**Diplommetry.**\* By I. P. Singh (Somaiya Publications, Pvt. Ltd., Bombay, India, 1970, 114 pages).

In a small volume of 110 pages, Dr. Singh undertakes the task of quantifying diplomacy. The problems of diplomatic life which he had experienced in the Indian Foreign Service inspired him to develop a quantitative, measurable approach as an aid in the solution of such problems. Diplomacy to Dr. Singh is the formulation, conduct and evaluation of foreign policy. Diplomatic actions, accordingly, are intended to achieve some combination of the following goals: "to strengthen the security of the country, or to ward off an element of danger to its security; to augment the prosperity of the country or to eliminate a threat to its well being; to stress the country's sovereignty or to stave off an affront to that sovereignty; to enhance the influence of the country over its fellow states or to remove a factor which tends to diminish its influence over them or some other similar aim."

Dr. Singh views the primary function of diplommetry as an aid in achieving those objectives, by providing "a conversion table to diplomats by which they can translate complex political situations into figures up to a reasonable reliable degree." Dr. Singh is very careful to note that what he proposes should be used "only for guidance and should never be taken as answers to diplomatic riddles."

Basically his approach is to develop formulae and indices using well known measurable factors of a nation and to apply these to various diplomatic problems. His list of factors are a nation's population, manpower, total government expenditures, total exports, total imports, value of foreign aid given and value of foreign aid received.

From these basic data of nations, Dr. Singh develops a calculus of national self interest, a quantitative measure of how a nation should proportion diplomatic effort among its basic goals. He proceeds to develop a ledger of diplomatic achievements, an indicator of a nation's relative diplomatic success. Another chapter is devoted to evaluating particular diplomatic actions of a nation by developing calculus of positive and negative points resulting from such actions.

Dr. Singh holds forth the promise of a system unraveling complex problems of diplomatic life. On closer examination, one is left with the uneasy feeling that his solutions raise as many questions as they purport to answer. An example will help to illustrate why this is so.

Dr. Singh sets up rules for measuring and combining factors in his development of a calculus of national self interest. Thus a primary goal of a sovereign state, ensuring its physical security is measured by the number of men in arms in that state. A threat to a country's security is measured by the differential in armed strength which Dr. Singh terms the "Defense Quotient" of a country. Specifically, the "Defense Quotient" of a country is the ratio of armed manpower of the country to the armed manpower of its adversary. If country B with three million in armed manpower threatens country A with one million in armed manpower, country A's Defense Quotient

\* EDITOR'S NOTE: *This word does not presently appear in standard British or American dictionaries available to this editor.*

is one million divided by three million or ⅓. The inverse of this, 3/1, is the Absolute Defense Need of a country to achieve parity with its adversary. Recognizing that in the short run (a period of a year) many factors can affect the threat to a nation and that only marginal additions to the size of armed forces are possible, Dr. Singh makes certain qualifications. The defense problem, in the short run, depends upon the attention the country is paying to its defense threat in its budget compared with the attention its adversary is similarly paying to its defense. Thus, a nation's security problem is the "Absolute Defense Need" modified by the "Quotient of Defense Attention." There is no indication of how this modification or weighting process is taking place.

Assuming the security problem to be 3/1 as stated above, (for simplicity without the above modification) Dr. Singh proceeds to measure the appropriate share of national attention that ought to be devoted to this problem. The total national attention available to a country is measured by the size of the federal government's annual budget. If 20 percent of the federal budget is devoted to defense and the adversary has three times the armed strength, the country must devote 20X3 or 60 percent of its national attention to security or 60 percent of its diplomatic attention to national security. This type of analysis is used by Dr. Singh to measure other components of a nation's self-interest such as, share of prosperity, share of influence and share of sovereignty.

Dr. Singh's use of a nation's manpower as the basis of the measure of a nation's security is somewhat dubious. He reasons that nuclear weapons whether in the hands of both nations or in the hands of only one is merely a marginal threat. Security should be assessed, in Dr. Singh's analysis, on the basis of conventional armaments. However, once having established this, Dr. Singh proceeds to discount differences in the quality and quantity of firepower for three reasons: one reason is the extreme difficulty if not impossibility of comparing fire power; the second reason is that most countries possess similar types of fire power; and thirdly, weapons generally are in direct ratio to manpower.

In the modern world with tremendous variations in the quality and quantity of firepower and in the quality of manpower, comparisons based on quantities of manpower appear to be, at best, a superficial approach. Granted the fact that Dr. Singh's comparisons of manpower are merely rules of thumb, a comparison the author asserts could be discarded if better rules are found. The question arises concerning the value of such comparisons. The sole use of measured manpower fails to recognize the trade-offs between manpower and firepower and the other strategic factors in defense. Other questions also come to mind. For example, why is a nation's federal budget the best measure of the "national attention" of a country? Why should the product of the percentage of the federal budget devoted to defense and "Absolute Defense Need" (even modified by the Quotient of Defense Attention) be the proportion of diplomatic attention paid to security?

Consider, for example, the case of a nation devoting the absurdly low percentage of one percent of its federal budget to defense and all other conditions prevailing as stated before, i.e., an Absolute Defense Need ratio of 3/1. The diplomatic attention devoted to its security according to Dr. Singh's measure would be the product of three and one percent or three percent. The threat is no less than before and most likely greater since the nation has been spending so little for defense. Yet the result leads to a smaller amount of diplomatic attention to be devoted to the problem of security.

In developing the other parts of his calculus of self interest Dr. Singh proceeds to ascertain the percentages of diplomatic attention to be devoted to the other basic goals of prosperity, influence, and sovereignty. He carefully examines the appropriate characteristics and creates measurements for these goals which results in a percentage of diplomatic attention to be devoted to each of them. These percentages are developed independently and are unrelated to each other. In fact, in his example, the sum of the percentages is greater than 100 percent. He defines the situation as one appearing illogical but in fact rather than being illogical "all it means is that the demands on the country's diplomatic attention are greater than its capacity to cope with them effectively." He proceeds to scale down these shares proportionately so that the total attention does come to 100 percent.

To the reviewer, the procedure is illogical. The initial percentages are not related in any logical manner to each other, and therefore there is no reason to treat these factors on pro rata basis. Throughout his text there are numerous points where similar objections can be raised. The non-mathematical sections dealing with the complexities of diplomatic situations, such as uncertainties arising from the human factor, were a delight to the reviewer. Dr. Singh is very aware of these non-quantifiable complexities in human endeavors. However, it is these very non-quantifiable factors that limits, if not completely vitiates, Dr. Singh's attempts at quantification.

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