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Towson State Journal of International Affairs

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STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The study of international affairs as an academic discipline no longer belongs exclusively to the specialists in that field; rather, its scope has been extended to include the work of other related disciplines in recognition of the fact that international problems are not exclusively political in nature. It is the purpose of this journal to speak on matters involving international problems with many academic voices. More important, it is the purpose of this journal to permit undergraduate students to try their wings in describing, analyzing, and possibly suggesting solutions to the problems that have vexed nations in their contacts with each other.

The underlying premise of this journal is that undergraduate students *can* contribute effectively to a reasoned, moderate, academic analysis of international problems and that such contributions will have a more profound effect on the study of international affairs as well as on the student contributors to this journal than the passionate, partisan, and emotionally charged outbursts which have lately permeated American campuses.

Consequently, the *Journal* invites contributors to take an active interest in this publication. It encourages students as well as members of the Towson State faculty and the students and faculty from other campuses to contribute articles, reviews, and other pertinent materials.

Towson State Journal of International Affairs

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THE EMERGENCE OF OSTPOLITIK:
A COHORT APPROACH

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"Ostpolitik" has become a "household word" in international politics without having been fully understood. At best, "Ostpolitik" has been the subject of political histories and collections of documents.[1] While the causes of a foreign policy probably are too complex to be discovered entirely, it does seem possible and worthwhile to consider some of the factors that may have contributed to the emergence of a policy that has, for better or worse, changed the diplomatic face of Europe. In this essay, my goal is to offer what I believe to be a productive way of looking at one such factor.

West German leadership has never been unified in advocating Ostpolitik, nor have Bonn's leaders arrived at a precise denotation of what that concept means in terms of substantive policy. Its "meaning" has, indeed, been a function of leadership — and hence this variable adopts considerable weight when analyzing the origins of Ostpolitik and its culmination in public treaties between the FRG and Communist Europe (four by mid-1973). To say that the content of public policy varies in some direct sense with political leadership is a common sense beginning to what can be a more exact analysis of that factor in promoting Ostpolitik.

While advocates of a generally conciliatory policy toward Communist Europe from the end of Adenauer's chancellorship until the 1969 election included members of all major West German political parties, there are similarities which exist among such advocates. Those similarities can be seen by beginning with the observation that Ostpolitik, in its various forms, became increasingly accepted as a major tenet of West German foreign policy after the Adenauer years. Thus, the nature of corresponding leadership changes should be examined. A working hypothesis would be that Bonn's political leaders had little or no effect on the increasing orientation towards Ostpolitik, and that any leadership (among major parties) would have evinced such a rapprochement effort toward Communist Europe.

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[1] For Example, Waldemar Besson's *Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik* (München: R. Piper & Co. Verlag, 1970), Marion Gräfin Dönhoff's *Deutsche Aussenpolitik von Adenauer bis Brandt* (Hamburg: Christian Wegner Verlag, 1970), Boris Meissner's *Die deutsche Ostpolitik 1961-1970* (Köln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1970), and many others are all essentially political history or collections of documents and press reports.

After examining pertinent data, such an hypothesis must be rejected. Instead, a tentative yet direct relationship is seen between leadership composition and increasing West German commitment to Ostpolitik. One can verbalize this relationship, most productively, through the concept of "cohorts."

What we commonly refer to as a "generation" is closely related to the concept of "cohorts." The difference between the two terms is the effort to use the latter in a more precise manner in order to make it a useful explanatory tool. To analyze human behavior through a cohort approach involves a perspective that is at once demographic and psychoanalytic. The combination of these two perspectives constitutes an attempt to simplify the impenetrable problem of human "motives." Since individual choices of action may be due to a myraid of idiosyncratic causes, an approach that combines generational and psychoanalytic factors uses a large "N" to compensate for (i.e., "cancel out") idiosyncracies that determine specific conduct, and deals with probabilities. Such a technique is suggested here by broadening the "leadership variable" to include FRG political leadership writ large — the Bundestag, political party membership and the official positions of the government such as Chancellor, Foreign Minister, etc. (that is, all those whose positions accrue to them by virtue of their political activity or standing, not civil service careers). An open political system is, then, particularly amenable to cohort analysis since political leadership consists of more than a "ruling elite" and since indications of mass opinion are readily obtainable.[2]

Essentially, there were two cohorts leading the Ostpolitik advocates in the mid-1960's, supported by a third cohort which was too young to be part of political leadership but was of voting age. The first consisted of those who were old enough to participate in politics before and during the Hitler years as youths or young adults, and did so in opposition to Nazism. (Collaboration with Nazism, of course, was a different response to the same stimuli). The second was composed of individuals whose first political experience occurred during the Bonn Republic. The birthdates of the first cohort cluster around World War I and the first years of Weimar (1910-20). The second group, most of whom were born during the Weimar Republic (1920-not later than 1930) remained politically inactive until Bonn. (Figure I illustrates these cohort's identities).

The contention implicit to such cohort analysis is that psychological developments of infancy and early childhood — the time of political socialization — played a role in promoting the behavior of West German political leadership in their Ostpolitik efforts. Both cohorts, it can be argued, endured eras of domestic chaos during their political socialization, the initial period

[2] See detailed identification of "Cohort Analysis" by Norman B. Ryder, *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Second Edition* (New York: 1968), Volume 2, Page 549; see also Karl Mannheim, "The Sociological Problem of Generations" in Paul Keskemeti, ed., *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge* (London: 1952), pp. 276-320, for the term "generational units"; for the applicability of cohort analysis to democratic systems see H. Hughes, "History and Psychoanalysis: The Explanation of Motive," *History as Art and Science* (New York: 1964), pp. 61-62.

[3] Frank J. Sorauf, *Perspectives on Political Science* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Books, Inc., 1966), p. 41.

of which is usually completed by the age of ten, and invariably by twelve,[3] to include World War I and revolution for the first cohort, and Weimar's demise in political and economic chaos and Hitlerian repression for the second cohort. Furthermore, the devastating effect of World War II, so severe in its impact on both cohorts of leadership age in the late 1960's, provided an added impetus for favorable reaction to the idea of Ostpolitik.

Such an approach focuses on an added explanatory factor for West German policy changes, while not replacing other variables operative in policy decisions. In that respect, it is important to make several qualifications. First, anyone citing the presence of cohorts to explain social or political phenomena must realize that the process of (political) socialization is clearly ongoing, to include "early socialization experiences and late socialization experiences during adolescence, as well as post-socialization experiences as an adult . . . both political and nonpolitical." [4] The complexity of socialization, however, should not obscure its primary component — inputs during the first ten years.

Second, cohort analysis in no way implies that the time of birth, alone, "determines" political behavior. The only contention made by a demographic/psychoanalytic approach is that, given a large population with similar birthdates *and* similar life experiences, a degree of behavioral coalescence can be expected.

What the foregoing paragraphs point to is, of course, speculative. There are, however, good reasons for accepting what a cohort approach suggests in the case of Ostpolitik emergence in West German foreign policy.

One begins with the macro-level observation of similar political behavior in the period under consideration by certain segments of West German politicians and similar political attitude in parts of the voting public — similarities found in growing adherence to tenets of Ostpolitik. This observation serves to suggest that an explanatory factor for such behavior and/or attitude may lie in the psychology of age/experiential groupings (i.e., cohorts or "generational units" as Mannheim called them). An historical survey of what might constitute shared experiences for similar age groups indicates the presence or absence of events that could be formative during years of political socialization. As indicated above, these events can be seen for the political leadership of the FRG, writ large, which was emerging in the mid and late 1960's. The early experiences, similar for both identified cohorts in their chaotic, disruptive nature as well as their duration, were succeeded by the further trauma of world war in which both cohorts bore the brunt of physical and psychological anguish.

One can infer from such similar experiences, that decisive childhood impressions coalesced into a "natural view of the world," [5] reinforced by wartime disaster. By such a "natural view," Mannheim meant an original set of experiences during political socialization through which later political inputs or outputs must pass, affecting the substance of both (the adjective "political" was not his). Deprived of security, both cohorts underwent times

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[4] Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965), p. 270.
[5] Mannheim, op. cit., p. 298.

FIGURE I

Birth-Experiential Cohorts Affecting "Ostpolitik" Emergence

Time

Age 60	Second Reich	Weimar Republic	Hitler's Third Reich		The Federal Republic			Brandt
50		War & Revolution	Economic Depriva-tion & Political Chaos	War	Allied Occupa-tion	Adenauer Years		Grand Coalition
40							Erhard	
30				Political Activity: Anti-Nazi	Political Activity Begins			
20			Voting Age			3rd Cohort		
10		Political Socialization	1st Cohort	2nd Cohort				

1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970

of strife during their early childhood (and in some cases into their adolescence). Conflict, both real and potential, was a daily part of young German children's lives during the First World War and immediately after, and during Weimar's final years and Hitler's first years.

An abhorrence to ongoing periods of confrontation, a desire to avoid conflict or threat of force grew out of this common type of experience. Members of the first cohort, having endured significant events simultaneously to form a comradeship through anti-Nazi beliefs, came to coalesce with members of the second cohort who shared a very similar set of original experiences. Not only were their initial socialization periods alike, but suffering in war cemented an already "common destiny." [6] Even though the experiences of a young adult vis-à-vis a child in war vary greatly in magnitude, World War recalled the anxiety of earlier years for both cohorts under consideration, reconfirming earlier fears.

As these people naturally assumed political roles in the FRG (as older leaders retired and died off), it is not surprising that their position has offered far greater conciliatory emphasis than their predecessors. From the Bad Godesberg conference, where the SPD gave up any pretense of being "revolutionary" for a new "consensus" image, the trend has been clear (in other FRG parties as well). In the specific instance of FRG-Communist Europe relations, one can notice the commitment to a relaxation of tension, and an avoidance of confrontation which has manifested itself in the quest for declarations renouncing the use of force. All of these emphases, one can suggest, harken back to the very formative experiences previously suggested.

Support for this argument can be obtained through various data — which substantiate 1) that people born at certain times with shared experiences (including higher education levels) suddenly emerged in Bonn's political leadership in 1965-69, 2) that this leadership consisted of two cohorts with similar perceptions regarding Ostpolitik, 3) that these cohorts have the political support of a third, well-educated, post-World War II cohort, and 4) that these data coincide with the increasing dominance of Ostpolitik in FRG foreign policy.

As late as 1965, the political leadership of West Germany was markedly older than at the same time as rapprochement efforts in 1969-71. The cohorts mentioned above, generally in their early 30's to early 50's during Erhard's chancellorship, remained largely outside major decision-making positions and did not constitute majorities in either the Bundestag or Bundesrat. In two general elections (1965 and 1969), the composition of Bundestag membership (irrespective of party considerations) changed suddenly and considerably; this corresponded with a changing electorate into which millions of new voters born after World War II simultaneously began entering. From 1965, during the final years of CDU/CSU rule outside the Grand Coalition, to 1970, the Bundestag membership lost its older echelon, which was *not* simply replaced by an equal number of new, over-60 members. Whereas

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[6] Ibid., p. 303.

55% had been born before World War I in 1965, the 1969 Bundestag had a majority of MP's who were born after the First World War and, more significantly, an average age of 49 years.[7] As the age of political leadership in the FRG decreased in the 1960's, the educational level rose significantly. In 1965, the Bundestag had 290 deputies with some university training; in 1969 this number had risen to 331.[8] Hence, the entire complexion of political leadership in West Germany had undergone an important transformation.

Clearly, such changes occur in any legislative body to a degree. The suddenness of Bundestag developments, however, was significant, corresponding as it did to major alterations in foreign policy. Other analysts have recognized the emergence of identical cohorts in all German parties during the mid-1960's, coincident with early phases of Ostpolitik offered by liberal CDU members during the Grand Coalition and even under Erhard:

"Thus the younger generation who began their political careers in the postwar period have had to make haste slowly. They carried off their earliest successes in the FDP, where the elderly generation was squeezed from leadership in many places already before 1960. But in both the CDU and SPD the pressure from the younger politicians in the 30-40 age bracket became particularly intense in the mid-1960's.[9]

Professor Alfred Grosser makes a similar observation regarding emerging SPD leadership in the 1960's citing as examples such men as Helmut Schmidt and Horst Ehmke. Grosser sees these men as "unsentimental representatives of efficiency and a rationalized world" who, "despite their age differences (they were born on December 23, 1918 and February 4, 1927, respectively) belonged to the same generation of those who aim to give the old party a new image." [10] The generational phenomenon identified by Grosser was further confirmed by the 1969 composition of the SPD's Parliamentary Party "steering group" — ten men (Wehner, the chairman, 5 vice-chairmen and 4 secretaries), the oldest of whom was Wehner (born in November, 1906), the youngest born in 1932, and the majority born between 1915-1925.

Meanwhile, CDU leadership evinced similar developments, i.e., cohort emergence. The demise of Kiesinger after his 1969 election defeat was, perhaps, the "coup de grace" to older, more conservative CDU leadership (that is, Schroeder and Kiesinger, both close to 60 in 1969, were "liberal" on the issue of rapprochement vis-à-vis Adenauer and Erhard, but conservative relative to new party leaders). The Mainz Congress of November 1969 concluded many party changes, even though Kiesinger was temporarily retained as chairman, being removed only in 1971 after having become no more than a figurehead. Rainer Barzel, born in 1924, led the changeover to a post-World War I-born cohort. Other leaders whose names became known in CDU

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[7] W. Zapf, ed. *Betrage zur Analyse der deutscher Oberschicht* (München, 1965) p. 33-35 and Lewis J. Edinger, "Political Change in Germany" in *Comparative Politics,* II (July, 1970), p. 567.

[8] *Deutscher Bundestag 6. Wahlperiode* (Darmstadt: Neue Darmstädter Verlagsanstalt, 1970), p. 255.

[9] A. Heidenheimer, *Governments of Germany* (New York: Crowell, 1968), p. 176.
[10] Alfred Grosser, *Germany in Our Time* (New York: Praeger, 1971), p. 153.

politics after 1969 were Gerhard Stoltenberg (41 years old in 1969), Helmut Kobel (39), Rudiger Gob (41), etc. In the 1969 Bundestag the CDU could even boast the youngest deputy, 28 year-old Dieter Schulte. With the arrival of such young men in political roles, the CDU began the 1970's with more youth than at any other time in its history in the Bonn Republic. Although critical of SPD Ostpolitik in a new opposition role, Barzel's CDU was certainly far from the Adenauer-Erhard intransigence. Thus, the CDU completed its transformation as well.

Again, what is important is not the natural succession of leadership, but the coincidence of that succession — in West Germany's experience by identifiable cohorts — with foreign policy changes. As long as the Adenauer-Erhard CDU/CSU government held power, the primary characteristic of West German foreign policy was intransigence based on adamant ideological preconceptions. The gradual influx of Ostopolitik tenets gained momentum correspondingly with leadership changeover. Furthermore, the distinct and sudden acceleration of Ostpolitik policies in 1969-71 was simultaneous with the final ascension of this cohort to West German leadership in the form of an SPD-FDP coalition (see Figure II), maintained and enlarged in 1972.

Other coextensive phenomena suggest the same relationship. The years of 1957 and 1961 constituted the oldest group elected to the Bundestag since 1949.[11] The preponderance of men over 50 at that time meant that their political socialization occurred before Hitler, and perhaps before Weimar. Indeed, in the case of major policy makers during the 1950's such as Adenauer, Erhard, Brentano and Krone, political socialization occurred largely before World War I. Correspondingly, foreign policy during the Adenauer years and largely through Erhard's chancellorship showed few if any aspects now denoted by the concept of Ostpolitik other than Schroeder's abortive attempts in 1965-66. A distinct break, or reversal in the age pattern occurred in 1965 and continued in 1969. Meanwhile, the foreign policies of the Grand Coalition and first Brandt government advocated increasing contact with Communist Europe.

Support given to these new ruling cohorts, as its leadership has advocated and now effected Ostpolitik in various forms, has been derived from certain segments of the West German populace. For the most part, professionals, skilled workers and those with college education have provided support to more recent German leadership in moves towards Ostpolitik. For example, a 1961 poll reported that 55% of "professional people," 46% of "skilled workers," and 60% of college educated people would have accepted the Older-Neisse line at that time as a de facto German border.[12] These groups have, in Bonn's political history, given votes to liberal CDU candidates, liberal FDP and SPD.[13] Conversely, unskilled workers, white collar

[11] Gerhard Loewenberg, *Parliament in the German Political System* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1967), p. 87.

[12] Robert A. Dahl, *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 428.

[13] W. Zapf in "Sozialstruktur deutscher Parlement" in *Wahlhandbuch* (1965 and 1969) (Frankfurt, 1965 and 1969); also Noelle and Neumann, *Jahrbuch der Öffentlichen Meinung, 1958-1964*, pp. 3ff EMNID, Informationen, Numbers 13, 26 (1964).

FIGURE II†

Age Composition of Bundestag

Election Year	Percent Under 40 Years	Percent From 40-49 Yrs.	Percent 50 Years or Over
1957	13	30	58
1961	13	27	60
1965	15	30	55
1969	15	36	49

Sources: 1957 and 1961 from *Amtliches Handbuch des Deutschen Bundestages,* #3 Wahlperiode (Dammstadt: Neuer Darmstädter Verlagsanstalt, 1958) and Ibid #4; for 1965, *Die Welt,* September 24, 1965; for 1969, *Deutscher Bundestag,* #6 Wahlperiode (Darmstadt: Neuer Darmstädter Verlagsanstalt, 1970).

workers and public servants (the supporters of CDU/CSU candidates of the Adenauer-Erhard genre as well as more right-wing minor parties) have generally opposed Ostpolitik.

Because of the input of young voters (born after World War II) in the 1965 and 1969 elections, supporters for Ostpolitik increased in numbers relative to the total population. A study of essentially the same groups in the FRG, concluded in mid-1967, confirmed this trend up to that date; among those polled, nearly 85% accepted the loss of territory east of the Oder-Neisse.[14] Legal recognition of that de facto loss, a prime component of Ostpolitik, was favored by 70% of academic elites, almost 60% of labor, virtually half of journalists, and 42% of all other elites.[15]

Because older, less-educated cohorts which experienced the Nazi regime as adults are naturally declining, the continued increases of support for Ostpolitik could have been expected among the voting public, particularly in the 1972 election. That such should have been expected in FRG voting is indicated by surveys of public attitude toward the division of Germany. In 1956, the East-West division was viewed as "intolerable" by 52%; a peak was reached in 1962 at 61%, declining to 53% after the years of crisis. But the startling drop in percentage of the public regarding division as "intolerable" occurred when the post-war-born youth entered voting age — i.e., to 38% in 1965 and 26% in 1966.[16]

Another indication of popular response among newer voters to Ostpolitik appeals (plus, of course, domestic policies) was the increase in SPD

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[14] Dahl, Ibid., p. 428.

[15] John Wokeller, "German Elites and Foreign Policy" — mimeo, no date, p. 4; quoted in Josef Korbel, "West Germany's Ostopolitik: II" in *Orbis* (Spring, 1971) p. 340.

[16] E. Noelle and E. P. Neumann, *The German Public Opinion Polls, 1947-1966* (Allensbach: Verlag für Demoskopie, 1967), p. 459 and *Die Zeit,* March 28, 1967.

party membership at times exactly corresponding to the emergence of the above described leadership cohorts. The elements of the German populace which have been notably receptive to ideas of Ostpolitik (i.e., the most educated and/or the most skilled) have tended to be precisely those who give votes to the SPD (or liberal FDP and liberal CDU candidates), and join its membership. Since party membership and electoral fortunes seem to vary directly, it is interesting to note that SPD membership reached its lowest in 1961 with 580,000 when it was least successful in electing its candidates; in the next 7 years, however, membership rose to 800,000 and has since reached a level 100% greater than 1961.

This trend in SPD membership, of course, is only one more coincidental bit of information when considered alone. When considered together with many indicators, however, a coalescence of trends strongly suggests the validity of a cohort approach; SPD membership trends during the 1960's correspond to increasing election success for that party, increasing Ostpolitik foreign policy, and the increasing presence of voters born after World War II. Significantly, the FRG electorate was relatively oldest in 1961, elected the oldest Bundestag (by average age, see Figure II), and thereby supported the most conservative foreign policy engendered by Bonn — namely, Adenauer-Brentano cold-war policies against rapprochement with the Communists.

The importance of younger voters for Ostpolitik was indicated by an Infas (Institute for Applied Social Sciences) public opinion survey of August 4, 1970 showing "that among the young generation the belief prevails that a dismantling of differences with Eastern neighbors is more beneficial to the security of the Federal Republic than a strengthening of friendship with the West. Of the 18-24 year-olds, 53% see the security of the Federal Republic guaranteed through "having few enemies in the East," while 33% of this same group saw greater security through "plenty of friends in the West." [17]

Thus, a demographic approach to the leadership variable has, through the concept of a cohort, allowed emphasis on three "generational groupings" from which much of the impetus for Ostpolitik has arisen; two leadership cohorts in combination have emerged to effect major changes in all FRG political parties' leadership in the 1960's alongside the arrival of a post-World War II generation of voters to provide necessary electoral support.

Ostpolitik, then, became a primary component of West German foreign policy in large part due to the changing nature of Bonn's political leadership. In the broader perspective, the restructuring of Central and Eastern European politics after 1969 was fostered by FRG leadership-electorate transformations.

[17] *The Treaty of August 12, 1970 Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* (Bonn: Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, 1970), p. 202.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT

By Phil Williams*

One of the most prominent characteristics of an adolescent discipline is that it encompasses a large number of areas which have not been subjected to careful and comprehensive examination. International politics is such a discipline, and the study of crisis management has long retained this "Cinderella" status within it. Even during the 1950s when theories of deterrence, limited war, and arms control were being developed in abundance, comparatively little attention was given to the dangers arising from crises and none at all to the problem of how such dangers could be ameliorated. This situation seemed to have improved after October 1962 when the drama of the Cuban Missile Crisis coupled with its skillful resolution stimulated a great deal of interest in the notion of crisis management. Rather like Cinderella's visit to the ball, however, the transformation was short-lived and more apparent than real. Although the concept became fashionable, it rarely received more than cursory attention or superficial analysis.[1]

This neglect of crises and the manner in which they are handled is extremely unfortunate. There are good reasons why crises merit attention. In the first place, their practical importance is difficult to overestimate. Crises are integrally related to the issue of war or peace. Indeed, our understanding of the outbreak of war is likely to be greatly enhanced by a study of major crises, and possibly by comparing crises which precipitated war with those which were resolved peacefully. Even when there is no outbreak of violence, the repercussions of a crisis situation may be enormous. Whether a crisis acts as a turning point is debatable, but there can be little doubt that it catalyzes existing trends within the international system. Furthermore, it is possible to argue that crises deserve attention since they highlight many

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* In this context a right is defined as a claim on specified members of a collectivity, that is expressed in representative law or law of compromise, for non-interference or aid in the performance of a socially recognized function; and a duty is defined as an obligation of specified members of a collectivity, that is expressed in representative law or law of compromise, to refrain from interference or to render aid in the performance of a socially recognized function. Following La Piere, representative law refers to group or organizational norms, whether formal or customary, that are enforced by the application of coercion. Law of compromise refers to those norms of representative law that regulate inter-group or inter-organizational conflict.[6] Representative law, therefore, is "the most effective form of law."[7] Roles are sets of rights and duties oriented to the performance of a socially recognized function.

[1] A notable exception is Coral Bell, *The Conventions of Crisis,* (London, O.U.P., 1971). Also worthy of mention is Oran R. Young, *The Politics of Force: Bargaining during International Crises,* (Princeton, Princeton University Press 1968). Young's book does not deal with crisis management as such, but contains many important insights of immediate relevance. It is a pioneering work on the subject of crises and one to which the author owes a great intellectual debt.

important characteristics of inter-state relations. If, as Clausewitz once claimed, a battle is "war concentrated," then a crisis can equally legitimately be regarded as a microcosm of international politics.

As well as increasing our substantive knowledge, however, the study of crises can also contribute to the methodology of international politics. The area is one where traditional historical and political analysis can profitably be combined with some of the newer, more scientific techniques. By examining a relatively small number of crises on a comparative basis, for example, it is possible to avoid both the Scylla of the historian who regards *every* event or situation as entirely unique, and the Charybdis of the behavioural scientist who generalizes indiscriminately, ignoring the fact that differences may be as important as similarities. Another advantage is that crisis behaviour can be analyzed from both systematic and decision-making perspectives. It is possible to concentrate on the interaction process *between* national units *and* on the way in which policy is made *within* them. As long as the precise focus of attention at any particular time is made explicit, the use of both "levels of analysis" can only prove beneficial. In fact they supplement each other in the effort to achieve an optimum degree of understanding.

Keeping these considerations in mind, our present purpose is to amplify and elucidate the concept of crisis management in such a manner as to make explicit its essential elements and distinguish these from its less important aspects. The area of attention is much narrower than that of Coral Bell's recent study, as we are concerned only with crises between adversaries and not at all with tension between allies.[2] This is reflected in our definition of an international crisis as a confrontation between states, which usually occupies a short time period and in which the danger of war breaking out becomes far higher than in the normal run of international affairs.[3] While it has to be recognized that many other definitions of crisis are possible (from both systemic and decision-making vantage points[4]), the advantage of the one used here is its stress on the risk of violence. Although the risk of war is always latent in the state system, at times of crisis this risk becomes very

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[2] See Bell, *Ibid* for a discussion of both adversary and intra-mural crises.

[3] c.f. Young *op cit*. p. 15 "A crisis in international politics is a process of interaction occurring at higher levels of perceived intensity than the ordinary flow of events and characterized by: a sharp break from the ordinary flow of politics; shortness of duration; a rise in the perceived prospects that violence will break out; and significant implications for the stability of some system (or pattern of relationships) in international politics."
Our definition differs from Young's in one important respect: it stresses the *real* increase in the probability of war as opposed to merely a *perceived* increase.

[4] The classic decision-making definition is that formulated by Charles F. Hermann which sees a crisis as involving a high threat to values, surprise, and short decision time. This definition is particularly important since it necessitates viewing a crisis as it appears to the participants. Thus the Cuban Missile Crisis could be examined from the perspective of both Soviet and American decision-makers. Such an analysis is likely to lead to some interesting ideas. For example it becomes immediately apparent that the participants faced different degrees of crisis in terms of the values threatened (this corresponds with the notion of a "balance of interests" discussed below).
Moreover, the crisis lasted much longer for the Americans than for the Russians. It began for America with the discovery of the missiles; it only began for the Soviet Union days later with the announcement of the American response. There are many other interesting conclusions to be drawn from such an analysis, but unfortunately, they cannot be dealt with here. See C. F. Hermann's Crises in Foreign Policy: A Simulation Analysis (New York, Bobbs-Merrill, 1969).

real. To a large extent this is due to the general characteristics which normally exist in crisis situations.[5]

In the first place a crisis involves a high threat to the national security goals of at least one of the participants. Thus it usually necessitates a vigorous response which may bring with it the possibility of open conflict. This danger is exacerbated by the fact that policymakers operate under great psychological stress stemming from both the seriousness of the problem with which they are faced and the urgency with which it needs to be solved. They may also be confronted with great uncertainties in their attempts to assess the situation and devise courses of action for dealing with it. Furthermore, decision-makers are liable to feel that they have very little control over events and the direction in which they are leading. Whether a crisis does in fact exhibit such reduced control is a matter of some controversy. The position taken here, however, is basically in agreement with that of T. C. Schelling who argues that the essence of a crisis is its sheer unpredictability.[6] In this respect though, crisis decision-making differs from ordinary foreign policy making only in degree and not in kind since statesmen generally find themselves having to operate in an environment over which they have only tenuous control at best.[7] Nevertheless, it is apparent that given such characteristics the peaceful resolution of a crisis is an awesome task.

The term "management" presents almost as many problems and ambiguities as that produced by "crisis." Consequently, crisis management has been subject to diverse interpretations. On the one hand it has been defined as "reaching a solution acceptable to both sides without resorting to force," [8] and on the other, as "winning a crisis while at the same time keeping it within tolerable limits of danger and risk to both sides." [9] Although these definitions are not diametrically opposed, there are substantial differences of emphasis between them. To a large extent these are explicable in light of the dual nature of crises.[10] As well as being times of danger, crises are also periods of opportunity.[11] Consequently, it is very largely a matter of emphasis whether they are regarded as bilateral competition in which the purpose is above all to attain one's objectives *or* as shared danger in which the main priority should be the reduction of risks.[12] Much depends on the prevailing circumstances, and the two aspects will usually coexist side by side in dif-

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[5] The following discussion of the characteristics of a crisis owes a great deal to H. Kahn and A. J. Wiener, *Crises and Arms Control* (Hudson Institute 1962) and H. H. Lentner *The Concept of Crisis as Viewed by the U.S. Department of State* (Western Reserve University).

[6] T. C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, Yale University Press 1966) p. 97. He continues: "It is the essence of a crisis that the participants are not fully in control of events; they take steps and make decisions . . . . in a realm of risk and uncertainty."

[7] It must be stressed, of course, that the degree of control which states have over their environment is subject to enormous variations depending among other things, on the capability of the state and on what it is attempting to achieve.

[8] L. Lipson quoted in "Crisis Management or Crisis Prevention?" *NATO Letter* Aug.-Sept. 1966 p. 14.

[9] W. R. Kintner and D. C. Schwarz, *A Study on Crisis Management* (Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania) Appendix B p. 21.

[10] See Young, *op. cit.* ch. I.

[11] F. L. Schuman, *The Cold War: Retrospect and Prospect* (Baton Rouge Louisianna State University Press 2nd Ed. 1967) p. 72.

[12] Schelling, *op. cit.* p. 120.

ferent proportions as the situation varies. The validity of both the above interpretations of crisis management must, therefore, be recognized, although the particular interpretation being presented here is much nearer to the first definition.

Our concern is not so much with resolving the substantive issues at stake as with the procedures for controlling and regulating a crisis so that it does not get out of hand and lead to war. The existence of nuclear weapons means that this problem has become particularly important. Yet, the peaceful resolution of crises was not always so urgent a task as it is today. In the Sarajevo Crisis of July 1914, for example, the major participants believed they could achieve a quick decisive victory if war broke out. Consequently, there was no perception of common interest between them, and the avoidance of war was very definitely a secondary consideration.[13] The nature, scope, and duration of the struggle which followed, however, was to prove a major landmark in transforming attitudes. This was particularly the case in Britain and France where mass conventional war came to be seen as the absolute weapon. Fear of using it led to paralysis and indecision. Thus the major objectives of British and French foreign policy during the inter-war years was avoidance of war. Policymakers such as Chamberlain and Daladier regarded the crises of the later 1930s with horror and were concerned almost exclusively with their *dangers*. Both war and crises were abhorrent to them. Hitler's attitudes, however, were very different. He saw in crises merely further *opportunities* to promote his policy of territorial advancement and felt that even if war did occur resistance from the democracies would be negligible. The skilful manner in which he exploited this fundamental asymmetry of attitudes can be clearly discerned from a study of the Munich Crisis. Indeed, so successful was Hitler that Munich has appropriately been described as a "victory without violence" for Germany.[14]

What are the implications of all this for our discussion of crisis management? If we accept that crisis management is merely "winning" a crisis, then Munich was a superb example of crisis management by Hitler. Where this interpretation falls down is that the German leader was intent on attaining his objective regardless of whether this was merely by the threat of force or its actual use. On the other hand, all Chamberlain's efforts were directed at the peaceful resolution of the crisis. But even this cannot be equated with crisis management. Appeasement differs from crisis management in that it involves "peace at any price" or surrender to aggression. It puts peace above all other interests and regards any peaceful settlement as preferable to war. Appeasement is the result of unilateral pacifism whereas crisis management is the result of perceptions on the part of all the major antagonists that they have an overriding common interest in making an agreement short of war, while at the same time recognizing that there is room to bargain over the

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[13] See L. Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914 Vol. II* (London, O.U.P., 1952) p. 516. Perhaps a partial exception to this was Britain, although it must be admitted that even now the priorities of British policy are not entirely clear.

[14] E. M. Robertson, *Hitler's Prewar Policy & Military Plans 1933-39* (London, Longmans, 1963) p. 136.

exact terms and nature of that agreement. In other words, crisis management requires a careful mixture of restraint and firmness on all sides if it is not to degenerate into pure aggressiveness or appeasement.

The crucial question is whether or not such a mixture is unique to the nuclear age. What is immediately apparent is that the fear of war is now much more evenly distributed among the dominant powers of the international system than it was during the 1930s. Nevertheless, the nature of international politics has not been radically transformed. Force and the threat of force are still viable options which statesmen may profitably choose in their search for security or aggrandisement. To argue in this way, however, is not to minimize the impact of nuclear weapons. There have been subtle but important changes in the manner in which force has been used. The perennial concern of statesmen with securing, protecting and promoting the interests of their nation has not diminished in the present era. As in the past it may necessitate vigorous actions carrying substantial risks. *But,* to use Hoffmann's striking analogy, although the nuclear powers still play the game of chicken they are extremely careful to keep their foot on the brake pedal.[15] This situation is a reflection of what is perhaps best described as the basic *duality of purpose* on the part of states in the nuclear age. Statesmen usually have certain objectives, the attainment of which may involve the risk of nuclear war. But they have to temper these risks, to keep them as low and as controllable as possible. In short, their central problem is to achieve their aims while avoiding the uppermost levels of conflict.

Such dual considerations are reflected in the new breed of "regulatory measures" to control the use of force which has been spawned by fear of a nuclear holocaust.[16] Measures such as deterrence, the limiting of war, the control of armaments and the management of crises, are all symptomatic of the fact that although force still has great utility it needs to be held in rein to a far greater extent than ever before. This becomes clear if we compare Hitler's behaviour in the Munich Crisis with Kennedy's at the time of Cuba. What emerges clearly from such a comparison is that Hitler was concerned almost *solely* with maximizing his gains, whereas Kennedy was attempting to achieve deliberately limited objectives while minimizing the attendant risks. Oran Young summed up the problem superbly in his argument that in nuclear crises it is necessary to demonstrate resolve—prudently.[17] Thus, although it was necessary for Kennedy to "rock the boat" in order to eject the Soviet missiles from Cuba, he simultaneously took precautions which he hoped would prevent the boat from capsizing. He knew that if it did capsize both he and his opponent would drown. His was a view not shared by Hitler. He seems to have felt that even if his actions toppled the boat then he would be able to swim to safety and emerge victorious while his French and British opponents would drown. It is apparent from this that

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[15] S. Hoffmann, *The State of War: Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Politics.* (London, Pall Mall, 1965) p. 142.

[16] R. E. Osgood and R. W. Tucker, Force, Order and Justice. (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press 1967). See in particular ch. 3, on the control of force.

[17] See Young, *op. cit.* ch. 8. Resolve and Prudence.

the major prerequisite for crisis management is the assumption on the part of all the major participants that they may have more to lose than they have to gain by going to war. In the nuclear age this is, by and large, a self-evident proposition.

Even if the assumption is present and acted upon, however, this does not necessarily guarantee success in the management of crises. There are a variety of obstacles to peaceful resolution. In the first place, there are a host of constraints on decision-makers arising out of the domestic environment. Crises are rarely, if ever, completely insulated from such difficulties as may be caused by bureaucratic pressures, organizational factors or broader political considerations. These can impinge directly on the process of choosing the best policy to fit the prevailing circumstances and may seriously influence the decisions which are subsequently arrived at. Unfortunately, there is not the space here to delve into all the manifestations of this problem. Suffice to say that although domestic political considerations are important, they pale into relative insignificance when compared to the "compelling" international situation which usually prevails at times of crisis.[18] Given the rules of the game in international politics, there are what might be described as *typical* policies or *natural* reactions which are almost automatic in the light of the external situation. Thus it was not concern about the November elections which prompted Kennedy to vigorous action in October 1962. Rather was such action necessary because of the drastic nature of the Soviet move and its possible repercussions for Western security if allowed to go unchallenged. But even where, as in this instance, domestic constraints are at a minimum, the task of the crisis managers remains a formidable one.

The intractable nature of crisis situations has been outlined above, but deserves further attention. Particularly acute is the danger that events can pass outside the scope of conscious choice or decision with the result that, despite all the efforts of the participants, the interaction between them will result in an outbreak or expansion of violence. Past decisions, prelaid schemes, or impetuous behaviour can so easily lead to the participants losing control over events or, perhaps equally disastrous, losing their freedom of choice. Furthermore, crises are fertile breeding grounds for miscalculations. Incomplete or incorrect information may result in the misperception of the opponents' behaviour or a miscalculation of the strength of his commitment. Thus the participants become committed to incompatible objectives as did Russia and Austria-Hungary in the summer of 1914.[19] Mistakes are also possible in the manipulation of threats. Boat rocking, brinkmanship and deliberate, albeit limited, escalation are inherently perilous undertakings, while accidental escalation is always a source of great danger.

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[18] For a very different view see T. Halper, *Foreign Policy Crises: Appearance and Reality in Decision Making* (Columbus Ohio, Merrill 1971).

[19] The leaders of both Germany and Austria-Hungary seem to have felt that Russia would stand by and allow Serbia to be humiliated. The Russians however, felt that if they reneged on their commitment to Serbia then they would lose their status as a great power. Consequently, Austria-Hungary adopted a militant policy towards Serbia while the Russians decided that Serbia's integrity had to be upheld.

The implication of all this is that the outbreak of violence need not be deliberately initiated and may in fact erupt despite the best efforts of statesmen to prevent it. To develop Hoffmann's analogy: although the drivers may keep their feet on the brake pedal, this does not eliminate the possibility of brake failure and consequent disaster. The aim of crisis management is to render such possibilities as remote as possible. A central objective must be to ensure that the crisis remains under control and that war does not occur through a series of miscalculations and mistakes. The Oxford Dictionary defines management as control, and it is possible to argue that the attempt to maintain control over events and not allow them to get out of hand or to develop a momentum of their own is in large part what crisis management is all about.

The rest of the paper will attempt to highlight some of the "ground rules" whereby success in these tasks may be achieved. A basic assumption throughout is that useful lessons can be learned from a study of past crises, but that such lessons are contingent. They may not be appropriate in all situations and should be applied only with discrimination. The peaceful resolution of crises requires a flexible combination of techniques which makes allowance for the unforeseen and the unique, rather than rigid adherence to patterns of behaviour which proved successful in the past. Nevertheless, there may well exist what Coral Bell has appropriately described as a "learning curve" in crisis management.[20] Professor Bell suggests that there is a direct link between experience and efficiency which is handed down from one set of decision-makers to the next. While this is true, its implications need spelling out more carefully than has so far been done. The fundamental point is that as crises re-occur, expectations are formed about what behaviour can be anticipated and what behaviour is acceptable. Such conventions are an important asset in the management of crises. Certain restraints become semi-automatic and salient thresholds endowed with an unprecedented degree of legitimacy. At the same time, too much should not be claimed for these conventions. They rest upon fragile foundations and may be disregarded as soon as the self-interest of one or more of the participants in a crisis demands it. Even accepting this qualification, however, the techniques, conventions and modes of behaviour which have assisted in the peaceful resolution of great power crises since 1945 deserve analysis.

A fundamental "rule" in crisis management must be to assess carefully the implications of any action for the adversary. How are these actions likely to be interpreted? In attempting to answer questions such as these the basic quality demanded is one of empathy, or as Robert Kennedy puts it in his account of the Missile Crisis, an ability to "place ourselves in the other country's shoes." [21] While this was clearly done in October 1962, and was influential in the choice of blockade rather than air strike, the same cannot be said about American behaviour prior to World War Two or during hostilities in Korea. In both instances little or no attempt was made to assess

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[20] Bell, *op. cit.* p. 24.
[21] R. F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days* (London, Pan Books, 1969) p. 121.

how the evolving situation would be perceived by the opponent. During the Korean War in particular, the American decision-makers failed to realize the significance of the threat they were posing for the recently established Chinese regime by their advance into the North. The unification of Korea under China's most powerful ideological enemy was a prospect which could not be viewed with equanimity by Mao. For a government which had not yet fully consolidated its power, the establishment of a hostile state on its doorstep with the potential to support internal challenges to the regime was an intolerable danger. Unfortunately, the Chinese were unable to communicate successfully such feelings to Washington, thus violating another part of the sacred code of crisis management.

This second basic tenet of crisis management (which, like the others applies equally well to limited war) is that adversaries should communicate with each other in order to clarify their respective positions. The Sino-American failure to do this during the Korean War was due to Chinese unfamiliarity with the mechanics of the Western-dominated international system, cultural differences between the two nations, and the distorted perceptions of key American officials who believed what they wanted to see and ignored unpalatable facts.[22] The complete failure to establish communication resulted in the Chinese having to intervene in the war and the Americans being taken by surprise. Although this example occurred during a limited war it is illustrative of the general problems facing policy makers in crisis. Since successful communication is a *sine qua non* of crisis management, how can such problems be overcome? A large part of the answer is sheer persistence. Only by utilizing to the full the various channels available, is it possible to convey to an opponent the strength of one's commitments or clarify the direction of one's intentions. Thus, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy and Khrushchev communicated with one another both publicly and secretly, directly and indirectly, and by use of both words and actions. During crises, actions which carry a high risk of violence take on great symbolic significance. Thus the blockade was meant to signify American determination that Soviet missiles be removed from Cuba. Such actions, however, are rarely self-explanatory and can be used to far better effect if combined with verbal explanations. Kennedy's television broadcast which initiated the public phase of the Cuban Crisis was a necessary supplement to the blockade. Although ostensibly designed as a message to the American nation, its most important audience was in the Kremlin. The blockade and the broadcast were essential corollaries of each other: neither would have

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[22] Particularly important is the way in which the Americans failed to realize that another nation could regard them as aggressive. This was especially the case with a nation to which they had always been benevolent. A very competent discussion of such historical and cultural legacies can be found in J. Stoessinger, *Nations in Darkness* (New York, Random House, 1971) chs. 1-4.
A comprehensive discussion of the more immediate causes of miscommunication is A. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to enter the Korean War* (New York, Macmillan, 1960). J. Rivera, *The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy* (Columbus, Ohio, Merrill, 1968) contains some useful comments on the American intelligence failure to anticipate the Chinese response. Particularly important seems to have been the notion that "since the North Korean forces were virtually defeated, the Chinese would be poorly advised to enter the war at such a time." Troop estimates were also grossly deficient and no one seems to have considered the possibility of Chinese troops being dispersed and hidden. See p. 55.

been nearly so effective without the other. By providing a legal justification for a "quarantine," for example, Kennedy was endeavouring to avoid forcing Khrushchev into a violent reaction. Yet without a blockade, verbal messages would have been to no avail in stopping the Soviet build-up.

Less dramatic, although no less absorbing, were those communications which took place informally and through rather unexpected third parties. The Fomin-Scali conversations have, of course, achieved great notoriety and will not be dealt with here. Equally instructive, however, is Khrushchev's conversation with an American business-man William E. Knox at an opera in Moscow. Knox was informed that the missiles were under strict Soviet control and that there was no danger of the "volatile" Cubans getting hold of them.[23] This was meant as a reassurance to Washington, being designed to obviate the need for any precipitate U.S. move against Castro. Communications have been equally important during other crises. In 1961, when the barriers were erected separating the two halves of Berlin, the Soviets took great pains in their communique to stress that the basic rights of West Berlin itself (for which the Western powers had declared themselves willing to fight) were not affected.[24] The burden of all this is that crisis management requires clear and precise communication between adversaries which reduces the area of ambiguity to a minimum. Coral Bell, however, has given qualified approval to the creative use of ambiguity by statesmen in crises.[25] This might prove beneficial in certain instances, but its dangers generally outweigh any advantages to be gained. Dean Acheson could well testify to this in light of accusations that his famous National Press Club speech (in which he stated that South Korea lay outside the U.S. defence perimeter in the event of a global war) misled the Russians and North Koreans into believing that South Korea could be conquered without eliciting a firm American response.

His even more famous successor was to testify to many things, not the least of which was that "brinkmanship" or the deliberate creation of risk was a "necessary art" when dealing with the Communists. While agreeing with this, the proviso should be added that it is a very difficult and dangerous art to master. Bargaining tactics such as brinkmanship and escalation can pay large dividends if successful, but the penalties for failure are stark indeed. Complications arise when the opponent is also willing to escalate a conflict, for then it may prove impossible to keep it on the lower rungs of the escalation ladder. Although this ladder may be very long and have stopping places or landings where it is possible to get off and reverse the direction, it is equally conceivable that the spiral of action and reaction between the opposing sides may reach such a pitch that control over the situation could disappear and the process become irreversible. All restraint may vanish and fire-breaks or thresholds be passed automatically. There may be a *point of critical escalation,* after which it becomes impossible to avoid the outbreak

[23] A. L. Horelick and M. Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1966) p. 133.
[24] See J. E. Smith, *The Defense of Berlin* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1963) p. 268.
[25] Bell, *op. cit.* p. 74.

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of open hostilities. Unfortunately, no one knows quite where on the escalation ladder this point is.

It is true that in Cuba a limited use of force with threats of further escalation reversed the direction of the conflict spiral and started it back downward.[26] But although in this case escalation and brinkmanship were conducive to, rather than incompatible with the peaceful resolution of the crisis, it is not inconceivable that in some circumstances crisis management and escalation might prove to be mutually exclusive alternatives. Such possibilities can be discerned even in the writings of Herman Kahn who did most to develop the concept. Kahn notes that where both sides are using escalation as a bargaining technique, either could win by increasing its efforts so long as the opponent was not prepared to do the same. As we have seen, uncertainty about the opponent's intentions may be rife in a crisis and the belief that he will not respond vigorously wildly optimistic. "Neither side is willing to back down precisely because it believes or hopes it can achieve its objective, without war. It may be willing to run some risk of war to achieve its objective, but it feels that the other side will back down or compromise before the risk becomes very large." [27] Unfortunately, the margin for error in this situation is small. If both sides feel that the stakes at issue involve their vital interests then neither may be prepared to back down.

Although both may be willing to enter the "competition in risk-taking," if the outcome is to be decided peacefully it is essential that one of the contestants be far *less* prepared than his adversary to pursue his objectives vigorously. To state a truism: escalation is likely to be most successful when used unilaterally. Robert Osgood has argued that "the comparative resolve to use force" or the "relative risk-taking propensities of the two sides" [28] will depend on the relative interests each has at stake. In other words, the tactics of brinkmanship and escalation are dependent for their success on an asymmetry of interests between the protagonists and on the correct perception and evaluation of this asymmetry by them. Such was the case in October 1962. In the aftermath of the crisis there was a great deal of acrimonious debate over whether it was American nuclear or local conventional superiority which had proved decisive. The issue also came into focus again recently with the loss of American strategic superiority and the attainment of nuclear parity by the Soviet Union.[29] Yet if Cuba really has anything to teach here it is that the relative decline in America's position lacks the significance often imputed to it. Too much stress can easily be laid on calculations about the number and type of missiles each side possess or on the relative strength of conventional forces in the area. When the superpowers become entangled in a crisis the fear of involvement in nuclear war is equally shared. Even if one side has a significant numerical advantage, a nuclear holocaust is unlikely to

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[26] See A. & R. Wohlstetter, *Controlling the Risks in Cuba* Adelphi Paper 17 (London, I.S.S. 1965) pp. 17-22.

[27] H. Kahn, *On Escalation* (New York, Praeger, 1965) p. 12.

[28] Osgood & Tucker, *op. cit.* p. 148.

[29] A good discussion of this is to be found in W. Slocombe, *The Political Implications of Strategic Parity* Adelphi Paper 77 (London, I.S.S. 1971).

be regarded with any less abhorrence. Thus, it is not so much the immense power which the superpowers wield that counts as the will to bring it to bear — and this is determined above all by the relative interests at stake.

Such a pattern can be clearly discerned both in Cuba and the Berlin crisis of 1961. The American leaders were prepared to take the risks they did over Cuba because vital national interests were at stake. The Soviet Union was not prepared to "up the ante" because, in the last analysis, the issue was peripheral to its security. The events surrounding the erection of barriers separating the two halves of Berlin demonstrate the same phenomenon at work, although this time in the opposite direction. The reason the Berlin Wall remained intact was that the West recognized its importance to the Soviet Union. The viability of East Germany, and ultimately of the whole Soviet Empire depended upon it. Consequently, there was no attempt to counteract the move.[30] The upshot of all this is that crisis management depends upon framing one's objectives in such a way that the vital interests of the opponent are not trespassed upon. In broader terms, the *avoidance* of direct superpower confrontations depends upon mutual recognition of distinct spheres of interest.

Restraint on objectives and restraint on means almost invariably go together; and just as the superpowers have been very careful to limit their objectives, they have also been acutely aware of the need for restrictions on the weapons used to achieve them. Although employing coercive bargaining techniques, they have been particularly reluctant to use outright violence. Indeed the coercion/violence distinction has formed a threshold of such salience that it ranks in importance with that between conventional and nuclear weapons in lmiited war contexts.[31] As far as crises are concerned it is also much more relevant than its greatly publicized counterpart. It can even be argued that the threshold has been almost religiously observed, the ordination ceremony beginning with the Berlin Crisis of 1948. Both sides exhibited great caution during the crisis, the Russians building up the blockade gradually and positing "technical difficulties" as justification, while neither Washington nor London would sanction an armed convoy to break it.[32] Truman's rejection of this option finds a distinct parallel fourteen years later in Kennedy's initial rejection of an invasion or air-strike to remove the missiles. Moreover, Khrushchev's failure to run the blockade bears certain similarities to Stalin's avoidance of serious interference with the airlift.

In both crises it was generally felt that even a localized clash could spark off a train of events leading to disaster. The prevailing image seemed to be in accordance with Schelling's view that violence is a hotheaded

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[30] While conventional weakness in the area may have been a contributory factor to Western inaction, it does not seem to have been critical. Western recognition of Soviet interests was probably far more decisive. An excellent account of the crisis can be found in J. L. Richardson, *Germany and the Atlantic Alliance* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1966). See in particular p. 286-7.

[31] Young, *op. cit.*, p. 14, note 13.

[32] On the arguments for a convoy see L. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (London, Heinemann, 1950) p. 374. For the considerations which finally prevailed see H. S. Truman, *Memoirs Vol. II. Years of Trial and Hope 1946-52* (New York, Signet, 1965) p. 151.

activity which can easily get out of control.[33] This has been reflected not only in the conscious decisions to opt for courses of action involving a moderate rather than a high risk of violence, but also in the care which has been taken to prevent its accidental or inadvertent outbreak. Where this necessitates strict political control over military operations, then such control has been firmly established. Political control is also helpful in the task of maintaining freedom of choice both for oneself and the opponent. It is vital that policy-makers are not forced into violent actions because they lack alternatives. In nuclear crises, "blank cheques" cannot be given to the military, allowing them to proceed with prelaid contingency plans as was done in 1914. Careful watch must also be kept over lesser allies to ensure that they do not take actions which may eventually restrict one's options. It is sobering to remember that guarantees to small powers were partially responsible for Russian involvement in the First World War and British entanglement in the Second. The danger of minor powers sparking off a nuclear holocaust is perhaps greatest of all today in the Middle East, although it is notable that even here both superpowers have avoided inextricable involvement. Indeed, by June 1967 the lessons of earlier crises had become deeply entrenched in the thoughts and policies of both Soviet and American decision-makers, as is symbolized most dramatically in the use of the "hot-line" during the Six Day War.

But even where the lessons described here are carried out, and the various conventions and thresholds observed, there is no guarantee of success. Crisis management can fruitfully be compared to the task of accident prevention. Certain common sense rules can be religiously followed, but accidents can nevertheless occur as it is impossible to anticipate all contingencies. The crises of the nuclear age provide reassurance, but the danger of over confidence must be guarded against at all costs. For while crisis management is a necessary condition to prevent crises precipitating war, it is not a sufficient condition. This is perhaps the supreme lesson of all.

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[33] Schelling, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

POLITICS AND HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Politics and Historical Consciousness
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The poet Robert Duncan has distinguished among two kinds of states that are structured out of human activity. The first type is familiar — it is "the political domain we call the State." [1] The second type often eludes consciousness, yet is more profound than the first — it is "the state of being that we feel in all the relationship of the pronouns 'we' and 'they' to the nation." [2] It is the political state of being with which we will be concerned in this essay; particularly in its expression through frames of human coexistence.

Acting in the mode of historical consciousness involves one in the relationship of the pronouns "we" or "they" to his relevant collectivity. He is concerned with the human quest to achieve extended frames of space and time in which his actions have meaning. Friedrich Baerwald has referred to society as a "trans-personal time-space continuum." [3] For Baerwald, if the individual cannot "transcend the narrow limitation of his own existence by linking himself with larger frameworks of time and space which are supplied to him in the human condition of coexistence he cannot begin to realize his potentials." [4] If one's life is to have significance for others, social organizations must exist to preserve one's contributions. The boundaries of "we" for the individual are the boundaries that he sets on his meaning for others in history. His consciousness of his rights and duties to the "we" betray his working conception of social organization.

In that historical consciousness defines the relationship of the pronouns "we" and "they" to one's relevant collectivity, and thereby defines the plight of the individual enfolded into collectivities more or less organized, the essence of historical consciousness is complex. Since it describes the orientation of the person to space and time frames transcending his immediate situation, historical consciousness includes a component of space and time consciousness. Since the person is oriented to extended space and time frames because he wants to appreciate contributions from the past and create his own contributions for the future, historical consciousness includes a com-

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[1] Robert Duncan, "Man's Fulfillment in Order and Strife," *Caterpillar* 8/9 (1969), 241.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] Friedrich Baerwald, "Humanism and Social Ambivalence," *Thought*, XLII, 167 (Winter, 1967), 553.
[4] *Ibid.*

ponent of juridical consciousness that describes a person's relation to systems of rights and duties that are grounded in the need to facilitate preservation and creation of contributions to the good life. Since rights and duties require enforcement, historical consciousness includes a vision of the appropriate collectivities through which human action should be organized. This vision defines alternative types of organization. Finally, since there are tensions between creation and preservation, historical consciousness includes an interpretation of alienation.

The development of historical consciousness in the West can be traced through several stages. First, we can distinguish traditional consciousness — a starting-point for many writers. D. Barley has described the Medieval traditional consciousness: "Graphically, we might picture the individual as a small sphere. Traditional social structure would then appear as concentric spheres surrounding the individual: the family, the community, the world, the cosmos (in mythology or religion). All were held to have a single, unified reference point, sanctioned by the cosmic view and the constraint of inescapable community norms. One's position and activity in one set of relationships was likely to be congruent with those in another, since they involved repetitious interactions with persons anchored to the same point of reference." [5] Whether or not there ever was a time when people conceived themselves as radiating meaning through concentric spheres of space and epochs of time; when people had consistent sets of rights and duties; when people interpreted their institutions as organically related and necessary; and when people related to the world primarily as "we"; is not germane to the argument at hand. It is important merely to note that the conception of a traditional consciousness is a convenient starting-point for a discussion of man as *socius*, just as the idea of a social contract was a convenient beginning to a discussion of man as particular individual.

From the perspective of traditional consciousness, space and time are unified, though not homogeneous or uniform. All men refer to the same framework of meaning, though that framework may be so complex as to define conceptions of heaven and earth, and the temporal and eternal. With regard to systems of rights and duties, harmony within and between roles obtains*. For traditional consciousness, the exercise of rights and the discharge of duties with respect to the performance of one function facilitates the exercise of rights and the discharge of duties with respect to the individual's other functions. As for the type of organizational form characteristic

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[5] D. Barley, "Organization and Human Existence," *Cross Currents,* XVII, 2 (Spring, 1967), 184.

*In this context a right is defined as a claim on specified members of a collectivity, that is expressed in representative law or law of compromise, for non-interference or aid in the performance of a socially recognized function; and a duty is defined as an obligation of specified members of a collectivity, that is expressed in representative law or law of compromise, to refrain from interference or to render aid in the performance of a socially recognized function. Following La Piere, representative law refers to group or organizational norms, whether formal or customary, that are enforced by the application of coercion. Law of compromise refers to those norms of representative law that regulate inter-group or inter-organizational conflict.[6] Representative law, therefore, is "the most effective form of law."[7] Roles are sets of rights and duties oriented to the performance of a socially recognized function.

[6] Richard T. La Piere, *A Theory of Social Control* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1954), 317-320.

[7] *Ibid.,* 318.

of traditional consciousness, we have the institution — a standardized set of roles oriented toward fulfilling a basic aim of the collectivity. An institution might be exemplified in thousands of actual organizations. In accordance with our myth, the institutions of traditional consciousness mutually support one another. Finally, alienation in traditional consciousness is expressed as alienation from individuality. The person has no unique contribution to make to the collectivity; he contributes to the existence of future generations through the "we" and its collective endeavors. In all, traditional consciousness represents the fully socialized, if not civilized, man.

It is important to note that many people in the contemporary world are characterized by modes of consciousness approaching traditional consciousness. However, with the advent of the modern age, new modes of historical consciousness become possible. When we discuss the forms of modern consciousness we depart from the realm of myth and enter perspectives through which we often interpret the relationship of "we" and "they" to the relevant collectivity. From the standpoint of modern consciousness, time and space are disunified. If social organization exists to provide extended space and time frames through which the actions and products of individuals gain meaning beyond their immediate situation, modern consciousness comprehends a number of such frames, each one in competition with the others. The religious frames of traditional consciousness remain and are supplemented by frames of nation, class, profession and state. One may commit himself to one or another of these frames as primary, but such a commitment must be either tentative and problematic, or self-deceptive. Among the contending frames, the view of world history as the relevant space-time continuum and humanity as the relevant collectivity is asserted as relative to the others. Modernity is characterized by two modes of time and space consciousness. For the missionary, one of the contending frames of space and time is meaningful and the others are delusive. The object is to demonstrate through the application of whatever means necessary that the missionary's judgment is correct. Success comes to guarantee meaning when meaning no longer guarantees success. For the anthropologist, one of the contending frames of space and time is more meaningful than any other. The object is to move through the many spaces and times and create what Wayne A. R. Leys has called an "elastic unity" of them.[8] Leys has described the predicament of anthropologist's consciousness as it applies to politics: "The unstable pluralism of the political reality creates problems that may properly be called philosophical. How can a man, dealing with different issues in different kinds of games, achieve some sense of personal integrity and preserve his sanity?"[9] Leys advises that the anthropologist escape from worship of any one kind of political process because the principles appropriate to one process will be inappropriate to another. How a personal elastic unity of diverse frames of space and time can provide meaning Leys does not explain.

For modern consciousness, disharmony within and between roles ob-

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[8] Wayne A. R. Leys, "Political Philosophy — In Quotation Marks," in Malcolm B. Parsons (ed.), *Perspectives in the Study of Politics* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1968), 37.
[9] *Ibid.*, 35.

tains. The exercise of rights and the discharge of duties with respect to the performance of one function often impedes the exercise of rights and the discharge of duties with respect to the individual's other functions. Again, there are two modes of juridical consciousness that cope with this situation. The missionary selects one of his roles as most significant, relates it to his frame of meaning and judges all of his other roles in relation to that commitment. The anthropologist, who cannot accord any role more significance than another attempts to ease role strain through various forms of rationalization, commits himself to live in continuous tension or revalues the role by manipulating his various rights and duties to maximize immediate personal gratification. The tactics of rationalization and bargaining for personal gratification have been described by William Goode.[10] Social psychologists do not seem to believe that a liberal might embrace continuous tension. Of course, the tactics of rationalization and personalism represent an erosion of historical consciousness. Manipulation of the role structure through compartmentalization of roles, delegation of duties, elimination of role relationships and extension of some role commitments at the expense of others, mark a withdrawal of the individual from the quest for meaning and the substitution of a quest for balance or congruity.[11] The process of bargaining for maximum rights and minimum duties marks a recognition that meaning is impossible beyond the immediate situation. Gratification becomes a substitute for transhumanization, and all projects become private. Both the creation of a phantom public by the missionary and the withdrawal from public time and space by the anthropologist point beyond themselves to post-modern life. If rights and duties are a condition of meaning, and transpersonal meaning is a basic need of man, the attempt to force meaning through stifling the conflict of perspectives and the attempt to live without meaning refute themselves. Modern man can, in good faith, live in continuous tension, always recognizing that his choices within and between roles are arbitrary with respect to a public world. We may ask, however, whether good faith is enough.

In modern consciousness, the institution is replaced by the organization, or the association, as the primary form through which human action is organized. While the institution is a standardized set of roles oriented toward fulfilling a basic aim of the collectivity, an organization or association is a set of roles oriented toward fulfilling a particular aim. No longer are the vehicles of organizing human endeavor seen as necessary to the fulfillment of meaning, and no longer are they mutually supportive. They are, however, identifiable by the aims that they serve. Perhaps the best account of organization in the modern world has been presented by Peter Blau and W. Richard Scott who distinguish among organizations by a criterion of *cui bono*.[12] In business concerns owners are the prime beneficiaries, in service organizations clients are the prime beneficiaries, in commonweal organizations the public-at-large is the prime beneficiary, and in mutual-benefit associations the mem-

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[10] William J. Goode, "A Theory of Role Strain," *The American Sociological Review*, 25 (1960), 483-96.
[11] *Ibid.*
[12] Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott, *Formal Organizations* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1962), 43.

bers are the prime beneficiaries.[13] Blau and Scott discuss neither the ways in which the aims of various organizations might be coordinated, nor the possibilities of organizations serving other beneficiaries than those stated. They do note that a change in prime beneficiary signifies a radical alteration in the basic nature of the organization. The democratic state is organized like a mutual-benefit association.[14]

As was the case with space and time consciousness and juridical consciousness, there are two forms of modern consciousness with respect to the primary form of organization. Here, the distinction between missionary's consciousness and anthropologist's consciousness mirrors the distinction between the monist and pluralist positions on state sovereignty that has been transferred to systems theory by David Easton and Talcott Parsons.[15] In a recent volume Donald McIntosh has stretched the modern preoccupation to its ultimate conclusion: "It is possible, of course, to argue that the State has no purpose — only its subunits. While this position has been rejected here, . . . (the) point is . . . that one must choose one or the other of the two positions before one can begin to grapple with the main problems of political theory in a coherent way." [16] Essentially, the missionary argues that one organization or association, or sub-system, authoritatively allocates values for a collectivity (or should so allocate values), while the anthropologist argues that no one sub-system has consistent priority in the allocation of values for a collectivity (or should have such priority). Again, the missionary is concerned with imposing a sovereignty and, thereby, a meaning on the collectivity. The anthropologist believes that contending interests are somehow balanced, that intense interests are satisfied, or that one must accept a world of chaos in which ignorant armies clash by night. The first stance substitutes peace for meaning, the second substitutes utility for meaning and the third embraces meaninglessness. Of course, the missionary does no better in his effort to will a public interest out of rhetorical images or partial principles of order such as class, nation, citizenship or profession.

The alienation of modern man is no longer alienation from individuality. Rather, it is alienation from the frames of space and time that might provide meaning. For the missionary this generalized state is determined as alienation from the power to make the preferred time and space frame sovereign. There are two components of such alienation: alienation from decision-making and alienation from purpose. G. H. Mead has described the first component as a presupposition of the political institution: "In a word, the political institution presupposes first, relations set up between those at an effective distance from each other, distance which may be measured in miles or days or in insurmountable barriers of social classes and castes; and secondly, that the social control over the conduct of men in the relationship, which would arise through the other social relations if these distances were overcome, must in the interest of the whole be exercised by some compelling

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[13] *Ibid.*
[14] *Ibid.*, 253.
[15] W. J. M. Mackenzie, *Politics and Social Science* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1967), 110.
[16] Donald McIntosh, *The Foundations of Human Society* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969), 316-17.

social force within the radius of whose action the distant individuals fall; and thirdly, that with the completion of the socialization of those who lie within this relationship the function of the institution, its guarantee of rights, ceases." [17] Since the "completion" of socialization cannot be approached in a world characterized by role strain and institutional conflict, multiple codes of representative law, upheld by the organizationally powerful, impose the frames of space and time favored by some on others. Of course, failing to approach the goal of full socialization — the missionary's fondest dream — compelling social force is exercised in the interest of a part and rationalized as in the interest of the collectivity. F. Baerwald has described the second component of alienation. He argues that organizations articulate specific goals and "develop procedures and safeguards to assure these objectives." [18] However, in order to "fulfill the basic exigency of coexistence as the social time-space continuum" each organization must also be concerned with "its projection, identity maintenance and continuity." [19] When project orientation, or mere maintenance, displaces object orientation, or goal attainment, as the primary aim of the organization, there is alienation from purpose. Missionaries have often thought that if they controlled Mead's compelling social force they could minimize project orientation and maximize object orientation. Of such dreams are tragedies made. Such dreams are old-fashioned. For the anthropologist, alienation is determined as estrangement from responsibility for one's creation and preservation. William James described this type of alienation: ". . . when a living want of mankind has got itself officially protected and organized in an institution, one of the things which the institution most surely tends to do is to stand in the way of the natural gratification of the want itself." [20] Frustration here is not so much due to power as it is a consequence of technique and specialization: "Too often do the place-holders of such institutions frustrate the spiritual purpose to which they were appointed to minister by the technical light which soon becomes the only light in which they seem to be able to see the purpose, and the narrow way which is the only way in which they can work in its service." [21] The anthropologist sees the organizations around him as dehumanizing in that their essence is technique. Nicola Chiaromonte has remarked that the "political idea characteristic of our time" is that technique must be applied efficiency to society by treating society as a "uniform material to be molded and an energy to be regulated." [22] The anthropologist asks what meaning the organizational life might have beyond the provision of biological need, and then sniffs the pollution, realizing that biological need is not satisfied. As a seeker after harmony or gratification, or as an existentialist, he knows in advance that there is no way out of his quandary. The missionary mistakes the will to meaning

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[17] George Herbert Mead, "Natural Rights and the Theory of Political Institution," in Andrew Reck (ed.), *George Herbert Mead, Selected Writings* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1964), 169.

[18] Friedrich Baerwald, *Thought,* XLII, 553.

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] William James, *Human Immortality: Two Supposed Objections* (London: Archibald Constable and Co., 1906), 7.

[21] *Ibid.*

[22] Nicola Chiaromonte, "On Modern Tyranny: A Critique of Western Intellectuals," *Dissent,* March-April, 1969, 143.

for meaning; the anthropologist gives up on the will to meaning. The anthropologist is more advanced.

Post-modern historical consciousness grows out of contraditions in modern consciousness. Whereas time and space are unified in traditional consciousness and plural in modern consciousness, they are absent in post-modern consciousness, at least as extended frames. As George Herbert Mead wrote: ". . . reality exists in a present. The present of course implies a past and a future, and to these both we deny existence." [23] Robert Duncan states the matter as one who exists as a post-modern man: "This feeling of coming to the end or the beginning of things never comes to an end and is always beginning." [24] If one refuses to become a missionary and also refuses to characterize the quest for meaning as unnecessary or absurd, he is left with no transpersonal frames of space and time to which he can relate his creations. He, therefore, loses the sense that he is capable of making contributions and retreats to a consciousness of time that is bounded by the limits of his physical presence or by an infinity of emptiness. Just as the individual is retreating from engagement with history, he is accorded less and less time and space of his own. Space and time increasingly become organized by impersonal structures to which the individual cannot sincerely commit himself. The individual, thus, experiences a profound contraction of his environment and is in the state of coarctation. Lacking transpersonal frames of space and time that would make a contribution meaningful, he may involve himself with technique or the pursuit of power. If he becomes an expert technician he will be absorbed in a universe of abstract and infinite process and he will experience a deadening mysticism. If he attains power he will be engrossed in convincing others to commit themselves to a space-time frame in which he does not believe. The man of power and the technician combine to dominate contemporary organization. Chiaromonte remarks that the essence of modern tyranny is the belief that society must be modified "from on high by means of more or less violent external interventions." [25] Modern tyranny is correlated with "the fact that modern man cannot conceive of anything absolute outside the political absolute, and therefore of no other duty superior to that of political action, and no other ultimate means of resolving action outside of technically organized violence." [26]

Since systems of rights and duties only have a moral meaning when they are oriented to the preservation or extension of space and time frames for human contributions, the disappearance of extended space and time frames also signals the perversion of rights and duties. While modern man attempted to impose a system of rights and duties on a collectivity, balance conflicting rights and duties, gain gratification within a system of rights and duties, or accept contradiction, post-modern man tries to maximize his rights and minimize his duties in every situation, whether or not he will gain immediate

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[23] George Herbert Mead, *The Philosophy of the Present* (LaSalle: Open Court Publishing Company, 1959), 1.
[24] Robert Duncan, *Caterpillar* 8/9, 231.
[25] Nicola Chiaromonte, *Dissent*, March-April, 1969, 149.
[26] *Ibid.*, 148.

gratification in the process. To maximize rights means to minimize interference and maximize aid in the performance of a function. To minimize duties means to maximize interference and minimize aid with respect to the performance of functions by others. The strategy of maximizing rights and minimizing duties is the strategy of appropriating time and space in which to carry out one's personal project. Of course, the project is private and has no meaning in an extended space and time frame. The time and space are sought none-the-less, and they are sought at the necessary expense of others. One appropriates time in the post-modern world of organization by bribery, force and fraud. It is the dynamics of fraud that concern us here. Unlike the missionary, post-modern man does not believe that he can impose meaning for a collectivity through force. Unlike the anthropologist, post-modern man does not believe that the quest for meaning can be eschewed. He does believe that meaning can be private or, at best relational, and that a condition for gaining meaning is the successful application of bribery, force or fraud.

The typical form of organization in the post-modern world is no longer the association or organization, but the complex, conglomerate and agency. The smallest unit of organization for post-modern consciousness is the agency. An agency is a set of roles oriented to the performance of a specific task or a set of specific tasks. In relation to the agency the individual is a technician who is expected to be practical in the sense Barry Targan uses the term: ". . . by practical we mean the best ultimate solution to a problem through the most efficient application of human energies . . ." [27] However, unless the individual has opted for absorption in technique, he will attempt to maximize his rights and minimize his duties within the agency so that he can escape the agency. When the individual escapes the agency, he enters the conglomerate. A conglomerate is a set of diverse agencies that are administered as a unit. Since there is no rationale for the aggregation of any particular agencies within a conglomerate, as forms of organization conglomerates are completely project oriented (directed towards self-preservation and brute expansion). They can "spin-off" or amalgamate agencies at any time such actions will give them more space and time. It is the agencies that are object oriented and powerless. It is the conglomerates that are project oriented and powerful. Agencies are the nodal points for professional and sub-professional activities. As the centers of technique, they marshal whatever energies they can for goal attainment. The space and time situation of the technician in an agency may be somewhat improved by a professional association or union that acts as an interest group. However, these associations tend to become conglomerates themselves. Conglomerates are the nodal points for political activities, and in the post-modern world, politics occurs in complexes. Complexes are aggregations of conglomerates that can cooperate in appropriating resources in some situations, although they compete with one another in other situations. In any situation the conglomerate is a member of one or more complexes. Since the conglomerate is initially defined

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[27] Barry Targan, "The Survival Papers: No. 1 — Saving the Species," *Discourse*, XII, 2 (Spring, 1969), 257.

as a member of a complex by an agency that it has amalgamated, the conglomerate can be a member of two or more complexes that seem to be in conflict. However, the conglomerate can only gain in this situation because it will take the side of the stronger complex in any situation and sacrifice the agency that represents the weaker complex. In a conflict, object orientation will always be sacrified to project orientation. In the sense we are using the term, conglomerates are not necessarily business concerns. The walls of separation between business concerns, service organizations, commonweal organizations and mutual benefit associations are crumbling, if they haven't fallen already. Conglomerates gain resources through the provision of goods and services (sales), access to the means to coercion, fraud and reciprocity. Reciprocity is a term in anti-trust law that means "a seller's use of the volume or potential volume of its purchases to induce others to buy its own products." [28] Reciprocity may be broadened to include "reciprocity effect," or the "tendency of a firm desiring to sell to another company to channel its purchases to that company." [29] Reciprocity may be extended from its core meaning to include all cases in which an organization or person influences or coerces another organization or person to give it resources because it can fulfill a need of that organization or person. Organizations and individuals in the post-modern world aim to be the dominant partners in as many relationships of reciprocity as possible. What better way to maximize rights and minimize duties than to gain aid merely because you can provide a necessary service to another, not because you have provided that service?

Alienation in the post-modern world reaches its ultimate conclusion as alienation from extended space and time frames. For the technician there is abstract and infinite process; for the politician there is momentary advantage. History disappears in the conglomerate that serves no purpose but accumulation. The vehicle for the enforcement of rights and duties contains no ground for rights and duties but power. And might does not make right. Historical consciousness is itself negated and becomes present consciousness, in which past and future are implied, but do not exist.

Post-modern consciousness represents a negation of historical consciousness and its four components. In traditional consciousness space and time were unified, though not uniform or homogeneous. There was one central core of meaning, usually sacred, to which men could refer their works. In modern consciousness, space and time become disunified and, therefore, several centers of possible meaning appear. Missionary's consciousness represents an attempt to select one space and time frame as real and suppress the others. Anthropologist's consciousness expresses an effort to make a personal elastic unity out of multiple space and time frames. Post-modern consciousness considers the adoption of one space and time frame as real to be an exercise of bad faith, while at the same time refusing to give up the quest for a central meaning. The space and time frame of post-modern conscious-

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[28] Joseph Egelhof, "Nixon Trust Policy Raked by 2 Leaders," *Chicago Tribune*, October 24, 1969, Sec. 3, 9.
[29] *Ibid.*

ness shrinks to the individual's presence or dissolves in a vacuous infinity. While Marshall McLuhan has written that if the city civilizes man, "then might not our current translation of our entire lives into the spiritual form of information seem to make of the entire globe, and of the human family, a single conciouness?": we may answer, "No!"; no, not unless there is a message as well as a medium.[30] In traditional conciousness rights and duties were congruent, while in modern conciousness there was conflict within and between roles. In post-modern consciousness, rights and duties no longer appear as instrumental to the realization of goals, or the preservation and creation of contributions. While the oppressed of tradition might demand a good king to enforce rights and duties and the modern oppressed might demand a new set of rights and duties; the post-modern oppressed, composed of all post-modern men, attempt to maximize their rights and minimize their duties in every situation. With the collapse of time and space, the ground of rights and duties in the possibility of transhumanization has given way. The idea of right has been forgotten. For traditional conciousness the typical form of organization was the institution — a set of roles oriented toward the fulfillment of a basic aim of the collectivity. As space and time frames become plural, organizations — sets of roles oriented toward the fulfillment of particular aims — took the place of institutions as the typical organizational units. In the post-modern era conglomerates succeed organizations. Conglomerates, with no purpose but brute expansion, are the concrete extensions of contracted space and time frames in the world. Finally, alienation in traditional conciousness was estrangement from the "I"; the creator and appreciator of unique contributions. In modern conciousness the "I" appears on the stage but, paradoxically, is alienated from the organizations through which he might make a contribution and appreciate the contributions of others. He is alienated from the process of allocating rights and duties and he becomes increasingly aware that the allocations are intended to further project orientation rather than object orientation. Further, he is alienated from responsibility for the creation and preservation of human works by the extension of technique. The post-modern world ushers in alienation from historical conciousness itself. As extended space and time frames drop away, the human being loses consciousness that he can be engrossed in the relationship of the pronouns "we" and "they" to his relevant collectivity as a creator and appreciator of meaningful contributions. He has no relevant collectivity and his acts have no transpersonal meaning. Just as value conciousness was depreciated in traditional consciousness, so historical consciousness is depreciated in the post-modern modes of orientation.

In the post-modern era there is no transpersonal space and time, merely personal spaces and times. Men maintain individual projects and attempt to gain access to organizational power and, ultimately, the means to coercion, to experiment with these projects. While in the modern age men spoke of being religious without belonging to a church, in the post-modern era men

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[30] Marshall McLuhan, *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man* (New York: Signet Books, 1964), 67.

speak of their historicity without belonging to a collectivity. When men vie for access to the means to coercion so that they can experiment with their projects, the crisis in historical conciousness becomes a political crisis. Everything is done for the nonce — for the occasion or for the time. However, opponents seek to hide their conceptions of time and space from one another as a condition for carring out their experiments. They will use force and bribery on one another, as well as fraud. The vehicle of fraud is the nonce word — the word used for one occasion. Nonce words become components of strategies aimed at maximizing rights and minimizing duties through shifting one's professed allegiance from one collectivity to another, whenever this is advantageous. Through maximizing rights and minimizing duties one attempts to become the dominant partner in as many relationships of reciprocity as possible. In the post-modern world individuals with private and disguised projects confront one another in a contest to maximize rights and minimize duties so that they can obtain space, time, resources and aid for experimenting with these projects. Force, bribery, and the continous shifting of allegiances from one collectivity to another are the means used to prosecute the battle.

The core of historical consciousness is being engrossed in the relationship of the pronouns "we" and "they" to one's relevant collectivity. One's relevant collectivity is the collectivity that provides him with his transpersonal space and time frames. When transpersonal space and time frames collapse one can no longer relate to the world through the notions of "we" and "they". Therefore, post-modern man is free to use "we" and "they" at his personal convenience — for the nonce. Of course, politicians throughout history have pledged loyalty to collectivities and have broken their trust by experimenting with their private projects. In ancient China Han Fei Tzu wrote that politicians "who further the private interests of old friends are called "staunch", those who distribute largesses out of the public funds are called "kind men. . . ."[31] However, only with the advent of plural space and time frames could politicians begin to move among various collectivities, peddling philosophies of history for the nonce — building coalitions. During the modern period, politicians attempted to provide what Paul Meadows has called an "eschatos" — "a portrayal of the 'final' end or direction of change" that serves as "a meta-model of meaningfulness in history.[32] Ideology, from the perspective of historical conciousness, provided meaning for one's actions, just as it provided goals from the perspective of value conciousness. The meaning-frame contained within an ideology specified the "we" that gave history its purpose and opposed it to a "they" that was an obstacle to progress. The prevalence of ideology gave rise to an antidote — the sociology of knowledge, or, as Arthur Bentley called it, socio-analysis. Bentley was shocked that everywhere "around us parts of our social activity are casting their

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[31] Arthur Waley, *Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China* (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, n.d.), 164.
[32] Paul Meadows, "Eschatons of Change: Philosophical Backgrounds of Development Theory," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology,* IX, 1 (March, 1968), 41.

demands absolutely against the social sky, ignoring their relativity, stating themselves in language-thought structures which split themselves off from their origin in activity and attempt to justify that from which they arise."[33] Bentley's hope was for an educational system that would criticize ideology by "giving the meanings of words and thoughts, slogans and ideals, policies and doctrines in terms of their groupal origins and groupal bearers."[34] What Bentley failed to realize, of course, was that ideologies were more than just rationalizations of interests. They were attempts to provide an "eschatos". No doubt, ideologies were exploited by men of power. The historical mission of the "we" might be changed, its membership might be expanded or contracted, its space might be redefined and the time of realization might be put off or brought closer. However, in the modern era, politicians usually manipulated only one ideology. They could be effectively criticized through socio-analysis because they could be identified as representatives of some partial interest. In the post-modern era ideologies gave way to images. From the perspective of value conciousness images provide life-styles rather than goals. From the perspective of historical conciousness images provide identifications rather than meanings. In the modern era, groups bore an historical mission and were organized as associations. In the post-modern era confluxes exemplify ways of life and are organized as complexes. Confluxes are the typical creations of post-modern politicians. The "silent majority" as "we" and the "vocal minority" as "they"; the "effete corps of impudent snobs"; the "boys in Viet Nam"; the "Now Generation" — all of these are confluxes. Confluxes are depictions of life-styles with which people can identify. Politicians pledge their loyalty to confluxes of their own creation. They shift their loyalty from one conflux to the next as the chance for greater advantage arises. Confluxes are described by nonce words. Confluxes are the relevant collectivities of the post-modern era. Leaders act in the name of confluxes and oppositions appeal to them. The importance of confluxes in contemporary political rhetoric is testimony to the collapse of extended space and time frames in the post-modern era. Sociology of knowledge or socio-analysis cannot effectively criticize images. The antidotes for modern consciousness analyzed goal-oriented behavior and its rationalization — whether conscious or self-deceptive. Behavior and rhetoric could be referred to a group, class or occupational basis. In a world of conglomerates, politics does not express social formations, but expresses private projects. This does not mean that interest groups and classes are no longer important factors in political affairs. The Roman Catholic Church is still an important factor in political affairs and it is a traditional institution. However, added to the older kinds of collectivities are confluxes; and the older kinds of collectivities tend to be reinterpreted as confluxes as time goes on. A new antidote is necessary to aid the post-modern mind in understanding its dimensions. Baerwald has suggested "situational analysis"

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[33] Arthur F. Bentley, *Relativity in Man and Society* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1926), 196-97.
[34] *Ibid.*, 197.

as the proper function of sociology and political science: "The interplay between the internal processes of growth of the individual and the specific space and time references as they result from his location in society can be made the subject of a situational analysis. This can contribute to an exploration of the causes of the malfunctioning of individuals and of group neuroses and indicate methods of a more successful social integration."[35] Thusfar we have been engaged in a situational analysis of post-modern man. We have described the space and time references characteristic of the present age and have related them to political processes. It remains to show that political and social actions are self defeating under the conditions imposed by post-modern consciousness.

Post-modern politics revolves around loyalties because post-modern man is a being in search of a collectivity to which he can pledge allegiance. Post-modern man confronts a dilemma that follows from his inability to accept either missionary's or anthropologist's consciousness. From the point of view of the missionary, he denounces the anthropologist's attempt to live without a transpersonal meaning. From the point of view of the anthropologist, he denounces the missionary's attempt to impose an arbitrary space and time frame on other human beings. Thus, he quests for a meaning that is essentially private and that does not transcend his spatio-temporal position, as a substitute for a meaning that is rationally defensible and that does transcend his spatio-temporal position. As a consequence of the quest for a private meaning, post-modern man attempts to maximize rights and minimize duties. He shifts his loyalties from one collectivity to the next and at the extreme invents phantom collectivities, or confluxes, to which he claims allegiance. When post-modern men confront one another, systems of rights and duties collapse, and force and wealth order relations. Claims of loyalty to one or another collectivity are discounted and the strategy of shifting loyalties is no longer effective. All collectivities are deemed confluxes and there is no public space in which to carry out private projects. Universal diffidence of the kind that Hobbes described supervenes: "And from this diffidence to one another there is no way for any man to secure himself so reasonable as anticipated — that is, by force or wiles to master the persons of all men he can, so long till he sees no other power great enough to endanger him; and this is no more than his own conservation requires, and is generally allowed."[36] The only project possible in this reconstituted state of nature is the project of waging war: "For WAR consists not in battle only, or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known; and therefore the notion of *time* is to be considered in the nature of war as it is in the nature of weather. For as the nature of foul weather lies not in a shower or two of rain but in an inclination thereto of many days together, so the nature of war consists not in actual fighting but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary."[37] Hobbes recognized that in the state of war time is

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[35] Friedrich Baerwald, "A Sociological View of Depersonalization," *Tought*, XXI, 120 (Spring, 1956), 77n.
[36] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan: Parts I and II* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, Inc., 1958), 106.
[37] *Ibid.*, 106-107.