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"Tam Minervá quam Marte."

EDITED BY THE
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exact sciences, in their various relations; in the department of natural history, in reference to animals, minerals, plants, shells, and geological formations; and in geography and statistics.

"Articles in polite literature; embracing original tales, whether of an imaginative or real character. And, as the object is to give a popular character to the work, both on the score of amusement, as well as instruction, the experience of the officers of the Navy may be effectually superadded, by their furnishing an account of interesting incidents, connected with their long and varied cruises, in the form of sketches of their frequent excursions into the interior of countries; and their visits to points of striking interest, in developing national customs and character—such as Lima and Valparaiso, in the Pacific, the Islands of the South Seas, the romantic shores of Sicily, and last, though not least, Port Mahon, and the Balearic Group.

"Reviews, biographies, and such other matter, not enumerated, as ordinarily make up the contents of a Magazine."

It is confidently believed, that there is an abundance of talent in the Navy, for the successful support of such a work; and with proper zeal and industry, on the part of those capable of affording the desired assistance, in bringing it to the aid of the "Committee of Publication," a new and powerful impulse may be given to the diffusion of useful and ornamental knowledge in the service, by which its character will be exalted, and a higher estimate formed by the public, of its capacities, attributes, and legitimate tendency.

COMPARATIVE RESOURCES OF THE AMERICAN NAVY.

By a Citizen—an honorary member of the U. S. Naval Lyceum.

THERE exist, in the histories of States, periods of infancy, adolescence, youth, manhood, and decadency, as in that of the human frame, in its progress from childhood to decay. In former ages, and under ordinary circumstances, these transitions have been gradual, society usually exhibiting the several aspects of barbarism, feebleness, improvement, and civilization, before it attains the complete developement of its powers, leaving behind a long and eventful history, which, commencing in obscurity, becomes brighter and more distinct with the growing intelligence of its members.

Little of this common fortune, however, has marked the career of America. We have had to encounter the hardships and privations of subduing a wilderness, it is true; but our fathers brought to the task a knowledge of all the contemporary arts of life, and principles that, to say the least, were fully equal to the best of the century in which they lived. From the hour of their arrival in this hemisphere, to the present moment, the advancement of society has been commensurate with these great means, and the results are of a character to induce the most profound reflections, and to inspire the deepest gratitude.

Thousands yet live, who remember these States as Colonies, and, perhaps, a majority of those who are still engaged in active life, can look back, as if it were but yesterday, to the time when necessity, no less than prudence, compelled them to regard the country as a third, or even a fourth rate power. That day is already past, and the time has arrived when America, without an impeachment of her sagacity or discretion, may begin to think of taking her station by the side of the foremost nations of Christendom. Facts have outstripped calculation. The habits of the mind have not kept even pace with the changes of our situation; and while we are, in truth, able, in every sense, and, we trust, as willing

as men ever ought to be, to assume an attitude worthy of our best principles and high destinies, there are, still, some, disposed to reason concerning the foreign policy of the country, on data drawn from the condition in which America so lately *was*, rather than from those that may be drawn from the condition in which America actually *is*.

A crisis has arrived, that renders the investigation of these truths more than usually proper; and, while I feel that neither my limits nor my leisure admits of justice being done to the subject, it is the object of the present article to present to the reader some observations on this interesting topic.

I shall begin, by remarking, that too many, (in regarding the present controversy with France,) appear to have lost sight altogether of the great object which the nation has in view. They seem to think that the preservation of peace is all that can be desired. To this end they direct their reasoning, their influence, and their hopes. Peace is not the object we seek. Peace we have; and in order to maintain it, no great ingenuity is necessary. To effect this abstract purpose, we have only to abandon all claims to our rights, all pretensions to character, and to lose sight entirely of one of the greatest objects for which this Union was formed, and for which we have become a nation; viz. the security of the citizen, when removed beyond the protection of his own municipal laws. The preservation of peace, in our present situation, is but a secondary or a collateral consideration. True humanity, like true policy, is just as much interested in our not mistaking the accessory for the principal, in this matter, as it would be in refusing the use of bullets in warfare, that we might go back to that condition of society, in which men are beaten to death with clubs.

The assertion of high and fair principles, and the maintenance of national character, have just the same connection with justice, and by necessary connection with real humanity, as an advanced state of the arts has on the conduct of wars, which, it is scarcely necessary to say, become less brutal and vindictive, as they become farther removed from the struggles of sheer brute force. If we fight, it is that the sacred claims of truth may be supported, and in defence

of principles that are necessary, not only to the character and dignity, but, in the end, to the independence of the nation.

It is admitted, on all hands, that America and France stand towards each other, at this moment, in warlike attitudes. Whatever may be the result of the present unfortunate difficulties, it is peculiarly proper, therefore, that we should take a cool, and an accurate inventory of our means to sustain a contest, and that these means shall be compared with those likely to be at the disposal of the other party. Dispensing with any more preliminary remarks, I shall come, at once, to this duty.

Whether a war with France should be purely maritime, or not, it is certain that our principal means of offence, as well as of defence, are to be looked for in a navy. If we are to be invaded, this arm of the national defence will prove the most efficient in anticipating and preventing descents on the coast, as well as in completing the triumph of a victory on land, by intercepting retreat. Serious invasion, in fact, would be impracticable, in the face of a strong marine; for reinforcements and supplies would be unattainable; and harassing expeditions, like those attempted by the British, in the war of 1812, would become too hazardous to be risked. On the other hand, if we are to strike at the French colonies, the wisest and most practicable means of bringing the war to a just and speedy close, the policy can only be effected, under the protection of powerful and victorious fleets. To the Navy, then, I shall chiefly direct the inquiry of the present article, deferring the interests connected with the other service, to some future day.

I will here remark, that the public mind appears to have taken a wrong bias, on the subject of the method of carrying on a French war. Most of our reasoning is applied to the means of defence, when our energies should be directed to the means of attack. Though our war would be purely defensive in principle, to be successful, it must become aggressive in fact. A war that should be purely defensive, would confine its efficiency solely to commercial losses; a mode of injuring an enemy, that all experience has shown to be unequal to the

attainment of its end. Neither war, nor non-intercourse, would exclude the manufactures and products of France from our markets. They would be dearer, and their consumption would probably be diminished, though not to an extent seriously to injure our enemy, while the consumer, in both cases, would pay the difference. Expedients of this nature, are certain to open new sources of trade and profit, and not unfrequently, at the expense of the morals and laws of the nation which most relies on their efficacy. *A war with France, to be effective, must be conducted vigorously on the offensive.* Our ships must be abroad in fleets; the American waters must lie at our mercy, nor must the enemy be permitted to find security, even in the European seas. Without aiming at such high means, the struggle, it is true, may serve as a protest in favor of great principles, and it may (to a certain extent) preserve the character and tone of the people; but it will do no justice to the resources, to the enterprise, and to the policy of the nation. That I am not exceeding the bounds of discretion, in making these assertions, it shall be my endeavor to demonstrate.

In the number of her vessels, in preparation, in naval arsenals, and in naval stores, the marine of France is greatly in advance of our own. But all these are the results of artificial and forced means, rather than of causes which may be called natural. The true maritime resources of this country exceed those of France in a much greater degree than that in which her present preparations are in advance of ours. France, with a view to compete with England and Russia for the mastery of the Mediterranean, the great object of her maritime policy, has been forcing her navy, which exists rather in despite of the national character, and a limited commercial navigation, than as a consequence of both, or of either. On the other hand, the marine of this country, as it is now organized, has been forced upon us by our wants, and in direct opposition to the leading prejudice in favor of an exaggerated and misdirected spirit of saving. Twenty years since, a fleet of twenty ships of the line was looked forward to, as to the most remote probability; as an event of another century; and yet we have nearly attained that

point, in a time of general peace, and in the face of contending factions, who have constantly made a stalking-horse of economy, to obtain power. The navy of America is the offspring of her commercial necessities; while that of France is the result of a policy that has incessantly to struggle against natural disadvantages.

It follows from these truths, that France, as a naval power, appears stronger on paper than she will be found to be in fact; and that America, with her energies properly directed, would be found to be stronger in fact, than she appears to be on paper. There is also another reason why France, as a naval power, is not nearly as strong as she is made to appear by her returns. The cruising vessels do not much exceed half of her list; a large proportion of her vessels being transports, hospital-ships, store-ships, and despatch boats, none of which would be available as against us, unless in the event of invasion; a course that could not be taken, were the resources of this country rightly developed. On the other hand, no marine in the world, has, relatively, so few useless vessels as our own. We have ships that require repairs, it is true, but once in order, there is scarcely a vessel on the list, not one of any force, that could not be made really effective.

All that I claim, as premises for my argument, are the facts, that this nation is skilful and rapid in the equipment of vessels; that it has, in abundance, the *materiel* of naval warfare; that its mariners are as good and as brave as those of any other nation, and that the *morale* and discipline of its marine are as high. I ask no more; I presume that no one will be disposed to deny me these. I shall affirm that, man for man, ship for ship, and gun for gun, the French are no better than ourselves, and I trust no American will wish me to say less in our own behalf.

An offensive and defensive maritime war can be carried on only in fleets of heavy vessels. Light cruisers may annoy, and they may invigorate by their successes, but they can scarcely produce peace. Desultory warfare on the ocean, like skirmishes on the land, does not lead to great results. Economy itself, therefore, points to heavy investments at the

commencement, and to large exhibitions of force, that a waste of time and of efforts may be avoided. One victory, like that of Trafalgar, would be worth a hundred successful combats in frigates. It would cost less in blood and treasure, and would directly tend to peace, while defeats in detail would rather excite our enemy to new efforts, and produce little more than fresh exertions. I know that the public mind is not yet prepared for a great demonstration of naval force; that opinion has not kept pace with facts; and that they who are most disposed to meet the struggle, calculate more largely on the effects of commercial distress in France, than on our own means to coerce justice. It is my aim to prove their error.

In order to make out my case, let us investigate facts. The annual revenue of France may be put, in round numbers, at \$200,000,000. This is an enormous sum, and we are too apt to ascribe undue power to the nation which can pay it. But it should be remembered, this is what France is paying to-day, in a time of peace, though with an army on a war establishment. In this expenditure, however, is included all the charges of justice, a portion of the expenses of the roads, the civil cost of government, and many other heads of expenditures, that, with us, are purely local. Perhaps \$20,000,000 may about meet the proportion of similar items with us, including the cost of the army and navy, on the present peace establishments. Counting head for head, the people of this country, to say the least, are quite as able to pay an equal amount of taxes, as the people of France. If there be rather more wealth among the rich in France, there is vastly more poverty among the poor. As a whole, therefore, after allowing for the difference in numbers, we are, in fact, the richer nation of the two.

The known rate of increase of the population, will give America, to-day, 15,000,000 of souls; while that of France is about 32,500,000: for the facility of calculation, however, I will put the latter at 33,000,000. If 15,000,000 of souls pay \$20,000,000, 33,000,000 ought to pay but \$44,000,000; whereas France, in fact, pays already four times and a half that sum. Now, making all plausible deductions from this calculation, and allowing for a greater military and naval

equipment on the part of France,—which military and naval preparations, however, are necessary for objects unconnected with us, and may therefore fairly be set down in the general account against her,—we arrive at positive proofs that, comparatively, we are in a much better condition to bear the pecuniary burdens of a war, than the power with which we may be called upon to contend.

But money is not the only essential of war. Knowledge of the arts, organization, and *materiel*, are also required. Grape-shot, in some situations, are better than dollars. A knowledge of all the arts necessary to force naval armaments, will not be denied us. Our organization, though somewhat defective, is capable of an expansion and improvement to meet the emergency. There may be some delay in the necessary accumulation of *materiel*, especially ship-timber; but as durability must be sacrificed to necessity, I think this difficulty could be overcome, within the time I shall allow. The question of men shall be attended to in its place. With these preliminaries arranged, I shall proceed to show that a fleet of fifty sail of two-deckers, might be built, equipped, and sent to sea, within one year from this day, and there maintained, during a war of five years, on the present resources of this country.

The cost of such a ship as the Delaware, with her crew on board, may be set down at \$500,000. If built in a southern port, it might a little exceed this sum; if in a northern, there would be more than a proportionate gain. The twelve vessels already launched, or nearly ready to be launched, with the materials collected for others, shall be counted, in a pecuniary sense, as ten sail completely equipped. This will leave forty sail to be paid for. As the cost of every thing would be enhanced by a forced armament, and it would be necessary to build a portion, at least, (say half,) of these ships by contract, twenty per cent. shall be added for the difference. Forty ships, at \$600,000, would make a total of \$24,000,000. This expenditure could be easily met by the Treasury, during the current year.

A ship of the size of the Delaware might, on emergency, and with great efforts, be constructed in ninety days; but twice that period shall be allowed. This would, of course,

render it necessary to put up twenty ships at a time. There probably are, in the yards, ten ship-houses, of sufficient size to take in two-deckers, which would cause a saving of at least a month in a ship; especially in the northern ports. It might be necessary to use a good deal of white-oak in the frames of these vessels, but as economy of time, and not of money, would be the object, as just intimated, the loss would be in durability. It may even be questioned, *ceteris paribus*, if, on account of the difference in weight, a white-oak ship will not sail faster than a live-oak ship. It is not easy to see why this must not be the case, in moderate weather.

We next come to the important point of the crews. My plan would reject the use of frigates and sloops, beyond a very limited number. England (our great example, in too many things) has led us into an error, on this point. It is indispensably necessary to Great Britain, to keep up her communications with her numerous dependencies, by light armed cruisers. They are also eminently useful in her narrow seas, and in protecting her trade, by means of convoys. America is differently situated. We have no narrow seas; no colonies; nor could the system of convoys be established among us. The navigation we may possess in time of war must depend chiefly on its heels or its armaments. As a protection against privateers, the latter would be found, half the time, sufficient. All the government can do, will be to keep the coast clear, for entrances and exits, and, occasionally, to sweep particular seas. I repeat, we have no periodical colonial trade, that will admit of convoys. Neither are convoys suited to the character of this people. We might possibly send cotton-loaded ships, in autumn and winter, in fleets; but our treaties forbidding monopolies in this matter, like those which England enjoys in her colonial intercourse, neutrals would get all that portion of the carrying that our owners were not disposed to risk. This is almost the only interest that would be seriously injured by a French war. Cotton itself, after a short depression, would, I think, command higher prices, even in the country, so long as there should continue a safe outlet; for the domestic manufactories would create a lively competition for the raw material, and

enterprise, being directed to other objects, would impede the progressive opening of new cotton fields.

I shall take the present number of frigates and sloops, as all that will be needed. Our force, to be efficient, I repeat, (for on this truth rests all the validity of my argument,) must be exhibited in masses, and not frittered away in single ships. The former system made Napoleon a conqueror. The latter would have left him merely a marauder.

Fifteen frigates and twenty sloops shall be allowed. The crew of a heavy two-decker may be estimated at 900 souls; but to meet contingencies, it shall here be set down at 1000. For the same reason, the crews of the frigates shall be raised to 500, and those of the sloops to 250, all told. The supernumeraries would answer to do the service of the yards, and the usual port duty. These estimates will give us 50,000 souls for the line-of-battle ships; 7,500 for the frigates; and 5,000 for the sloops; making a total of 62,500 men: From this calculation, large as it certainly is, shall be excluded, entirely, the quarter-deck officers.

Taking each line-of-battle ship at 90 guns, each frigate at 54, and each sloop at 22, we get a total of 5,750 guns, which, at a marine a gun, makes a deduction from the remainder of the crews, of an equal number of men, leaving 56,750 still to be provided. The marines are deducted, because they are simply soldiers; might, at need, be drafted from the line of the army, and could be raised without difficulty, at any time.

We have now to recruit 56,750 petty officers, seamen, ordinaries, landsmen, and boys. Large ships notoriously requiring a smaller proportion of able seamen than frigates and sloops, 10,000 landsmen would not be a large estimate for the vessels named. The common American might safely be trusted at a gun tackle, or a brace, or a tack, or a fall, in opposition to the common French marine conscript. Were we to increase this amount to 20,000, the advantage would still be on our side, as must be apparent to all who are acquainted with the habits and physical forces of the laborers of the two countries. In general mental resources, and in aptitude to learn, there is no comparison between them. Al-

lowing a further addition of 5,000 boys, or of lads between twelve and eighteen, we have still to raise 41,750 petty officers, seamen, and ordinaries.

Although, in time of peace, good petty officers are difficult to be had, yet, in a war in which *no commissions should be issued to privateers*, it is believed they could be raised in any desirable numbers. The high pay, the advantage of prize money, want of employment in the commercial marine, and, it is trusted, a love of country, would lead thousands of active young men, mates of ships, &c., into the service, as quartermasters, quarter-gunners, captains of tops, &c. &c. Ordinary seamen, in similar circumstances, would abound. If we allow for 3,000 petty officers, we shall certainly not be accused of a want of liberality. This number would not, probably, be employed afloat, but including supernumeraries, I think something near it would be required. If the remainder of the crews be equally divided between the seamen and the ordinaries, it will leave rather less than 20,000 men of each class, to complete the equipments. The country has, in round numbers, 100,000 mariners. Allowing that one half of these are thrown out of employment by a war, can it be thought that 50,000 mariners will not supply 3,000 petty officers, and 20,000 seamen, and such seamen, too, as are rated after the petty officers of a man-of-war?

Seamen, like fluids, are certain to find their level. Where there is good pay, good food, and good treatment, they will most abound. The packet service, between New-York and Europe, is perhaps the hardest duty in which a mariner can be employed. The pay is not very high, and yet they are always found.

No service pays equally well with our own; for no nation can so well afford to pay. Neither does any other service give a better ration; England excepted, perhaps no nation as good. A French admiral once inquired of the writer, how much we paid our seamen. On hearing the amount, he exclaimed, "It is not possible you can ever have a large marine; no nation could support the expense!" "How much, Monsieur, do you give your king?" "Eight millions of dollars, annually," observed Gen. La Fayette, who was present.

"Well, we pay the President \$25,000; we will meet the difference in the cost of seamen, by the difference between these two items, alone, to say nothing of the other results of a general system of economy, which, perhaps, is carried out to a fault."

If the government will give *all* the prize money, in every case, to the officers and crews, instead of deducting one half for the pensions, as is now done, one great difficulty in obtaining men, will at once be removed. Nations should never speculate on their captures, but wisely use them as incentives to induce others to effect their great political ends. A deduction of ten per cent. might be made in behalf of the Pension Fund; but the balance should, without reserve, be given to the captors. By adopting this course, and by refusing to commission privateers, more than half of the mariners of the country would always be at its disposal, in the event of a serious maritime war.

I hold it to be unnecessary to show, that the population of the country is equal to bearing a drain of a hundred thousand men, for naval and military purposes, since the returns of the war of 1812, show a larger proportion (militia exclusive) under arms, in the years 1814 and 1815. I have far greater doubts of being able properly to officer the force named, than of the nation's being able to man it. The list of captains would require to be raised to about a hundred; that of the master commandants is now quite as large as would be needed, while that of the lieutenants ought not to be much less than six hundred. The service, as now organized, would readily furnish the necessary Flag Officers, and captains; but some doubts may be justly entertained on the subject of lieutenants. Ships may be handled, however, and well handled, too, with fewer officers than we are accustomed to attach to them; and a year or two of active warfare would do all that is required, to fit the elder midshipmen for promotion. Lawrence had a watch in the second year of his service; and Decatur wore a broad pennant within ten years from the day he was first afloat. I shall be asked, admitting that the country can build and equip the force named, in the time stated, in what manner are the annual burdens to be

met, and to what object are the services of so large a fleet to be directed?

There is little question, but we should be compelled to resort to loans, in carrying on a vigorous warfare; nor is there any doubt as to the ability of the nation to borrow, at reasonable rates of interest, any sums that are likely to be required. Direct taxation, the sales of public lands, and the custom houses, protected in their receipts by fleets able to keep the ports open, and the American seas clear of enemies, (a few straggling cruisers excepted,) would yield a sum much nearer to the whole amount of the expenditures of the country, than may at first be imagined.

The mean of the population of America, during the war of 1812, was about 8,000,000, or rather more than half of what would be the mean of the population, during a war that should commence on the 1st January, 1836, and terminate on the 1st January, 1840. No one will deny that the wealth of this country has increased, during the last twenty years, in a ratio greatly exceeding that of the population. I shall assume, however, that man for man, we are only as rich to-day, as we were in 1812.

As there was no recourse to taxation, in the first year of the last war, that year shall be omitted in the estimates. The last year, however, was a year of peace. My estimates shall be taken from the years '13, '14, and '15. I will therefore double the receipts of the custom houses, in 1814, in order to obtain what would have been the probable receipts of 1815, had not peace been made, and shall take the receipts of direct taxation, for the three years of '12, '14, and '15, as the latter year gave, probably, neither more nor less of this species of revenue, on account of the termination of the war. Indeed, the receipts of 1816, from this source of revenue, were larger than those of either of the former years.

The custom house receipts (war duties) of the years 1813, and of that of 1814, doubled, amounted to \$25,223,167. This, it will be remembered, was while the coast was swarming with enemy's cruisers, and, virtually, without any neutral trade. The receipts from direct taxation and excise, in 1813, 1814, and 1815, amounted to \$14,226,971; total, from both

sources of the revenue, \$39,452,138; or a yearly average of \$13,150,712. This latter sum, doubled, would give us the revenue to be derived from twice the population, supposing us to be placed under precisely similar circumstances. The amount would be \$26,301,424, per annum.

But the circumstances, even in a French war, would not be at all similar to those of the last war. Neutral rights would be respected; our fleets, sweeping the coast, would put blockades out of the question; and the consumption of the country is rather quadrupled than doubled. A French war would not essentially diminish the receipts of the custom houses. The principal commercial loss would be in the carrying trade, after allowing for the *coups de main* of the enemy's privateers.

The sum of \$26,000,000, would leave a clear revenue of more than \$20,000,000, to be applied to military objects. This country pays no subsidies, supports no sinecurists, lavishes nothing on useless luxury. After a small sum for civil purposes is supplied, every dollar that is raised can be turned against her enemies! There is scarcely a doubt, that, by internal taxation and war duties, the current revenue to be applied to military and naval objects, might readily be raised to more than \$40,000,000.

I shall next make some probable estimates of the cost of our fleet. The pay of the petty officers would amount to \$648,000 per annum. That of 18,875 seamen, to \$2,718,000. That of the same number of ordinaries, to \$2,265,000. That of the landsmen, to \$960,000. That of the marines, to about \$500,000, officers included; and that of the boys, to \$300,000. Total, \$7,391,000. This sum shall be raised to \$9,000,000, to meet the pay and allowances of the officers. The rations of 62,500 men, at war prices, and with war contingencies, or at twenty cents a ration, would cost \$4,562,500 per annum. This is probably a high calculation; but I am not making estimates for an appropriation; but to convince the reader of the power of the country, and I wish to defeat cavilling, by the liberality of all my allowances. The pay and subsistence, then, of the navy, would amount to \$13,562,000, or, reducing it to round numbers, to \$14,000,000.

An allowance must now be made for naval stores, repairs, and reconstructions, under the casualties of war. There must, of necessity, be a good deal of vagueness in forming an opinion as to the latter contingencies; but, keeping in view a studied liberality, I hope to anticipate objections. Admitting that the cost of the whole marine would amount to \$30,000,000, twenty-five per cent. per annum would, I trust, cover the cost of stores, repairs, and reconstructions. Add, then, these \$7,500,000 to the \$14,000,000, and a total of \$21,500,000 is obtained. If we say of \$22,000,000, we shall not surpass the net revenue, after deducting all civil expenses that would accrue, on premises *taken from the facts of the last war*, disastrous and improvident as that war is known to have been.

My data for the expenses of the army, are not so close, or exact. I am assured, however, that all charges included, the army now costs annually about \$333 per man. This, it will be remembered, is with skeleton regiments, or with an undue proportion of officers, and a staff suitable for 20,000 men. But, taking this rule for our guide, an army of 30,000 men, quite enough, certainly, for a struggle with France with the coast covered by fifty sail of the line, would cost about \$10,000,000 per annum, exclusively of the ammunition expended in battle, and similar extra charges. This sum, if necessary, might be raised by loans; but the necessity could only come from a culpable neglect to impose duties at the commencement of the contest.

If a debt of \$50,000,000 should be contracted, after calculating all the extra charges that would follow a war, in the shape of half-pay and pensions, and the increased establishments of the country, it could, and probably would be paid off in the first five years of peace. A debt of \$50,000,000 would be in the proportion of three dollars twelve and a half cents a head, for a population of 16,000,000. The debt funded in 1790, was at the rate of more than eighteen dollars per head. That of 1816, was at the rate of fifteen dollars per head. The same proportion as the latter sum bore to the population, in 1816, would enable us to clear a debt of \$240,000,000, and, if the additional wealth of the nation be

computed, probably one of \$500,000,000, in the first fifteen years of peace.

To prove that these estimates are reasonable, I shall refer to farther facts. In 1802, Great Britain, with a population in the British Islands, about equal to what our own is to-day, employed, in her fleets and armies, 326,613 men; the rates of pay in her army and navy being about half what they are in our own. This country had more than 50,000 men actually in her army and navy, at the peace of 1815. I say the rate of pay being about half as high as our own, for it requires no reasoning to show, that men will most freely serve, where they are the best remunerated.

I pretend not to anticipate the result of the French question. My object is to show the power of America, not with any view to kindle a spirit of pride, but simply to satisfy opinion; or, I may be permitted to add, to draw it nearer to the facts of our situation, than it has been accustomed to stand. If a war become necessary, we should all wish to see that war conducted on a scale commensurate with the great resources of the country, on a scale suited to the dignity and objects of such a strife, and on a scale that may lead to some of those lasting and important results which should always be kept in view, in making "the last appeal of nations."

At another time, I shall endeavor to consider the manner in which the proposed force might advantageously be employed in a war with France. Should it be necessary, I shall endeavor to defend the positions I have taken, by further facts and more elaborate demonstrations, which a want of leisure compels me to omit in this hurried article. In particular, do I propose to lay before the public a plan for manning the navy, on which much reflection has been bestowed, and which I most firmly believe to be, not only practicable, but every way expedient. One other statement, only, remains to be mentioned here. In a fleet of fifty ships, ten would probably be always in dock, or undergoing repairs, on an average, during a service of four years. This would diminish all my current estimates of money and men, from twelve to twenty per cent.

J. F. C.

HINTS ON MANNING THE NAVY, ETC. ETC.

By a Citizen—An honorary member of the U. S. Naval Lyceum.

In my last communication, the question of manning the navy, was reserved for a separate number of the Naval Magazine. This point I now propose, briefly, to discuss, though I am still compelled to urge the want of sufficient time to do justice either to this publication, or to the subject.

As respects all labor, America is placed in a situation different from that of older and more populous countries. The demand for men exceeds the supply, and they who cannot obtain what they conceive to be a suitable remuneration for their services in one pursuit, seldom fail to seek it in another. It follows, that there is rarely a continued glut of seamen, in any one of our ports, as is sometimes the case in Europe; for, after the level has been restored, by the men separating and going to other parts of the country, should the demand not be increased, the foreigners go home, while our own people turn their attention to the land. This amphibious character is quite common to the American mariner, more particularly among the fishermen and whalers, and it should always be borne in mind, in estimating the resources of the country.

The occasional scarcity of mariners in this country, does not proceed from any indisposition to the sea, or to the want of native seamen, but to the suddenness and frequency of commercial changes, and to the circumstance that men are never obliged to throw themselves entirely on the liberality of employers. A steady demand is certain to obtain the required supply. Were foreigners excluded from our ships, this supply would soon be purely of home growth.

In such a state of things, it is idle to expect that the country can ever furnish the men necessary to a sudden armament, unless the government resort to continued and systemized means of raising mariners, or without as sudden

a check to the commercial navigation, which, by throwing men out of their ordinary employment, would place them, in a degree, at the disposal of the country. We have, then, the choice of knowingly injuring the ordinary navigation of trade, by stripping it of its men, each time there shall be occasion for a naval equipment larger than common, or of devising some expedient that shall provide for one branch of the common interests, without doing material injury to another. The wisest, and the most statesman-like means of effecting this great end, is by resorting to a system that shall create within itself an excess equal to the probable contingency, and which will also have the merit of gradually driving the foreign seamen from our ports. The latter *desideratum* can best be accomplished in connection with a plan for regularly manning the navy, for it will never do to tax a growing navigation, by insisting on the exclusion of foreigners, until native substitutes have been secured.

In this communication, I can do little more than give an outline of the plan I would propose. It is subject to an infinity of details, and it is to be expected that practice would suggest many improvements on all that the most ingenious theories might devise. The reader, moreover, will make the necessary allowance for the hurry with which this article has been prepared.

My project embraces a regular department for the enlisting and drilling of men. By department, however, I do not absolutely mean any bureau in the civil branch of the service, (although there might be an advantage in such an arrangement,) but simply, that a military separation should be effected between those who will control this interest, and those who shall be employed in the more ordinary duties of the navy.

Let, then, a captain of proper experience, temper, and habits of discipline, be ordered to assume the command of the recruiting and drill service. A requisite number of commanders, lieutenants, masters, passed midshipmen, and midshipmen, should be put under his orders. To these it would be necessary to add a liberal allowance of other warrant, and of petty officers. Particular care should be had in the selection

of these officers, and it might be well to tempt, by liberal wages and ample appointments, decayed ship masters, or mates, men of professional skill and suitable characters, to enter for this particular branch of duty.

A port should then be selected for a place of general rendezvous. There are some important considerations which would point out Newport, as the most eligible station for such a service; others, however, would induce one to give a preference to New-York. After a careful revision of the advantages and disadvantages of both, I lean to the opinion, that the objects of the system would be most advanced, by keeping the men in a port where the active operations of seamen would be constantly before their eyes.

When these preliminaries were arranged, and the party of officers and petty officers was properly organized, selected agents should be sent into the *interior* to enlist. These enlistments might be made for three, four, or five years, in addition to the six months of drill, according to the wants of the moment. The pay should be equal to that of the army, in addition to a necessary amount of clothing; care being had to make the latter neat, but strictly professional. Young men, except in emergencies, should always be preferred. It is believed that there could be no great difficulty in collecting, in this manner, any desirable amount of physical force. The love of enterprise and of novelty, a longing for the sea, and the other well known impulses which stimulate the young and ardent, would at all times put at the disposal of the government thousands, and, if required, tens of thousands, of the active population of the country. The navy would be preferred to the army, as offering a wider field to enterprise, and furnishing greater novelty, and we know that large armies have been raised by very inefficient means, from a population of not more than half the amount of that of the present day.

The extent of these enlistments would be regulated by the wants of the service. It might be well to commence with some four or five thousand men, to which one or two thousand should be added annually, to meet the vacancies created by the periodical discharges.

As fast as enlisted, the men should be transferred to local stations; and thence, in bodies, to the general station; where previous provision would have been made for their reception. As a matter of course, the extent of these provisions would be regulated by the extent of the experiment. A ship, or ships, according to circumstances, should be placed under the order of the captain commanding this branch of service. It would be better, if there could also be a station on shore, connected with the vessels. Either of the small islands of the port of New-York, would be well suited to such an object; the constant communication between the vessels and the land, by means of boats, forming a useful part of the drill.

On the arrival of a party of recruits, instead of being turned over to the officers of a cruising vessel, to run the chances of the service, they should be put into the hands of those whose sole business it was to *prepare them to be of use*. No class of men have hitherto been so little treated like reasoning beings, as sailors. Their peculiar knowledge is to be taught by imparted instruction, as well as any other, and yet, nineteen in twenty are left to acquire it, by long and laborious struggles in active life, by awkward imitation, and by such information as can be gleaned from a mate or a shipmaster, in his moments of condescension or good nature. A man may certainly teach himself mathematics, taking sufficient time and using severe application; but we all know that he can be taught by another with greater ease to himself, and much more expeditiously. Any adult could be taught the combinations of letters, and the nature and uses of words and syllables, in six months, and are we to believe the same man cannot be taught, in the same time, the combinations and uses of the ropes of a ship, to such a degree, that, under proper direction, he might make a prompt and intelligent use of them? I have seen men who have been a twelvemonth, or even longer, in a ship, without knowing how to make a *flat-knot*, and yet a man of average intellect can be *taught* to make a *flat-knot*, and to understand its advantages over a *granny*, in such a way as never to forget it, in half a dozen lessons of five minutes each. By seeing a

hundred others around him constantly employed in learning the same things, by periodical examinations and periodical practice, one month would enable the recruit to make every knot and splice in use on board a ship. Soldiers undergo a previous drill, as a matter of course; mechanics have their regular instruction; all handicraft arts and sciences are taught, but the knowledge of a sailor, in this country in particular, is left to be matter of fortuitous acquisition.

To give a summary of my system:—I would put the two ends of a rope into the hands of the recruit; it would show him that by bringing these ends through the bights so as to leave them next the *standing parts*, a knot is made that will neither *draw* nor *jam*; and I would show him the advantages of such a knot over one that will *draw*, or *jam*. From a *flat knot*, I would proceed to a *bowline*; to *half-hitches*; *timber-hitches*; *clove-hitches*; up to the most complicated uses of a rope, according to the dexterity and aptitude of the individual. *All* should be taught the commoner duties; *the willing and clever* should be classed, and pushed beyond them.

To particularize, in another branch of duty. I would rig a yard on land, at a reasonable height from the ground, and so near a stage that the officers could walk conveniently in front of it. Here the several acts of furling and reefing should be first performed, in such a way that *instruction* and *explanation* might go hand and hand, with *exercise*. One reef taken in this way, deliberately and with kind instruction, would teach a recruit more than twenty taken aloft, with an effort to see how soon the sail could be shortened. First learn to do well, intelligently, and thoroughly; and then learn to do expeditiously.

In short, the whole system is based on the following undeniable truths: viz. that man is a reasoning animal; that a sailor is a man; that he can acquire sooner and better, by kindness and care, and imparted instruction, than by the severity, (necessary severity if you will,) imitation and *divided duties* of a cruising ship; that six months of steady instruction would teach a *raw-hand* more than he would learn in any other way, in years; that the Lancastrian method of in-

struction can be applied to this art, as well as to the art of reading, or even better, it being purely *practical* and *visible*; that the best men often get disgusted with the sea merely on account of their ignorance, the contempt that awaits ignorance among seamen, and the necessity that duty at sea should be chiefly done by those who already understand it; that raw-hands do not learn at sea, because they hesitate about acknowledging their inferiority; that the duty of an ordinary seaman, on board a man of war, cannot only be learned, but *well learned*, in the course of six months' careful and intelligent instruction, while it is rarely learned in three years in a cruising vessel, and that the man, who goes on board the latter, prepared by a previous drill, which has been conducted kindly and with the sole desire to teach, will steadily advance in knowledge by practice, and will, in fact, *commence his cruise a better seaman, than the landsman, under the present arrangement, usually ends it.*

It may admit of question, whether the ordinary rendezvous for the seamen, ought, or ought not, to be connected with an experiment like this. My own opinion is in favor of the union of the two under one head, or, at least, of keeping a proportion of the seamen with the landsmen, until their services should be required at sea. They might be used as subordinate instructors, in the intervals. It may suit the prejudices of some to deride the idea of converting a tar into an instructor, but this objection is of a piece with all those that proceed from bigoted and unreflecting professional habits, and is not entitled to much respect. Greater obstacles than this, have been overcome by authority and example. Thirty years since the sea officer who manifested a taste for the arts that this magazine is established to promote, would have been the subject of ridicule. No class of men have undergone greater modifications of character within my time, than seamen, whether their lot be cast on the quarter-deck, or on the fore-castle, and yet ships were never better handled, or better taken care of, no battles better fought than they are to-day. The old Trunions of the eighteenth century, would be several glasses in disposing of a sloop or a small frigate, a job that the men of our time usually get through with, in thirty or forty minutes. God has created

man with a portion of his own high intelligence, and there can be no more certain sign of delusion, or of mistaken prejudice, than to discard the use of a right reason, in controlling any one of the ordinary affairs of life. Treat a sailor as a reasoning animal, and he will cultivate the faculty; treat him as one without thought, and he readily degenerates into brutality and ignorance. The ancient unfavorable character of seamen, was the result of their treatment, and their treatment the result of that want of sympathy which grew out of the transient relations of merchant vessels, in which most mariners learn their trade and form their characters.

It has been said, in the last number of this publication, that large ships require a less proportion of seamen than small. Most of the men drilled in the manner just described, at the end of six months, would be fit to rate as ordinaries, and a fair portion of them would soon be qualified to rate as seamen. A few, no doubt, would become petty officers before their terms of enlistment had expired. Such a system, however, ought to be supported by the commanders of cruising vessels, who should be instructed to advance all whose conduct and improvement would justify the measure. The apprentice system would prove less efficacious, because it could not well be conducted on a sufficient scale to meet the current wants of the service, no ship-master being willing to take a greater physical force than he has need of. Boys, however, might be enlisted for a longer period, say seven years, and the government might engage to give them additional advantages and a higher class of instruction.

It would be a great addition to the utility of such a scheme, were a frigate or two attached to the station, with orders to cruise on the coast during the fine season. As there would always be in readiness many supernumeraries, in time of peace, these vessels would be reasonably efficient, even with such crews, and might act as part of a home squadron. The men would always form a corps to throw into the forts on an emergency, and, as they would also be exercised with small arms, they might be brought to act on the coast, in the event of a rising of the slaves, or even on still graver occasions. As their times expired, they would either re-enter the service as seamen, or join the mercantile marine,

for no man could, or rather would enlist twice as a landsman. In this manner the wants of the navy and of commerce might be supplied, a thing not to be expected, in the present state of the country, without recourse being had to some such artificial means.

The truth of the principle rests on the fact, that the supply of men in a nation situated like our own, will never naturally exceed the demand, and this system is intended to create a demand in a form that shall act as both cause and effect.

Much might be added to enforce the usefulness of the experiment, but at present, little more than the general suggestion can be given. Before closing this article, however, I ask leave to extend it to another subject, which is also of great interest to the navy, and more particularly so, just at this moment. I allude to the gradations of rank among the officers, which are in danger of being so confounded, as to impair the discipline of the service, and without discipline, all other expedients to create a marine will be rendered of no avail.

It is much easier to prove that our imitation of England is natural, than to prove that it has always been wise. As respects the navy, high political considerations have compelled us to reject some of the strongest incentives to meet hardships and danger, which are used in that country; a mistaken and ill-judging prejudice has curtailed our rewards on other points, and, always adhering to imitation as far as we have gone, we have been left with only a miserable remnant of the English system. The consequence has been that, in this country, men are required to devote their lives, their time, and their hopes, to the service, with fewer inducements than are held out in any other maritime nation. How far this nakedness of self-devotion is just, it is not my intention to inquire; but I feel certain that nothing would be easier than to show it is neither far-sighted nor politic. There is no man, at all likely to do credit to a service, who would not prefer its honors to its pecuniary rewards. Money is a treacherous motive to keep before the eyes of a military man, for, however necessary to his wants, when it gets to be the sole incentive, it deadens his sense of honor, paralyzes his chivalry, and reduces him to

the level of those vulgar feelings, which tempt men into calculations that do any thing but point the way to personal sacrifices and glory. Money should be given, and given freely, as a minister to the necessities of life, and to discharge the obligation due from him who is protected to him who protects; but evil be the hour, when the naval Captain shall live only for his pay!

In England, the naval officer has constantly before his eyes the incentives of social rank, in the various degrees of knighthood, with many minor means of distinction that have been devised to quicken his exertions, holding before him the peerage, with its lasting power and hereditary consequence, as the highest goal of his ambition. Most of these inducements belong to the class which, from high political considerations, have been very properly rejected here. But the English officer has, in addition, many other and strictly professional objects to aim at, as the rewards of his toils and dangers. England has no less than nine distinct gradations of rank among her admirals alone, besides three professional dignities, that are reserved as rewards for success and long services; all of which are so many inducements unknown to this country. The American naval officer, until quite lately, had but three of those enviable epochs, which are dependent on promotion, to cheer the self-denying services of an entire life. From a midshipman, he became a lieutenant; from a lieutenant, a commander; from a commander, a captain; when that star, which true policy tells us should always shine before those from whom we expect severe sacrifices, set for ever! Limited as were these inducements, and injurious to discipline, as the system necessarily became, by crowding the whole list into four grades of rank, it had not (nor has it now) the redeeming merit of placing him who had gone through the long probation, on a level with men that, in other services, commenced life with himself; men, too, perhaps, whom he had bravely and skilfully overcome, in fighting the battles of his country. It may yet be the hard fortune of *Captain Hull* to fall in with *Admiral Dacres*, on service.

It is not an easy matter to impress on one in civil life the importance that ought to be attached to gradations of military rank. The respect that is paid to a commission is the

basis of all authority, and, although a difference in number, or of date, confers command, every one, in the least acquainted with service, knows how to appreciate the additional deference and weight, that is given to authority, by positive rank.

Nor is this all. In this country, the departments find it no easy matter to enforce discipline at all, for not an officer is cashiered, that strong political influence is not brought to bear on his restoration, or an officer passed in promotion, that a party is not made to "see him righted," as it is termed, although he may be even unfit to retain the commission that he actually holds. When promotion occurs but twice or three times in a life, the event is of sufficient importance to induce even the indolent and the incompetent to make a rally to recover the ground that has been lost, while the rarity of the occasions, and the importance of the crisis, tempt their commiserating friends to lend them all their aid. This is an evil that can be greatly lessened, if not absolutely cured, by increasing the number of grades in the service, and by diminishing the motives for an interference that is too often unreflecting, and, quite frequently, as injurious as it is indiscreet.

Within the last ten years the youth has been put on board ship, on trial, receiving a warrant at the end of a few months. The probation is not long enough, nor is there sufficient reason for issuing the warrant so soon. He who conducts himself properly, is just as certain to receive it, as, at a later day, he will be to receive his commission. The first six years of a young man's service usually form his character, and it is all important that he should be constantly kept under the checks and stimulants of preferment. With a view to the general effect on the whole service, therefore, and with due deference to those who are charged with its interests, I beg leave to suggest the following plan.

Let the youth, on entering the service, be rated as a Midshipman, by letter of appointment, as at present. At the end of two years, on *testimonials of character*, let him receive his warrant as a Midshipman. At the end of two more years, on like testimonials, let him receive a warrant as

a Master's Mate, with a slight increase of pay; the Master's Mate to rank all the warrant officers forward. At the end of two more years, or of six in the service, all of which should be counted as attached afloat, let him be examined, and receive a warrant as a Passed Master's Mate. The duties of a mere Midshipman, and those of a Master's Mate, are so very distinct, that I think the change of name called for, and the latter more suitable to the pride of a young seaman.

A question may now arise, whether it would be best to have three classes of Lieutenants, or two. I would propose three, of which one should fill a rank between the present Lieutenant and the Master; one should be of the present rank; and one of a rank between the present Lieutenant and the Commander. They might be entitled First Lieutenants, or Lieutenants Commandant; Lieutenants; and Signal, or Junior Lieutenants. I prefer Signal Lieutenant, because it is a nautical term, and one already familiar to the service. The Commander and Captain would follow. It would be an improvement were the rank of Post Captain to be added. The grades (excluding those of Commodore and Master) would then stand as follows:—

1. Acting Midshipman.
2. Midshipman.
3. Master's Mate.
4. Passed Master's Mate.
5. Signal Lieutenant.
6. Lieutenant.
7. First Lieutenant, or Lieutenant Commandant.
8. Commander.
9. Captain.
10. Post Captain.
11. Rear Admiral.
12. Vice Admiral.
13. Admiral.

Excluding the Flag Officers, whose numbers and ranks must be increased with the increasing wants of the service, or the service will never attain the dignity it deserves or extensive usefulness, there would be eight distinct preferments between

the novice and the captain, instead of the five that now exist. The present Capt. Page, who is just promoted, entered the service on the 17th December, 1810. During twenty-five years he has been twice promoted. Capt. Stevens, who is just made a Captain, entered the service the 8th February, 1804. His luck is a little better, the war having given him a lift. He has been three times promoted in twenty-eight years. Perhaps thirty years may be taken as a fair average for the time passed, and to be passed, between the grades, counting from that of a Midshipman to that of a Captain. The introduction of Acting Midshipmen and Passed Midshipmen, has increased the intermediate steps to five. Were the time equally divided, this would give six years in each rank; but two of these steps occur in the first six years, leaving intervals of eight years between those which succeed. Under the proposed change, the average periods between the promotions would be less than four years, and more equally divided between them all than at present. Captain Breese, who is just promoted, has been nineteen years a lieutenant! Under the proposed system, he would have been three times promoted to reach his present rank, instead of once, as has really been his hard fortune. Any one can appreciate the effect on the hopes, character, and ambition of the officer, by cheering his progress through life, with these occasional rays of sunshine. But this is not all; *each promotion is an ordeal of character*, and those temporary reformatations and impulses which we now see, as men draw near to the head of their list, by being more frequent, would become more permanent; the department would hesitate less about rigidly doing its duty; and friends would be more apt to refer the failing applicant to the succeeding year, and to a change of conduct, as the wisest and most speedy means of recovering his lost ground.

Officers of different grades rarely quarrel seriously, and when they do, courts usually decide between them. The tone of discipline would be higher, when enforced by distinct rank, and a life and a zest would be given to the service of which it now stands greatly in need. The Passed Midshipman who shall be promoted this winter, will have to look forward some fifteen or twenty years, before he can expect farther

advancement, but, justice being first done to those who have already endured the long probation, by raising them to the ranks they have fairly earned, how different would be the situation of the young Signal Lieutenant who had just received his commission! In three or four years he might expect another.

The rank of Commodore, as an acting or brevet rank, is particularly useful. It gives the department the privilege of selecting its agents, for critical duty, a privilege that is indispensable to a proper administration of the service. It might, perhaps, be well to commission two or three Commodores, merely to establish the rank, but it is a grade that ought to be dealt tenderly with. In all cases Captains, or Post Captains acting in command of squadrons, should be rigidly made to drop the title on lowering their broad pendants. It is, and ought to be, a *brevet* rank, suited to emergencies. The title should never be permitted to be used at all, nor any other than a distinguishing pendant hoisted, except under orders from the department. These distinctions, which may appear subtle and over-nice to landsmen, are useful to discipline, powerful incentives to exertion, and indispensable to dignity.

The officer has his regular, and his accidental or contingent duties. Of the first, the Acting Midshipman, and Midshipman, would perform the boat service and other ordinary duties of the rank; the Master's Mate, the boat duty of his proper station, his watch, hold, and birth-deck duties, as to-day; the Passed Mate, a grade that would be much less numerous than it now is, promotions being more frequent, would have the holds and spirit-rooms in large ships, would act as Masters and Assistant-Masters, and generally would do the duty of the present Passed Midshipmen. The Signal, or Junior Lieutenants, would act as signal officers in large ships, second officers of watches on board two-decked ships and frigates, and as Lieutenants in smaller vessels. The Lieutenants would act as Lieutenants of the watches in large vessels, and as first Lieutenants in sloops, brigs, and schooners. The Lieuts. Commandant, as first Lieutenants in ships of the line and frigates, as commanders of brigs and schooners, and as first Lieutenants in yards, &c. The Commanders would have the sloops and their present

shore-duty. The Captains would take the frigates, except in particular cases, and the Post-Captains the ships of the line, the navy yards, and the squadrons that did not require a flag.

This may sound like innovation, and there is no doubt that it involves great changes in the present system. But the question we are to ask is, whether these changes will not be improvements. Experience will sustain me in much the greater part of what is here proposed. The probation of the midshipman is already established; but it has the fault of attempting a thing it does not accomplish. Less than two years is scarcely a probation at all, and the time the youth is without a warrant scarcely makes him look forward to its possession as preferment. Master Mates are known to the service, but their appointments lose all their value as promotion, and as professional ordeals, by their irregularity and inconstancy. One of the most essential benefits of the station is lost; that of incentive, through promotion. The duty of a Midshipman is proper for a lad; but the Master's Mate performs functions that require knowledge and reflection; his duty is proper for a man. The Passed Mate would merely be the present Passed Midshipman. The Signal Lieutenant exists in fact, in a variety of forms; as in the duties of a signal officer, of which every vessel under the immediate orders of a flag must have one; as in the Lieutenants of fore-castles; and all other Lieutenants who have not watches of their own. The Lieutenants would be the Lieutenants of the present system; and the Lieutenants Commandants, or First Lieutenants, are practically known to the service already. This last is perhaps the change most called for, of all others. In the event of the Captain's death, or inability, the command would devolve on an officer superior in rank to those under his orders. The principal benefit to be obtained by making two classes of Captains would be in increasing the ordeals of character as men drew near to those high and responsible grades, on the proper performance of whose duties, efficiency of construction, discipline, national aptitude and other maritime qualities, must, after all, rely for opportunities and power to exhibit their excellence. A first-

rate commander would make more out of an indifferent fleet, than an indifferent commander would make out of a first-rate fleet. In this country, where large sinecure lists of officers, that will admit of selection, can scarcely be expected, it becomes of the last importance that improper or incompetent men should not be allowed to take post for their flags.

The navy can be made the most efficient means for maintaining the national rights, and the national character, that this people possesses; it can be made a means of defence that no other power would presume to despise, or, within our own waters, would presume to brave; it can easily, and it ought to be made to give us as absolute command of the North American ocean, as England ever had over her own narrow seas: it can be made to extend the protection of the flag of the republic to the remotest corner of the world, and, in the next fifty years, to render this Union, under Providence, capable of maintaining, in face of the whole earth, its own just and generous principles of civilized intercourse. But to effect these high ends we are not to sleep on our posts, or to lend our ears to the syren notes of universal peace and general philanthropy, which it is the fashion to sing, that others may be lulled into security, while those who practise the deception overlook no occasion to strengthen their own means of offence and defence, in readiness for the great war of opinions that the men of this generation will yet witness, convulsing Christendom to its centre.

I will sum up all in a word, by presenting the governing principle in each of the propositions that have been made: In a country in which the demand for men, unless recourse is had to extraordinary means, never can exceed the supply, it becomes the duty of government to produce this supply, by resorting to measures to create a demand, there being the absolute certainty, that, for a long time to come, one will be limited by the other. This is the whole case, so far as principle is concerned, in respect to the means of manning our ships. The policy of changing the ranks, is dependent on a principle equally clear. Gradations in rank are indispensable to discipline, and the very fact that all the quarter-deck sea-officers, including the midshipman and

the commodore, are now virtually crowded into the present narrow compass, ought to lead us to distrust the wisdom of the present arrangement. The proposed alterations add the strong incentives of progressive preferment, to the security that will be produced by sustaining authority and confirming discipline, by the introduction of new, and what are believed to be useful, grades.

In my former communication, it was assumed that there could not be much difficulty in obtaining the crews of fifty sail of the line, during a war that should throw seamen, to a certain degree, out of employment; but, in this article higher ground has been taken, as it ought to be an object of national policy to secure the defence of the country, without essentially injuring any of the more material branches of its industry. Should an expedient like the one proposed be adopted, it is thought a force might be put afloat that would enable the ordinary navigation to go on, by calling in the aid of such wandering seamen of other nations, as are ever ready to serve for a liberal pay. Such has always been the policy of England, in her wars, and such ought to be ours.

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