is controversial for his collaboration with the Vichy régime. Camus, torn apart by the Algerian war, was criticized by both the liberals and the conservatives for not taking sides publicly during the conflict. Finally, many French people still resent the way in which de Gaulle ended the Algerian war.

Bernard Ledwidge served as Minister at the British embassy in Paris during de Gaulle's last four years a President of the Fifth Republic. Therefore, he had first hand knowledge of de Gaulle, whom he met with several times. Thanks to the author's access to previously unpublished American and British documents and interviews with former officials, including diplomats and persons close to the General, we have a well-documented biography in which Legwidge does not hide his admiration for de Gaulle. He describes both the man and the statesman, who twice managed to rescue his nation — the first time from the defeat of World War II and the second time from the threat of civil war during the Algerian conflict.

De Gaulle had no doubt that his destiny was to play a major role in the history of France. He left his mark wherever he went, as a cadet at Saint Cyr, as a prisoner of war, after being wounded twice during the First World War, (where his companions used to call his "le connétable"), and as a captain at the Ecole Supérieure de Guerre where he argued "in favor of a free offensive use of tank units against the official thesis that tanks could not operate independently of infantry." In all of these guises he showed a lack of patience for mediocrity. This was a characteristic which he would demonstrate all his life, and which was regarded by certain of his colleagues as arrogance. It nearly brought an end to his military career. He was rescued by Marshal Pétain, the hero of Verdun, whose protége he had become. This was the same Pétain who condemned de Gaulle to death for treason after his departure for England in 1940. The intriguing relationship between the two men is well analyzed by Ledwidge, as is the complex relationship between de Gaulle and Churchill.

The role de Gaulle played during the Second World War is rather well known. However, Mr. Ledwidge emphasizes the formidable obstacles that de Gaulle had to surmount in order to impose himself, through stubborness and shrewd political manipulations, as the head of "La France Libre." In order to achieve this, he had to deal not only with some opposition within the French Resistance, but also with the Allies — above all, the hostility of Franklin D. Roosevelt. For the readers who have not lived through that period, it is perhaps difficult to grasp what "l'appel du 18 juin" (reproduced in the chapter "De Gaulle Assumes France") meant for the people who heard it for the first time. It gave the French hope, after a humiliating defeat, to hear the voice of this unknown general, broadcasting from the BBC, telling them "whatever happens, the flame of French resistance must not and will not be extinguished."